Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Jorge Madero-Gil, Petitioner v. United States

NO.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

JORGE MADERO-GIL, RAFAEL MAJANO MALDONADO,

OMAR HERNANDEZ LOZANO, VICTOR REYNOSO-VALDEZ, and

JAVIER ENRIQUE MELENDEZ-WISENTHAL,

Petitioners,

Vv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

MARJORIE A. MEYERS

Federal Public Defender

Southern District of Texas

Attorney of Record

MICHAEL HERMAN

Assistant Federal Public Defender

Attorneys for Petitioners

440 Louisiana Street, Suite 1350

Houston, TX 77002-1056

Telephone: (713) 718-4600

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether, in light of Pereira v. Sessions, 138 8. Ct. 2105 (2018), the

immigration court issuing orders of removal against each petitioner lacked

jurisdiction to issue such orders, so that use of such orders in a prosecution

. for illegal reentry violated the separation of powers and due process.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

Petitioners were convicted in separate proceedings before the district court, and the

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit entered separate judgments in each of

their cases. Because petitioners seek review of these judgments on the basis of identical

questions, they jointly file this petition with this Court. See Sup. Ct. R. 12.4. All parties to

petitioners’ Fifth Circuit proceedings are named in the caption of the case before this

Court.!

‘Tn the courts below, petitioner Melendez-Wisenthal was also known by the aliases listed

in the captions in Appendix E.

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DIRECTLY RELATED PROCEEDINGS

United States District Court (S.D. Tex.):

United States v. Jorge Madero-Gil, No. 4:18-CR-594 (April 12, 2019)

United States v. Rafael Majano Maldonado, No. 4:18-CR-590 (April 19, 2019)

United States vy. Omar Hernandez Lozano, No. 4:18-CR-598 (May 16, 2019)

United States v. Victor Reynoso-Valdez, 7:18-CR-1783 (May 28, 2019)

United States v. Javier Enrique Melendez-Wisenthal, 4:18-CR-387 (May 15, 2019)

United States Court of Appeals (Sth Cir.):

United States v. Jorge Madero-Gil, No. 19-20241 (March 18, 2020)

United States v. Rafael Majano Maldonado, No. 19-20283 (March 23, 2020)

United States vy. Omar Hernandez Lozano, No. 19-20327 (March 4, 2020)

United States v. Victor Reynoso-Valdez, 19-40417 (March 24, 2020)

United States v. Javier Enrique Melendez-Wisenthal, 19-20333 (March 13, 2020)

United States Supreme Court

Pedroza-Rocha v. United States, No. 19-6588

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED ..00......ccccccccccccesesceeseeseeseceeesececaesaceaecsecscessaeaessesseeseeeeesneenaseneass i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS 0.00... eccccceccecceeeceeeeeeeeeseseeeeeeaetaetaessseeesseeaeeateneaees il

DIRECTLY RELATED PROCEEDING ......0....ccccccecceseeeeeeeeceeseeneensetaeeaseaeeseesesseseeseseees iti

TABLE OF CONTENTS ...0...ccecceseccescesecseeceeeeceeeeceeceeeesecseseneeaseaeesaeeseseeseaeeaessesseeaeenseaeeeas iv

TABLE OF CITATIONS ...0...ccccecccccsssceceesesecceececeeccseceseeseeaecaeeaeeaessneeaeesnseecsaesassasssseasenesas vil

PRAYER o0....ccccccsscesscsscsceescesecseesseessesessecsceseesceseeesenseeaeesecseceassaecssesecscessessesseeeaeeseesesaeeasenenees 1

OPINIONS BELOW ...........::c:ccesceseseeseteeeeeeeeeeee coceseneesteneceeneeeceesetaeeseeseeaeneeseeateesseesstaeeetess 1

JURISDICTION ........ccccccccccsscseeseesseceenscsscesecseceesaecsesaeesecaeeseeseseceeaecseeseseaseaeesesseesesseesaeeaseae 1

CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY, AND REGULATORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED .......ccccccecceseeseenseseeseeseeececeetseesacsecscesaeeseeeeceaeeaetaneaseateaanees 2

BASIS OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION IN THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT .00..ceccecceceeeeeeeeseceeceeeneeeaeeattaeteeseessesseeseesenes 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ..0....cccccceccescseceecceseeeeeeeeseesccceesecseeseenseeaecerssesaaesaceaseaeensaenes 3

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT occ eeeeseeeeeeeeeseseeseeeseeseesessecaenesesseseesenees 5

