Petition for Writ of Certiorari — In Re Frank Deville, Petitioner

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SUPREME COURT

FILED

DEC 11 2019

Jorge Navarrete Clerk

S258993

Deputy

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

En Banc

FRANK DEVTLLE. Petitioner,

V.

COURT OF APPEAL, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION FIVE,

Respondent;

JANIES R. BLOCH et al., Real Parties in Interest.

The petition for writ of mandate is denied.

RECEIVED

FEB 2 4 2020

•FFICE OF THE OLERK

SUPREME COURT, U.S.

:

CANT! L-SAKAU YE

ChiefJustice

44

mm m mmi - new* &»»♦

FILED

Nov 21,2019

DANIEL P POTTER, Claris

Maria-Peraz

Deputy cterk

11/21/2019

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED. IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL.01?‘THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

■ SECOND APPELLATE-DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

FRANK DEVILLE,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

B291099

{Los. Angeles County

Stager. Ot. No. BC624734)

v.

JAMES R. BLOCH et ah,

Defendants and .Respondents,

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles

County, Michael L. Stern, Judge, Affirmed,

' Frank Deville, in pro, per-,, for Plaintiff and Appellant,

' Dechert, William W. Oxley and Nathan M. McClellan, for

Defendants and Respondents James R, Bolch, Phillip Dam.aska,

Ed Mopas, John Hogarth, and Paul .R, Hirt,-Jr.

Steptoe & Johnson, Jason Le vin and .Melanie A. Ayerh, for

Defendant and Respondent Exids Technologies.

*

.v

12

Plaintiff and appellant Frank Deville (Deville) appeals from

trial court rulings that sustained without leave to amend

demurrers filed by Exide Technologies (Exide) and certain of

officers and managers: James R. Bloch, Philip Damaska, Ed

Mopas, John Hogarth, and R. Paul Hirt, *. (the Inffividual

The trial court found the bulk of Deville s causes of

Defendants).

action, which allege he suffered harm from exposure to toxic

chemicals while employed at an Exide plant m Vernon,

California, were barred because the statutory workers

compensation scheme was the exclusive available remedy for

injuries suffered in the course and scope, of employmen . We

consider whether Deville alleged facts negating application of the

exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act

(Lab. Code, § 3200 et seq.).

I. BACKGROUND

A

Devilled Injury

“Because this appeal arises from a ruling on a demurrer,

we treat the demurer as a dmi.tting all properly pleaded material

facts. [Citations.]” (Shirk u. Vista Unified School Dist. (200?) 42

Cal.4th'201,206.)

Deville worked at Exide’s hazardous waste treatment and

storage plant in Vernon for 29 years . At that location, Exide

recycled automotive batteries, w Mch recovered the lead used in

the batteries. Deville was a forklift driver and furnace operator.

On April 24, 2013, the Department of Toxic Substance

Control (D'TSC) ordered Exide-to suspend operations m Vernon

because plant operations were causing discharge of illegal

amounts of lead into the air, water, and soil.

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2

Before operations at Exide’s Vernon facility were halted,

Deville experienced what he calls two “profound” health-related

incidents at work. On one occasion. Deville ltat consciousness

while cleaning one of the facility's furnaces. (Previously, Deville

had only experienced dizziness while cleaning furnaces; on

occasion, he had reported these episodes of dizziness to Exide‘s

management.) After regaining consciousness, Deville drove

himself to Exide’s medical facility where a doctor examined him,

advised him to consult with his personal physician, and told him

he could return to work the following day. On the second

occasion, which also arose in connection with cleaning one of the

furnaces, Deville felt dizzy, left the furnace, and went to a

restroom where he produced a urine stream that he says was

black in color.

B.

Demlle’s Lawsuit

In June 2016, more than three years after these two alleged

incidents and suspension of operations at Exide s Vernon plant,

Deville sued the Individual Defendants, alleging unspecified

injuries caused by exposure to lead and other hazardous

chemicals while working at the Vernon facility. He later added

Exide as a defendant.

Deville subsequently filed the operative first amended

complaint . It asserts six causes of action: negligence, negligence

per se, strict liability for ultrahazardous. activity,

misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment, private

1

The operative complaint does not say whether Deville told

anyone at Exide—either a manager, coworker, or a company

health care worker—about this second incident.

