Application — San Mateo County, California, et al., Applicants v. Peabody Energy Corporation

Supreme Court briefJun 12, 2020

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No. _______

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

COUNTY OF SAN MATEO, ET AL.,

Applicants,

v.

PEABODY ENERGY COMPANY,

Respondent.

On Application for Recall and to Stay Mandate of the

United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

APPLICATION FOR RECALL OF MANDATE

AND STAY PENDING PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

Directed to the Honorable Neil M. Gorsuch,

Associate Justice of the United States

And Circuit Justice for the Eighth Circuit

Matthew K. Edling

Counsel of Record

Victor M. Sher

Martin D. Quiñones

Sher Edling LLP

100 Montgomery St., Suite 1410

San Francisco, CA 94104

(628) 231-2500

matt@sheredling.com

vic@sheredling.com

marty@sheredling.com

Michael Rubin

Altshuler Berzon LLP

177 Post Street, Suite 300

San Francisco, CA 94108

(415) 421-7151

mrubin@altber.com

Counsel for County of San Mateo, City of Imperial Beach, and County of Marin

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................... 1

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ...................................................... 3

REASONS TO GRANT THE STAY .................................................................................... 6

A.

There Is at Least a Reasonable Probability that Certiorari Will be

Granted to Resolve the Split of Circuit Authority. ......................................... 11

B.

There Is Also a Reasonable Prospect that the Government Plaintiffs

Will Prevail on the Merits if Certiorari Is Granted. ....................................... 20

C.

The Government Plaintiffs Will Suffer Irreparable Harm if the

Mandate is Not Recalled Because Dismissing Their Claims in

California Could Moot Review of the Eighth Circuit’s Ruling. .................... 25

D.

The Equities Weigh in Government Plaintiffs’ Favor. ................................... 27

CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................ 28

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Cty. of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp.,

___ F.3d ___, 2020 WL 2703701 (9th Cir. May 26, 2020) ................................... 4, 11

Cty. of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp.,

294 F. Supp. 3d 934 (N.D. Cal. 2018) ........................................................................ 4

Cty. of Santa Clara v. Atl. Richfield Co.,

137 Cal. App. 4th 292 (2006) ..................................................................................... 9

Cty. of Santa Clara v. Superior Court,

50 Cal. 4th 35 (2010) .............................................................................................. 3, 9

Honig v. Doe,

484 U.S. 305 (1988) .................................................................................................. 25

In re Advanced Min. Sys., Inc.,

173 B.R. 467 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994) ...................................................................... 26

In re Chateaugay Corp.,

944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991) .............................................................................. passim

In re Continental Airlines,

125 F.3d 120 (3d Cir. 1997)...................................................................................... 15

In re Country Squire Assocs. of Carle Place, L.P.,

203 B.R. 182 (B.A.P. 2d Cir. 1996) .......................................................................... 25

In re Irizarry,

171 B.R. 874 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994) ......................................................................... 14

In re Peabody Energy Corp.,

599 B.R. 610 (E.D. Mo. 2019) ..................................................................................... 5

In re Peabody Energy Corp., No. 16-42529,

2017 WL 4843724 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. Oct. 24, 2017) .................................................. 5

In re Peabody Energy Corp.,

958 F.3d 717 (8th Cir. 2020) ............................................................................ passim

iii

In re Torwico Elecs., Inc.,

8 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 1993).................................................................................. passim

Lucas v. Townsend,

486 U.S. 1301 (1988) ................................................................................................ 20

Matter of Davis,

3 F.3d 113 (5th Cir. 1993) .......................................................................... 2, 8, 13, 14

Ohio v. Kovacs,

469 U.S. 274 (1985) ................................................................................ 17, 18, 19, 24

Packard Elevator v. I.C.C.,

782 F.2d 112 (8th Cir. 1986) .................................................................................... 27

Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport,

495 U.S. 552 (1990) .................................................................................................. 24

People v. ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co.,

17 Cal. App. 5th 51 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017) ................................................... 3, 9, 10, 16

Preiser v. Newkirk,

422 U.S. 395 (1975) .................................................................................................. 25

Rostker v. Goldberg,

448 U.S. 1306 (1980) ................................................................................................ 21

United States v. Apex Oil Co.,

579 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 2009) ............................................................................ passim

United States v. Whizco, Inc.,

841 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1988) .................................................................................. 2, 7

Statutes

11 U.S.C. § 101 ..................................................................................................... passim

28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) ........................................................................................................ 4

42 U.S.C. § 6901 ........................................................................................................... 12

42 U.S.C. § 9601 ........................................................................................................... 15

iv

Cal. Civ. Code. § 3479 .................................................................................................... 3

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 473(b) ....................................................................................... 26

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 731.......................................................................................... 3, 9

Rules

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) ................................................................................................. 26

Other Authorities

H.R. Rep. No. 95-595 (1977) ........................................................................................ 24

v

TO THE HONORABLE NEIL M. GORSUCH, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE

UNITED STATES AND CIRCUIT JUSTICE FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT:

INTRODUCTION

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

deepened the split of authority among the circuits on a fundamental question of

bankruptcy law that is likely to recur with increased frequency in the wake of

recent pandemic-related bankruptcies: under what circumstances is a cause of

action that provides for exclusively equitable relief a “claim” subject to discharge in

bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)?1 The Eighth Circuit held that even where, as

here, state law “limits the recovery on [a cause of action] to equitable relief,” that

cause of action is dischargeable if the debtor could end up “pay[ing] money” to

implement the required equitable relief, “without regard to who receives the

payment”—i.e., even if none of that money is or could be paid to the creditorplaintiff, as is the case here. In re Peabody Energy Corp., 958 F.3d 717, 724–25

(8th Cir. 2020) (Attached as Appendix A).

That holding conflicts with the law of at least four other circuits, each of

which has expressly held that causes of action providing exclusively equitable relief

are dischargeable under Section 101(5) only if “the holder of an equitable claim can,

Section 101 of the Bankruptcy Code defines a dischargeable “claim” as “a right to

payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated,

unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal,

equitable, secured, or unsecured,” or “a right to an equitable remedy for breach of

performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such

right to an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured,

unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured.” See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5).

1

1

in the event that the equitable remedy turns out to be unobtainable, obtain a money

judgment instead.” See United States v. Apex Oil Co., 579 F.3d 734, 736 (7th Cir.

2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 67 (2010); see also Matter of Davis, 3 F.3d 113, 116

(5th Cir. 1993) (Section 101(5) allows only discharge of “contingent claims for money

damages that are alternatives to equitable remedies”); In re Torwico Elecs., Inc., 8

F.3d 146, 150 (3d Cir. 1993) (same); In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 1008 (2d

Cir. 1991) (cause of action not dischargeable where plaintiff has “no option to accept

payment in lieu of” equitable relief). The only circuit to reach the same conclusion

as the Eighth Circuit is the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Whizco, Inc., 841 F.2d

147, 150 (6th Cir. 1988) (claim for mine cleanup injunction dischargeable where

defendant did “not have the physical capacity to reclaim the mine site himself, and

[thus] would have to hire others to perform the work for him”).

Applicants County of San Mateo, City of Imperial Beach, and County of

Marin (“Government Plaintiffs”), which are three California public entities that

filed nuisance abatement causes of action, among other things, against Respondent

Peabody Energy Company (“PEC”) and others, intend to petition for a writ of

certiorari to have this Court resolve this critical but disputed question of

bankruptcy law. If the Eighth Circuit’s mandate is not recalled and the order of the

bankruptcy court stayed, the Government Plaintiffs will be required by that order

to dismiss all claims against PEC in their underlying lawsuits (which are currently

stayed for unrelated reasons), thus potentially mooting the parties’ dispute and

causing the Government Plaintiffs irreparable harm.

