Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Center for Biological Diversity, et al., Petitioners v. Chad Wolf, Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, et al.

Supreme Court briefJan 31, 2020

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App. 1

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL )

)

DIVERSITY, et al.,

)

Plaintiffs,

)

v.

)

No. 18-cv-655 (KBJ)

)

KEVIN McALEENAN, Acting

Secretary of the Department of )

)

Homeland Security, et al.,

)

Defendants.

)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

(Filed Sep. 4, 2019)

More than 20 years ago, Congress enacted the

Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“the IIRIRA” or “the Act”), an immigration

and border-security reform statute that was intended,

in substantial part, “to improve deterrence of illegal

immigration to the United States[.]” H.R. Rep. No. 104828, at 1 (1996) (Conf. Rep.); see also Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,

Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C., Title I, 110 Stat. 3009-546

(1996). To that end, Congress expressly authorized the

erection of physical barriers and roads “in the vicinity

of the United States border to deter illegal crossings in

areas of high illegal entry[,]” Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div.

C., Title I, § 102(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 554 (1996), and

App. 2

it specifically identified the border near San Diego,

California, as one such area, id. § 102(b). Moreover, in

order to facilitate swift construction of these new border barriers, Congress authorized the Attorney General of the United States to waive otherwise-applicable

provisions of two environmental statutes—the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (“ESA”), 16 U.S.C. §§ 153144, and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969

(“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370m-12—to the extent

“necessary[,]” as determined by the Attorney General.

Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C., Title I, § 102(c), 110 Stat.

3009-546, 554 (1996). Significantly for present purposes, in the 23 years that have transpired since the

initial passage of the IIRIRA, Congress has amended

the statute not only to identify additional priority areas for construction, see Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub.

L. No. 109-367, § 3, 120 Stat. 2638, 2638-39 (2006);

Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub.

L. No. 110-161, § 564, 121 Stat. 1844, 2090-91 (2008),

but also to expand the waiver authority to include all

laws (not just the two environmental statutes), and to

limit significantly the jurisdiction of the federal courts

to adjudicate challenges to waivers that are issued pursuant to the IIRIRA’s rapid-construction mandate, see

REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, Title

I, § 102, 119 Stat. 231, 306 (2005).

The scope of the IIRIRA’s waiver authorization

and this Court’s ability to consider legal actions that

contest the government’s waiver of environmental

laws to speed the construction of border barriers are

the core legal issues in the instant case. On January

App. 3

22, 2018, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland

Security (“DHS”) announced that DHS was invoking

the IIRIRA to waive the application of 25 laws with respect to the construction of physical barriers along a

20-mile stretch of the border in New Mexico (hereinafter “the New Mexico Waiver”). See Determination Pursuant to Section 102 of the IIRIRA, as Amended, 83

Fed. Reg. 3,012, 3,013-14 (Jan. 22, 2018). Plaintiffs

Center for Biological Diversity, Southwest Environmental Center, Defenders of Wildlife, and Animal Legal Defense Fund (“Plaintiffs”) have brought the instant

action to contest the DHS Secretary’s waiver decision;

they claim, primarily, that the Secretary’s waiver determination is ultra vires and unlawful “because it exceeds the limited grant of authority for such waivers

contained in IIRIRA Section 102,” (Compl., ECF No. 1,

¶ 2), and that the New Mexico Waiver “will have numerous negative impacts on the wildlife, plants, and

the sensitive biological habitats on and near the proposed” project site (id. ¶ 60). Plaintiffs also insist that

the IIRIRA’s waiver authority is unconstitutional in

various ways. (See id. ¶ 2 (“[A]ny interpretation of

[IIRIRA] Section 102 that would sanction the issuance

of the New Mexico Waiver would render this statutory

provision so broad and unbounded in scope that it

would run afoul of the [c]onstitutional principles of

Separation of Powers, the Non-Delegation Doctrine,

the Presentment Clause and other constitutional provisions.”).)

Before this Court at present are two dispositive

cross-motions that the parties in this matter have filed.

App. 4

Plaintiffs have moved for summary judgment on their

ultra vires and constitutional claims, and DHS has

moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims or, in the alternative, request summary judgment. (See Pls.’ Mot. for

Summ. J. (“Pls.’ Mot.”), ECF No. 16; Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss & Alternatively Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. (“Defs.’

Mot.”), ECF No. 21.) DHS maintains, as a threshold

matter, that this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to determine whether the New Mexico Waiver is

ultra vires, because “Congress has expressly withdrawn

district court jurisdiction to review non-constitutional

challenges to the [DHS] Secretary’s exercise of waiver

authority[.]” (Defs.’ Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. & Mem. in Supp.

of Defs.’ Mot. (“Defs.’ Mem.”), ECF No. 21-1, at 21.)1 In

addition, DHS asserts that Plaintiffs’ claims are meritless, because the Secretary has not exceeded the

agency’s statutory authority in issuing the New Mexico Waiver (see id. at 26-42), and because the IIRIRA’s

grant of waiver authority is not so broad as to violate

the Constitution (see id. at 42-50). Plaintiffs respond

that the Court has jurisdiction to hear their ultra vires

claims despite the statutory restrictions on judicial review because the New Mexico Waiver was not properly

issued pursuant to the IIRIRA (see Pls.’ Mem. in Supp.

of Pls.’ Mot. (“Pls.’ Mem.”), ECF No. 16-1, at 42-45), and

they further maintain that they are entitled to summary judgment with respect to their ultra vires and

constitutional claims (see id. at 26-42, 45-54).

1

Page-number citations to the documents that the parties

have filed refer to the page numbers that the Court’s electronic

filing system automatically assigns.

App. 5

For the reasons explained fully below, this Court

concludes that Congress has unambiguously precluded

all non-constitutional legal challenges to the exercise

of the DHS Secretary’s waiver authority, including ultra vires claims. Adding a belt to these suspenders,

Congress has further removed this Court’s subjectmatter jurisdiction over any non-constitutional waiver

challenges; therefore, this Court is without power to

address the merits of Plaintiffs’ ultra vires contentions.

The Court also finds that Plaintiffs’ constitutional

claims cannot proceed, based on the reasoning of a

persuasive prior opinion from this district that addresses the constitutionality of the IIRIRA’s section

102(c) waiver authority in substantially similar circumstances and holds that Congress has provided sufficient limitations to the agency’s exercise of power to

comport with the Constitution’s separation-of-powers

requirements. Consequently, Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment will be DENIED, and Defendants’

cross-motion will be GRANTED, insofar as both the

ultra vires and the constitutional claims will be dismissed. A separate Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will follow.

I.

BACKGROUND

A. Section 102 Of The Illegal Immigration

Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act

Congress enacted the IIRIRA in 1996, seeking to

amend the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965

(“INA”). As described in the Conference Report, the

purpose of the IIRIRA was

App. 6

to improve deterrence of illegal immigration

to the United States by increasing border

patrol and investigative personnel, by increasing penalties for alien smuggling and for

document fraud, by reforming exclusion and

deportation law and procedures, by improving

the verification system for eligibility for employment, and through other measures, to

reform the legal immigration system and facilitate legal entries into the United States,

and for other purposes[.]

H.R. Rep. No. 104-828, at 1. The IIRIRA “marked one

of the most significant reforms to immigration since

the [INA],” Marshal Garbus, Environmental Impact of

Border Security Infrastructure: How Department of

Homeland Security’s Waiver of Environmental Regulations Threatens Environmental Interests Along the

U.S.-Mexico Border, 31 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 327, 334 (2018),

and it was developed in the midst of a “political shift to

increase border security during the Clinton administration’s Southwest Border Strategy, which made

control of unauthorized immigration a top priority[,]”

id. at 335. Leading up to the enactment of the IIRIRA,

a measure known as “Operation Gatekeeper was the

Clinton administration’s initiative to control unauthorized immigration along the San Diego/Tijuana border, which had been one of the highest traffic locations

for unauthorized border crossings.” Id.2

2

In the four years preceding the IIRIRA’s enactment, “Operation Gatekeeper increased the deployment of border patrol officers by 60%, marking an unprecedented level of resources devoted

App. 7

1. Congress commands construction of physical barriers in “areas of high illegal entry

into the United States”

As originally enacted, section 102(a) of the IIRIRA

provided that the Attorney General “shall take such

actions as may be necessary to install additional physical barriers and roads (including the removal of obstacles to detection of illegal entrants) in the vicinity of

the United States border to deter illegal crossings in

areas of high illegal entry into the United States.” Pub.

L. No. 104-208, Div. C., Title I, § 102(a), 110 Stat. 3009546, 554 (1996) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1103 note).3 The

statute itself did not delineate what qualifies as an

“area[ ] of high illegal entry,” except insofar as section

102(b) provided specifically for “construction of fencing

and road improvements in the border area near San

Diego, California,” id. § 102(b) (capitalization altered).4

In section 102(b) of the IIRIRA, which is presently

entitled “Construction of fencing and road improvements along the border,” Congress proceeded beyond

section 102(a)’s broad grant of discretion to the Executive Branch with respect to border construction, to

to border security.” Garbus, Environmental Impact of Border Security Infrastructure, 31 Tul. Envtl. L.J. at 335.

3

Because of the numerous amendments to the IIRIRA over

the years, and because section 102 is codified as a note to 8 U.S.C.

§ 1103, this Court will cite to the provision only as “IIRIRA section 102,” and will identify the year of enactment only when citing

to versions other than that currently in effect.

4

The legislative history of the IIRIRA provides no further

indication of Congress’s intent with respect to the broad discretion it conferred upon the Attorney General.

App. 8

specify certain geographical areas along the southwest

border where “[a]dditional fencing” must be built, and

in this regard, it designated particular stretches of

land as “[p]riority areas[.]” IIRIRA § 102(b)(1)(A), (B).

Congress initially pinpointed a 14-mile stretch of the

international land border near San Diego, California,

“starting at the Pacific Ocean and extending eastward,”

and mandated construction “of second and third fences,

in addition to the existing reinforced fence, and for

roads between the fences.” IIRIRA § 102(b)(1) (1996)

(“Construction of Fencing and Road Improvements in

the Border Area Near San Diego, California”). In 2006,

Congress amended section 102(b)(1) to identify five areas along the southern border (no longer including the

14-mile stretch that section 102(b) had previously addressed), and specifically required the DHS Secretary

to “provide for at least 2 layers of reinforced fencing,

the installation of additional physical barriers, roads,

lighting, cameras, and sensors” in those five areas. Id.

§ 102(b)(1)(A) (2006).5

5

When Congress enacted the Homeland Security Act of 2002,

it transferred responsibility for border security from the nowabolished Immigration and Naturalization Service to the newly

created DHS. See Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). Over

time, Congress expressly incorporated this change into the

IIRIRA’s section 102. See H.R. Rep. No. 109-72, at 171 (2005)

(Conf. Rep.) (explaining the replacement of “the reference in current law to the Attorney General by a reference to the Secretary

of Homeland Security” in the newly amended section 102(c)); Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-367, 120 Stat. 2638, 2639

(2006) (incorporating “the Secretary of Homeland Security” in

amendments to section 102(b)); Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, § 564, 121 Stat. 1844, 2090

App. 9

Congress amended section 102(b)(1)(A) again in

2008; it eliminated the specified list of geographical areas and replaced that language with the following

statement: “In carrying out subsection (a), the Secretary of Homeland Security shall construct reinforced

fencing along not less than 700 miles of the southwest

border where fencing would be most practical and effective and provide for the installation of additional

physical barriers, roads, lighting, cameras, and sensors

to gain operational control of the southwest border.”

Id. § 102(b)(1)(A). However, Congress remained silent

with respect to how or why the Secretary was to select

“not less than 700 miles” for fencing along the southwest border. See, e.g., Michael John Garcia, Cong. Research Serv., R43975, Barriers Along the U.S. Borders:

Key Authorities and Requirements, at 11-12 (2016).

As mentioned previously, through its various

amendments to the IIRIRA’s section 102, Congress has

consistently and unequivocally established that, with

respect to the creation of physical barriers and roads,

certain spots along the southern border are “[p]riority

areas.” Id. § 102(b)(1)(B). In 2006, section 102(b)(1)(B)

provided specific deadlines for the construction of such

barriers in two of the five geographic areas that Congress identified. See id. § 102(b)(1)(B) (2006). Most

recently, in 2008, Congress amended the “[p]riority

areas” provision—section 102(b)(1)(B)—to require the

Secretary of DHS to “identify the 370 miles, or other

(2008) (amending section 102(a) “by striking ‘Attorney General,

in consultation with the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization,’ and inserting ‘Secretary of Homeland Security’ ”).

App. 10

mileage determined by the Secretary . . . along the

southwest border where fencing would be most practical and effective in deterring smugglers and aliens attempting to gain illegal entry into the United States[.]”

Id. § 102(b)(1)(B)(i).6 The statute further specifies that

this “authority . . . shall expire on December 31, 2008,”

id., and that fencing along those 370 (or other) miles

must be completed “not later than December 31, 2008,”

id. § 102(b)(1)(B)(ii).

The 2008 amendments also added a new provision

to section 102(b)(1) that required DHS to “consult with

the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Agriculture, States, local governments, Indian tribes, and

property owners in the United States to minimize the

impact on the environment, culture, commerce, and

quality of life for the communities and residents located near the sites at which such fencing is to be constructed.” Id. § 102(b)(1)(C)(i).

2. Congress permits waiver of laws that impede construction of border barriers, and

limits federal litigation concerning such

waivers

Notably, in addition to requiring the construction

of physical barriers and roads in highly trafficked areas of the border, Congress also cleared the way for

6

Once more, Congress provided no indication within the

statute as to how or why the Secretary was to identify 370 (or

other) miles, and, as far as this Court can discern, the legislative

history contains no such explanation.

App. 11

swift execution of the IIRIRA’s section 102 borderbarrier mandate. At the time the IIRIRA was enacted,

certain environmental statutes were chief among the

legal impediments to the rapid construction of the

physical barriers and roads that the statute prescribed—specifically, the Endangered Species Act and

the National Environmental Policy Act7—and Congress

expressly addressed its concerns about the delay that

enforcement of such environmental mandates might

engender in the text of the IIRIRA itself, by authorizing the waiver of the requirements that these two statutes impose. When enacted in 1996, section 102(c)

stated: “[t]he provisions of the [ESA] and the [NEPA]

are waived to the extent the Attorney General deems

necessary to ensure expeditious construction of the

barriers and roads under this section.” IIRIRA § 102(c)

(1996).

By 2005, it had become clear that, “[d]espite the

existing waiver provision, construction of the San

Diego barriers has been delayed due to a dispute involving other laws.” H.R. Rep. No. 109-72 (Conf. Rep.),

at 171 (2005). Consequently, Congress amended the

7

For example, under the ESA, before authorizing building

projects, federal agencies are required to consult with the Fish

and Wildlife Service to “insure [sic] that any action authorized,

funded, or carried out by such agency . . . is not likely to jeopardize

the continued existence of any endangered or threatened [non-marine] species[.]” 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). Similarly, under the NEPA,

prior to undertaking a “major Federal action[ ] significantly affecting the quality of the human environment,” 42 U.S.C.

§ 4332(2)(C), an agency is required to conduct an extensive evaluation of the environmental consequences of that proposed action.

App. 12

IIRIRA’s waiver provision to permit the DHS Secretary

to waive all legal requirements that can impede expeditious construction of border barriers, see IIRIRA

§ 102(c)(1); see also H.R. Rep. No. 109-72, at 171 (explaining that “[c]ontinued delays caused by litigation

have demonstrated the need for additional waiver authority with respect to other laws that might impede

the expeditious construction of security infrastructure

along the border[,]” and noting that Congress decided

to authorize the waiver of “all laws” rather than “all

legal requirements” in order to “clarify[ ] [its] intent

that the Secretary’s discretionary waiver authority

extends to any local, state[,] or federal statute, regulation, or administrative order that could impede expeditious construction of border security infrastructure”).

Thus, section 102(c) now specifies that

[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law,

the Secretary of Homeland Security shall

have the authority to waive all legal requirements such Secretary, in such Secretary’s sole

discretion, determines necessary to ensure

expeditious construction of the barriers and

roads under this section. Any such decision by

the Secretary shall be effective upon being

published in the Federal Register.

IIRIRA § 102(c)(1).

Finally, and significantly for present purposes,

Congress also specifically addressed—and significantly

restricted—the scope of the federal courts’ authority

to review legal challenges that arise from DHS’s implementation of the IIRIRA’s waiver provision. This

App. 13

change occurred as part of the package of amendments

that expanded the DHS Secretary’s waiver authority

in the manner described above. In its entirety, the provision of the IIRIRA’s section 102(c) that addresses federal court review states:

(2) Federal court review.—

(A) In general.—The district courts of

the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear all causes or

claims arising from any action undertaken, or any decision made, by the

Secretary of Homeland Security pursuant to paragraph 1 [i.e., the waiver

provision]. A cause of action or claim

may only be brought alleging a violation of the Constitution of the United

States. The court shall not have jurisdiction to hear any claim not specified in this subparagraph.

(B) Time for filing of complaint.—

Any cause or claim brought pursuant

to subparagraph (A) shall be filed not

later than 60 days after the date of

the action or decision made by the

Secretary of Homeland Security. A

claim shall be barred unless it is filed

within the time specified.

(C) Ability to seek appellate review.—

An interlocutory or final judgment,

decree, or order of the district court

may be reviewed only upon petition

App. 14

for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme

Court of the United States.

Id. § 102(c)(2).

