Reply Brief — Valero Energy Corporation, et al., Petitioners v. Environmental Protection Agency

No. 19-835

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

VALERO ENERGY CORPORATION AND

AMERICAN FUEL & PETROCHEMICAL MANUFACTURERS,

Petitioners,

v.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the District of Columbia Circuit

REPLY FOR PETITIONERS

CLARA M. POFFENBERGER

CLARA POFFENBERGER

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

AND POLICY, LLC

2933 Fairhill Road

Fairfax, Virginia 22031

(703) 231-5251

EVAN A. YOUNG

Counsel of Record

STEPHANIE F. CAGNIART

ELLEN SPRINGER

JOSHUA MORROW

BAKER BOTTS L.L.P.

98 San Jacinto Boulevard

Suite 1500

Austin, Texas 78701

(512) 322-2506

evan.young@bakerbotts.com

Counsel for Petitioner Valero Energy Corporation

(additional counsel on inside front cover)

SAMARA L. KLINE

5600 Lovers Lane

Ste 116-324

Dallas, Texas 75209

(214) 679-7671

MEGAN H. BERGE

BAKER BOTTS L.L.P.

700 K Street N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20001

(202) 639-1308

BRITTANY M. PEMBERTON

BRACEWELL LLP

2001 M Street N.W.

Suite 900

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 828-1708

Counsel for Petitioner

Valero Energy Corporation

RICHARD MOSKOWITZ

AMERICAN FUEL &

PETROCHEMICAL

MANUFACTURERS

1800 M Street N.W.

Suite 900 North

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 457-0480

Counsel for Petitioner

American Fuel &

Petrochemical Manufacturers

RULE 29.6 STATEMENT

The corporate disclosure statement in the petition remains accurate.

(i)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Rule 29.6 Statement .............................................................. i

Table of Authorities ............................................................ iii

I.

II.

EPA’s Disregard Of Statutory Text

Necessitates Review ............................................. 2

A.

EPA ignores clear statutory text ............... 2

B.

Administrative convenience does not

make EPA’s interpretation

reasonable ..................................................... 7

C.

EPA does not defend its arbitrary

and capricious refusal to consider

the point of obligation ................................ 10

EPA’s Collateral Proceeding Does Not

Rectify Its Failure To Abide By The Act ......... 10

A.

EPA identifies no authority allowing

it to substitute agency-friendly,

discretionary proceedings for the

mandatory annual rulemaking that

Congress required...................................... 10

B.

EPA’s collateral-proceeding denial

deserves no deference................................ 12

Conclusion ........................................................................... 14

(ii)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

CASES

Americans for Clean Energy v. EPA,

864 F.3d 691 (D.C. Cir. 2017) ........................................ 8

Bennett v. Spear,

520 U.S. 154 (1997) ....................................................... 10

Cellnet Communication, Inc. v. FCC,

965 F.2d 1106 (D.C. Cir. 1992) .................................... 12

Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro,

136 S. Ct. 2117 (2016) ................................................... 13

Ergon-West Virginia, Inc. v. EPA,

896 F.3d 600 (4th Cir. 2018) ......................................... 13

Flyers Rights Education Fund, Inc. v. FAA,

864 F.3d 738 (D.C. Cir. 2017) ...................................... 12

Massachusetts v. EPA,

549 U.S. 497 (2007) ....................................................... 12

National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n

v. Brand X Internet Services,

545 U.S. 967 (2005) ....................................................... 14

Renewable Fuels Ass’n v. EPA,

948 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2020) ..................................... 13

Telecommunications Research & Action

Center v. FCC,

750 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ........................................ 11

Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA,

573 U.S. 302 (2014) ..................................................5, 7, 8

Verizon v. FCC,

770 F.3d 961 (D.C. Cir. 2014) ...................................... 12

(iii)

iv

STATUTES

5 U.S.C. §553 ....................................................................... 11

42 U.S.C. §7545(o) ...................................................... passim

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

VALERO ENERGY CORPORATION AND

AMERICAN FUEL & PETROCHEMICAL MANUFACTURERS,

Petitioners,

v.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the District of Columbia Circuit

REPLY FOR PETITIONERS

The BIO repeats the lower court’s error: It ignores

crucial statutory text and twists other provisions to accommodate EPA’s preferred outcome. Congress did not

mean what it said, EPA claims, because considering the

point-of-obligation determination annually would overwork EPA. EPA’s arguments amass power in the agency

far beyond the limits that Congress delineated.

