Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Juan Alberto Cantu-Siguero, Petitioner v. United States

NO.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

JUAN ALBERTO CANTU-SIGUERO, JOSE GOMEZ-LOPEZ,

HORACIO GUTIERREZ-MURILLO, EDUARDO HERNANDEZ CASTELLANOS,

PEDRO PALACIOS GUEVARA, ODWAR GEOVANY PALOMEQUE-RAMOS,

JOSE ANTONIO VARGAS CASTRO, MARGARITO ZARATE-HERNANDEZ, and

JUAN DE DIOS TREVINO-VILLARREAL,

Petitioners,

Vv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

MARJORIE A. MEYERS

Federal Public Defender

Southern District of Texas

Attorney of Record

SCOTT A. MARTIN

Assistant Federal Public Defender

Attorneys for Petitioners

440 Louisiana Street, Suite 1350

Houston, TX 77002-1056

Telephone: (713) 718-4600

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether, in light of Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105

(2018), the immigration court issuing orders of removal against

each petitioner lacked jurisdiction to issue such orders, so that

use of such orders in a prosecution for illegal reentry violated

the separation of powers and due process.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

Petitioners were convicted in separate proceedings before the district court, and the

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit entered separate judgments in each of

their cases. Because petitioners seek review of these judgments on the basis of identical

questions, they jointly file this petition with this Court. See Sup. Ct. R. 12.4. All parties to

petitioners’ Fifth Circuit proceedings are named in the caption of the case before this

Court.!

DIRECTLY RELATED PROCEEDINGS

There are no other state or federal proceedings “directly related” to the cases. in this

Court. See Sup. Ct. R. 14.1(b)(iii).

' Tn the courts below, petitioners Gomez-Lopez and Palomeque-Ramos were also known

by the aliases listed in the captions in Appendices B and F.

il

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED 00.0... .eeecceccesceceecesseeeeseescesaeeacencesceaecneeseeesceaeeaesaeeaecasenetseearereaeens i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS... ccccssceccsessecseesceseeseeseeececaeeesseeaeeeseeseeseeeeeneaeeees il

DIRECTLY RELATED PROCEEDING. .........cccccccccsssssseessesseesessesseeseesenseeseeseeseeeesesaeens ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS ......ccccecccesesessensesceeesecseeeeeenecseesseseeaeeacsessaeaeeneesseesaesaeeesaesaeeecseees ili

TABLE OF CITATIONS ...0..eccccccesssceceseeseesesceseeecseesecsecseeseaesaescesesaeeeesesseeecesaeeeseecaeeesers vi

PRAYER ooo. ceeeecccccsscescesesseeseeseeesecaeeaeesecsceaessecsesaeeaecsecenecseesaeeaecaecseeseesenseeaeeaeeaesareaeseetateneeas 1

OPINIONS BELOW ...00....eccceccecceccesceseeseescesssecesccaeeasceseesecsecscecaeeneenaesaceaeeaeeeseeeaeeaeeaeettaeeaes 1

JURISDICTION 0.0... ceccccccesecseesceceeseseeseeceseeseseeseeseeeesecscesecsessessesaesceneeaceesaecaseeeseeaeeaeeesaeeees 1

CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY, AND REGULATORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED 1.00... cecececeesessccecceseeeecceneeseeeceaecaeesseeeeaessesaneaesaeeeceacenecseeeetareas 2

BASIS OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION IN THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 0... ccccccecceeseessceseesecseeseeeeeseesseseeseensseseeseeeesees 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 00... ccccecccssscesesseeeceeseesceaecseeseeaenesaesaeseeaeeaseecaesaeeeeeeeseseeaeees 3

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT o......cccccecceeceeeecceeceeceseeseceesecaesaeeeeeeteeeeeseneneens 5

The Court should grant certiorari to address the important issue whether, in

light of Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), the immigration court

issuing orders of removal against each petitioner lacked jurisdiction to issue

such orders, so that use of such orders in a prosecution for illegal reentry

violated the separation of powers and due process. ............ccccccecseseeseeeseetseeseenseneees 5

A. The decisions below in each case are incorrect and violate the

SParation Of POWEYTS. .......cccccccccscccssccsscessscccsssessseeessccssseesssesseessecesseeessessseeeeens 5

B. This Court should resolve a circuit split over whether, in light of

Pereira, the statutory definition of “notice to appear” defines the

jurisdiction of the immigration COULTS. ...........ccccceeeeseeseesseeseeseeeeesseeeeseenees 8

ili

TABLE OF CONTENTS -— (Cont’d)

Page

C. The Fifth Circuit’s restrictions on collaterally attacking removal

orders in illegal reentry prosecutions conflict with this Court’s

precedent and violate due Process. ..... cece seseeseeeetccseeeeeaeeeseeeseeesaeessesesaeens 10

D. The Court should grant certiorari. ......c.ccccescssesssssescseneeceseessnesseeesneesseseees 12

CONCLUSION vvesssssssssssssstsstnssiesssnsianiestsestsetsseastsssnes vevcsetenetenanseatisatiatese 14

APPENDIX A: Order of the Court of Appeals in

JUAN ALBERTO CANTU-SIGUERO 1... ceecseseseeseseessesseeseeaeessenassseeseesnesseseaseseanees 15

APPENDIX B: Order of the Court of Appeals in

JOSE GOMEZ-LOPEZ......ceeceesccsscseseeessenceesecseesseesecsssessessesesesssessesesescseseeessassseneseeseneanes 17

