Petition for Writ of Certiorari — In Re Aretha Townsend, Petitioner
Supreme Court briefJan 2, 2020
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IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON, D.C.
APPENDIX
[ATTACHED TO: “Petitioner Townsends”corrected “WRIT OF MANDAMUS”!
ATTACHMENT
rLi
7/L^
Aretha Townsend/Pro-se (IFP) Petitioner
P.O. Box 1197
Austell, GA 30168
(770)361-8359
APPENDIX A
The “Order”presiding Judge Michael L. Brown/District Court (State of Georgia)
“Order”dated August 16, 2019
!■
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
Aretha Townsend,
Plaintiff,
Case No. l:19-mi-00122
v.
Michael L. Brown
United States District Judge
District Judge Leigh Martin May,
Defendant.
ORDER
Under Order at 8, Townsend v. National Labor Relations Board,
No. l:18-CV-05750-LMM (N.D. Ga. Jan. 23, 2019) (No. 4), Ms. Townsend
is prohibited from filing any document in any matter before the District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia unless she is represented by
counsel or first obtains leave of the court. This is due to a history of
frequently filing frivolous complaints. On July 30, 2019, Ms. Townsend
filed an Application for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis. (Dkt. 1.)
On August 6, 2019, Judge Leigh Martin May recused herself from this
matter (Dkt. 2) and the Clerk submitted the Application to the
undersigned for review.
After reviewing the submission, the Court finds that the proposed
complaint is frivolous.
Therefore, the Court DECLINES to grant
permission for Ms. Townsend to file her proposed complaint (Dkt. 1-1)
and DECLINES to approve any request to proceed in forma pauperis
(Dkt. 1). The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this Order to
Ms. Townsend via certified mail, return receipt requested, to the address
she provided: P.Q. Box 1197, Austell, GA 30168. Receipt of delivery shall
also be maintained in the miscellaneous file.
SO ORDERED this 16th day of August, 2019.
Michael L. Brown
United States District Judge
2
.
i
APPENDIX B
(“Notice ofRecusal”) provided by District Judge Leigh Martin May (State of
Georgia)
“Notice”dated August 6, 2019
. i
4
Case l:19-mi-00122-MLB Document 2 Filed 08/06/19 Page 1 of 1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
ARETHA TOWNSEND,
Plaintiff,
v.
DISTRICT JUDGE LEIGH MARTIN
MAY, ■
CIVIL ACTION NO.
i:i9-mi-oi22-LMM
Defendant.
ORDER
The undersigned hereby recuses herself and DIRECTS the Clerk of Court
to reassign this matter in accordance with Internal Operating Procedure 905-1.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 6th day of August, 2019.
lAff) 1 (IAtPvw
Leigh Martin May
1
_______
UniteciStafesDistrict Judge
APPENDIX C
(“Writ of Certiorari”,' to include attachment—APPENDIX) filed by “Petitioner’)
Docketed July 30, 2019
APPENDIX D
■«
[The “Order” presiding District Judge Leigh Martin May; dated January 23, 2019]
(Attached as Record ofEvidence] attached to Appendix)
Case l:18-cv-05750-LMM Document 4 Filed 01/23/19 Page lot 8
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
ARETHA TOWNSEND,
Plaintiff,
v.
CIVIL ACTION NO.
i:i8-CV-05750-LMM
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD,
Defendant.
ORDER
This case comes before the Court on a frivolity determination pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). On January 2, 2019, Magistrate Judge Catherine M.
Salinas granted Plaintiff in forma pauperis status for the purpose of allowing a
frivolity determination. The case was then transferred to the undersigned on
January 2, 2019. After due consideration, the Court enters the following Order:
I.
LEGAL STANDARD
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) requires a federal court to dismiss an action if it
(1) is frivolous or malicious, or (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. The purpose of Section 1915(e)(2) is “to discourage the filing of, and
waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits that paying
.
litigants generally do not initiate because of the costs of bringing suit and because
of the threat of sanctions for bringing vexatious suits under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11.” Nejtzke.y,,,,Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). A dismissal
Case l:18-cv-05750-LMM Document 4 Filed 01/23/19 Page 2 of 8
pursuant to Section 1915(e)(2) may be made sua sponte by the Court prior to the
issuance of process, so as to spare prospective defendants the inconvenience and
expense of answering frivolous complaints. Id at 324.
A claim is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in
fact.” Id. at 325. In other words, a complaint is frivolous when it “has little or no
chance of success —for example, when it appears “from the face of the complaint
that the factual allegations are clearly baseless [,] the legal theories are
indisputably meritless,” or “seeks to enforce a right that clearly does not exist.”
£a.i roily.. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993) (internal quotations omitted);
see Neltzke, 490 U.S. at 327. Claims premised on allegations that are “fanciful” or
“fantastic” are subject to dismissal for frivolity. Denton v. Herrmndpy. 504 U.S.
25, 32 (1992) (quoting Meiteke, 490 U.S. at 325). In the context of a frivolity
determination, the Court’s authority to “‘pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual
allegations means that a court is not bound, as it usually is when making a
determination based solely on the pleadings, to accept without question the truth
of the plaintiffs allegations.” Denton. 564 U.S. at 32 (quoting Neitzke. 490 U.S.
at 325).
A complaint fails to state a claim when it does not include “enough factual
matter (taken as true)” to “give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is
and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corn, v. Twnmhlv. 550 U.S.
544,555-56 (2007) (noting that “[fjactual allegations must be enough to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level,” and the complaint “must contain
Case l:18-cv-05750-LMM Document 4 Filed 01/23/19 Page 3 of 8
something more .. . than . . . statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion
[of] a legally cognizable right of action”); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 u.S. 662,
680-685 (2009); Qxfoj;cLAssetJlgmt. v. Jaharis. 297 F.3d 1182,1187-88 (11th
Cir. 2002) (stating that “conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of
facts[,] or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal”).