2

For these reasons and as further detailed below, Government Plaintiffs

respectfully request that this Court recall the Eighth Circuit’s mandate in this

matter and stay its judgment pending this Court’s final determination of the issues

raised in the Government Plaintiffs’ upcoming petition for writ of certiorari.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Government Plaintiffs filed three separate complaints in California state

court against major investor-owned energy companies, including PEC, on July 17,

2017. Each lawsuit alleged eight state law causes of action, including a

representative public nuisance cause of action on behalf of the People of the State of

California for equitable abatement,2 and seven other claims for violations of other

California tort laws. Cty. of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., San Mateo Super. Ct., No.

17 CV-03222; City of Imperial Beach v. Chevron Corp., Contra Costa Super. Ct., No.

2 California’s Code of Civil Procedure provides a cause of action “in the name of the

people of the State of California to abate a public nuisance,” which may be brought

only by “the district attorney or county counsel of any county in which the nuisance

exists, or by the city attorney of any town or city in which the nuisance exists.” Cal.

Civ. Proc. Code § 731. Equitable abatement is the sole relief that section 731

authorizes government plaintiffs to recover in such representative public nuisance

actions. See People v. ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co., 17 Cal. App. 5th 51, 122 (Cal. Ct.

App. 2017); see also Cty. of Santa Clara v. Superior Court, 50 Cal.4th 35, 55–56

(2010). Money damages or other alternative monetary relief is never available. See

id. Under California law, a nuisance is “[a]nything which is injurious to health, . .

. or is indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of

property, . . . or unlawfully obstructs the free passage or use, in the customary

manner, of any navigable lake, or river, bay, stream, canal, or basin, or any public

park, square, street, or highway . . . .” Cal. Civ. Code § 3479. A public nuisance, in

turn, is “one which affects at the same time an entire community or neighborhood,

or any considerable number of persons . . . .” Id. § 2480.

3

C17-01227, App. 9461–9571; Cty. of Marin v. Chevron Corp., Marin Super. Ct., No.

CIV 17-02586.

The defendants in the California cases (including PEC) removed the

Government Plaintiffs’ lawsuits to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District

of California, where the cases were assigned to a single judge who subsequently

remanded all three for lack of federal subject-matter jurisdiction. See Cty. of San

Mateo v. Chevron Corp., 294 F. Supp. 3d 934 (N.D. Cal. 2018). The California

district court on April 9, 2018, stayed its remand order pending appeal. Cty. of San

Mateo v. Chevron Corp., No. 3:17-cv-04929-VC, Dkt. 240 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2018).

Defendants in the California lawsuits appealed the district court’s remand

order to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1447(d), which affirmed and ordered the cases remanded to the three state courts

in which they were filed. Cty. of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., ___ F.3d ___, 2020 WL

2703701 (9th Cir. May 26, 2020).

On April 13, 2016, before those California cases had been filed, PEC filed a

Petition for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in the Eastern District of Missouri.

See In re Peabody Energy Corp., No. 16-42529, Dkt. 1 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. Apr. 13,

2016). On March 17, 2017, the bankruptcy court entered an order confirming the

company’s proposed Plan of Reorganization. In re Peabody Energy Corp., No. 1642529, Dkt. 2763 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. Mar. 17, 2017). On April 3, 2017, the Plan went

into effect and the reorganized company emerged from bankruptcy. In re Peabody

Energy Corp., No. 16-42529, Dkt. 2867 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. Apr. 3, 2017).

4

On August 28, 2017, PEC filed a motion before the bankruptcy judge to

enjoin the Government Plaintiffs’ further prosecution of their California public

nuisance and related tort claims against PEC. In re Peabody Energy Corp., No. 1642529, Dkt. 3362 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. Aug. 28, 2017). The bankruptcy judge granted

that motion on October 24, 2017, and ordered the Government Plaintiffs to dismiss

the underlying actions in California against Peabody with prejudice. In re Peabody

Energy Corp., No. 16-42529, 2017 WL 4843724 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. Oct. 24, 2017). The

bankruptcy judge denied the Government Plaintiffs’ request for a stay of his order

on December 8, 2017. In re Peabody Energy Corp., No. 16-42529, Dkt. 3622 (Bankr.

E.D. Mo. Dec. 8, 2017).

The Government Plaintiffs timely appealed the bankruptcy court’s rulings to

the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. On September 20, 2018,

the district court denied the Government Plaintiffs’ motion for stay pending appeal.

In re Peabody Energy Corp., No. 4:17-cv-02886-RWS, Dkt. 32 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 9,

2018). On March 29, 2019, the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s ruling

and entered judgment. In re Peabody Energy Corp., 599 B.R. 610 (E.D. Mo. 2019).

The Government Plaintiffs appealed from the district court’s denial of a stay

pending appeal and affirmance of the bankruptcy court’s injunction in separate

appeals. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings on May 6, 2020. In

re Peabody Energy Corp., 958 F.3d 717.

5

REASONS TO GRANT THE STAY

Each element that this Court considers on an application for a stay is

satisfied here. There is a reasonable probability that certiorari will be granted and

at least a fair prospect that this Court will reverse the Eighth Circuit; the

Government Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm if the mandate is not recalled

and if the bankruptcy court’s injunction order requiring dismissal with prejudice of

all claims against PEC is not stayed; and the equities and public interest weigh in

favor of a stay.

Section 101 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101(5), defines

a dischargeable “claim” as “(A) a right to payment, whether or not such right is

reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured,

unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured,” or “(B) a

right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a

right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is reduced to

judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or

unsecured.” The principal issue in this case is whether the Government Plaintiffs’

public nuisance claim against PEC for equitable abatement gives rise to a “right to

payment” within the meaning of that section.

Contrary to the conclusion reached by all but one other circuit to decide the

issue, and of potentially enormous concern to every public entity seeking

environmental clean-up or other equitable abatement remedies against any

company that has the option of declaring bankruptcy, the Eighth Circuit panel held

6

that because under California law a defendant that “commits a public nuisance can

be ordered to pay into a fund, overseen by a receiver, to remedy or eliminate the

hazard complained of rather than being ordered to clean up the nuisance [itself],”

the state law remedy of equitable abatement gives rise to a “right to payment”

within the meaning of Section 101(5), meaning that the representative public

nuisance cause of action is treated as a dischargeable “claim” in bankruptcy. In re

Peabody Energy Corp., 958 F.3d at 724; accord Whizco, 841 F.2d at 150–51 (cleanup

obligation under Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 dischargeable

where defendant lacked “physical capacity to reclaim the mine himself” and

“fulfilling his obligation to reclaim the site would force the defendant to spend

money”).

That holding conflicts with at least four other circuits’ interpretation and

application of 11 U.S.C. § 101(5), including most directly the Seventh Circuit in

Apex Oil, 579 F.3d 734, which held that the “right of payment” language in Section

101(5)(B) means payment to the plaintiff, because nearly every mandatory

injunction (and most prohibitory injunctions) require at least some expenditure of

money to implement. As the Seventh Circuit (Posner, J.) explained in that case,

“[a]lmost every equitable decree imposes a cost on the defendant,” and to expand

the “right to payment” beyond the right of the creditor to demand its own receipt of

payment from the estate in bankruptcy would mean “that every equitable claim is

dischargeable in bankruptcy unless there is [some other] specific exception in the

[Bankruptcy] Code.” Id. at 738 (emphasis added). That result would conflict with

7

Congress’s intent to carve out most equitable decrees from the definition of

dischargeable “claims.” See id. Because the California law under which the

Government Plaintiffs filed their underlying representative public nuisance cause of

action does not permit them to obtain a money judgment or to recover any payment

of money for themselves from PEC, directly or indirectly, this appeal would have

been decided differently under Seventh Circuit law.

Decisions from the Second, Third, and Fifth Circuits also hold that Congress

did not intend equitable decrees to come within the meaning of “right to payment”

under Section 101(5) unless they can be satisfied through an alternative payment to

the plaintiff. A cause of action giving rise only to equitable relief is not transformed

into a dischargeable claim simply because the defendant must spend money to

comply with its equitable obligations. See In re Torwico Elecs., Inc., 8 F.3d at 150;

Matter of Davis, 3 F.3d at 116; In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d at 1009.