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3

permanent nuisance, and unfair competition (Bus, & Prof Code,

§ 17200). DeviUe alleged he was injured by defendants collective

(though not much was alleged regarding the role of the

failure

Individual Defendants) to properly use and store hazardous and

toxic substances at the Vernon plant, to disclose fully and

accurately the risks presented to human health presented y e

chemicals used at the plant, to remediate or clean up

contaminants, and to provide proper safety equipment and

.

training. As a result of defendants’ misconduct, Deville alleged

....

his health had been “slowly deteriorating” since operations at the

Vernon facility were suspended in 2013.

Although the operative complaint alleges defendants

concealed the “great danger” posed by various chemicals at the

plant, it does not allege defendants knew he had suffered a workrelated, injury. Rather, the operative complaint avers defendants

were aware of “injuries and damages suffered” by plaintiffs m

ot her cases brought against Exide, hut were only “aware of the

risk that [Deville] and other employees could have suffered and

were suffering” (emphasis ours) injury from work-related

chemical exposure. The operative complaint also does not allege

facts to suggest defendants concealed from Deville their

.

knowledge he had been injured or that this supposed injury had

been aggravated by any such concealment.

The Trial Court Sustains Defendants’ Demurrers

The Individual Defendants

L

In their demurrer to the operative complaint, the

Individual Defendants argued, among other things, that all of

Deville’s claims were precluded by workers1 compensation

exclusivity principles, he., that an employee who suffers an injury

C.

15 .

4

of his or her employment must seek

in the course and scope

redress through the no-fault statutory workers’ compensation

275. 283 [Labor Code section 3600 "establishes the exclusive

of the workers' compensation system by furnishing an

jurisdiction.

ivil liability for any injury sustained by

employer immunity from ci

an employee and his or her dependent arising out of and in tbe

course of his or her employment”].)

In opposition, Deville contended the Individual Defendants

fraudulently concealed “the dangers of working at the Facility5

and his claims were therefore excepted from workers5

compensation exclusivity principles under a statute that allows

employee to bring an action at law for damages against his or

an

her employer Iwjhere the employee’s injury is aggravated by the

employer’s fraudulent concealment of the existence of the injury

and its connection with the employment...” (Lab. Code,

1 3602, subd. (b)(2).) In the event the trial court

_ sustained the

,

demurrer, Deville requested leave to amend his complaint bu

„_ds irrelevant to the workers’ compensation exclusivity

on groun

He asserted he could allege facts concerning when he was

issue.

diagnosed with “brain damage and other medical issues” and .

when Exide “finally admitted to violating environmental laws.

In reply, the Individual Defendants maintained the La or

Code's fraudulent concealment exception apples only to

employers. The Individual Defendants argued further that

exceptions under the Workers’ Compensation Act for claims

against fellow employees would only arise under circumstances

not at issue in the operative complaint: injuries caused by either

18

.5-

4

»

:■

employee’s willful and unprovoked acts of physical

a fellow

aggression or a fellow employee’s intoxication.

?

The trial court sustained the Individual Defendants

demurrer without leave to amend. We know this only because

there is a minute order in the appellate record that states: The

demurrer to the first through fifth causes of action is sustained

without leave to amend based on the exclusivity issue. (Ill The

Court grants its own motion for judgment on the pleadings

regarding the sixth cause of action [i.e., the unfair competition

claim}. There is nothing to enjoin." The record does not include a

reporter's transcript of the hearing on the demurrer, nor does it

include a judgment of dismissal as to the Individual Defendants.

Eodde

2.

Exide separately demurred to the operative complaint,

making the same workers' compensation exclusivity argument

(among others) on which the Individual Defendants had

prevailed. Deville opposed Exide's demurrer by reprising almost

verbatim the arguments he had made in response to the

Individual Defendants’ demurrer.2 In addition, he similarly

2

In support of Ms opposition to Exide's demurrer, Deville

asked the trial court to take judicial notice of various documents,

including court records; DTSC reports regarding violations at,

and a “Closure Plan” for, the Vernon facility; and various records

from Exide's bankruptcy proceedings. The subsequent minute

order sustaining the demurrer does not indicate whether the trial

court granted or denied Deville's request for judicial notice. We

infer from the trial court's silence that judicial notice was taken

of the court and government records identified m Seville s

request. (Evtd. Code, § 456; Aaronoff v. Martinez-Senftner (2QUb)

136 Cal.App.4th 910, 918-919.)

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reprised his request for leave to amend on grounds immaterial to

workers’ compensation exclusivity.