The Court should grant certiorari to address the important issue whether, in

light of Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), the immigration court

issuing orders of removal against each petitioner lacked jurisdiction to issue

such orders, so that use of such orders in a prosecution for illegal reentry

violated the separation of powers and due procesS. ...........ecceeseeeeesneeseeeseeeeeeseenenees 5

A. The decisions below in each case are incorrect and violate the

Separation Of POWETS..........ccccceccceccessceseecsseesseecseeeesseeceseessseesseessaeensesesseeesteens 5

B. This Court should resolve a circuit split over whether, in light of

Pereira, the statutory definition of “notice to appear” defines the

jurisdiction of the immigration COUITS. ..........ccccecseeceeeereeeeeeeeteeeeaeeeaeeseeeneeees 7

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS - (Cont’d)

Page

C. The Fifth Circuit’s restrictions on collaterally attacking removal

orders in illegal reentry prosecutions conflict with this Court’s

precedent and violate due Process. .........eccescccseeseeseceneeeeeeeeecseceeeseeeeneeseeees 10

D. The Court should grant CertiOrari. .........ccccccccessseesesseeeseeeseeseecnneeeeesaeeeaeeeeees 12

CONCLUSION 0... ececceceeeceseeseeeessecesesscenecsceeaceseesecseseeenecceeaecaecaeesevansansnaseaeseaeeasesasseeegs 14

APPENDIX A: Opinion of the Court of Appeals in

JORGE MADERO-A-GIL o.oo. ceceecceeceeccecceceeseessessesseesceeceeceucescesezseeaecsecaeeeaeseeeeenaesaeeaeeenes 15

APPENDIX B: Opinion of the Court of Appeals in

RAFAEL MAJANO MALDONADO 00... ccccceccceececseeeeeeeneeseeesetaeesseeneeanesseeseeeeeeeesaeens 18

APPENDIX C: Opinion of the Court of Appeals in

OMAR HERNANDEZ LOZANO (..0...ceccceceeceeseeseeseeeceeceescececaecsenaceeetaecaeesseneesaeeaeeneeees 20

APPENDIX D: Opinion of the Court of Appeals in

VICTOR REYNOSO-VALDEZ.........cceccescceceeeeeseeseeseesececeeceesesseeaesseeseenaeenseseeesesenseaes 22

APPENDIX E: Opinion of the Court of Appeals in

JAVIER ENRIQUE MELENDEZ-WISENTHAL ......ecececcesesceseseeesececeesecesenseeeeeneenes 25

APPENDIX F: Memorandum Opinion and Order of the District Court in

JORGE MADERO-Gi1 o.oo ccceseeeeeeceeseteeeeceeseeneceeeseeseenecesenenaseaeeaeeaeeeaeesaeeeseaeeateaes 27

APPENDIX G: Order of the District Court in .

RAFAEL MAJANO MALDONADO 1... ccc ccccccesceeeseeeeseeeeceeeneeeaceaetaeeneeeateneseaseaseaes 33

APPENDIX H: Order of the District Court in

OMAR HERNANDEZ LOZANO 1.00. eeescceeeeececeeeeeesetseeneeeceeceeseeeeseseeesaeeeetaneseenees 37

APPENDIX I: Order of the District Court in .

VICTOR REYNOSO-VALDEZ 0.0. ceccecescecessecnecneceeeeseesecnesseesesateaeesnesseecaeeaeenseeaseas 54

APPENDIX J: Opinion of the District Court in

JAVIER ENRIQUE MELENDEZ-WISENTHAL .....0...ccceeecccseeeseeseeseeeceeseeeseeaeeeeeeesees 55

TABLE OF CONTENTS -— (Cont’d)

Page

APPENDIX K: Texts of Constitutional, Statutory

and Regulatory Texts Involved ...........cccccsccsscssseeeseecsseeesseeeeeeceseeeaeceaeeseeseaeeeearerseeenaees 58

vi

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CASES

Ali v. Barr, 924 F.3d 983 (8th Cir. 2019) ooo ccccccccsccsccseceeeeseesseesecesseesesseesseeesessssenseens 8-9

Banegas Gomez v. Barr, 922 F.3d 101

(2d Cir, 2019) oooeccccccccccscssssseessesseesseessecsaeceseeseceseceseeacesseeseeseecseeeseneeesseeeaeeeaeeeseesseens 8-9

Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007) oo..esceeccesscesceeseeeseceeesseceeeesceeseeeaeceeceneeaeeeseeeaeeeaeeaes 6