The conflict between the Eighth and Sixth Circuits on the one hand, and the

Second, Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits on the other, concerning the

fundamentally important bankruptcy law question of whether and to what extent

equitable claims are dischargeable in bankruptcy, is direct and immediate. The

dispute is of heightened national importance now because of the substantial

increase in COVID-19-related bankruptcy filings that have already begun due to

stay-at-home orders and changes in the public’s habits, activities, and spending

patterns. The question presented plainly warrants certiorari review.

8

There is at least a fair prospect of reversal if certiorari is granted, because

under the appropriate standard articulated by the majority of circuits, the

Government Plaintiffs’ representative public nuisance causes of action are not

“claims.” Under California law, a public nuisance claim by a government plaintiff on

behalf of the People under California Code of Civil Procedure § 731 can be remedied

only by an equitable order of abatement, which is never convertible to a right of

payment to the plaintiff. “Damages are not an available remedy in the type of public

nuisance action [under § 731], a representative public nuisance action,” only

equitable abatement. ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co., 17 Cal. App. 5th at 122; see also

Cty. of Santa Clara v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 4th at 55–56; Cty. of Santa Clara v.

Atl. Richfield Co., 137 Cal. App. 4th 292, 310–11 (2006).

California courts have recognized that an equitable abatement order in a

representative public nuisance case may include “establishment of a fund, in the

name of the People, dedicated to abating the public nuisance,” paid into by the

defendant and administered by an independent, court-appointed receiver. ConAgra

Grocery Prods. Co., 17 Cal. App. 5th at 131–32. In such instances, because damages

at law are unavailable, the abatement fund may only be used for future abatement.

The public entity plaintiff “may not recover . . . funds that it has already expended

to remediate a public nuisance,” id. at 132, the fund may be used “solely to pay for

the prospective removal of the hazards” created by the nuisance, and “any funds

that ha[ve] not been utilized for that sole purpose by the end of the . . . abatement

period [a]re to be returned to [the] defendants,” id. at 133. While California trial

9

courts can always choose “to have defendants handle the remediation themselves”

as an abatement remedy, they also have discretion to “require[e] defendants to

prefund remediation costs” at an estimated value where direct abatement by the

defendant “would have been difficult for the court to oversee and for defendants to

undertake.” Id. at 133–34. The establishment of an abatement fund, however,

“plainly d[oes] not require, contemplate, or permit the deposit of those funds” into

the plaintiff’s possession. Id. at 134. Because there is no possibility under California

law that the Government Plaintiffs here could obtain any portion of an abatement

fund, the representative public nuisance claims are not “claims” within the proper

interpretation of Section 101(5), and the Eighth Circuit’s decision should be

reversed.

The Government Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm without a stay.

Absent recall of the mandate and a stay, Government Plaintiffs will be forced to

dismiss their California representative public nuisance claims against PEC, with

prejudice. Once those California cases are dismissed with prejudice as to PEC, any

certiorari petition from Government Plaintiffs would arguably become moot,

depriving the Government Plaintiffs of their right to seek certiorari review and

depriving them of their substantive rights under California’s representative public

nuisance law. Mooting the Government Plaintiffs’ right to pursue certiorari relief

constitutes irreparable harm.

Finally, the equities and public interest weigh in favor of a stay. A recall of

the mandate and stay would cause no countervailing harm to PEC, because all

10

proceedings in the California court actions have been stayed for more than two

years pending appeal to the Ninth Circuit of the district court’s order remanding

those consolidated case to the various state courts in which they were filed. On May

26, 2020, the Ninth Circuit affirmed that remand order, see Cty. of San Mateo v.

Chevron Corp., 2020 WL 2703701, and the defendants, including PEC, have been

granted an extension of time to file a petition for rehearing and/or rehearing en

banc until July 9, 2020. See Order Granting Motion for Extension of Time to File,

Cty. of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., No. 18-15499, Dkt. 204 (9th Cir. June 8, 2020).

A.

There Is at Least a Reasonable Probability that Certiorari Will

be Granted to Resolve the Split of Circuit Authority.

There is at least a reasonable probability that the Court will grant certiorari

review in this case. The Eighth Circuit’s decision conflicts with the reasoning and

holdings of at least four other circuit courts addressing the same question, namely

whether equitable remedies that a defendant can only satisfy by paying money to a

third party are dischargeable in bankruptcy. Whether such remedies are

dischargeable is of major national importance with implications for federal, state,

and local agencies and officials across many areas of substantive law.

The Eighth Circuit’s ruling makes the existing circuit split even deeper, and

review by this Court is needed to resolve that split. By holding that an order under

California’s representative nuisance statute that could require PEC to accomplish

equitable abatement by funding an independent receiver to implement the

abatement subject to judicial oversight constitutes an “equitable remedy that ‘gives

rise to a right to payment’” and is therefore a dischargeable “claim” under 11 U.S.C.

11

§ 101(5), see In re Peabody Energy Corp., 958 F.3d at 724, the Eighth Circuit created

a direct conflict with long-standing reasoning and holdings of at least the Second,

Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits on an important question of bankruptcy law.

First, the Court’s opinion conflicts with the most recent and most closely on

point decision in Apex Oil, 579 F.3d 734. In that case, the Seventh Circuit held that

an injunction under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C.

§ 6901 et seq. (“RCRA”), requiring a bankrupt defendant to “abate th[e] nuisance” of

certain hazardous waste was not dischargeable, even though the defendant had “no

in-house capability of cleaning up a contaminated site” and would necessarily have

to pay a third-party contractor an estimated $150 million to comply with the

injunction. As Judge Posner wrote for the unanimous panel: “The natural reading of

[11 U.S.C. § 101(5)] is that if the holder of an equitable claim can, in the event that

the equitable remedy turns out to be unobtainable, obtain a money judgment

instead, the claim is dischargeable.” Apex Oil, 579 F.3d at 736. Because RCRA “does

not entitle a plaintiff to demand, in lieu of action by the defendant that may include

the hiring of another firm to perform a clean up ordered by the court, payment of

clean-up costs,” nor indeed “any form of monetary relief,” the injunction ordering

the defendant to abate the nuisance did not give rise to a right to payment. Id.

The Seventh Circuit in Apex Oil rejected the defendant’s proposed “arbitrary”

distinction “between injunctions that the defendant can comply with internally and

injunctions that it has to hire an independent contractor in order to achieve

compliance with,” because “whether a polluter can clean up his pollution himself or

12

has to hire someone to do it has no relevance to the policy of either the Bankruptcy

Code or [RCRA].” Id. at 738. Such a distinction “would discourage polluters from

developing an internal capability of cleaning up their pollution, even if hiring third

parties to do it would be more expensive,” and would not advance the purposes of

either RCRA or the bankruptcy code. Id. Posed simply: “Why distinguish a check

written to an employee from a check written to an independent contractor?” Id.

The Eighth Circuit’s decision here also conflicts with the Fifth Circuit’s

opinion in Matter of Davis, 3 F.3d 113. There, the plaintiff obtained a fraud

judgment in Texas state court against his business partner, who “then took refuge

in bankruptcy.” Id. at 114. In the fraud proceeding, the Texas court ordered several

forms of relief, including “the equitable remedies of resulting trust, partition in kind

[of real property owned jointly by the plaintiff and defendant], deed reformation,

appointment of a receiver, and dissolution of a partnership” between the plaintiff

and defendant. Id. at 116. The defendant debtor argued that “since failure to

perform his obligations under any of the equitable remedies would justify an award

of money damages,” the remedies were all dischargeable under Section 101(5). The

Fifth Circuit concluded, based on an analysis that was similar to the Seventh

Circuit’s reasoning in Apex Oil, that “Section 101(5)(B) is designed to cause the

liquidation of contingent claims for money damages that are alternatives to

equitable remedies,” and that “[t]he ability of a debtor to choose between

performance and damages in some cases is not the same as a debtor’s liability for

money damages for failing to satisfy an equitable obligation.” Id. at 116 (emphasis

13

added). The court held that Texas law “does not view the payment of money as an

alternative” to the remedies of a resulting trust or deed reformation. Id. at 117. The

court also held that while Texas does permit forced sale of real property as division

of the proceeds as an alternative to partition in kind, “it is not a preferred remedy”

and was unavailable on the facts of the case. Id. Importantly, the court found that

the dissolution of the parties’ real estate partnership and appointment of a receiver

“to conserve the assets” of the partnership was dischargeable—the parties did not

contest the dischargeability of those remedies—because the purpose of that relief

was to preserve money proceeds that would be transferred directly to the plaintiff,

equivalent to damages. See id.; see also In re Irizarry, 171 B.R. 874, 879 (B.A.P. 9th

Cir. 1994) (equitable remedy of deed reformation was not a “claim” where plaintiffs

did not “have a money damage alternative in the event of non-performance,” and

“d[id] not seek to recover the value of the property, but only the property itself”).

