Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Retail Ready Career Center, Inc., Petitioner v. United States

Supreme Court briefJan 30, 2020

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App. 1

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

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No. 18-10801

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

$4,480,466.16 in funds seized from Bank of America

account ending in 2653

Defendant,

RETAIL READY CAREER CENTER INCORPORATED,

Claimant - Appellant

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

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ON PETITION FOR PANEL REHEARING

(Filed Nov. 5, 2019)

Before ELROD, WILLETT, and DUNCAN, Circuit

Judges.

STUART KYLE DUNCAN, Circuit Judge:

The petition for panel rehearing is DENIED. We

withdraw the previous opinion issued August 22, 2019,

936 F.3d 233, and substitute the following:

App. 2

We address whether a claimant in a civil forfeiture

proceeding may counterclaim for constitutional tort

damages against the United States. The district court

held a claimant may never file counterclaims of any

kind. It adopted the First Circuit’s reasoning that, because a forfeiture is an in rem proceeding against property, there is no “claim” against a claimant that he may

“counter.” Although this reasoning has been adopted by

several district courts and recently by the Sixth Circuit, we find it unpersuasive and decline to adopt it. We

nonetheless affirm the district court’s judgment dismissing the counterclaims for a different reason. The

counterclaims here seek damages based on alleged

Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations arising from

the property seizure. The United States has not waived

sovereign immunity for either claim. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment on the alternative

ground that the counterclaims are barred by sovereign

immunity.

I.

Appellant Retail Ready Career Center (“RRCC”)

was a private school in Texas offering a six-week “boot

camp style” course to train students as Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (“HVAC”) technicians.1

According to RRCC, “[m]ost” students were “veterans

who pa[id] for the course using their earned GI Bill

1

We draw these facts primarily from RRCC’s verified claim,

which we accept as true for purposes of reviewing the district

court’s grant of a motion to dismiss. See Masel v. Villareal, 924

F.3d 734, 743 (5th Cir. 2019).

App. 3

benefit,” but “courses were open to other participants”

as well. In 2017, the United States Department of

Veterans Affairs (“VA”) began investigating whether

RRCC had falsely claimed to be in compliance with the

“85-15” rule. This rule prohibits the VA from approving

a veteran’s enrollment in a course “for any period during which more than 85 percent of the students enrolled in the course are having all or part of their

tuition, fees or other charges paid for them by the educational institution or by VA[.]” 38 C.F.R. § 21.4201.

The rule’s purpose is to “minimize the risk that veterans’ benefits will be wasted on educational programs

of little value . . . and to prevent charlatans from grabbing the veterans’ education money.” Cleland v. Nat’l

Coll. of Bus., 435 U.S. 213, 219 (1978) (cleaned up).

In September 2017, federal warrants were issued

to seize the money in RRCC’s bank accounts—amounting to over $4.6 million—as the alleged proceeds of

federal law violations. See FED. R. CIV. P., SUPPLEMENTAL RULE (“SUPP. RULE”) G(3)(b) (“the court—on

finding probable cause—must issue a warrant” to seize

movable property not in government control).2 In October 2017, the government filed a complaint in rem

seeking forfeiture of the funds under various fraud

and conspiracy statutes.3 After receiving notice of the

2

The government also seized other property not relevant to

this appeal, including over $100,000 from five other bank accounts; real property located in Dallas, Texas; and seven luxury

vehicles.

3

See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) (providing “[a]ny property, real or personal, which constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to a violation of [certain federal laws]” is “subject

App. 4

forfeiture action, RRCC filed a verified claim to the

seized property. See 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(4)(A) (providing

that “[a]ny person claiming an interest in the seized

property may file a claim asserting such person’s interest in the property”); SUPP. RULE G(5)(a) (setting out

claim requirements). In its verified claim, RRCC alleged that the seizure occurred without prior notice

or hearing; caused “an immediate and devastating effect on RRCC’s business”; and forced RRCC to “close

the school,” dismiss employees without pay, and fly

students home lest they be “stranded in Texas.” RRCC

also included two “constitutional counterclaims,”

which alleged the seizure violated the Fourth and Fifth

Amendments and sought “damages to compensate

[RRCC] for the destruction of its business.”

The government moved to dismiss RRCC’s counterclaims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

Relying principally on the First Circuit’s decision in

United States v. One Lot of U.S. Currency ($68,000),

927 F.2d 30 (1st Cir. 1991) (“$68,000”), the government

argued that “claimants in civil-forfeiture cases may not

file counterclaims against the United States, as they

are merely claimants, not the party against which the

to forfeiture to the United States”); id. § 981(a)(1)(D) (providing

“[a]ny property, real or personal, which represents or is traceable

to the gross receipts obtained, directly or indirectly, from a violation of [federal fraud statutes]” is “subject to forfeiture to the

United States”); id. § 982(a)(3) (providing a court shall order that

a person convicted of a federal fraud offense forfeit to the United

States any property “which represents or is traceable to the gross

receipts obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of such violation”).

App. 5

suit is directed.” The district court noted the parties

had not cited “any binding Fifth Circuit authority” on

this question, but found “persuasive” the First Circuit’s

reasoning in $68,000, which had been followed by several district courts from other circuits.4 The district

court therefore granted the government’s motion to

dismiss RRCC’s counterclaims, “hold[ing] that, as a

claimant in an in rem civil forfeiture action, RRCC cannot bring a counterclaim.”

Meanwhile, the government struggled to state an

adequate claim against RRCC’s funds under the forfeiture rules. The district court dismissed the government’s first amended complaint, finding its allegations

insufficiently specific. The second amended complaint

met the same fate. See, e.g., United States v.

$4,480,466.16 In Funds Seized, 2018 WL 4096340, at

*3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 28, 2018) (ruling allegations in second amended complaint were “insufficient to comply

with Supp[lemental] R[ule] G(2)’s requirement that

the complaint must ‘state sufficiently detailed facts to

support a reasonable belief that the government will

be able to meet its burden of proof at trial’ ”); SUPP.

4

See United States v. 8 Luxury Vehicles, 88 F.Supp.3d 1332,

1337 (M.D. Fla. 2015); United States v. Funds from Fifth Third

Bank Account # 0065006695, 2013 WL 5914101, at *12 (E.D.

Mich. Nov. 4, 2013); United States v. $22,832.00 in U.S. Currency,

2013 WL 4012712, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 6, 2013); United States

v. $43,725.00 in U.S. Currency, 2009 WL 347475 at *1 (D.S.C.

Feb. 3, 2009); United States v. 1866.75 Board Feet, 2008 WL

839792, at *3 (E.D. Va. Mar. 25, 2008); United States v. Assorted

Comput. Equip., 2004 WL 784493, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 9, 2004).

App. 6

RULE G(2)(f ). The parties continue to litigate that issue

below.5

The issues before us on appeal concern only the

fate of RRCC’s counterclaims. On June 12, 2018, the

district court entered a final judgment dismissing

RRCC’s counterclaims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), which RRCC timely appealed. We have

jurisdiction to review that Rule 54(b) judgment. See

New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. United States, 272 F.2d

754, 756 (5th Cir. 1959) (dismissal of counterclaim,

when plaintiff ’s claim is still pending, is non-appealable “absent a certificate under Rule 54(b)”).

II.

We review the district court’s judgment dismissing

RRCC’s counterclaims de novo, “ ‘accepting all wellpleaded facts [in RRCC’s counterclaims] as true and

viewing those facts in the light most favorable to

[RRCC].’ ” SGK Props., LLC v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n,

881 F.3d 933, 943 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Stokes v.

Gann, 498 F.3d 483, 484 (5th Cir. 2007)). We may affirm

the district court’s judgment “on any basis supported

5

Following RRCC’s appeal in this case, the government filed

its third amended complaint, in response to which RRCC moved

for dismissal and summary judgment. The district court has not

ruled on those motions. Instead, the district court granted the

government’s motion to stay the forfeiture action for 120 days

during the pendency of a related, ongoing criminal investigation.

The stay expired June 6, 2019, at which point the government

moved to extend the stay for an additional 120 days. That motion

is pending before the district court.

App. 7

by the record.” Total Gas & Power North Am., Inc. v.

FERC, 859 F.3d 325, 332 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Taylor

v. City of Shreveport, 798 F.3d 276, 279 (5th Cir. 2015);

EEOC v. Simbaki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475, 481 (5th Cir.

2014)); see also Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 391 (2002)

(“[I]t is well settled that an appellate tribunal may affirm a trial court’s judgment on any ground supported

by the record.”).

III.

We decline to endorse the district court’s ruling

that claimants in in rem civil forfeiture proceedings

are barred, always and everywhere, from filing counterclaims. As we explain below, that broad holding relies on dubious reasoning in a First Circuit opinion

that overlooks the procedural rights of claimants

in in rem forfeiture actions and that conflicts with

longstanding practice in in rem admiralty cases. Nonetheless, we affirm the district court’s judgment on the

narrower ground that RRCC’s constitutional damages

claims are barred by sovereign immunity.

A.

The district court relied heavily on the First Circuit’s decision in $68,000, which concerned an in rem

forfeiture action against a cocaine-tainted Lincoln

Town Car. 927 F.2d at 31–32. The claimant, Castiello,

sought to retrieve a “portable telephone” from the car

by “fil[ing] what he termed a ‘counterclaim’ for [its] return.” Id. at 34. The First Circuit identified multiple

App. 8

flaws in Castiello’s position. For instance, the court

pointed out that, because the forfeiture warrant did

not even encompass the telephone, Castiello’s “personal property claim had no place in th[e] action.” Id.

at 35.6 But the court also laid down this broader reason

for rejecting Castiello’s “counterclaim”:

By definition, a counterclaim is a turn-thetables response directed by one party (“A”) at

another party (“B”) in circumstances where

“B” has earlier lodged a claim in the same proceeding against “A.” A forfeiture action is in

rem, not in personam. The property is the defendant. Since no civil claim was filed by the

government against Castiello—indeed, rather

than being dragooned into the case as a defendant, he intervened as a claimant—there

was no “claim” to “counter.” Thus, Castiello’s

self-styled counterclaim was a nullity, and the

court below appropriately ignored it.

$68,000, 927 F.2d at 34. This citationless half-paragraph

furnished the sole rationale for the district court’s

holding below that “a claimant in an in rem civil forfeiture action . . . cannot bring a counterclaim.”

6

Had the warrant included the telephone, the court stated it

was “at least arguable” that Castiello could “replevy” it “within

the contours of the government’s forfeiture action.” Id. at 34 n.7

(citing United States v. Castro, 883 F.2d 1018 (11th Cir. 1989);

Goodman v. Lane, 48 F.2d 32 (8th Cir. 1931)). The court also

pointed out that, regardless, Castiello remained free to retrieve

the phone “administratively, by a motion in [his] underlying criminal case, or by bringing an independent civil action.” Id. at 35

(cleaned up) (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1618; FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e);

United States v. Wilson, 540 F.2d 1100, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1976)).