Per the above-quoted statutory language, any legal action challenging an act of or determination by the

DHS Secretary with respect to the waiver of legal requirements in order to facilitate the construction of

physical barriers along the border pursuant to subsection 102(c)(1) must allege a constitutional violation,

and has to be filed in federal district court within 60

days of the Secretary’s notice of such waiver. See id.

§ 102(c)(2)(A), (B). In addition, the federal district

court (which has exclusive jurisdiction to hear any

such claims) can entertain such a challenge only if the

claim alleges a violation of the Constitution. See id.

§ 102(c)(2)(A). Furthermore, the Supreme Court is the

only tribunal vested with the authority to review any

such district court determination. See id. § 102(c)(2)(C).

In this way, Congress has made crystal clear that it

intends “to ensure that judicial review of actions or decisions of the Secretary not delay the expeditious construction of border security infrastructure, thereby

defeating the purpose of the Secretary’s waiver.” H.R.

Rep. No. 109-72, at 172.

B. Facts Pertaining To The Instant Challenge

Prior to 2017, the Secretary of DHS had issued

waivers pursuant to section 102(c) of the IIRIRA on

just five occasions. (See Pls.’ Mem. at 20; Defs.’ Mem. at

App. 15

16.)8 Each of these waivers related to one of the construction projects that Congress had specifically delineated in section 102(b). (See Pls.’ Mem. at 36 & n.32.)

Then, on January 25, 2017, President Donald Trump

issued Executive Order No. 13,767—entitled “Border

Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements”

—which, among other things, ordered the DHS Secretary to “take all appropriate steps to immediately plan,

design, and construct a physical wall along the southern border[.]” 82 Fed. Reg. 8,793, 8,794 (Jan. 25, 2017).

According to that executive order, the “wall” must be “a

contiguous, physical wall or other similarly secure,

contiguous, and impassable physical barrier.” Id. Pursuant to this mandate, in August and September of

2017, the DHS Secretary issued two waivers under

the IIRIRA’s section 102(c). See 82 Fed. Reg. 35,984,

35,984-85 (Aug. 2, 2017); 82 Fed. Reg. 42,829, 42,82931 (Sept. 12, 2017).9

8

Those waiver determinations all were made by former DHS

Secretary Michael Chertoff, in September of 2005, see 70 Fed.

Reg. 55,622, 55,622-23 (Sept. 22, 2005); January of 2007, see 72

Fed. Reg. 2,535, 2,535-36 (Jan. 19, 2007); October of 2007, see 72

Fed. Reg. 60,870, 60,870 (Oct. 26, 2007); and April of 2008, see 73

Fed. Reg. 19,077, 19,077-78 (Apr. 8, 2008); 73 Fed. Reg. 19,078,

19,078-80 (Apr. 8, 2008).

9

These waivers were subsequently challenged in the United

States District Court for the Southern District of California and

were eventually subject to litigation in the United States Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. See In re Border Infrastructure

Envtl. Litig., 915 F.3d 1213, 1221, 1226 (9th Cir. 2019) (finding

that the IIRIRA’s section 102(c)(2) did not bar the district court

or the court of appeals’ review of claims “challeng[ing] the scope

of the Secretary’s authority to build roads and walls under sections 102(a) and 102(b),” as opposed to “the scope of the waiver

App. 16

As relevant here, on January 22, 2018, DHS published in the Federal Register the Secretary’s determination that a specified 20-mile stretch of border in New

Mexico qualifies as “an area of high illegal entry” under

section 102(a) of the IIRIRA; that “[t]here is presently

a need to construct physical barriers and roads in the

vicinity of the border of the United States to deter illegal crossings in the project area”; and that waiver of

25 statutes “in their entirety,” including the ESA and

the NEPA, is “necessary” to “ensure the expeditious

construction of the barriers and roads in the project

area[.]” 83 Fed. Reg. 3,012, 3,013 (Jan. 22, 2018). According to Plaintiffs, the project area that is the subject

of the New Mexico Waiver “is located in the middle of

the internationally-renowned Chihuahuan Desert,

considered to be one of the world’s most biologically

diverse deserts due to the presence and abundance of

endemic species that exist nowhere else on earth.”

(Pls.’ Mem. at 23.) Plaintiffs also maintain that, in additional [sic] to several detrimental non-environmental impacts, “[t]he New Mexico Border Wall Project will

result in numerous negative impacts on the wildlife,

vegetation, and the sensitive biological habitats on and

near the proposed Project site.” (Id.; see also id. at 2325.)

authority under section 102(c)[,]” and holding that the border projects at issue were “authorized under section 102(a)’s broad grant

of authority, which is not limited by section 102(b)”).

App. 17

DHS announced the commencement of its work on

the New Mexico Border Wall Project on April 9, 2018.10

In a press release, U.S. Customs and Border Protection

clarified that, “[a]s part of the President’s Executive

Order 13767, and at the direction of the Department of

Homeland Secretary, construction for a border wall replacement in Santa Teresa with new bollard style wall

will begin on Monday, April 9[,]” and that “[c]onstruction is slated to run for approximately 390 days.”11 During the motions hearing this Court held in December

of 2018, Defendants’ counsel indicated that the New

Mexico Border Wall Project’s “barrier installation” was

completed in October of 2018, and that “the accompanying road” was “expected to be completed in January

[of 2019].” (Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 32, at 56:9-11.)12 DHS also

presently asserts that the agency consulted with “representatives from the Department of the Interior, U.S.

Fish & Wildlife Service [(‘USFWS’)], and Bureau of

Land Management [(‘BLM’)]” prior to the DHS Secretary’s determination that the New Mexico Waiver

should be issued (Defs.’ Mem. at 18), and that before

the April 2008 commencement of construction, DHS

consulted with “relevant Native American tribes and

the New Mexico State Historic Preservation Officer[,]”

10

See Santa Teresa Border Wall Replacement Project to

Begin, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (Apr. 9, 2018), https://

www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/santa-teresa-borderwall-replacement-project-begin.

11

Id.

12

The parties have not updated the Court since the motions

hearing as to the status of the construction projects at issue in

this matter.

App. 18

as well as “two New Mexico state agencies, the local

county manager, USFWS, BLM, and the U.S. Army

Corps of Engineers” (id.).

C. Procedural History

Plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit on March 22,

2018 (see Compl.), claiming that the DHS Secretary’s

invocation of waiver authority under the IIRIRA’s section 102(c) with respect to the New Mexico Border Wall

Project was ultra vires and therefore unlawful (see id.

¶¶ 64-72 (Count One); id. ¶¶ 73-80 (Count Two)), and

that the New Mexico Waiver violates three provisions

of the Constitution of the United States: the Take Care

Clause (see id. ¶¶ 81-85 (Count Three)); the NonDelegation and Separation of Powers Doctrine (see id.

¶¶ 86-94 (Count Four)); and the Presentment Clause

(see id. ¶¶ 95-100 (Count Five)). Plaintiffs’ complaint

claims that the Secretary lacked statutory authority to

issue the New Mexico Waiver—i.e., that the Secretary

acted in an ultra vires manner—because, in Plaintiffs’

view, section 102(c)’s waiver authority “is limited to the

specific border barriers and roads [that Congress] required to be constructed pursuant to IIRIRA Section

102(b)” (id. ¶ 67 (emphasis added)), yet DHS had already fulfilled section 102(b)’s construction requirements at the time that the New Mexico Waiver was

issued (see id. ¶ 70). Alternatively, Plaintiffs argue that

the Secretary impermissibly transcended the agency’s

statutory authority because DHS “failed to conduct necessary prerequisites for exercising the waiver authority

App. 19

for expedited construction as set forth in provision

IIRIRA Section 102(b)(1)(C).” (Id. ¶ 74.)

Plaintiffs’ complaint further claims that, by issuing the New Mexico Waiver, DHS has violated the Constitution’s venerated separation-of-powers principles.

First, insofar as the DHS Secretary’s issuance of the

New Mexico Waiver “failed to comply with the requirements and limitations of IIRIRA Section 102” (id.

¶ 85), Plaintiffs maintain that the decision to issue the

waiver violated the Take Care Clause of the United

States Constitution, which requires that the Executive

Branch “ ‘shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully

executed[.]’ ” (Id. ¶ 83 (quoting U.S. Const. art. II, § 3).)

Second, Plaintiffs assert that the IIRIRA’s section 102(c)

itself transgresses the constitutional non-delegation

doctrine, because the statute “delegates to the Executive Branch, namely the DHS Secretary, the legislative

power to waive the application of any Congressionallyenacted law to construction on the U.S.-Mexico border”

without “an intelligible general policy to guide [the

Secretary’s] decision-making.” (Id. ¶¶ 92, 93.) Third,

and finally, Plaintiffs argue that the IIRIRA’s section

102(c) violates the Presentment Clause, both on its

face and as applied to the circumstances of the instant

case, because the statute impermissibly “vests unilateral power in the DHS Secretary to waive the application of any laws in areas along the border for purposes

of building border walls without Congress passing a

law to void the specific laws at issue or limit their application, and presenting it to the President” (id. ¶ 98),

and because, with respect to the New Mexico Border

App. 20

Wall Project in particular, the Secretary “chose which

laws to waive and which laws to obey, without an act of

Congress specifying which particular law or set of laws

could be waived and without the presentation of said

Congressional act to the President” (id. ¶ 99).13

In addition to the complaint, Plaintiffs have also

filed a motion for summary judgment that restates and

reinforces the assertions that are made in their pleading. (See Pls.’ Mot. (filed on May 10, 2018); Pls.’ Mem.)

Defendants responded, on June 15, 2018, by filing a

motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint, or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. (See Defs.’ Mot.). In

their motion, Defendants argue, as a threshold matter,

that this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to determine whether the New Mexico Waiver is ultra vires,

as Plaintiffs claim, because “Congress has expressly

withdrawn district court jurisdiction to review nonconstitutional challenges to the Secretary’s exercise of

waiver authority[.]” (Defs.’ Mem. at 21; see also id.

(quoting IIRIRA § 102(c)(2)(A)); id. at 19-26). Defendants also contend that Plaintiffs’ ultra vires claims fail

as a matter of law. (See, e.g., id. at 27 (asserting Plaintiffs have not “identif[ied] a ‘statutory right’ by which

Plaintiffs are entitled to vindication[,]” as valid ultra

vires claims allegedly require); see also id. at 28-42

(arguing that DHS did not violate any statutory

13

To remedy the ultra vires and constitutional claims identified in the complaint, Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief, and ask

this Court to “[s]et aside and vacate the New Mexico Waiver” and

to “[e]njoin DHS from implementing the New Mexico Border Wall

Project until and unless it complies with all laws that would apply

absent the unlawful waiver[.]” (Compl. at 30-31.)

App. 21

prohibition or requirement when it issued the New

Mexico Waiver). Defendants further insist that the

IIRIRA’s section 102(c) and the New Mexico Waiver

comport with the Constitution. (See id. at 42-50.)

This Court held a motions hearing on the parties’

cross-motions on December 18, 2018. (See Min. Entry

of Dec. 18, 2018.) During the hearing, Defendants represented, for the first time, that “the Department of

Homeland Security and [the DHS Secretary] had relied on both section 102(a) and 102(b) of the IIRIRA

when issuing the waiver at issue in this case” (Min. Order of Dec. 19, 2018 (emphasis added)), and the Court

subsequently ordered the parties to file supplemental

briefs (at Plaintiffs’ request) to address the potential

implications of this new revelation on the parties’ arguments (see id.). After the hearing, the Court also

acted to consolidate another matter—Center for Biological Diversity v. Nielsen, No. 18-cv-2396—with the

instant case. (See Min. Order of Jan. 9, 2019; see also

Resp. to Order to Show Cause, 18-cv-2396, ECF No. 9,

at 1 (agreeing that the Court “should consolidate” the

two cases because they “involve many of the same parties and both challenge [the DHS Secretary’s] invocation of Section 102 of [the IIRIRA] to waive dozens of

laws that would otherwise apply to the construction of

border wall projects” (footnotes omitted)).)14

14

The legal arguments are identical in the instant case and

18-cv-2396, but the facts vary: whereas the plaintiffs here challenge waivers regarding border construction in New Mexico, the

plaintiffs in 18-cv-2396 challenge waivers regarding border construction in Texas. (See Compl., 18-cv-2396, ECF No. 1, ¶ 1.) On

App. 22

The parties filed the aforementioned supplemental briefs by February 28, 2019. (See ECF Nos. 31,

33, 34.) Thus, the parties’ cross-motions are now ripe

for this Court’s review.

II.

LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Cross-Motions For Summary Judgment In

Cases Involving Ultra Vires Claims And

Constitutional Challenges To Agency Action

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 requires a court

to grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). However, in cases challenging

agency action, “[t]he entire case on review is [ordinarily] a question of law, and only a question of law[,]”

Marshall Cty. Health Care Auth. v. Shalala, 988 F.2d

1221, 1226 (D.C. Cir. 1993), and, therefore, the summary judgment standard functions slightly differently.

Cf. Henry v. Sec’y of Treasury, 266 F. Supp. 3d 80, 86

(D.D.C. 2017) (explaining that, in the context of the

February 4, 2019, Plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary

judgment regarding the waivers at issue in 18-cv-2396. (See Pls.’

Partial Mot. for Summ. J. Regarding Tex. Waivers, ECF No. 30.)

Because the Court’s conclusions with respect to the cross-motions

in this Memorandum Opinion also apply to Plaintiffs’ partial motion relating to the Texas Waivers, the Court will not separately

address that motion in this Opinion. Moreover, consistent with

this Opinion, the partial motion for summary judgment (ECF No.

30) will be DENIED.

App. 23

APA, “the reviewing court generally . . . reviews the

[agency’s] decision as an appellate court addressing issues of law”).

Notably, “in the context of ultra vires and constitutional separation of powers claims, there are no questions of fact, because whether or not a statute or the

Constitution grants the [Executive Branch] the power

to act in a certain way is a pure question of law.” Am.

Fed. of Gov’t Emps., AFL-CIO v. Trump, 318 F. Supp. 3d

370, 394 (D.D.C. 2018), rev’d on other grounds, 929 F.3d

748 (D.C. Cir. 2019); see also, e.g., Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1332-39 (D.C. Cir.

1996) (conducting de novo review). “The same can be

said of any questions of interpretation that a federal

court may have to answer in parsing out the meaning

of any relevant statutes[.]” Am. Fed. of Gov’t Emps.,

AFL-CIO, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 394.

B. Defense Motions Styled As “Motions To

Dismiss, Or, In The Alternative, For Summary Judgment”

When a defendant moves for summary judgment

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 as an alternative to dismissal under Rule 12 (see, e.g., Defs.’ Mem.

at 50 (“Plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed as a matter of law or, in the alternative, the Court should . . .

grant summary judgment to Defendants”)), “the decision regarding whether or not to treat a motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment is committed to the

sound discretion of the trial court[,] which means that

App. 24

this Court need not necessarily accede to [the defendants’] request regarding how its motion should be evaluated.” Ross v. U.S. Capitol Police, 195 F. Supp. 3d 180,

192 (D.D.C. 2016) (first alteration in original) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). Where, as here,

a defendant maintains that the case should be terminated either because the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law under Rule 56, or because the

pleadings are insufficient to state a claim or to establish the court’s jurisdiction under Rule 12, the court

may review the parties’ arguments with respect to

both of those grounds to determine the extent to which

the motion can be sustained. See, e.g., Smith v. United

States, 121 F. Supp. 3d 112, 119-26 (D.D.C. 2015) (evaluating certain arguments under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) and others under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 56, where defendants’ motion sought

either dismissal for failure to state a claim or summary

judgment). However, because such a motion presents

these alleged defects as alternative bases for terminating the action, the court may also opt to evaluate one

basis for termination of the action and not the other.

See, e.g., Jones v. Nat’l Council on Disability, 66

F. Supp. 3d 94, 104 n.8 (D.D.C. 2014); ViroPharma, Inc.

v. Hamburg, 916 F. Supp. 2d 76, 77, 83 (D.D.C. 2013);

cf. PDK Labs., Inc. v. DEA, 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C. Cir.

2004) (Roberts, J., concurring) (stating where there “is

a sufficient ground for deciding th[e] case . . . , the cardinal principle of judicial restraint—if it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide

more—counsels us to go no further”).

App. 25

Notably, here, Defendants have maintained that

summary judgment in their favor is warranted as an

alternative to their argument that Plaintiffs’ complaint

must be dismissed prior to judgment, pursuant to either Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) or Rule

12(b)(6). A defendant may move to dismiss a complaint

for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), and once such a motion has been filed, it is the plaintiff ’s burden to establish the court’s jurisdiction by a preponderance of the

evidence. See Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Exp.-Imp. Bank of

U.S., 85 F. Supp. 3d 250, 259 (D.D.C. 2015). “[I]f the

plaintiff fails to do so, the court must dismiss the complaint[.]” Ross, 195 F. Supp. 3d at 191.

When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule

12(b)(1), a court must “treat the complaint’s factual allegations as true” and “grant plaintiffs the benefit of all

inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.”

Delta Air Lines, 85 F. Supp. 3d at 259 (internal quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted). However,

the “factual allegations in the complaint” receive “closer

scrutiny in resolving a 12(b)(1) motion than in resolving a 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim.” Id.

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Furthermore, unlike in the Rule 12(b)(6) context, the Court

“may consider materials outside the pleadings” in resolving the Rule 12(b)(1) question. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

A defendant may also move to dismiss a complaint

for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). When considering such a

App. 26

motion, a court must assess whether the complaint

contains “ ‘sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,

to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face[,]’ ”

Harris v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth., 791 F.3d 65, 68

(D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

678 (2009)), i.e., whether the complaint’s allegations

are sufficient to permit a “ ‘reasonable inference that

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,’ ”

Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27, 46

(2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). In this regard,

the “ ‘court must accept as true all of the allegations

contained in a complaint[,]’ ” but need not do the same

for legal conclusions. Harris, 791 F.3d at 68 (quoting

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “Accordingly, ‘threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice’ ” to survive

a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Id. (alteration

omitted) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).