The Third Circuit has long applied the same reasoning as the Seventh and

Fifth Circuits. In In re Torwico Elecs., Inc., 8 F.3d at 150, the Third Circuit held

that an order to abate “an ongoing nuisance in direct violation of state

environmental laws” was not a dischargeable claim, “even if the debtor must expend

money to comply.” There, the debtor had been ordered prepetition by the New

Jersey Department of Environmental Protection and Energy to abate hazardous

waste it had released at a manufacturing facility. Id. at 147. The defendant argued

that it would have to spend money to remediate the pollution, in part because it was

no longer in possession of the facility, and thus the remedy was a dischargeable

14

claim. Id. at 149. The court disagreed, holding that the state agency “d[id] not seek

a monetary judgment, but rather seeks to remedy ongoing pollution by forcing [the

debtor] to clean up the site.” Id. Significantly, the court observed that if it “adopt[ed]

the . . . position that any order requiring the debtor to expend money creates a

dischargeable claim, it is unlikely that the state could effectively enforce its laws:

virtually all enforcement actions impose some cost to the violator.” Id. at 150 n.4.

Because the agency could not “force the debtor to pay money to the state,” its

nuisance abatement action did not create a dischargeable claim. Id. at 150

(emphasis added).3

The Second Circuit reached the same conclusion in the context of a cleanup

order under the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,

and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. (“CERCLA”). In In re Chateaugay Corp.,

944 F.2d at 1009, the court held that while EPA could not recover costs to clean up

environmental contamination that it had already incurred because, “[t]o the extent

that CERCLA affords EPA and others a right to payment in lieu of an order directed

solely at cleanup, . . . such an order is a ‘claim.’” The court also held, however, that

3 In In re Continental Airlines, 125 F.3d 120 (3d Cir. 1997), by contrast, an airline

pilots union sought specific performance of certain “seniority integration” provisions

in its prepetition collective bargaining agreement with a bankrupt airline. The court

held that while the collective bargaining agreement was silent on the remedy

available for breach of the seniority integration terms, it was “reasonable to

conclude that a corollary right to payment of liquidated damages would flow from a

breach giving rise to the equitable remedy” of specific performance. Id. at 134

(citation omitted). Because “monetary payment [wa]s an alternative for the

equitable remedy of seniority integration,” id. at 133 (emphasis added), the cause of

action for breach of that contractual obligation was a dischargeable claim.

15

an order to clean up the site to prevent future contamination was not a

dischargeable claim because under the substantive law of CERCLA, EPA did not

have “authority to accept a payment from a responsible party as an alternative to

continued pollution.” Id. at 1008. The Second Circuit thus concluded: “Since there is

no option [for EPA under CERCLA] to accept payment in lieu of continued pollution,

any order that to any extent ends or ameliorates continued pollution is not an order

for breach of an obligation that gives rise to a right of payment and is for that

reason not a ‘claim,’” notwithstanding the practical reality that the debtor would

have to spend money to comply with such an order. Id.

The Eighth Circuit held below—incorrectly, Government Plaintiffs contend—

that an order pursuant to California law requiring abatement but permitting the

trial court, in its discretion, to allow the defendant to pay into an abatement fund

managed by an independent third-party receiver who would be required to return

any unused abatement funds to that defendant (and not to the plaintiff)4 would

constitute “an equitable remedy . . . convertible into a monetary obligation” and

thus constitute a dischargeable claim. In re Peabody Energy Corp., 958 F.3d at 724.

The Court held that the available remedy is a dischargeable claim “without regard

to who receives the payment,” in part because “it is the municipalities and their

people who stand to benefit from” the abatement order. Id. But as the Seventh

Circuit pointed out, the prevailing plaintiffs in an action for equitable relief always

4 See People v. ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co., 17 Cal. App. 5th at 131–34 (affirming

order creating abatement fund in lead paint nuisance case).

16

stand to benefit from the defendant’s compliance with the court-order injunction.

After all, “[i]f ‘any order requiring the debtor to expend money creates a

dischargeable claim, it is unlikely that the state could effectively enforce its laws:

virtually all enforcement actions impose some cost on the violator.’” Apex Oil, 579

F.3d at 737 (quoting In re Torwico Elecs., Inc., 8 F.3d at 150 n.4.). And as the

Second, Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits agree, the purpose and effect of Section

105 is to discharge payments of money to the plaintiff that serve as an alternative to

equitable relief.

The Eighth Circuit based its holding in part on a misreading of this Court’s

1985 decision in Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985), which held that the State of

Ohio had a dischargeable claim against a debtor where a receiver was appointed to

“take possession of all of [the debtor’s] assets” to implement an injunctive order to

clean up an environmental nuisance. Id. at 282–83. Kovacs, however, is fully

consistent with the holdings of the Second, Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits. In

Kovacs, a cleanup injunction had been entered prior to the debtor’s bankruptcy, and

when the debtor “failed to comply with their obligations under the injunction,” the

state court ordered—before the bankruptcy petition—that a receiver be appointed

to, among other actions, levy the debtor’s wages and take possession of all his assets

“to defray cleanup costs” that the state would otherwise pay. Id. at 276, 281 n.9. The

Court specifically noted that “[t]he injunction surely obliged [the debtor] to clean up

the site,” but “when he failed to do so,” the state chose not to “prosecute [the debtor]

under the environmental laws or bring civil or criminal contempt proceedings,” but

17

instead exercised its broad authority to obtain appointment of a receiver to take

over all of the debtor’s assets. Id. at 282–83 (emphasis added). On those facts, the

court held that “the State was seeking no more than a money judgment as an

alternative to requiring [the debtor] to perform the obligations imposed by the

injunction”

because injunctive relief was no longer available under the

circumstances of that case. Id. at 281 (emphasis added).

In this case, by contrast, the Government Plaintiffs seek an equitable

abatement order in the first instance. If Government Plaintiffs prevail, the court

will require PEC and its co-defendants to remediate the public nuisance they

created, either through their own personnel and contractors or through those

retained by an independent court-appointed receiver. Under no circumstance will

PEC be required to pay any money to Government Plaintiffs, nor will Government

Plaintiffs have authority to exercise any dominion or control over any PEC funds.

Cf. Apex Oil, 579 F.3d at 737 (distinguishing relief sought in Kovacs, where the

receiver “was seeking money rather than an order that the debtor clean up the

contaminated site,” from an injunction that that the defendant would have to spend

money to comply with); In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d at 1009 (affirming cleanup

order and stating that “to the extent that an order is obtained under CERCLA or

any other environmental statute that seeks to end or ameliorate pollution, we are

satisfied that nothing in Kovacs permits a discharge of such obligation,” even where

defendant would be required to spend money to comply).

18

The Eighth Circuit’s holding that a representative California public nuisance

cause of action is a dischargeable claim because relief “can include obligations to

pay money” into an abatement fund managed by an independent receiver thus

squarely conflicts with the Second, Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits’ holdings in

that Section 101(5) could not have been intended to define “claim” so broadly.