City of Arlington v. F.C.C., 569 U.S. 290 (2013) eee eeeecceseeeeeseeeeceeeeceeeeeceeeeeeeeetaeeneeaes 5

Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946) ooo. cccccseccssecssceceneceseeseaeeceaeeensesseeeeseens 1]

Goncalves Pontes v. Barr, 938 F.3d 1

(Ast Cir, 2019) occ cccccecscsseeseecssssseeeseesseessesseeetecesecsaseseceseceesseeeseeeeeaeeseesseeenees 8-10

Hernandez-Perez v. Whitaker, 911 F.3d 305

(6th Cir, 2018) occ ccccsscssccscesecsseceneesseceeecseceseeeeeessesesecssesseeessesecesecseesseeesesesessseeeseeeeees 9

Karingithi v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 1158

(Oth Cir, 2019) ooceecccccccsesseeseesseeseesseceeeceeeeseecseceaesesescesaeesaecssesscessneaeeeeeesreseseeeeeeees 8-9

Lopez v. Barr, 925 F.3d 396

(Oth Cir, 2019) oo. ceeeccessessessessesecscesseeeeseeceeeaeeaecseeseeeeaesaessesaesaassasseseeeeaeseeseneeaseeseeetees 9

Lopez-Munoz v. Barr, 941 F.3d 1013

(LOth Cir, 2019) occ ccccsessessceeseeesecesseesseesseceseceseesecsecsseeseceseenseesscenesenecnaeenseseaesas 10

Matter of Bermudez-Cota, 27 I. & N. Dec. 441

(BIA 2018) ooecceccccccccesscessessesseescensccesecsseesseceseceseesseesseeeecseesaeceaessesaeceesseesseseaeeeeeeaseeaees 9

Nkomo vy. U.S. Att’y Gen., 930 F.3d 129

(3d Cir, 2019) ooo eee ccccceesseeseesseesseesseesseesseessecessesseessesseenseeeseessesseceeeseeseseeesseeees 8, 10

Ortiz-Santiago v. Barr, 924 F.3d 956

(7th Cir, 2019) oocccccccccssessecssecsesseccesceseeceseecsecssecsseeesseecesecssecseeeseseseeeeeaeenuressteeeeeas 8-10

Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018) occ ccccesessecsseesseeeseeeeseeeeeeeeseeeseeesaes passim

Vil

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Page

CASES — (cont’d)

Perez-Sanchez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 935 F.3d 1148

(Vth Cir, 2019) occ ccc eccccssecsecensenseesseeseessececesesseeeeeeeseecsaeeeseeeeceseseseeesereneeesees 8, 10

Pierre-Paul v. Barr, 930 F.3d 684

(Sth Cir. 2019) ooo ceccccccccesscsssccsseecsseeesseeeseeesseseseesseseceeceeseeceaeesseeesesessessseeseneeeas 4, 6, 8-9

Santos-Santos v. Barr, 917 F.3d 486

(6th Cir. 2019) coe ceccccscecssscssceceseeeseecsseecseecseecsseesseeeseeeeseeeceeeeeeeeseeseneeseseeseeeeneeesaeens 8

United States v. Cortez, 930 F.3d 350

(Ath Cir, 2019) oe ccccsccssecssecseecesecsececesseessensesneesseceaeeseeeseeceecssceaeceeecteseaeenseeeseeaes 8-9

United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002) .rccsssssssesssssevssssssesessstsessssevesssssevesesssveeseeseees 5

United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828 (1987) ..eccccccceesscessesececeseeeeseeeneeseneeeneens 10

United States v. Pedroza-Rocha, 933 F.3d 490

(Sth Cir. 2019), petition for cert. filed,

(No. 19-6588) (U.S. Nov. 12, 2019). ice ceecssssseeseessseeseeesrecenessseeseenaeeneeeeesseenseeaes 3-4

Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302 (2014) ooo. eeeeeceeeeeceeeseeteeeeeteeeeaeenes 7

STATUTES AND RULES

8 CF.R. § 1003.13 occ cccccscssscssssesecsseesecsecseeeseeeseesecsseceeeeeeeeseessseeeeeeeeseeaeseaeeseeeeees 3,7

8 C.FLR. § 1003.14 (a) occ ccccccccscscseseesseensecseenseceeeseceaecesecesesnseesseesseseseseesesesaeeerenseestes 7

8 CLFLR. § 1003.15(D) coc cceccccsccsseesecesesseeeesacessessecsaeceseesaeesseesseesaeeseeesesaeeeaeeneeenees 6-7

8 CLF.R. § 1003.15 (C) occ cccecccccsccsscsseeseessecesceeeeeseessenseceeecesecesaeeaeecseeeseeeseseeesseseeesreeseenees 7