Unlike Rule 12(b)(1), Rule 12(b)(6) “places th[e]

burden on the moving party” to show that the complaint is legally insufficient. Cohen v. Bd. of Trustees of

the Univ. of the Dist. of Columbia, 819 F.3d 476, 481

(D.C. Cir. 2016) (citing 5B Charles A. Wright & Arthur

R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357 (3d

ed. 2015)). And in contrast to a motion to dismiss

brought under Rule 12(b)(1), a court assessing whether

a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be

granted must limit its analysis to the four corners of

the complaint, as well as any “documents attached as

exhibits or incorporated by reference in the complaint,

or documents upon which the plaintiff ’s complaint

App. 27

necessarily relies[.]” Page v. Mancuso, 999 F. Supp. 2d

269, 275 (D.D.C. 2013) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs have brought two ultra vires claims (the

first and second claims for relief ) and three constitutional claims (the third, fourth, and fifth claims for relief ), each of which challenges DHS’s issuance of the

New Mexico Waiver, as explained above. For the reasons laid out below, this Court finds that Congress has

expressly precluded judicial review of non-constitutional claims that arise from DHS’s exercise of the

IIRIRA’s section 102(c) waiver authority, and Plaintiffs

have failed to allege facts that are sufficient to sustain

their constitutional claims as a matter of law. Thus,

Plaintiffs’ entire complaint must be DISMISSED.

A. Plaintiffs’ Ultra Vires Claims Cannot Be

Adjudicated In Federal Court

Plaintiffs’ primary contention is that, “[b]ecause

the scope of the IIRIRA Section 102(c) waiver provision

is limited to the border barriers and road requirements

specified by IIRIRA Section 102(b), the requirements

of which have already been fulfilled, the purported

waiver of . . . laws under the New Mexico Waiver is an

unlawful ultra vires act.” (Compl. ¶ 71.) In the alternative, Plaintiffs assert that, “by approving the waiver

prior to completing at least the prerequisite consultation mandated in Section 102(b)(1)(C),” the DHS

App. 28

Secretary’s “decision to issue the New Mexico Waiver

facially violates the requirements under IIRIRA Section 102 and is thus ultra vires because it is in excess

of the Secretary’s delegated powers[.]” (Id. ¶ 80.) Plaintiffs insist that these are legal claims that this Court

can, and must, adjudicate, given the “ ‘strong presumption that Congress intends judicial review of administrative action[.]’ ” (Pls.’ Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. & Reply in

Supp. of Pls.’ Mot. (“Pls.’ Opp’n”), ECF No. 23, at 14

(quoting Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 542 (1988)).)

But, unfortunately for Plaintiffs, the language of section 102(c)(2)(A) plainly evidences Congress’s intent to

preclude non-constitutional causes of action that assail

a DHS section 102(c) waiver determination, and Congress has also expressly deprived the federal courts of

jurisdiction over non-constitutional claims that challenge DHS’s section 102(c) waiver decisions. Thus,

Congress has made it abundantly clear that Plaintiffs’

ultra vires claims cannot proceed in federal court.

1. While judicial review of allegedly lawless

agency action is ordinarily presumed, clear

indicia of congressional intent can overcome that presumption

Courts have long recognized that an aggrieved

party can sue in federal court to challenge agency action as ultra vires, even when a statute does not specifically delineate that right. See Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of

Fam. Phys., 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986) (“From the beginning our cases have established that judicial review of

a final agency action by an aggrieved person will not

App. 29

be cut off unless there is persuasive reason to believe

that such was the purpose of Congress.” (internal quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted)).15 Moreover, as Plaintiffs here have recognized, there are cases

in which plaintiffs have been able to proceed in federal

court with respect to ultra vires claims even when Congress has precluded judicial review of agency action.

See, e.g., Aid Ass’n for Lutherans v. USPS, 321 F.3d

1166, 1172-73 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Railway Labor Execs.’

Ass’n v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 29 F.3d 655, 662-63 (D.C.

Cir. 1994). In authorizing review of ultra vires claims

under such circumstances, courts appear to have relied

primarily on the well-established “strong presumption

that Congress did not mean to prohibit all judicial review[,]” Dart v. United States, 848 F.2d 217, 221 (D.C.

Cir. 1988) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted), as well as precedents that make

clear that “[j]udicial review is favored when an agency

is charged with acting beyond its authority[,]” id. (emphasis added); see also Trudeau v. Fed. Trade Comm’n,

456 F.3d 178, 189-90 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Aid Ass’n for

Lutherans, 321 F.3d at 227-28. In other words, even

when “Congress ha[s] expressed an unqualified intent

to shut off review,” an exception may still exist “on

15

“A challenge to agency action on the ground that it is ultra

vires requires a plaintiff to establish a patent violation of agency

authority[.]” DCH Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Price, 257 F. Supp. 3d 91, 94

(D.D.C. 2017) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see

also Fla. Health Scis. Ctr., Inc. v. Sec. of Health & Human Servs.,

830 F.3d 515, 522 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“A violation is patent if it is

obvious or apparent.” (internal quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted)).

App. 30

grounds that the legislature would not be deemed to

have barred judicial comparison of agency action with

plain statutory commands unless such a ban was

clearly articulated.” Dart, 848 F.2d at 222 (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted).

Of course, the devil is in the details: each case involves a statute that must be interpreted to evaluate

the degree to which, via the express preclusion of jurisdiction or otherwise, Congress also intended to bar

even plausible claims of ultra vires agency action. No

less an authority than the United States Supreme

Court has reminded lower courts that “[t]he presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action is

just that—a presumption[,]” Block v. Cmty. Nutrition

Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 349 (1984), and that the grant of

jurisdiction under section 1331 of Title 28 of the United

States Code, which generally “confer[s] jurisdiction on

federal courts to review agency action,” Califano v.

Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977), is subject to “preclusion-of-review statutes created or retained by Congress,” id. Thus, while Plaintiffs are correct that there

exists “a judicial disinclination to infer that Congress

wished to insulate plain statutory violations from review[,]” Dart, 848 F.2d at 222 (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted)—and, indeed, it is presumed that Congress does not have such intention—

that presumption does not end the matter, because it

can be overcome by an unambiguous statutory provision that plainly precludes jurisdiction, or narrowly

restricts the available causes of action, or both. See

Block, 467 U.S. at 349 (explaining that the strong

App. 31

presumption in favor of judicial review “may be overcome by specific language or specific legislative history

that is a reliable indicator of congressional intent”).

Such congressional intent “may also be inferred from

contemporaneous judicial construction barring review

and the congressional acquiescence in it, . . . from the

collective import of legislative and judicial history behind a particular statute, . . . [or] from the statutory

scheme as a whole.” Id. (citations omitted).

As a practical matter, this all means that federal

courts “will normally disregard ‘basically lawless’

agency action only when clearly instructed to do so.”

Ralpho v. Bell, 569 F.2d 607, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also Dart, 848 F.2d

at 221 (“[O]nly upon a showing of clear and convincing

evidence of a contrary legislative intent should the

courts restrict access to judicial review[.]” (internal

quotation marks, citation, and alterations omitted)).

Thus, in the face of clear statutory language and other

indisputable indicia of Congress’s intent to prevent

federal courts from reviewing even ultra vires agency

action, it is not enough for a plaintiff to point to a statute that governs agency conduct and to argue merely

that Congress must have intended for its provisions to

be judicially enforced. As the D.C. Circuit has long recognized, the mere fact “[t]hat Congress has imposed

strictures [on agencies] does not, of course, prevent it

from shielding even the most patent deviation from the

statutory scheme from judicial redress where the Constitution is in no wise implicated.” Ralpho, 569 F.2d at

App. 32

622 (citing Switchmen’s Union v. Nat’l Mediation Bd.,

320 U.S. 297, 301 (1943)).

2. Section 102(c)(2) of the IIRIRA strips federal district courts of the power to review

any and all non-constitutional claims that

arise from the Secretary’s exercise of section 102(c)’s waiver authority

With respect to Plaintiffs’ ability to bring, and this

Court’s power to consider, the ultra vires claims at issue here, the Court need look no further than the “specific language[,]” Block, 467 U.S. at 349, of the IIRIRA,

and, in particular, the text of section 102(c)(2)(A). For

the following reasons, this statutory provision plainly

compels the conclusion that there is both a cause-ofaction restriction and a jurisdictional bar with respect

to this Court’s consideration of non-constitutional challenges to the DHS Secretary’s actions undertaken pursuant to section 102(c)(1), including the ultra vires

claims that Plaintiffs are asserting. Cf. Caminetti v.

United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (“It is elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first

instance, be sought in the language in which the act is

framed, and if that is plain, and if the law is within the

constitutional authority of the lawmaking body which

passed it, the sole function of the courts is to enforce it

according to its terms.” (citations omitted)); United

States v. Cordova, 806 F.3d 1085, 1098 (D.C. Cir. 2015)

(“As always, we begin with the text of the statute.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

App. 33

The full text of section 102(c)(2)(A) of the IIRIRA

reads as follows:

[t]he district courts of the United States shall

have exclusive jurisdiction to hear all causes

or claims arising from any action undertaken,

or any decision made, by the Secretary of Homeland Security pursuant to [section 102(c)(1)]. A

cause of action or claim may only be brought

alleging a violation of the Constitution of the

United States. The court shall not have jurisdiction to hear any claim not specified in this

subparagraph.

IIRIRA § 102(c)(2)(A).16 By its plain terms, this statutory provision applies to the instant circumstances.

First of all, all of Plaintiffs’ claims unquestionably

“aris[e] from an[ ] action undertaken, or a[ ] decision

made, by the Secretary of Homeland Security pursuant to [section 102(c)(1)][,]” id., which is section 102’s

waiver provision (see, e.g., Compl. ¶ 1 (“In this action,

Plaintiffs . . . challenge the issuance of a waiver on

January 22, 2018 by [the DHS Secretary] . . . that purports to exempt construction of approximately twenty

miles of border walls and associated infrastructure in

16

Section 102(c)(2)(B) further requires that “[a]ny cause or

claim brought pursuant to [section 102(c)(2)(A)] shall be filed not

later than 60 days after the date of the action or decision made by

the Secretary of Homeland Security. A claim shall be barred unless it is filed within the time specified.” IIRIRA § 102(c)(2)(B).

And Section 102(c)(2)(C) limits appellate review: “An interlocutory or final judgment, decree, or order of the district court may

be reviewed only upon petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States.” Id. § 102(c)(2)(C). Neither of

these additional provisions is at issue here.

App. 34

southern New Mexico [ ] from compliance with the

[NEPA], the [ESA], and numerous other statutory requirements.”); id. ¶ 2 (“In issuing the New Mexico

Waiver, Secretary Niels[e]n invoked the authority purportedly contained in Section 102 of [IIRIRA]. . . .

[T]he New Mexico Waiver is ultra vires and unlawful

because it exceeds the limited grant of authority for

such waivers contained in IIRIRA Section 102.”); id.

¶ 4 (“[B]ecause the New Mexico Border Wall Project

does not fall within the scope of projects mandated by

Section 102, . . . the waiver authority under Section

102(c) is inapplicable to the New Mexico Border Wall

Project.”)). This means that, per the language of section

102(c)(2)(A), “[t]he district courts of the United States

. . . have exclusive jurisdiction to hear” Plaintiffs’ claims.

IIRIRA § 102(C)(2)(A).

Next, the IIRIRA expressly addresses both the

ability of a plaintiff to bring a cause of action or claim

concerning the Secretary’s exercise of that waiver authority and the power of the federal district courts to

review any such claims—and it restricts both, in no uncertain terms. In rapid succession, section 102(c)(2)(A)

provides that “[a] cause of action or claim may only be

brought alleging a violation of the Constitution of the

United States[,]” id. (emphasis added), and then states

that “[t]he court shall not have jurisdiction to hear

any claim not specified in this subparagraph[,]” id.

(emphasis added). Thus, Congress has not only expressly restricted a plaintiff ’s right to bring any nonconstitutional claim that challenges a DHS waiver

determination, but has also limited a court’s authority

App. 35

to consider any challenge other than those alleging

constitutional violations. Indeed, the plain language of

the statute leaves no doubt that, except for review of

alleged violations of the Constitution, Congress intended to preclude completely judicial review of agency

actions taken, or decisions made, pursuant to section

102’s waiver provision, including the contention that a

particular waiver decision is not authorized by statute.

See In re Border Infrastructure Envtl. Litig., 915 F.3d

1213, 1221 (9th Cir. 2019) (explaining that the jurisdictional bar applies to ultra vires claims that challenge

DHS waivers on the grounds that “the waivers themselves were not authorized by the Secretary’s authority

under section 102(c)(1)”); (see also Compl. ¶ 72 (asserting that the DHS Secretary’s “purported waiver of laws

under the New Mexico Waiver is an unlawful ultra

vires act” because “the New Mexico Border Wall Project

is not subject to the scope of the IIRIRA Section 102(c)

waiver authority”).)

Given the abundantly clear and specific language

that Congress used in the IIRIRA’s section 102(c)(2)(A),

see Block, 467 U.S. at 349, which plainly blocks nonconstitutional claims by precluding such causes of action and also stripping federal courts of the power to

consider such claims, it is not necessary for the Court

to delve into the IIRIRA’s legislative history to determine Congress’s intent. See Caminetti, 242 U.S. at 485.

But even a cursory review of the IIRIRA’s legislative

pedigree supports this Court’s conclusions.

As mentioned above, the Conference Report pertaining to the 2005 amendments to the IIRIRA’s section

App. 36

102, which added the judicial review provision (see

supra Part I.A.2), explains that, despite the Attorney

General’s then-existing ability to waive the ESA and

the NEPA, “[c]ontinued delays caused by litigation

have demonstrated the need for additional waiver authority with respect to other laws that might impede

the expeditious construction of security infrastructure

along the border[.]” H.R. Rep. No. 109-72, at 171.17

Therefore, according to the Conference Report, it was

the vexing litigation delays that motivated Congress to

amend section 102 such that it now authorizes the

waiver of “all laws that [the DHS Secretary] determines, in his or her sole discretion, are necessary to

ensure the expeditious construction of the border barriers[,]” and also “prohibit[s] judicial review of a waiver

decision or action by the Secretary[.]” Id. The Conference Report further states that Congress “bar[red]

judicially ordered compensatory, declaratory, or injunctive, equitable, or any other relief or other remedy for

damage alleged to result from any such decision or action[,]” and “provided federal judicial review [only] for

claims alleging that the actions or decisions of the Secretary violate the United States Constitution.” Id. at

171, 172. Thus, Congress’s unmistakable “intent [was]

to ensure that judicial review of actions or decisions of

the Secretary not delay the expeditious construction of

17

Recall that Congress also transferred the authority contained in section 102(c)(1) from the Attorney General to the DHS

Secretary as part of the 2005 amendments to IIRIRA. (See supra

note 5.)

App. 37

border security infrastructure, thereby defeating the

purpose of the Secretary’s waiver.” Id. at 172.

Accordingly, both the statutory language of section

102(c)(2)(A), which imposes restrictions on judicial review of the DHS Secretary’s actions taken pursuant to

section 102(c)(1) in two different ways, and the legislative history of the enactment of those restrictions,

make crystal clear that Congress intended to eliminate

litigation that would “delay the expeditious construction of border security infrastructure[,]” to the fullest

extent possible, i.e., to the extent constitutionally allowed. Id.

3. Plaintiffs’ efforts to contradict the clear

conclusion that their ultra vires claims cannot proceed are not persuasive

Facing an indisputable pattern of congressional

actions and statements that clearly and convincingly

establish Congress’s intent to preclude litigation over

the DHS Secretary’s waiver authority, Plaintiffs have

cleverly crafted an “unlawful conduct” loophole in section 102(c)(2)(A)’s text where one does not exist. First, they

maintain that “by its plain terms,” section 102(c)(2)(A)

“simply precludes statutory review of ‘any action undertaken, or any decision made, by the [DHS Secretary] pursuant to [section 102(c)(1)][,]’ ” and, then,

Plaintiffs assert that “the [New Mexico Waiver] was

not an action lawfully made ‘pursuant to’ the circumspect waiver authority of § 102(c)(1).” (Pls.’ Opp’n at 14

(emphasis in original) (quoting IIRIRA § 102(c)(2)(A));

App. 38

see also Pls.’ Mem. at 43 (“Plaintiffs’ claim here is that

the New Mexico Waiver was not properly issued ‘pursuant to’ IIRIRA § 102(c)(1).” (emphasis in original)).)

This reading is designed to persuade the Court that

Congress “simply” intended to preclude judicial review

of legal claims concerning lawful exercises of the DHS

Secretary’s waiver authority. (See, e.g., Pls.’ Opp’n at 14

(asserting that “the Waiver was not an action lawfully

made ‘pursuant to’ the circumspect waiver authority of

§ 102(c)(1)” (emphasis in original)).) But the words

“lawfully made” appear nowhere in the relevant statutory text. See IIRIRA § 102(c)(2)(A) (limiting judicial

review of “any action undertaken, or any decision made

. . . pursuant to paragraph (1)” (emphasis added)). And,

of course, whether or not the New Mexico Waiver was

lawful is precisely the contention that this Court would

be required to decide if it does, indeed, have the power

to review Plaintiffs’ ultra vires claims.