While the Federal Rules do not require specific facts to be pled for every element
of a claim or that claims be pled with precision, “it is still necessary that a
complaint contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the
material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal
theory.’” Fin. Sec. Assurance. Inc, v. Stephens. Inc.. 500 F.3d 1276,1282-83 (nth
Cir. 2007). A plaintiff is required to present “more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” and “‘naked assertion^]’ devoid of
‘further factual enhancement’” do not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting
Tjyembly, 550 U.S. at 555).
The Court recognizes that Plaintiff is appearing pro se. Thus, the
Complaint is more leniently construed and “held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus. 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Tannenbaum v. United States.
148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). However, nothing in that leniency excuses a
plaintiff from compliance with threshold requirements of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. See Moon y. Newsome. 863 F.2d 835, 837 (nth Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 863 (1989). Neither does this leniency require or allow courts
3
Case l:18-cv-05750-LMM Document 4 Filed 01/23/19 Page 4 of 8
“to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading [by a pro se litigant] in order to
sustain an action.” Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd.. 760 F.3d 1165,1169 (nth Cir.
2014) (quoting GJR Invs., Inc, v, Ctv, of Escambia. 132 F.3d 1359,1369 (11th Cir.
1998)).
II.
DISCUSSION
On August 29, 2016, Plaintiff filed an action in this district seeking review
of the decision by the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board
(“General Counsel”) not to issue a complaint on her behalf. See Townsend v.
NLRB, No. i:i6-cv-3i69-WSD (N.D. Ga.) (“Townsend I”L On April 26, 2017, the
Court dismissed Plaintiffs action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) because
the General Counsel s decision to decline to file a complaint is unreviewable by
federal courts. Townsendl, Dkt. No. [5] at 3. Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal on
May 5, 2017 and filed an application to appeal in forma pauperis (Plaintiffs
“application”) on May 19, 2017. Townsend L Dkt. Nos. [11,12]. The Court denied
Plaintiffs application because Plaintiffs appeal was “not taken in good faith” as it
lacked an affidavit reciting the issues to be reviewed upon appeal and was not
“capable of being convincingly argued.” Townsend I. Dkt. No. [12] at 3-4.
A. Motion for Reconsideration
Plaintiff seeks review of the order in Townsend I dismissing her application
to appeal in forma pauperis. Dkt. No. [3] at 1. After thoroughly reviewing the
Complaint, the Court construes Plaintiffs self-styled “Wrongful Dismissal” and
“Amended Redress . .. and Reply Brief as a Motion for Reconsideration
4
Case l:18-cv-05750-LMM Document 4 Filed 01/23/19 Page 5 of 8
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 6o(b). See Dkt. No. [3] at 1,18, 25. However, a
“motion for relief from final judgment [under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)] must be filed
in the district court and in the action in which the original judgment was
entered.” Bankers Mortg. Co. v. United States. 423 F.2d 73, 78 (5th Cir. 1970).
Plaintiffs Motion fails because she filed her Motion in a different action than the
one for which she seeks review. Id.
Plaintiffs Complaint can also be construed liberally as an independent
action for relief pursuant to the “savings clause” in Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(1).
However, relief under this provision is “reserved for those cases of‘injustices
which, in certain instances, are deemed sufficiently gross to demand a departure’
from rigid adherence to the doctrine of res judicata.” United States v. Beecerlv.
524 U.S. 38, 46 (1998) (quoting Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co..
322 U.S. 238, 244 (1944)). Further, “[an] independent action can not be made a
vehicle for the relitigation of issues.” Bankers Mortg. Co.. 423 F.2d at 79. A party
may not use an independent action to argue “issues that were open to litigation in
thefoFmer actiori%v3feTe he had'a^faif oppoftifnlfy't6_make'HiFcraim dr defense in
that action.” Id.; see also Gonzalez v. Sec’v for Dep’t of.Corf.. 366 F.3d 1253, 129192 (11th Cir. 2004) (explaining that Rule 6o’s savings clause “was never intended
to permit parties to relitigate the merits of claims or defenses, or to raise new
claims or defenses that could have been asserted during the litigation of the
case.”). In Plaintiff s notice of appeal of the Townsend I Court’s dismissal of her
original complaint, Plaintiff alleged that the General Counsel’s “unreviewable
5
Case l:18-cv-05750-LMM Document 4 Filed 01/23/19 Page 6 of 8
discretion” was unconstitutional. Townsend I. Dkt. No. [7] at 5. Plaintiff
reiterates the very same argument as her basis for requesting the Court to
reconsider the denial of her previous application. Dkt. No. [3] at 11. Plaintiff
cannot use Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d) as a vehicle for relitigating claims that failed in a
previous matter. Bankers Mortg. Co.. 423 F.2d. at 79.
B. Filing Restriction
Pursuant to the All Writs Act, district courts may enjoin litigants with a
documented history of abusive litigation practices from pursuing further actions.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a); Vendo Co. v. Lekto-Vend Corp.. 433 U.S. 623, 639 n.9
(1977) (“Federal courts are able to enjoin future repetitive litigation.”). The
Eleventh Circuit has explained:
The [All Writs] Act allows courts to safeguard not only ongoing
proceedings, but potential future proceedings, as well as alreadyissued orders and judgments. This includes the power to enjoin
litigants who are abusing the court system by harassing their
opponents. A court has a responsibility to prevent single litigants from
unnecessarily encroaching on the judicial machinery needed by
others, and a litigant can be severely restricted as to what he may file
and how he must behave in his applications for judicial relief.
_
Maid, of the Mist Corp. v. Alcatraz Media. LLC. 338 F. App’x 940, 942 (11th Cir.