The RFS program pervades the entire transportationfuel sector, affecting the nation’s energy security, environmental efforts, and food-supply chain—and every person

or business that relies on motor vehicles for travel, deliveries, or anything else. If EPA can employ “administrative

ease” to evade clear textual commands and skew judicial

review in this program, then the opinions below license

any agency to do the same. This Court should grant review and reverse.

(1)

2

I. EPA’S DISREGARD OF STATUTORY TEXT NECESSITATES REVIEW

EPA defends an outcome that, by ignoring the Act’s

text, transfers substantial power to the agency and excuses it from a statutory command. EPA further ascribes

unwritten motives to Congress that the text rebuts. The

result transforms a “[r]equired” element of annual rulemaking into a discretionary act that EPA can avoid forevermore while insulating itself from meaningful judicial review. This Court should grant review to uphold congressionally-mandated limits on agency discretion and to enforce traditional judicial oversight.

A. EPA ignores clear statutory text

1. EPA’s lead argument is that “nothing in the text of

[paragraph 3] requires EPA to conduct an annual reconsideration” of the point of obligation. BIO11 (emphasis

added). If the Government reads the Act as saying “nothing” about timing, then this Court’s plain-text teachings

have yet to be absorbed.

The Act states that the renewable-fuel determination

must be made each “calendar year,” and its first required

element is ensuring the “appropriate[ness]” of the point of obligation.

Pet.

App.

170a

(42

U.S.C.

§7545(o)(3)(B)(ii)).

The timing directive precedes “as appropriate” by

eleven words.

3

EPA does not address this plain text. It quotes only

ten words of paragraph (3)(B) and entirely omits from its

Argument the words “calendar year”—which appear

three times in paragraph (3)(B).1 See BIO11-23. EPA’s

interpretations flout the Act’s plain text:

Text

EPA

(i) * * * [E]ach * * * calendar year[] * * * [EPA] shall

determine * * *, with respect

to the following calendar year,

the renewable fuel obligation * * *.

(ii) Required elements[.]

The renewable fuel obligation determined for a calendar year under clause (i)

shall—(I) be applicable to refineries, blenders, and importers,

as

appropriate * * *.

§ 7545(o)(3)(B)(i), (ii) (emphases added).

“[N]othing in the text of

[paragraph 3] requires

EPA to conduct an annual reconsideration” of

the point of obligation.

Paragraph (3)(B)(ii)(I) does

not mention ¶2—although ¶3

makes other internal crossreferences.

Paragraph (3)(B)(ii)(I) “can

reasonably be understood

as a cross-reference to

EPA’s prior determina-

BIO11.

EPA mischaracterizes petitioners’ timing argument as entirely dependent on the term “appropriate.” BIO14. Petitioners criticized the

majority for making that assertion, which ignores the words “calendar year.” Pet. 15.

1

4

tion under” ¶2. BIO15.

Paragraph (3)(B)(ii)(I) does Paragraph (3)(B)(ii)(I)

“sought to clarify” that

not mention “distributors.”

distributors are excluded. BIO16.

An “appropriate” point of obligation is the first of three

“[r]equired elements” that

Congress

identified

in

¶(3)(B)(ii) for annual renewable-fuel determinations.

“The ‘focus of the annual rulemakings’ is to

calculate

percentage

standards, not to reconsider the basic structure

of the program as a

whole.” BIO13 (quoting

Pet. App. 51a).

2. EPA points to other statutory provisions that it

acknowledges “require EPA to review and, if appropriate,

revise its regulations by a date certain.” BIO12-13. Paragraph (3)(B) is materially indistinguishable. It, too, identifies both the timing (“each * * * calendar year[]”) and the

activity (determining the “appropriate” point of obligation). Interpreting paragraph (3)(B)(ii)(I) to afford EPA

discretion to decide not to evaluate the point of obligation

annually eviscerates the Act. It also jeopardizes the other

provisions EPA identifies and creates a roadmap for any

agency to evade Congress’s typical means of ensuring regular consideration of, public participation in, and judicial

oversight over future-reaching programs.