8 CLFLR. § 1003.18 occ ccccccccscesssessesseeseeceeeaeeeseeseescesseeceseecseceseceseeeseceaeeseseseseeeseeneeeaees 7

8 C.FLR. § 1003.18(D) co.cc cccccscesscesscscssecsecsseessesecseeceeesseeeeeeseceseseeeeeeeeeeeeeaeeeeeseeseaees 6

Vili

TABLE OF CITATIONS - (cont’d)

Page

STATUTES AND RULES - (cont’d)

8 C.FLR. § 1103.14 (a) oe cecesessecneceeceeeeeesecssecsevsecsecaceaesaesseseeeaeeaeeesesesaeeseseaeeaeeneees 3

8 C.F.R. § 1239.1 oe. souneasaeeanseeanseesneeasecssieesuiensneesnessnsecssessnesssossesnceanersieesnesesnns 7

BUS.C. § L225 (D1) eee ec eeccseeseeseesseeetseeseeesesaseseesecsesseeeaessececseseesaeeeeseesseeeaeeseenees 6

0 nck OAR i 292.) (0) Ere 6

Ss OR ORE 18 74: seeeeceeeeseseseseseseneneees 6

& U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1) cecccscsscsscssssssesessssessesssssesssescsssssesssseseesesseceseseseseeee sessesssssessesssees passim

8 US.C. § L229(a)A)(G)G) one ceeeccseesneeseeeeessecseeseceeeccssessesseesesseceeeceateeeseneeseeae® 3,5

BUS.C. § 1326 icc cicscsccseseessecesensessecseessecsecsecseesscesecsecseseceesesseeseeaeeseeneeeaeenesenseaeesees 2-3

8 ULS.C. § 1326(a) ieee ccceesceceeseeesececceseeseesecseeeseeaeeaecsecsaseneeaecseeseeeeeeesaeeeeeeaeeeaeeas 10, 11

8 ULS.C. § 1326(d) oe eee ce cccescssessesseescceseesecsceeseesesseeaecsecseseaceaecsesseeececeesseaeeaeeeneeaeeaes 10-11

BUS.C. § 1329 cece csscsecseesecsseesceseeesessecseeseesaessessessecneenaesaessececseseeeseessesseseaesaeeneseees 2

18 U.S.C. § 3231 ec eeecessessesssesceseceeeesecsceesessecsecsessecesesseesesseesesseesesseeaeeseescerseeseseaseaeess 2

2B U.S.C. § 12541) ccecccsececcssesccsssvecessvecesuecesnsecessuscessvecessusecssuscessusecssusssssivessassesenuseessneeesee l

Sup. Ct. Ro 12.4 cccceeceeccccscesesseesececenaeesececesaeeeesseeseesceeaeseeesessaeeaesaeeaeeaesaceeeeeaesseseaeeaeeas ii

Sup. Ct Ro 1B eee eeeccesececeeceeseecesseeseeececaessecsecsneeaesaecseseeecesaesaeseeseesaecaeseaeeeeseeesueserteees 1

MISCELLANEOUS

Immigration and Naturalization Service and EOJR, Proposed Rules, Inspection and

Expedited Removal of Aliens, 62 Fed. Reg. 444-01, 1997 WL 1514 (Jan. 3, 1997) .......... 7

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TABLE OF CITATIONS -— (cont’d)

MISCELLANEOUS

Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (ITRIRA) of 1996,

§ 309(c)(2), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat 3009 (1996) .cccccccccccsscssesssssssssssesesseesssen

TRAC-Immigration, Immigration Prosecutions for 2019 (Oct. 31, 2019),

https://tracfed.syr.edu/results/9x705dbb47eSa0 btm «0... ceceecseeseeseseeseeseeseeseeseeneesees

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, EOIS, Statistics Yearbook FY 2018,

https://www. justice. gov/eoir/file/1198896/download ..........:ccsssssssseseceneneeeeeeeeeeeeseeeeees

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, EOIR, FY 2013 Statistics Yearbook (Apr. 2014),

https://www. justice. gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2014/04/16/fy13syb.pdf.......

US. Dep’t of Justice, EOIR, FY 2008 Statistical Year Book (Mar. 2009),

https://www. justice. gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2009/03/27/fy08syb.pdf.......