2010) (internal quotations'and citations omitted). Nonetheless, a litigant may not
be “completely foreclosed from any access to the court.” Id
The Court has reviewed Plaintiffs filing activity in this district. Since
August 2015, Plaintiff has filed suit against various Defendants in eight separate
6
Case l:18-cv-05750-LMM Document 4 Filed 01/23/19 Page 7 of 8
cases, including the instant case.1 All of these cases have been dismissed as
. fnvolous- Further, as she did in the present case, Plaintiff filed one of these suits
in an attempt to relitigate the same claims already raised and rejected in a prior
suit
No. i:i5-cv-2835-WSD (N.D. Ga.); Townsend
Staples, Inc,, No. i:i8-cv-2635-LMM (N.D. Ga.).
Because of Plaintiffs long history of filing frivolous complaints against
numerous defendants, the Court finds it appropriate to restrict Plaintiff from
submitting further pro se filings in this or any other matter in the Northern
District of Georgia without first obtaining leave of the Court. See Dinardo v. Palm
Beach Cty. Circuit Court Judge, 199 F. App’x 731, 735-37 (11th Cir. 2006)
(upholding a similar filing restriction where the plaintiffs in the action “had filed
seven different pro se lawsuits in the District Court for the Southern District of
Florida against various public officials and judicial officers over the preceding
year”); see_als,o Martin-Trigona v. Shaw. 986 F.2d 1384,1387-88 (11th Cir. 1993)
(“This Court has upheld pre-filing screening restrictions on litigious plaintiffs.”)
(citing Copelan.d y.„Gi-een, 949 F.2d 390, 391 tilth Cir. 1991) (per curiam) and
1 These cases include Townsend v. Staples. Inc.. No. i:i5-cv-2835-WSD (N.D.
Ga.) (filed Aug. 11, 2015); Townsend v. NLRB. No. H16-CV-3169-WSD (N.D. Ga.)
(filed Aug. 29, 2016); Townsend v. Waterford Point, et al.. No. i:i6-cv-46ioLMM (N.D. Ga.) (filed Dec. 15, 2016); Townsend v. Ga. State Revenue Dep’t. No.
i:i7-cv-oi52-LMM (N.D. Ga.) (filed Jan. 13, 2017); Townsend v. Rdnc. Memt.
Corp., et al., No. i:17-cv-o639-LMM (N.D. Ga.) (filed Feb. 21, 2017); Townsend v.
Staples, Inc,, No. i:i8-cv-2635-LMM (N.D. Ga.) (filed May 29, 2018); and
Townsend v. Capital One Auto’s, et al.. No. IH8-CV-3952-LMM (N.D. Ga.) (filed
Aug. 20, 2018).
7
Case l:18-cv-05750-LMM Document 4 Filed 01/23/19 Page 8 of 8
Cofield v.AlaJPub. Serv. Comm,, 936 F.2d 512, 517-18 (11th Cir. 1991)). The
Court finds that this restriction appropriately balances Plaintiffs right of access
to the courts with the Court’s need to manage its docket and limit abusive filings.
See Cofield, 936 F.2d at 517 (citing In re McDonald. 489 U.S. 180 (1989) (per
curiam)).
Accordingly, the Clerk is DIRECTED to DISMISS this action
WITHOUT PREJUDICE as frivolous. The Clerk is DIRECTED to CLOSE
this case.
In light of Plaintiff s documented history of frequent and frivolous
litigation, IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff must either be
represented by counsel or obtain leave of court before filing any documents in
this matter or in any other matter before the Northern District of Georgia. The
Clerk’s Office is DIRECTED to submit any document that Plaintiff wishes to file
to the Court for preliminary review.
IT IS SO ORDERED this ^ day of January, 2019.
f
Xb(\ If
/
Leigli Martin May
United States District Judge
8
Case l:18-cv-05750-LMM Document 4 Filed 01/23/19 Page 1 of 8
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
ARETHA TOWNSEND,
Plaintiff,
v.
CIVIL ACTION NO.
i:i8-CV-05750-LMM
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD,
Defendant.
ORDER
This case comes before the Court on a frivolity determination pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). On January 2, 2019, Magistrate Judge Catherine M.
Salinas granted Plaintiff in forma pauperis status for the purpose of allowing a
frivolity determination. The case was then transferred to the undersigned on
January 2, 2019. After due consideration, the Court enters the following Order:
I.
LEGAL STANDARD
1
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) requires a federal court to dismiss an action if it
1
(1) is frivolous or malicious, or (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. The purpose of Section 1915(e)(2) is “to discourage the filing of, and
waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits that paying
litigants generally do not initiate because of the costs of bringing suit and because
of the threat of sanctions for bringing vexatious suits under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11.” Neitzke v. Williams. 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). A dismissal
Case l:18-cv-05750-LMM Document 4 Filed 01/23/19 Page 2 of 8
pursuant to Section 1915(e)(2) may be made sua sponte by the Court prior to the
issuance of process, so as to spare prospective defendants the inconvenience and
expense of answering frivolous complaints. Id at 324.
A claim is frivolous “where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in
fact. Id at 325. In other words, a complaint is frivolous when it “has little or no
chance of success —for example, when it appears “from the face of the complaint
that the factual allegations are clearly baseless [,] the legal theories are
indisputably meritless,” or “seeks to enforce a right that clearly does not exist.”
Carroll v.
984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993) (internal quotations omitted);
see Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. Claims premised on allegations that are “fanciful” or
“fantastic” are subject to dismissal for frivolity. Denton v. Hernandez. 504 U.S.
25, 32 (1992) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325). In the context of a frivolity
determination, the Court’s authority to ‘“pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual
allegations’ means that a court is not bound, as it usually is when making a
determination based solely on the pleadings, to accept without question the truth
of the plaintiffs allegations.” Denton, 504 U.S. at 32 (quoting Neitzke. 490 U.S.
at 325).