EPA’s claim that paragraph (3)(B)(ii)(I) “is reasonably

understood as permitting EPA to apply its prior ‘obligated

party’ determination [from paragraph 2] in conducting its

annual analysis” also proves too much. BIO12. EPA identifies no textual basis for this reading, and there is none.

5

Had Congress intended to incorporate paragraph 2’s determinations into paragraph (3)(B)(ii)(I), the Act would

say so. Elsewhere in paragraph 3, Congress used express

language for internal cross-references, including to paragraph 2. E.g., §7545(o)(3)(B)(i) (cross-referencing paragraph 2); §7545(o)(3)(B)(ii)(III) (cross-referencing

§7545(o)(3)(B)(ii)(I)).2

3. Finally, EPA defends its position not with textual

analysis, but with an unsound syllogism based on questionable premises:

 Congress would not require EPA to do something

that EPA finds overly burdensome;

 annually considering whether the point of obligation remains appropriate would be very burdensome; and so

 the statute cannot possibly mean what it says.

This replaces rather than construes the Act.

a. Citing only the lower court’s opinion, EPA declares

that “[t]he ‘focus of the annual rulemakings’ is to calculate

percentage standards, not to reconsider the basic structure of the program as a whole.” BIO13 (quoting Pet. App.

51a). Congress, however, told the agency what to “focus”

on when it set the “appropriate” point-of-obligation determination as the first “[r]equired element[]” of annual rulemaking. “[A]n agency may not rewrite clear statutory

terms to suit its own sense of how the statute should operate.” Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA (UARG), 573 U.S.

302, 328 (2014). This case merits review because of such

methodological errors, not just because of the serious context in which they arose.

In response to petitioners’ showing that EPA’s interpretation would

render paragraph (3)(B)(ii)(I) superfluous, EPA reiterates the majority’s argument (BIO15-16), but ignores petitioners’ and Judge Williams’s rebuttals (see Pet. 19; Pet. App. 81a-84a).

2

6

b. Deeming an annual required element to require no

action at all is hardly a respectful reading of a major statute. Yet an essential premise of the judgments below and

the BIO is that Congress must not have intended annual

point-of-obligation consideration—it would be “strange indeed if Congress required EPA * * * to rethink a choice so

basic” each year. BIO13 (quoting Pet. App. 51a). Inverting the teaching that Congress doesn’t hide elephants in

mouseholes, EPA would have Congress building a mansion to house a mouse. It would be “strange indeed” to

expressly designate an annual required element—yet intend that EPA could decide it early on and never consider

it again.

EPA’s interpretation is especially ill-suited to a statute

designed for change. EPA does not dispute that when

Congress established the forward-looking RFS program

in 2005, its evolution was unpredictable and dependent on

the agency’s responses to changing circumstances and developing information. Pet. 20-21. Statutory volume goals

increase annually, domestic and imported supply-and-demand change annually, and new fuel pathways are periodically approved. These continually changing factors warrant annual attention to whether the designated point-ofobligation determination remains appropriate, an element

that both EPA and the court below acknowledge as “foundational” to the program’s success. Pet. App. 41a, 50a;

BIO8, 10, 11, 17.3 How could Congress better convey a

command to annually review that foundation than by making it the first required element of every annual rule?

EPA acknowledges that its current actions will shape the program’s

next phase beginning in 2023. BIO22-23; §7545(o)(2)(B)(ii)(I). Given

the RFS program’s national and long-term import, enforcing the balance of powers that Congress mandated could hardly be more pressing.

3

7

c. Finally, inherent in EPA’s and the lower court’s

framing is another mistaken premise—that annual consideration requires “wholesale reevaluation” of the point-ofobligation determination. BIO14. The Act requires EPA

to take the program’s pulse at annual intervals—not overhaul it.