APPENDIX C: Opinion of the Court of Appeals in

HORACIO GUTIERREZ-MURILLO uci eececcsesssenecssessecnecsseseseecsseesesssssasenssssseesnees 19

APPENDIX D: Opinion of the Court of Appeals in

EDUARDO HERNANDEZ CASTELLANOS 0... ecccsssesecsecsssneesscssessansesssessssssseeseee 21

APPENDIX E: Opinion of the Court of Appeals in ;

PEDRO PALACIOS GUEVARA... ceceesecssestessertetsecseceeseeeseceacesesaaseaessasanssessracasseeeeees 23

APPENDIX F: Opinion of the Court of Appeals in

ODWAR GEOVANY PALOMEQUE-RAMOG.......ceccsssessssssereeesessesseeseeseseeseaseaseasens 25

APPENDIX G: Opinion of the Court of Appeals in

JOSE ANTONIO VARGAS CASTRO 0... ce cececcsssssecssessenscrseseesaseeassasessenssesnscnessesenees 27

APPENDIX H: Opinion of the Court of Appeals in

MARGARITO ZARATE-HERNANDEZ .....ecccseseseesesseetesseesessenecssecseeseceasenssneeseenetaees 29

APPENDIX I: Opinion of the Court of Appeals in

JUAN DE DIOS TREVINO-VILLARREAL 1... ei ceeeseseesecsecneseeecascnsassseseseeaseasesesnees 32

APPENDIX J: Order of the District Court in ;

JUAN ALBERTO CANTU-SIGUERO ...... oe eeccccceeeseeeeceeceseeeeeseeeenesseeenessacasoesensaees 34

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS -— (Cont’d)

Page

APPENDIX K: Order of the District Court in

JOSE GOMEZ-LOPEZ 0.....ececceccessescsceseeseeeceeccsececceseeseesecseeseeneceseseeeeaesaecaeeensateneeneseeears 35

APPENDIX L: Opinion of the District Court in

HORACIO GUTIERREZ-MURILLO ...0...ecececceeeecceceeeeeseeseeeceeeeeaeescesecsecseeeaeeaeeaeeseeasees 42

APPENDIX M: Opinion of the District Court in

EDUARDO HERNANDEZ CASTELLANOS 0... eceeeeesseeseeseceeceeeeeeeeeeaetaeeaeeaetetees 56

APPENDIX N: Opinion of the District Court in

PEDRO PALACIOS GUEVARA (0... iecccccccccscesseeeceseenseeesesseeeaeesseeseecseeeaeeeseseteeteneeaees 63

APPENDIX O: Opinion of the District Court in

ODWAR GEOVANY PALOMEQUE-RAMOG .........cccccecceeeceeeeeeseeeeeeeetsetaeeaeeseeaenees 75

APPENDIX P: Opinion of the District Court in

JOSE ANTONIO VARGAS CASTRO 0... ceceecesseeseeesececeeeeeneceeeeaeeeeseaeeeneeeneeaeeaeeas 78

APPENDIX Q: Opinion of the District Court in

MARGARITO ZARATE-HERNANDEZ ......eeeceeecescscceseeeteneeeceeseeseeeeeeeeseeeceeesseeateateee 80

APPENDIX R: Opinion of the District Court in

JUAN DE DIOS TREVINO-VILLARREAL uo. eeeceeestsescceceeseeseeseeseeesensceaeeaetaseeenes 83

APPENDIX S: Texts of Constitutional, Statutory

and Regulatory Texts Involved 0.0... eeeeeesceeeesseesseceseesseesseceeeesessseeneecseesseeeaesseeensenteaee 86

TABLE OF CITATIONS

Page

CASES

Ali v. Barr, 924 F.3d 983

(Sth Cir, 2019) occ cccescescesseessceseeeseceaeseseeeseseeeaecscecaecseecseseaecsnesseseaeeaeeeeeseeeseesseeneetaees 9

Banegas Gomez v. Barr, 922 F.3d 101

(2d Cir, 2019) occ cceeceecescsscesseseceesesessecseessessecseeseeseesaccesesecessessessessseaeeeseseesecseeeaeeateaeeeees 9

Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007) .....ceccccecceeseseseeesesseceececseeeenessaeecaaeeeeeesneeceaeeesteees 6

City of Arlington v. F.C.C., 569 U.S. 290 (2013) occ eeeeeeeeseeseeeseceeecneeeseeeneeeseeseeseeeneees 5

Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946) oo... cccccccccsccessseeseeceseceseesesneesteeseaeeeses 11-12

Goncalves Pontes v. Barr, 938 F.3d 1

(Ast Cir, 2019) occ cececeessceeesseeceseeeneceseeseecseceaeeseseaeeseeeseeaeceesseeeeeeseesaesaesseeeneees 9-10

Hernandez-Perez v. Whitaker, 911 F.3d 305

(6th Cir, 2018) oo. eee cccsscececcesecssceseesesecceaceseesesseesecaecseesecseceeceaesaeeeenseeseeseeneneaneneeaes 9-10

Karingithi v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 1158

(Oth Cir, 2019) eee cecccecceseecesceeseeceeeeeeeessesseeseeaeeaecsesaeeaceeesnecsecsecsasaseceaeesesneeeaeraeeateas 9-10

Lopez v. Barr, 925 F.3d 396 .