App. 9

We readily grasp why the district court disposed

of RRCC’s counterclaims on this basis. As the court

pointed out, the First Circuit’s musing in $68,000 has

metastasized to several district courts, and also recently to the Sixth Circuit. See Zappone v. United

States, 870 F.3d 551, 561 (6th Cir. 2017) (stating that

owner in civil forfeiture action may “intervene” but

“may not assert counterclaims against the United

States”) (citing $68,000). And the district court had no

binding authority from our court, because we have

never squarely addressed the issue. We do so now.

Examining the issue as one of first impression, we respectfully reject the First Circuit’s broad rationale for

barring counterclaims in in rem civil forfeiture proceedings.

First, the fact that a forfeiture proceeding is “in

rem, not in personam” does not determine a claimant’s

rights in the proceeding. The forfeiture rules allow a

claimant to take numerous actions respecting the

seized property, even though the proceeding is “in rem.”

To begin with, a claimant may “file a claim” to protect

his interests in the property.7 He may also file: (1) an

answer to the government’s complaint, SUPP. RULE

G(5)(b); (2) a Rule 12 motion, id.; (3) objections to government interrogatories, SUPP. RULE G(6)(b); (4) a

7

See 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(4)(A) (providing “any person claiming an interest in the seized property may file a claim asserting

such person’s interest in the property in the manner set forth in

the Supplemental Rules”); SUPP. RULE G(5)(a)(i) (providing “[a]

person who asserts an interest in the defendant property may

contest the forfeiture by filing a claim in the court where the

action is pending”).

App. 10

motion to suppress use of the seized property as evidence, SUPP. RULE G(8)(a); and (5) a motion raising a

defense under the Excessive Fines Clause of the

Eighth Amendment, SUPP. RULE G(8)(e); see also 18

U.S.C. § 983(g) (claimant may file a “petition” to “determine whether the forfeiture was constitutionally excessive”). And the civil forfeiture statute lets claimants

do other things, such as: (1) raise and prove an “innocent owner” defense, 18 U.S.C. § 983(d); (2) move to set

aside the forfeiture for lack of notice, id. § 983(e); and

(3) seek immediate release of seized property, id.

§ 983(f ).8 The point being: If a claimant can do all this

in in rem forfeiture proceedings, it cannot be that he is

barred from filing counterclaims simply because forfeitures are “in rem and not in personam.”

Thus, contrary to the First Circuit’s view in

$68,000, the answer to this puzzle does not lie in the

brute fact that, in a forfeiture proceeding, “[t]he property is the defendant.” 927 F.2d at 34. That truism begs

the question what other actors in the proceeding (besides the property itself ) may assert rights arising out

of the forfeiture. See, e.g., United States v. All Funds

In Account Nos. 747.034/278, 747.009/278, & 747.714/278

Banco Espanol de Credito, Spain, 295 F.3d 23, 25 (D.C.

Cir. 2002) (observing that “[c]ivil forfeiture actions are

8

See generally Stefan D. Cassella, The Civil Asset Forfeiture

Reform Act of 2000: Expanded Government Forfeiture Authority

and Strict Deadlines Imposed on All Parties, 27 J. Legis. 97, 97,

125–151 (2001) (“Casella”) (summarizing “comprehensive revision” to forfeiture procedures enacted by Civil Asset Forfeiture

Reform Act of 2000 (“CAFRA”), Pub. L. 106-185, 117 Stat. 202

(2000)).

App. 11

brought against property, not people,” but that “[t]he

owner of the property may intervene to protect his interest”). The multiple procedural options given claimants by the civil forfeiture rules sit uneasily with the

notion that a claimant can never bring counterclaims

in those proceedings.

Second, the reasoning in $68,000 overlooks the

rules governing intervenors. Rule 24 allows intervention of right to “anyone” who, inter alia, “claims an interest relating to the property . . . that is the subject of

the action.” FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2). That sounds quite

like the position of a claimant in a forfeiture proceeding; indeed, the forfeiture rules treat a claimant in

precisely those terms. See 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(4)(A) (allowing “any person claiming an interest in the seized

property” to file a claim); SUPP. RULE G(5)(a)(i) (allowing “[a] person who asserts an interest in the defendant property” to contest the forfeiture). Moreover, our

cases have described “claimants” in forfeiture proceedings as “intervenors.”9 In $68,000 itself, the First Circuit said Castiello “intervened as a claimant.” 927 F.2d

at 34. Likewise here, the government described RRCC

as “an intervening party.” The kinship between

9

See, e.g., United States v. An Article of Drug Consisting of

4,680 Pails, 725 F.2d 976, 981 (5th Cir. 1981) (observing, “[a]fter

seizure pursuant to a warrant for arrest in rem, Pfizer intervened

as claimant and filed an answer”); United States v. 110 Bars of

Silver, 508 F.2d 799, 801 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (“This forfeiture proceeding stems from intervenor’s conviction for melting

down United States coins[.]”); Westfall Oldsmobile, Inc. v. United

States, 243 F.2d 409, 411 (5th Cir. 1957) (describing owner contesting automobile forfeiture as “claimant-intervenor”).

App. 12

“claimants” and “intervenors” does not support a blanket rule barring claimants’ counterclaims in forfeiture

proceedings. Quite the opposite. As we have explained,

“[u]nder federal law, an intervenor of right ‘is treated

as he were an original party and has equal standing

with the original parties.’ ” Brown v. Demco, 792 F.2d

478, 480–81 (5th Cir. 1986) (quoting Donovan v. Oil,

Chem., and Atomic Workers Int’l Union, 718 F.2d 1341,

1350 (5th Cir. 1983)); see also 7C WRIGHT & MILLER,

FED. PRAC. & PROC. § 1920 (3d ed.) (explaining an intervenor “has equal standing with the original parties”

and “is entitled to litigate fully on the merits once

intervention has been granted”) (citing Gilbert v. Johnson, 601 F.2d 761, 768 (5th Cir. 1979) (Rubin, J., specially concurring)).10

Third and finally, adopting the First Circuit’s reasoning in $68,000 would conflict with practice in

10

To be sure, the Supplemental Rules applicable to forfeiture

actions do not expressly provide that a claimant may file counterclaims. But “[t]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also apply to

[in rem forfeiture] proceedings except to the extent that they are

inconsistent with these Supplemental Rules.” SUPP. RULE A(2).

We discern nothing in the Supplemental Rules inconsistent with

the general proposition that claimants may file counterclaims in

forfeiture proceedings. Relatedly, one district court has suggested

that Rule 13(d) implicitly bars claimants in forfeiture proceedings

from counterclaiming against the United States. See United

States v. 8 Luxury Vehicles, 88 F.Supp.3d at 1334–1335, 1337

(M.D. Fla. 2015). We disagree. Rule 13 merely confirms that allowing counterclaims does not “expand” any waivers of sovereign

immunity by the United States. See FED. R. CIV. P. 13(d) (“These

rules do not expand the right to assert a counterclaim—or to claim

a credit—against the United States or a United States officer or

agency.”). We address sovereign immunity infra.

App. 13

admiralty cases, which have long entertained counterclaims (or their equivalents) in in rem proceedings. See,

e.g., Superior Derrick Services, LLC v. LONESTAR 203,

547 F. App’x. 432, 437 (5th Cir. 2013) (unpublished)

(discussing merits of counterclaim asserted in in rem

proceeding); Incas & Monterey Printing and Packaging, Ltd. v. M/V Sang Jin, 747 F.2d 958, 963–964 & n.16

(5th Cir. 1984) (considering counterclaims by timecharterer of seized vessel in in rem action); Treasure

Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned

Sailing Vessel, 569 F.2d 330, 335 (5th Cir. 1978) (considering United States’ claims when it “intervened in

plaintiffs’ in rem action as a party defendant and filed

a counterclaim asserting a property right in the res”);

Ellis Diesel Sales & Serv., Inc. v. M/V On Strike, 488

F.2d 1095 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (considering in

rem action in which “[d]efendant filed a counterclaim

alleging damages negligently caused to the vessel”)11;

11

See also, e.g., Puerto Rico Ports Auth. v. Barge Katy-B, O.N.

606665, 427 F.3d 93, 99, 100 (1st Cir. 2005) (noting intervenor’s

counterclaim for damages in in rem proceeding); Hawkspere Shipping Co., Ltd. v. Intamex, S.A., 330 F.3d 225, 230 (4th Cir. 2003)

(considering counterclaim by claimants in in rem proceeding for

wrongful arrest of vessel); Bradford Marine, Inc. v. M/V Sea Falcon, 64 F.3d 585, 586–587 (11th Cir. 1995) (reviewing attorney’s

fees awarded on a counterclaim in an in rem action); Teyseer Cement Co. v. Halla Maritime Corp., 794 F.2d 472, 478 (9th Cir.

1986) (considering whether counterclaim by intervenor in in rem

proceeding waived personal jurisdiction); Ocean Ship Supply,

Ltd. v. MV Leah, 729 F.2d 971, 973 (4th Cir. 1984) (considering

counterclaim for wrongful seizure and damages incurred therein);

Koch Fuels, Inc. v. Cargo of 13,000 Barrels of No. 2 Oil, 704 F.2d

1038, 1039 (8th Cir. 1983) (reviewing district court’s decision to

sever counterclaims in an in rem action for trial by jury).

App. 14

see also, e.g., Compania Naviera Vascongada v. United

States, 354 F.2d 935, 940 (5th Cir. 1966) (addressing

merits of “libel” and “cross-libel” in in rem proceeding)12;

and see, e.g., THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, 2 ADMIRALTY &

MAR. LAW § 21:6 (6th ed. 2018) (“SCHOENBAUM”) (explaining that a claimant must prove “demonstrable

bad faith or malice” to succeed on a wrongful seizure

counterclaim).

Moreover, the modern procedural rules applicable

to admiralty and maritime claims plainly foresee

counterclaims in in rem and quasi in rem proceedings.

For instance, Supplemental Rule E(7)—which applies

to “actions in rem and quasi in rem”—sets forth the

circumstances under which a plaintiff must furnish

“security” for damages demanded in a “counterclaim.”

See SUPP. RULE E(7)(a), (b)13; id., advisory committee

12

The older admiralty term “cross-libel” is equivalent to

“counterclaim”: “With the merger of law and admiralty in 1966,

admiralty’s classic and ancient phraseology of libels and cross-libels was replaced with the more mundane terminology of claims

and counterclaims[.]” Titan Nav., Inc. v. Timsco, Inc., 808 F.2d

400, 403 (5th Cir. 1987) (emphasis added); see also 3A BENEDICT

ON ADMIRALTY § 306 (2019) (“Rule 13, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which treats of counterclaims and cross-claims is the modern counterpart of the old admiralty cross-libels. While the

nomenclature has changed the admiralty practice has basically

remained the same.”).