EPA concedes that its other annual duties already require “in-depth analysis of renewable-fuels markets” and

draw numerous comments. BIO13. Any additional pointof-obligation-related burden would be marginal. Indeed,

annual consideration would likely reduce EPA’s alleged

burden—it would allow EPA to timely address changing

facts, such as RIN-market dysfunction and misalignment

between the means for compliance (blending renewable

fuel) and the obligated parties (which presently exclude

blenders). And by addressing all “[r]equired elements”

together, program decisions would be more effective and

responsive, such that duplicative litigation (which has followed every annual rule) could only decrease.

Not only does plain text dismantle EPA’s argument—

Congress can mandate tasks agencies find burdensome—

but the facts do, too.

B. Administrative convenience does not make

EPA’s interpretation reasonable

“At a minimum,” EPA argues, the Act “does not unambiguously require” annual consideration of the point of obligation. BIO14. Even if true (but see supra Part I.A),

EPA would still have to show that its interpretation is reasonable. Nothing in the BIO comes close.

1. Like the court of appeals, EPA relies on administrative ease both to create and resolve a supposed ambiguity.

See BIO13-17. “An agency confronting resource constraints may change its own conduct, but it cannot change

the law.” UARG, 573 U.S. at 327. EPA’s view that assessing the point of obligation is not “feasible or

8

worthwhile,” BIO17, therefore inverts the relationship between Congress and agencies. Bowing to claims of administrative ease would always transfer massive power from

the legislative branch to the agency—“a severe blow to the

Constitution’s separation of powers.” UARG, 573 U.S. at

327. This provides another compelling reason for review.

Even if administrative ease alone could satisfy Chevron step 2, EPA must show an annual check-up on the

point-of-obligation determination is unreasonably burdensome. EPA fails this hurdle too. See supra Part I.A.3.c.

While EPA complains that it “address[ed] some 18,000

comments” in the denial proceeding, BIO16, 98% were duplicates—only about 350 comments were unique. Pet.

App. 369a.

2. Echoing the lower court, EPA asserts it is “unlikely”

EPA would fail to act “if the need * * * arises.” BIO16

(quoting Pet. App. 53a). Congress lacked the same confidence in the agency (otherwise, why mandate annual notice-and-comment rulemaking?). EPA’s track record also

belies its assurances:



2013: EPA fails to issue a final rule setting 2014 obligations.



2014: EPA fails to issue a final rule for 2015; it

takes no action on point-of-obligation issues, despite challenges to the exclusion of blenders from

EPA’s obligated-parties definition in January. Pet.

App. 365a, 532a.



2015: Despite many stakeholder comments showing that excluding blenders from the obligated-parties definition was inappropriate, EPA’s final rule

for 2016 (and, retroactively, 2014 and 2015) declares

point-of-obligation comments “beyond the scope.”

Ams. for Clean Energy v. EPA, 864 F.3d 691, 703

(D.C. Cir. 2017). EPA takes no action on the point-

9

of-obligation petitions.





2016: Additional obligated parties petition for

point-of-obligation reconsideration or rulemaking.

EPA declares point-of-obligation comments “beyond the scope” of 2017 final rule. Pet. App. 187a.

2017: EPA denies all pending point-of-obligationrelated petitions in November; it refuses to respond to point-of-obligation comments in its final

rule for 2018.

EPA trumpets the 2017 collateral proceeding, in which

EPA refused to reconsider its 2010 obligated-parties definition excluding blenders. EPA’s denial protected socalled “reliance” interests, Pet. App. 361a, but any such interests stemmed largely from EPA’s prior inaction. Further, the denial relied heavily on a 2015 paper, the only independent assessment of RIN-market data EPA has undertaken in the past decade. This paper, however, was

based on information from 2013, before many of the ill effects of excluding blenders had manifested. See Pet. App.

392 n.45, 396, 402a n.61, 409a n.75, 410a n.78.

EPA’s activities post-dating the D.C. Circuit’s opinions

equally belie its “trust-us” assurances. In the rulemakings

for 2019 and 2020, EPA again refused to consider comments regarding the severe adverse consequences that

demonstrate that excluding blenders was inappropriate.