(Oth Cir, 2019) ooeeeeeccccecscesecseceeeesecsesseceaessecsecseceeceacsesceesecaceaesaeenessesseeaeeseeseenseeaesaeeeees 9

Lopez-Munoz v. Barr, 941 F.3d 1013

(LOth Cir, 2019) ooo cececseessecseeseeessecsneceeessensesaeeesesaeeeaeeseecseecsesaeseaeesseeeaeeseeeeeaees 10

Matter of Bermudez-Cota, 27 I. & N. Dec. 441 (BIA 2018) occ cceeeeesteeeneeeeneee 9-10

Nkomo y. U.S. Att’y Gen., 930 F.3d 129

(3d Cir, 2019) ooo ceececeecceseceeeceneceereseeeaeceeesseecaeenaceaesaessnsaessaessecseeeaeessaeeeeesneeenaees 9-10

Ortiz-Santiago v. Barr, 924 F.3d 956-62

(7th Cir, 2019) oie eeccceecescsseseceseecceseeseeseccsesesscesessceaessessessceseseecessseseeeseeseaeeateeeeeaees 8-10

Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018) oon eeeeeecceecceceeeseceeeeetseeeeeeeneeeeeeaeens passim

vi

TABLE OF CITATIONS — (Cont’d)

Page

CASES -— (Cont’d)

Perez-Sanchez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 935 F.3d 1148

(V1 th Cir, 2019) occ ee ececseceseseecceseeseeseeseeeeeseeseseesscesseeseceeeaessecseseeeeseeseeeeeeeeeeees 8, 10

Pierre-Paul v. Barr, 930 F.3d 684

(Sth Cir. 2019) ce cececsccesessecsecseeseesecsecseeseesessseessesesneevsecseeeseeseeaeeaeeneenseateaes 4, 6, 9-10

Santos-Santos v. Barr, 917 F.3d 486-91

(6th Cir, 2019) oe eesneenecseesseesessecseeeceessecseeseeseessesseceaseseesecseeneseeeeeesaseeceseeseeeeeeeseees 9

United States v. Cortez, 930 F.3d 350

(4th Cir. 2019) oc ceesecseessecsceeesecsesecesevsecseceesseseseseesseesesseseeeeeeseceaeeseesenaetaneaeens 9-10

United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002) .o...cecccccccccccsccssssceeesseeeesseecesseeeeesesssesenseeeeas 5

United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828 (1987) ....ecceeeccessessseseteeeseeeteeeeeenseeeeaees 10

United States v. Pedroza-Rocha, No. 18-50828, 933 F.3d 490

(Sth Cir. 2019), petition for cert. filed, (No. 19-6588) (U.S. Nov. 12, 2019)........ passim

Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302 (2014) ...ccecceccsccsssessseeseeesseeesseeseeeas 7

STATUTES AND RULES

8 CLELR. § 1003.13 oo eceeceessecsecseeeeeseesesesceseeseseessesanessecseeneessecnesaeesessteaeeseeseseeenaes 3,7

8 CLEAR. § 1003.14 (a) occ ee cccecsccsecsecsecseeseesseseesaceceeaesaeseeescessesseeeaeeaessecseserseetseeseeaeeaeeeees 7

8 C.F.LR. § 1003.15(B) ooo ee eeeeceseeecneesecseceeeeeeeeseesaeeeeseseeseeeeessenersecaeeneeseeseeeesates 6-7

8 CER. § 1003.15 (C) cece eeeeeseesessesseeseeseceesseeseceecseenscesesnecsesecesceseeseeneseeesesaeesesseseaseeees 7

8 C.F.AR. § 1003.18 occ eee ccececcesesseesessesseesecseeseesesacssceeaeeseeeaessessaseeessecsesaesaesaeeaeseeeeaeaeeas 7

8 CLELR. § 1003.18(D) oie eeecceceeseesseesecseesseeacenesceeaesaesseeeaecaesseeeaeeaecsessaeeneseesesssssaeeaeaeeas 6

8 CLEAR. § 1103.14 (a) oo ee cceeecsecssesseeseeseeseeseesesaeeseesseeseceeecesseesesecesaesaseeseeseaseaeeneeaeees 3

Vii

TABLE OF CITATIONS — (Cont'd)

Page

STATUTES AND RULES - (Cont’d)

8 CER. § 1239.1 cceccscsssescscssssseessssssesscessvesessevecessussscesssvescsssuvecessansssesssssseesaveseasaeseessneeseene 7

BULS.C. §1225(b)(L) eesescsssssssssenneeeeeeeseen tie 6

B U.S.C. § 1228 (b) coeeccsssssssssssssssssssssvessssssssssssssscessssessessssssssssssestssesssssssssssssnnvessssesessssesen 6

8 U.S.C. § 1229 voecceccccssssscsssssssssssssnssessssssssssssssnsseussesssessssssssssvsissssesesessssssssuneestesseessssseesee 6

8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(L) essssssssssessssssssssveesssssessssssevessssessssssssssssssseestsssesssssssesssessevtseeeeee passim

8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(L)(G)(i) ceeseceesessesssssssssssssessvesssssssssssssssssveessssssssessssssssssuneeessesee ene 3,5

B U.S.C. § 1326. ceccccecssssssccssssssssssssssssvvvsecessssssssssvessssssssssssssssunsessessesssseesessssnunmessesessssen 2-3