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, EOIR, FY 2003 Statistical Year Book (Apr. 2004),

https://www justice. gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2008/04/18/fy03syb.pdf.......

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Marshals Service, FY 2020 Performance Budget:

Federal Prisoner Detention Appropriation 19 (Mar. 2019),

https://www.justice. gov/jmd/page/file/1144161/download ..........ceeeeeeeseeeteeseeeeeees

U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Quick Facts: Illegal Reentry Offenses (Fiscal Year 2018),

https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/quick-

facts/Mlegal Reentry FY18 pdf. oo... cecsescsessescsesecesssenecseseneseeseeseseseaeeeeseaesenenesees

Page

veveseses 12

PRAYER

Petitioners Madero-Gil, Majano Maldonado, Hernandez Lozano, Reynoso-Valdez,

and Melendez-Wisenthal respectfully pray that this Court grant their consolidated petition

for certiorari.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in

petitioners’ cases are attached to this petition as Appendices A through E. The opinions

and orders of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas are attached

as Appendices F through J.

JURISDICTION

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issued its opinions on the

following dates: on March 18, 2020, for Mr. Madero-Gil; on March 23, 2020, for Mr.

Majano Maldonado; on March 4, 2020, for Mr. Hernandez Lozano; on March 24, 2020,

for Mr. Reynoso-Valdez; and on March 13, 2020, for Mr. Melendez-Wisenthal. See

Appendices A-F. This petition is filed within 90 days after entry of judgment in each case.

See Sup. Ct. R. 13.1. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS

INVOLVED

The texts of the relevant constitutional, statutory and regulatory provisions involved

are attached as Appendix K.

BASIS OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION IN THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

These cases were originally brought as federal criminal prosecutions under 8 U.S.C.

1326. The district court therefore had jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1329 and 18

US.C. § 3231.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In separate proceedings in the United States District Court for the Southern District

of Texas, petitioners were charged by indictment with the offense of illegal reentry of a

previously deported alien, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Each petitioner filed a motion

to dismiss the indictment in his respective case, arguing that, in light of Pereira v. Sessions,

138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), the prior order of removal and any reinstatement thereof was void

because the Immigration Judge issuing the order did not have jurisdiction to issue such an

order and that the use of such a void order violated due process. Specifically, each

petitioner argued that the “Notice to Appear” provided by immigration authorities alleging

the grounds of removal prior to issuance of the first order of removal did not state the time

and place at which removal proceedings were to be held and, in light of Pereira, such a

document lacking that information was not a valid “Notice to Appear” under 8 U.S.C. §

1229(a)(1)(G)(i). Consequently, petitioners argued, the document did not vest jurisdiction

with the immigration court in light of regulations which provide that “[jJurisdiction vests,

and proceedings before an Immigration Judge commence, when” the Department of

Homeland Security files a notice to appear with the immigration court. 8 C.F.R. §

1103.14(a); see also 8 C.F.R. 1003.13. The district court denied the motion in each case.

see Appendices F-J, and petitioners timely appealed.

In all of Petitioners’ appeals, the Government filed a motion for summary affirmance

relying on the decision in United States v. Pedroza-Rocha, 933 F.3d 490 (Sth Cir. 2019),

petition for cert. filed, (No. 19-6588) (U.S. Nov. 12, 2019). In Pedroza-Rocha, the Fifth

Circuit held that the omission of the hearing time did not make the notice to appear

defective because the regulatory definition of the notice to appear (which does not require

a hearing time), not the statutory definition (which does), controls. Pedroza-Rocha, 933

F.3d at 497 (citing Pierre-Paul v. Barr, 930 F.3d 684, 689-90 (Sth Cir. 2019)). Even if the

notice to appear was defective, the later notice of hearing cured it. Pedroza-Rocha, 933

F.3d at 497. And the regulation requiring a notice to appear to be filed with the immigration

court was not jurisdictional. Id. at 497-98. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit, relying on

Pedroza-Rocha, affirmed the judgment in each of petitioners’ cases. See Appendices A-E.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

The Court should grant certiorari to address the important issue whether, in

light of Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), the immigration court

issuing orders of removal against each petitioner lacked jurisdiction to issue

such orders, so that use of such orders in a prosecution for illegal reentry

violated the separation of powers and due process

A. The decisions below in each case are incorrect and violate the separation of

powers.

An agency’s power to act comes from Congress. City of Arlington v. F.C.C., 569

U.S. 290, 298 (2013). Courts must “tak[e] seriously, and apply[ | rigorously, in all cases,

statutory limits on agencies’ authority.” Jd. at 307.