The trial court sustained Bride's demurrer without leave to

amend and dismissed the case. Again, all we have is a minute

order reflecting the court’s ruling, and there is no signed

judgment of dismissal in the record.

^

Deville appealed separately from each of the trial court s

demurrer orders. We consolidated the appeals for decision.

II. DISCUSSION

The Individual Defendants’ demurrer was properly

ustained without leave to amend because the operative

complaint alleges the Individual Defendants were acting within

the scope of their employment and did not allege any facts that

would satisfy the two exceptions to workers’ compensation

exclusivity rules when individual defendants (as opposed to an

employer) are sued. Similarly, Exide’s demurrer to the bulk of

DeviUe’s claims was properly sustained because the operative

complaint does not adequately allege facts establishing any of the

elements of the fraudulent concealment of injury exception to

workers’ compensation exclusivity on which Deville relies to

maintain his action. Both in the trial court and this court,

Deville has proffered no facts to suggest he can amend his

8

The minute order states, in relevant part: “The demurrer

is sustained without leave to amend. [1] - * * The workersO

compensation exclusivity is not applicable. [1] The Court«-ders

this case dismissed.” In context, the reference to “not applicable

L an obvious typographical error and Deville does not contend

otherwise.

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7

pleading to avoid the workers’ compensation exclusivity bar. And

Deville has waived any challenge to the trial court’s ruling on his

unfair competition cause of action by failing to adequately

present the issue in his briefs. We shall therefore affirm.

A.

Standard of Review

"In reviewing an order: sustaining a demurrer, we examine

the operative complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges^

facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory.

[Citation.] If the demurrer was sustained without leave to

amend, we consider whether there is a ’reasonable possibility’

4

Deville moved us to take judicial notice of a number of

documents, none of which was presented to the trial court,

including various reports by and correspondence from Ul bC

regarding the Vernon facility and correspondence to Deville trom

Exide’s bankruptcy counsel and the department of Health. e

deny the motion. (Haworth v, Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal 4th

372, 379, fn. 2; Brosierhous v. State Bar (1995) 12 Cal.4th 315,

325-326.)

We also resolve the appeal on the merits despite Deville’s

appeal from the trial court’s orders sustaining the demurrers that

are, strictly speaking, non-appealable, rather than from final

judgments of dismissal, which are appealable. (Morest v.

Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2014) 224

Cal.App.4th 199, 203-204 [“To promote the orderly

administration of justice, and to avoid the useless waste ot

judicial and litigant time that would result from dismissing the

appeal merely to have a judgment formally entered m the teal

court and .., new appeals] filed, we order the teal court to enter

[two] judgmentjs] of dismissal nunc pro tunc as of the a e[sj1°

the orderrs] [sustaining defendants’ respective demurrers withou

leave to amend], and we will construe the notice[s] of appeal to

refer to th[ose] judgment[sf] (Mores),)

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8

that the defect in the complaint could be cured by amendment.

[Citation ] The burden is on plaintiffs to prove that amen en

could cure the defect. [Citation.]* {King V-Comariners, Inc.

(2018) 5 Cal.Sth 10.39, 1050.)

B.

General Principles: Workers’ Compensation

“As a general rule, an employee injured in the course of

is limited to the remedies available under the

employment is

Workers’ Compensation Act.” ■ (Davis v, Lockheed Corp. (1993) 13

Cal.App.4th 519, 521, citing Foster v. Xerox Corp. (1985) 40

Cal.Sd 306. 308 (Foster); accord, Arriaga v. County of Alameda

(1995) 9 CaL4th 1055, 1060 [“when a complaint affirmatively

alleges facts indicating that the Act applies, no civil action will,

lie, and the complaint is subject to a general demurrer unless it

states additional facts that negate application of the exclusive

remedy rule”].) i;[T]his rule of exclusivity is. based on the

‘“presumed ■compensation bargain,'"* in which “(t]he employee

is afforded relatively swift and certain payment of benefits to

cure or relieve the effects of industrial injury without having to

prove fault but, in exchange, gives up the wider range of damages

potentially available in tort.”*’ (Torres v. Parkhouse Tire Service,

Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.dth 995, 1001 (Torres).)