B U.S.C. § 1326(0) crecceccssssssssssssssssnsevssecsssssssssssesessssssesssssnsssesesessseseesssssssanseeeesessssssn 10-11

8 U.S.C. § 1326(d) ceessessssssssssssssssssssvsssssssssssssvessesesssssssssssunsssssssssssssesssavsnsassvesessesseseen 10-12

8 ULS.C. § 13290 vavccccscsssssssssssssssssssssssvvsssesssssssssuesstssssssessssssssssnsuscssssesssssssssssnusveeesssssssssesen 2

18 U.S.C. § 3231 esccssscssesssssssssssssssssssssssvessssssssassssssveessssssesssssssssunvvesesssssssesesssssusvesssesesessen 2

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) cecssssssesssssssssssssssssssssssseeeees ssntntasntananananananananananussine 1

Sup. Ct Ro 1BLD ceececececccsssssccssessssssssvssseveessssssssssnscvsssessessssssssssnsvsvusssssssssssesssssssvensesssesessesen 1

Vill

TABLE OF CITATIONS — (Cont’d)

MISCELLANEOUS

Immigration and Naturalization Service and EOIR, Proposed Rules, Inspection and

Expedited Removal of Aliens, 62 Fed. Reg. 444-01, 1997 WL 1514 (Jan. 3, 1997)

Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996,

§ 309(c)(2), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat 3009 (1996)....ccscsssscscssssssssesssssssssseessseee

TRAC-Immigration, Immigration Prosecutions for 2019 (Oct. 31, 2019),

https://tracfed.syr.edu/results/9x70Sdbb47eSa0 html 0.0... eeeeeeceseceseceeeteteteteteseeeenees

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, EOIS, Statistics Yearbook FY 2018,

https://www. justice. gov/eoir/file/1198896/download .........c.ccseseceressesseeneereeseessen

US. Dep’t of Justice, EOIR, FY 2013 Statistics Yearbook (Apr. 2014),

https://www. justice. gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2014/04/16/fy1 3syb.pdf........

US. Dep’t of Justice, EOIR, FY 2008 Statistical Year Book (Mar. 2009),

https://www.justice. gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2009/03/27/fy08syb.pdf........

US. Dep’t of Justice, EOIR, FY 2003 Statistical Year Book (Apr. 2004),

https://www. justice. gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2008/04/18/fy03syb.pdf........

US. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Marshals Service, FY 2020 Performance Budget:

Federal Prisoner Detention Appropriation 19 (Mar. 2019),

https://www. justice. gov/jmd/page/file/1144161/download ...........:cccscesesesesesenenenesees

U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Quick Facts: Illegal Reentry Offenses (Fiscal Year 2018),

https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/quick-

facts/Ilegal Reentry FY18 pdf. oc eceseesesenenseeseeeeeeseeeceeeeecacececeeeeeaeaeeesseeeeeseees

ix

Page

seseseees 12

PRAYER

Petitioners Cantu-Siguero, Gomez-Lopez, Gutierrez-Murillo, Hernandez

Castellanos, Palacios Guevara, Palomeque-Ramos, Vargas Castro, Zarate-Hernandez, and

Trevino-Villarreal respectfully pray that this Court grant their consolidated petition for

certiorari.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in

petitioners’ cases are attached to this petition as Appendices A through I. The opinions and

orders of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas are attached as

Appendices J through R.

JURISDICTION

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issued its opinions on the

following dates: on January 10, 2020, for Mr. Gomez-Lopez; on January 29, 2020, for Mr.

Palomeque-Ramos; on January 30, 2020, for Mr. Palacios Guevara and Mr. Vargas Castro;

on February 3, 2020, for Mr. Zarate-Hernandez; on February 5, 2020, for Mr. Hernandez

Castellanos; on February 7, 2020, for Mr. Gutierrez-Murillo; on February 14, 2020, for Mr.

Trevino- Villarreal; and on February 17, 2020, for Mr. Cantu-Siguero. See Appendices A-

I. This petition is filed within 90 days after entry of judgment in each case. See Sup. Ct. R.

13.1. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS

INVOLVED

The texts of the relevant constitutional, statutory and regulatory provisions involved

are attached as Appendix S.

BASIS OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION IN THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

These cases were originally brought as federal criminal prosecutions under 8 U.S.C.

1326. The district court therefore had jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1329 and 18

U.S.C. § 3231.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In separate proceedings in the United States District Court for the Southern District

of Texas, petitioners were charged by indictment with the offense of illegal reentry of a

previously deported alien, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Each petitioner filed a motion

to dismiss the indictment in his respective case, arguing that, in light of Pereira v. Sessions,

138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), the prior order of removal and any reinstatement thereof was void

because the Immigration Judge issuing the order did not have jurisdiction to issue such an

order and that the use of such a void order violated due process. Specifically, each

petitioner argued that the “Notice to Appear” provided by immigration authorities alleging

the grounds of removal prior to issuance of the first order of removal did not state the time

and place at which removal proceedings were to be held and, in light of Pereira, such a

document lacking that information was not a valid “Notice to Appear” under 8 U.S.C. §

1229(a)(1)(G)G). Consequently, petitioners argued, the document did not vest jurisdiction

with the immigration court in light of regulations which provide that “[j]urisdiction vests,

and proceedings before an Immigration Judge commence, when” the Department of

Homeland Security files a notice to appear with the immigration court. 8 CFR. §

1103.14(a); see also 8 C.F.R. 1003.13. The district court denied the motion in each case.

see Appendices J-R, and petitioners timely appealed.