The notice to appear is such a limit. Congress specified that the notice to appear

must be served on every noncitizen in removal proceedings. § 1229(a)(1). It also required

that a notice to appear must have a hearing time. § 1229(a)(1)(G)(G). The omission of a

hearing time cannot be cured; without it, the document is not a notice to appear. Pereira,

138 S. Ct. at 2116.

Without a notice to appear, the immigration court lacks authority to remove a

noncitizen. § 1229(a)(1). That is because service of the notice to appear is necessary for

subject matter jurisdiction — the immigration judge’s authority to preside over cases. See

United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002) (describing subject matter jurisdiction

as “the court’s statutory or constitutional authority to hear the case” (cleaned up)).

Immigration judges only have authority to decide cases in which the Department of

Homeland Security chooses to serve a notice to appear. § 1229(a)(1). In contrast,

immigration officials — not judges — can rule on a noncitizen’s deportability and

5

inadmissibility through certain expedited procedures when no notice to appear is filed. See,

eg., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1), 1228(b). The notice to appear confers subject matter

jurisdiction by defining the cases over which immigration judges preside. See Bowles v.

Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 213 (2007) (“the notion of subject-matter jurisdiction obviously

extends to classes of cases ... falling within a court’s adjudicatory authority” (cleaned up)).

The government has sought to avoid this straightforward application of § 1229(a)(1)

and Pereira by arguing that the regulatory definition of a notice to appear, not the statutory

one, applies to the notice to appear required to start the removal proceeding. The

regulations do not require a hearing time. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.15(b), 1003.18(b).

In Pierre-Paul and Pedroza-Rocha, the Fifth Circuit agreed. By ignoring the

jurisdictional import of § 1229(a)(1) and finding “no glue” between the regulations and §

1229(a)(1), the Fifth Circuit distinguished Pereira and approved a two-step procedure: first

a notice to appear with no hearing time, and then a notice of hearing. Pierre-Paul, 93 0F3d

at 691.

But there is glue binding the statute to the regulations. Congress’s transitional

instructions recognize the jurisdictional significance of the notice to appear. Illegal

Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IRIRA) of 1996, § 309(c)(2),

Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat 3009 (1996) (making certain documents “valid as if provided

under [§ 1229] (as amended by this subtitle) to confer jurisdiction on the immigration

judge”). And the regulations incorporate the statutory jurisdictional limit by providing that

a charging document such as a notice to appear vests jurisdiction with the immigration

court. §§ 1003.13, 1003.14(a); see 8 C.F.R. § 1239.1.

The agency even acknowledged the need to “implement[ ] the language of the

amended Act indicating that the time and place of the hearing must be on the Notice to

Appear” and committed to providing a hearing time in the notices to appear “as fully as

possible by April 1, 1997[.]” Immigration and Naturalization Service and EOIR, Proposed

Rules, Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens, 62 Fed. Reg. 444-01, 1997 WL 1514

(Jan. 3, 1997). But the agency created an exception that hearing times could be omitted if

providing them was not practicable, such as when “automated scheduling [is] not possible

... (&.g., power outages, computer crashes/downtime).” Jd. at 449; see 8 CFR. §§

1003.15(b), (c); 1003.18.

Two decades later, “almost 100 percent of notices to appear omit the time and date

of proceeding[.]” Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2111 (cleaned up). The “where practicable”

regulatory exception swallowed the statutory rule of including the hearing time in the

notice to ‘appear. And the Fifth Circuit sanctioned the agency’s attempt to rewrite the

statute. This violates the separation of powers. Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573

U.S. 302, 327 (2014) (agencies cannot “revise clear statutory terms that turn out not to

work in practice’).

B. This Court should resolve a circuit split over whether, in light of Pereira, the

statutory definition of “notice to appear” defines the jurisdiction of the

immigration courts.

Eleven circuits, as well as the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), have weighed

in on the proper definition of a “notice to appear” and the effect of a putative notice missing

a hearing time. The circuits are split on whether the statutory or regulatory definition of a

notice to appear governs, and whether a notice to appear is a jurisdictional requirement or

a claims-processing rule.

Two circuits hold that the statutory definition of a notice to appear applies to starting

a removal proceeding, but eight circuits and the BIA hold that the regulatory definition

does.