13

Supplemental Rule E(7) provides as follows:

(7) Security on Counterclaim.

(a) When a person who has given security for damages in the original action asserts a counterclaim

that arises from the transaction or occurrence

that is the subject of the original action, a plaintiff

for whose benefit the security has been given

App. 15

notes (2000) (explaining that “[s]ubdivision (7)(a) is

amended to make it clear that a plaintiff need give security to meet a counterclaim only when the counterclaim is asserted by a person who has given security to

respond in damages in the original action”).14 Given

those textual cues in the Supplemental Rules, it would

seem anomalous to say that counterclaims are always

out-of-bounds in in rem proceedings. And yet the First

Circuit’s rule would bar counterclaims in forfeiture

actions precisely because they are “in rem, not in personam” proceedings. $68,000, 927 F.2d at 34. That

must give security for damages demanded in the

counterclaim unless the court, for cause shown,

directs otherwise. Proceedings on the original

claim must be stayed until this security is given

unless the court directs otherwise.

(b) The plaintiff is required to give security under

Rule E(7)(a) when the United States or its corporate instrumentality counterclaims and would

have been required to give security to respond in

damages if a private party but is relieved by law

from giving security.

14

See also, e.g., Transportes Caribe, S.A. v. M/V Trader, 860

F.2d 637 (5th Cir. 1988) (affirming district court’s order to post

countersecurity under Rule E); Titan Nav., 808 F.2d at 402–03 &

n.2 (discussing development of Supplemental Rule E(7)); Seaboard & Carribean Transp. Corp. v. Hafen-Dampfschiffahrt A.G.

Hapag-Hadac Seebader-Dienst, 329 F.2d 538, 539–541 (5th Cir.

1964) (applying Rule E precursor, Admiralty Rule 50, to a “crosslibelant” in a “libel in rem” proceeding); and see also SCHOENBAUM

§ 21:6 (explaining that “[s]ubsection 7 of [Supplemental Rule E]

contemplates the filing of a counterclaim against the party initiating the seizure”); 4 BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 2.23 (2019) (illustrating how a court may consider “whether or not a counterclaim

has merit for the purposes of determining whether or not a counterclaimant is entitled to countersecurity” under Rule E(7)).

App. 16

overbroad proposition clashes with venerable admiralty practice and modern maritime rules, and we decline to endorse it.

In sum, we respectfully decline to adopt the reasoning in $68,000 that, because “the property is the defendant” in a forfeiture proceeding, a claimant with

interests in that property may never file a counterclaim. If RRCC’s counterclaims are to be dismissed, it

must be for a different reason.15

B.

We affirm the district court’s judgment on a narrower ground. See, e.g., AT&T, Inc. v. United States, 629

F.3d 505, 510 (5th Cir. 2011) (“[i]t is well settled” that

a court of appeals may affirm “on any ground supported by the record”) (citation omitted). On appeal,

the government argues in the alternative that the

15

In addition to rejecting its reasoning, we note that $68,000

addressed a scenario quite different from ours. As the First Circuit observed, the forfeiture warrant in that case did not encompass the property that was the subject of the claimant’s

“counterclaim.” See 927 F.2d at 34 n.7 (“This is not a case where

the claimant seeks the return of the same property which the government seeks to forfeit.”). Had the warrant included the property, the First Circuit acknowledged, the claimant might have

sought to “replevy” the property in the forfeiture action. Id. The

Sixth Circuit’s decision in Zappone—the only circuit case to have

adopted the First Circuit’s reasoning—is also procedurally distinguishable. That case affirmed the dismissal of untimely “counterclaims” asserting Bivens claims against IRS agents who seized

property in a forfeiture action. 870 F.3d at 554. But the IRS

agents were not even parties in the forfeiture proceeding, making

a “counterclaim” against them particularly tenuous.

App. 17

United States has not waived its sovereign immunity

with respect to the particular claims asserted in

RRCC’s counterclaims—damages claims for violations

of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments—and that those

claims are therefore barred. We agree.

“It is axiomatic that the United States may not be

sued without its consent and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction.” United States v.

Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983) (citing United States

v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941); 14 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, FED. PRAC. & PROC. § 3654); see also, e.g.,

In re Supreme Beef Processors, Inc., 468 F.3d 248, 251–

52 (5th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (“The Constitution contemplates that, except as authorized by Congress, the federal government and its agencies are immune from

suit.”) (citing Hercules, Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S.

417, 422 (1996)). A waiver of sovereign immunity “cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed,”

and any waiver “will be strictly construed, in terms of

its scope, in favor of the sovereign.” Doe v. United

States, 853 F.3d 792, 796 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting

United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980);

Lane v. Peña, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The government argues that

RRCC has identified no statute unequivocally waiving

the United States’ immunity for the damages claims in

RRCC’s counterclaims. Specifically, RRCC seeks damages arising from the “unreasonable seizure” of its

bank accounts in violation of the Fourth Amendment

and from the lack of “notice and hearing” in violation

App. 18

of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The

government is correct.

In its reply brief, RRCC attempts to identify the

required waiver in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c). In that provision, Congress “re-waived” the United States’ sovereign immunity under the Federal Tort Claims Act

(“FTCA”) for certain property damages claims arising

out of forfeitures.16 See, e.g., Smoke Shop, LLC v. United

16

Section 2680(c) provides, in relevant part, that the FTCA

immunity waiver applies “to any claim based on the injury or loss

of goods, merchandise, or other property, while in the possession

of any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement

officer, if—

(1) the property was seized for the purpose of forfeiture under any provision of Federal law providing for

the forfeiture of property other than as a sentence imposed upon conviction of a criminal offense;

(2) the interest of the claimant was not forfeited;

(3) the interest of the claimant was not remitted or

mitigated (if the property was subject to forfeiture);

and

(4) the claimant was not convicted of a crime for

which the interest of the claimant in the property was

subject to forfeiture under a Federal criminal forfeiture

law.”

28 U.S.C. § 2680(c)(1)–(4). The subsection cross-references 28

U.S.C. § 1346(b), which in relevant part provides that federal district courts have exclusive jurisdiction over post-January 1, 1945

money damages claims against the United States for

injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death

caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of

any employee of the Government while acting within

the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person,

App. 19

States, 761 F.3d 779, 782 (7th Cir. 2014) (explaining

that in the 2000 CAFRA reforms Congress “ ‘rewaived’

the government’s immunity” under the FTCA “for tort

actions stemming from law-enforcement detentions of

property” under specific circumstances); Foster v.

United States, 522 F.3d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining that “CAFRA . . . restored the waiver of sovereign immunity—or ‘re-waived’ sovereign immunity—

with respect to certain forfeiture-related seizures”).

What RRCC overlooks, however, is that the FTCA’s immunity waiver does not extend to “constitutional torts”

like the Fourth and Fifth Amendment damages claims

pled in RRCC’s counterclaims. We have squarely recognized that “[c]onstitutional torts . . . do not provide a

proper predicate for an FTCA claim.” Spotts v. United

States, 613 F.3d 559, 565 n.3 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing

FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 478 (1994)); see also, e.g.,

Coleman v. United States, 912 F.3d 824, 835 (5th Cir.

2019) (the “source of substantive liability under the

FTCA” must be the “law of the State” and not federal

law) (citing Meyer, 510 U.S. at 478); Sanchez v. Rowe,

870 F.2d 291, 295 (5th Cir. 1989) (explaining “the FTCA

does not provide a cause of action for constitutional

torts” because “by definition constitutional torts are

not based on state law”) (cleaned up). Thus, the FTCA

waiver does not encompass the constitutional damages

would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the

law of the place where the act or omission occurred.

Id. § 1346(b)(1).

App. 20

claims in RRCC’s counterclaims, and the district court

therefore lacked jurisdiction over them.17

RRCC also argues that the United States waives

sovereign immunity simply by “initiat[ing] an in rem

proceeding.” RRCC cites no authority supporting that

grandiose proposition. It points only admiralty cases

allowing a limited cross-libel against the United States

when the United States sues another vessel for collision damages. See United States v. The Thekla, 266 U.S.

17

We do not decide whether RRCC could bring valid FTCA

claims as counterclaims in a civil forfeiture proceeding. See, e.g.,

Life Partners Inc. v. United States, 650 F.3d 1026, 1029-1030 (5th

Cir. 2011) (discussing administrative exhaustion requirements

which are “a prerequisite to suit under the FTCA”) (citing 28

U.S.C. § 2675(a); McAfee v. 5th Circuit Judges, 884 F.2d 221, 22223 (5th Cir. 1989)). We decide only that the specific claims asserted in RRCC’s counterclaims fall outside the CAFRA re-waiver

and are therefore barred by sovereign immunity. Additionally, we

note that neither the Tucker Act nor its companion, the Little

Tucker Act, waive sovereign immunity over RRCC’s claims. The

Tucker Act provides a judicial avenue for “any claim against the

United States founded . . . upon the Constitution.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1491(a)(1); see also United States v. Bormes, 568 U.S. 6, 11

(2012) (discussing Tucker Act). The waiver in the Tucker Act,

however, “has been limited to apply only to the Takings Clause

. . . because only that clause contemplates payment by the federal

government.” Rothe Dev. Corp. v. U.S. Dept. of Defense, 194 F.3d

622, 625 (5th Cir. 1999). Here, RRCC does not invoke the Tucker

Act, and its Fifth Amendment claims are premised on an alleged

due process violation, not the Takings Clause. See, e.g., Bellamy

v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 720, 723 (1985) (explaining claims court

“has no jurisdiction over claims based upon the Due Process and

Equal Protection guarantees of the Fifth Amendment, because

these constitutional provisions do not obligate the Federal Government to pay money damages” (quoting Carruth v. United

States, 224 Ct. Cl. 422, 445 (1980) (cleaned up)).

App. 21

328 (1924); United States v. The Paquete Habana, 189

U.S. 453 (1903); The Siren, 74 U.S. 152 (1868); see also,

e.g., United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495, 502–03 (1940)

(explaining that, in such cases, “it is necessary to determine the cross-libel as well as the original libel to

reach a conclusion as to liability for the collision”).18

But RRCC directs us to no authority supporting the

proposition that this distinct admiralty rule waives the

United States’ sovereign immunity whenever it institutes a civil forfeiture proceeding. Nor does RRCC direct us to any unambiguous statutory waiver of the

United States’ immunity under such circumstances.19

As we have already explained, Congress did enact an

unambiguous immunity waiver with respect to forfeiture proceedings, see 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c)(1)-(4), but it

has no application here.