In all of Petitioners’ appeals, the Government filed a motion for summary affirmance

relying on the decision in United States v. Pedroza-Rocha, 933 F.3d 490 (Sth Cir. 2019),

petition for cert. filed, (No. 19-6588) (U.S. Nov. 12, 2019). In Pedroza-Rocha, the Fifth

Circuit held that the omission of the hearing time did not make the notice to appear

defective because the regulatory definition of the notice to appear (which does not require

a hearing time), not the statutory definition (which does), controls. Pedroza-Rocha, 933

F.3d at 497 (citing Pierre-Paul v. Barr, 930 F.3d 684, 689-90 (Sth Cir. 2019)). Even if the

notice to appear was defective, the later notice of hearing cured it. Pedroza-Rocha, 933

F.3d at 497. And the regulation requiring a notice to appear to be filed with the immigration

court was not jurisdictional. Jd. at 497-98. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit, relying on

Pedroza-Rocha, affirmed the judgment in each of petitioners’ cases. See Appendices A-I.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

The Court should grant certiorari to address the important issue whether, in

light of Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), the immigration court

issuing orders of removal against each petitioner lacked jurisdiction to issue

such orders, so that use of such orders in a prosecution for illegal reentry

violated the separation of powers and due process

A. The decisions below in each case are incorrect and violate the separation of

powers.

An agency’s power to act comes from Congress. City of Arlington v. F.C.C., 569

U.S. 290, 298 (2013). Courts must “tak[e] seriously, and apply[ ] rigorously, in all cases,

statutory limits on agencies’ authority.” Jd. at 307.

The notice to appear is such a limit. Congress specified that the notice to appear

must be served on every noncitizen in removal proceedings. § 1229(a)(1). It also required

that a notice to appear must have a hearing time. § 1229(a)(1)(G)(). The omission of a

hearing time cannot be cured; without it, the document is not a notice to appear. Pereira,

138 S. Ct. at 2116.

Without a notice to appear, the immigration court lacks authority to remove a

noncitizen. § 1229(a)(1). That is because service of the notice to appear is necessary for

subject matter jurisdiction — the immigration judge’s authority to preside over cases. See

United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002) (describing subject matter jurisdiction

as “the court’s statutory or constitutional authority to hear the case” (cleaned up)).

Immigration judges only have authority to decide cases in which the Department of

Homeland Security chooses to serve a notice to appear. § 1229(a)(1). In contrast,

immigration officials — not judges — can rule on a noncitizen’s deportability and inadmis-

5

sibility through certain expedited procedures when no notice to appear is filed. See, e.g., 8

U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1), 1228(b). The notice to appear confers subject matter jurisdiction by

defining the cases over which immigration judges preside. See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S.

205, 213 (2007) (“the notion of subject-matter jurisdiction obviously extends to classes of

cases ... falling within a court’s adjudicatory authority” (cleaned up)).

The government has sought to avoid this straightforward application of § 1229(a)(1)

and Pereira by arguing that the regulatory definition of a notice to appear, not the statutory

one, applies to the notice to appear required to start the removal proceeding. The

regulations do not require a hearing time. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.15(b), 1003.18(b).

In Pierre-Paul and Pedroza-Rocha, the Fifth Circuit agreed. By ignoring the

jurisdictional import of § 1229(a)(1) and finding “no glue” between the regulations and §

1229(a)(1), the Fifth Circuit distinguished Pereira and approved a two-step procedure: first

a notice to appear with no hearing time, and then a notice of hearing. Pierre-Paul, 930 F.3d

at 691.

But there is glue binding the statute to the regulations. Congress’s transitional

instructions recognize the jurisdictional significance of the notice to appear. Illegal

Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, § 309(c)(2),

Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat 3009 (1996) (making certain documents “valid as if provided

under [§ 1229] (as amended by this subtitle) to confer jurisdiction on the immigration

judge”). And the regulations incorporate the statutory jurisdictional limit by providing that

a charging document such as a notice to appear vests jurisdiction with the immigration

court. §§ 1003.13, 1003.14(a); see 8 C-F.R. § 1239.1.

The agency even acknowledged the need to “implement[ ] the language of the

amended Act indicating that the time and place of the hearing must be on the Notice to

Appear” and committed to providing a hearing time in the notices to appear “as fully as

possible by April 1, 1997[.]” Immigration and Naturalization Service and EOIR, Proposed

Rules, Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens, 62 Fed. Reg. 444-01, 1997 WL 1514

(Jan. 3, 1997). But the agency created an exception that hearing times could be omitted if

providing them was not practicable, such as when “automated scheduling [is] not possible

... (€.g., power outages, computer crashes/downtime).” Jd. at 449; see 8 C.F.R. §§

1003.15(b), (c); 1003.18.

Two decades later, “almost 100 percent of notices to appear omit the time and date

of proceeding[.]” Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2111 (cleaned up). The “where practicable”

regulatory exception swallowed the statutory rule of including the hearing time in the

notice to appear. And the Fifth Circuit sanctioned the agency’s attempt to rewrite the

statute. This violates the separation of powers. Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573

U.S. 302, 327 (2014) (agencies cannot “revise clear statutory terms that turn out not to

work in practice”).

B. This Court should resolve a circuit split over whether, in light of Pereira, the

statutory definition of “notice to appear” defines the jurisdiction of the

immigration courts.

