Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Homer Lawrence Lane, Petitioner v. Alabama
Supreme Court briefOct 30, 2019
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No.
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CV
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Supreme Court, U S
FILED
OCT 3 0 2019
IN THE
f
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
L_£^CE OF THE CLERK '
HOMER LAWRENCE LANE,
PETITIONER
vs.
STATE OF ALABAMA,
RESPONDENT(S)
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE ALABAMA SUPREME COURT
Homer Lawrence Lane
AIS #122331
SCCF - 1000 St. Clair Road
Springville, Alabama 35146-5582
RECEIVED
MOV - 5 »
QUESTION(S) PRESENTED
I. WHETHER THE STATE OF ALABAMA MAY IMPOSE A STATE
PROCEDRURAL BAR RULE TO PRECLUDE A STRUCTURAL ERROR CLAIM.
LIST OF PARTIES
[ X ] All Parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page.
[ ]
All parties do not appear in the caption of the case on the cover page. A list of all
parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is the subject of this petition
is as follows:
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INDEX TO APENDICES
1
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
11
JURISDICTION
2
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
4
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
10
CONCLUSION
10
PROOF OF SERVICE
11
INDEX TO APPENDICES
APPENDIX A: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals (May 17, 2019) Memorandum
Decision
APPENDIX B: A4abama-Q©ui:t-ef-€r-i-mina-l'-A-ppeais-(-May-lTV2-007-)-Memor.andum<7
‘Decision-'
APPENDIX C:
APPENDIX D:
APPENDIX E:
APPENDIX F:
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED
PAGE
CASES
Argersinger v. Hamlin,
530 (19972)
407,
25,
92 S.Ct.
2006,
32 L.Ed.2d
5
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 113
L. Ed. 2d 302 (1991)............................................................................. 6
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 399 (1977)
Davis v. State,
682 So.2d 476
. 6
(Ala.Crim.App. 1995)......6
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d
.5
799 (1963)
Luis V.
(2016)
United
States,
136
S.Ct.
1083,
194
L.Ed.2d
. . . .6
Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 629 (1986)
Sullivan v Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275,
2078, 2081, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993)
STATUTES AND RULES
Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 32.2 et seq.
OTHER
Federal Constitution:
Amendment 5.
Amendment 6.
Amendment 14
278,
256
.6
113
S.Ct.
. 8
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment below.
OPINIONS BELOW
[ ] For cases from federal courts:
The opinion of the United States court of appeals appears at Appendix N/A to
The petition and is
[ ] reported at
N/A
[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,
[ ] is unpublished.
; or,
The opinion of the United States district court appears at Appendix N/A to
The petition and is
[ ] reported at
N/A
; or,
[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,
[ ] is unpublished.
[X]
For cases from state courts:
The opinion of the highest state court to review the merits appears at
Appendix
A to the petition
The petition and is
[ ] reported at__
; or,
[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,
[X] is unpublished.
The opinion of the Alabama Court Criminal of Appeals
Appears at Appendix A to the petition and is
[ ] reported at_________________________________
; or,
[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,
[X] is unpublished.
1
JURISDICTION
[ ] For cases from federal courts:
The date on which the United States Court of Appeals decided my case
was N/A .
[ ] No petition for rehearing was timely filed in my case.
[ ] A timely petition for rehearing was denied by the United States Court of
Appeals on the on the following date: N/A and a copy of the order denying
rehearing appears at Appendix N/A .
[ ] An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted to
and including N/A (date) on N/A (date) in Appendix No. N/A .
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
[X]
For cases from state courts:
The date on which the highest state court decided my case was May 17, 2019
A copy of that decision appears at Appendix A
[ X ] A timely petition for rehearing was thereafter denied on the following date:
June 7, 2019
[ ] An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted to
and including N/A (date) on
N/A (date) in Appendix No.
N/A .
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).
2
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Federal Constitution:
Amendment 6.
Amendment 14.
3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
l. The Petitioner, Homer Lawrence Lane (hereinafter,
Lane), was indicted by the June 1978 Term of the
Talladega, Alabama County Grand Jury for an offense of
"ROBBERY OR ATTEMPT THEREOF,
WHEN THE VICTIM IS
INTENTIONALLY KILLED BY THE DEFENDANT," in a violation
of Section 13-11-2(a)(2), Alabama Code 1975.
On or about October 10, 1978, Lane entered a plea
of not guilty to the offense of Capital Murder.
On or about October 16, 1978, Lane withdrew his
plea of not guilty and pled guilty as charged. Due to
the nature of the offense, it was necessary for the
State to prove a prima facie case before conducting the
sentencing phase of the trial.