Finally, RRCC claims we cannot reach sovereign

immunity for two reasons. First, RRCC points out the

government did not raise the issue below. That is irrelevant: Whether the United States’ sovereign immunity

18

See also generally 2 AM. JUR. 2d ADMIRALTY § 44 (“Whenever the United States sues for damage inflicted on its vessel or

cargo, it impliedly waives its exemption from admiralty jurisdiction as to cross libels or counterclaims arising from the same

transaction.”) (citing The Thekla, 266 U.S. 328; The Western

Maid, 257 U.S. 419 (1922)).

19

RRCC incorrectly points to the immunity waiver in 46

U.S.C. § 30903(a), but that statute also pertains only to certain

admiralty claims involving the United States. See, e.g., MS Tabea

Schiffahrtsgesellschaft MBH & Co. KG v. United States, 636 F.3d

161, 165 n.1 (5th Cir. 2011) (explaining that “[t]he Suits in Admiralty Act (SAA) . . . provides the appropriate waiver for maritime

tort claims against the United States”) (citing 46 U.S.C. § 30903).

App. 22

has been waived is a question of subject matter jurisdiction we can address for the first time on appeal. See,

e.g., Lewis v. Hunt, 492 F.3d 565, 568 (5th Cir. 2007)

(appellate court may consider United States’ sovereign

immunity sua sponte, “[a]lthough the parties and the

district court did not raise [it]”); Bodin v. Vagshenian,

462 F.3d 481, 484 (5th Cir. 2006) (lack of waiver of

United States’ sovereign immunity under FTCA “deprives federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction”).

Second, RRCC claims that addressing sovereign immunity would convert a without-prejudice dismissal

below into a with-prejudice dismissal on appeal, which

would be inappropriate without a cross-appeal. See,

e.g., Jennings v. Stephens, 135 S. Ct. 793, 798 (2015)

(explaining “an appellee who does not cross-appeal

may not ‘attack the [district court’s] decree with a view

either to enlarging his own rights thereunder or of

lessening the rights of his adversary’ ”) (quoting United

States v. American Railway Express Co., 265 U.S. 425,

435 (1924)). RRCC is again mistaken. Claims barred

by sovereign immunity are dismissed without prejudice, not with prejudice. See, e.g., Warnock v. Pecos Cty.,

Tex., 88 F.3d 341, 343 (5th Cir. 1996) (explaining that

“[b]ecause sovereign immunity deprives the court of jurisdiction, the claims barred by sovereign immunity

can be dismissed only under Rule 12(b)(1) and not with

prejudice”); see also, e.g., United States v. Texas Tech

Univ., 171 F.3d 279, 285 n.9 (5th Cir. 1999) (same, citing Warnock); 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, FED. PRAC. & PROC.

§ 2373 (because dismissal for lack of jurisdiction does

not reach merits, claim “must be considered to have

been dismissed without prejudice.”). Thus, we may, and

App. 23

do, rule that RRCC’s counterclaims are barred by sovereign immunity.20

IV.

Congress has provided various remedies for claimants like RRCC who assert that the United States has

wrongfully seized their property in forfeiture proceedings. See, e.g., United States v. Khan, 497 F.3d 204, 208

(2nd Cir. 2007) (by reforming the forfeiture laws in

CAFRA, “Congress was reacting to public outcry over

the government’s too-zealous pursuit of civil and criminal forfeitures”). Under certain circumstances, claimants who “substantially prevail[ ]” in a forfeiture action

may recover attorneys’ fees, costs, and interest. See 28

U.S.C. § 2465(b)(1)(A)–(C). In some cases, they may sue

the United States for property damages under the

FTCA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c)(1)–(4). What claimants

may not do, however, is sue the United States for constitutional torts arising out of the property seizure.

Congress has not waived the United States’ sovereign

immunity for damages claims of that nature. Because

RRCC’s counterclaims sought precisely those kinds of

20

Because we resolve the appeal on sovereign immunity

grounds, we do not address the government’s argument that

RRCC’s damages counterclaims are barred by 28 U.S.C.

§ 2465(b)(2)(A). Part of a provision addressing government liability for costs, fees, and interest when a claimant prevails in a forfeiture proceeding, § 2465(b)(2)(A) provides that “[t]he United

States shall not be required to disgorge the value of any intangible benefits nor make any other payments to the claimant not specifically authorized by this subsection.” 28 U.S.C. § 2465(b)(2)(A).

App. 24

damages, we hold its counterclaims are barred by sovereign immunity.

AFFIRMED.

App. 25

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

No. 18-10801

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

$4,480,466.16 in funds seized from Bank of America

account ending in 2653

Defendant,

RETAIL READY CAREER CENTER INCORPORATED,

Claimant - Appellant

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

(Filed Aug. 22, 2019)

Before ELROD, WILLETT, and DUNCAN, Circuit

Judges.

STUART KYLE DUNCAN, Circuit Judge:

In this civil forfeiture proceeding, the United

States seized millions of dollars from a Texas vocational school, alleging the funds were the fruits of a

scheme to fleece veterans. The school intervened as a

claimant, denied the government’s allegations, and

counterclaimed for constitutional tort damages

App. 26

against the government for ruining its business. The

district court dismissed the school’s counterclaims as a

matter of law. Finding no authority from our court on

the issue, the district court adopted the First Circuit’s

view that claimants in an in rem forfeiture proceeding

may never bring counterclaims. See United States v.

One Lot of U.S. Currency ($68,000), 927 F.2d 30, 34 (1st

Cir. 1991) (“$68,000”). On appeal, the school protests

that this categorical rule barring all counterclaims in

civil forfeiture proceedings is incorrect. We decline to

address that question, however, because the school’s

specific counterclaims are barred for a more fundamental reason—sovereign immunity—and so the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over

them. We therefore vacate the district court’s judgment

and remand with instructions to dismiss the school’s

counterclaims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

I.

Appellant Retail Ready Career Center (“RRCC”)

was a private school in Texas offering a six-week “boot

camp style” course to train students as Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (“HVAC”) technicians.1

According to RRCC, “[m]ost” students were “veterans

who pa[id] for the course using their earned GI Bill

benefit,” but “courses were open to other participants”

as well. In 2017, the United States Department of

1

We draw these facts primarily from RRCC’s verified claim,

which we accept as true for purposes of reviewing the district

court’s grant of a motion to dismiss. See Masel v. Villarreal, 924

F.3d 734, 743 (5th Cir. 2019).

App. 27

Veterans Affairs (“VA”) began investigating whether

RRCC had falsely claimed to be in compliance with the

“85-15” rule. This rule prohibits the VA from approving

a veteran’s enrollment in a course “for any period during which more than 85 percent of the students enrolled in the course are having all or part of their

tuition, fees or other charges paid for them by the educational institution or by VA[.]” 38 C.F.R. § 21.4201.

The rule’s purpose is to “minimize the risk that veterans’ benefits will be wasted on educational programs

of little value . . . and to prevent charlatans from

grabbing the veterans’ education money.” Cleland v.

Nat’l Coll. of Bus., 435 U.S. 213, 219 (1978) (cleaned

up).

In September 2017, federal warrants were issued

to seize the money in RRCC’s bank accounts—over

$4.6 million—as the alleged proceeds of federal law violations. See FED. R. CIV. P., SUPPLEMENTAL RULE

(“SUPP. RULE”) G(3)(b) (explaining “the court—on finding probable cause—must issue a warrant” to seize

movable property not in government control).2 In October 2017, the government filed a complaint in rem

seeking forfeiture of the funds under various fraud

and conspiracy statutes.3 After receiving notice of that

2

The government also seized other property not relevant to

this appeal, including over $100,000 from five other bank accounts; real property located in Dallas, Texas; and seven luxury

vehicles.

3

See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) (providing “[a]ny property, real or personal, which constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to a violation of [certain federal laws]” is “subject

to forfeiture to the United States”); id. § 981(a)(1)(D) (providing

App. 28

action, RRCC filed a verified claim to the seized property. See 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(4)(A) (providing “[a]ny person claiming an interest in the seized property may file

a claim asserting such person’s interest in the property”); SUPP. RULE G(5)(a) (setting out claim requirements). In its verified claim, RRCC alleged that the

seizure occurred without prior notice or hearing;

caused “an immediate and devastating effect on

RRCC’s business”; and forced RRCC to “close the

school,” dismiss employees without pay, and fly students home lest they be “stranded in Texas.” RRCC

also included two “constitutional counterclaims,”

which alleged the seizure violated the Fourth and Fifth

Amendments and sought “damages to compensate

[RRCC] for the destruction of its business.”

The government moved to dismiss RRCC’s counterclaims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

Relying principally on the First Circuit’s decision in

$68,000, 927 F.2d 30, the government argued that

“claimants in civil-forfeiture cases may not file counterclaims against the United States, as they are merely

claimants, not the party against which the suit is

directed.” The district court noted the parties had not

cited “any binding Fifth Circuit authority” on this

“[a]ny property, real or personal, which represents or is traceable

to the gross receipts obtained, directly or indirectly, from a violation of [federal fraud statutes]” is “subject to forfeiture to the

United States”); id. § 982(a)(3) (providing a court shall order that

a person convicted of a federal fraud offense forfeit to the United

States any property “which represents or is traceable to the gross

receipts obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of such violation”).

App. 29

question, but found “persuasive” the First Circuit’s

reasoning in $68,000,4 which had been followed by

several district courts from other circuits.5 The court

therefore granted the government’s motion to dismiss

RRCC’s counterclaims, “hold[ing] that, as a claimant in

an in rem civil forfeiture action, RRCC cannot bring a

counterclaim.”

4

The entirety of the First Circuit’s reasoning on this point

consists of this citation-free half-paragraph:

By definition, a counterclaim is a turn-the-tables response directed by one party (“A”) at another party

(“B”) in circumstances where “B” has earlier lodged a

claim in the same proceeding against “A.” A forfeiture

action is in rem, not in personam. The property is the

defendant. Since no civil claim was filed by the government against [the claimant]—indeed, rather than being dragooned into the case as a defendant, he

intervened as a claimant—there was no “claim” to

“counter.” Thus, [the claimant’s] self-styled counterclaim was a nullity, and the court below appropriately

ignored it.

$68,000, 927 F.2d at 34.

5

See United States v. 8 Luxury Vehicles, 88 F. Supp. 3d 1332,

1337 (M.D. Fla. 2015); United States v. Funds from Fifth Third

Bank Account # 0065006695, No. 13-11728, 2013 WL 5914101, at

*12 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 4, 2013); United States v. $22,832.00 in

U.S. Currency, No. 1:12 CV 01987, 2013 WL 4012712, at *4 (N.D.