The split of authority between this case and the Sixth Circuit’s Whizco

decision on one hand, and cases like Apex Oil, In re Torwico, In re Chateaugay

Corp., Matter of Davis, and In re Continental Airlines turns on interpretation of a

core provision of the bankruptcy code that defines when a cause of action

constitutes a “claim” under 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). Interpretation and application of

that statutory provision is of critical importance to countless bankruptcies,

especially in cases like this and Apex Oil in which a government entity is seeking an

order requiring a bankrupt defendant to abate a nuisance, remediate environmental

hazards, or otherwise engage in purely remedial activities, not to compensate the

public entity or its residents but to restore the status quo.

The question at issue here is likely to recur with increasing frequency given

the dire economic consequences that have already begun to unfold as a result of the

COVID-19 pandemic. An unprecedented number of corporate entities in a broad

range of industries have already begun to initiate bankruptcy proceedings. Many

such entities are in the energy sector like PEC and/or are potentially subject to

considerable environmental liabilities. For example, the Louisiana Oil and Gas

Association, a state trade group, disclosed on May 4, 2020 that in a survey of its

19

membership “more than half of company leaders indicated that bankruptcy or

closures are likely” due to “economic consequences of the global COVID-19

pandemic” and falling oil prices. See State’s Oil Producers Shuttering at Alarming

Rate, La. Oil & Gas Ass’n (May 4, 2020), available at https://www.loga.la/news-andarticles/states-oil-producers-shuttering-at-alarming-rate. Within the last month, at

least one Texas shale oil company filed a chapter 11 bankruptcy petition with more

than $500 million in secured debt, citing “[t]he precipitous decline in oil prices from

the combined effect of the COVID-19 pandemic and the flooding of oil markets by

warring international producers” as the principal force inducing the bankruptcy.

See Declaration of David E. Roberts Jr. in Support of the Debtors’ Chapter 11

Petitions and First Day Relief, In re Gavlian Res., LLC, No. 20-32656, Dkt. 13 (S.D.

Tex. Bankr. May 16, 2020).

Because the Eighth Circuit’s ruling here has deepened a split of appellate

authority on a critical question of bankruptcy law, one that is likely to recur and

arise more frequently in litigation nationwide, there is at a minimum a reasonable

possibility that the Court will grant certiorari review.

B.

There Is Also a Reasonable Prospect that the Government

Plaintiffs Will Prevail on the Merits if Certiorari Is Granted.

A party seeking to stay this Court’s mandate must also show “a fair prospect

that five Justices will conclude that the case was erroneously decided below.” Lucas

v. Townsend, 486 U.S. 1301, 1304 (1988) (Kennedy, J., in chambers). There appear

to be few guiding principles to determine which cases present a “fair prospect” for

reversal on certiorari. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 448 U.S. 1306, 1309 (1980)

20

(Brennan, J., in chambers) (likelihood of reversal “in a context as sensitive as that

before me cannot be predicted with anything approaching certainty”). There is at

least a fair prospect of reversal in this case if certiorari is granted, because the

Eighth Circuit’s analysis is at odds with the statutory language and purpose, and

because of the potentially damaging implications of the Eighth Circuit’s ruling upon

environmental compliance cases and to the broad range of consumer protection and

other cases, commonly prosecuted by public entities, where equity is the principal

remedy sought by the public entity or private attorney general plaintiff.

The Eighth Circuit’s holding that equitable causes of action are dischargeable

whenever the bankrupt defendant might potentially have to expend money to

satisfy the judgment “without regard to who receives the payment,” In re Peabody

Energy Corp., 958 F.3d at 725, dramatically expands the scope of dischargeable

liabilities and ultimately renders superfluous Section 101(5)(B)—which only makes

dischargeable a narrow category of equitable claims (those that create “a right to an

equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to

payment . . .”).

As the Seventh Circuit cautioned in Apex Oil, “[a]lmost every equitable

decree imposes a cost on the defendant, whether the decree requires him to do

something . . . or, as is more common, to refrain from doing something.” 579 F.3d at

737. By adopting the contrary rule that a right to payment exists whenever a

defendant may have the option of complying with an equitable judgment by paying

someone to act on its behalf, the Eighth Circuit has effectively concluded “that every

21

equitable claim is dischargeable in bankruptcy unless there is a specific exception in

the Code,” which “is inconsistent with the Code’s creation in 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(B) of

only a limited right to the discharge of equitable claims.” See id.

Absent a stay followed by a grant of certiorari review and reversal, the

Eighth Circuit’s ruling will have grave consequences for government litigation

against defendants in or post-bankruptcy (where defendants have the choice of

filing their bankruptcy petition in the Eighth or Sixth Circuits rather than

elsewhere), from environmental enforcement and consumer protection actions to

cases arising out of the national opioid crisis. Indeed, the United States warned of

that very consequence when it sought to enforce the RCRA cleanup order as the

plaintiff in Apex Oil. In opposing the defendant’s petition for certiorari in that case,

the United States argued that “[b]ecause neither RCRA nor the relevant district

court order allows petitioner to pay money to the government in lieu of carrying out

the required cleanup, the obligation imposed on petitioner is not dischargeable in

bankruptcy.” Brief of United States in Opp. to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13,

Apex Oil Co. v. United States, No. 091023 (U.S. July 2010) (emphasis added). The

government further argued that the “expenditure-of-money test” applied by the

Sixth Circuit in Whizco and now by the Eighth Circuit did not “accor[d] with the

statutory definition of ‘claim’ and with congressional intent,” and would “prevent

Section 101(5)(B)’s ‘right to payment’ language from imposing any meaningful

practical limit on the class of equitable remedy rights that will constitute

dischargeable claims.” Id. at 17–19.

22

As the United States correctly observed in Apex Oil, the plain text of the U.S.

Bankruptcy Code supports the majority of circuits’ interpretation of Section

101(5)(B). Section 101(5)(A) states in relevant part that any “right to payment” is

dischargeable, “whether or not such right is . . . legal [or] equitable . . . .” 11 U.S.C. §

101(5)(A). Section 101(5)(B), in turn, states that a “right to an equitable remedy for

breach of performance” is dischargeable “if such breach gives rise to a right to

payment . . . .” Id. § 101(5)(B). If every equitable decree that required a defendant to

spend money constituted a “right to payment,” any remedy encompassed by Section

101(5)(A) would already be a dischargeable “claim” under that section, the plain

language of which permits discharge of any “right to payment” whether “legal” or

“equitable.” Under the Eighth Circuit’s analysis, the entirely of Section 101(5)(B)

would therefore become mere surplusage.

As the Apex Oil court thus correctly concluded, the “natural reading” of

Section 101(5)(B), as a matter of logic no less than plain language, must be that an

equitable remedy is dischargeable only “if the holder of an equitable claim can, in

the event that the equitable remedy turns out to be unobtainable, obtain a money

judgment instead . . . .” 579 F.3d at 736 (emphasis added). That is, Section 101(5)(A)

allows the discharge of a cause of action or other obligation that gives the holder a

right to receive payment—whether in equity or at law—while Section 101(5)(B)

additionally allows the discharge of a cause of action or other obligation that

provides an equitable remedy for specific performance, but only if the holder can

23

convert the underlying cause of action into a right to receive payment in the event of

breach.

Congress has made clear that while the statutory definition of a “claim” is

broad, Section 101(5)(B) is “intended to cause the liquidation or estimation of

contingent rights of payment for which there may be an alternative equitable

remedy, with the result that the equitable remedy will be susceptible to being

discharged in bankruptcy.” H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 549 (1977); cf. Pa. Dep’t of Pub.

Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 558 (1990). Thus, for example, a dischargeable

claim exists when under state law “a judgment for specific performance may be

satisfied by an alternative right to payment, in the event performance is refused,”

while by contrast, “rights to an equitable remedy for breach of performance with

respect to which such breach does not give rise to a right to payment are not ‘claims’

and would therefore not be susceptible to discharge in bankruptcy.” H.R. Rep. No.

