Application — San Mateo County, California, et al., Applicants v. Peabody Energy Corporation
Supreme Court briefJun 12, 2020
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No. _______
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
COUNTY OF SAN MATEO, ET AL.,
Applicants,
v.
PEABODY ENERGY COMPANY,
Respondent.
On Application for Recall and to Stay Mandate of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
APPLICATION FOR RECALL OF MANDATE
AND STAY PENDING PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
Directed to the Honorable Neil M. Gorsuch,
Associate Justice of the United States
And Circuit Justice for the Eighth Circuit
Matthew K. Edling
Counsel of Record
Victor M. Sher
Martin D. Quiñones
Sher Edling LLP
100 Montgomery St., Suite 1410
San Francisco, CA 94104
(628) 231-2500
matt@sheredling.com
vic@sheredling.com
marty@sheredling.com
Michael Rubin
Altshuler Berzon LLP
177 Post Street, Suite 300
San Francisco, CA 94108
(415) 421-7151
mrubin@altber.com
Counsel for County of San Mateo, City of Imperial Beach, and County of Marin
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................... 1
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ...................................................... 3
REASONS TO GRANT THE STAY .................................................................................... 6
A.
There Is at Least a Reasonable Probability that Certiorari Will be
Granted to Resolve the Split of Circuit Authority. ......................................... 11
B.
There Is Also a Reasonable Prospect that the Government Plaintiffs
Will Prevail on the Merits if Certiorari Is Granted. ....................................... 20
C.
The Government Plaintiffs Will Suffer Irreparable Harm if the
Mandate is Not Recalled Because Dismissing Their Claims in
California Could Moot Review of the Eighth Circuit’s Ruling. .................... 25
D.
The Equities Weigh in Government Plaintiffs’ Favor. ................................... 27
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................ 28
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Cty. of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp.,
___ F.3d ___, 2020 WL 2703701 (9th Cir. May 26, 2020) ................................... 4, 11
Cty. of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp.,
294 F. Supp. 3d 934 (N.D. Cal. 2018) ........................................................................ 4
Cty. of Santa Clara v. Atl. Richfield Co.,
137 Cal. App. 4th 292 (2006) ..................................................................................... 9
Cty. of Santa Clara v. Superior Court,
50 Cal. 4th 35 (2010) .............................................................................................. 3, 9
Honig v. Doe,
484 U.S. 305 (1988) .................................................................................................. 25
In re Advanced Min. Sys., Inc.,
173 B.R. 467 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994) ...................................................................... 26
In re Chateaugay Corp.,
944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991) .............................................................................. passim
In re Continental Airlines,
125 F.3d 120 (3d Cir. 1997)...................................................................................... 15
In re Country Squire Assocs. of Carle Place, L.P.,
203 B.R. 182 (B.A.P. 2d Cir. 1996) .......................................................................... 25
In re Irizarry,
171 B.R. 874 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994) ......................................................................... 14
In re Peabody Energy Corp.,
599 B.R. 610 (E.D. Mo. 2019) ..................................................................................... 5
In re Peabody Energy Corp., No. 16-42529,
2017 WL 4843724 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. Oct. 24, 2017) .................................................. 5
In re Peabody Energy Corp.,
958 F.3d 717 (8th Cir. 2020) ............................................................................ passim
iii
In re Torwico Elecs., Inc.,
8 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 1993).................................................................................. passim
Lucas v. Townsend,
486 U.S. 1301 (1988) ................................................................................................ 20
Matter of Davis,
3 F.3d 113 (5th Cir. 1993) .......................................................................... 2, 8, 13, 14
Ohio v. Kovacs,
469 U.S. 274 (1985) ................................................................................ 17, 18, 19, 24
Packard Elevator v. I.C.C.,
782 F.2d 112 (8th Cir. 1986) .................................................................................... 27
Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport,
495 U.S. 552 (1990) .................................................................................................. 24
People v. ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co.,
17 Cal. App. 5th 51 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017) ................................................... 3, 9, 10, 16
Preiser v. Newkirk,
422 U.S. 395 (1975) .................................................................................................. 25
Rostker v. Goldberg,
448 U.S. 1306 (1980) ................................................................................................ 21
United States v. Apex Oil Co.,
579 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 2009) ............................................................................ passim
United States v. Whizco, Inc.,
841 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1988) .................................................................................. 2, 7
Statutes
11 U.S.C. § 101 ..................................................................................................... passim
28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) ........................................................................................................ 4
42 U.S.C. § 6901 ........................................................................................................... 12
42 U.S.C. § 9601 ........................................................................................................... 15
iv
Cal. Civ. Code. § 3479 .................................................................................................... 3
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 473(b) ....................................................................................... 26
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 731.......................................................................................... 3, 9
Rules
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) ................................................................................................. 26
Other Authorities
H.R. Rep. No. 95-595 (1977) ........................................................................................ 24
v
TO THE HONORABLE NEIL M. GORSUCH, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE
UNITED STATES AND CIRCUIT JUSTICE FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT:
INTRODUCTION
In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
deepened the split of authority among the circuits on a fundamental question of
bankruptcy law that is likely to recur with increased frequency in the wake of
recent pandemic-related bankruptcies: under what circumstances is a cause of
action that provides for exclusively equitable relief a “claim” subject to discharge in
bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)?1 The Eighth Circuit held that even where, as
here, state law “limits the recovery on [a cause of action] to equitable relief,” that
cause of action is dischargeable if the debtor could end up “pay[ing] money” to
implement the required equitable relief, “without regard to who receives the
payment”—i.e., even if none of that money is or could be paid to the creditorplaintiff, as is the case here. In re Peabody Energy Corp., 958 F.3d 717, 724–25
(8th Cir. 2020) (Attached as Appendix A).
That holding conflicts with the law of at least four other circuits, each of
which has expressly held that causes of action providing exclusively equitable relief
are dischargeable under Section 101(5) only if “the holder of an equitable claim can,
Section 101 of the Bankruptcy Code defines a dischargeable “claim” as “a right to
payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated,
unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal,
equitable, secured, or unsecured,” or “a right to an equitable remedy for breach of
performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such
right to an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured,
unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured.” See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5).
1
1
in the event that the equitable remedy turns out to be unobtainable, obtain a money
judgment instead.” See United States v. Apex Oil Co., 579 F.3d 734, 736 (7th Cir.
2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 67 (2010); see also Matter of Davis, 3 F.3d 113, 116
(5th Cir. 1993) (Section 101(5) allows only discharge of “contingent claims for money
damages that are alternatives to equitable remedies”); In re Torwico Elecs., Inc., 8
F.3d 146, 150 (3d Cir. 1993) (same); In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 1008 (2d
Cir. 1991) (cause of action not dischargeable where plaintiff has “no option to accept
payment in lieu of” equitable relief). The only circuit to reach the same conclusion
as the Eighth Circuit is the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Whizco, Inc., 841 F.2d
147, 150 (6th Cir. 1988) (claim for mine cleanup injunction dischargeable where
defendant did “not have the physical capacity to reclaim the mine site himself, and
[thus] would have to hire others to perform the work for him”).
Applicants County of San Mateo, City of Imperial Beach, and County of
Marin (“Government Plaintiffs”), which are three California public entities that
filed nuisance abatement causes of action, among other things, against Respondent
Peabody Energy Company (“PEC”) and others, intend to petition for a writ of
certiorari to have this Court resolve this critical but disputed question of
bankruptcy law. If the Eighth Circuit’s mandate is not recalled and the order of the
bankruptcy court stayed, the Government Plaintiffs will be required by that order
to dismiss all claims against PEC in their underlying lawsuits (which are currently
stayed for unrelated reasons), thus potentially mooting the parties’ dispute and
causing the Government Plaintiffs irreparable harm.