Ohio Aug. 6, 2013); United States v. $43,725.00 in U.S. Currency,

No. 4:08–1373–TLW, 2009 WL 347475 at *1 (D.S.C. Feb. 3, 2009);

United States v. 1866.75 Bd. Feet, No. 1:07cv1100 (GBL), 2008 WL

839792, at *3 (E.D. Va. Mar. 25, 2008); United States v. Assorted

Comput. Equip., No. 03–2356V, 2004 WL 784493, at *2 (W.D.

Tenn. Jan. 9, 2004). The Sixth Circuit has recently adopted the

First Circuit’s rationale in $68,000. See Zappone v. United States,

870 F.3d 551, 561 (6th Cir. 2017).

App. 30

Meanwhile, the government struggled to state an

adequate claim against RRCC’s funds under the forfeiture rules. The district court dismissed the government’s first amended complaint, finding its allegations

insufficiently specific. The second amended complaint

met the same fate. See United States v. $4,480,466.16

In Funds Seized, No. 3:17–CV–2989–D, 2018 WL

4096340, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 28, 2018) (ruling allegations in second amended complaint were “insufficient

to comply with Supp[lemental] R[ule] G(2)’s requirement that the complaint must ‘state sufficiently detailed facts to support a reasonable belief that the

government will be able to meet its burden of proof

at trial’ ”); SUPP. RULE G(2)(f ). The parties continue to

litigate that issue below.6

The issues before us on appeal concern only the

fate of RRCC’s counterclaims. On June 12, 2018, the

district court entered a final judgment dismissing

RRCC’s counterclaims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), which RRCC timely appealed. We have

jurisdiction to review that Rule 54(b) judgment. See

New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. United States, 272 F.2d

754, 756 (5th Cir. 1959) (dismissal of counterclaim,

6

Following RRCC’s appeal in this case, the government filed

its third amended complaint, in response to which RRCC moved

for dismissal and summary judgment. The district court has not

ruled on those motions. Instead, the district court granted the

government’s motion to stay the forfeiture action for 120 days

during the pendency of a related, ongoing criminal investigation.

The stay expired June 6, 2019, at which point the government

moved to extend the stay for an additional 120 days. That motion

is pending before the district court.

App. 31

when plaintiff’s claim is still pending, is non-appealable

“absent a certificate under Rule 54(b)”).

II.

We review the district court’s judgment dismissing

RRCC’s counterclaims de novo, “accepting all wellpleaded facts [in RRCC’s counterclaims] as true and

viewing those facts in the light most favorable to

[RRCC].” SGK Props., LLC v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 881

F.3d 933, 943 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Stokes v. Gann,

498 F.3d 483, 484 (5th Cir. 2007)). We may affirm the

district court’s judgment “on any basis supported by

the record.” Total Gas & Power N. Am., Inc. v. FERC,

859 F.3d 325, 332 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Taylor v. City

of Shreveport, 798 F.3d 276, 279 (5th Cir. 2015); EEOC

v. Simbaki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475, 481 (5th Cir. 2014)); see

also Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 391 (2002) (“[I]t is well

settled that an appellate tribunal may affirm a trial

court’s judgment on any ground supported by the record.”).

III.

On appeal, RRCC asks us to disclaim the district

court’s broad ruling that claimants in in rem civil forfeiture proceedings are barred, always and everywhere, from filing counterclaims. We decline to address

that question, however, because RRCC’s counterclaims

are barred for a more fundamental reason: sovereign

App. 32

immunity.7 As the government points out, the United

States has not waived its sovereign immunity with

respect to the particular claims asserted in RRCC’s

counterclaims—damages claims for violations of the

Fourth and Fifth Amendments—and the district court

therefore lacked subject matter jurisdiction over them.

We agree.

“It is axiomatic that the United States may not

be sued without its consent and that the existence of

consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction.” United

States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983) (citing

United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941);

14 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, FED. PRAC. & PROC.

§ 3654); see also, e.g., In re Supreme Beef Processors,

Inc., 468 F.3d 248, 251–52 (5th Cir. 2006) (en banc)

(“The Constitution contemplates that, except as authorized by Congress, the federal government and its

agencies are immune from suit.” (citing Hercules, Inc.

v. United States, 516 U.S. 417, 422 (1996))). A waiver of

sovereign immunity “cannot be implied but must be

unequivocally expressed,” and any waiver “will be

strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in favor of the

sovereign.” Doe v. United States, 853 F.3d 792, 796 (5th

Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S.

535, 538 (1980); Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996))

(internal quotation marks omitted). The government

7

Because we rule on the basis of sovereign immunity, nothing in our opinion should be read as approving the First Circuit’s

rationale in $68,000 that counterclaims in in rem forfeiture proceedings are categorically barred. As the district court pointed

out, no decision of ours has adopted that broad view and we have

no occasion to address whether it is correct.

App. 33

argues that RRCC has identified no statute unequivocally waiving the United States’ immunity for the

damages claims in RRCC’s counterclaims. Specifically,

RRCC seeks damages arising from the “unreasonable

seizure” of its bank accounts in violation of the Fourth

Amendment and from the lack of “notice and hearing”

in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process

Clause. The government is correct.

In its reply brief, RRCC attempts to identify the

required waiver in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c). In that provision, Congress “rewaived” the United States’ sovereign

immunity under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”)

for certain property damages claims arising out of forfeitures.8 See, e.g., Smoke Shop, LLC v. United States,

8

Section 2680(c) provides, in relevant part, that the FTCA

immunity waiver applies “to any claim based on the injury or loss

of goods, merchandise, or other property, while in the possession

of any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement

officer, if—

(1) the property was seized for the purpose of forfeiture under any provision of Federal law providing for

the forfeiture of property other than as a sentence imposed upon conviction of a criminal offense;

(2) the interest of the claimant was not forfeited;

(3) the interest of the claimant was not remitted or

mitigated (if the property was subject to forfeiture);

and

(4) the claimant was not convicted of a crime for

which the interest of the claimant in the property was

subject to forfeiture under a Federal criminal forfeiture

law.”

28 U.S.C. § 2680(c)(1)–(4). The subsection cross-references 28

U.S.C. § 1346(b), which in relevant part provides that federal

App. 34

761 F.3d 779, 782 (7th Cir. 2014) (explaining that in

the 2000 Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act or “CAFRA”

Congress “ ‘rewaived’ the government’s immunity” under the FTCA “for tort actions stemming from lawenforcement detentions of property” under specific

circumstances); Foster v. United States, 522 F.3d 1071,

1075 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining “CAFRA . . . restored

the waiver of sovereign immunity—or ‘re-waived’ sovereign immunity—with respect to certain forfeiturerelated seizures”). RRCC overlooks, however, that the

FTCA waiver does not extend to “constitutional torts”

like the Fourth and Fifth Amendment damages claims

pled in RRCC’s counterclaims. We have squarely recognized that “[c]onstitutional torts . . . do not provide a

proper predicate for an FTCA claim.” Spotts v. United

States, 613 F.3d 559, 565 n.3 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing

FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 478 (1994)); see also, e.g.,

Coleman v. United States, 912 F.3d 824, 835 (5th Cir.

2019) (the “source of substantive liability under the

FTCA” must be the “law of the State” and not federal

law (citing Meyer, 510 U.S. at 478)); Sanchez v. Rowe,

870 F.2d 291, 295 (5th Cir. 1989) (explaining “the FTCA

does not provide a cause of action for constitutional

district courts have exclusive jurisdiction over post-January 1,

1945 money damages claims against the United States for

injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death

caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of

any employee of the Government while acting within

the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person,

would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the

law of the place where the act or omission occurred.

Id. § 1346(b)(1).

App. 35

torts” because “by definition constitutional torts are

not based on state law” (cleaned up)). Thus, the FTCA

waiver does not encompass the constitutional damages

claims in RRCC’s counterclaims, and the district court

thus lacked jurisdiction over them.9

RRCC also argues that the United States waives

sovereign immunity simply by “initiat[ing] an in rem

proceeding.” RRCC cites no authority supporting that

grandiose proposition. It points only to admiralty cases

9

We do not decide whether RRCC could bring valid FTCA

claims as counterclaims in a civil forfeiture proceeding. See, e.g.,

Life Partners Inc. v. United States, 650 F.3d 1026, 1029-30 (5th

Cir. 2011) (discussing administrative exhaustion requirements

which are “a prerequisite to suit under the FTCA”) (citing 28

U.S.C. § 2675(a); McAfee v. 5th Circuit Judges, 884 F.2d 221, 222–

23 (5th Cir. 1989)). We decide only that the specific claims asserted in RRCC’s counterclaims fall outside the CAFRA re-waiver

and are therefore barred by sovereign immunity. Additionally, we

note that neither the Tucker Act nor its companion, the Little

Tucker Act, waive sovereign immunity over RRCC’s claims. The

Tucker Act provides a judicial avenue for “any claim against the

United States founded . . . upon the Constitution.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1491(a)(1); see also United States v. Bormes, 568 U.S. 6, 11

(2012) (discussing Tucker Act). The waiver in the Tucker Act,

however, “has been limited to apply only to the Takings Clause

. . . because only that clause contemplates payment by the federal

government.” Rothe Dev. Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, 194 F.3d

622, 625 (5th Cir. 1999). Here, RRCC does not invoke the Tucker

Act, and its Fifth Amendment claims are premised on an alleged

due process violation, not the Takings Clause. See, e.g., Bellamy

v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 720, 723 (1985) (explaining claims court

“has no jurisdiction over claims based upon the Due Process and

Equal Protection guarantees of the Fifth Amendment, because

these constitutional provisions do not obligate the Federal Government to pay money damages” (quoting Carruth v. United

States, 224 Ct. Cl. 422, 445 (1980) (cleaned up)).

App. 36

allowing a limited cross-libel against the United States

when the United States sues another vessel for collision damages. See United States v. The Thekla, 266 U.S.

328 (1924); United States v. The Paquete Habana, 189

U.S. 453 (1903); The Siren, 74 U.S. 152 (1868); see also,

e.g., United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495, 502–03

(1940) (explaining that, in such cases, “it is necessary

to determine the cross-libel as well as the original libel

to reach a conclusion as to liability for the collision”).10

But RRCC directs us to no authority for the proposition that this distinct admiralty rule waives the United

States’ sovereign immunity whenever it institutes a

civil forfeiture proceeding. Nor does RRCC direct us to

any unambiguous statutory waiver of the United

States’ immunity under such circumstances.11 As we

have already explained, Congress did enact an unambiguous immunity waiver with respect to forfeiture

proceedings, see 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c)(1)-(4), but it has no

application here.

10

See generally 2 AM. JUR. 2d ADMIRALTY § 44 (“Whenever the

United States sues for damage inflicted on its vessel or cargo, it

impliedly waives its exemption from admiralty jurisdiction as to

cross libels or counterclaims arising from the same transaction.”