A complaint fails to state a claim when it does not include “enough factual
matter (taken as true)” to “give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is
and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Coro, v. Twnmhlv. 550 U.S.
544, 555-56 (2007) (noting that “[fjactual allegations must be enough to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level,” and the complaint “must contain
(
Case l:18-cv-05750-LMM Document 4 Filed 01/23/19 Page 3 of 8
something more . .. than . .. statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion
[of] a legally cognizable right of action”); see also Ashcroft v, Iqbal. 556 U.S. 662,
680-685 (2009); QjrfordAsset Mgmt. v. Jaharis. 297 F_3d 1182,1187-88 (11th
Cir. 2002) (stating that “conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of
facts[,] or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal”).
Wlnle the Federal Rules do not require specific facts to be pled for every element
of a claim or that claims be pled with precision, “it is still necessary that a
complaint contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the
material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal
theory.’” Fin,.Sec, Assurance, Inc, v. Stephens. Inc.. 500 F.3d 1276,1282-83 (11th
Cir. 2007). A plaintiff is required to present “more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” and “‘naked assertion^]’ devoid of
‘further factual enhancement’” do not suffice. Iqbal 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting
Twombiv. 550 U.S. at 555).
The Court recognizes that Plaintiff is appearing pro se. Thus, the
Complaint is more leniently construed and “held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus. 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Tannenbaum v. United States.
148 F.3d 1262,1263 (11th Cir. 1998). However, nothing in that leniency excuses a
plaintiff from compliance with threshold requirements of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. See Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (nth Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 863 (1989). Neither does this leniency require or allow courts
3
Case l:18-cv-05750-LMM Document 4 Filed 01/23/19 Page 4 of 8
“to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading [by a pro se litigant] in order to
sustain an action.” Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd-. 760 F.3d 1165,1169 (11th Cir.
2014) (quoting GJR Invs., Inc, v. Ctv. of Escambia. 132 F.3d 1359,1369 (11th Cir.
1998)).
II.
DISCUSSION
On August 29, 2016, Plaintiff filed an action in this district seeking review
of the decision by the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board
(“General Counsel1’) not to issue a complaint on her behalf. See Townsend v.
NLRB, No. i:i6-cv-3i69-WSD (N.D. Ga.) (“Townsend I”). On April 26, 2017, the
Court dismissed Plaintiff s action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) because
the General Counsel’s decision to decline to file a complaint is unreviewable by
federal courts. Townsend I. Dkt. No. [5] at 3. Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal on
May 5, 2017 and filed an application to appeal informa pauperis (Plaintiffs
“application”) on May 19, 2017. Townsend I. Dkt. Nos. [n, 12]. The Court denied
Plaintiffs application because Plaintiffs appeal was “not taken in good faith” as it
lacked an affidavit reciting the issues to be reviewed upon appeal and was not
“capable of being convincingly argued.” Townsend I. Dkt. No. [12] at 3-4.
A. Motion for Reconsideration
Plaintiff seeks review of the order in Townsend I dismissing her application
to appeal in forma pauperis. Dkt. No. [3] at 1. After thoroughly reviewing the
Complaint, the Court construes Plaintiffs self-styled “Wrongful Dismissal” and
“Amended Redress ... and Reply Brief’ as a Motion for Reconsideration
4
Case l:18-cv-05750-LMM Document 4 Filed 01/23/19 Page 5 of 8
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 6o(b). See Dkt. No. [3] at 1,18, 25. However, a
“motion for relief from final judgment [under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)] must be filed
in the district court and in the action in which the original judgment was
entered.” BankersMprtg. Co. v. United States. 423 F.2d 73, 78 (5th Cir. 1970).
Plaintiffs Motion fails because she filed her Motion in a different action than the
one for which she seeks review. Id.
Plaintiffs Complaint can also be construed liberally as an independent
action for relief pursuant to the “savings clause” in Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(1).
!
However, relief under this provision is “reserved for those cases of‘injustices
which, in certain instances, are deemed sufficiently gross to demand a departure’
from rigid adherence to the doctrine of res judicata.” United States v. Beggerlv.
524 U.S. 38, 46 (1998) (quoting HazehAtlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co..
322 U.S. 238, 244 (1944)). Further, “[an] independent action can not be made a
vehicle for the relitigation of issues.” Bankers Morte. Co.. 423 F.2d at 79. A party
may not use an independent action to argue “issues that were open to litigation in
the former action where he had a fair opportunity to make his claim or defense in
that action.” IdL; see also Gonzalez v. Sec’v for Dep’t of Corr.. 366 F.3d 1253,129192 (11th Cir. 2004) (explaining that Rule 6o’s savings clause “was never intended
to permit parties to relitigate the merits of claims or defenses, or to raise new
claims or defenses that could have been asserted during the litigation of the
case.”). In Plaintiffs notice of appeal of the Townsend I Court’s dismissal of her
original complaint, Plaintiff alleged that the General Counsel’s “unreviewable
5
Case l:18-cv-05750-LMM Document 4 Filed 01/23/19 Page 6 of 8
discretion” was unconstitutional. Townsend I. Dkt. No. [7] at 5. Plaintiff
reiterates the very same argument as her basis for requesting the Court to
reconsider the denial of her previous application. Dkt. No. [3] at 11. Plaintiff
cannot use Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d) as a vehicle for relitigating claims that failed in a
previous matter. Bankers Mortg. Co.. 423 F.2d. at 79.
B. Filing Restriction
Pursuant to the All Writs Act, district courts may enjoin litigants with a
documented history of abusive litigation practices from pursuing further actions.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a); Vendo Co. v. Lekto-Vend Corp.. 433 U.S. 623, 639 n.9
(1977) (“Federal courts are able to enjoin future repetitive litigation.”). The
Eleventh Circuit has explained:
The [All Writs] Act allows courts to safeguard not only ongoing
proceedings, but potential future proceedings, as well as alreadyissued orders and judgments. This includes the power to enjoin
litigants who are abusing the court system by harassing their
opponents. A court has a responsibility to prevent single litigants from
unnecessarily encroaching on the judicial machinery needed by
others, and a litigant can be severely restricted as to what he may file
--““aiid-how^he-mnsrtehavedirhis^applimtionFTorllMicMTSliWf....