2
For these reasons and as further detailed below, Government Plaintiffs
respectfully request that this Court recall the Eighth Circuit’s mandate in this
matter and stay its judgment pending this Court’s final determination of the issues
raised in the Government Plaintiffs’ upcoming petition for writ of certiorari.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Government Plaintiffs filed three separate complaints in California state
court against major investor-owned energy companies, including PEC, on July 17,
2017. Each lawsuit alleged eight state law causes of action, including a
representative public nuisance cause of action on behalf of the People of the State of
California for equitable abatement,2 and seven other claims for violations of other
California tort laws. Cty. of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., San Mateo Super. Ct., No.
17 CV-03222; City of Imperial Beach v. Chevron Corp., Contra Costa Super. Ct., No.
2 California’s Code of Civil Procedure provides a cause of action “in the name of the
people of the State of California to abate a public nuisance,” which may be brought
only by “the district attorney or county counsel of any county in which the nuisance
exists, or by the city attorney of any town or city in which the nuisance exists.” Cal.
Civ. Proc. Code § 731. Equitable abatement is the sole relief that section 731
authorizes government plaintiffs to recover in such representative public nuisance
actions. See People v. ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co., 17 Cal. App. 5th 51, 122 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2017); see also Cty. of Santa Clara v. Superior Court, 50 Cal.4th 35, 55–56
(2010). Money damages or other alternative monetary relief is never available. See
id. Under California law, a nuisance is “[a]nything which is injurious to health, . .
. or is indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of
property, . . . or unlawfully obstructs the free passage or use, in the customary
manner, of any navigable lake, or river, bay, stream, canal, or basin, or any public
park, square, street, or highway . . . .” Cal. Civ. Code § 3479. A public nuisance, in
turn, is “one which affects at the same time an entire community or neighborhood,
or any considerable number of persons . . . .” Id. § 2480.
3
C17-01227, App. 9461–9571; Cty. of Marin v. Chevron Corp., Marin Super. Ct., No.
CIV 17-02586.
The defendants in the California cases (including PEC) removed the
Government Plaintiffs’ lawsuits to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of California, where the cases were assigned to a single judge who subsequently
remanded all three for lack of federal subject-matter jurisdiction. See Cty. of San
Mateo v. Chevron Corp., 294 F. Supp. 3d 934 (N.D. Cal. 2018). The California
district court on April 9, 2018, stayed its remand order pending appeal. Cty. of San
Mateo v. Chevron Corp., No. 3:17-cv-04929-VC, Dkt. 240 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2018).
Defendants in the California lawsuits appealed the district court’s remand
order to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(d), which affirmed and ordered the cases remanded to the three state courts
in which they were filed. Cty. of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., ___ F.3d ___, 2020 WL
2703701 (9th Cir. May 26, 2020).
On April 13, 2016, before those California cases had been filed, PEC filed a
Petition for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in the Eastern District of Missouri.
See In re Peabody Energy Corp., No. 16-42529, Dkt. 1 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. Apr. 13,
2016). On March 17, 2017, the bankruptcy court entered an order confirming the
company’s proposed Plan of Reorganization. In re Peabody Energy Corp., No. 1642529, Dkt. 2763 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. Mar. 17, 2017). On April 3, 2017, the Plan went
into effect and the reorganized company emerged from bankruptcy. In re Peabody
Energy Corp., No. 16-42529, Dkt. 2867 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. Apr. 3, 2017).
4
On August 28, 2017, PEC filed a motion before the bankruptcy judge to
enjoin the Government Plaintiffs’ further prosecution of their California public
nuisance and related tort claims against PEC. In re Peabody Energy Corp., No. 1642529, Dkt. 3362 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. Aug. 28, 2017). The bankruptcy judge granted
that motion on October 24, 2017, and ordered the Government Plaintiffs to dismiss
the underlying actions in California against Peabody with prejudice. In re Peabody
Energy Corp., No. 16-42529, 2017 WL 4843724 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. Oct. 24, 2017). The
bankruptcy judge denied the Government Plaintiffs’ request for a stay of his order
on December 8, 2017. In re Peabody Energy Corp., No. 16-42529, Dkt. 3622 (Bankr.
E.D. Mo. Dec. 8, 2017).
The Government Plaintiffs timely appealed the bankruptcy court’s rulings to
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. On September 20, 2018,
the district court denied the Government Plaintiffs’ motion for stay pending appeal.
In re Peabody Energy Corp., No. 4:17-cv-02886-RWS, Dkt. 32 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 9,
2018). On March 29, 2019, the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s ruling
and entered judgment. In re Peabody Energy Corp., 599 B.R. 610 (E.D. Mo. 2019).
The Government Plaintiffs appealed from the district court’s denial of a stay
pending appeal and affirmance of the bankruptcy court’s injunction in separate
appeals. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings on May 6, 2020. In
re Peabody Energy Corp., 958 F.3d 717.
5
REASONS TO GRANT THE STAY
Each element that this Court considers on an application for a stay is
satisfied here. There is a reasonable probability that certiorari will be granted and
at least a fair prospect that this Court will reverse the Eighth Circuit; the
Government Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm if the mandate is not recalled
and if the bankruptcy court’s injunction order requiring dismissal with prejudice of
all claims against PEC is not stayed; and the equities and public interest weigh in
favor of a stay.
Section 101 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101(5), defines
a dischargeable “claim” as “(A) a right to payment, whether or not such right is
reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured,
unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured,” or “(B) a
right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a
right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is reduced to
judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or
unsecured.” The principal issue in this case is whether the Government Plaintiffs’
public nuisance claim against PEC for equitable abatement gives rise to a “right to
payment” within the meaning of that section.
Contrary to the conclusion reached by all but one other circuit to decide the
issue, and of potentially enormous concern to every public entity seeking
environmental clean-up or other equitable abatement remedies against any
company that has the option of declaring bankruptcy, the Eighth Circuit panel held
6
that because under California law a defendant that “commits a public nuisance can
be ordered to pay into a fund, overseen by a receiver, to remedy or eliminate the
hazard complained of rather than being ordered to clean up the nuisance [itself],”
the state law remedy of equitable abatement gives rise to a “right to payment”
within the meaning of Section 101(5), meaning that the representative public
nuisance cause of action is treated as a dischargeable “claim” in bankruptcy. In re
Peabody Energy Corp., 958 F.3d at 724; accord Whizco, 841 F.2d at 150–51 (cleanup
obligation under Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 dischargeable
where defendant lacked “physical capacity to reclaim the mine himself” and
“fulfilling his obligation to reclaim the site would force the defendant to spend
money”).
That holding conflicts with at least four other circuits’ interpretation and
application of 11 U.S.C. § 101(5), including most directly the Seventh Circuit in
Apex Oil, 579 F.3d 734, which held that the “right of payment” language in Section
101(5)(B) means payment to the plaintiff, because nearly every mandatory
injunction (and most prohibitory injunctions) require at least some expenditure of
money to implement. As the Seventh Circuit (Posner, J.) explained in that case,
“[a]lmost every equitable decree imposes a cost on the defendant,” and to expand
the “right to payment” beyond the right of the creditor to demand its own receipt of
payment from the estate in bankruptcy would mean “that every equitable claim is
dischargeable in bankruptcy unless there is [some other] specific exception in the
[Bankruptcy] Code.” Id. at 738 (emphasis added). That result would conflict with
7
Congress’s intent to carve out most equitable decrees from the definition of
dischargeable “claims.” See id. Because the California law under which the
Government Plaintiffs filed their underlying representative public nuisance cause of
action does not permit them to obtain a money judgment or to recover any payment
of money for themselves from PEC, directly or indirectly, this appeal would have
been decided differently under Seventh Circuit law.
Decisions from the Second, Third, and Fifth Circuits also hold that Congress
did not intend equitable decrees to come within the meaning of “right to payment”
under Section 101(5) unless they can be satisfied through an alternative payment to
the plaintiff. A cause of action giving rise only to equitable relief is not transformed
into a dischargeable claim simply because the defendant must spend money to
comply with its equitable obligations. See In re Torwico Elecs., Inc., 8 F.3d at 150;
Matter of Davis, 3 F.3d at 116; In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d at 1009.