Eleven circuits, as well as the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), have weighed

in on the proper definition of a “notice to appear” and the effect of a putative notice missing

a hearing time. The circuits are split on whether the statutory or regulatory definition of a

notice to appear governs, and whether a notice to appear is a jurisdictional requirement or

a claims-processing rule.

Two circuits hold that the statutory definition of a notice to appear applies to starting

a removal proceeding, but eight circuits and the BIA hold that the regulatory definition

does.

The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits, applying this Court’s reasoning in Pereira,

interpret § 1229(a)(1) as requiring the notice to appear used to begin removal proceedings

to have a hearing time. The Seventh Circuit rejects as “absurd” the government’s argument

that the notice to appear referenced in the regulations is not the same notice to appear

defined in the statute. Ortiz-Santiago v. Barr, 924 F.3d 956, 961-62 (7th Cir. 2019). The

Eleventh Circuit explains that, per § 1229(a)(1), Congress intended for service of the notice

to appear to “operate as the point of commencement for removal proceedings[,]” and “the

agency was not free to redefine the point of commencement{.]” Perez-Sanchez v. U.S. Att’y

Gen., 935 F.3d 1148, 1154 (11th Cir. 2019).

The First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits find that

the regulatory definition of a notice to appear, which does not require a hearing time,

applies for beginning removal proceedings.” Several circuits also hold that a later notice

of hearing cures any statutory defect. See Pierre-Paul, 930 F.3d at 690; but see Lopez v.

Barr, 925 F.3d 396, 405 (9th Cir. 2019) (a defective § 1229(a)(1) notice to appear cannot

be cured by a notice of hearing for the stop-time rule).

In finding that the regulatory definition controls, the First, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits

specifically defer to the BIA’s reasoning. Goncalves Pontes, 938 F.3d at 7; Karingithi, 913

F.3d at 1161; Hernandez-Perez v. Whitaker, 911 F.3d 305, 312 (6th Cir. 2018). The BIA

interpreted Pereira narrowly, limiting it to the stop-time rule, and approved the two-step

process of notice to appear without a hearing time followed by a notice of hearing. Matter

of Bermudez-Cota, 27 I. & N. Dec. 441, 443-47 (BIA 2018). The Seventh Circuit,

however, sharply criticized reliance on the BIA’s decision, which it found “brushed too

quickly over the Supreme Court’s rationale in Pereira” and failed to consider significant

legislative history. Ortiz-Santiago, 924 F.3d at 962.

Four circuits and the BIA believe that a notice to appear is a jurisdictional

requirement, but five circuits disagree.

The Second and Eighth Circuits hold that a notice to appear, as defined by the

regulations, confers “jurisdiction” on the immigration court. Ali, 924 F.3d at 986; Banegas

Gomez, 922 F.3d at 112. The Sixth and Ninth Circuits adopt similar reasoning after

2 See Goncalves Pontes v. Barr, 938 F.3d 1, 6-7 (1st Cir. 2019); Banegas Gomez v. Barr,

922 F.3d 101, 110-12 (2d Cir. 2019); Nkomo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 930 F.3d 129, 133-34 (3d Cir.

2019); United States v. Cortez, 930 F.3d 350, 363 (4th Cir. 2019); Pierre-Paul, 930 F.3d at 690;

Santos-Santos v. Barr, 917 F.3d 486, 490-91 (6th Cir. 2019); Ali v. Barr, 924 F.3d 983, 986 (8th

Cir. 2019); Karingithi v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 1158, 1161-62 (9th Cir. 2019).

9

deferring to the BIA. Hernandez-Perez, 911 F.3d at 314-15; Karingithi, 913 F.3d at 1161;

see Bermudez-Cota, 27 J. & N. Dec. at 447.

The Fourth and Fifth Circuits disagree and find the regulations provide a claimsprocessing, not jurisdictional, rule. Cortez, 930 F.3d at 362; Pierre-Paul, 930 F.3d at 692.

The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits also hold that the statutory time requirement is a claimsprocessing, not a jurisdictional rule. Perez-Sanchez, 935 F.3d at 1154; Ortiz-Santiago, 924

F.3d at 963. Similarly, the Tenth Circuit holds that neither the statute nor the regulations

provide a jurisdictional rule. Lopez-Munoz v. Barr, 941 F.3d 1013, 1015-18 (10th Cir.

2019).

The First and Third Circuits reject that § 1229(a)(1) has jurisdictional significance

but do not decide whether the regulations do. Goncalves Pontes, 938 F.3d at 7 n.3; Nkomo,

930 F.3d at 134. In light of the fractured reasoning of the circuits’ decisions on the

jurisdictional significance of the statutory and regulatory definitions of “Notice to Appear,”

certiorari should be granted.

C. The Fifth Circuit’s restrictions on collaterally attacking removal orders in

illegal reentry prosecutions conflict with this Court’s precedent and violate due

process

The offense of illegal reentry depends on a determination made in an administrative

proceeding. § 1326(a); United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 837-38 (1987). The

government must prove the defendant is a noncitizen who “has been ... removed” from the

United States and later reenters the United States without permission. § 1326(a). Section

1326(d) provides that a defendant “may not challenge the validity of the deportation order

.. unless” the defendant shows exhaustion of administrative remedies, deprivation of

10

judicial review, and fundamental unfairness. Due process, however, requires a defendant

be allowed to challenge the jurisdictional basis of the administrative order being used to

prosecute him.