Thus, Plaintiffs’ interpretation of the reach of section 102(c)(2)(A)’s judicial review language assumes

the answer to the very question that has to be decided,

in a manner that is entirely circular. That is, Plaintiffs

repeatedly maintain that because the statute precludes only the exercise of jurisdiction to consider

waivers that have been lawfully issued, Congress did

not intend to bar the exercise of this Court’s jurisdiction to consider whether the New Mexico Waiver is

lawful. (See, e.g, Pls.’ Mem. at 43 (“Plaintiffs do not

dispute that Congress has limited judicial review of

non-constitutional claims regarding a waiver properly

issued pursuant to IIRIRA § 102(c)(1), as articulated in

App. 39

§ 102(c)(2),” but “Plaintiffs’ claim here is that the New

Mexico Waiver was not properly issued ‘pursuant to’

IIRIRA §102(c)(1). Accordingly, the ultra vires claim is

not subject to § 102(c)(2)’s judicial review restrictions.”

(emphasis in original)).) In other words, Plaintiffs’ core

contention is that it is the unlawful nature of the DHS

Secretary’s section 102(c) waiver that allows this Court

to proceed to determine the lawfulness of the DHS Secretary’s waiver despite the jurisdictional bar, because

the jurisdictional bar applies only to challenges to lawful waivers. And Plaintiffs further insist that any other

conclusion is “untenable” because “DHS would not only

hold unfettered discretion to take action under § 102,

but would also have unreviewable discretion to determine that any action it takes falls within the section’s

delegated authority.” (Pls.’ Mem. at 44-45.)

Unfortunately for Plaintiffs, it is their argument,

and not a plain reading of section 102(c)(2)(A), that

leads to a “tautological result[.]” (Id. at 44.) Rather,

with respect to the threshold questions of whether

Plaintiffs’ ultra vires claims are cognizable under the

IIRIRA and whether this Court has subject-matter

jurisdiction to consider Plaintiffs’ claims, this Court

must evaluate Congress’s intent in light of the language of the statute. And as explained above, in this

Court’s view, Congress has made it abundantly clear

that claims that challenge the propriety or lawfulness

of the Secretary’s conduct with respect to the exercise

of section 102(c)’s waiver authority will not suffice; only

a claim that the DHS waiver at issue is unconstitutional will do. Therefore, plaintiffs cannot press ultra

App. 40

vires claims in federal court, nor do federal courts have

jurisdiction to consider such claims, simply and solely

because those claims are not constitutional challenges.

To be sure, “[s]uch a conclusion undermines the

‘inherent power of the federal courts to reestablish

the [non-constitutional] limits on executive authority

through judicial review’ ” (id. at 45 (quoting Adamski

v. McHugh, 304 F. Supp. 3d 227, 237 (D.D.C. 2015))),

which makes it entirely understandable that Plaintiffs

are reluctant to accept that Congress would have intended to permit a federal agency to flout its statutory

directives. But, as noted previously, Congress has this

right, so long as “the Constitution is in no wise implicated,” Ralpho, 569 F.2d at 622, and this Court cannot

construe the IIRIRA to provide it with review powers

that Congress has plainly precluded. In other words,

however rational Plaintiffs’ concerns may be, such matters must be taken up with Congress. Here, Plaintiffs

cannot reasonably assert that Congress must have

meant something different than what its statute

plainly says.

It is also clear to this Court that Plaintiffs’ reasoning with respect to how the Court’s subject-matter

jurisdiction is to be evaluated under the instant circumstances cannot be sustained. As noted previously,

Plaintiffs’ primary contention is, in essence, that Congress intended for section 102(c)(2)(A) to preclude only

judicial review of non-meritorious non-constitutional

claims regarding DHS waivers—i.e., that only challenges to lawful waiver determinations by the Secretary are barred. (See Pls. Opp’n at 14; see also Pls.

App. 41

Mem. at 43 (“Plaintiffs do not dispute that Congress

has limited judicial review of non-constitutional claims

regarding a waiver properly issued pursuant to IIRIRA

§ 102(c)(1)[.]” (emphasis omitted)).) But whether or not

a federal court has the power to consider a plaintiff ’s

claim does not, and cannot, depend upon the court’s

deciding, as a threshold matter, that the plaintiff ’s

claim is a meritorious one. See Cause of Action Inst. v.

IRS, No. 16-cv-2354, 2019 WL 3225751, at *8-9 (D.D.C.

July 17, 2019). This Court recently rejected this same

reasoning in a markedly different context, see id., and

Plaintiffs’ version of that same argument is no more

persuasive.

Plaintiffs’ attempts to distinguish non-meritorious non-constitutional challenges to DHS waivers (i.e.,

challenges to section 102(c) waivers that were lawfully

issued) from those non-constitutional legal claims that

have merit (i.e., challenges to section 102(c) waivers

that were not lawfully issued) is also flatly inconsistent

with the statutory text, insofar as Congress has made

no effort whatsoever to suggest that it intended for

only non-meritorious non-constitutional claims to be

barred by section 102(c)(2)(A). To the contrary, in that

provision, Congress states plainly that “only” constitutional “causes or claims” are allowed, and that federal

courts do have not jurisdiction to determine the merits

of any non-constitutional claims, IIRIRA § 102(c)(2)(A)

(emphasis added); there is no exception provided for

potentially valid ones.

Finally, this Court notes that the mechanics of

section 102(c)(2)(A) are such that even if the phrase

App. 42

“pursuant to” is read to mean “lawfully pursuant to,”

as Plaintiffs argue, that interpretation would, at most,

indicate that Plaintiffs’ ultra vires claims are viable

causes of action—it says nothing about the distinct issue of this Court’s power to consider and resolve such

claims. As explained above, section 102(c)(2) not only

establishes that the only “cause[s] of action or “claim[s]”

that can be brought to challenge a section 102(c)(1)

waiver are those that “alleg[e] a violation of the Constitution of the United States,” but it also states that

“[t]he court shall not have jurisdiction to hear any

claim not specified in this subparagraph.” Id. (emphasis added). Congress certainly could have referenced

subparagraph (1) with respect to this language, as it

did when addressing the viable causes of action or

claims—e.g., by stating that the district courts’ jurisdiction does not extend to “causes or claims arising

from any action undertaken, or any decision made, by

the Secretary of Homeland Security pursuant to paragraph (1) [section 102(c)(1)][,]” IIRIRA § 102(c)(2)(A)—

and, if it had done so, perhaps Plaintiffs could reasonably contend that its “lawfully pursuant to” reading

applies and permits district courts to retain jurisdiction to address unlawful waivers. But, instead, the last

sentence of section 102(c)(2)(A) strips the Court of

jurisdiction over “any claim not specified in this subparagraph[,]” id., and the sole claims “specified in . . .

subparagraph” (c)(2) are those that “alleg[e] a violation

of the Constitution of the United States[,]” id. Therefore, even if Plaintiffs were correct that ultra vires

causes of action or claims are cognizable where a plaintiff challenges the DHS Secretary’s alleged waiver as

App. 43

unlawful, given the language of the statute, this Court

still would “not have jurisdiction” to entertain such

claims. Id.

*

*

*

In sum, this Court finds that section 102(c)(2)(A)

plainly and unequivocally expresses Congress’s intent

with respect to restricting judicial review of legal challenges to section 102(c)(1) waiver determinations, in a

manner that overcomes even the strong presumption

that Congress ordinarily intends for agency actions to

be subject to review by the federal courts. Consistent

with its desire “to ensure that judicial review . . . not

delay the expeditious construction of border security

infrastructure,” H.R. Rep. No. 109-72, at 172, Congress

has drafted section 102(c)(2)(A) to lead inexorably to

the conclusion that there is neither a viable cause of

action in federal court concerning section 102(c)(1)

waiver determinations, nor federal court jurisdiction to

review any such challenge, unless the claim alleges

a violation of the United States Constitution. Consequently, this Court cannot, and will not, address the

merits of Plaintiffs’ non-constitutional contentions

that the New Mexico Waiver “exceeds the limited grant

of authority for such waivers contained in IIRIRA Section 102[(c)(1)]” (Compl. ¶ 2), or that DHS acted unlawfully because it failed to satisfy the consultation

prerequisite set forth in section 102(b)(1)(C) before the

New Mexico Waiver issued. Instead, the Court agrees

with DHS that, even if Plaintiffs claims were valid, by

App. 44

virtue of section 102(c)(2)(A), these non-constitutional

challenges must be dismissed.18

18

As it turns out, the supplemental briefing that the parties

submitted on the impact of the DHS Secretary’s sudden invocation of IIRIRA section 102(b), in addition to 102(a), as the agency’s

authority for undertaking the New Mexico Border Wall Project

has no bearing whatsoever on the Court’s analysis. (See supra

Part I.C.) Regardless of whether DHS based its decision to commence the New Mexico construction project pursuant to section

102(a) or 102(b), Plaintiffs’ ultra vires claims remain substantively the same—i.e., that the Secretary acted outside his statutory authority because the New Mexico project does not fall within

the 700 miles of construction specifically outlined in section

102(b)—and, more importantly, the Court’s analysis of whether

or not it has jurisdiction to consider such claims is entirely unaffected. (See Pls.’ Suppl. Br., ECF No. 31, at 18-27; Defs.’ Suppl.

Br., ECF No. 33, at 9-22.)

In addition, while Defendants do not distinguish between

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) as the basis

for dismissal, the Court has concluded that Plaintiffs’ claims are

subject to dismissal under both Rules. That is, given the plain

language of section 102(c)(2)(A), Plaintiffs have failed to establish

this Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, warranting dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) for “lack of subject-matter jurisdiction[,]” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), and Plaintiffs have also failed to establish that

there exists a cause of action by which they can bring these

claims, warranting dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for “failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted[,]” Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6); see also Eagle Trust Fund v. USPS, 365 F. Supp. 3d 57,

63 (D.D.C. 2019) (“[A] plaintiff who fails to show that the law authorizes him to bring his lawsuit fails to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted.” (citations omitted)).

App. 45

B. Plaintiffs Have Failed To State Viable

Constitutional Claims

The IIRIRA’s judicial review provision indisputably preserves this Court’s authority to review a legal

claim that “an[ ] action undertaken, or a[ ] decision

made, by the Secretary of Homeland Security” with respect to the waiver of legal requirements under section

102(c)(1) violates the Constitution. IIRIRA § 102(c)(2)(A).

Plaintiffs here assert generally that the IIRIRA’s section 102(c)(1) waiver authority is “unconstitutional because it unlawfully vests Congress’s lawmaking powers

in the Executive Branch” (Pls.’ Mem. at 45), and they

maintain, in particular, that if section 102(c)(1) is interpreted to authorize waivers for border construction

projects beyond those projects that are specifically delineated in section 102(b), then section 102(c)(1) violates the Presentment Clause (see id. at 45-48); the

constitutional non-delegation doctrine (see id. at 4852); and the Take Care Clause (see id. at 52-54). Plaintiffs further insist that DHS must have relied on this

unconstitutional interpretation of the agency’s section

102(c)(1) waiver authority in order to issue the New

Mexico Waiver, because the [sic] “the reinforced fencing

along . . . 700 miles of the southwest border” that is

outlined in section 102(b) had already been completed

when the New Mexico Waiver issued. (Pls.’ Mem. at 31

(quoting IIRIRA § 102(b)(1)(A)).)

The first potential impediment to the advancement of Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims arose during

this Court’s motions hearing, when Defendants suddenly asserted, for the first time, that the New Mexico

App. 46

Waiver was issued pursuant to the terms of section

102(b) of the IIRIRA (which authorizes the construction of “at least 700 miles” of reinforced fencing along

the southwest border, IIRIRA § 102(b)), and not in spite

of that provision, as Plaintiffs had maintained (see

Hr’g Tr. at 77:13-15). A round of supplemental briefing

ensued, as mentioned above (see supra Part I.C.), with

Plaintiffs contending that “DHS in fact did not invoke

§ 102(b) in the Waiver notice” and instead relied solely

on section 102(a) with respect to the New Mexico

Waiver (Pls.’ Suppl. Br., ECF No. 31, at 8 (emphasis in

original)), while DHS asserted that “[t]he Secretary relied both on the general mandate set out in § 102(a) . . .

and the specific call in § 102(b)(1) for additional infrastructure needed to gain operational control of the

southwest border” (Defs.’ Suppl. Br., ECF No. 33, at 7).

As a preliminary matter, this Court finds that any

distinction between, on the one hand, the DHS Secretary’s exercise of section 102(c)(1) waiver authority as

applied to construction projects generally authorized

under the IIRIRA’s section 102(a), and, on the other,

the invocation of section 102(c)(1) with respect to construction authorized under a differently interpreted

section 102(b) that does not limit the DHS Secretary

to only 700 miles of construction, makes no difference

with respect to the constitutional arguments that

Plaintiffs have pressed here.19 Either way, the Court

19

Even Plaintiffs appear to admit that, regardless of whether

DHS based its decision to commence the New Mexico construction

project on section 102(a) or 102(b), their constitutional claims are

unaltered. (See Pls.’ Suppl. Br. at 11 (“Defendants’ new position—

App. 47

concludes that section 102(c)(1) sufficiently limits DHS’s

authority so as not to run afoul of the Constitution in

the manner that Plaintiffs allege.

1. The constitutional limits on Congress’s

authority to delegate authority to the Executive Branch are well established

The Supreme Court has long recognized that

“[t]he Constitution sought to divide the delegated powers of the new federal government into three defined

categories, legislative, executive and judicial, to assure,

as nearly as possible, that each Branch of government

would confine itself to its assigned responsibility.” INS

v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983). This hallowed division is reinforced by various constitutional provisions that delineate requirements for each branch in

carrying out its duties, in order to maintain that separation of powers. Cf. id. at 957-58 (“To preserve those

checks, and maintain the separation of powers, the

carefully defined limits on the power of each Branch

must not be eroded.”). The Presentment Clause requires,

that the authority to issue the New Mexico Waiver emanates not

just from § 102(a) but also § 102(b)—only fortifies those constitutional concerns. Plainly, it would mean that even in § 102(b), Congress provided absolutely no limits on Executive action, but

instead . . . granted the DHS Secretary a carte blanche to waive

any law [he] deems an impediment to any project [he] decides to

undertake anywhere in the vicinity of the southwest border.”).)

Thus, this Court need only address the core of Plaintiffs’ constitutional argument: that section 102(c)(1)’s waiver authority, unbounded by the specific projects outlined in section 102(b), is an

overly broad grant of authority from Congress to the Executive

Branch.

App. 48

for example, that “[e]very Bill which shall have passed

the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of

the United States[.]” U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. Such

requirements “were intended to erect enduring checks

on each Branch and to protect the people from the improvident exercise of power by mandating certain prescribed steps.” Chadha, 462 U.S. at 957. Similarly,

“repeal of statutes, no less than enactment, must conform with Art[icle] I[,]” id. at 954, and “[t]here is no

provision in the Constitution that authorizes the President to enact, to amend, or to repeal statutes[,]” Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 438 (1998).

“The nondelegation doctrine is [also] rooted in the

principle of separation of powers that underlies our tripartite system of Government.” Mistretta v. United

States, 488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989). The Supreme Court

explains that doctrine this way: because “[t]he Constitution provides that ‘all legislative Powers herein

granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United

States,’ and we long have insisted that ‘the integrity

and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution’ mandate that Congress

generally cannot delegate its legislative power to another Branch.” Id. at 371-72 (quoting U.S. Const. art. I,

§ 1; Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692

(1892)). But Congress can confer its powers within limits; specifically, “[s]o long as Congress shall lay down

by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the

person or body authorized to exercise the delegated authority is directed to conform, such legislative action is

App. 49

not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.” Id. at

372 (internal quotation marks, citation, and alteration

omitted). This means that a congressional delegation

of power to the Executive Branch is “constitutionally

sufficient if Congress clearly delineates the general

policy, the public agency which is to apply it, and the

boundaries of this delegated authority.” Id. at 372-73

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see

also Mich. Gambling Opp’n v. Kempthorne, 525 F.3d 23,

30 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Milk Indus. Found. v. Glickman,

132 F.3d 1467, 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

Finally, separation-of-powers principles also drive

evaluations of claims brought under the Constitution’s

Take Care Clause, U.S. Const. art. II, § 3, because such

analysis focuses specifically on the President’s authority in relation to Congress’s. See Youngstown Sheet &

Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952). “In the

framework of our Constitution, the President’s power

to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the

idea that he is to be a lawmaker.” Id.; see also id. (“The

Constitution limits [the President’s] functions in the

lawmaking process to the recommending of laws he

thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad[,]

[a]nd the Constitution is neither silent nor equivocal

about who shall make laws which the President is to

execute.”). Thus, the Framers made clear that, far from

creating laws that bind the people of the United States,

the President “shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.” U.S. Const. art. II, § 3 (emphasis added);

see also Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117 (1926)

(concluding that the Take Care Clause applies to the

App. 50

entire Executive Branch, rather than the President

alone, because, “[a]s [the President] is charged specifically to take care that [the laws] be faithfully executed,

the reasonable implication, even in the absence of express words, was that as part of his executive power he

should select those who were to act for him under his

direction in the execution of the laws”).