The conflict between the Eighth and Sixth Circuits on the one hand, and the
Second, Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits on the other, concerning the
fundamentally important bankruptcy law question of whether and to what extent
equitable claims are dischargeable in bankruptcy, is direct and immediate. The
dispute is of heightened national importance now because of the substantial
increase in COVID-19-related bankruptcy filings that have already begun due to
stay-at-home orders and changes in the public’s habits, activities, and spending
patterns. The question presented plainly warrants certiorari review.
8
There is at least a fair prospect of reversal if certiorari is granted, because
under the appropriate standard articulated by the majority of circuits, the
Government Plaintiffs’ representative public nuisance causes of action are not
“claims.” Under California law, a public nuisance claim by a government plaintiff on
behalf of the People under California Code of Civil Procedure § 731 can be remedied
only by an equitable order of abatement, which is never convertible to a right of
payment to the plaintiff. “Damages are not an available remedy in the type of public
nuisance action [under § 731], a representative public nuisance action,” only
equitable abatement. ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co., 17 Cal. App. 5th at 122; see also
Cty. of Santa Clara v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 4th at 55–56; Cty. of Santa Clara v.
Atl. Richfield Co., 137 Cal. App. 4th 292, 310–11 (2006).
California courts have recognized that an equitable abatement order in a
representative public nuisance case may include “establishment of a fund, in the
name of the People, dedicated to abating the public nuisance,” paid into by the
defendant and administered by an independent, court-appointed receiver. ConAgra
Grocery Prods. Co., 17 Cal. App. 5th at 131–32. In such instances, because damages
at law are unavailable, the abatement fund may only be used for future abatement.
The public entity plaintiff “may not recover . . . funds that it has already expended
to remediate a public nuisance,” id. at 132, the fund may be used “solely to pay for
the prospective removal of the hazards” created by the nuisance, and “any funds
that ha[ve] not been utilized for that sole purpose by the end of the . . . abatement
period [a]re to be returned to [the] defendants,” id. at 133. While California trial
9
courts can always choose “to have defendants handle the remediation themselves”
as an abatement remedy, they also have discretion to “require[e] defendants to
prefund remediation costs” at an estimated value where direct abatement by the
defendant “would have been difficult for the court to oversee and for defendants to
undertake.” Id. at 133–34. The establishment of an abatement fund, however,
“plainly d[oes] not require, contemplate, or permit the deposit of those funds” into
the plaintiff’s possession. Id. at 134. Because there is no possibility under California
law that the Government Plaintiffs here could obtain any portion of an abatement
fund, the representative public nuisance claims are not “claims” within the proper
interpretation of Section 101(5), and the Eighth Circuit’s decision should be
reversed.
The Government Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm without a stay.
Absent recall of the mandate and a stay, Government Plaintiffs will be forced to
dismiss their California representative public nuisance claims against PEC, with
prejudice. Once those California cases are dismissed with prejudice as to PEC, any
certiorari petition from Government Plaintiffs would arguably become moot,
depriving the Government Plaintiffs of their right to seek certiorari review and
depriving them of their substantive rights under California’s representative public
nuisance law. Mooting the Government Plaintiffs’ right to pursue certiorari relief
constitutes irreparable harm.
Finally, the equities and public interest weigh in favor of a stay. A recall of
the mandate and stay would cause no countervailing harm to PEC, because all
10
proceedings in the California court actions have been stayed for more than two
years pending appeal to the Ninth Circuit of the district court’s order remanding
those consolidated case to the various state courts in which they were filed. On May
26, 2020, the Ninth Circuit affirmed that remand order, see Cty. of San Mateo v.
Chevron Corp., 2020 WL 2703701, and the defendants, including PEC, have been
granted an extension of time to file a petition for rehearing and/or rehearing en
banc until July 9, 2020. See Order Granting Motion for Extension of Time to File,
Cty. of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., No. 18-15499, Dkt. 204 (9th Cir. June 8, 2020).
A.
There Is at Least a Reasonable Probability that Certiorari Will
be Granted to Resolve the Split of Circuit Authority.
There is at least a reasonable probability that the Court will grant certiorari
review in this case. The Eighth Circuit’s decision conflicts with the reasoning and
holdings of at least four other circuit courts addressing the same question, namely
whether equitable remedies that a defendant can only satisfy by paying money to a
third party are dischargeable in bankruptcy. Whether such remedies are
dischargeable is of major national importance with implications for federal, state,
and local agencies and officials across many areas of substantive law.
The Eighth Circuit’s ruling makes the existing circuit split even deeper, and
review by this Court is needed to resolve that split. By holding that an order under
California’s representative nuisance statute that could require PEC to accomplish
equitable abatement by funding an independent receiver to implement the
abatement subject to judicial oversight constitutes an “equitable remedy that ‘gives
rise to a right to payment’” and is therefore a dischargeable “claim” under 11 U.S.C.
11
§ 101(5), see In re Peabody Energy Corp., 958 F.3d at 724, the Eighth Circuit created
a direct conflict with long-standing reasoning and holdings of at least the Second,
Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits on an important question of bankruptcy law.
First, the Court’s opinion conflicts with the most recent and most closely on
point decision in Apex Oil, 579 F.3d 734. In that case, the Seventh Circuit held that
an injunction under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6901 et seq. (“RCRA”), requiring a bankrupt defendant to “abate th[e] nuisance” of
certain hazardous waste was not dischargeable, even though the defendant had “no
in-house capability of cleaning up a contaminated site” and would necessarily have
to pay a third-party contractor an estimated $150 million to comply with the
injunction. As Judge Posner wrote for the unanimous panel: “The natural reading of
[11 U.S.C. § 101(5)] is that if the holder of an equitable claim can, in the event that
the equitable remedy turns out to be unobtainable, obtain a money judgment
instead, the claim is dischargeable.” Apex Oil, 579 F.3d at 736. Because RCRA “does
not entitle a plaintiff to demand, in lieu of action by the defendant that may include
the hiring of another firm to perform a clean up ordered by the court, payment of
clean-up costs,” nor indeed “any form of monetary relief,” the injunction ordering
the defendant to abate the nuisance did not give rise to a right to payment. Id.
The Seventh Circuit in Apex Oil rejected the defendant’s proposed “arbitrary”
distinction “between injunctions that the defendant can comply with internally and
injunctions that it has to hire an independent contractor in order to achieve
compliance with,” because “whether a polluter can clean up his pollution himself or
12
has to hire someone to do it has no relevance to the policy of either the Bankruptcy
Code or [RCRA].” Id. at 738. Such a distinction “would discourage polluters from
developing an internal capability of cleaning up their pollution, even if hiring third
parties to do it would be more expensive,” and would not advance the purposes of
either RCRA or the bankruptcy code. Id. Posed simply: “Why distinguish a check
written to an employee from a check written to an independent contractor?” Id.