Maid of the Mist Corp. v. Alcatraz Media. LI-C. 338 F. App’x 940, 942 (nth Cir.
2010) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Nonetheless, a litigant may not
be “completely foreclosed from any access to the court.” Id.
The Court has reviewed Plaintiffs filing activity in this district. Since
August 2015, Plaintiff has filed suit against various Defendants in eight separate
6
Case l:18-cv-05750-LMM Document 4 Filed 01/23/19 Page 7 of 8
cases, including the instant case.1 All of these cases have been dismissed as
frivolous. Further, as she did in the present case, Plaintiff filed one of these suits
in an attempt to relitigate the same claims already raised and rejected in a prior
suit -See Townsend y^StaplesOnc., No. i:is-cv-2835-WSD (N.D. Ga.); Townsend
.w Staples, Inc., No. K18-CV-2635-LMM (N.D. Ga.).
Because of Plaintiffs long history of filing frivolous complaints against
numerous defendants, the Court finds it appropriate to restrict Plaintiff from
submitting further pro se filings in this or any other matter in the Northern
District of Georgia without first obtaining leave of the Court. See Dinardo v. Palm
B,eaeh Ctv. Circuit Court Judge, 199 F. App’x 731, 735-37 (nth Cir. 2006)
(upholding a similar filing restriction where the plaintiffs in the action “had filed
seven different pro se lawsuits in the District Court for the Southern District of
Florida against various public officials and judicial officers over the preceding
year”); seeako Martin-Trigona v. Shaw. 986 F.2d 1384,1387-88 (11th Cir. 1993)
(“This Court has upheld pre-filing screening restrictions on litigious plaintiffs.”)
(citing Copeland v. Green, 949 F.2d 390, 391 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) and
1 These cases include Townsend v. Staples. Inc.. No. i:is-cv-2835-WSD (N.D.
Ga.) (filed Aug. 11, 2015); Townsend v. NLRB. No. i:i6-cv-3i69-WSD (N.D. Ga.)
(filed Aug. 29, 2016); Townsend v. Waterford Point, et ciL. No. i:i6-cv-46ioLMM (N.D. Ga.) (filed Dec. 15, 2016); Townsend v. Ga. State Revenue Dep’t. No.
i:i7-cv-oi52-LMM (N.D. Ga.) (filed Jan. 13, 2017); Townsend v. Educ. Mgmt.
Corp., eta!., No. i:17-cv-o639-LMM (N.D. Ga.) (filed Feb. 21, 2017); Townsend v.
Staplesjnc,, No. i:i8-cv-2635-LMM (N.D. Ga.) (filed May 29, 2018); and
Townsend v. Capital One Auto’s, et al,. No. K18-CV-3952-LMM (N.D. Ga.) (filed
Aug. 20, 2018).
7
Case l:18-cv-05750-LMM Document 4 Filed 01/23/19 Page 8 of 8
Cofield Y^AlaJPub^Sery. Comim, 936 F.2d 512, 517-18 (11th Cir. 1991)). The
Court finds that this restriction appropriately balances Plaintiffs right of access
to the courts with the Court’s need to manage its docket and limit abusive filings.
See Cofield, 936 F.2d at 517 (citing In re McDonald. 489 U.S. 180 (1989) (per
curiam)).
Accordingly, the Clerk is DIRECTED to DISMISS this action
WITHOUT PREJUDICE as frivolous. The Clerk is DIRECTED to CLOSE
this case.
In light of Plaintiffs documented history of frequent and frivolous
litigation, IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff must either be
represented by counsel or obtain leave of court before filing any documents in
this matter or in any other matter before the Northern District of Georgia. The
Clerk’s Office is DIRECTED to submit any document that Plaintiff wishes to file
to the Court for preliminary review.
IT IS SO ORDERED this
day of January, 2019.
f
!bk^.
Leigh Martin May jj
United States District Judge
8
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
ARETHA TOWNSEND,
Plaintiff,
v.
EDUCATION MANAGEMENT CORP.,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
AND FMS INVESTMENTS CORP.
CIVIL ACTION NO.
i:17-CV-oo639-LMM
Defendants.
ORDER
This case comes before the Court on a frivolity determination pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). On February 22, 2017, Magistrate Judge Catherine M.
Salinas granted Plaintiff in forma pauperis status for the purpose of allowing a
frivolity determination. The case was then transferred to the undersigned on July
2, 2018. For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds Plaintiffs Complaint is
frivolous.
I.
LEGAL STANDARD
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) requires a federal court to dismiss an action if it (1)
is frivolous or malicious, or (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. The purpose of Section 1915(e)(2) is “to discourage the filing of, and
waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits that paying
litigants generally do not initiate because of the costs of bringing suit and because
of the threat of san ctions for bringing vexatious suits under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11.” Neltzkey. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). A dismissal
pursuant to Section 1915(e)(2) may be made sua sponte by the Court prior to the
issuance of process, so as to spare prospective defendants the inconvenience and
expense of answering frivolous complaints. Id- at 324.
A claim is frivolous “where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in
fact.” IdL at 325. In other words, a complaint is frivolous when it “has little or no
ch ance of success”—for example, when it appears “from the face of the complaint
that the factual allegations are clearly baseless[J the legal theories are
indisputably meritless,” or “seeks to enforce a right that clearly does not exist.”
[
Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993) (internal quotations omitted);
see Nejtzke, 490 U.S. at 327. Claims premised on allegations that are “fanciful” or
“fantastic” are subject to dismissal for frivolity. Denton v. Hernandez. 504 U.S.