This Court considered the use of an administrative order to impose criminal

sanctions when selective service registrants, whose military inductions were ordered by

local boards, were prosecuted for refusing to be inducted into the military. Estep v. United

States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946). Even though the statute did not specify that defendants could

collaterally attack those induction orders, the Court could not “believe that Congress

intended that criminal sanctions were to be applied to orders issued by local boards no

matter how flagrantly they violated the rules and regulations which define their

jurisdiction.” Jd. at 121. The Court refused to resolve any statutory ambiguity against the

accused, noting that “[w]e are dealing here with a question of personal liberty.” Jd. at 122.

Here, too, we are dealing with a question of personal liberty and an administrative

agency that acted outside the authority defining its jurisdiction. Congress limits any

challenge to the “validity of the deportation order” in § 1326(d), but that cannot be read to

remove the government’s burden to prove that a defendant has been removed. § 1326(a).

Just as a notice to appear without a hearing time is not a notice to appear, Pereira, 138 S.

Ct. at 2116, a removal order entered without jurisdiction is not removal order.

Alternatively, § 1326(d) is unconstitutional if it prevents a defendant from

challenging the jurisdictional validity of the removal order. To comport with due process,

petitioners must be able to challenge whether the immigration court lacked jurisdiction

11

even if he cannot satisfy the § 1326(d) criteria. The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Pedroza-

Rocha to the contrary, as applied to petitioners’ cases, conflicts with this Court’s precedent

in Estep.

D. The Court should grant certiorari.

For decades, immigration authorities ignored the statutory requirement to include a

hearing time in the notice to appear. In the past two decades, well over 200,000 notices to

appear were filed on average per year.? Most of those notices lacked hearing times.

Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2111. As a result, millions of people have been deported by an agency

without authority to do so.

Many of those removed came back unlawfully. Illegal reentry continues to be the

most prosecuted federal felony.* In fiscal year 2018, over 18,000 people were sentenced

for illegal reentry.> These prosecutions not only cost defendants their liberty, taxpayers

3 See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), Statistics

Yearbook FY 2018, at 7, https:/Avww.justice.gov/eoir/file/1198896/download; U.S. Dep’t of Justice,

EOIR, FY 2013 Statistics Yearbook, at A7 (Apr. 2014),

https://www- justice. gov/sites/default/files/eoi/legacy/2014/04/16/fyl 3syb.pdf; U.S. Dep’t of Justice,

EOIR, FY 2008 Statistical Year Book, at Bl (Mar. 2009),

https://www.justice. gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2009/03/27/fyO8syb.pdf U.S. Dep’t of Justice,

EOI, FY 2003 Statistical Year Book, at B2 (Apr. 2004),

https:/Avww. justice. gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2008/04/18/fy03syb.pdf.

4 TRAC-Immigration, Immigration Prosecutions for 2019 (Oct. 31, 2019),

https://tracfed.syr.edu/results/9x705dbb47e5a0.html.

> U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Quick Facts: Ilegal Reentry Offenses (Fiscal Year 2018),

https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pd f/research-and-publications/quickfacts/Hlegal Reentry FY18. pdf.

12

pay approximately $27,000 to detain a defendant for the average 10-month sentence.° The

number affected militates against leaving the agency’s deliberate decades-long violation of

a congressional directive unchecked.

For these reasons, the consolidated petition for certiorari should be granted.

Alternatively, if the Court grants certiorari in Pedroza-Rocha, No. 19-6588, the petition

should be held pending this Court’s final decision in Pedroza-Rocha and then disposed of

as appropriate in light of that decision.

® U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Marshals Service, FY 2020 Performance Budget: Federal Prisoner

Detention Appropriation 19 (Mar. 2019), hitps://Avww.justice.gov/jmd/page/file/1144161/download

(daily non-federal facility cost in fiscal year 2018 was $90.17).

13

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Date: February 26, 2020

14

Respectfully submitted,

MARJORIE A. MEYERS

Federal Public Defender

Southern District of Texas

Attorney of Record

py Se 6. Wek.

SCOTT A. MARTIN"

Assistant Federal Public Defender

Attormeys for Petitioners

440 Louisiana Street, Suite 1350

Houston, TX 77002-1056

Telephone: (713) 718-4600

Case: 19-20524 Document: 00515312335 Page:1 Date Filed: 02/17/2020

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

No. 19-20524

February 17, 2020

Summary Calendar vary

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

JUAN ALBERTO CANTU-SIGUERO,

Defendant—Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

No. 4:19-CR-78-1

Before DAVIS, SMITH, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Juan Cantu-Siguero appeals his conviction of illegal reentry after

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in

5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

15 APPENDIX A

Case: 19-20524 Document: 00515312335 Page:2 Date Filed: 02/17/2020

No. 19-20524

deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(1). Cantu-Siguero entered

a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion

to dismiss.

Cantu-Siguero contends that the district court erred in denying his

motion to dismiss the indictment. He contends that his original removal order

was void because the immigration judge lacked jurisdiction to issue it, given

that it followed a defective notice to appear that failed to specify a date and

time for the removal hearing. In the alternative, Cantu-Siguero contends that

he either satisfies or is excused from the 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d) requirements to

attack his removal proceeding collaterally.