See Pet. 14 n.5. Ironically, EPA argues that the bankruptcy of the largest independent refiner on the East

Coast due to RFS obligations post-dated the denial, and

should be “present[ed] * * * to the agency in the first instance.” BIO21. This information was presented to EPA

in the 2019 rulemaking, but EPA summarily disregarded

it as “beyond the scope.” See Pet. 14 n.5.

The backlog of work that EPA now bemoans is not a

flaw in Congress’s design. It is the result of EPA’s years-

10

long dereliction of duty.

C. EPA does not defend its arbitrary and capricious refusal to consider the point of obligation

EPA entirely ignores petitioners’ argument that placing the point of obligation “beyond the scope” of the 2018

annual rulemaking was arbitrary and capricious. Pet. 2225. Even absent §7545(o)(3)(B)(ii)(I), EPA cannot solicit

comments on the RIN market’s functionality while simultaneously refusing to entertain comments identifying the

inappropriate point-of-obligation determination as a reason for the market’s dysfunction. Pet. 23. Clarity from

this Court regarding agencies’ basic obligations to the regulated public remains needed.

II. EPA’S COLLATERAL PROCEEDING DOES NOT RECTIFY ITS FAILURE TO ABIDE BY THE ACT

A. EPA identifies no authority allowing it to substitute agency-friendly, discretionary proceedings for the mandatory annual rulemaking that

Congress required

The second question presented warrants this Court’s

review because the judgments below undermine the principle that an agency’s “discretion as to the substance of the

ultimate decision”—here, whether excluding blenders remains appropriate—“does not confer discretion to ignore

the required procedures of decisionmaking.” Bennett v.

Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 172 (1997) (emphasis added).

EPA contends that it was harmless to partition the

point-of-obligation consideration into a one-shot, collateral

proceeding. BIO20. But by definition, a one-time collateral proceeding cannot reasonably discharge EPA’s duty

to annually consider the point of obligation. And although

EPA urges the Court not to trouble itself about the manifestly different deference levels, it simultaneously emphasizes that judicial review of the collateral proceeding must

11

be “extremely limited” and “highly deferential.” BIO9.

EPA’s claim that the choice of procedure does not “materially affect the outcome of judicial review,” BIO16, thus

rings hollow, particularly because the majority in Alon did

not determine how EPA would fare under ordinary review,

Pet. App. 32a.

Beyond the standard of review, EPA ignores—and

hopes this Court will ignore—numerous differences between EPA’s chosen procedure and the statutorily-mandated one, each of which enhances agency power at the expense of the other branches:

Notice-and-comment

rulemaking under

§7545(o)(3)(B)(ii)

Petition for

rulemaking under

5 U.S.C. §553(e)

EPA must act every year.

EPA must act within a

reasonable but unbounded time.4

All stakeholders have notice

that EPA is acting.

Notice is required only

after EPA disposes of

the petition.

EPA must receive and consider comments.

EPA has discretion to

ask for comments, or

not.

EPA must initiate considera- Petitioners must ask

tion.

EPA for consideration.

Courts have interpreted “reasonable” in this context to allow for delays of nearly a decade. See Pet. 27; see also Telecomms. Research &

Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (defining “reasonable delay” using the “the hexagonal contours of a standard” that “is

hardly ironclad” and “sometimes suffers from vagueness”).

4

12

EPA must gather facts.

Petitioners must gather

facts for EPA’s review.

EPA must consider all aspects of the problem in a single determination.

EPA argues it can partition each aspect into

separate rulemakings.

EPA has no discretion to ignore the Act’s clear requirements.

EPA can refuse a petition for rulemaking using its “broad discretion

to choose how best to

marshal its limited resources.”5

EPA naturally prefers the second column. The petition-for-rulemaking procedure flips the burden from the

agency to the petitioners and relegates judicial review to

the category of “cases * * * ‘evaluated with a deference so

broad as to make the process akin to nonreviewability.’”

Verizon v. FCC, 770 F.3d 961, 966 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting

Cellnet Commc’n, Inc. v. FCC, 965 F.2d 1106, 1111 (D.C.