(citing The Thekla, 266 U.S. 328; The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419

(1922))).

11

RRCC incorrectly points to the immunity waiver in 46

U.S.C. § 30903(a), but that statute also pertains only to certain

admiralty claims involving the United States. See, e.g., MS Tabea

Schiffahrtsgesellschaft MBH & Co. KG v. United States, 636 F.3d

161, 165 n.1 (5th Cir. 2011) (explaining that “[t]he Suits in Admiralty Act (SAA) . . . provides the appropriate waiver for maritime

tort claims against the United States” (citing 46 U.S.C. § 30903)).

App. 37

Finally, RRCC claims we cannot reach sovereign

immunity for two reasons. First, RRCC points out the

government did not raise the issue below. That is irrelevant: Whether the United States’ sovereign immunity

has been waived is a question of subject matter jurisdiction we can address for the first time on appeal. See,

e.g., Lewis v. Hunt, 492 F.3d 565, 568 (5th Cir. 2007)

(holding that an appellate court may consider United

States’ sovereign immunity sua sponte, “[a]lthough the

parties and the district court did not raise [it]”); Bodin

v. Vagshenian, 462 F.3d 481, 484 (5th Cir. 2006) (explaining that lack of waiver of United States’ sovereign

immunity under FTCA “deprives federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction”). Second, RRCC claims that

addressing sovereign immunity would convert a without-prejudice dismissal below into a with-prejudice

dismissal on appeal, which would be inappropriate

without a cross-appeal. See, e.g., Jennings v. Stephens,

574 U.S. 271, 135 S. Ct. 793, 798 (2015) (explaining “an

appellee who does not cross-appeal may not ‘attack the

[district court’s] decree with a view either to enlarging

his own rights thereunder or of lessening the rights of

his adversary’ ” (quoting United States v. Am. Ry. Express Co., 265 U.S. 425, 435 (1924))). RRCC is again

mistaken. Claims barred by sovereign immunity are

dismissed without prejudice, not with prejudice. See,

e.g., Warnock v. Pecos Cty., Tex., 88 F.3d 341, 343 (5th

Cir. 1996) (explaining that “[b]ecause sovereign immunity deprives the court of jurisdiction, the claims

barred by sovereign immunity can be dismissed only

under Rule 12(b)(1) and not with prejudice”); see also,

e.g., United States v. Tex. Tech Univ., 171 F.3d 279, 285

App. 38

n.9 (5th Cir. 1999) (same, citing Warnock); 9 WRIGHT &

MILLER, FED. PRAC. & PROC. § 2373 (because dismissal

for lack of jurisdiction does not reach merits, claim

“must be considered to have been dismissed without

prejudice”). Thus, we may, and do, rule that RRCC’s

counterclaims are barred by sovereign immunity.12

IV.

Congress has provided various remedies for claimants like RRCC who assert that the United States has

wrongfully seized their property in forfeiture proceedings. See, e.g., United States v. Khan, 497 F.3d 204, 208

(2nd Cir. 2007) (by reforming the forfeiture laws in

CAFRA, “Congress was reacting to public outcry over

the government’s too-zealous pursuit of civil and criminal forfeitures”). Under certain circumstances, claimants who “substantially prevail[ ]” in a forfeiture action

may recover attorneys’ fees, costs, and interest. See

28 U.S.C. § 2465(b)(1)(A)–(C). In some cases, they may

sue the United States for property damages under the

FTCA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c)(1)–(4). What claimants

may not do, however, is sue the United States for constitutional torts arising out of the property seizure.

12

Because we resolve the appeal on sovereign immunity

grounds, we do not address the government’s argument that

RRCC’s damages counterclaims are barred by 28 U.S.C.

§ 2465(b)(2)(A). Part of a provision addressing government liability for costs, fees, and interest when a claimant prevails in a forfeiture proceeding, § 2465(b)(2)(A) provides that “[t]he United

States shall not be required to disgorge the value of any intangible benefits nor make any other payments to the claimant not specifically authorized by this subsection.” 28 U.S.C. § 2465(b)(2)(A).

App. 39

Congress has not waived the United States’ sovereign

immunity for damages claims of that nature. Because

RRCC’s counterclaims sought precisely those kinds of

damages, we hold its counterclaims are barred by sovereign immunity.

We VACATE the district court’s judgment and

REMAND with instructions to dismiss RRCC’s counterclaims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

App. 40

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, §

§

Plaintiff,

§

Civil Action No.

VS.

§

§ 3:17-CV-2989-D

$4,480,466.16 IN FUNDS

§

SEIZED FROM BANK OF

§

AMERICA ACCOUNT

§

ENDING IN 2653, et al.,

§

Defendants in rem.

§

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

(Filed Apr. 26, 2018)

In this civil forfeiture action, claimants Retail

Ready Career Center, Inc. (“RRCC”), Jonathan Davis

(“Davis”), Melissa Richey (“Richey”), Lake Forrest

Drive Properties, Inc. (“Lake Forrest”), Clear Conscience, LLC (“Clear Conscience”), and Trades United

Inc. (“Trades United”) (collectively, “claimants”) move

to dismiss the first amended complaint (“amended

complaint”) and for a more definite statement.1

Claimants have also filed two motions to unseal court

records. The government moves under 18 U.S.C.

§ 981(g)(1) to stay this proceeding during the pendency

of a related, ongoing criminal investigation, and it

moves under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss RRCC’s

1

Claimants also move to dismiss the complaint, but, as discussed below, see infra § III (A), these motions are moot.

App. 41

counterclaims. For the following reasons, the court denies the government’s motion to stay; grants the government’s motion to dismiss RRCC’s counterclaims;

denies as moot claimants’ motions to dismiss plaintiff ’s complaint; grants claimants’ motions to dismiss

plaintiff ’s amended complaint; denies claimants’ motions to unseal court records; and grants the government leave to file a second amended complaint in order

to comply with Supp. R. G(2)(f ).

I

In September and October 2017, the government

seized certain property (collectively, the “defendant

property”) as derived from proceeds traceable to a violation, violations, or conspiracy to violate federal law.2

On October 30, 2017 the government filed the instant

in rem action, alleging, inter alia, that the defendant

property

is subject to forfeiture pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

§ 981(a)(1)(c), 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(D), and 18

2

The government seized $4,480,466.16 in funds from a Bank

of America account ending in 2653; $146,370.00 in funds from a

Bank of America account ending in 0252; $77,437.59 in funds

from a Charles Schwab account ending in 8588; $263.47 in funds

from a Wells Fargo account ending in 2092; $9,668.28 in funds

from a Bank of Utah account ending in 2251; $2,814.51 in funds

from a Bank of Utah account ending in 0784; a 2014 Lamborghini

Aventador; a 2016 Ferrari 488; a 2017 Bentley Continental GT

V8; a 2017 Mercedes-Benz AMG S63; a 2016 Mercedes-Benz G63;

a 2016 Dodge Ram 2500; a 2016 BMW Alpina; real property

located at 14888 Lake Forest Drive in Dallas, Texas; and

$11,005.00 in funds from a Capital One account ending in 2713.

App. 42

U.S.C. § 982(a)(3) because it is derived from

proceeds traceable to a violation, violations,

or conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1031, 18

U.S.C. §§ 286 and 371, 18 U.S.C. § 641, 18

U.S.C. § 1001, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, and 18 U.S.C.

§ 1343 [as] is shown by the Verification Affidavit in Support of the United States’ Complaint

for Forfeiture of Special Agent Miguel Coias,

filed under seal, and incorporated as Plaintiff ’s Exhibit 1, in the Appendix filed in support of this Complaint.

Compl. ¶ 6.3

After receiving notice of the action, claimants filed

verified claims to the defendant property. They then

moved, in three separate motions, to dismiss the complaint and for a more definite statement. They also

moved to unseal court records. On December 14, 2017

the government filed the amended complaint and

moved to dismiss the constitutional counterclaims of

claimant RRCC. Claimants, again in three separate

motions filed on December 29, 2017, moved to dismiss

the amended complaint and for a more definite statement. They also filed a second motion to unseal court

records. On January 18, 2018 the government filed a

motion to stay, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 981(g)(1), on the

ground that a stay is necessary to protect the ongoing

3

The amended complaint contains a similar allegation, except that it also cites 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c). See Am. Compl. ¶ 6.

App. 43

criminal investigation from expansive civil discovery.

The court now addresses these motions.4

II

The court turns first to the government’s motion

to stay.

A

The government seeks a stay of this civil forfeiture

action against the defendant properties pursuant to 18

U.S.C. § 981(g)(1), which provides, in pertinent part:

“[u]pon the motion of the United States, the court shall

stay the civil forfeiture proceeding if the court determines that civil discovery will adversely affect the ability of the Government to conduct a related criminal

investigation or the prosecution of a related criminal

case.” 18 U.S.C. § 981(g)(1). In deciding whether to

grant such a stay, “the court must determine, first,

whether a related criminal investigation or prosecution exists and, second, whether civil discovery will ‘adversely affect’ the ability of the government to conduct

that criminal investigation or prosecution were the

civil forfeiture case allowed to proceed.” United States

v. All Funds ($357,311.68) Contained in N. Tr. Bank of

4

Two other motions remain pending: claimant Davis’ April

5, 2018 motion and petition to release property pursuant to 18

U.S.C. § 983(F), and claimant Richey’s April 10, 2018 motion and

petition to release property pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 983(F). These

motions will be decided in due course.

App. 44

Fla. Account No. 7240001868, 2004 WL 1834589, at *2

(N.D. Tex. 2004) (Fish, C.J.) (“All Funds”).

B

The government contends that a stay is necessary

to protect an ongoing criminal investigation from the

expansive scope of civil discovery; that the criminal investigation and the civil forfeiture case arise from the

same facts and circumstances, as set forth in a sealed

affidavit filed with the amended complaint; that discovery in this civil forfeiture case could compromise

the investigation by permitting depositions of individuals who may be called to testify at a criminal trial,

including the defendants (who have a Fifth Amendment right to remain silent), law enforcement agents,

and individuals involved in the scheme under investigation; and that civil discovery could compromise

confidential law enforcement information, as well as

provide improper opportunities for the defendants to

ascertain prematurely the details of the ongoing

criminal investigation by earlier and broader civil discovery than is permissible in criminal proceedings.5

5

The government contends that requiring it to disclose the

identity of all witnesses with discoverable information and all

documents gathered in the course of the investigation, as claimants have already sought to do in the Rule 26 initial disclosure

process, would prejudice the criminal prosecution by subjecting

the government’s criminal investigation to broader discovery

than would otherwise be available at this stage to the subject of a

criminal investigation.