These separation-of-powers principles are the

bedrock of many courts’ analyses with respect to constitutional challenges to a federal statute that authorizes broad discretionary decision making by executive

branch officials. However, constitutional claims are

rarely successful in this context, because courts have

construed the circumstances in which congressional

action conferring authority to an executive agency

transgresses the Constitution’s separation-of-powers

limits quite narrowly. See, e.g., Mistretta, 488 U.S. at

373 (noting that the Supreme Court has upheld “without deviation, Congress’ ability to delegate power under broad standards”); Arpaio v. Obama, 27 F. Supp. 3d

185, 210 n.14 (D.D.C. 2014) (“[A] finding of excessive

delegation of authority is extremely rare.”). As relevant

here, by this Court’s count, prior plaintiffs have raised

Presentment Clause, non-delegation doctrine, and

Take Care Clause claims concerning the government’s

waiver of laws under the IIRIRA’s section 102(c)(1)

three times in cases in which published opinions have

issued, see In re Border Infrastructure Envtl. Litig., 284

F. Supp. 3d 1092 (S.D. Cal. 2018); Save Our Heritage

Org. v. Gonzales, 533 F. Supp. 2d 58 (D.D.C. 2008); Defs.

of Wildlife v. Chertoff, 527 F. Supp. 2d 119 (D.D.C.

App. 51

2007)—and none has succeeded. For the reasons that

follow, the instant case is no exception.

2. A persuasive prior opinion squarely rejects

Plaintiffs’ separation-of-powers claims in

a nearly identical context, and this Court

sees no reason to reach a different conclusion

In 2007, two animal welfare and environmental

protection organizations filed a lawsuit in this district

“alleg[ing] that the Secretary of Homeland Security’s

waiver of numerous federal environmental laws under

section 102 of [the IIRIRA] is unconstitutional.” Defs.

of Wildlife v. Chertoff, 527 F. Supp. 2d 119, 120-21

(D.D.C. 2007). The legal action concerned the DHS

Secretary’s invocation of his authority under section

102(c)(1) of the IIRIRA to waive the NEPA and various

other laws with respect to a border construction project

in Arizona. See id. at 121-22. The plaintiffs alleged

that, when invoked in such a manner, the IIRIRA’s section 102(c) violates the Presentment Clause, “because

it provides the DHS Secretary with a roving commission to repeal, in his sole discretion, any law in all 50

titles of the United States Code that he concludes

might impede construction of a border wall[,]” id. at

123 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted),

and they further maintained that “the waiver authority violates fundamental separation of powers principles because it is an unconstitutional delegation of

legislative power to the Executive Branch[,]” id. at 126.

App. 52

Notably, with respect to the Presentment Clause

claim, the Defenders of Wildlife plaintiffs asserted that

“the power granted by section 102 of the [IIRIRA] to

the Secretary of DHS to waive the applicability of any

law that would otherwise apply to border wall and

fence construction projects is unmistakably the power

partially to repeal or amend such laws,” because “[t]he

laws waived by the Secretary’s federal register notice

are repealed . . . to the extent that they otherwise

would have applied to wall and road construction[.]”

Id. at 124 (internal quotation marks, citations, and

alterations omitted). But the court found such arguments “unavailing,” id. (Huvelle, J.) (citing Sierra Club

v. Ashcroft, Civ. No. 04-272, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

44244, *21 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2005)), because the

IIRIRA’s waiver provision did not bear the hallmarks

of a partial repeal or amendment of a statute in violation of the Presentment Clause that the Supreme

Court identified with respect to the Line Item Veto Act

in Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).

As Judge Huvelle explained, “[i]n Clinton, the Supreme Court struck down the Line Item Veto Act of

1996, which gave the President the authority to ‘cancel’

certain federal spending items that had been passed

by Congress, because the Court found that the Act—

‘[i]n both legal and practical effect’—allowed the President to amend Acts of Congress by repealing portions

of them.” Id. at 123 (alteration in original). Judge Huvelle reasoned that “[i]t was ‘critical’ to the Clinton

Court’s decision that the Line Item Veto Act essentially

‘gave the President the unilateral power to change the

App. 53

text of duly enacted statutes[,]’ ” id. (alterations omitted) (quoting Clinton, 524 U.S. at 437, 447), and that

“[t]he line items cancelled by the President would no

longer have any ‘legal force or effect’ under any circumstance[,]” id. (quoting Clinton, 524 U.S. at 437, 464). By

contrast, under the IIRIRA’s waiver provision, “[t]he

Secretary has no authority to alter the text of any statute, repeal any law, or cancel any statutory provision,

in whole or in part.” Id. And, as Judge Huvelle pointed

out, to assert otherwise would effectively transform

any Executive Branch waiver (the U.S. Code contains

“myriad examples” of such) into a violation of Article I,

“no matter how limited in scope.” Id. at 124-25.

In Defenders of Wildlife, Judge Huvelle further

distinguished section 102(c) from the Line Item Veto

Act on the grounds that the latter “authorized the

President ‘to effect the repeal of laws for his own policy

reasons,’ thereby ‘rejecting the policy judgment made

by Congress and relying on his own policy judgment.’ ”

Id. at 125 (alteration omitted) (quoting Clinton, 524

U.S. at 444, 445). However, “when the DHS Secretary

exercises his waiver authority under the [IIRIRA], he

is acting as Congress has expressly directed—i.e., to

‘expeditious[ly]’ construct ‘physical barriers and roads

. . . to deter illegal crossings in areas of high illegal entry[.]’ ” Id. (second alteration and ellipsis in original)

(quoting IIRIRA § 102(a), (c)(1)). Moreover, and finally,

“[t]he [IIRIRA’s] waiver provision . . . relates to foreign

affairs and immigration control[,]” which are two

“area[s] in which the Executive Branch has traditionally exercised a large degree of discretion.” Id. at 126;

App. 54

see also Clinton, 524 U.S. at 445 (explaining that “the

foreign affairs arena” is one in which the President has

“a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were domestic

affairs alone involved”).

Next, although the plaintiffs in Defenders of Wildlife did not specifically invoke the Take Care Clause, in

support of their claim that the IIRIRA’s section 102(c)

waiver authority violates the non-delegation doctrine,

they asserted that “[t]he fundamental constitutional

role of the Executive Branch under Article II . . . is to

faithfully execute—not selectively void—the laws[,]”

527 F. Supp. 2d at 126 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted), and argued that both “[t]he Secretary’s attempt to repeal unilaterally nineteen laws

that otherwise would have constrained his conduct,

and the law that purports to authorize him in taking

such improper action, thus squarely offend both Articles I and II[,]” id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).20 These arguments also failed to persuade

Judge Huvelle.

She persuasively explained that, “[i]n order to exercise the waiver authority under the [IIRIRA], Congress has required the Secretary to determine if the

waiver is ‘necessary to ensure expeditious construction

of the barriers and roads under [section 102 of IIRIRA].’ ”

Id. at 127 (second alteration in original) (quoting IIRIRA

20

Thus, in this context, non-delegation doctrine and Take

Care Clause arguments are the same. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 3

(requiring that the President “shall take Care that the Laws be

faithfully executed”).

App. 55

§ 102(c)(1)). Congress has further directed the Secretary “to construct fencing only ‘in the vicinity of the

United States border to deter illegal crossings in areas

of high illegal entry into the United States.’ ” Id. (quoting IIRIRA § 102(a)). With these statutory limitations

in mind, Judge Huvelle then concluded that “[t]his

legislative directive meets the requirements of the

Supreme Court’s nondelegation cases[,]” id., because

“[t]he ‘general policy’ is ‘clearly delineated’—i.e. to expeditiously ‘install additional physical barriers and

roads . . . to deter illegal crossings in areas of high illegal entry[,]’ ” id. (ellipsis in original) (quoting Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372-73; IIRIRA § 102(a)). Moreover,

“the ‘boundaries’ of the delegated authority are clearly

defined by Congress’s requirement that the Secretary

may waive only those laws that he determines ‘necessary to ensure expeditious construction.’ ” Id. (quoting

Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372-73; IIRIRA § 102(c)(1)).

Judge Huvelle then compared the IIRIRA’s waiver

provision with delegations of power that the Supreme

Court had previously upheld, see id. (citing Whitman

v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001)), and observed that her conclusion that the IIRIRA’s waiver

provision does not constitute “an impermissibly standardless delegation” was “in accord with the only other

decision to address the question of whether the

[IIRIRA’s] waiver provision is a constitutional delegation[,]” id. (citing Sierra Club, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

44244, at *21). Significantly for present purposes,

Judge Huvelle further noted that “even if, as argued by

plaintiffs, this waiver provision is unique insofar as the

App. 56

number of laws that may be waived is theoretically

unlimited, the Secretary may only exercise the waiver

authority for the ‘narrow purpose’ prescribed by Congress: ‘expeditious completion’ of the border fences authorized by IIRIRA in areas of high illegal entry.” Id.

at 128 (quoting Sierra Club, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

44244, at *20).

In the instant case, Plaintiffs have challenged the

exact same statutory provision—the IIRIRA’s section

102(c)(1)—on the exact same separation-of-powers

grounds, and they have done so by repackaging essentially the same constitutional arguments that Judge

Huvelle found unpersuasive in Defenders of Wildlife.21

21

For example, Plaintiffs argue that the IIRIRA’s section

102(c)(1) waiver authority violates the Presentment Clause, because “the act of waiving a law’s application to border wall construction effectively repeals a portion of that duly enacted statute

and, in both ‘legal and practical effect’ amends into that statute

an exemption provision for border wall construction.” (Pls.’ Mem.

at 46 (quoting Clinton, 524 U.S. at 438); see also id. (asserting

that the DHS Secretary’s waiver “functionally result[ed] in ‘truncated versions of [25] bills that passed both Houses of Congress’ ”

(second alteration in original) (quoting Clinton, 524 U.S. at 440)).)

Plaintiffs also argue that section 102(c)(1) is “devoid of intelligible

principle” if that statute is interpreted as unbounded by the specific projects outlined in section 102(b) (id. at 49), and that, by

invoking the section 102(c)(1) waiver, the Executive Branch is

shirking its Article II responsibility to faithfully execute the law

(see id. at 53-54); cf. Defs. of Wildlife, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 126

(maintaining that the Executive Branch is supposed to “faithfully

execute—not selectively void—the laws” (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted)). As a final example, Plaintiffs reiterate the

Defenders of Wildlife plaintiffs’ argument that section 102(c)’s

waiver authority is exceptionally broad, “as broad, if not broader,

than prior delegations of legislative authority to the Executive

App. 57

Nevertheless, Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish the

instant case from Defenders of Wildlife, first, by asserting that that case “arose in the context of DHS carrying

out activities specifically authorized under [IIRIRA

section] 102(b)” (Pls.’ Mem. at 48 (citing Defs. of Wildlife, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 128)), and, second, by insisting

that the Defenders of Wildlife plaintiffs “narrowly challenged the constitutionality of the scope of laws that

the Secretary may waive—and did not challenge, as is

at issue here, the constitutionality of the waiver’s application to types of construction, project geography,

and time.” (Pls.’ Opp’n at 36 (emphasis in original).)

Both of these contentions miss the mark.

To begin with, nothing about Judge Huvelle’s analysis in Defenders of Wildlife turned on section 102(c)’s

waiver authority’s being limited by section 102(b). See

527 F. Supp. 2d at 123-26 (never mentioning section

102(b) when assessing the plaintiffs’ argument that

the DHS Secretary’s waiver violated the Presentment

Clause, nor when concluding that it had not, and quoting only from IIRIRA sections 102(c) and 102(a) when

observing that the DHS Secretary acted “as Congress

has expressly directed”). Furthermore, Defenders of Wildlife does not hold that Congress had provided a sufficiently intelligible principle to guide DHS’s authority

under the IIRIRA’s waiver provision by limiting section

102(c)’s waiver authority to section 102(b) projects.

Branch that the Supreme Court has deemed unconstitutional.”

(Pls.’ Mem. at 50 (citing Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S.

388 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295

U.S. 495 (1935)).)

App. 58

Rather, as the opinion plainly states, Congress provided a guiding principle by specifying that “the Secretary may only exercise the waiver authority for the

‘narrow purpose’ prescribed by Congress: ‘expeditious

completion’ of the border fences authorized by IIRIRA

in areas of high illegal entry[,]” Defs. of Wildlife, 527

F. Supp. 2d at 128 (quoting Sierra Club, 2005 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 44244, at *20), and this principle applies

with respect to the New Mexico Waiver as well. Therefore, this Court sees no reason to diverge from Judge

Huvelle’s reasoning or conclusions under the circumstances presented in this case.

Nor have Plaintiffs offered any other case that

compels a different result. As Judge Huvelle noted, Sierra Club v. Ashcroft does not stand for the proposition

that “the geographic scope of the waiver authority”

must be “limited” in order to be constitutional. Id. at

128 n.7.22 “Rather, the court upheld the waiver because

the ‘necessity’ standard provided an adequate intelligible principle to circumscribe the action the Secretary

was permitted to take.” Id. (citing Sierra Club, 2005

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44244, at *20-21). And, importantly,

that intelligible principle derives from section 102(c),

which authorizes the DHS Secretary to waive laws to

the extent that the Secretary “determines” such waiver

22

As Defenders of Wildlife puts it: “the Sierra Club court mistakenly believed that the [IIRIRA’s] waiver provision applies only

to the construction of a specific section of fencing near San Diego[,]” id. at 128 n.7 (citing Sierra Club, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

44244, at *21), but its “reasoning was not dependent on the belief

that the geographic scope of the waiver authority was so limited[,]” id.

App. 59

is “necessary to ensure expeditious construction of

the barriers and roads under this section[,]” IIRIRA

§ 102(c), and also section 102(a), which authorizes the

Secretary to “take such actions as may be necessary

to install additional physical barriers and roads . . . in

the vicinity of the United States border to deter illegal

crossings in areas of high illegal entry into the United

States[,]” id. § 102(a). Therefore, section 102(b)’s further direction is functionally unnecessary for section

102(c)(1) to comport with constitutional separation-ofpowers principles. Put another way, from the standpoint

of what suffices as guidance from Congress regarding

how the Executive Branch is to exercise the authority

granted in the statute for constitutional purposes, what

is set forth in subsections 102(a) and 102(c) is enough.

See also Cty. of El Paso v. Chertoff, No. EP-08-CA-196,

2008 WL 4372693, at * 4 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2008)

(“[T]he Waiver Legislation clearly satisfies the intelligible principle standard.”); Save Our Heritage Org.,

533 F. Supp. 2d at 64 (“[T]his Court finds no constitutional impediment to the Secretary’s waivers because

there is an intelligible principle that the Secretary must

conform to in the exercise of his delegated power.”).

3. Plaintiffs’ Take Care Clause claim is another iteration of Plaintiffs’ Presentment

Clause and non-delegation doctrine arguments, and it fails for the same reasons

Finally, “it is not at all clear that a claim under the

Take Care Clause presents a justiciable claim for this

Court’s resolution.” Am. Fed. of Gov’t Emps., AFL-CIO,

App. 60

318 F. Supp. 3d at 439 (citing Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 127,

138-40 (D.D.C. 2018)). But even if it does, the Take

Care Clause claim that Plaintiffs make in the instant

action merely repackages their two other constitutional claims, and, therefore, it must suffer the same

fate.

Plaintiffs maintain, for example, that “in issuing

the [New Mexico] Waiver, [the DHS Secretary] is purporting to be a lawmaker . . . , leading to the effective

repeals of portions of duly enacted statutes . . . without

being confined and guided by the Congressional construction mandate in § 102(b)” (Pls.’ Mem. at 53)—an

argument that echoes, almost verbatim, their argument in support of the Presentment Clause claim (see

id. at 46 (“[T]he act of waiving a law’s application to

border wall construction effectively repeals a portion of

that duly enacted statute[.]”)), as well as their argument in support of the non-delegation doctrine claim

(see id. at 49 (arguing that summary judgment is appropriate because the IIRIRA’s section 102(c) “lacks

the requisite boundaries of this delegated authority”).

(See also Pls.’ Opp’n at 40 (clarifying that the Secretary’s invocation of IIRIRA section 102(c) violates the

Take Care Clause “because the New Mexico Waiver

overreaches into Congress’s lawmaking authority”).)

Plaintiffs have offered no basis for treating or viewing

their Take Care Clause claim as anything other than a

rehashing of the same concern that animates Plaintiffs’ Presentment and non-delegation claims—i.e., that

Congress has delegated to DHS unlimited authority to

App. 61

exercise, in essence, legislative power, in a manner that

the U.S. Constitution does not permit—and this Court

has already explained why Plaintiffs have failed to establish that section 102(c)(1) and the New Mexico

Waiver “overreach[ ] into Congress’s lawmaking authority” in violation of the Constitution’s separation-ofpowers principles. (See supra Part III.B.2.)

Because Plaintiffs’ underdeveloped Take Care

Clause claim is founded on the legal arguments that

this Court has already rejected, it requires nothing

more in terms of analysis. Therefore, this Court’s prior

reasoning is the basis for its present conclusion that

Plaintiffs’ Take Care Clause claim must be dismissed

as well.

IV. CONCLUSION

This Court finds that Congress has spoken in no

uncertain terms about the limits of judicial review

when it comes to legal claims that challenge on nonconstitutional grounds the DHS Secretary’s authority

to waive otherwise-applicable legal requirements with

respect to the construction of border barriers under the

IIRIRA. Indeed, the IIRIRA’s section 102(c)(2)(A) specifically states that, with respect to “causes or claims

arising from any action undertaken, or any decision

made, by the Secretary of Homeland Security pursuant

to [section 102(c)(1)],” such a “cause of action or claim

may only be brought alleging a violation of the Constitution of the United States[,] [and] [t]he court shall not

have jurisdiction to hear any claim not specified in this

App. 62

subparagraph.” IIRIRA § 102(c)(2)(A). Thus, this Court

has no authority to consider the merits of Plaintiffs’

arguments that the New Mexico Waiver is ultra vires

or otherwise unlawful. And to the extent that Plaintiffs

have proceeded to make Presentment Clause, nondelegation doctrine, and Take Care Clause claims regarding the impermissibility of the New Mexico

Waiver, they have done so against the backdrop of a

prior determination by a judge in this district that

section 102 provides sufficient limitations on DHS’s

authority so as not to violate the Constitution’s

separation-of-powers principles. This Court finds that

precedent persuasive, and it compels the conclusion

that Plaintiffs’ complaint fails to state plausible constitutional claims as a matter of law.