95-595, at 549. This Court has thus held that equitable causes of action are claims

under Section 101(5)(B) only when they have been or can be “reduced to a monetary

obligation” under the substantive law giving rise to the cause of action. See Kovacs,

469 U.S. at 282. The Sixth and Eighth Circuits’ interpretation would bulldoze the

carefully tailored statutory language and reach far beyond the clear intent of

the statute.

Given the potentially broad and harmful ramifications of the Eighth Circuit’s

opinion, the persuasive analysis of the Seventh Circuit in Apex Oil, and the federal

government’s past agreement with the position advocated by Government Plaintiffs

24

here, there is at least a reasonable prospect that this Court will reverse on the

merits if certiorari is granted.

C.

The Government Plaintiffs Will Suffer Irreparable Harm if the

Mandate is Not Recalled Because Dismissing Their Claims in

California Could Moot Review of the Eighth Circuit’s Ruling.

Government Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm if the mandate is not

recalled and this case is not stayed. The bankruptcy court’s order, affirmed by the

Eighth Circuit, requires the Government Plaintiffs to dismiss the claims in their

California lawsuits against PEC with prejudice. If no stay is granted and

Government Plaintiffs are compelled to comply with the bankruptcy court’s order

and dismiss with prejudice their claims against PEC in the California action, they

will have forfeited the very causes of action against PEC that they seek to preserve

by pursuing certiorari review in this Court, potentially mooting their ability to seek

such review.5 The risk of pretermitting Government Plaintiff’s ability to

meaningfully petition for certiorari constitutes sufficient irreparable harm to justify

recalling the mandate and issuing a stay, as mootness on appeal is “the

‘quintessential form of prejudice.’” In re Country Squire Assocs. of Carle Place, L.P.,

203 B.R. 182, 183 (B.A.P. 2d Cir. 1996) (quoting In re Advanced Min. Sys., Inc., 173

“The rule in federal cases is that an actual controversy must be extant at all stages

of review” to supply jurisdiction consistent with Article III of the Constitution.

Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975). “That the dispute between the parties

was very much alive when suit was filed, or at the time the Court of Appeals

rendered its judgment, cannot substitute for the actual case or controversy that an

exercise of this Court's jurisdiction requires.” Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 317

(1988).

5

25

B.R. 467, 469 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994). Government Plaintiffs’ untenable position can

only be overcome by a stay.

PEC and the other defendants in the California actions have previously

argued that if Government Plaintiffs dismiss their California actions against PEC

and the bankruptcy court’s order is later reversed, Government Plaintiffs could seek

reinstatement of those actions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5), which authorizes

courts to “relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment . . . based

on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated.” But that argument

provides no solace because, if dismissal of the California lawsuits with prejudice

moots the petition for certiorari from the bankruptcy court order, Government

Plaintiffs will have lost the opportunity to challenge the basis for the order leading

to the dismissal, and with it any possibility for relief under Rule 60. Moreover, even

if the contingent possibility of relief under Rule 60 were enough to overcome

mootness, Government Plaintiffs have identified no case (and PEC has never cited

one) in which Rule 60(b)(5) has been applied to relieve a plaintiff from a voluntary

dismissal with prejudice, as the bankruptcy court order would require here.

Further, there is no California provision comparable to Rule 60 that Government

Plaintiffs could pursue in state court, and state court procedures, not federal, would

likely govern now that the Ninth Circuit has affirmed the California district court’s

order remanding the California cases to state court. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §

473(b) (limiting relief from judgment to instances of “mistake, inadvertence,

surprise, or excusable neglect”).

26

The harm threatened to Government Plaintiffs here from the mandate

issuing without a stay is “both certain and great; . . . actual and not theoretical.”

Packard Elevator v. I.C.C., 782 F.2d 112, 115 (8th Cir. 1986). Government Plaintiffs

risk losing not only their right to obtain an appellate decision on the underlying

merits of the bankruptcy court’s order, but their entire underlying California case

against PEC. That harm is irreparable and warrants a stay.

D.

The Equities Weigh in Government Plaintiffs’ Favor.

The balance of equities, including the public interest, further supports

recalling the mandate and staying the bankruptcy court’s order. The underlying

California litigation has been stayed in the Northern District of California for more

than two years. Neither PEC nor any of the other defendants have been served with

discovery, filed any dispositive motions, or answered the complaints. The

defendants, including PEC, were recently granted an extension of 30 days to file

any petition for rehearing with the Ninth Circuit from that court’s affirmance of the

district court’s remand order, meaning the mandate directing the case to be

remanded to state court cannot issue until at least mid-July, and likely much later

if the defendants in fact petition for rehearing. See Order Granting Motion for

Extension of Time to File, Cty. of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., No. 18-15499, Dkt.

204 (9th Cir. June 8, 2020). PEC’s burden to date has thus been de minimis and any

additional burden to PEC from a stay of the bankruptcy court’s order pending the

Government Plaintiffs’ petition for certiorari (or decision not to file such a petition)

would likewise be minimal, given the litigation’s slow and limited pace to date.

27

The public interest, by contrast, weighs strongly in favor of enabling the

Court to resolve the question raised by Government Plaintiffs’ anticipated petition,

as the scope of dischargeable obligations in bankruptcy has an enormous potential

impact on public entities and others who seek to pursue their statutory and common

law

rights

to

equitable

relief

from

entities

that

are,

or

may

be,

in

bankruptcy proceedings.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, Applicants County of San Mateo, California;

City of Imperial Beach, California; and County of Marin, California (“Government

Plaintiffs”) respectfully request that the mandate of the Eighth Circuit Court of

Appeals be recalled, and the court’s judgment be stayed pending Government

Plaintiffs’ timely petitioning this Court for a writ of certiorari.

Dated: June 10, 2020

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Matthew K. Edling

Matthew K. Edling

matt@sheredling.com

Sher Edling LLP

100 Montgomery Street, Suite 1410

San Francisco, CA 94014

Tel: (628) 231-2500

Attorney for Plaintiffs-Applicants,

County of San Mateo, et al.

28

APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Appendix A: Court of Appeals Opinion

In re Peabody Energy Corp. (8th Cir. 2020)

May 6, 2020 …………………………………………………1a

In re Peabody Energy Corporation, 958 F.3d 717 (2020)

while a closer call, the bankruptcy court did not abuse its

discretion in determining that the municipalities' nuisance

claims did not fall within the carve-out for government claims

brought under “Environmental Law”;

958 F.3d 717

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

IN RE: PEABODY ENERGY CORPORATION Debtor

County of San Mateo, California;

City of Imperial Beach, California;

County of Marin, California Appellants

v.

Peabody Energy Corporation Appellee

Office of U.S. Trustee U.S. Trustee

In re: Peabody Energy Corporation Debtor

County of San Mateo, California;

City of Imperial Beach, California;

County of Marin, California Appellants

v.

Peabody Energy Corporation Appellee

Office of U.S. Trustee U.S. Trustee

the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in

determining that the municipalities' claims did not fall within

the plan's carve-out for government claims brought under

“applicable police or regulatory law”; and

the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in

determining that reorganized debtor's bankruptcy discharged

their representative public-nuisance claim, even though

California law limited recovery on that claim to the equitable

remedy of abatement.

Affirmed.

Procedural Posture(s): On Appeal; Motion to Enforce

Discharge Injunction.

No. 18-3242, No. 19-1767

|

Submitted: March 10, 2020

|

Filed: May 6, 2020

*720 Appeals from United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Missouri—St. Louis

Attorneys and Law Firms

Synopsis

Background: Reorganized Chapter 11 debtor moved to

enforce discharge injunction by requiring dismissal of statecourt causes of action filed against it by California counties

and city which sought to hold debtor and other energy

companies liable for their alleged contributions to global

warming. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern

District of Missouri, Barry S. Schermer, J., 2017 WL

4843724, granted motion and required dismissal of causes of

action as claims that had been discharged. Counties and city

appealed. The District Court, Rodney W. Sippel, J., 599 B.R.