App. 45

Claimants respond that the government has failed

to meet its burden to show that discovery will adversely affect a related criminal investigation. They

contend that the government has shown only a hypothetical possibility that discovery “could” have a harmful effect on a related criminal investigation, which is

insufficient to establish that a criminal investigation

“will” be adversely affected; that the government has

failed to identify any discovery request or discovery

abuse, or identify any particular types of information

for which discovery should not be permitted (such as,

for example, confidential informants or witnesses

whose identities must be protected); that civil discovery will not harm the criminal investigation because

this case can be resolved without discovery—the only

reason claimants have not filed a motion for summary

judgment “packed with evidence proving [their] innocence” is because the government refuses to disclose

the allegations that claimants need to disprove, Claimants’ Br. 6; and that the government’s inability or unwillingness to submit evidence in support of its motion

to stay is indicative of the fact that the motion lacks

merit. Claimants also posit that, even if the government could meet its burden to show that civil discovery

will adversely affect a related criminal investigation, a

stay would nonetheless be inappropriate because a

protective order, rather than a stay, would protect the

government’s interest without unfairly limiting claimants’ ability to pursue the civil case.

The government replies that, if it is required to

disclose all of the people who have relevant knowledge

App. 46

about the case, this will have a negative impact on the

government’s related, ongoing criminal investigation,

and that a protective order would be inadequate because “if the case were to continue, information would

necessarily be disclosed to people who are both claimants [in] this case and subjects of the related criminal

investigation, obviating a protective order’s efficacy.”

Gov’t Reply 7.

C

Claimants do not challenge the existence of a related, ongoing criminal investigation. Instead, they

contend that the government has failed to meet its burden to show how discovery will adversely affect that

investigation. This court has previously explained that

§ 981(g)(1) requires “that the Government actually

show that civil discovery will adversely affect its ability to conduct the criminal investigation.” All Funds,

2004 WL 1834589, at *2 (emphasis omitted). “There is

no presumption that civil discovery, in itself, automatically creates an adverse affect on the government’s

related criminal proceeding. On the contrary, the Government must make an actual showing regarding the

anticipated adverse affect.” Id. (citing cases); see also

United States v. $3,592.00 United States Currency,

2016 WL 5402703, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2016) (“But

to grant a stay on this record, without any specific

showing and when no lesser alternatives (such as a

protective order, or preliminarily limiting discovery to

certain areas or types) have even been attempted, in

this Court’s view would be inconsistent with the

App. 47

standard articulated by the statute.”); cf. United States

v. 1,730,010.00 in U.S. Currency More or Less, 2007 WL

1164104, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 16, 2007) (granting stay

where government “specifically establishe[d],” through

a sealed affidavit, that “civil discovery will adversely

affect the ability of the Government to conduct a related criminal investigation.”). The government has

failed to do so in its present motion.

The government contends that “[d]iscovery in this

case could compromise the investigation by permitting

depositions of individuals who may be called at a criminal trial, including the defendants (who have a Fifth

Amendment right to remain silent), law enforcement

agents, and individuals involved in the scheme under

investigation,” Gov’t Br. 5, and that civil discovery “also

could compromise confidential law enforcement information, as well as provide improper opportunities for

the defendant to ascertain prematurely the details of

the ongoing criminal investigation by earlier and

broader civil discovery than is permissible in criminal

proceedings,” id. at 6. The government cites as an example claimants’ Rule 26 initial disclosure requests,

which the government contends will

forc[e] the government to disclose the identity

of all witnesses with discoverable information

and all documents gathered in the course of

the investigation [which] would prejudice the

criminal prosecution by subjecting the government’s criminal investigation to broader

discovery than would otherwise be available

to the subject of an investigation at this stage.

App. 48

Id. The government’s arguments, however, “do nothing

more than speculate about how civil discovery will adversely affect its criminal investigation.” All Funds,

2004 WL 1834589, at *2.

As Chief Judge Fish explained in All Funds, under

the government’s theories, “every civil forfeiture case

with a related criminal investigation is entitled to a

stay. Such speculative and conclusory theories undercut the requirement of section 981(g) that the Government actually show that civil discovery will adversely

affect its ability to conduct the criminal investigation.”

Id. As in All Funds, the government has failed here to

point to any specific discovery request or abuse that

has taken place, and it makes no legitimate argument

about the prospective ability of any of the claimants to

engage in discovery that could compromise its related

criminal investigation.6 Id. (citations omitted). The

government has not shown that civil discovery will

compromise the identity of confidential informants or

6

In its reply brief, the government states that it described

the negative impact that discovery would have “and the specific

harm that would arise from the claimants’ Rule 26 disclosures

demand, demonstrated in the attached exhibits.” Gov’t Reply 5-6.

The attached exhibits consist of the government’s Rule 26(a)(1)

initial disclosures, in which the government states that it is “withholding the names of . . . all other individuals aside from the lead

case agents listed below, subject to the Court’s ruling on the government’s impending motion to stay and the Claimants’ motion

to unseal the affidavit filed under seal in support of the Plaintiff ’s

first amended complaint,” Gov’t Reply App. 6, and a transmittal

email. Neither of these documents, however, sheds any light on

how civil discovery in this case will have a negative impact on the

government’s related, ongoing criminal investigation.

App. 49

cooperating witnesses. Id. (citing cases). Nor has the

government shown how the claimants might abuse the

discovery process with overbroad discovery requests.

Id. (citing cases).

In sum, the government has not carried its burden

of showing that discovery in this civil forfeiture action

will adversely affect its criminal investigation of any

claimant. See 18 U.S.C. § 981(g)(1). Accordingly, the

government’s motion to stay this civil forfeiture proceeding is denied.

D

The court below is granting the government leave

to file a second amended complaint and is permitting

claimants to move anew to dismiss if, in light of the

amended pleading, they are still unable to draft a responsive pleading or conduct meaningful discovery. If

the government is able to make the required showing

to obtain a stay under 18 U.S.C. § 981(g)(1), or to obtain

other relief short of a complete stay (e.g., a protective

order or order limiting discovery to certain areas or

types), it may seek such relief by timely motion.

III

The court turns next to claimants’ motions to dismiss and for more definite statement.

App. 50

A

In view of the filing of the amended complaint,

RRCC’s December 4, 2017 motion to dismiss and for

more definite statement, Davis’ December 4, 2017 motion to dismiss and for more definite statement, and

the December 4, 2017 motion to dismiss and for a more

definite statement of claimants Richey, Lake Forrest,

Clear Conscience, and Trades United, all of which

were directed at the government’s now-superseded

complaint, are denied without prejudice as moot.

B

In their December 29, 2017 motions to dismiss—

which are addressed to the amended complaint—

claimants first move to dismiss on the ground that the

government has failed to plead a statutory basis for the

court to exercise in rem jurisdiction over the defendant

property.

Supp. R. G(2)(b) provides, in pertinent part, that

the complaint must “state the grounds for subjectmatter jurisdiction [and] in rem jurisdiction over the

defendant property.” Supp. R. G(2)(e) requires that the

complaint “identify the statute under which the forfeiture action is brought.” The amended complaint alleges

that the defendant property is subject to forfeiture

under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) and (D) and 18 U.S.C.

§ 982(a)(3), and that the defendant property (other

than the real property) was seized in Dallas and has

been turned over to the United States Marshals

App. 51

Service in Dallas, who maintains custody of it.7 Am.

Compl. ¶¶ 4, 6. These allegations are sufficient to state

the grounds for subject-matter jurisdiction and to identify the statute under which the forfeiture action is

brought.

C

Claimants next move to dismiss the amended complaint on the ground that it fails to plead sufficient

facts to state a claim under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C), 18

U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(D), 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(3), or 24 U.S.C.

§ 2461(c).8

1

Pleading requirements for forfeiture actions in

rem are governed by Rule G of the Supplemental Rules

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See generally

Supp. R. G. Under Supp. R. G(8)(b), a claimant who

establishes standing to contest forfeiture9 may move

to dismiss the action under Rule 12(b). The sufficiency

of the complaint is governed by Supp. R. G(2), which

7

18 U.S.C. § 981(b)(2)(C) provides that a seizure of property

subject to forfeiture may be made without a warrant if the property was lawfully seized by a state or local law enforcement

agency and transferred to a Federal agency. The government contends, and claimants do not dispute, that the defendant property

was seized pursuant to a valid seizure warrant.

8

The government acknowledges “that it has no claims under

24 U.S.C. § 2461(c).” Gov’t Br. at 9-10.

9

The government does not contend that any claimant lacks

standing.

App. 52

requires, inter alia, that the verified complaint “state

sufficiently detailed facts to support a reasonable belief that the government will be able to meet its burden

of proof at trial.”10 Supp. R. G(2)(f ). In other words, the

government must “state[ ] the circumstances giving

rise to the forfeiture claim with sufficient particularity” to allow a claimant to conduct a “meaningful investigation of the facts and draft[ ] a responsive pleading.”

United States v. Mondragon, 313 F.3d 862, 867 (4th Cir.

2002).11

2

In their motions to dismiss, claimants contend,

inter alia, that the government has not alleged sufficiently detailed facts to support a reasonable belief

that it will be able to establish that a violation of any

10

18 U.S.C. § 983(c) provides that, in a civil forfeiture suit,

“the burden of proof is on the Government to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the property is subject to forfeiture,” and that “if the Government’s theory of forfeiture is that

the property was used to commit or facilitate the commission of a

criminal offense, or was involved in the commission of a criminal

offense, the Government shall establish that there was a substantial connection between the property and the offense.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 983(c)(1), (3).

11

Although Mondragon pre-dates the adoption of Supp. R.

G(2), the advisory committee’s notes explain that the new Rule

expressly incorporates the Fourth Circuit’s holding in promulgating the new pleading standard for in rem forfeiture actions. See

Supp. R. G advisory committee’s note to 2006 Amendments (“The

complaint must state sufficiently detailed facts to support a reasonable belief that the government will be able to meet its burden

of proof at trial. See [Mondragon, 313 F.3d at 866]. Subdivision

(2)(f ) carries this forfeiture case law forward without change.”).

App. 53

of the enumerated statutes occurred or that any of

the defendant property is traceable to any of the unpleaded facts regarding the purported violations. The

court agrees.

In support of its claim for civil forfeiture, the government pleads the following “facts and basis for forfeiture”:

[t]he defendant property is subject to forfeiture pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(c), 18

U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(D), 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(3),

and 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c) because it is derived

from proceeds traceable to a violation, violations, or conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1031,

18 U.S.C. §§ 286 and 371, 18 U.S.C. § 641, 18

U.S.C. § 1001, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, and 18 U.S.C.

§ 1343. This is shown by the Verification Affidavit in Support of the United States’ Complaint for Forfeiture of Special Agent Miguel

Coias, filed under seal, and incorporated as

Plaintiff ’s Exhibit 1, in the Appendix filed in

support of this amended complaint.