Accordingly, a jury was selected, impaneled, and
sworn in accordance with the law and trial of the case
commenced which ultimately resulted in a verdict of
guilt for the Capital Murder offense as charged in the
indictment and a recommendation for a sentence of
death.
On or about October 24, 1978, Presiding Judge
William
C.
Sullivan
(deceased)
rejected
the
recommendation of the jury and sentenced Lane to a term
of imprisonment for "life without parole."
On or about September 26, 2018, Lane submitted a
Rule 32 Petition for Postconviction Relief to the
Circuit Court of Talladega County challenging his
conviction and sentence for the offense of Capital
Murder.
On or about October 1, 2018, the said petition was
filed, and/or docketed by the Talladega County Circuit
Clerk's Office.
On or about December 12, 2018, the State filed its
"State's Answer and Motion to Dismiss." (CR. 71-78)
On or about December 27, 2018, Lane filed a
"Petitioners Response To States Answer And Motion To
Dismiss." (CR. 92-94)
4
On or about January 10, 2 019, the trial court
entered an Order denying and dismissing the Rule 32
Petition. (CR. 95-102)
The trial court held that Lane's petition was
successive and barred by state procedural Rule(s) 32.2
etc., Ala.R.Crim.Pro..
On or about January 22, 2019, Lane filed a timely
I
Notice of Appeal' to the Alabama Court of Criminal
Appeals (CR. 103-106)
The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the judgment of
the trial court on May 17,
2 019 and overruled the
Application for Rehearing on June 7, 2019.
2. A copy of the Opinion of the appellate court is attached
to this petition as Appendix A which shows the Court of
Criminal Appeals case number to be CR-18-0414.
3. Petitioner alleges as grounds for the issuance of the
writ the following:
(A) The basis of this petition for the writ is that
the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals is
in
conflict with prior decisions of the United States Supreme
Court on the same point of law.
Accordingly,
the
Petitioner averred that,
"he
was
unconstitutionally denied his right to counsel
(at a
critical stage of the proceedings) , in a violation of the
Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution."
The Memorandum decision by the Court acknowledges that
Petitioner's claim in this cause is jurisdictional but
purports that he is not entitled to postconviction relief
because he raised this claim in 2007 and the court's
(though acknowledging that Lane was denied his right to
counsel) ruled adversely on the claim.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right of counsel in
all criminal prosecutions. The United States Constitution
Amendment VI assures the right to counsel in all Federal
and
State
criminal
prosecutions
in
that
result
imprisonment. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 4 07, 25, 92 S.Ct.
2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (19972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963).
5
Petitioner's claim in this cause that he was denied
counsel (at a critical stage of the proceedings) cannot be
deemed as harmless error by this Honorable Court.
Petitioner avers that his initial appearance and
arraignment in district court triggered his right to
counsel because it was a critical stage in the criminal
proceedings and transformed his
status
from that of
'suspect
to
criminal
defendant.
See;
Michigan
v.
Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 629 (1986), Brewer v. Williams, 430
U.S. 387, 399 (1977)
Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court held in
the case of Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 111 S. Ct.
1246,
113
L.
Ed.
2d
302
(1991),
we
divided
constitutional errors into two classes,
The first we
called "trial error," because the errors "occurred during
presentation of the case to the jury" and their effect may
"be quantitatively assessed in the context of other
evidence presented in order to determine whether [they
were] harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."
Id., at 307308, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 113 L. Ed. 2d 302 (internal quotation
marks
omitted).
These
include
"most
constitutional
errors." Id., at 306, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 113 L. Ed. 2d 302.
The second class of constitutional error we called
"structural defects." These "defy analysis by 1 harmlesserror' standards" because they "affect the framework within
which the trial proceeds," and are not "simply an error in
the trial process itself." Such errors include the denial
of counsel, see Gideon v. Wainwright, 3 72 U.S. 335, 83 S.
Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1963), the denial of the right of
self-representation, see McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168,
177-178, n 8, 104 S. Ct. 944, 79 L. Ed. 2d 122 (1984), the
denial of the right to public trial, see Waller v. Georgia,
467 U.S. 39, 49, n 9, 104 S. Ct. 2210, 81 L. Ed. 2d 31
(1984), and the denial of the right to trial by jury by the
giving of a defective reasonable-doubt instruction, see
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 124
L. Ed. 2d 182 (1993).
In the case of Luis v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 1083,
194 L.Ed.2d 256 (2016), the Supreme Court stated that, "We
have little trouble concluding that erroneous deprivation
of the right to counsel,
with consequences that are
necessarily
unquantifiable
and
indeterminate,
unquestionably qualifies as 'structural error.'"