The Eighth Circuit’s decision here also conflicts with the Fifth Circuit’s
opinion in Matter of Davis, 3 F.3d 113. There, the plaintiff obtained a fraud
judgment in Texas state court against his business partner, who “then took refuge
in bankruptcy.” Id. at 114. In the fraud proceeding, the Texas court ordered several
forms of relief, including “the equitable remedies of resulting trust, partition in kind
[of real property owned jointly by the plaintiff and defendant], deed reformation,
appointment of a receiver, and dissolution of a partnership” between the plaintiff
and defendant. Id. at 116. The defendant debtor argued that “since failure to
perform his obligations under any of the equitable remedies would justify an award
of money damages,” the remedies were all dischargeable under Section 101(5). The
Fifth Circuit concluded, based on an analysis that was similar to the Seventh
Circuit’s reasoning in Apex Oil, that “Section 101(5)(B) is designed to cause the
liquidation of contingent claims for money damages that are alternatives to
equitable remedies,” and that “[t]he ability of a debtor to choose between
performance and damages in some cases is not the same as a debtor’s liability for
money damages for failing to satisfy an equitable obligation.” Id. at 116 (emphasis
13
added). The court held that Texas law “does not view the payment of money as an
alternative” to the remedies of a resulting trust or deed reformation. Id. at 117. The
court also held that while Texas does permit forced sale of real property as division
of the proceeds as an alternative to partition in kind, “it is not a preferred remedy”
and was unavailable on the facts of the case. Id. Importantly, the court found that
the dissolution of the parties’ real estate partnership and appointment of a receiver
“to conserve the assets” of the partnership was dischargeable—the parties did not
contest the dischargeability of those remedies—because the purpose of that relief
was to preserve money proceeds that would be transferred directly to the plaintiff,
equivalent to damages. See id.; see also In re Irizarry, 171 B.R. 874, 879 (B.A.P. 9th
Cir. 1994) (equitable remedy of deed reformation was not a “claim” where plaintiffs
did not “have a money damage alternative in the event of non-performance,” and
“d[id] not seek to recover the value of the property, but only the property itself”).
The Third Circuit has long applied the same reasoning as the Seventh and
Fifth Circuits. In In re Torwico Elecs., Inc., 8 F.3d at 150, the Third Circuit held
that an order to abate “an ongoing nuisance in direct violation of state
environmental laws” was not a dischargeable claim, “even if the debtor must expend
money to comply.” There, the debtor had been ordered prepetition by the New
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection and Energy to abate hazardous
waste it had released at a manufacturing facility. Id. at 147. The defendant argued
that it would have to spend money to remediate the pollution, in part because it was
no longer in possession of the facility, and thus the remedy was a dischargeable
14
claim. Id. at 149. The court disagreed, holding that the state agency “d[id] not seek
a monetary judgment, but rather seeks to remedy ongoing pollution by forcing [the
debtor] to clean up the site.” Id. Significantly, the court observed that if it “adopt[ed]
the . . . position that any order requiring the debtor to expend money creates a
dischargeable claim, it is unlikely that the state could effectively enforce its laws:
virtually all enforcement actions impose some cost to the violator.” Id. at 150 n.4.
Because the agency could not “force the debtor to pay money to the state,” its
nuisance abatement action did not create a dischargeable claim. Id. at 150
(emphasis added).3
The Second Circuit reached the same conclusion in the context of a cleanup
order under the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. (“CERCLA”). In In re Chateaugay Corp.,
944 F.2d at 1009, the court held that while EPA could not recover costs to clean up
environmental contamination that it had already incurred because, “[t]o the extent
that CERCLA affords EPA and others a right to payment in lieu of an order directed
solely at cleanup, . . . such an order is a ‘claim.’” The court also held, however, that
3 In In re Continental Airlines, 125 F.3d 120 (3d Cir. 1997), by contrast, an airline
pilots union sought specific performance of certain “seniority integration” provisions
in its prepetition collective bargaining agreement with a bankrupt airline. The court
held that while the collective bargaining agreement was silent on the remedy
available for breach of the seniority integration terms, it was “reasonable to
conclude that a corollary right to payment of liquidated damages would flow from a
breach giving rise to the equitable remedy” of specific performance. Id. at 134
(citation omitted). Because “monetary payment [wa]s an alternative for the
equitable remedy of seniority integration,” id. at 133 (emphasis added), the cause of
action for breach of that contractual obligation was a dischargeable claim.
15
an order to clean up the site to prevent future contamination was not a
dischargeable claim because under the substantive law of CERCLA, EPA did not
have “authority to accept a payment from a responsible party as an alternative to
continued pollution.” Id. at 1008. The Second Circuit thus concluded: “Since there is
no option [for EPA under CERCLA] to accept payment in lieu of continued pollution,
any order that to any extent ends or ameliorates continued pollution is not an order
for breach of an obligation that gives rise to a right of payment and is for that
reason not a ‘claim,’” notwithstanding the practical reality that the debtor would
have to spend money to comply with such an order. Id.
The Eighth Circuit held below—incorrectly, Government Plaintiffs contend—
that an order pursuant to California law requiring abatement but permitting the
trial court, in its discretion, to allow the defendant to pay into an abatement fund
managed by an independent third-party receiver who would be required to return
any unused abatement funds to that defendant (and not to the plaintiff)4 would
constitute “an equitable remedy . . . convertible into a monetary obligation” and
thus constitute a dischargeable claim. In re Peabody Energy Corp., 958 F.3d at 724.
The Court held that the available remedy is a dischargeable claim “without regard
to who receives the payment,” in part because “it is the municipalities and their
people who stand to benefit from” the abatement order. Id. But as the Seventh
Circuit pointed out, the prevailing plaintiffs in an action for equitable relief always
4 See People v. ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co., 17 Cal. App. 5th at 131–34 (affirming
order creating abatement fund in lead paint nuisance case).
16
stand to benefit from the defendant’s compliance with the court-order injunction.
After all, “[i]f ‘any order requiring the debtor to expend money creates a
dischargeable claim, it is unlikely that the state could effectively enforce its laws:
virtually all enforcement actions impose some cost on the violator.’” Apex Oil, 579
F.3d at 737 (quoting In re Torwico Elecs., Inc., 8 F.3d at 150 n.4.). And as the
Second, Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits agree, the purpose and effect of Section
105 is to discharge payments of money to the plaintiff that serve as an alternative to
equitable relief.
The Eighth Circuit based its holding in part on a misreading of this Court’s
1985 decision in Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985), which held that the State of
Ohio had a dischargeable claim against a debtor where a receiver was appointed to
“take possession of all of [the debtor’s] assets” to implement an injunctive order to
clean up an environmental nuisance. Id. at 282–83. Kovacs, however, is fully
consistent with the holdings of the Second, Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits. In
Kovacs, a cleanup injunction had been entered prior to the debtor’s bankruptcy, and
when the debtor “failed to comply with their obligations under the injunction,” the
state court ordered—before the bankruptcy petition—that a receiver be appointed
to, among other actions, levy the debtor’s wages and take possession of all his assets
“to defray cleanup costs” that the state would otherwise pay. Id. at 276, 281 n.9. The
Court specifically noted that “[t]he injunction surely obliged [the debtor] to clean up
the site,” but “when he failed to do so,” the state chose not to “prosecute [the debtor]
under the environmental laws or bring civil or criminal contempt proceedings,” but
17
instead exercised its broad authority to obtain appointment of a receiver to take
over all of the debtor’s assets. Id. at 282–83 (emphasis added). On those facts, the
court held that “the State was seeking no more than a money judgment as an
alternative to requiring [the debtor] to perform the obligations imposed by the
injunction”
because injunctive relief was no longer available under the
circumstances of that case. Id. at 281 (emphasis added).
In this case, by contrast, the Government Plaintiffs seek an equitable
abatement order in the first instance. If Government Plaintiffs prevail, the court
will require PEC and its co-defendants to remediate the public nuisance they
created, either through their own personnel and contractors or through those
retained by an independent court-appointed receiver. Under no circumstance will
PEC be required to pay any money to Government Plaintiffs, nor will Government
Plaintiffs have authority to exercise any dominion or control over any PEC funds.
Cf. Apex Oil, 579 F.3d at 737 (distinguishing relief sought in Kovacs, where the
receiver “was seeking money rather than an order that the debtor clean up the
contaminated site,” from an injunction that that the defendant would have to spend
money to comply with); In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d at 1009 (affirming cleanup
order and stating that “to the extent that an order is obtained under CERCLA or
any other environmental statute that seeks to end or ameliorate pollution, we are
satisfied that nothing in Kovacs permits a discharge of such obligation,” even where
defendant would be required to spend money to comply).
18
The Eighth Circuit’s holding that a representative California public nuisance
cause of action is a dischargeable claim because relief “can include obligations to
pay money” into an abatement fund managed by an independent receiver thus
squarely conflicts with the Second, Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits’ holdings in
that Section 101(5) could not have been intended to define “claim” so broadly.