The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits, applying this Court’s reasoning in Pereira,

interpret § 1229(a)(1) as requiring the notice to appear used to begin removal proceedings

to have a hearing time. The Seventh Circuit rejects as “absurd” the government’s argument

that the notice to appear referenced in the regulations is not the same notice to appear

defined in the statute. Ortiz-Santiago v. Barr, 924 F.3d 956, 961-62 (7th Cir. 2019). The

Eleventh Circuit explains that, per § 1229(a)(1), Congress intended for service of the notice

to appear to “operate as the point of commencement for removal proceedings[,]” and “the

agency was not free to redefine the point of commencement[.]” Perez-Sanchez v. U.S. Att’y

Gen., 935 F.3d 1148, 1154 (11th Cir. 2019).

The First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits find that

the regulatory definition of a notice to appear, which does not require a hearing time,

applies for beginning removal proceedings.” Several circuits also hold that a later notice

2 See Goncalves Pontes v. Barr, 938 F.3d 1, 6-7 (1st Cir. 2019); Banegas Gomez v. Barr,

922 F.3d 101, 110-12 (2d Cir. 2019); Nkomo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 930 F.3d 129, 133-34 (3d Cir.

2019); United States v. Cortez, 930 F.3d 350, 363 (4th Cir. 2019); Pierre-Paul, 930 F.3d at 690;

Santos-Santos v. Barr, 917 F.3d 486, 490-91 (6th Cir. 2019); Ali v. Barr, 924 F.3d 983, 986 (8th

Cir. 2019); Karingithi v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 1158, 1161-62 (9th Cir. 2019).

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of hearing cures any statutory defect. See Pierre-Paul, 930 F.3d at 690; but see Lopez v.

Barr, 925 F.3d 396, 405 (9th Cir. 2019) (a defective § 1229(a)(1) notice to appear cannot

be cured by a notice of hearing for the stop-time rule).

In finding that the regulatory definition controls, the First, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits

specifically defer to the BIA’s reasoning. Goncalves Pontes, 938 F.3d at 7; Karingithi, 913

F.3d at 1161; Hernandez-Perez v. Whitaker, 911 F.3d 305, 312 (6th Cir. 2018). The BIA

interpreted Pereira narrowly, limiting it to the stop-time rule, and approved the two-step

process of notice to appear without a hearing time followed by a notice of hearing. Matter

of Bermudez-Cota, 27 I. & N. Dec. 441, 443-47 (BIA 2018). The Seventh Circuit,

however, sharply criticized reliance on the BIA’s decision, which it found “brushed too

quickly over the Supreme Court’s rationale in Pereira” and failed to consider significant

legislative history. Ortiz-Santiago, 924 F.3d at 962.

Four circuits and the BIA believe that a notice to appear is a jurisdictional

requirement, but five circuits disagree.

The Second and Eighth Circuits hold that a notice to appear, as defined by the

regulations, confers “jurisdiction” on the immigration court. Ali, 924 F.3d at 986; Banegas

Gomez, 922 F.3d at 112. The Sixth and Ninth Circuits adopt similar reasoning after

deferring to the BIA. Hernandez-Perez, 911 F.3d at 314-15; Karingithi, 913 F.3d at 1161;

see Bermudez-Cota, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 447.

The Fourth and Fifth Circuits disagree and find the regulations provide a claims-

processing, not jurisdictional, rule. Cortez, 930 F.3d at 362; Pierre-Paul, 930 F.3d at 692.

The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits also hold that the statutory time requirement is a claimsprocessing, not a jurisdictional rule. Perez-Sanchez, 935 F.3d at 1154; Ortiz-Santiago, 924

F.3d at 963. Similarly, the Tenth Circuit holds that neither the statute nor the regulations

provide a jurisdictional rule. Lopez-Munoz v. Barr, 941 F.3d 1013, 1015-18 (10th Cir.

2019).

The First and Third Circuits reject that § 1229(a)(1) has jurisdictional significance

but do not decide whether the regulations do. Goncalves Pontes, 938 F.3d at 7 n.3; Nkomo,

930 F.3d at 134. In light of the fractured reasoning of the circuits’ decisions on the

jurisdictional significance of the statutory and regulatory definitions of “Notice to Appear,”

certiorari should be granted.

C. The Fifth Circuit’s restrictions on collaterally attacking removal orders in

illegal reentry prosecutions conflict with this Court’s precedent and violate due

process

The offense of illegal reentry depends on a determination made in an administrative

proceeding. § 1326(a); United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 837-38 (1987). The

government must prove the defendant is a noncitizen who “has been ... removed” from the

United States and later reenters the United States without permission. § 1326(a). Section

1326(d) provides that a defendant “may not challenge the validity of the deportation order

. unless” the defendant shows exhaustion of administrative remedies, deprivation of

judicial review, and fundamental unfairness. Due process, however, requires a defendant

be allowed to challenge the jurisdictional basis of the administrative order being used to

prosecute him.