25, 32 (1992) (quoting Ngjtzkg, 490 U.S. at 325). In the context of a frivolity
determination, the Court’s authority to “‘pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual
allegations’ means that a court is not bound, as it usually is when making a
Hdetermination based solely on the pleadings, to accept without question the truth
of the plaintiffs allegations.” Denton, 504 U.S. at 32 (quoting Neitzke. 490 U.S.
at 325).
A complaint fails to state a claim when it does not include “enough factual
matter (taken as true)” to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . .. claim is
and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corn, v. Twomblv. 550 U.S.
544, 555~56 (2007) (noting that “[fjactual allegations must be enough to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level,” and the complaint “must contain
something more . .. than ... statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion
[of] a legally cognizable right of action”); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal 556 U.S. 662,
680-685 (2009); Oxford Asset Memt. v. Jaharis. 297F.3d 1182, 1187-88 (11th
Cir. 2002) (stating that “conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of
facts[,] or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal”).
While the Federal Rules do not require specific facts to be pled for every element
of a claim or that claims be pled with precision, “it is still necessary that a
complaint ‘contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the
material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal
theory.’” Fin, Sec. Assurance. Inc, v, Stephens. Inc.. 500 F.3d 1276,1282-83 (11th
Cir. 2007). A plaintiff is required to present “more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” and ‘“naked assertion[s]’ devoid of
‘further factual enhancement’” do not suffice. Iqbal. 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting
Twomblv. 550 U.S. at 555).
The Court recognizes that Plaintiff is appearing pro se. Thus, the
Complaint is more leniently construed and “held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus. 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Tannenbanm v. United States.
148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). However, nothing in that leniency excuses a
plaintiff from compliance with threshold requirements of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. See Moon v. Newsome. 863 F.2d 835, 837 (1.1th Cir. 1998), cert.
3
denied, 493 U.S. 863 (1989). Neither does this leniency require or allow courts
to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading [by a pro se litigant] in order to
sustain an action.” GJR In vs.. Inc, v. County of Escambia. Fla.. 132 F.3d 1359,
1369 (11th Cir. 1998).
II.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff attended the Art Institute of Atlanta (the “ALA”), owned by
Defendant Education Management Corp., from April 1993 to May 1994. Plaintiff
received three Federal Family Education Loans (FFEL) totaling $10,125.00 and
one Federal Perkins Loan in the amount of $1,261.00. Dkt. No. [3] at 65. On May
10,1994> Plaintiff was severely injured in a car accident which prevented her
from completing the last six weeks of the quarter. Dkt. No. [3] at 9, 73. Plaintiff
withdrew from the AIAon May 17, 1994 and alleges a financial aid representative
told her the loans “were forgiven.” Dkt. No. [3] at 9.
In 2000, Plaintiff received a phone call from the Federal. Direct Loan
Program, an affiliate of Defendant U.S. Department of Education, inquiring
about the outstanding student loan debt. Dkt. No. [3] at 10-11. According to
Plaintiff, a representative suggested consolidation of the student loans. Dkt. No.
[3] at 10. On April 24, 2000, Plaintiff applied for and received a Federal Direct
Consolidation Loan (“FDCL”) in the amount of $10,358.98. Dkt. No. [3] at 67.
Again, on October 19, 2003, Plaintiff applied for and received an FDCL in the
amount of $15,101.67. Dkt. No. [3] at 34,104. Plaintiff allegedly disputed the
4
validity of the underlying loans, but failed to raise those objections at the time
because she “was young and not knowledgeable.” Dkt. No. [3] at 10.
From April 2012 until November 2016, Plaintiff sent multiple letters
disputing the validity of the underlying loans to Defendants. Dkt. No. [3] at 7-12,
18-22, 25-29, 32-33, 36-38, 42-47, 48-49, 52-56. In each correspondence,
Plaintiff alleges the loans were forgiven in 1994 upon withdrawal from the AIA,
As such, Plaintiff alleges that the Federal Direct Loan Program used manipulative
tactics to encourage Plaintiff to apply for FDCLs on the basis of loans that
allegedly did not exist. Subsequently, the U.S. Department of Education
improperly reported that information to credit bureaus and debt collectors, such
as Defendant FMS Investment Corp.
Plaintiffs Complaint does not list any causes of action against Defendants.
Based on a review of the Exhibi ts, it appears at bottom Pl aintiff AIA “fail[ed] to
honor its word to “forgive the student loan debt,” or committed fraud. Dkt. No.
[3] at 85. According to Plaintiffs affidavit, the U.S. Department of Education,
therefore, committed fraud by using student loan debt that allegedly did not exist
after May 1994 to “manipulate” her into consolidating the debt. Dkt. No. [3] at
86. Plaintiff discovered AIA failed to forgive the loans when she was contacted by
the Federal Direct Loan program and, therefore, was aware of the basis for the
fraud claims against Education Management Corp., the U.S. Department of
Education, and FMS Investment Corp. in 2000. Dkt. No. [3] at 7. In Georgia, the
statute of limitations for fraud is four years running from the time of the
5
plaintiff s discovery of the fraud. Hamburger v. PFM Capital Mgmt. Inc.. 649
S.E.2d 779, 784 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007). Plaintiff knew about the alleged fraud in
2000 and, thus, the statute of limitations began tolling at that time. Dkt. No. [3]
at 10. As a result, Plaintiffs fraud claims are barred by the four-year statute of
limitations.