Accordingly, and as set forth in the accompanying

Order, Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment must

be DENIED, and Defendants’ motion to dismiss, or,

in the alternative, for summary judgment must be

GRANTED.

DATE: September 5, 2019

/s/ Ketanji Brown Jackson

KETANJI BROWN JACKSON

United States District Judge

App. 63

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL )

)

DIVERSITY, et al.,

)

Plaintiffs,

)

v.

)

No. 18-cv-655 (KBJ)

KEVIN McALEENAN, Acting )

Secretary of the Department of )

)

Homeland Security, et al.,

)

Defendants.

)

ORDER

(Filed Sep. 4, 2019)

For the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion, it is hereby

ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary

Judgment (ECF No. 16) is DENIED. It is

FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion

to Dismiss and Alternatively Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 21) is GRANTED, insofar

as Plaintiffs’ claims are dismissed. It is

FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Partial

Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Texas Waivers (ECF No. 30) is DENIED.

App. 64

DATE: September 4, 2019

/s/ Ketanji Brown Jackson

KETANJI BROWN JACKSON

United States District Judge

App. 65

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL )

)

DIVERSITY, et al.,

)

Plaintiffs,

)

v.

)

No. 18-cv-655 (KBJ)

KEVIN McALEENAN, Acting )

Secretary of the Department of )

)

Homeland Security, et al.,

)

Defendants.

)

ORDER

(Filed Sep. 11, 2019)

In the Memorandum Opinion and Order that this

Court issued on September 4, 2019, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims in case No. 18-cv-655 (see ECF

Nos. 37, 38), and also denied Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment in consolidated case No. 18-cv2396 (see Mem. Op., ECF No. 37, at 17 & n.14). Given

this ruling, it is hereby

ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Partial

Dismissal (ECF No. 39) is GRANTED, and that the

claims in case No. 18-cv-2396 are DISMISSED.

App. 66

DATE: September 11, 2019

/s/ Ketanji Brown Jackson

KETANJI BROWN JACKSON

United States District Judge

App. 67

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL )

)

DIVERSITY, et al.,

)

Plaintiffs,

)

No. 1:19-02085 (KBJ)

v.

)

KEVIN McALEENAN, et al., )

)

Defendants.

)

ORDER

(Filed Sep. 12, 2019)

On September 4, 2019, this Court issued a Memorandum Opinion in Case No. 18-00655, resolving claims

over certain of Defendants’ waiver determinations made

pursuant to the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”) (codified at

8 U.S.C § 1103 note). In light of that ruling, and the

parties’ Stipulation in this action, it is hereby:

ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint

is dismissed for the reasons set forth in the Court’s

opinion in Case No. 18-00655, with the understanding

that the parties’ appeal rights remain preserved; and

further

ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and Request for a Hearing (ECF No.

8) is hereby deemed withdrawn; and it is further

App. 68

ORDERED that the Court’s September 9, 2019

Minute Order calling for a Joint Status Report is

hereby withdrawn.

DATE: September 13, 2019

/s/ Ketanji Brown Jackson

KETANJI BROWN JACKSON

United States District Judge

App. 69

APPENDIX C

U.S. Constitution

Article I, Section 1—The Legislature

All legislative Powers herein granted shall be

vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall

consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.

*

*

*

Article I, Section 7—Revenue Bills,

Legislative Process, Presidential Veto

All bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the

House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose

or concur with Amendments as on other Bills.

Every Bill which shall have passed the House of

Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become

a Law, be presented to the President of the United

States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall

return it, with his Objections to that House in which it

shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections

at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it.

If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House

shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together

with the Objections, to the other House, by which it

shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two

thirds of that House, it shall become a Law. But in all

such Cases the Votes of both Houses shall be determined by Yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons

voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on

the Journal of each House respectively. If any Bill shall

not be returned by the President within ten Days

App. 70

(Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented

to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if

he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be

a Law.

Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives

may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United

States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be

approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be

repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations

prescribed in the Case of a Bill.

*

*

*

App. 71

APPENDIX D

Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act Section 102, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1103 note,

provides as follows:

(a) In General.—The Secretary of Homeland

Security shall take such actions as may be necessary

to install additional physical barriers and roads (including the removal of obstacles to detection of illegal

entrants) in the vicinity of the United States border to

deter illegal crossings in areas of high illegal entry into

the United States.

(b) Construction of Fencing and Road Improvements Along The Border.

(1) Additional fencing along southwest

border.—

(A) Reinforced fencing.—In carrying out subsection (a), the Secretary of Homeland Security shall construct reinforced

fencing along not less than 700 miles of the

southwest border where fencing would be

most practical and effective and provide for

the installation of additional physical barriers, roads, lighting, cameras, and sensors to

gain operational control of the southwest border.

(B) Priority areas.—In carrying out

this section [amending this section], the Secretary of Homeland Security shall—

(i) identify the 370 miles, or other

mileage determined by the Secretary, whose

App. 72

authority to determine other mileage shall

expire on December 31, 2008, along the

southwest border where fencing would

be most practical and effective in deterring smugglers and aliens attempting to

gain illegal entry into the United States;

and

(ii) not later than December 31,

2008, complete construction of reinforced

fencing along the miles identified under

clause (i).

(C)

Consultation.—

(i) In general.—In carrying out this

section, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall consult with the Secretary of

the Interior, the Secretary of Agriculture,

States, local governments, Indian tribes,

and property owners in the United States

to minimize the impact on the environment, culture, commerce, and quality of

life for the communities and residents located near the sites at which such fencing

is to be constructed.

(ii) Savings provision.—Nothing in

this subparagraph may be construed

to—

(I) create or negate any right of

action for a State, local government,

or other person or entity affected by

this subsection; or

App. 73

(II) affect the eminent domain

laws of the United States or of any

State.

(D) Limitation on requirements.—

Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), nothing

in this paragraph shall require the Secretary

of Homeland Security to install fencing, physical barriers, roads, lighting, cameras, and

sensors in a particular location along an international border of the United States, if

the Secretary determines that the use or

placement of such resources is not the most

appropriate means to achieve and maintain

operational control over the international border at such location.

(2) Prompt acquisition of necessary

easements.—The Attorney General, acting under

the authority conferred in section 103(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act [8 U.S.C. 1103(b)]

(as inserted by subsection (d)), shall promptly acquire such easements as may be necessary to carry

out this subsection and shall commence construction of fences immediately following such acquisition (or conclusion of portions thereof ).

(3) Safety features.—The Attorney General, while constructing the additional fencing under this subsection, shall incorporate such safety

features into the design of the fence system as are

necessary to ensure the well-being of border patrol

agents deployed within or in near proximity to the

system.

App. 74

(4) Authorization of appropriations.—

There are authorized to be appropriated such

sums as may be necessary to carry out this subsection. Amounts appropriated under this paragraph are authorized to remain available until

expended.

(c)

Waiver.—

(1) In general.—Notwithstanding any other

provision of law, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall have the authority to waive all legal

requirements such Secretary, in such Secretary’s

sole discretion, determines necessary to ensure

expeditious construction of the barriers and

roads under this section. [amending this section].

Any such decision by the Secretary shall be effective upon being published in the Federal Register.

(2)

Federal court review.—

(A) In general.—The district courts of

the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear all causes or claims arising

from any action undertaken, or any decision

made, by the Secretary of Homeland Security

pursuant to paragraph (1). A cause of action

or claim may only be brought alleging a violation of the Constitution of the United

States. The court shall not have jurisdiction

to hear any claim not specified in this subparagraph.

(B) Time for filing of complaint.—

Any cause or claim brought pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall be filed not later than 60

App. 75

days after the date of the action or decision

made by the Secretary of Homeland Security.

A claim shall be barred unless it is filed within

the time specified.

(C) Ability to seek appellate review.—An interlocutory or final judgment,

decree, or order of the district court may be

reviewed only upon petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United

States.

App. 76

APPENDIX E

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Office of the Secretary

Determination Pursuant to Section 102 of the

Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant

Responsibility Act of 1996, as Amended

AGENCY: Office of the Secretary, Department of

Homeland Security.

ACTION: Notice of determination.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Secretary of Homeland Security has

determined, pursuant to law, that it is necessary to

waive certain laws, regulations and other legal requirements in order to ensure the expeditious construction of barriers and roads in the vicinity of the

international land border of the United States near the

Santa Teresa Land Port of Entry in the state of New

Mexico.

DATES: This determination takes effect on January

22, 2018.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The principal mission requirements of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) include border security and the

detection and prevention of illegal entry into the

United States. Border security is critical to the nation’s

national security. Recognizing the critical importance

of border security, Congress has ordered DHS to

achieve and maintain operational control of the international land border. Secure Fence Act of 2006, Public

App. 77

Law 109–367, 2, 120 Stat. 2638 (Oct. 26, 2006) (8 U.S.C.

1701 note). Congress defined “operational control” as

the prevention of all unlawful entries into the United

States, including entries by terrorists, other unlawful

aliens, instruments of terrorism, narcotics, and other

contraband. Id. Consistent with that mandate from

Congress, the President’s Executive Order on Border

Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements

directed executive departments and agencies to deploy

all lawful means to secure the southern border. Executive Order 13767, § 1. To achieve this end, the President directed, among other things, that I take

immediate steps to prevent all unlawful entries into

the United States, to include the immediate construction of physical infrastructure to prevent illegal entry.

Executive Order 13767, § 4(a).

Congress has provided the Secretary of Homeland

Security with a number of authorities necessary to

carry out DHS’s border security mission. One of these

authorities is found at section 102 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of

1996 (“IIRIRA”). Public Law 104–208, Div. C, 110 Stat.

3009–546, 3009–554 (Sept. 30, 1996) (8 U.S.C. 1103

note), as amended by the REAL ID Act of 2005, Public

Law 109–13, Div. B, 119 Stat. 231, 302, 306 (May 11,

2005) (8 U.S.C. 1103 note), as amended by the Secure

Fence Act of 2006, Public Law 109–367, 3, 120 Stat.

2638 (Oct. 26, 2006) (8 U.S.C. 1103 note), as amended

by the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2008, Public Law 110–161, Div. E, Title V,

§ 564, 121 Stat. 2090 (Dec. 26, 2007). In section 102(a)

App. 78

of IIRIRA, Congress provided that the Secretary of

Homeland Security shall take such actions as may be

necessary to install additional physical barriers and

roads (including the removal of obstacles to detection

of illegal entrants) in the vicinity of the United States

border to deter illegal crossings in areas of high illegal

entry into the United States. In section 102(b) of

IIRIRA, Congress has called for the installation of additional fencing, barriers, roads, lighting, cameras, and

sensors on the southwest border. Finally, in section

102(c) of IIRIRA, Congress granted to the Secretary of

Homeland Security the authority to waive all legal requirements that I, in my sole discretion, determine

necessary to ensure the expeditious construction of

barriers and roads authorized by section 102 of

IIRIRA.

Determination and Waiver

Section 1

The United States Border Patrol’s El Paso Sector

is an area of high illegal entry. For example, in fiscal

year 2016, the United States Border Patrol (“Border

Patrol”) apprehended over 25,000 illegal aliens and

seized approximately 67,000 pounds of marijuana and

approximately 157 pounds of cocaine. Since the creation of DHS, and through the construction of border infrastructure and other operational improvements, the

Border Patrol has been able to make significant gains

in border security within the El Paso Sector; however,

more work needs to be done. In fact, in recent years,

App. 79

the El Paso Sector has seen an increase in apprehensions. The El Paso Sector therefore remains an area of

high illegal entry for which there is an immediate need

to construct border barriers and roads.

To begin to meet the need for enhanced border infrastructure in the El Paso Sector, DHS will take immediate action to replace existing vehicle barrier with

bollard wall. Vehicle barrier replacement in the El

Paso Sector is among DHS’s highest priority border security requirements. The vehicle barrier replacement

will take place along an approximately twenty mile

segment of the border that starts at the Santa Teresa

Land Port of Entry and extends westward. This approximately twenty mile segment of the border is referred to herein as the “project area” and is more

specifically described in Section 2 below.

Although the existing vehicle barrier has aided

border enforcement within the project area, Border Patrol must have a more effective means of deterring and

preventing illegal crossings. The area within Mexico

that is situated across the border from the project area

has a population of almost two million people, including the city of Ciudad Juarez. The close proximity of

this heavily populated area and its urban infrastructure creates opportunities for illegal entrants to gain

quick and immediate access to the border. On the

United States side of the border, the eastern portion of

the project area includes developed areas where illegal

aliens can quickly blend into the population and have

App. 80

ready access to roads, highways, and other infrastructure. The western portion of the project area is made

up of desert areas where there is little to no natural

terrain that deters illegal crossings and illegal aliens

can quickly access state highways as a means of travel

into the interior of the United States. Replacing the existing vehicle barrier with bollard wall within the project area will improve Border Patrol’s operational

efficiency and, in turn, further deter and prevent illegal crossings.

Section 2

I determine that the following area in the vicinity

of the United States border, located in the State of New

Mexico within the United States Border Patrol’s El

Paso Sector is an area of high illegal entry (the “project

area”): Starting at the Santa Teresa Land Port of Entry

and extending west to Border Monument 10.

There is presently a need to construct physical

barriers and roads in the vicinity of the border of the

United States to deter illegal crossings in the project

area. In order to ensure the expeditious construction of

the barriers and roads in the project area, I have determined that it is necessary that I exercise the authority that is vested in me by section 102(c) of the

IIRIRA as amended.

Accordingly, pursuant to section 102(c) of IIRIRA,

I hereby waive in their entirety, with respect to the construction of roads and physical barriers (including, but

not limited to, accessing the project area, creating and

App. 81

using staging areas, the conduct of earthwork, excavation, fill, and site preparation, and installation and upkeep of physical barriers, roads, supporting elements,

drainage, erosion controls, and safety features) in the

project area, the following statutes, including all federal, state, or other laws, regulations and legal requirements of, deriving from, or related to the subject of, the

following statutes, as amended: The National Environmental Policy Act (Pub. L. 91–190, 83 Stat. 852 (Jan. 1,

1970) (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.)), the Endangered Species

Act (Pub. L. 93–205, 87 Stat. 884 (Dec. 28, 1973) (16

U.S.C. 1531 et seq.)), the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (commonly referred to as the Clean Water Act

(33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq.)), the National Historic Preservation Act (Pub. L. 89665, 80 Stat. 915 (Oct. 15, 1966),

as amended, repealed, or replaced by Pub. L. 113–287

(Dec. 19, 2014) (formerly codified at 16 U.S.C. 470 et

seq., now codified at 54 U.S.C. 100101 note and 54

U.S.C. 300101 et seq.)), the Migratory Bird Treaty Act

(16 U.S.C. 703 et seq.), the Migratory Bird Conservation Act (16 U.S.C. 715 et seq.), the Clean Air Act (42

U.S.C. 7401 et seq.), the Archeological Resources Protection Act (Pub. L. 96–95 (16 U.S.C. 470aa et seq.)), the

Paleontological Resources Preservation Act (16 U.S.C.

470aaa et seq.), the Federal Cave Resources Protection

Act of 1988 (16 U.S.C. 4301 et seq.), the Safe Drinking

Water Act (42 U.S.C. 300f et seq.), the Noise Control Act

(42 U.S.C. 4901 et seq.), the Solid Waste Disposal Act,

as amended by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq.), the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability

Act (42 U.S.C. 9601 et seq.), the Archaeological and Historic Preservation Act (Pub. L. 86–523, as amended,

App. 82

repealed, or replaced by Pub. L. 113–287 (Dec. 19,

2014) (formerly codified at 16 U.S.C. 469 et seq., now

codified at 54 U.S.C. 312502 et seq.)), the Antiquities

Act (formerly codified at 16 U.S.C. 431 et seq., now codified 54 U.S.C. 320301 et seq.), the Historic Sites, Buildings, and Antiquities Act (formerly codified at 16 U.S.C.

461 et seq., now codified at 54 U.S.C. 3201–320303 &

320101–320106), the Farmland Protection Policy Act

(7 U.S.C. 4201 et seq.), the Federal Land Policy and

Management Act (Pub. L. 94–579 (43 U.S.C. 1701 et

seq.)), National Fish and Wildlife Act of 1956 (Pub. L.

84–1024 (16 U.S.C. 742a, et seq.)), the Fish and Wildlife

Coordination Act (Pub. L. 73–121 (16 U.S.C. 661 et

seq.)), the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. 551

et seq.), the Eagle Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 668 et seq.),

the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (25 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.), and the American Indian Religious Freedom Act (42 U.S.C. 1996).

This waiver does not repeal the previous waiver

published in the Federal Register on April 8, 2008

(73 FR 19078). I reserve the authority to make further

waivers from time to time as I may determine to be

necessary under section 102 of the IIRIRA, as amended.

Dated: January 10, 2018.

Kirstjen M. Nielsen,

Secretary of Homeland Security.

[FR Doc. 2018–00996 Filed 1–19–18; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 9111–14–P

App. 83

APPENDIX F

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Office of the Secretary

Determination Pursuant to Section 102 of the

Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, as Amended

AGENCY: Office of the Secretary, Department of

Homeland Security.

