Petition for Writ of Certiorari — In Re Frank Deville, Petitioner
Supreme Court briefFeb 19, 2020
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SUPREME COURT
FILED
DEC 11 2019
Jorge Navarrete Clerk
S258993
Deputy
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
En Banc
FRANK DEVTLLE. Petitioner,
V.
COURT OF APPEAL, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION FIVE,
Respondent;
JANIES R. BLOCH et al., Real Parties in Interest.
The petition for writ of mandate is denied.
RECEIVED
FEB 2 4 2020
•FFICE OF THE OLERK
SUPREME COURT, U.S.
:
CANT! L-SAKAU YE
ChiefJustice
44
mm m mmi - new* &»»♦
FILED
Nov 21,2019
DANIEL P POTTER, Claris
Maria-Peraz
Deputy cterk
11/21/2019
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED. IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL.01?‘THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
■ SECOND APPELLATE-DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
FRANK DEVILLE,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
B291099
{Los. Angeles County
Stager. Ot. No. BC624734)
v.
JAMES R. BLOCH et ah,
Defendants and .Respondents,
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Michael L. Stern, Judge, Affirmed,
' Frank Deville, in pro, per-,, for Plaintiff and Appellant,
' Dechert, William W. Oxley and Nathan M. McClellan, for
Defendants and Respondents James R, Bolch, Phillip Dam.aska,
Ed Mopas, John Hogarth, and Paul .R, Hirt,-Jr.
Steptoe & Johnson, Jason Le vin and .Melanie A. Ayerh, for
Defendant and Respondent Exids Technologies.
*
.v
12
Plaintiff and appellant Frank Deville (Deville) appeals from
trial court rulings that sustained without leave to amend
demurrers filed by Exide Technologies (Exide) and certain of
officers and managers: James R. Bloch, Philip Damaska, Ed
Mopas, John Hogarth, and R. Paul Hirt, *. (the Inffividual
The trial court found the bulk of Deville s causes of
Defendants).
action, which allege he suffered harm from exposure to toxic
chemicals while employed at an Exide plant m Vernon,
California, were barred because the statutory workers
compensation scheme was the exclusive available remedy for
injuries suffered in the course and scope, of employmen . We
consider whether Deville alleged facts negating application of the
exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act
(Lab. Code, § 3200 et seq.).
I. BACKGROUND
A
Devilled Injury
“Because this appeal arises from a ruling on a demurrer,
we treat the demurer as a dmi.tting all properly pleaded material
facts. [Citations.]” (Shirk u. Vista Unified School Dist. (200?) 42
Cal.4th'201,206.)
Deville worked at Exide’s hazardous waste treatment and
storage plant in Vernon for 29 years . At that location, Exide
recycled automotive batteries, w Mch recovered the lead used in
the batteries. Deville was a forklift driver and furnace operator.
On April 24, 2013, the Department of Toxic Substance
Control (D'TSC) ordered Exide-to suspend operations m Vernon
because plant operations were causing discharge of illegal
amounts of lead into the air, water, and soil.
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2
Before operations at Exide’s Vernon facility were halted,
Deville experienced what he calls two “profound” health-related
incidents at work. On one occasion. Deville ltat consciousness
while cleaning one of the facility's furnaces. (Previously, Deville
had only experienced dizziness while cleaning furnaces; on
occasion, he had reported these episodes of dizziness to Exide‘s
management.) After regaining consciousness, Deville drove
himself to Exide’s medical facility where a doctor examined him,
advised him to consult with his personal physician, and told him
he could return to work the following day. On the second
occasion, which also arose in connection with cleaning one of the
furnaces, Deville felt dizzy, left the furnace, and went to a
restroom where he produced a urine stream that he says was
black in color.
B.
Demlle’s Lawsuit
In June 2016, more than three years after these two alleged
incidents and suspension of operations at Exide s Vernon plant,
Deville sued the Individual Defendants, alleging unspecified
injuries caused by exposure to lead and other hazardous
chemicals while working at the Vernon facility. He later added
Exide as a defendant.