Cir. 1992)). That extraordinary deference has emboldened

EPA to declare as “beyond the scope” any information indicating that continuing to exclude blenders from compliance obligations is not appropriate, hinders statutory objectives, jeopardizes energy security, and disincentivizes

growth-enhancing investment in renewable fuels.

Congress, however, chose the first column. It falls to

this Court to hold EPA—and all agencies eager to escape

statutory limits—to account.

B. EPA’s collateral-proceeding denial deserves no

deference

EPA’s collateral-proceeding denial was arbitrary and

Flyers Rights Educ. Fund, Inc. v. FAA, 864 F.3d 738, 743 (D.C. Cir.

2017) (quoting Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527 (2007)).

5

13

capricious and therefore reached the wrong result.

Among other things, the denial’s central thesis is fundamentally inconsistent with EPA’s contemporaneous findings in other RFS-program actions. While heaping praise

on the denial, EPA makes no attempt to defend the serious

inconsistencies that petitioners identified. See Pet. 29. Instead, EPA perfunctorily cites the opinion below (which,

at best, papers over those inconsistencies). BIO21.6

EPA’s denial rests heavily on EPA’s purported “belief ”

that independent refiners “generally” recover the costs of

compliance with annual obligations (i.e., the cost of acquiring RINs on the open, unregulated market) by passing

those costs through to customers. See, e.g., Pet. App.

401a-403a. Other courts have recognized the obvious inconsistency between this position and EPA’s escalating

findings that obligated merchant refiners are experiencing economic hardships warranting exemptions from the

program. The Tenth Circuit, for example, recently noted

the “unexplained inconsistency” between an economichardship exemption and EPA’s pass-through theory. Renewable Fuels Ass’n v. EPA, 948 F.3d 1206, 1257 (10th Cir.

2020) (quoting Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136

S. Ct. 2117, 2126 (2016)); see also Ergon-W. Va., Inc. v.

EPA, 896 F.3d 600, 613 (4th Cir. 2018).

The denial’s reasoning did not overcome these recognized deficiencies. EPA characterized contrary information as “not * * * convincing.” Pet. App. 403a. It (like

the court of appeals) did not address why obligated parties

would spend years in protracted rulemakings and court

proceedings urging a change in the point of obligation if

the existing regime caused them no harm. Meanwhile,

EPA questions whether the petition encompasses EPA’s collateralproceeding decision. BIO20. Yes—the second question presented

asks whether that decision improperly “ignores key evidence.” Pet. i.

6

14

outside the collateral-proceeding silo, EPA specifically

found again and again that independent refiners actually

were suffering economic hardship as a direct result of RFS

obligations. See Pet. 30.

These and other undefended and “[u]nexplained inconsistenc[ies]” in EPA’s momentous decision to deny reconsideration of its point-of-obligation determination establish that the agency’s action deserves no deference. Nat’l

Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545

U.S. 967, 981 (2005).

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

15

Respectfully submitted.

CLARA M. POFFENBERGER

CLARA POFFENBERGER

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

AND POLICY, LLC

2933 Fairhill Road

Fairfax, Virginia 22031

(703) 231-5251

SAMARA L. KLINE

5600 Lovers Lane

Ste 116-134

Dallas, Texas 75209

(214) 679-7671

MEGAN H. BERGE

BAKER BOTTS L.L.P.

700 K Street N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20001

(202) 639-1308

BRITTANY M. PEMBERTON

BRACEWELL LLP

2001 M Street N.W.

Suite 900

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 828-1708

Counsel for Petitioner

Valero Energy Corporation

April 2020

EVAN A. YOUNG

Counsel of Record

STEPHANIE F. CAGNIART

ELLEN SPRINGER

JOSHUA MORROW

BAKER BOTTS L.L.P.

98 San Jacinto Boulevard

Suite 1500

Austin, Texas 78701

(512) 322-2506

evan.young@bakerbotts.com

Counsel for Petitioner

Valero Energy Corporation

RICHARD MOSKOWITZ

AMERICAN FUEL &

PETROCHEMICAL

MANUFACTURERS

1800 M Street N.W.

Suite 900 North

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 457-0480

Counsel for Petitioner

American Fuel &

Petrochemical Manufacturers