Plaintiff also appears to claim the U.S. Department of Education violated
the Fair Credit Reporting Act by misrepresenting Plaintiffs outstanding studentloan debt to credit reporting agencies. Dkt. No. [3] at 10-11. In compliance with
the Higher Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. § 1070 et. seq., the U.S. Department
of Education reported information to credit bureaus once Plaintiffs FDCLs were
declared in default. According to 15 U.S.C. § i68ip(i), the statute of limitations
for FCRA violations is two years from the “date of discovery by plaintiff of the
violation that is the basis for such liability.” At the latest, Plaintiff knew about the
alleged fraud in 2012 and, thus, the statute of limitations began tolling at that
time. Dkt. No. [3] at 10. As a result, Plaintiffs FCRA claims are barred by the twoyear statute of limitations. 15 U.S.C. § i68ip(i).
Accordingly, the Clerk is DIRECTED to DISMISS this action
WITHOUT PREJUDICE as frivolous. The Clerk is DIRECTED to CLOSE
this case.
6
IT IS SO ORDERED this
day of July, 2018.
S'
Leigh Martin May
United States District Judge
7
I
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
ARETHA TOWNSEND,
Plaintiff,
v.
CIVIL ACTION NO.
i:i7-CV-o639-LMM
EDUCATION MANAGEMENT
CORP., et al,
i
Defendants.
ORDER
This case comes before the Court on Plaintiffs Application fo:.
1
ve to
Appeal In Forma Pauperis [8]. On July 23, 2018, this Court dismiss d daintiffs
•f
Complaint without prejudice as frivolous. Plaintiff now moves this Court to allow
her to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.
J
Applications to appeal in forma pauperis are governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915
and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 24. In pertinent part, § 1915 provides:
(a)(i) [A]ny court of the United States may authorize the
commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or
proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without prepayment
of fees or security therefor, by a person who submits an affidavit that
includes a statement of all assets such prisoner possesses that the
person is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor. Such
affidavit shall state the nature of the action, defense or appeal and
affiant's belief that the person is entitled to redress.
;
(3) An appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial
court certifies in writing that it is not taken in good faith.
!
Similarly, Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 24 provides:
(1) . . . [A] party to a district-court action who desires to appeal
in forma pauperis must file a motion in the district court. The party
must attach an affidavit that:
(A) shows . . . the party's inability to pay or to give security
for fees and costs;
(B) claims an entitlement to redress; and
(C) states the issues that the party intends to present on
appeal.
(3) ... A party who was permitted to proceed in forma pauperis
in the district-court action . . . may proceed on appeal in forma
pauperis without further authorization, unless: (A) the district court-before or after the notice of appeal is filed—certifies that the appeal is
not taken in good faith . . . and states in writing its reasons for the
certification or finding....
Thus, both §i9i5(a) and Rule 24 make clear that two requirements must be
satisfied for a party to prosecute an appeal in forma pauperis. First, the party
must show an inability to pay. Second, the appeal must be brought in good faith.
i. Ability to Pav
The -Court has reviewed- Plaintiffs Application and finds that she does not
1
have an ability to pay the appeal filing fee.
2. The Good Faith Standard
:
But even if Plaintiff has shown an inability to pay, she would also have to
demonstrate her appeal is brought in good faith. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); Fed. R.
App. P. 24(3). A party’ demonstrates good faith by seeking appellate review of any
!
issue that is not frivolous judged under an objective standard. See Coppedge
2
United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962); Busch v. County of Volusia. 189 F.R.D.
687, 691 (M.D. Fla. 1999); United States v. Wilson. 707 F. Supp. 1582,1583 (M.D.
Ga. 1989), affd., 896 F.2d 558 (11th Cir. 1990). An issue is frivolous when it
appears that the legal theories are “indisputably meritless.” See Neitzke v.
Mlhams, 490 U.S, 319, 327 (1989); Carroll v. Gross. 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir.
1993); see also Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.sd 528, 531 (11th Cir. 2002) (an in
forma pauperis action is frivolous, and thus not brought in good faith, if it is
“without arguable merit either in law or fact”); Bilal v. Driver. 251 F.3d 1346,
1349 (11th Cir. 2001) (same). “Arguable means capable of being convincingly
argued.” Sun v. Forrester, 939 F.2d 924, 925 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam). Where
a claim is arguable, but ultimately will be unsuccessful, it should be allowed to
proceed. See Cofield v. Alabama Pub. Serv. Comro’n.. 936 F.2d 512, 515 (11th Cir.
1991).
Plaintiff s application states that her appeal grounds are as follows:
Lower Court judge failed to discern appropriately, the “reset”
-------- statutnryM:4ma™and-wr©ngfully*disinrissed-PliaintLffs’0omplaint:--------------Dkt. No. [8]. Plaintiff does not substantively challenge the Court’s prior holding,
that Plaintiff s claims are barred by the relevant statutes of limitations. Therefore,
Plaintiffs Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis [8] is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 24th day of August, 2018.
Leigh Martin May
United States District Judge
3
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 18-13560-H
ARETHA TOWNSEND,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
EDUCATION MANAGEMENT CORPORATION,
agent of Art Institute of Atlanta,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
and all associated names
other
Federal Student Aid
other
Default Resolutions Group
other
Ombudsman Group,
FMS INVESTMENTS CORP., (FMS),
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
— fortheNorthem District ofGeorgia
ORDER:
Aretha Townsend moves for leave to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis (“IFP”) in her
appeal of the district court's dismissal without prejudice of her pro se civil suit against the
Education Management Corporation, the U.S. Department of Education (uDOE”), and FMS
Investments Corporation (MFMS”) concerning the collection of her student loan debt Townsend
also moves for "summary judgment” on appeal and for appointment of counsel. Consequently,
the appeal is subject to a frivolity determination. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). "[A]n action is
frivolous if it is without arguable merit either in law or fact.” Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528,
531 (11th Cir. 2002) (quotation marks omitted).