“An employee who suffers an injury in the course of his

employment may recover damages in an action at law only if he

comes within certain exceptions to the workers' compensation .

law. [Citations.] One of these exceptions is embodied in [Labor

Code section 3602, subdivision (b)(2)]. It provides that an action

at law may be brought ‘Where the employee’s injury is

aggravated by the employer’s fraudulent concealment of the

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9

existence of the injury and its connection with the employment,

in which case the employer’s liability shall be limited to those

damages proximately caused by the aggravation.” (Foster, supra,

40 Cal 3d at p. 308, fa. omitted.)

The fraudulent concealment exception is extremely

limited;’ (Jensen v. Amgen, Inc. (2003) 105 CaLApp.4th 1322,

1326.) To maintain a civil action against an employer under the

fraudulent concealment exception, a plaintiff must “in general

terms” plead three essential facts: (1) the employer knew of the

plaintiffs work-related injury; <2) the employer concealed the

knowledge from the plaintiff; and (3) the injury was aggravated

as a result of such concealment. (Foster, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p.

312; accord, Palestini v. General Dynamics Carp. (2002) 99

Cal.App.4th 80, 89-90.) If any one of these elements is lacking,

the exception does not apply and the employer is entitled to

dismissal of the lawsuit. (Hughes Aircraft Go. v. Superior Court

(1896) 44 Cal.App.4th 1790, 1797.)

As for on-the-job injury lawsuits brought not against

employers but co-employees, the Legislature in 1959 provided co­

employees immunity from such suits for conduct committed

within the scope of employment. (Torres, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p.

1002.) The only exceptions to this rule are those created by

statute: “willful and unprovoked physical aet[s] of aggression or

“intoxication” by the other employee. (Lab. Code, § 3601, subd.

(a)(l)-(2); Hendy v. Lasse (1991) 54 Cal.3d 723, 738-739;; Oliva o.

Heath (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 926, 931-932.)

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C.

The Trial Court Correctly Found the Bulk ofDevtlles

Claims Are Barred by Workers’ Compensation

Exclusivity Principles

L

As alleged, any injury Deville suffered arose out

of and in the course of his employment

Courts apply a two-prong test in determining whether an

injured employee’s claim is preempted by the Act’s exclusive

remedy provisions. First, the injury must “arise[ ] out of and m

the course of the employment.” (Lab. Code, § 3600, subd. (a),

Shoemaker v. Myers (1990) 52 Cal.Sd 1,15.) “To be within the

scope of employment, the incident giving rise to the injury must

be an outgrowth of the employment.... 19 (Torres, supra, 26

Cal.4th atp, 1008.) Second, the acts or events giving rise to the

.

injury must constitute u‘a risk reasonably encompassed within

the compensation bargain.’” <Charles J, Vacanti, M.D., Int o.

State Comp. Ins. Fund (2001) 24 Cal.4th 800. 819-20.) “If they do

not, then the exclusive remedy provisions are inapplicable^

because the malfeasor is no longer acting as on ‘employer.” (Id.

at p. 820.)

A long line of California cases has held that workplace

safety failures, including those related to exposure to hazardous - •

chemicals, are a risk reasonably encompassed within the

compensation bargain. (See, e.f„ dohns-ManviUe Products Corp

v. Superior Court (1980) 27 Cal.3d 465, 467-475 (Johns-Manmlle);

Gunnell v. Metrocolor Laboratories, Inc. (2001) 92 CaLApp.4th

710, 719-723 [workers compensation is exclusive remedy for

employee injured by exposure to dangerous chemical substances

even though, employer concealed dangers .from employee]; Wright

v.. FMC Corp. (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 777, 779 [workers’

compensation is exclusive remedy for employee injured by

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exposure to noxious chemicals even though employer “concealed

and misrepresented the hazard to induce [employee] to accept

employment”];, and Buitner v. American Bell Tel. Co. (1040) 41

Cal.App.2d 581. 582, 584 [workers’ compensation is exclusive

. remedy for employee injured by exposure to carbon tetrachloride

even though employer represented exposure was “harmless ].) In

Johns-Mdnville. for instance, the plaintiff employee alleged an

asbestos manufacturer employer knew the dangers of long

exposure to asbestos yet concealed this knowledge 'from the

employee, assured the employee that it was safe to work with

■asbestos, failed to provide adequate protective devices, and

violated government regulations governing dust levels at the

workplace. ' (Johns-ManvUle, supra, 27 Cal.3d atp. 469.) Our

Supreme Court held such intentional employer misconduct m

failing to provide a safe workplace is not actionable in a civil suit

' for damages. (Id. at pp. 474-475.) The court reasoned that it is

not an uncommon aspect of the employment relationship for an

employer to know of the existence of a danger to an employee yet

fail to take corrective action. (Id. at p. 474.) If civil lawsuits were

allowed for such employer misconduct, the Court found, the

workers’ compensation system would be undermined. (Ibid.;

accord, Fermino v. Fedco, Inc. (1997) 7 Cal4th 701, 723, fa. 7

[“regulatory crimes such as violations of health and safety

standards or special orders’ are actions within the norma course

of employment].)