ACTION: Notice of determination.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Secretary of Homeland Security has

determined, pursuant to law, that it is necessary to

waive certain laws, regulations, and other legal requirements in order to ensure the expeditious construction of barriers and roads in the vicinity of the

international land border of the United States in Cameron County in the State of Texas.

DATES: This determination takes effect on October

10, 2018.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Important

mission requirements of the Department of Homeland

Security (“DHS”) include border security and the detection and prevention of illegal entry into the United

States. Border security is critical to the nation’s national security. Recognizing the critical importance of

border security, Congress has mandated DHS to

achieve and maintain operational control of the international land border. Secure Fence Act of 2006, Public

Law 109–367, § 2, 120 Stat. 2638 (Oct. 26, 2006) (8

App. 84

U.S.C. 1701 note). Congress defined “operational control” as the prevention of all unlawful entries into the

United States, including entries by terrorists, other

unlawful aliens, instruments of terrorism, narcotics,

and other contraband. Id. Consistent with that mandate from Congress, the President’s Executive Order

on Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements directed executive departments and agencies to deploy all lawful means to secure the southern

border. Executive Order 13767, § 1. In order to achieve

that end, the President directed, among other things,

that I take immediate steps to prevent all unlawful entries into the United States, including the immediate

construction of physical infrastructure to prevent illegal entry. Executive Order 13767, § 4(a).

Congress has provided to the Secretary of Homeland Security a number of authorities necessary to

carry out DHS’s border security mission. One of those

authorities is found at section 102 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of

1996, as amended (“IIRIRA”). Public Law 104–208, Div.

C, 110 Stat. 3009546, 3009–554 (Sept. 30, 1996) (8

U.S.C. 1103 note), as amended by the REAL ID Act of

2005, Public Law 109–13, Div. B 119 Stat. 231, 302, 306

(May 11, 2005) (8 U.S.C. 1103 note), as amended by the

Secure Fence Act of 2006, Public Law 109–367, §3, 120

Stat. 2638 (Oct. 26, 2006) (8 U.S.C. 1103 note), as

amended by the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2008, Public Law 110–161, Div. E, Title V, § 564, 121 Stat. 2090 (Dec. 26, 2007). In section

102(a) of IIRIRA, Congress provided that the Secretary

App. 85

of Homeland Security shall take such actions as may

be necessary to install additional physical barriers and

roads (including the removal of obstacles to detection

of illegal entrants) in the vicinity of the United States

border to deter illegal crossings in areas of high illegal

entry into the United States. In section 102(b) of

IIRIRA, Congress mandated the installation of additional fencing, barriers, roads, lighting, cameras, and

sensors on the southwest border. Finally, in section

102(c) of IIRIRA, Congress granted to the Secretary of

Homeland Security the authority to waive all legal requirements that I, in my sole discretion, determine

necessary to ensure the expeditious construction of

barriers and roads authorized by section 102 of

IIRIRA.

Determination and Waiver

Section 1

The United States Border Patrol’s Rio Grande Valley Sector is an area of high illegal entry. For the last

several years, the Rio Grande Valley Sector has seen

more apprehensions of illegal aliens than any other

sector of the United States Border Patrol (“Border Patrol”). For example, in fiscal year 2017 alone, Border

Patrol apprehended over 137,000 illegal aliens. In that

same year Border Patrol seized approximately 260,000

pounds of marijuana and approximately 1,200 pounds

of cocaine.

In order to satisfy the need for additional border

infrastructure in the Rio Grande Valley Sector, DHS

App. 86

will take action to construct barriers and roads. DHS

will construct mechanical gates and roads within gaps

of existing barriers in the vicinity of the United States

border in the Rio Grande Valley Sector. The segments

of the border within which such construction will occur

are referred to herein as the “project area” and are

more specifically described in Section 2 below.

Section 2

I determine that the following areas in the vicinity

of the United States border, located in Cameron

County in the State of Texas, within the United States

Border Patrol’s Rio Grande Valley Sector, are areas of

high illegal entry (the “project area”):

• Starting approximately three-tenths (0.3) of a

mile west of a gap in the existing levee wall commonly

referred to as the Anacua gate location, which is situated at the intersection of Wichita Street and the International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC)

levee approximately one and one-half (1.5) miles south

of the intersection of Wichita Street with US Route

281, and extending to approximately three-tenths (0.3)

of a mile east of the Anacua gate location.

• Starting approximately three-tenths (0.3) of a

mile west of a gap in the existing levee wall commonly

referred to as the Webber Road gate location, which is

situated at the intersection of Webber Road and the

IBWC levee located approximately eight-tenths (0.8) of

a mile southwest of the intersection of Webber Road

with US Route 281, and extending approximately

App. 87

three-tenths (0.3) of a mile east of the Webber Road

gate location.

• Starting approximately three-tenths (0.3) of a

mile southwest of a gap in the existing levee wall commonly referred to as the Cantu Road gate location,

which is situated at the intersection of Avilia Road and

the IBWC levee located approximately eight-tenths of

a mile south of the intersection of Avilia Road with US

Route 281, and extending approximately three-tenths

(0.3) of a mile northeast of the Cantu Road gate location.

• Starting approximately three-tenths (0.3) of a

mile west of a gap in the existing levee wall commonly

referred to as the Garza Sandpit Road gate location,

which is situated at the intersection of the County

Road 677 and the IBWC levee located approximately

two-tenths (0.2) of a mile southwest of the intersection

of County Road 677 with US Route 281, and extending

approximately three-tenths (0.3) of a mile northeast of

the Garza Sandpit Road gate location.

• Starting approximately three-tenths (0.3) of a

mile northwest of a gap in the existing levee wall commonly referred to as the Pool Road gate location, which

is situated at the intersection of Domanski Drive with

the IBWC levee located approximately one (1) mile

south of the intersection of Domanski Drive and US

Route 281, and extending approximately three-tenths

(0.3) of a mile southeast of the Pool Road gate location.

• Starting approximately three-tenths (0.3) of a

mile northwest of a gap in the existing levee wall

App. 88

commonly referred to as the Flor De Mayo gate location, which is situated at the intersection of Flor De

Mayo Road and the IBWC levee located approximately

seven-tenths (0.7) of a mile southwest of the intersection of Flor De Mayo Road with US Route 281, and extending approximately three-tenths (0.3) of a mile

southeast of the Flor De Mayo Road gate location.

• Starting approximately three-tenths (0.3) of a

mile northwest of a gap in the existing levee wall commonly referred to as the Impala Road gate location,

which is situated at the intersection of an unnamed

road and the IBWC levee (said unnamed road is approximately 250 feet long from its point of intersection

with the IBWC levee and a point located approximately 100 feet northwest of the intersection of Impala

Drive and Gazelle Avenue) located approximately one

(1) mile east of the Brownsville/Veterans Port of Entry,

and extending approximately three-tenths (0.3) of a

mile southeast of the Impala Road gate location.

• Starting approximately three-tenths (0.3) of a

mile west of a gap in the existing levee wall commonly

referred to as the South Point Road gate location,

which is situated at the intersection of South Point

Road and the IBWC levee located approximately

seven-tenths (0.7) of a mile south of the intersection of

South Point Road with Southmost Boulevard, and extending approximately three-tenths (0.3) of a mile

northeast of the South Point Road gate location.

• Starting approximately three-tenths (0.3) of a

mile south of a gap in the existing levee wall commonly

App. 89

referred to as the Loops Sandpit gate location, which

is situated at the intersection of an unnamed road and

the IBWC levee located approximately 65 feet east of

the intersection of Alaska Road with S. Oklahoma

Drive, and extending approximately three-tenths (0.3)

of a mile north of the Loops Sandpit gate location.

• Starting approximately three-tenths (0.3) of a

mile south of a gap in the existing levee wall commonly

referred to as the Implement Shed gate location, which

is situated at the intersection of County Road 142 and

the IBWC levee located approximately 675 feet east of

the intersection of Oklahoma Avenue with County

Road 142, and extending approximately three-tenths

(0.3) of a mile north of the Implement Shed gate location.

• Starting approximately three-tenths (0.3) of a

mile south of a gap in the existing levee wall commonly

referred to as the Florida Road gate location, which is

situated at the intersection of Florida Road and the

IBWC levee located approximately 600 feet east of the

intersection of Oklahoma Avenue with Florida Road,

and extending approximately three-tenths (0.3) of a

mile north of the Florida Road gate location.

There is presently an acute and immediate need

to construct physical barriers and roads in the vicinity

of the border of the United States in order to prevent

unlawful entries into the United States in the project

area. In order to ensure the expeditious construction of

the barriers and roads in the project area, I have

App. 90

determined that it is necessary that I exercise the authority that is vested in me by section 102(c) of IIRIRA.

Accordingly, pursuant to section 102(c) of IIRIRA,

I hereby waive in their entirety, with respect to the construction of roads and physical barriers (including, but

not limited to, accessing the project area, creating and

using staging areas, the conduct of earthwork, excavation, fill, and site preparation, and installation and upkeep of physical barriers, roads, supporting elements,

drainage, erosion controls, safety features, lighting,

cameras, and sensors) in the project area, all of the following statutes, including all federal, state, or other

laws, regulations, and legal requirements of, deriving

from, or related to the subject of, the following statutes,

as amended: The National Environmental Policy Act

(Pub. L. 91190, 83 Stat. 852 (Jan. 1, 1970) (42 U.S.C.

4321 et seq.)); the Endangered Species Act (Pub. L. 93–

205, 87 Stat. 884 (Dec. 28, 1973) (16 U.S.C. 1531 et

seq.)); the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (commonly referred to as the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C.

1251 et seq.)); the National Historic Preservation Act

(Pub. L. 89–665, 80 Stat. 915 (Oct. 15, 1966), as

amended, repealed, or replaced by Pub. L. 113–287

(Dec. 19, 2014) (formerly codified at 16 U.S.C. 470 et

seq., now codified at 54 U.S.C. 100101 note and 54

U.S.C. 300101 et seq.)); the Migratory Bird Treaty Act

(16 U.S.C. 703 et seq.); the Migratory Bird Conservation Act (16 U.S.C. 715 et seq.); the Clean Air Act (42

U.S.C. 7401 et seq.); the Archeological Resources Protection Act (Pub. L. 96–95 (16 U.S.C. 470aa et seq.)); the

Paleontological Resources Preservation Act (16 U.S.C.

App. 91

470aaa et seq.); the Federal Cave Resources Protection

Act of 1988 (16 U.S.C. 4301 et seq.); the Safe Drinking

Water Act (42 U.S.C. 300f et seq.); the Noise Control Act

(42 U.S.C. 4901 et seq.); the Solid Waste Disposal Act,

as amended by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq.); the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability

Act (42 U.S.C. 9601 et seq.); the Archaeological and Historic Preservation Act (Pub. L. 86–523, as amended, repealed, or replaced by Pub. L. 113–287 (Dec. 19, 2014)

(formerly codified at 16 U.S.C. 469 et seq., now codified

at 54 U.S.C. 312502 et seq.)); the Antiquities Act (formerly codified at 16 U.S.C. 431 et seq., now codified 54

U.S.C. 320301 et seq.); the Historic Sites, Buildings,

and Antiquities Act (formerly codified at 16 U.S.C. 461

et seq., now codified at 54 U.S.C. 3201–320303 &

320101–320106); the Farmland Protection Policy Act

(7 U.S.C. 4201 et seq.); the Coastal Zone Management

Act (Pub. L. 92–583 (16 U.S.C. 1451, et seq.)); the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (Pub. L. 94–579

(43 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.)); the National Wildlife Refuge

System Administration Act (Pub. L. 89–669, 16 U.S.C.

668dd–668ee); National Fish and Wildlife Act of 1956

(Pub. L. 84–1024 (16 U.S.C. 742a, et seq.)); the Fish and

Wildlife Coordination Act (Pub. L. 73-121 (16 U.S.C.

661 et seq.)); the Administrative Procedure Act (5

U.S.C. 551 et seq.); the River and Harbors Act of 1899

(33 U.S.C. 403)); the Eagle Protection Act (16 U.S.C.

668 et seq.); the Native American Graves Protection

and Repatriation Act (25 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.); and the

American Indian Religious Freedom Act (42 U.S.C.

1996).

App. 92

This waiver does not revoke or supersede the previous waiver published in the Federal Register on

April 8, 2008 (73 FR 19078), which shall remain in full

force and effect in accordance with its terms. I reserve

the authority to execute further waivers from time to

time as I may determine to be necessary under section

102 of IIRIRA.

Dated: October 2, 2018.

Kirstjen M. Nielsen,

Secretary of Homeland Security.

[FR Doc. 2018–21930 Filed 10–9–18; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 9111–14–P

App. 93

APPENDIX G

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Determination Pursuant to Section 102 of the

Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, as Amended

AGENCY: Office of the Secretary, Department of

Homeland Security.

ACTION: Notice of determination.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Secretary of Homeland Security has

determined, pursuant to law, that it is necessary to

waive certain laws, regulations, and other legal requirements in order to ensure the expeditious construction of barriers and roads in the vicinity of the

international land border of the United States in Hidalgo County in the State of Texas.

DATES: This determination takes effect on October

11, 2018.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Important

mission requirements of the Department of Homeland

Security (“DHS”) include border security and the detection and prevention of illegal entry into the United

States. Border security is critical to the nation’s national security. Recognizing the critical importance of

border security, Congress has mandated DHS to

achieve and maintain operational control of the international land border. Secure Fence Act of 2006, Public

Law 109–367, §2, 120 Stat. 2638 (Oct. 26, 2006) (8

U.S.C. 1701 note). Congress defined “operational

App. 94

control” as the prevention of all unlawful entries into

the United States, including entries by terrorists, other

unlawful aliens, instruments of terrorism, narcotics,

and other contraband. Id. Consistent with that mandate from Congress, the President’s Executive Order

on Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements directed executive departments and agencies to deploy all lawful means to secure the southern

border. Executive Order 13767, § 1. In order to achieve

that end, the President directed, among other things,

that I take immediate steps to prevent all unlawful entries into the United States, including the immediate

construction of physical infrastructure to prevent illegal entry. Executive Order 13767, § 4(a).

Congress has provided to the Secretary of Homeland Security a number of authorities necessary to

carry out DHS’s border security mission. One of those

authorities is found at section 102 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of

1996, as amended (“IIRIRA”). Public Law 104–208, Div.

C, 110 Stat. 3009–546, 3009–554 (Sept. 30, 1996) (8

U.S.C. 1103 note), as amended by the REAL ID Act of

2005, Public Law 109–13, Div. B, 119 Stat. 231, 302,

306 (May 11, 2005) (8 U.S.C. 1103 note), as amended

by the Secure Fence Act of 2006, Public Law 109–367,

§3, 120 Stat. 2638 (Oct. 26, 2006) (8 U.S.C. 1103 note),

as amended by the Department of Homeland Security

Appropriations Act, 2008, Public Law 110–161, Div. E,

Title V, § 564, 121 Stat. 2090 (Dec. 26, 2007). In section

102(a) of IIRIRA, Congress provided that the Secretary

of Homeland Security shall take such actions as may

App. 95

be necessary to install additional physical barriers and

roads (including the removal of obstacles to detection

of illegal entrants) in the vicinity of the United States

border to deter illegal crossings in areas of high illegal

entry into the United States. In section 102(b) of

IIRIRA, Congress mandated the installation of additional fencing, barriers, roads, lighting, cameras, and

sensors on the southwest border. Finally, in section

102(c) of IIRIRA, Congress granted to the Secretary of

Homeland Security the authority to waive all legal requirements that I, in my sole discretion, determine

necessary to ensure the expeditious construction of

barriers and roads authorized by section 102 of

IIRIRA.

Determination and Waiver

Section 1

The United States Border Patrol’s Rio Grande Valley Sector is an area of high illegal entry. For the last

several years, the Rio Grande Valley Sector has seen

more apprehensions of illegal aliens than any other

sector of the United States Border Patrol (“Border Patrol”). For example, in fiscal year 2017 alone, Border

Patrol apprehended over 137,000 illegal aliens. In that

same year Border Patrol seized approximately 260,000

pounds of marijuana and approximately 1,200 pounds

of cocaine.

In order to satisfy the need for additional border

infrastructure in the Rio Grande Valley Sector, DHS

will take action to construct barriers and roads. DHS

App. 96

will construct barriers and roads within various segments of the border in the Rio Grande Valley Sector.

The segments of the border within which such construction will occur are referred to herein as the “project area” and are more specifically described in

Section 2 below.

Section 2

I determine that the following areas in the vicinity

of the United States border, located in Hidalgo County

in the State of Texas, within the United States Border

Patrol’s Rio Grande Valley Sector, are areas of high illegal entry (the “project area”):

• Starting approximately a quarter mile west of

the location where the levee intersects Goodwin/

Abram road and running east in proximity to the International Boundary and Water Commission (“IBWC”)

levee to approximately a quarter mile east of Anzalduas Dam Road, a total distance of approximately

eight (8) miles.

• Starting at the eastern boundary of the Santa

Ana National Wildlife Refuge and running east in

proximity to the IBWC levee approximately two and

four-tenths (2.4) miles to the western boundary of the

Monterrey Banco Tract of the Lower Rio Grande Valley

National Wildlife Refuge.

• Starting at the eastern boundary of the Monterrey Banco Tract of the Lower Rio Grande Valley National Wildlife Refuge and running south and east in

App. 97

proximity to the IBWC levee for approximately one

and one-half (1.5) miles.