Here, any appeal from the district court’s order dismissing Townsend’s suit would be
frivolous. The record supports that the district court properly dismissed all of Townsend’s
claims under the False Claims Act (“FCA”) because, as a pro se party, Townsend could not
maintain a qui tam action on behalf of the United States. See Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870,
873 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that a pro se relator cannot maintain a qui tam action under the
FCA). The record also supports the district court’s dismissal of all of Townsend’s claims under
the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”) because the FTC Act does not create a private
right of action. See Fulton v. Hecht, 580 F.2d 1243, 1248 n.2 (5th Cir. 1978) (“[T]here is no
private cause of action for violation of the FTC Act”).
To the extent that Townsend raised a state-law fraud claim arising from the DOE’s
actions in convincing her to consolidate her federal student loans in 2000, such a claim would be
barred by the applicable statute of limitations. See Hamburger v. PFM Capital Mgmt. Inc., 649
S.E.2d 779,784 (Ga Ct App. 2007) (stating that the statute of limitations for fraud in Georgia is
four years). Similarly, to the extent that Townsend raised a Fair Credit Reporting Act claim
based on the DOE’s reporting of her debt to credit agencies, such a claim was also barred by the
statute of limitations. See 15 U.S.C. § 168lp(l) (providing that the statute of limitations for an
FCRA claim is two years after the date of discovery by the plaintiff of the violation that is the
basis for liability).
The record supports the district court’s dismissal of Townsend’s Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (“FDCPA”) claims against the DOE because the DOE is not a “debt collector”
2
within the meaning of the Act Specifically, the principal purpose of the DOE is not the
collection of debts, nor does it collect debts on behalf of others. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).
To the extent that Townsend alleged in Claims 3 and 4 of her complaint that FMS
violated the FDCPA by offsetting her 2015 federal income tax refund, denying her hardship
waiver, or failing to process her student loan debt discharge application, Townsend did not plead
any facts alleging that FMS, as a third-party debt collector, possessed the authority to compel the
DOE to release her tax refund, or grant her hardship or discharge applications. Accordingly,
Claims 3 and 4 failed to state a claim against FMS that was “plausible on its face.” See Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (holding that a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter to allow a court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged
misconduct).
As to Townsend’s motion for “summary judgment,” summary disposition would be
inappropriate because, as discussed above, she has not shown that her position is clearly right as
a matter of law, or, because the district court did not err in dismissing her suit without prejudice,
that any substantial right of hers is likely to be prejudiced by delay. See Groendyke Tramp., Inc.
v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969) (holding that summary disposition is appropriate
either where time is of the essence or where “the position of one of the parties is clearly right as a
matter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the outcome of the case”).
Similarly, Townsend has not shown exceptional circumstances warranting the appointment of
counsel, where, as here, her appeal is frivolous.
3
!
Accordingly, Townsend’s motion for IFP status, on appeal is DENIED.
Townsend’s
(
i
motions for “summary judgment” and appointment of counsel also are DENIED.
!
I
;
m/v
;
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE
i
j
i
4
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
ELBERT PARR TUTTLE COURT OF APPEALS BUILDING
56 Forsyth Street, N.W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
David J. Smith
Clerk of Court
For rules and forms visit
www.cal 1 .uscourts.pov
January 25, 2019
Aretha Townsend
POBOX 1197
AUSTELL, GA 30168
Appeal Number: 18-13560-H
Case Style: Aretha Townsend v. Education Management Corp., et al
District Court Docket No: 1:17-cv-00639-LMM
This Court requires all counsel to file documents electronically using the Electronic Case
Files ("ECF") system, unless exempted for good cause.
The enclosed order has been ENTERED.
Pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 42-1(b) you are hereby notified that upon expiration of
fourteen (14) days from this date, this appeal will be dismissed by the clerk without further
notice unless you pay to the DISTRICT COURT clerk the docketing and filing fees, with notice
to this office.
Sincerely,
DAVID J. SMITH, Clerk of Court
Reply to: Gerald B. Frost, H
Phone #: (404) 335-6182
MOT-2 Notice of Court Action
x
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 18-13560-H
ARETHA TOWNSEND,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
EDUCATION MANAGEMENT CORPORATION,
agent of Art Institute of Atlanta,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
and all associated names
other
Federal Student Aid
other
Default Resolutions Group
other
Ombudsman Group,
FMS INVESTMENTS CORP., (FMS),
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
Before: TJOFLAT and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.
BY THE COURT:
Aretha Townsend has filed a motion for reconsideration, pursuant to 11th Cir. R. 27-2, of
this Court’s order dated January 25, 2019, denying her motions for leave to proceed on appeal
informa pauperis, for “summary judgment,” and for appointment of counsel in the appeal of the
district court’s order dismissing her pfo^se civil complaint as frivolous. Because Townsend has
not alleged any points of law or fact that this Court overlooked or misapprehended in denying her
motion, her motion for reconsideration is DENIED.
2
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
ELBERT PARR TUTTLE COURT OF APPEALS BUILDING
56 Forsyth Street, N.W,
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
David J. Smith
Clerk of Court
For rules and forms visit
www.cal 1 .uscourts.gov
March 13, 2019
Aretha Townsend
PO BOX 1197
AUSTELL, GA 30168
Appeal Number: 18-13560-H
Case Style: Aretha Townsend v. Education Management Corp., et al
District Court Docket No: 1:17-cv-00639-LMM
This Court requires all counsel to file documents electronically using the Electronic Case
Files ("ECF") system, unless exempted for good cause.
The enclosed order has been ENTERED.
Pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 42-1(b) you are hereby notified that upon expiration of
fourteen (14) days from this date, this petition will be dismissed by the clerk without further
notice unless the docketing fee is paid to the clerk of this court.
Sincerely,
DAVID J. SMITH, Clerk of Court
Reply to: Gerald B. Frost, H/lt
Phone #: (404) 335-6182
MOT-2 Notice of Court Action
Additional material
from this filing is
available in the
Clerk's Office.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.