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This Court considered the use of an administrative order to impose criminal

sanctions when selective service registrants, whose military inductions were ordered by

local boards, were prosecuted for refusing to be inducted into the military. Estep v. United

States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946). Even though the statute did not specify that defendants could

collaterally attack those induction orders, the Court could not “believe that Congress

intended that criminal sanctions were to be applied to orders issued by local boards no

matter how flagrantly they violated the rules and regulations which define their

jurisdiction.” Jd. at 121. The Court refused to resolve any statutory ambiguity against the

accused, noting that “w]e are dealing here with a question of personal liberty.” Jd. at 122.

Here, too, we are dealing with a question of personal liberty and an administrative

agency that acted outside the authority defining its jurisdiction. Congress limits any

challenge to the “validity of the deportation order” in § 1326(d), but that cannot be read to

remove the government’s burden to prove that a defendant has been removed. § 1326(a).

Just as a notice to appear without a hearing time is not a notice to appear, Pereira, 138 S.

Ct. at 2116, a removal order entered without jurisdiction is not removal order.

Alternatively, § 1326(d) is unconstitutional if it prevents a defendant from

challenging the jurisdictional validity of the removal order. To comport with due process,

petitioners must be able to challenge whether the immigration court lacked jurisdiction

even if he cannot satisfy the § 1326(d) criteria. The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Pedroza-

Rocha to the contrary, as applied to petitioners’ cases, conflicts with this Court’s precedent

in Estep.

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D. The Court should grant certiorari.

For decades, immigration authorities ignored the statutory requirement to include a

hearing time in the notice to appear. In the past two decades, well over 200,000 notices to

appear were filed on average per year.? Most of those notices lacked hearing times.

Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at2111. As aresult, millions of people have been deported by an agency

without authority to do so. |

Many of those removed came back unlawfully. Illegal reentry continues to be the

most prosecuted federal felony.* In fiscal year 2018, over 18,000 people were sentenced

for illegal reentry.” These prosecutions not only cost defendants their liberty, taxpayers

pay approximately $27,000 to detain a defendant for the average 10-month sentence.° The

number affected militates against leaving the agency’s deliberate decades-long violation of

a congressional directive unchecked.

3 See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), Statistics

Yearbook FY 2018, at 7, https:/Awww.justice.gov/eoir/file/1198896/download; U.S. Dep’t of Justice,

EOIR, FY 2013 Statistics Yearbook, at A7 (Apr. 2014),

https:/Awww. justice. gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2014/04/16/fyl3syb.pdf U.S. Dep’t of Justice,

EOIR, FY 2008 Statistical Year Book, at Bi (Mar. 2009),

hitps://Awww, justice. gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2009/03/27/fy08syb.pd& U.S. Dep’t of Justice,

EOIR, FY 2003 Statistical Year Book, at B2 (Apr. 2004),

https:/Awww- justice. gov/sites/default/files/eou/legacy/2008/04/18/fy03syb.pdf.

4 TRAC-Immigration, Immigration Prosecutions for 2019 (Oct. 31, 2019),

https://tracfed.syr.edu/results/9x705dbb47e5a0.html.

5 U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Quick Facts: [legal Reentry Offenses (Fiscal Year 2018),

https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/quickfacts/Ilegal Reentry FY18.pdf.

® U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Marshals Service, FY 2020 Performance Budget: Federal Prisoner

' Detention Appropriation 19 (Mar. 2019), https:/Avww.justice.gov/jmd/page/file/1144161/download

(daily non-federal facility cost in fiscal year 2018 was $90.17).

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For these reasons, the consolidated petition for certiorari should be granted.

Alternatively, if the Court grants certiorari in Pedroza-Rocha, No. 19-6588, the petition

should be held pending this Court’s final decision in Pedroza-Rocha and then disposed of

as appropriate in light of that decision.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Date: March 30, 2020

Respectfully submitted,

MARJORIE A. MEYERS

Federal Public Defender

Southern District of Texas

Attorney of Record

» JW

MICHAEL HERMAN

Assistant Federal Public Defender

Attorneys for Petitioners

440 Louisiana Street, Suite 1350

Houston, TX 77002-1056

Telephone: (713) 718-4600

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