The split of authority between this case and the Sixth Circuit’s Whizco
decision on one hand, and cases like Apex Oil, In re Torwico, In re Chateaugay
Corp., Matter of Davis, and In re Continental Airlines turns on interpretation of a
core provision of the bankruptcy code that defines when a cause of action
constitutes a “claim” under 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). Interpretation and application of
that statutory provision is of critical importance to countless bankruptcies,
especially in cases like this and Apex Oil in which a government entity is seeking an
order requiring a bankrupt defendant to abate a nuisance, remediate environmental
hazards, or otherwise engage in purely remedial activities, not to compensate the
public entity or its residents but to restore the status quo.
The question at issue here is likely to recur with increasing frequency given
the dire economic consequences that have already begun to unfold as a result of the
COVID-19 pandemic. An unprecedented number of corporate entities in a broad
range of industries have already begun to initiate bankruptcy proceedings. Many
such entities are in the energy sector like PEC and/or are potentially subject to
considerable environmental liabilities. For example, the Louisiana Oil and Gas
Association, a state trade group, disclosed on May 4, 2020 that in a survey of its
19
membership “more than half of company leaders indicated that bankruptcy or
closures are likely” due to “economic consequences of the global COVID-19
pandemic” and falling oil prices. See State’s Oil Producers Shuttering at Alarming
Rate, La. Oil & Gas Ass’n (May 4, 2020), available at https://www.loga.la/news-andarticles/states-oil-producers-shuttering-at-alarming-rate. Within the last month, at
least one Texas shale oil company filed a chapter 11 bankruptcy petition with more
than $500 million in secured debt, citing “[t]he precipitous decline in oil prices from
the combined effect of the COVID-19 pandemic and the flooding of oil markets by
warring international producers” as the principal force inducing the bankruptcy.
See Declaration of David E. Roberts Jr. in Support of the Debtors’ Chapter 11
Petitions and First Day Relief, In re Gavlian Res., LLC, No. 20-32656, Dkt. 13 (S.D.
Tex. Bankr. May 16, 2020).
Because the Eighth Circuit’s ruling here has deepened a split of appellate
authority on a critical question of bankruptcy law, one that is likely to recur and
arise more frequently in litigation nationwide, there is at a minimum a reasonable
possibility that the Court will grant certiorari review.
B.
There Is Also a Reasonable Prospect that the Government
Plaintiffs Will Prevail on the Merits if Certiorari Is Granted.
A party seeking to stay this Court’s mandate must also show “a fair prospect
that five Justices will conclude that the case was erroneously decided below.” Lucas
v. Townsend, 486 U.S. 1301, 1304 (1988) (Kennedy, J., in chambers). There appear
to be few guiding principles to determine which cases present a “fair prospect” for
reversal on certiorari. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 448 U.S. 1306, 1309 (1980)
20
(Brennan, J., in chambers) (likelihood of reversal “in a context as sensitive as that
before me cannot be predicted with anything approaching certainty”). There is at
least a fair prospect of reversal in this case if certiorari is granted, because the
Eighth Circuit’s analysis is at odds with the statutory language and purpose, and
because of the potentially damaging implications of the Eighth Circuit’s ruling upon
environmental compliance cases and to the broad range of consumer protection and
other cases, commonly prosecuted by public entities, where equity is the principal
remedy sought by the public entity or private attorney general plaintiff.
The Eighth Circuit’s holding that equitable causes of action are dischargeable
whenever the bankrupt defendant might potentially have to expend money to
satisfy the judgment “without regard to who receives the payment,” In re Peabody
Energy Corp., 958 F.3d at 725, dramatically expands the scope of dischargeable
liabilities and ultimately renders superfluous Section 101(5)(B)—which only makes
dischargeable a narrow category of equitable claims (those that create “a right to an
equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to
payment . . .”).
As the Seventh Circuit cautioned in Apex Oil, “[a]lmost every equitable
decree imposes a cost on the defendant, whether the decree requires him to do
something . . . or, as is more common, to refrain from doing something.” 579 F.3d at
737. By adopting the contrary rule that a right to payment exists whenever a
defendant may have the option of complying with an equitable judgment by paying
someone to act on its behalf, the Eighth Circuit has effectively concluded “that every
21
equitable claim is dischargeable in bankruptcy unless there is a specific exception in
the Code,” which “is inconsistent with the Code’s creation in 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(B) of
only a limited right to the discharge of equitable claims.” See id.
Absent a stay followed by a grant of certiorari review and reversal, the
Eighth Circuit’s ruling will have grave consequences for government litigation
against defendants in or post-bankruptcy (where defendants have the choice of
filing their bankruptcy petition in the Eighth or Sixth Circuits rather than
elsewhere), from environmental enforcement and consumer protection actions to
cases arising out of the national opioid crisis. Indeed, the United States warned of
that very consequence when it sought to enforce the RCRA cleanup order as the
plaintiff in Apex Oil. In opposing the defendant’s petition for certiorari in that case,
the United States argued that “[b]ecause neither RCRA nor the relevant district
court order allows petitioner to pay money to the government in lieu of carrying out
the required cleanup, the obligation imposed on petitioner is not dischargeable in
bankruptcy.” Brief of United States in Opp. to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13,
Apex Oil Co. v. United States, No. 091023 (U.S. July 2010) (emphasis added). The
government further argued that the “expenditure-of-money test” applied by the
Sixth Circuit in Whizco and now by the Eighth Circuit did not “accor[d] with the
statutory definition of ‘claim’ and with congressional intent,” and would “prevent
Section 101(5)(B)’s ‘right to payment’ language from imposing any meaningful
practical limit on the class of equitable remedy rights that will constitute
dischargeable claims.” Id. at 17–19.
22
As the United States correctly observed in Apex Oil, the plain text of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code supports the majority of circuits’ interpretation of Section
101(5)(B). Section 101(5)(A) states in relevant part that any “right to payment” is
dischargeable, “whether or not such right is . . . legal [or] equitable . . . .” 11 U.S.C. §
101(5)(A). Section 101(5)(B), in turn, states that a “right to an equitable remedy for
breach of performance” is dischargeable “if such breach gives rise to a right to
payment . . . .” Id. § 101(5)(B). If every equitable decree that required a defendant to
spend money constituted a “right to payment,” any remedy encompassed by Section
101(5)(A) would already be a dischargeable “claim” under that section, the plain
language of which permits discharge of any “right to payment” whether “legal” or
“equitable.” Under the Eighth Circuit’s analysis, the entirely of Section 101(5)(B)
would therefore become mere surplusage.
As the Apex Oil court thus correctly concluded, the “natural reading” of
Section 101(5)(B), as a matter of logic no less than plain language, must be that an
equitable remedy is dischargeable only “if the holder of an equitable claim can, in
the event that the equitable remedy turns out to be unobtainable, obtain a money
judgment instead . . . .” 579 F.3d at 736 (emphasis added). That is, Section 101(5)(A)
allows the discharge of a cause of action or other obligation that gives the holder a
right to receive payment—whether in equity or at law—while Section 101(5)(B)
additionally allows the discharge of a cause of action or other obligation that
provides an equitable remedy for specific performance, but only if the holder can
23
convert the underlying cause of action into a right to receive payment in the event of
breach.
Congress has made clear that while the statutory definition of a “claim” is
broad, Section 101(5)(B) is “intended to cause the liquidation or estimation of
contingent rights of payment for which there may be an alternative equitable
remedy, with the result that the equitable remedy will be susceptible to being
discharged in bankruptcy.” H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 549 (1977); cf. Pa. Dep’t of Pub.
Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 558 (1990). Thus, for example, a dischargeable
claim exists when under state law “a judgment for specific performance may be
satisfied by an alternative right to payment, in the event performance is refused,”
while by contrast, “rights to an equitable remedy for breach of performance with
respect to which such breach does not give rise to a right to payment are not ‘claims’
and would therefore not be susceptible to discharge in bankruptcy.” H.R. Rep. No.