Cantu-Siguero acknowledges that his contentions are foreclosed by

United States v. Pedroza-Rocha, 933 F.3d 490 (5th Cir.), petition for cert. filed

(U.S. Nov. 6, 2019) (No. 19-6588), and Pierre-Paul v. Barr, 930 F.3d 684 (5th

Cir.), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Dec. 16, 2019) (No. 19-779). He explains that

he has raised them on appeal to preserve further review. The government has

filed an unopposed motion for summary affirmance, agreeing that the points

are foreclosed under Pedroza-Rocha and Pierre-Paul. In the alternative, the

government requests an extension of time to file its brief.

Summary disposition is proper where, inter alia, the position of one party

is “clearly right as a matter of law so that there can be no substantial question

as to the outcome of the case.” Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158,

1162 (5th Cir. 1969). Because Cantu-Siguero’s arguments are foreclosed by

this court’s precedent, there is no substantial question as to the outcome.

See id. Accordingly, the motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, the

alternative motion for an extension is DENIED as unnecessary, and the judg-

ment is AFFIRMED.

Case: 19-20190 Document: 00515266427 Page:1 Date Filed: 01/10/2020

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

No. 19-20190

J 10, 2020

Summary Calendar anuary

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

JOSE GOMEZ-LOPEZ, also known as Pedro Antonio Trujillo, also known as

Mercedes Escalante, also known as Roberto M Escalante,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:18-CR-485-1

Before JOLLY, JONES, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Jose Gomez-Lopez appeals his conviction of illegal reentry into the

United States and was sentenced to 24 months of imprisonment and one year

of supervised release. He entered a conditional guilty plea to the indictment,

reserving the right to challenge the district court’s denial of his motion to

dismiss the indictment.

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH

Cire. R. 47.5.4.

17 APPENDIX B

Case: 19-20190 Document: 00515266427 Page:2 Date Filed: 01/10/2020

No. 19-20190

Now, Gomez-Lopez asserts, as he did in the district court, that his prior .

removal was invalid because the notice to appear which commenced the

proceeding was defective for failing to specify a place, date, and time for his

removal hearing. He contends therefore that the removal order is void and

that the Government cannot establish an essential element of the illegal

reentry offense under 8 U.S.C. § 13826. He concedes that this challenge is

foreclosed by United States v. Pedroza-Rocha, 933 F.3d 490 (5th Cir. 2019),

petition for cert. filed (U.S. Nov. 6, 2019) (No. 19-6588), but he wishes to

preserve the issue for further review.

The Government has filed an unopposed motion for summary

affirmance, agreeing that the issue is foreclosed under Pedroza-Rocha.

Alternately, the Government requests an extension of time to file its brief.

Summary affirmance is appropriate if “the position of one of the parties

is clearly right as a matter of law so that there can be no substantial question

as to the outcome of the case.” Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158,

1162 (5th Cir. 1969).

Pedroza-Rocha concluded that the notice to appear was not deficient,

that any such alleged deficiency had not deprived the immigration court of

jurisdiction, and that Pedroza-Rocha could not collaterally attack his notice to

appear without first exhausting his administrative remedies. 933 F.3d at 496-

98. Gomez-Lopez’s arguments are, as he concedes, foreclosed. See id.

Accordingly, the Government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED,

the Government’s alternative motion for an extension of time to file a brief is

DENIED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Case: 19-20393 Document: 00515301994 Page:1 Date Filed: 02/07/2020

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

No. 19-20393 February 7, 2020

Summary Calendar

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

Vv.

HORACIO GUTIERREZ-MURILLO,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:18-CR-563-1

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, HO, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Horacio Gutierrez-Murillo appeals his conviction for illegally reentering

the United States after being removed. He challenges the district court’s

denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment. He argues that the indictment

was invalid because the prior removal order was void due to a defective notice

to appear that failed to specify a time and date for his removal hearing. He

concedes that the issue is foreclosed by Pierre-Paul v. Barr, 930 F.3d 684, 689-

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH

Cir. R. 47.5.4.

19 APPENDIX C

Case: 19-20393 Document: 00515301994 Page:2 Date Filed: 02/07/2020

No. 19-20393

93 (5th Cir. 2019), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Dec. 16, 2019) (No. 19-779), and

United States v. Pedroza-Rocha, 933 F.3d 490 (5th Cir. 2019), petition for cert.

filed (U.S. Nov. 12, 2019) (No. 19-6588), but he wishes to preserve it for further

review. The Government has filed an unopposed motion for summary

affirmance, agreeing that the issue is foreclosed under Pierre-Paul and

Pedroza-Rocha. Alternately, the Government requests an extension of time to

file a brief.

In Pedroza-Rocha, this court applied Pierre-Paul to conclude that the

notice to appear was not rendered deficient because it did not specify a date for

the hearing, that any such alleged deficiency had not deprived the immigration

court of jurisdiction, and that Pedroza-Rocha could not collaterally attack his

notice to appear without first exhausting his administrative remedies.

Pedroza-Rocha, 933 F.3d at 496-98. Gutierrez-Murillo’s arguments are, as he

concedes, foreclosed. See id. Because the Government’s position “is clearly

right as a matter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the

outcome of the case,” Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162

(5th Cir. 1969), the Government’s motion for summary affirmance is

GRANTED, the Government’s alternative motion for an extension of time to

file a brief is DENIED AS MOOT, and the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

[OCR skipped on page(s) 31-110]

[Read from a scan; the first 30 pages.]