• Starting at the eastern boundary of the La

Coma Tract of the Lower Rio Grande Valley National

Wildlife Refuge and running east in proximity to the

IBWC levee for approximately two and one-half (2.5)

miles.

• Starting where South International Boulevard crosses the IBWC levee and running west and

east in proximity to the IBWC levee approximately

one-half (0.5) of a mile in both directions.

• Starting approximately one-quarter (0.25) of

a mile west of the western boundary of the Mercedes

Settling Basin and running northeast in proximity to

the IBWC levee approximately two and one-half (2.5)

miles.

There is presently an acute and immediate need

to construct physical barriers and roads in the vicinity

of the border of the United States in order to prevent

unlawful entries into the United States in the project

area. In order to ensure the expeditious construction of

the barriers and roads in the project area, I have determined that it is necessary that I exercise the authority that is vested in me by section 102(c) of IIRIRA.

Accordingly, pursuant to section 102(c) of IIRIRA,

I hereby waive in their entirety, with respect to the construction of roads and physical barriers (including, but

not limited to, accessing the project area, creating and

using staging areas, the conduct of earthwork,

App. 98

excavation, fill, and site preparation, and installation

and upkeep of physical barriers, roads, supporting elements, drainage, erosion controls, safety features,

lighting, cameras, and sensors) in the project area, all

of the following statutes, including all federal, state, or

other laws, regulations, and legal requirements of, deriving from, or related to the subject of, the following

statutes, as amended: The National Environmental

Policy Act (Pub. L. 91–190, 83 Stat. 852 (Jan. 1, 1970)

(42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.)); the Endangered Species Act

(Pub. L. 93–205, 87 Stat. 884 (Dec. 28, 1973) (16 U.S.C.

1531 et seq.)); the Federal Water Pollution Control Act

(commonly referred to as the Clean Water Act (33

U.S.C. 1251 et seq.)); the National Historic Preservation Act (Pub. L. 89–665, 80 Stat. 915 (Oct. 15, 1966),

as amended, repealed, or replaced by Public Law 113–

287 (Dec. 19, 2014) (formerly codified at 16 U.S.C. 470

et seq., now codified at 54 U.S.C. 100101 note and 54

U.S.C. 300101 et seq.)); the Migratory Bird Treaty Act

(16 U.S.C. 703 et seq.); the Migratory Bird Conservation Act (16 U.S.C. 715 et seq.); the Clean Air Act (42

U.S.C. 7401 et seq.); the Archeological Resources Protection Act (Pub. L. 96–95 (16 U.S.C. 470aa et seq.)); the

Paleontological Resources Preservation Act (16 U.S.C.

470aaa et seq.); the Federal Cave Resources Protection

Act of 1988 (16 U.S.C. 4301 et seq.); the Safe Drinking

Water Act (42 U.S.C. 300f et seq.); the Noise Control Act

(42 U.S.C. 4901 et seq.); the Solid Waste Disposal Act,

as amended by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq.); the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability

Act (42 U.S.C. 9601 et seq.); the Archaeological and

App. 99

Historic Preservation Act (Pub. L. 86–523, as amended,

repealed, or replaced by Pub. L. 113–287 (Dec. 19,

2014) (formerly codified at 16 U.S.C. 469 et seq., now

codified at 54 U.S.C. 312502 et seq.)); the Antiquities

Act (formerly codified at 16 U.S.C. 431 et seq., now codified 54 U.S.C. 320301 et seq.); the Historic Sites, Buildings, and Antiquities Act (formerly codified at 16 U.S.C.

461 et seq., now codified at 54 U.S.C. 3201–320303 &

320101–320106); the Farmland Protection Policy Act

(7 U.S.C. 4201 et seq.); the Coastal Zone Management

Act (Pub. L. 92–583 (16 U.S.C. 1451, et seq.)); the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (Pub. L. 94–579

(43 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.)); the National Wildlife Refuge

System Administration Act (Pub. L. 89–669, 16 U.S.C.

668dd–668ee); National Fish and Wildlife Act of 1956

(Pub. L. 84–1024 (16 U.S.C. 742a, et seq.)); the Fish and

Wildlife Coordination Act (Pub. L. 73121 (16 U.S.C. 661

et seq.)); the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C.

551 et seq.); the River and Harbors Act of 1899 (33

U.S.C. 403)); the Eagle Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 668 et

seq.); the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (25 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.); and the American Indian Religious Freedom Act (42 U.S.C. 1996).

This waiver does not revoke or supersede the previous waiver published in the Federal Register on

April 8, 2008 (73 FR 19077), which shall remain in full

force and effect in accordance with its terms. I reserve

the authority to execute further waivers from time to

time as I may determine to be necessary under section

102 of IIRIRA.

App. 100

Dated: October 4, 2018.

Kirstjen M. Nielsen,

Secretary of Homeland Security.

[FR Doc. 2018–22063 Filed 10–10–18; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 9111–14–P

App. 101

APPENDIX H

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Office of the Secretary

Determination Pursuant to Section 102 of the

Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, as Amended

AGENCY: Office of the Secretary, Department of

Homeland Security.

ACTION: Notice of determination.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Secretary of Homeland Security has

determined, pursuant to law, that it is necessary to

waive certain laws, regulations, and other legal requirements in order to ensure the expeditious construction of barriers and roads in the vicinity of the

international land border in Cochise County and Pima

County, Arizona.

DATES: This determination takes effect on May 15,

2019.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Important

mission requirements of the Department of Homeland

Security (“DHS”) include border security and the detection and prevention of illegal entry into the United

States. Border security is critical to the nation’s national security. Recognizing the critical importance of

border security, Congress has mandated DHS to

achieve and maintain operational control of the international land border. Secure Fence Act of 2006, Public

Law 109–367, 2, 120 Stat. 2638 (Oct. 26, 2006) (8 U.S.C.

App. 102

1701 note). Congress defines “operational control” as

the prevention of all unlawful entries into the United

States, including entries by terrorists, other unlawful

aliens, instruments of terrorism, narcotics, and other

contraband. Id. Consistent with that mandate from

Congress, the President’s Executive Order on Border

Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements

directed executive departments and agencies to deploy

all lawful means to secure the southern border. Executive Order 13767, § 1. In order to achieve that end, the

President directed, among other things, that I take immediate steps to prevent all unlawful entries into the

United States, including the immediate construction of

physical infrastructure to prevent illegal entry. Executive Order 13767, § 4(a).

Congress has provided to the Secretary of Homeland Security a number of authorities necessary to

carry out DHS’s border security mission. One of those

authorities is section 102 of the Illegal Immigration

Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, as

amended (“IIRIRA”). Public Law 104–208, Div. C, 110

Stat. 3009–546, 3009–554 (Sept. 30, 1996) (8 U.S.C.

1103 note), as amended by the REAL ID Act of 2005,

Public Law 109–13, Div. B, 119 Stat. 231, 302, 306 (May

11, 2005) (8 U.S.C. 1103 note), as amended by the Secure Fence Act of 2006, Public Law 109–367, 3, 120

Stat. 2638 (Oct. 26, 2006) (8 U.S.C. 1103 note), as

amended by the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2008, Public Law 110–161, Div. E, Title V, § 564, 121 Stat. 2090 (Dec. 26, 2007). In section

102(a) of IIRIRA, Congress provided that the Secretary

App. 103

of Homeland Security shall take such actions as may

be necessary to install additional physical barriers and

roads (including the removal of obstacles to detection

of illegal entrants) in the vicinity of the United States

border to deter illegal crossings in areas of high illegal

entry into the United States. In section 102(b) of

IIRIRA, Congress mandated the installation of additional fencing, barriers, roads, lighting, cameras, and

sensors on the southwest border. Finally, in section

102(c) of IIRIRA, Congress granted to the Secretary of

Homeland Security the authority to waive all legal requirements that I, in my sole discretion, determine

necessary to ensure the expeditious construction of

barriers and roads authorized by section 102 of

IIRIRA.

Determination and Waiver

Section 1

The United States Border Patrol’s (Border Patrol)

Tucson Sector is an area of high illegal entry. In fiscal

year 2018, the Border Patrol apprehended over 52,000

illegal aliens attempting to enter the United States between border crossings in the Tucson Sector. Also in

fiscal year 2018, the Border Patrol had over 1,900 separate drug-related events between border crossings in

the Tucson Sector, through which it seized over

134,000 pounds of marijuana, 62 pounds of cocaine,

over 91 pounds of heroin, and over 902 pounds of methamphetamine. Additionally, Cochise and Pima Counties, which are within the Tucson Sector, have been

App. 104

identified as High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas by

the Office of National Drug Control Policy.

During the high levels of illegal entry of people

and drugs within the Tucson Sector, I must use my authority under Section 102 of IIRIRA to install additional physical barriers and roads in the Tucson Sector.

Therefore, DHS will take immediate action to replace

existing barriers in the Tucson Sector. Construction

will occur along four separate segments of the border,

which are referred to herein as the “project areas” and

more specifically described in Section 2 below.

The existing barriers within the project areas include both vehicle fencing and outmoded pedestrian

fencing that no longer satisfy Border Patrol’s operational needs. Transnational criminal organizations

known for smuggling drugs and aliens into United

States from Mexico are known to operate in the area

These transnational criminal organizations have been

able to use the lack of adequate infrastructure and the

surrounding terrain, which provides high ground for

scouts seeking to protect and warn smugglers moving

through the area, to their advantage. Therefore, Border Patrol requires a more effective barrier. The existing vehicle barriers and outmoded pedestrian fencing

will be replaced with an 18 to 30 foot barrier that employs a more operationally effective design. In addition, roads will be constructed or improved and

lighting will be installed.

To support DHS’s action under Section 102 of

IIRIRA, DHS requested that the Department of

App. 105

Defense, pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 284(b)(7), assist by constructing fence, roads, and lighting within the Tucson

Sector in order to block drug smuggling corridors

across the international boundary between the United

States and Mexico. The Acting Secretary of Defense

has concluded that the support requested satisfies the

statutory requirements of 10 U.S.C. 284(b)(7) and that

the Department of Defense will provide such support

in the project areas described in Section 2 below.

Section 2

I determine that the following areas in the vicinity

of the United States border, located in the State of Arizona within the United States Border Patrol’s Tucson

Sector, are areas of high illegal entry (the “project areas”):

• Starting approximately one-half (.5) mile

west of Border Monument 178 and extending east to

Border Monument 162;

• Starting at Border Monument 100 and extending east for approximately one (1) mile;

• Starting at Border Monument 98 and extending east to Border Monument 97; and

• Starting approximately one-half (.5) mile

west of Border Monument 83 and extending east to

Border Monument 74.

There is presently an acute and immediate need

to construct physical barriers and roads in the vicinity

App. 106

of the border of the United States in order to prevent

unlawful entries into the United States in the project

areas pursuant to sections 102(a) and 102(b) of

IIRIRA. In order to ensure the expeditious construction of the barriers and roads in the project areas, I

have determined that it is necessary that I exercise the

authority that is vested in me by section 102(c) of

IIRIRA.

Accordingly, pursuant to section 102(c) of IIRIRA,

I hereby waive in their entirety, with respect to the construction of physical barriers and roads (including, but

not limited to, accessing the project areas, creating and

using staging areas, the conduct of earthwork, excavation, fill, and site preparation, and installation and upkeep of physical barriers, roads, supporting elements,

drainage, erosion controls, safety features, lighting,

cameras, and sensors) in the project areas, all of the

following statutes, including all federal, state, or other

laws, regulations, and legal requirements of, deriving

from, or related to the subject of, the following statutes,

as amended: The National Environmental Policy Act

(Pub. L. 91–190, 83 Stat. 852 (Jan. 1, 1970) (42 U.S.C.

4321 et seq.)); the Endangered Species Act (Pub. L. 93–

205, 87 Stat. 884 (Dec. 28, 1973) (16 U.S.C. 1531 et

seq.)); the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (commonly referred to as the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C.

1251 et seq.)); the National Historic Preservation Act

(Pub. L. 89–665, 80 Stat. 915 (Oct. 15, 1966), as

amended, repealed, or replaced by Public Law 113–

287, 128 Stat. 3094 (Dec. 19, 2014) (formerly codified

at 16 U.S.C. 470 et seq., now codified at 54 U.S.C.

App. 107

100101 note and 54 U.S.C. 300101 et seq.)); the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (16 U.S.C. 703 et seq.); the Migratory Bird Conservation Act (16 U.S.C. 715 et seq.); the

Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.); the Archeological

Resources Protection Act (Pub. L. 96–95, 93 Stat. 721

(Oct. 31, 1979) (16 U.S.C. 470aa et seq.)); the Paleontological Resources Preservation Act (16 U.S.C. 470aaa et

seq.); the Federal Cave Resources Protection Act of

1988 (16 U.S.C. 4301 et seq.); the Safe Drinking Water

Act (42 U.S.C. 300f et seq.); the Noise Control Act (42

U.S.C. 4901 et seq.); the Solid Waste Disposal Act, as

amended by the Resource Conservation and Recovery

Act (42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq.); the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act

(42 U.S.C. 9601 et seq.); the Archaeological and Historic

Preservation Act (Pub. L. 86–523, 74 Stat. 220 (June

27, 1960) as amended, repealed, or replaced by Public

Law 113–287, 128 Stat. 3094 (Dec. 19, 2014) (formerly

codified at 16 U.S.C. 469 et seq., now codified at 54

U.S.C. 312502 et seq.)); the Antiquities Act (formerly

codified at 16 U.S.C. 431 et seq., now codified 54 U.S.C.

320301 et seq.); the Historic Sites, Buildings, and Antiquities Act (formerly codified at 16 U.S.C. 461 et seq.,

now codified at 54 U.S.C. 3201–320303 & 320101–

320106); Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (Pub. L. 90–542,

82 Stat. 906 (Oct. 2, 1968) (16 U.S.C. 1271 et seq.)); the

Farmland Protection Policy Act (7 U.S.C. 4201 et seq.);

the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (Pub. L.

94–579, 90 Stat. 2743 (Oct. 21, 1976) (43 U.S.C. 1701 et

seq.)); the Wilderness Act (Pub. L. 88–577, 78 Stat. 890

(Sept. 3, 1964) (16 U.S.C. 1131 et seq.)); 43 U.S.C. 387;

the National Wildlife Refuge System Administration

App. 108

Act (Pub. L. 89–669, 80 Stat. 926 (Oct. 15, 1966) (16

U.S.C. 668dd–668ee)); National Fish and Wildlife Act

of 1956 (Pub. L. 84–1024, 70 Stat. 1119 (Aug. 8, 1956)

(16 U.S.C. 742a, et seq.)); the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act (Pub. L. 73–121, 48 Stat. 401 (March 10,

1934) (16 U.S.C. 661 et seq.)); the National Trails System Act (16 U.S.C. 1241 et seq.); the Administrative

Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. 551 et seq.); the Wild Horse and

Burro Act (16 U.S.C. 1331 et seq.); the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 (33 U.S.C. 403); the National Park Service Organic Act and the National Park Service

General Authorities Act (Pub. L. 64–235, 39 Stat. 535

(Aug. 25, 1916) and Public Law 91–383, 84 Stat. 825

(Aug. 18, 1970) as amended, repealed, or replaced by

Public Law 113–287, 128 Stat. 3094 (Dec. 19, 2014)

(formerly codified at 16 U.S.C. 1, 2–4 and 16 U.S.C. 1a–

1 et seq., now codified at 54 U.S.C. 100101–100102, 54

U.S.C. 100301–100303, 54 U.S.C. 100501–100507, 54

U.S.C. 100701–100707, 54 U.S.C. 100721–100725, 54

U.S.C. 100751–100755, 54 U.S.C. 100901–100906, 54

U.S.C. 102101–102102)); Sections 401(7), 403, and 404

of the National Parks and Recreation Act of 1978 (Pub.

L. 95–625, 92 Stat. 3467 (Nov. 10, 1978)); 50 Stat. 1827

(April 13, 1937); Sections 301(a)–(f ) of the Arizona Desert Wilderness Act (Pub. L. 101–628, 104 Stat. 4469

(Nov. 28, 1990)); Arizona-Idaho Conservation Act of

1988 (Pub. L. 100–696, 102 Stat. 4571 (Nov. 18, 1988)

(16 U.S.C. 460xx)); 16 U.S.C. 450y (Pub. L. 77–216, 55

Stat. 630 (Aug. 18, 1941), as amended by Public Law

82–478, 66 Stat. 510 (July 9, 1952)); 67 Stat. c18 (Nov.

5, 1952); National Forest Management Act of 1976 (16

U.S.C. 1600 et seq.); Multiple-Use and Sustained-Yield

App. 109

Act of 1960 (16 U.S.C. 528–531); the Eagle Protection

Act (16 U.S.C. 668 et seq.); the Native American Graves

Protection and Repatriation Act (25 U.S.C. 3001 et

seq.); and the American Indian Religious Freedom Act

(42 U.S.C. 1996).

This waiver does not revoke or supersede the previous waivers published in the Federal Register on

October 26, 2007 (72 FR 60870), and April 8, 2008 (73

FR 19078), which shall remain in full force and effect

in accordance with their terms. I reserve the authority

to execute further waivers from time to time as I may

determine to be necessary under section 102 of IIRIRA.

Kevin K. McAleenan,

Acting Secretary of Homeland Security.

[FR Doc. 2019–10079 Filed 5–14–19; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 9111–14–P

App. 110

APPENDIX I

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Office of the Secretary

Determination Pursuant to Section 102 of the

Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, as Amended

AGENCY: Office of the Secretary, Department of

Homeland Security.

ACTION: Notice of determination.

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Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Center for Biological Diversity, et al., Petitioners v. Chad Wolf, Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, et al. | Frix