610, affirmed, and appeals were taken.

Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Morris S. Arnold, Senior

Circuit Judge, held that:

the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in

determining that the municipalities' common-law claims

did not fall within the plan's carve-out for government

claims brought under any “Environmental Law” to which

reorganized debtor was subject, and so were discharged;

Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellant

was Matthew Kendall Edling, of San Francisco, CA. Also

appearing on appellants’ brief were Victor M. Sher and

Michael Rubin of San Francisco, CA.

Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellee

was Shay Dvoretzky, of Washington, DC. The following

attorney(s) appeared on the appellee brief; Jaimie L.

Mansfield, of Saint Louis, MO, Parker Andrew RiderLongmaid, of Washington, DC, Heather Lennox, of

Cleveland, OH, John G. Willard, of Saint Louis, MO,

Matthew Curtis Corcoran, of Columbus, OH.

Before GRUENDER, ARNOLD, and SHEPHERD, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion

ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.

In April 2016, Peabody Energy Corporation filed for Chapter

11 bankruptcy. As part of the court-approved plan governing

Peabody's reorganization, governmental entities with claims

against Peabody had to file proof of their claims with the

(1a)

© 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

1

In re Peabody Energy Corporation, 958 F.3d 717 (2020)

bankruptcy court 1 by a certain date or the claims were

barred. After that date came and went, Peabody emerged as

a reorganized company.

A few months after Peabody was reorganized, three

California municipalities (San Mateo County, Marin County,

and the City of Imperial Beach) sued Peabody and more than

thirty other energy companies for their alleged contributions

to global warming. Each of these municipalities filed a

separate though nearly identical lawsuit, all in California state

courts, raising claims of strict liability and negligence for

failing to warn, strict liability for a design defect, negligence,

trespass, and private nuisance. They also brought two publicnuisance claims, one on behalf of the *721 people of

California seeking abatement of the nuisance, and the other on

their own behalf seeking, among other things, damages and

disgorgement of profits. Peabody returned to the bankruptcy

court and asked that it enjoin the municipalities from pursuing

their claims against it and require them to dismiss their

claims with prejudice on the ground that the court-approved

reorganization plan had discharged them.

The bankruptcy court agreed. It began with a review of the

municipalities' complaints, explaining that they focused on

acts occurring from 1965 to 2015. The court noted, moreover,

that the complaints mentioned Peabody sparingly, and, when

they did, they alleged that Peabody had exported coal

from California, continued to export coal from California,

participated in “a national climate change science denial

campaign” in 1991, and was linked to groups seeking to

undermine the connection between the companies' fossil

fuel products and climate change. The bankruptcy court

determined that the municipalities' claims, which involved

Peabody's pre-bankruptcy conduct save for the anodyne

allegation that Peabody continues to export coal from

California, were all discharged during Peabody's bankruptcy

proceedings, and so it enjoined the municipalities from

pursuing their claims against Peabody. The municipalities

appealed the bankruptcy court's decision to the district

court, 2 which affirmed. See

28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).

The municipalities now appeal to our court. When a

bankruptcy court's decision is appealed to the district court,

that court acts as an appellate court by reviewing legal

determinations de novo and factual findings for clear error.

See Fix v. First State Bank of Roscoe, 559 F.3d 803, 808 (8th

Cir. 2009). When the case comes to us, “[a]s the second court

of appellate review, we conduct an independent review of the

bankruptcy court's judgment applying the same standards of

review as the district court.” Id.

Confirmation of a Chapter 11 reorganization plan discharges

claims “[e]xcept as otherwise provided ... in the plan,” see 11

U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1), and the municipalities contend that there

are two provisions in the plan that exempt all their claims from

discharge. Importantly, since a confirmed Chapter 11 plan is

an order of the bankruptcy court, we review the bankruptcy

court's interpretation of a confirmed plan for an abuse of

discretion. See In re Dial Bus. Forms, Inc., 341 F.3d 738, 744

(8th Cir. 2003).

As relevant, the first provision that the municipalities rely

on exempts from discharge governmental claims brought

“under any applicable Environmental Law to which any

Reorganized Debtor is subject,” but the bankruptcy court

held that the municipalities' claims were not made under

“Environmental Law” as the plan contemplates that phrase

and so this carveout did not save the municipalities'

claims from discharge. The plan defined Environmental

Law as “all federal, state and local statutes, regulations

and ordinances concerning pollution or protection of the

environment, or environmental impacts on human health

and safety, including [ten federal statutes] and any state

or local equivalents of the foregoing.” A sample of the

federal statutes listed includes the Atomic Energy Act; the

Clean Air Act; the Comprehensive Environmental Response,

Compensation, and Liability Act; *722 and the Federal

Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act.

The municipalities argue that their common-law claims

against Peabody are “state or local equivalents” of “statutes,

regulations and ordinances concerning pollution” and so forth

because the municipalities raised these claims to protect the

environment. But as the bankruptcy court explained, when the

definition of Environmental Law mentioned “state or local

equivalent[s],” it was talking about equivalents to the ten

federal statutes listed, not equivalents to “statutes, regulations

and ordinances concerning pollution.” We think this is a

reasonable conclusion because we doubt the drafters of the

definition would feel the need to clarify that the equivalents

could be state or local when the part of the definition dealing

with pollution already explicitly said that state and local

laws could qualify. In other words, under the municipalities'

reading, the second mention of “state” and “local” would

be superfluous, and so we don't see how that reading could

comport with the parties' intentions. And the municipalities

(2a)

© 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

2

In re Peabody Energy Corporation, 958 F.3d 717 (2020)

have not demonstrated that their common-law claims are

equivalent to the listed federal statutes.

We also think that if the drafters of this carveout had meant for

it to include common-law claims they would have explicitly

said so, or at a minimum would not have specifically limited

Environmental Law to “statutes, regulations and ordinances.”

The bankruptcy court's interpretation is at least a reasonable

one, and so we cannot say that the bankruptcy court abused

its discretion in concluding that the municipalities' commonlaw claims did not fall within the plan's definition of

Environmental Law.

The municipalities' nuisance claims are a closer call because

they rely on specific California statutes, bringing them at

least arguably more in line with the plan's definition of

Environmental Law. But unlike the federal statutes listed,

nuisance claims have their roots in the common law and

are often referred to as common-law claims, including in

Missouri—the jurisdiction that Peabody calls home—whose

laws may well have been the focus of the parties who drafted

the carveout. See Smith v. ConocoPhillips Pipe Line Co., 801

F.3d 921, 926–27 (8th Cir. 2015). So we are not convinced

that the incidental tethering of the nuisance claims here to

statutes in a jurisdiction far from where Peabody's bankruptcy

proceedings occurred was the kind of claim the drafters

intended to carve out. And as the bankruptcy court noted,

the federal statutes listed are designed to remedy particular

environmental problems. In contrast, nuisance law, while

it may be used to resolve an environmental problem, does

not focus on particular environmental problems. In fact, a

nuisance can be something with no effect whatsoever on

the environment—like something “indecent or offensive to

the senses” or the sale of illegal drugs. See

Cal. Civ.

Code § 3479. We understand the force of the municipalities'

argument that their particular nuisance claims do focus on

the environment, no matter what other nuisance claims might

involve. But we cannot say that the bankruptcy court abused

its discretion in pointing out the broader potential scope of a

California nuisance claim, especially when we consider that

if the drafters of the carveout had wanted to include claims

of a fundamentally broader nature than the ten statutes listed,

they would have said so.