Deville’s operative complaint alleges facts that put his

claims squarely within the exclusive remedy constraints of the

Workers’ Compensation Act. -The.complaint alleges he sustained

his injury -during the 29 years he worked.at the Vernon plant. It

further alleges Deville was injured during the course of normal -

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business operations at the plant. The fact that he was allegedly

injured by defendants’ failure to safeguard Exide’s employees

from hazardous chemicals does not remove his claim from the

Act’s purview. As our high court has made clear, the risk of

injury from defendants’ .alleged safety failures is one reasonably

encompassed within the compensation bargain. (Johns-Manville,

supra, 27 Cal.3d at pp. 474-476.) Thus, to maintain his lawsuit

the burden was on Deville to allege facts showing his claims fell

within an exception to workers' compensation exclusivity

principles.0

2.

The operative complaint does not adequately

plead an. exception to workers’compensation

exclusivity

As to the Individual Defendants, the operative complaint is

devoid of any allegations sufficient to invoke the two statutory

exceptions to co-employee civil suit immunity for workplace

injury. The operative complaint nowhere alleges or even implies

that any Individual Defendant injured Deville by willful and

5

Deville s assertion that he was diagnosed with lead

poisoning three years after he stopped working at the Vernon

facility does not put him outside the workers’ compensation

system. Numerous California cases have held that diseases

which manifest after employment ends are nonetheless subject to

workers’ compensation. (See, e.g., Chevron U.SA.Inc. v.

Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1999) 19 CaL4th 1182,1186-1189,

1199 [asbestos-related disease diagnosed after worker no longer

employed by defendant is industrial injury covered ^yworkers

compensation]; Ashdown v. Ameron Internal, Corn. (2000) 84

Cal.App.4th 868, 874-878.)

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f

revoked acts of physical aggression or while intoxicated. The

un

trial court therefore properly sustained the Individual

Defendants' demurrer to Deville’s first through fifth causes of

action (he., all but his unfair competition claim). (Lab. Code

§ 3601, subd. (a); Bendy v, Lorn, supra, 64 Cal.3d at pp. 738-739;

Oliva o. Heath, supra, 35 Cal App.4th at pp. 931-932.)

As to Exide, the operative complaint’s allegations that the.

company knew there were risks to employees like Deville from

lead and other chemicals are insufficient, to invoke the fraudulent

concealment exception to workers’ compensation exclusivity' for

claims against employers. (McDonald v. Superior Court

(FUtUkoie Co.) (1986) 180 CaLA*p.3d 207, 803 ("Plaintiff alleged

in the complaint that Flintkote knew of.and fraudulently

concealed the ‘risk of the development of pulmonary disease5 and

‘risk of asbestos exposure.’ But be did not allege that flintkote

knew and concealed that plaintiff was suffering from the disease,

thereby aggravating that injury by its fraud. Such knowledge of

an existing work-related injury is essential to establish a claim

under [section 3602,] subdivision (b)(2)”].) It is “ [a] n employer’s.

actual knowledge of the existence of an employee s injury

connected with the employment [that] is a necessary prerequisite

to establishing a claim against the employer for fraudulent

concealment under section 3602(b)(2);’ (Palestini v. General

Dynamics Carp., supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 93, citing Foster,

supra, 40 Cal,3d at p. 312.)

..

There is no allegation in the operative complaint that Exide

had actual knowledge that the only two specific health-related

episodes Deville identifies were symptoms of lead poisoning. In

Deville alleges facts suggesting Exide did not know he had

fact,

been poisoned by exposure to lead or any other hazardous

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chemicals at the plant: after he visited Exide’s medical &dHty

following the loss of consciousness episode, the complaint alleges

the company doctor cleared him to return to work the following

day. Although Deville alleged he had reported prior episodes of

dizziness to Exide, no facts were alleged tying those prior

episodes to chemical exposure, as opposed to any other cause like

heat, dehydration, or exhaustion. And as for the black urme

episode, Deville never alleged he told anyone at Exide

managers, coworkers, or medical, personnel—about it.