95-595, at 549. This Court has thus held that equitable causes of action are claims
under Section 101(5)(B) only when they have been or can be “reduced to a monetary
obligation” under the substantive law giving rise to the cause of action. See Kovacs,
469 U.S. at 282. The Sixth and Eighth Circuits’ interpretation would bulldoze the
carefully tailored statutory language and reach far beyond the clear intent of
the statute.
Given the potentially broad and harmful ramifications of the Eighth Circuit’s
opinion, the persuasive analysis of the Seventh Circuit in Apex Oil, and the federal
government’s past agreement with the position advocated by Government Plaintiffs
24
here, there is at least a reasonable prospect that this Court will reverse on the
merits if certiorari is granted.
C.
The Government Plaintiffs Will Suffer Irreparable Harm if the
Mandate is Not Recalled Because Dismissing Their Claims in
California Could Moot Review of the Eighth Circuit’s Ruling.
Government Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm if the mandate is not
recalled and this case is not stayed. The bankruptcy court’s order, affirmed by the
Eighth Circuit, requires the Government Plaintiffs to dismiss the claims in their
California lawsuits against PEC with prejudice. If no stay is granted and
Government Plaintiffs are compelled to comply with the bankruptcy court’s order
and dismiss with prejudice their claims against PEC in the California action, they
will have forfeited the very causes of action against PEC that they seek to preserve
by pursuing certiorari review in this Court, potentially mooting their ability to seek
such review.5 The risk of pretermitting Government Plaintiff’s ability to
meaningfully petition for certiorari constitutes sufficient irreparable harm to justify
recalling the mandate and issuing a stay, as mootness on appeal is “the
‘quintessential form of prejudice.’” In re Country Squire Assocs. of Carle Place, L.P.,
203 B.R. 182, 183 (B.A.P. 2d Cir. 1996) (quoting In re Advanced Min. Sys., Inc., 173
“The rule in federal cases is that an actual controversy must be extant at all stages
of review” to supply jurisdiction consistent with Article III of the Constitution.
Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975). “That the dispute between the parties
was very much alive when suit was filed, or at the time the Court of Appeals
rendered its judgment, cannot substitute for the actual case or controversy that an
exercise of this Court's jurisdiction requires.” Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 317
(1988).
5
25
B.R. 467, 469 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994). Government Plaintiffs’ untenable position can
only be overcome by a stay.
PEC and the other defendants in the California actions have previously
argued that if Government Plaintiffs dismiss their California actions against PEC
and the bankruptcy court’s order is later reversed, Government Plaintiffs could seek
reinstatement of those actions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5), which authorizes
courts to “relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment . . . based
on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated.” But that argument
provides no solace because, if dismissal of the California lawsuits with prejudice
moots the petition for certiorari from the bankruptcy court order, Government
Plaintiffs will have lost the opportunity to challenge the basis for the order leading
to the dismissal, and with it any possibility for relief under Rule 60. Moreover, even
if the contingent possibility of relief under Rule 60 were enough to overcome
mootness, Government Plaintiffs have identified no case (and PEC has never cited
one) in which Rule 60(b)(5) has been applied to relieve a plaintiff from a voluntary
dismissal with prejudice, as the bankruptcy court order would require here.
Further, there is no California provision comparable to Rule 60 that Government
Plaintiffs could pursue in state court, and state court procedures, not federal, would
likely govern now that the Ninth Circuit has affirmed the California district court’s
order remanding the California cases to state court. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §
473(b) (limiting relief from judgment to instances of “mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect”).
26
The harm threatened to Government Plaintiffs here from the mandate
issuing without a stay is “both certain and great; . . . actual and not theoretical.”
Packard Elevator v. I.C.C., 782 F.2d 112, 115 (8th Cir. 1986). Government Plaintiffs
risk losing not only their right to obtain an appellate decision on the underlying
merits of the bankruptcy court’s order, but their entire underlying California case
against PEC. That harm is irreparable and warrants a stay.
D.
The Equities Weigh in Government Plaintiffs’ Favor.
The balance of equities, including the public interest, further supports
recalling the mandate and staying the bankruptcy court’s order. The underlying
California litigation has been stayed in the Northern District of California for more
than two years. Neither PEC nor any of the other defendants have been served with
discovery, filed any dispositive motions, or answered the complaints. The
defendants, including PEC, were recently granted an extension of 30 days to file
any petition for rehearing with the Ninth Circuit from that court’s affirmance of the
district court’s remand order, meaning the mandate directing the case to be
remanded to state court cannot issue until at least mid-July, and likely much later
if the defendants in fact petition for rehearing. See Order Granting Motion for
Extension of Time to File, Cty. of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., No. 18-15499, Dkt.
204 (9th Cir. June 8, 2020). PEC’s burden to date has thus been de minimis and any
additional burden to PEC from a stay of the bankruptcy court’s order pending the
Government Plaintiffs’ petition for certiorari (or decision not to file such a petition)
would likewise be minimal, given the litigation’s slow and limited pace to date.
27
The public interest, by contrast, weighs strongly in favor of enabling the
Court to resolve the question raised by Government Plaintiffs’ anticipated petition,
as the scope of dischargeable obligations in bankruptcy has an enormous potential
impact on public entities and others who seek to pursue their statutory and common
law
rights
to
equitable
relief
from
entities
that
are,
or
may
be,
in
bankruptcy proceedings.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Applicants County of San Mateo, California;
City of Imperial Beach, California; and County of Marin, California (“Government
Plaintiffs”) respectfully request that the mandate of the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals be recalled, and the court’s judgment be stayed pending Government
Plaintiffs’ timely petitioning this Court for a writ of certiorari.
Dated: June 10, 2020
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Matthew K. Edling
Matthew K. Edling
matt@sheredling.com
Sher Edling LLP
100 Montgomery Street, Suite 1410
San Francisco, CA 94014
Tel: (628) 231-2500
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Applicants,
County of San Mateo, et al.
28
APPENDIX
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Appendix A: Court of Appeals Opinion
In re Peabody Energy Corp. (8th Cir. 2020)
May 6, 2020 …………………………………………………1a
In re Peabody Energy Corporation, 958 F.3d 717 (2020)
while a closer call, the bankruptcy court did not abuse its
discretion in determining that the municipalities' nuisance
claims did not fall within the carve-out for government claims
brought under “Environmental Law”;
958 F.3d 717
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
IN RE: PEABODY ENERGY CORPORATION Debtor
County of San Mateo, California;
City of Imperial Beach, California;
County of Marin, California Appellants
v.
Peabody Energy Corporation Appellee
Office of U.S. Trustee U.S. Trustee
In re: Peabody Energy Corporation Debtor
County of San Mateo, California;
City of Imperial Beach, California;
County of Marin, California Appellants
v.
Peabody Energy Corporation Appellee
Office of U.S. Trustee U.S. Trustee
the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that the municipalities' claims did not fall within
the plan's carve-out for government claims brought under
“applicable police or regulatory law”; and
the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that reorganized debtor's bankruptcy discharged
their representative public-nuisance claim, even though
California law limited recovery on that claim to the equitable
remedy of abatement.
Affirmed.
Procedural Posture(s): On Appeal; Motion to Enforce
Discharge Injunction.
No. 18-3242, No. 19-1767
|
Submitted: March 10, 2020
|
Filed: May 6, 2020
*720 Appeals from United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Missouri—St. Louis
Attorneys and Law Firms
Synopsis
Background: Reorganized Chapter 11 debtor moved to
enforce discharge injunction by requiring dismissal of statecourt causes of action filed against it by California counties
and city which sought to hold debtor and other energy
companies liable for their alleged contributions to global
warming. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri, Barry S. Schermer, J., 2017 WL
4843724, granted motion and required dismissal of causes of
action as claims that had been discharged. Counties and city
appealed. The District Court, Rodney W. Sippel, J., 599 B.R.