Deville subsequently filed the operative first amended
complaint . It asserts six causes of action: negligence, negligence
per se, strict liability for ultrahazardous. activity,
misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment, private
1
The operative complaint does not say whether Deville told
anyone at Exide—either a manager, coworker, or a company
health care worker—about this second incident.
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3
permanent nuisance, and unfair competition (Bus, & Prof Code,
§ 17200). DeviUe alleged he was injured by defendants collective
(though not much was alleged regarding the role of the
failure
Individual Defendants) to properly use and store hazardous and
toxic substances at the Vernon plant, to disclose fully and
accurately the risks presented to human health presented y e
chemicals used at the plant, to remediate or clean up
contaminants, and to provide proper safety equipment and
.
training. As a result of defendants’ misconduct, Deville alleged
....
his health had been “slowly deteriorating” since operations at the
Vernon facility were suspended in 2013.
Although the operative complaint alleges defendants
concealed the “great danger” posed by various chemicals at the
plant, it does not allege defendants knew he had suffered a workrelated, injury. Rather, the operative complaint avers defendants
were aware of “injuries and damages suffered” by plaintiffs m
ot her cases brought against Exide, hut were only “aware of the
risk that [Deville] and other employees could have suffered and
were suffering” (emphasis ours) injury from work-related
chemical exposure. The operative complaint also does not allege
facts to suggest defendants concealed from Deville their
.
knowledge he had been injured or that this supposed injury had
been aggravated by any such concealment.
The Trial Court Sustains Defendants’ Demurrers
The Individual Defendants
L
In their demurrer to the operative complaint, the
Individual Defendants argued, among other things, that all of
Deville’s claims were precluded by workers1 compensation
exclusivity principles, he., that an employee who suffers an injury
C.
15 .
4
of his or her employment must seek
in the course and scope
redress through the no-fault statutory workers’ compensation
275. 283 [Labor Code section 3600 "establishes the exclusive
of the workers' compensation system by furnishing an
jurisdiction.
ivil liability for any injury sustained by
employer immunity from ci
an employee and his or her dependent arising out of and in tbe
course of his or her employment”].)
In opposition, Deville contended the Individual Defendants
fraudulently concealed “the dangers of working at the Facility5
and his claims were therefore excepted from workers5
compensation exclusivity principles under a statute that allows
employee to bring an action at law for damages against his or
an
her employer Iwjhere the employee’s injury is aggravated by the
employer’s fraudulent concealment of the existence of the injury
and its connection with the employment...” (Lab. Code,
1 3602, subd. (b)(2).) In the event the trial court
_ sustained the
,
demurrer, Deville requested leave to amend his complaint bu
„_ds irrelevant to the workers’ compensation exclusivity
on groun
He asserted he could allege facts concerning when he was
issue.
diagnosed with “brain damage and other medical issues” and .
when Exide “finally admitted to violating environmental laws.
In reply, the Individual Defendants maintained the La or
Code's fraudulent concealment exception apples only to
employers. The Individual Defendants argued further that
exceptions under the Workers’ Compensation Act for claims
against fellow employees would only arise under circumstances
not at issue in the operative complaint: injuries caused by either
18
.5-
4
»
:■
employee’s willful and unprovoked acts of physical
a fellow
aggression or a fellow employee’s intoxication.
?
The trial court sustained the Individual Defendants
demurrer without leave to amend. We know this only because
there is a minute order in the appellate record that states: The
demurrer to the first through fifth causes of action is sustained
without leave to amend based on the exclusivity issue. (Ill The
Court grants its own motion for judgment on the pleadings
regarding the sixth cause of action [i.e., the unfair competition
claim}. There is nothing to enjoin." The record does not include a
reporter's transcript of the hearing on the demurrer, nor does it
include a judgment of dismissal as to the Individual Defendants.
Eodde
2.