6
"No one doubts thefundamental character of
a
criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to the
""Assistance
of
Counsel. I I
In
Gideon
v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed.
2d 799 (1963), the Court explained:
'The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of
little avail if it did not comprehend the right to
be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and
educated layman has small and sometimes no skill
in the science of law. If charged with crime, he
is incapable,
generally, of
determining
for
himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He
is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left
without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial
without a proper charge,
and convicted upon
incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to
the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both
the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his
defense, even though he have a perfect one. He
requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step
in the proceedings against him. Without it, though
he be not guilty,
he
faces
the danger of
conviction because he does not know how to
I 1
establish his innocence.
Id., at 344-345, 83
S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (quoting Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69, 53 S. Ct. 55, 77 L.
Ed. 158 (1932)).
It is consequently not surprising: first, that
this Court's opinions often refer to the right to
counsel as ""fundamental, I I id., at 68, 53 S. Ct.
55, 77 L. Ed. 158; see Grosjean v. American Press
Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243-244, 56 S. Ct. 444, 80 L.
Ed. 660 (1936) (similar) ; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458, 462-463, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461
(1938)
(similar);
second,
that
commentators
describe the right as a ""great engin[e] by which
an innocent <*pg. 263> man can make the truth of
his innocence visible, 1 I Amar, Sixth Amendment
First Principles, 84 Geo. L. J. 641, 643 (1996);
see Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862, 95 S.
Ct. 2550, 45 L. Ed. 2d 593 (1975); third, that we
have understood the right to require that the
Government
provide
counsel
for
an
indigent
defendant accused of all but the least serious
7
crimes, see Gideon, supra, at 344, 83 S. Ct. 792,
9 L. Ed. 2d 799; and fourth, that we have
considered the wrongful deprivation of the right
error
to
counsel
a
''structural i i
that
so
affects the framework within which the trial
proceeds' ' that courts may not even ask whether
the error harmed the defendant. United States v.
Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 148, 126 S. Ct.
2557, 165 L. Ed. 2d 409 (2006) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see id., at 150, 126 S. Ct. 2557,
165 L. Ed. 2d 409.
Accordingly, Petitioner avers his claim "that he was
denied his right to counsel" is not subject to any
preclusion grounds where the United States Supreme Court
II II
has held that
structural error" requires automatic
reversal of a conviction."
(B) The basis of this petition for the writ is that
the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals is in
conflict with prior decisions of the United States Supreme
Court on the same point of law.
Accordingly, the Petitioner averred that, "the trial
court committed "structural error" where the court
failed to give a "reasonable doubt" instruction to the
jurors."
Petitioner avers that the United States Supreme
Court held in Sullivan v Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 278,
113 S.Ct. 2078, 2081, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993); that an
error in an instruction on reasonable doubt can never
be harmless error.
The
failure
to
give
a
jury
instruction
on
reasonable doubt is a structural defect that nullifies
the proceedings.
State v. Langley,
896 So.2d 200
(La.Ct.App. 2004)
In Davis v. State, 682 So.2d 476 (Ala.Crim.App.
1995), the appellate court found reversible error in a
trial court's failure to give a jury instruction on
'reasonable doubt' in a Capital Murder trial after the
defendant had pled guilty, relying on the case of
Sullivan v. Louisiana, supra.
8
The United States Supreme Court in Sullivan v.
Louisiana,
supra,
stated
that
an
error
in
an
instruction defining reasonable doubt can never be a
harmless error.
Likewise, the failure to define reasonable doubt
and to instruct the jury on reasonable doubt during a
trial proceeding in which the appellant pleads guilty
to Capital Murder and in which the State is required by
statute to prove the Appellant's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt is reversible error.
In the case at bar the trial court failed to give
the jury an instruction on reasonable doubt.
The
failure to give a reasonable doubt jury instruction is
a structural error that nullifies the proceedings.
"A structural error destroys the validity of the
proceedings; the trial and resulting verdict are an
absolute nullity and can have no effect whatever."
Where the trial court failed to give the jury a
'reasonable doubt' instruction, the court committed
reversible error and Lane is entitled to postconviction
relief in this cause.
9
4
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
Petitioner avers that this Honorable Court should
settle the question of whether a state procedural bar can
preclude a "structural defect" claim as the State of
Alabama has done in this case.
CONCLUSION
Petitioner respectfully requests that after a preliminary
examination, the writ of certiorari be granted and that
this Honorable Court proceed under its own rules to review
the matters complained of and to reverse the judgment of
the court of criminal appeals, and for such other relief as
Petitioner may be entitled to as a matter of law.
Respectfully Submitted,
y
Homer L. Lane, pro-se
Date: /oi - 3 0 - /
10
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