610, affirmed, and appeals were taken.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Morris S. Arnold, Senior
Circuit Judge, held that:
the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that the municipalities' common-law claims
did not fall within the plan's carve-out for government
claims brought under any “Environmental Law” to which
reorganized debtor was subject, and so were discharged;
Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellant
was Matthew Kendall Edling, of San Francisco, CA. Also
appearing on appellants’ brief were Victor M. Sher and
Michael Rubin of San Francisco, CA.
Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellee
was Shay Dvoretzky, of Washington, DC. The following
attorney(s) appeared on the appellee brief; Jaimie L.
Mansfield, of Saint Louis, MO, Parker Andrew RiderLongmaid, of Washington, DC, Heather Lennox, of
Cleveland, OH, John G. Willard, of Saint Louis, MO,
Matthew Curtis Corcoran, of Columbus, OH.
Before GRUENDER, ARNOLD, and SHEPHERD, Circuit
Judges.
Opinion
ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.
In April 2016, Peabody Energy Corporation filed for Chapter
11 bankruptcy. As part of the court-approved plan governing
Peabody's reorganization, governmental entities with claims
against Peabody had to file proof of their claims with the
(1a)
© 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
1
In re Peabody Energy Corporation, 958 F.3d 717 (2020)
bankruptcy court 1 by a certain date or the claims were
barred. After that date came and went, Peabody emerged as
a reorganized company.
A few months after Peabody was reorganized, three
California municipalities (San Mateo County, Marin County,
and the City of Imperial Beach) sued Peabody and more than
thirty other energy companies for their alleged contributions
to global warming. Each of these municipalities filed a
separate though nearly identical lawsuit, all in California state
courts, raising claims of strict liability and negligence for
failing to warn, strict liability for a design defect, negligence,
trespass, and private nuisance. They also brought two publicnuisance claims, one on behalf of the *721 people of
California seeking abatement of the nuisance, and the other on
their own behalf seeking, among other things, damages and
disgorgement of profits. Peabody returned to the bankruptcy
court and asked that it enjoin the municipalities from pursuing
their claims against it and require them to dismiss their
claims with prejudice on the ground that the court-approved
reorganization plan had discharged them.
The bankruptcy court agreed. It began with a review of the
municipalities' complaints, explaining that they focused on
acts occurring from 1965 to 2015. The court noted, moreover,
that the complaints mentioned Peabody sparingly, and, when
they did, they alleged that Peabody had exported coal
from California, continued to export coal from California,
participated in “a national climate change science denial
campaign” in 1991, and was linked to groups seeking to
undermine the connection between the companies' fossil
fuel products and climate change. The bankruptcy court
determined that the municipalities' claims, which involved
Peabody's pre-bankruptcy conduct save for the anodyne
allegation that Peabody continues to export coal from
California, were all discharged during Peabody's bankruptcy
proceedings, and so it enjoined the municipalities from
pursuing their claims against Peabody. The municipalities
appealed the bankruptcy court's decision to the district
court, 2 which affirmed. See
28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).
The municipalities now appeal to our court. When a
bankruptcy court's decision is appealed to the district court,
that court acts as an appellate court by reviewing legal
determinations de novo and factual findings for clear error.
See Fix v. First State Bank of Roscoe, 559 F.3d 803, 808 (8th
Cir. 2009). When the case comes to us, “[a]s the second court
of appellate review, we conduct an independent review of the
bankruptcy court's judgment applying the same standards of
review as the district court.” Id.
Confirmation of a Chapter 11 reorganization plan discharges
claims “[e]xcept as otherwise provided ... in the plan,” see 11
U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1), and the municipalities contend that there
are two provisions in the plan that exempt all their claims from
discharge. Importantly, since a confirmed Chapter 11 plan is
an order of the bankruptcy court, we review the bankruptcy
court's interpretation of a confirmed plan for an abuse of
discretion. See In re Dial Bus. Forms, Inc., 341 F.3d 738, 744
(8th Cir. 2003).
As relevant, the first provision that the municipalities rely
on exempts from discharge governmental claims brought
“under any applicable Environmental Law to which any
Reorganized Debtor is subject,” but the bankruptcy court
held that the municipalities' claims were not made under
“Environmental Law” as the plan contemplates that phrase
and so this carveout did not save the municipalities'
claims from discharge. The plan defined Environmental
Law as “all federal, state and local statutes, regulations
and ordinances concerning pollution or protection of the
environment, or environmental impacts on human health
and safety, including [ten federal statutes] and any state
or local equivalents of the foregoing.” A sample of the
federal statutes listed includes the Atomic Energy Act; the
Clean Air Act; the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act; *722 and the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act.
The municipalities argue that their common-law claims
against Peabody are “state or local equivalents” of “statutes,
regulations and ordinances concerning pollution” and so forth
because the municipalities raised these claims to protect the
environment. But as the bankruptcy court explained, when the
definition of Environmental Law mentioned “state or local
equivalent[s],” it was talking about equivalents to the ten
federal statutes listed, not equivalents to “statutes, regulations
and ordinances concerning pollution.” We think this is a
reasonable conclusion because we doubt the drafters of the
definition would feel the need to clarify that the equivalents
could be state or local when the part of the definition dealing
with pollution already explicitly said that state and local
laws could qualify. In other words, under the municipalities'
reading, the second mention of “state” and “local” would
be superfluous, and so we don't see how that reading could
comport with the parties' intentions. And the municipalities
(2a)
© 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
2
In re Peabody Energy Corporation, 958 F.3d 717 (2020)
have not demonstrated that their common-law claims are
equivalent to the listed federal statutes.
We also think that if the drafters of this carveout had meant for
it to include common-law claims they would have explicitly
said so, or at a minimum would not have specifically limited
Environmental Law to “statutes, regulations and ordinances.”
The bankruptcy court's interpretation is at least a reasonable
one, and so we cannot say that the bankruptcy court abused
its discretion in concluding that the municipalities' commonlaw claims did not fall within the plan's definition of
Environmental Law.
The municipalities' nuisance claims are a closer call because
they rely on specific California statutes, bringing them at
least arguably more in line with the plan's definition of
Environmental Law. But unlike the federal statutes listed,
nuisance claims have their roots in the common law and
are often referred to as common-law claims, including in
Missouri—the jurisdiction that Peabody calls home—whose
laws may well have been the focus of the parties who drafted
the carveout. See Smith v. ConocoPhillips Pipe Line Co., 801
F.3d 921, 926–27 (8th Cir. 2015). So we are not convinced
that the incidental tethering of the nuisance claims here to
statutes in a jurisdiction far from where Peabody's bankruptcy
proceedings occurred was the kind of claim the drafters
intended to carve out. And as the bankruptcy court noted,
the federal statutes listed are designed to remedy particular
environmental problems. In contrast, nuisance law, while
it may be used to resolve an environmental problem, does
not focus on particular environmental problems. In fact, a
nuisance can be something with no effect whatsoever on
the environment—like something “indecent or offensive to
the senses” or the sale of illegal drugs. See
Cal. Civ.
Code § 3479. We understand the force of the municipalities'
argument that their particular nuisance claims do focus on
the environment, no matter what other nuisance claims might
involve. But we cannot say that the bankruptcy court abused
its discretion in pointing out the broader potential scope of a
California nuisance claim, especially when we consider that
if the drafters of the carveout had wanted to include claims
of a fundamentally broader nature than the ten statutes listed,
they would have said so.