The operative complaint also alleges no facts that would

permit an inference Deville can satisfy the two remaining

elements of the fraudulent concealment exception, i.e., that Exide

concealed its supposed knowledge of DeviUe’s injury from Deville

himself and that Devxlie’s injury was aggravated as a result of

such concealment To state the obvious, if Deville is complaining

about injuries in the form of losing consciousness and producing

black urine, these are not injuries Exide could have concealed

from Deville even if the company wanted to.

The bottom line is Deville’s allegations about defendants

knowledge of risks and their failure to implement proper safety

measures do not provide a proper basis to believe Deville can

maintain his civil action under Labor Code section 3602,

subdivision (b)(1). The trial court was therefore correct to sustain

Exide’s demurrer to his first through fifth causes of action.

_D.

The Issue of Leave to Amend Is Forfeited

In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion

by sustaining defendants’ demurrers w ithout leave to amend, we

assess whether “there is a reasonable probability that the

com plaint could have been amended to cure its defects.

26

IS

[Citation.] ‘[T]he burden is on the piainti&io show in what

manner the complaint can be amended and how such an

amendment would cure the defect.’ [Citation.]” (Vasquez «.

Franklin Management Real Estate Fund, Inc. (2013) 222

Cal.App.4th 819, 826.) “To meet this burden, a plaintiff must

submit a proposed amended complaint or, on appeal, enumerate

the facts and demonstrate how those facts establish a cause of

action. [Citations.] Absent such a showing, the appellate courtcannot assess whether or not the trial court abused its discretion

by denying leave to amend.” {Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp.

(1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 857, 890; accord, Goodman v. Kennedy

(1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349 [“Plaintiff must show in what manner

he can amend his complaint and how that amendment will

change the legal effect of his pleading”].)

Deville has not come close to making the showing necessary

to warrant leave to amend. The proposed amendments he

identified in the trial court concerned only statute of limitations

issues, not the critical points concerning the fraudulent

concealment and coworker exceptions to workers’ compensation

exclusivity. Deville’s opening brief does not discuss or request

leave to amend the operative complaint at all, and his reply brief

includes only a conclusory request for leave to amend that does

not specify what facts he would allege or how they would avoid

the workers’ compensation exclusivity bar. He has therefore

forfeited the issue and we need not discuss why there was no

abuse of discretion in denying leave to amend. (Reid v. City of

San Diego (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 343, 369; Brown v. Deutsche

Bank National Trust Co. (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 275, 282; see

also Rakestraw v. California Physicians’ Service (2000) 81

Cal.App.4th 39, 44 [“Where the appellant offers no allegations to

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support the possibility of amendment and no legal authority

showing the viability of new causes of action, there is nohasis for

finding the trial court abused its discretion, whet it sustained the

demurrer without leave to. amend ]•)

E,

Demile fs Insufficiently Presented- Challenge to the

Trial Courfs Muling m -His Unfair Competition

Claim Is Waived

As to the Individual Defendants;, the trial court; granted

judgment on the pleadings on Devffle’s Unfair Competition Law

claim, ruling there was no conduqt.it could then enjoin:- The-trial

court’s minute order on Exide’s demurrer does not expressly

reference the unfair competition claim but sustains, the demurrer

without leave to amend and orders “this case” dismissed. On

appeal. Devilled argument in his opening brief regimdmg the

unfair competition claim is limited to two condusmy paragraphs

that mainly recite general law on the nature of an unfair

competition violation and the remedies available. The reply brief

repeats these paragraphs nearly verbatim, though adding a

sentence and an unavailing (and incomplete); case citation. The

challenge to this aspect of the trial hurt’s rulingis insufficiently

presented and, accordingly, waived. (See, e-g-, Mores, supra. 224

Cal.App.4fch at pp. 204-205; Cahill v. 8m Diego Gas & Electric

Co. (2011): 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956.)

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If

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*

' DISPOSITION

_ inal court is directed to eater a judgaetii of dismissal

Tlie

fo'tunc as of the date of the orders sustaining the

.

flUB.C p

■demurrers without- leave to amend Hie judipents are affirm®^

Defendants shall recover their costs on appeal.

NOT TO

BE. PUBLISHED IN THE Qfmm KWBIS

.BAKER, Actihi P* &

We concur:

mooiw:.

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Additional material

from this filing is

available in the

Clerk's Office.

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