Am. Compl. ¶ 6. These allegations are insufficient to

meet Supp. R. G(2)’s requirement that the complaint

must “state sufficiently detailed facts to support a reasonable belief that the government will be able to meet

its burden of proof at trial.” Supp. R. G(2)(f ). See, e.g.,

United States v. All Funds on Deposit in Lee Munder

Wealth Planning Resource Account Number *****1080, 137 F.Supp.3d 125, 130 (D. Mass. Jan. 22, 2016)

(holding as a matter of law that, where complaint

“[left] too much to the imagination,” and “[f ]actual

App. 54

allegations regarding many of the required elements of

[11 U.S.C. § 547(b), on which first claim for forfeitability is based] [were] missing,” complaint failed to meet

pleading standard of Supp. R. G(2)(f )); cf. United States

v. Funds in the Amount of $33,534.93 Account Number

Ending **8429 From Bank of Am., 2013 WL 12333983,

at *6 (D. N.M. Mar. 25, 2013) (denying motion to dismiss in civil forfeiture action where “the totality of

facts alleged [were] sufficiently detailed to apprise

Claimant of the basis for the forfeiture action, allowing

her to respond by contesting the source of these funds.

She is sufficiently informed to be able to conduct a

meaningful investigation [and therefore Supp. R.] G’s

particularity requirements have been met[.]”).

3

The government maintains that claimants’ arguments essentially focus on the fact that, pursuant to

court order, the verifying affidavit of Special Agent

Miguel Coias has been filed under seal. The government contends that the sealed affidavit includes facts

about an ongoing criminal investigation that forms the

basis of this lawsuit; that there are many decisions in

which courts have allowed civil forfeiture complaints

to be filed, and remain, under seal when the disclosure

of the underlying information could compromise an ongoing criminal investigation; that the sealed affidavit

filed in support of the amended complaint contains

more than sufficient facts to demonstrate the government’s entitlement to file and maintain the facts under

seal, and to the relief sought at this stage of the civil

App. 55

lawsuit and ongoing criminal investigation; that disclosure of the affidavit would reveal matters related to

an ongoing criminal investigation about claimants’

business dealings, and would have a deleterious effect

on the investigation; that, on balance, the need to complete the pending investigation outweighs claimants’

need for information to establish their rights to the defendant property; and that the government has filed a

motion to stay this civil litigation while the parallel

criminal investigation proceeds, and the government

should not be required to disclose any sealed materials

until the conclusion of the related criminal investigation. The court is not persuaded by the government’s

arguments.

First, although the court granted the government’s motion to seal the affidavit submitted in support of its amended complaint, the court is today

denying the government’s motion to stay. For the reasons explained above, the court holds that the government has not met its burden to show under 18 U.S.C.

§ 981(g)(1) that discovery in this civil forfeiture case

will adversely affect the related, ongoing criminal investigation of any claimant.

Second, the government has failed to point to any

case, and the court has found none, that supports the

court’s consideration of a sealed affidavit that a

claimant is unable to challenge—as opposed to a publicly-filed affidavit—when determining whether the

complaint meets the pleading standards of Rule 8 and

Supp. R. G(2). Cf. United States v. One Parcel of Real

Property, 921 F.2d 370, 376 (1st Cir. 1990) (reversing

App. 56

dismissal of in rem action where, although forfeiture

complaint was insufficient, government’s second affidavit, “expressly made part of the second forfeiture

complaint, alleges facts sufficient to support a reasonable belief that the government, at trial, can make a

probable cause showing that most, if not all, of the defendant property is connected to illegal drug proceeds.”

(footnote omitted)); United States v. 4492 S. Livonia

Rd., 889 F.2d 1258, 1266 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that

affidavit stating “the dates, circumstances, location

and parties to the alleged drug transactions as well as

the drugs and drug paraphernalia seized from the

premises, cured any defect in the complaint” (citation

omitted)). Allowing the government to keep from

claimants the “detailed facts” supporting its forfeiture

claim (especially in a case such as this where discovery

has not been stayed in light of a pending criminal investigation) would frustrate claimants’ ability to conduct a “meaningful investigation of the facts and

draft[ ] a responsive pleading.” Mondragon, 313 F.3d at

867.

D

Although the court concludes that the amended

complaint does not satisfy the pleading requirements

of Supp. R. G(2) and that claimants’ motion to dismiss

should be granted, it declines at this juncture to dismiss this action. Instead, the court grants the government leave to file, within 28 days of the date of this

memorandum opinion and order is filed, a second

amended complaint that “state[s] sufficiently detailed

App. 57

facts to support a reasonable belief that the government will be able to meet its burden of proof at trial.”

Supp. R. G(2)(f ). If, after the government files its second amended complaint, claimants are still unable to

draft a responsive pleading or conduct meaningful

discovery, they may move anew to dismiss the second

amended complaint.

IV

Claimants have filed two motions to unseal court

records.12 In light of the court’s granting of leave to the

government to file a second amended complaint that

complies with Supp. R. G(2)(f ), the court concludes

that the court records (i.e., the affidavits) should not be

unsealed at this time.

First, because the court is not relying on the contents of the sealed affidavits to deny claimants’ motions to dismiss, it is unnecessary to unseal the court

records. Second, the sealed affidavits filed in support

of the complaint and amended complaint may contain

information protected by the attorney-client privilege

or as work product. The court should not require the

government to disclose potentially protected material

without permitting it to invoke the privilege and/or

protection.

12

On December 4, 2017 claimants moved to unseal court

records, and, on December 29, 2017, after the government

amended its complaint, claimants filed a second motion to unseal

court records.

App. 58

Accordingly, the court denies claimants’ motions to

unseal.

V

Finally, the court considers the government’s motion to dismiss the counterclaims filed by claimant

RRCC.

A

In connection with its verified claim in this case,

RRCC has filed two constitutional counterclaims, alleging that the government violated the Fourth

Amendment by committing an unreasonable seizure

of its property, i.e., by seizing the claimed property

without an indictment, notice and hearing, or admissible evidence supporting a claim of forfeiture, and that

the government violated the Fifth Amendment by depriving RRCC of its property without due process of

law.

The government moves under Rule 12(b)(6) to

dismiss RRCC’s counterclaims, contending, inter alia,

that because RRCC is a claimant in this civil forfeiture

action—not a party against whom a claim is made—

RRCC may not file a counterclaim. In response, RRCC

argues that no in rem jurisdiction exists in this case;

that, as a matter of historical practice, an owner of arrested property can bring suit against the government

in actions in rem; that Supp. R. E(7) permits counterclaims in rem; that the Fifth Circuit has never

App. 59

suggested that counterclaims in in rem proceedings

were impermissible; and that the government’s authorities are incorrect because they all trace back to

a First Circuit case that cites no authority for the

proposition that counterclaims cannot be asserted

in rem.

B

Neither the government nor RRCC cites any binding Fifth Circuit authority addressing the question

whether a claimant can bring a counterclaim against

the United States in a civil forfeiture proceeding. Persuasive authority from other circuits, however, supports the conclusion that because RRCC is not a

defendant against whom a claim has been asserted,

it cannot bring a counterclaim in this civil forfeiture

proceeding.

In United States v. One Lot of U.S. Currency

($68,000), 927 F.2d 30 (1st Cir. 1991), the First Circuit

held that a claimant in a civil forfeiture action could

not assert a counterclaim against the government. The

court explained:

By definition, a counterclaim is a turn-thetables response directed by one party (“A”) at

another party (“B”) in circumstances where

“B” has earlier lodged a claim in the same proceeding against “A.” A forfeiture action is in

rem, not in personam. The property is the

defendant. Since no civil claim was filed by

the government against [the claimant]—indeed, rather than being dragooned into the

App. 60

case as a defendant, he intervened as a claimant—there was no “claim” to “counter.” Thus,

[the claimant’s] self-styled counterclaim was

a nullity, and the court below appropriately

ignored it.

Id. at 34. Other courts have followed this approach.

See, e.g., United States v. 8 Luxury Vehicles, 88 F.Supp.3d

1332, 1337 (M.D. Fla. 2015) (citing persuasive authority and concluding that “there is a general rule prohibiting the filing of counterclaims in civil proceedings

based on case law, Rule 13(d), and Supplementary Rule

G.”); United States v. Funds from Fifth Third Bank

Account # 0065006695, 2013 WL 5914101, at *12 (E.D.

Mich. Nov. 4, 2013) (holding that claimant could not file

counterclaim in civil forfeiture proceeding because

United States had not filed any claims against claimant and any permissible claims against United States

had to be filed as separate action); United States v.

$22,832.00 in U.S. Currency, 2013 WL 4012712, at *4

(N.D. Ohio Aug. 6, 2013) (“Claimants in an in rem civil

forfeiture action generally may not file counterclaims

against the government.”); United States v. $43,725.00

in U.S. Currency, 2009 WL 347475 at *1 (D.S.C. Feb. 3,

2009) (“[T]he true defendant in a civil forfeiture action

is the property that has been seized, rather than the

claimant of that property, and the claimant of the

seized property is not entitled to pursue a counterclaim

against the Government or individuals within the

limited scope of the in rem civil forfeiture action.”);

United States v. 1866.75 Board Feet, 2008 WL 839792,

at *3 (E.D. Va. Mar. 25, 2008) (“claimants in an in rem

civil forfeiture action . . . are not entitled to include

App. 61

counterclaims.”); United States v. Assorted Computer

Equip., 2004 WL 784493, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 9,

2004) (stating that civil forfeiture is in rem, not in personam, and that defendant is the property subject to

forfeiture, not the claimant, and “[b]ecause the government has not asserted a claim against [claimant], there

can be no counterclaim.”).

Based on these persuasive authorities, and absent

binding Fifth Circuit authority to the contrary, the

court grants the government’s motion to dismiss

RRCC’s counterclaim. The court holds that, as a claimant in an in rem civil forfeiture action, RRCC cannot

bring a counterclaim. Accordingly, the court grants the

government’s motion to dismiss RRCC’s counterclaims.

***

For the reasons explained, the court denies the

government’s January 18, 2018 motion to stay; grants

the government’s December 20, 2017 motion to dismiss

RRCC’s counterclaims; denies without prejudice as

moot claimants’ December 4, 2017 motions to dismiss

and for more definite statement; grants claimants’

December 29, 2017 motions to dismiss first amended

complaint and for more definite statement; denies

claimants’ December 4, 2017 motion to unseal court

records and December 29, 2017 second motion to unseal court records; and grants the government leave to

file a second amended complaint within 28 days of the

date this memorandum opinion and order is filed.

SO ORDERED.

App. 62

April 26, 2018.

/s/ Sidney A. Fitzwater

SIDNEY A. FITZWATER

UNITED STATES

DISTRICT JUDGE

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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