The municipalities emphasize that the plan, in a separate
provision governing its interpretation, explained that when
the plan used the word “including,” it meant “including
without limitation,” and so the municipalities urge us not
to dwell exclusively on the list of federal statutes in *723
interpreting the carveout. But that list shows the kinds of
laws on the minds of the parties who wrote the carveout,
and we understand the bankruptcy court's skepticism that
more far-reaching claims were also carved out. We think
that “including without limitation” could reasonably mean
that there might be more environmental statutes of a similar
scope that could be considered Environmental Laws, not that
any claim with a potential environmental reach is carved
out. If any claim with a potential environmental reach were
included, then why would the drafters include the list in the
first place? Or why would they not add to the list statutes
that are not so obviously Environmental Laws? Although
the municipalities advance a reasonable interpretation of the
plan, their interpretation is not without its faults, and so the
bankruptcy court's interpretation, which we also believe is
reasonable and is entitled to deference, does not amount to an
abuse of discretion.
A relevant portion of the second provision that the
municipalities rely on for the survival of their claims
exempts from discharge a governmental claim brought “under
any ... applicable police or regulatory law.” The bankruptcy
court held that the claims here were not brought under a
police or regulatory law, drawing from a section of the
11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4), that excepts
bankruptcy code, see
a government's attempt to enforce its “police and regulatory
power” from the automatic stay that results from the filing of
a bankruptcy petition. The bankruptcy court pointed out that
our court has held, in construing that provision, that when the
government's actions “would result in an economic advantage
to the government or its citizens over third parties in relation
to the debtor's estate,” then the government is not exercising
its police or regulatory power. It is acting as a creditor. See
In re Commonwealth Cos., 913 F.2d 518, 523 (8th Cir.
1990). Applying this so-called pecuniary-interest rule, the
bankruptcy court concluded that if the municipalities' claims
were successful, they would obtain a pecuniary advantage
over other creditors because they were seeking damages and
disgorgement of fifty-years-worth of profits and so they were
not seeking to enforce its police or regulatory power.
The municipalities maintain on appeal that we should not
review this aspect of the bankruptcy court's decision for an
abuse of discretion because in this instance the court was
interpreting a provision of the bankruptcy code, which raises
a question of law that we would review de novo. See In re
Archdiocese of Saint Paul & Minneapolis, 888 F.3d 944, 950
(8th Cir. 2018). We disagree. It is apparent to us that the
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In re Peabody Energy Corporation, 958 F.3d 717 (2020)
bankruptcy court here was simply construing the terms of the
§ 362 provided a
plan, and, as it explained, thought that
helpful guide in that effort. We therefore think what we have
before us is a question about the meaning of the plan, not
the bankruptcy code, and so we review the bankruptcy court's
holding for an abuse of discretion.
We see no abuse of discretion in the bankruptcy court's
§ 362, along with our court's
decision to draw on
interpretation of it, in determining the meaning of the
plan. To the extent the municipalities are objecting to the
way the bankruptcy court applied the pecuniary-purpose
rule, we reject their contention. If the municipalities forced
Peabody to disgorge its profits and recovered the damages
they sought, they would diminish the value of the other
creditors' ownership stakes in the reorganized Peabody,
redistributing the bankruptcy estate without ever having
themselves participated in the bankruptcy proceedings.
In addition, the municipalities seek money as the victims
of alleged torts, not *724 because they are exercising
regulatory or police authority over Peabody, which, according
to the complaints, is an out-of-state company acting outside of
the municipalities' borders. So for this independent reason, the
second carveout does not salvage the municipalities' claims.
The municipalities also assert that, even if the plans did not
exempt all their claims from discharge, Peabody's bankruptcy
did not discharge their representative public-nuisance claim.
Before addressing this argument, a brief survey of the relevant
bankruptcy law is in order. Confirmation of a Chapter 11
plan for reorganization “discharges the debtor from any debt
that arose before the date of such confirmation,” regardless
of whether “proof of the claim based on such debt is filed”
with the bankruptcy court. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1)(A). A
debt, meanwhile, is simply a “liability on a claim.” Id. §
101(12). A claim, in turn, is a “right to payment” or, as
more relevant here, a “right to an equitable remedy for
breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to
payment, whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is
reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured,
disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured.” Id. § 101(5).
The Supreme Court has noted that, by defining “claim” as
it did, Congress intended to adopt the “broadest available
definition” of the term. See
Johnson v. Home State Bank,
501 U.S. 78, 83, 111 S.Ct. 2150, 115 L.Ed.2d 66 (1991).
Our court has said that Congress intended “claim” to include
“virtually all obligations to pay money.” See
In re Flight
Transp. Corp. Sec. Litig., 874 F.2d 576, 583 (8th Cir. 1989).
The municipalities contend that the public-nuisance claim
they assert on behalf of the people of California is not a
claim under bankruptcy law because California law does not
permit them to recover damages under that theory; they can
obtain only an equitable decree ordering Peabody to abate the
nuisance. As a result, the argument goes, they do not have a
“right to payment” or an equitable remedy that “gives rise to
a right to payment,” so Peabody's bankruptcy does not affect
this claim in their complaint.
The difficulty with this argument is that, even though
California law limits the recovery on this claim to equitable
relief, that relief can include obligations to pay money. As
one of the cases that the municipalities rely on most heavily
explains, it is a “myth” that “equitable remedies are always
orders to act or not to act, rather than to pay,” as “equity often
orders payment[s]” that can be discharged in bankruptcy. See
United States v. Apex Oil Co., 579 F.3d 734, 736 (7th Cir.
2009). In California, a party who commits a public nuisance
can be ordered to pay into a fund, overseen by a receiver,
to remedy or eliminate the hazard complained of rather than
being ordered to clean up the nuisance themselves. See, e.g.,
People v. ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co., 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d
499, 569–70 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017). It does not matter that the
municipalities do not request that Peabody be ordered to pay
into an abatement fund. That a California court could order
them is sufficient to make the claim dischargeable, see
In
re Torwico Elecs., Inc., 8 F.3d 146, 150 (3d Cir. 1993);
In
re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 1008 (2d Cir. 1991),
because that order would convert the requirement to abate a
nuisance into an “obligation[ ] to pay money.” This case is
therefore unlike other cases that the municipalities point to
where the relevant equitable remedy was not convertible into
a monetary obligation. See, e.g.,
Apex Oil, 579 F.3d at 736;
Torwico, 8 F.3d at 150.
The municipalities point out that they would not receive
the proceeds that a *725 court directs to be paid into an
abatement fund; that money, unlike damages, would go to a
receiver. That is true enough, but we don't see why it makes
a difference. As already noted, we have broadly stated that
a “claim” includes “virtually all obligations to pay money,”
see
Flight Transp., 874 F.2d at 583, without regard to
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In re Peabody Energy Corporation, 958 F.3d 717 (2020)
who receives the payment. The Supreme Court, moreover, in
holding that obligations to pay for environmental cleanup are
subject to discharge, paid little attention to the fact that those
payments would go to a receiver, apparently assuming that
did not disqualify the right to payments from being a “claim.”
Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 283, 105 S.Ct. 705,
See
83 L.Ed.2d 649 (1985). Besides, even if the municipalities
cannot deposit abatement-fund payments into their general
treasuries, it is the municipalities and their people who stand
to benefit from them.
We therefore disagree with the municipalities' contention
that, since their representative public-nuisance claim entitles
them only to the equitable remedy of abatement, it is not
dischargeable in bankruptcy.
The municipalities contend finally that they have asserted
claims concerning Peabody's post-bankruptcy activities and
that those claims should be allowed to proceed. But we
agree with the bankruptcy court that all the claims in the
complaint are directed at Peabody's pre-bankruptcy conduct,
as the only allegation against Peabody involving its postbankruptcy conduct was that it continues to export coal from
California. That allegation is insufficient to raise a claim, and
so we decline to hold that it somehow changes the character
of the complaints as the municipalities maintain.
As a result, we affirm the judgment of the district court, and
though it probably goes without saying, we necessarily also
deny the municipalities' request for a stay of the bankruptcy
court's decision pending appeal.
All Citations
958 F.3d 717
Footnotes
1
2
The Honorable Barry S. Schermer, United States Bankruptcy Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri.
The Honorable Rodney W. Sippel, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri.
End of Document
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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.