The municipalities emphasize that the plan, in a separate

provision governing its interpretation, explained that when

the plan used the word “including,” it meant “including

without limitation,” and so the municipalities urge us not

to dwell exclusively on the list of federal statutes in *723

interpreting the carveout. But that list shows the kinds of

laws on the minds of the parties who wrote the carveout,

and we understand the bankruptcy court's skepticism that

more far-reaching claims were also carved out. We think

that “including without limitation” could reasonably mean

that there might be more environmental statutes of a similar

scope that could be considered Environmental Laws, not that

any claim with a potential environmental reach is carved

out. If any claim with a potential environmental reach were

included, then why would the drafters include the list in the

first place? Or why would they not add to the list statutes

that are not so obviously Environmental Laws? Although

the municipalities advance a reasonable interpretation of the

plan, their interpretation is not without its faults, and so the

bankruptcy court's interpretation, which we also believe is

reasonable and is entitled to deference, does not amount to an

abuse of discretion.

A relevant portion of the second provision that the

municipalities rely on for the survival of their claims

exempts from discharge a governmental claim brought “under

any ... applicable police or regulatory law.” The bankruptcy

court held that the claims here were not brought under a

police or regulatory law, drawing from a section of the

11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4), that excepts

bankruptcy code, see

a government's attempt to enforce its “police and regulatory

power” from the automatic stay that results from the filing of

a bankruptcy petition. The bankruptcy court pointed out that

our court has held, in construing that provision, that when the

government's actions “would result in an economic advantage

to the government or its citizens over third parties in relation

to the debtor's estate,” then the government is not exercising

its police or regulatory power. It is acting as a creditor. See

In re Commonwealth Cos., 913 F.2d 518, 523 (8th Cir.

1990). Applying this so-called pecuniary-interest rule, the

bankruptcy court concluded that if the municipalities' claims

were successful, they would obtain a pecuniary advantage

over other creditors because they were seeking damages and

disgorgement of fifty-years-worth of profits and so they were

not seeking to enforce its police or regulatory power.

The municipalities maintain on appeal that we should not

review this aspect of the bankruptcy court's decision for an

abuse of discretion because in this instance the court was

interpreting a provision of the bankruptcy code, which raises

a question of law that we would review de novo. See In re

Archdiocese of Saint Paul & Minneapolis, 888 F.3d 944, 950

(8th Cir. 2018). We disagree. It is apparent to us that the

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In re Peabody Energy Corporation, 958 F.3d 717 (2020)

bankruptcy court here was simply construing the terms of the

§ 362 provided a

plan, and, as it explained, thought that

helpful guide in that effort. We therefore think what we have

before us is a question about the meaning of the plan, not

the bankruptcy code, and so we review the bankruptcy court's

holding for an abuse of discretion.

We see no abuse of discretion in the bankruptcy court's

§ 362, along with our court's

decision to draw on

interpretation of it, in determining the meaning of the

plan. To the extent the municipalities are objecting to the

way the bankruptcy court applied the pecuniary-purpose

rule, we reject their contention. If the municipalities forced

Peabody to disgorge its profits and recovered the damages

they sought, they would diminish the value of the other

creditors' ownership stakes in the reorganized Peabody,

redistributing the bankruptcy estate without ever having

themselves participated in the bankruptcy proceedings.

In addition, the municipalities seek money as the victims

of alleged torts, not *724 because they are exercising

regulatory or police authority over Peabody, which, according

to the complaints, is an out-of-state company acting outside of

the municipalities' borders. So for this independent reason, the

second carveout does not salvage the municipalities' claims.

The municipalities also assert that, even if the plans did not

exempt all their claims from discharge, Peabody's bankruptcy

did not discharge their representative public-nuisance claim.

Before addressing this argument, a brief survey of the relevant

bankruptcy law is in order. Confirmation of a Chapter 11

plan for reorganization “discharges the debtor from any debt

that arose before the date of such confirmation,” regardless

of whether “proof of the claim based on such debt is filed”

with the bankruptcy court. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1)(A). A

debt, meanwhile, is simply a “liability on a claim.” Id. §

101(12). A claim, in turn, is a “right to payment” or, as

more relevant here, a “right to an equitable remedy for

breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to

payment, whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is

reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured,

disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured.” Id. § 101(5).

The Supreme Court has noted that, by defining “claim” as

it did, Congress intended to adopt the “broadest available

definition” of the term. See

Johnson v. Home State Bank,

501 U.S. 78, 83, 111 S.Ct. 2150, 115 L.Ed.2d 66 (1991).

Our court has said that Congress intended “claim” to include

“virtually all obligations to pay money.” See

In re Flight

Transp. Corp. Sec. Litig., 874 F.2d 576, 583 (8th Cir. 1989).

The municipalities contend that the public-nuisance claim

they assert on behalf of the people of California is not a

claim under bankruptcy law because California law does not

permit them to recover damages under that theory; they can

obtain only an equitable decree ordering Peabody to abate the

nuisance. As a result, the argument goes, they do not have a

“right to payment” or an equitable remedy that “gives rise to

a right to payment,” so Peabody's bankruptcy does not affect

this claim in their complaint.

The difficulty with this argument is that, even though

California law limits the recovery on this claim to equitable

relief, that relief can include obligations to pay money. As

one of the cases that the municipalities rely on most heavily

explains, it is a “myth” that “equitable remedies are always

orders to act or not to act, rather than to pay,” as “equity often

orders payment[s]” that can be discharged in bankruptcy. See

United States v. Apex Oil Co., 579 F.3d 734, 736 (7th Cir.

2009). In California, a party who commits a public nuisance

can be ordered to pay into a fund, overseen by a receiver,

to remedy or eliminate the hazard complained of rather than

being ordered to clean up the nuisance themselves. See, e.g.,

People v. ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co., 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d

499, 569–70 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017). It does not matter that the

municipalities do not request that Peabody be ordered to pay

into an abatement fund. That a California court could order

them is sufficient to make the claim dischargeable, see

In

re Torwico Elecs., Inc., 8 F.3d 146, 150 (3d Cir. 1993);

In

re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 1008 (2d Cir. 1991),

because that order would convert the requirement to abate a

nuisance into an “obligation[ ] to pay money.” This case is

therefore unlike other cases that the municipalities point to

where the relevant equitable remedy was not convertible into

a monetary obligation. See, e.g.,

Apex Oil, 579 F.3d at 736;

Torwico, 8 F.3d at 150.

The municipalities point out that they would not receive

the proceeds that a *725 court directs to be paid into an

abatement fund; that money, unlike damages, would go to a

receiver. That is true enough, but we don't see why it makes

a difference. As already noted, we have broadly stated that

a “claim” includes “virtually all obligations to pay money,”

see

Flight Transp., 874 F.2d at 583, without regard to

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In re Peabody Energy Corporation, 958 F.3d 717 (2020)

who receives the payment. The Supreme Court, moreover, in

holding that obligations to pay for environmental cleanup are

subject to discharge, paid little attention to the fact that those

payments would go to a receiver, apparently assuming that

did not disqualify the right to payments from being a “claim.”

Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 283, 105 S.Ct. 705,

See

83 L.Ed.2d 649 (1985). Besides, even if the municipalities

cannot deposit abatement-fund payments into their general

treasuries, it is the municipalities and their people who stand

to benefit from them.

We therefore disagree with the municipalities' contention

that, since their representative public-nuisance claim entitles

them only to the equitable remedy of abatement, it is not

dischargeable in bankruptcy.

The municipalities contend finally that they have asserted

claims concerning Peabody's post-bankruptcy activities and

that those claims should be allowed to proceed. But we

agree with the bankruptcy court that all the claims in the

complaint are directed at Peabody's pre-bankruptcy conduct,

as the only allegation against Peabody involving its postbankruptcy conduct was that it continues to export coal from

California. That allegation is insufficient to raise a claim, and

so we decline to hold that it somehow changes the character

of the complaints as the municipalities maintain.

As a result, we affirm the judgment of the district court, and

though it probably goes without saying, we necessarily also

deny the municipalities' request for a stay of the bankruptcy

court's decision pending appeal.

All Citations

958 F.3d 717

Footnotes

1

2

The Honorable Barry S. Schermer, United States Bankruptcy Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri.

The Honorable Rodney W. Sippel, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of

Missouri.

End of Document

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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