Exide separately demurred to the operative complaint,
making the same workers' compensation exclusivity argument
(among others) on which the Individual Defendants had
prevailed. Deville opposed Exide's demurrer by reprising almost
verbatim the arguments he had made in response to the
Individual Defendants’ demurrer.2 In addition, he similarly
2
In support of Ms opposition to Exide's demurrer, Deville
asked the trial court to take judicial notice of various documents,
including court records; DTSC reports regarding violations at,
and a “Closure Plan” for, the Vernon facility; and various records
from Exide's bankruptcy proceedings. The subsequent minute
order sustaining the demurrer does not indicate whether the trial
court granted or denied Deville's request for judicial notice. We
infer from the trial court's silence that judicial notice was taken
of the court and government records identified m Seville s
request. (Evtd. Code, § 456; Aaronoff v. Martinez-Senftner (2QUb)
136 Cal.App.4th 910, 918-919.)
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6
reprised his request for leave to amend on grounds immaterial to
workers’ compensation exclusivity.
The trial court sustained Bride's demurrer without leave to
amend and dismissed the case. Again, all we have is a minute
order reflecting the court’s ruling, and there is no signed
judgment of dismissal in the record.
^
Deville appealed separately from each of the trial court s
demurrer orders. We consolidated the appeals for decision.
II. DISCUSSION
The Individual Defendants’ demurrer was properly
ustained without leave to amend because the operative
complaint alleges the Individual Defendants were acting within
the scope of their employment and did not allege any facts that
would satisfy the two exceptions to workers’ compensation
exclusivity rules when individual defendants (as opposed to an
employer) are sued. Similarly, Exide’s demurrer to the bulk of
DeviUe’s claims was properly sustained because the operative
complaint does not adequately allege facts establishing any of the
elements of the fraudulent concealment of injury exception to
workers’ compensation exclusivity on which Deville relies to
maintain his action. Both in the trial court and this court,
Deville has proffered no facts to suggest he can amend his
8
The minute order states, in relevant part: “The demurrer
is sustained without leave to amend. [1] - * * The workersO
compensation exclusivity is not applicable. [1] The Court«-ders
this case dismissed.” In context, the reference to “not applicable
L an obvious typographical error and Deville does not contend
otherwise.
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7
pleading to avoid the workers’ compensation exclusivity bar. And
Deville has waived any challenge to the trial court’s ruling on his
unfair competition cause of action by failing to adequately
present the issue in his briefs. We shall therefore affirm.
A.
Standard of Review
"In reviewing an order: sustaining a demurrer, we examine
the operative complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges^
facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory.
[Citation.] If the demurrer was sustained without leave to
amend, we consider whether there is a ’reasonable possibility’
4
Deville moved us to take judicial notice of a number of
documents, none of which was presented to the trial court,
including various reports by and correspondence from Ul bC
regarding the Vernon facility and correspondence to Deville trom
Exide’s bankruptcy counsel and the department of Health. e
deny the motion. (Haworth v, Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal 4th
372, 379, fn. 2; Brosierhous v. State Bar (1995) 12 Cal.4th 315,
325-326.)
We also resolve the appeal on the merits despite Deville’s
appeal from the trial court’s orders sustaining the demurrers that
are, strictly speaking, non-appealable, rather than from final
judgments of dismissal, which are appealable. (Morest v.
Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2014) 224
Cal.App.4th 199, 203-204 [“To promote the orderly
administration of justice, and to avoid the useless waste ot
judicial and litigant time that would result from dismissing the
appeal merely to have a judgment formally entered m the teal
court and .., new appeals] filed, we order the teal court to enter
[two] judgmentjs] of dismissal nunc pro tunc as of the a e[sj1°
the orderrs] [sustaining defendants’ respective demurrers withou
leave to amend], and we will construe the notice[s] of appeal to
refer to th[ose] judgment[sf] (Mores),)
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8
that the defect in the complaint could be cured by amendment.
[Citation ] The burden is on plaintiffs to prove that amen en
could cure the defect. [Citation.]* {King V-Comariners, Inc.
(2018) 5 Cal.Sth 10.39, 1050.)
B.
General Principles: Workers’ Compensation
“As a general rule, an employee injured in the course of
is limited to the remedies available under the
employment is
Workers’ Compensation Act.” ■ (Davis v, Lockheed Corp. (1993) 13
Cal.App.4th 519, 521, citing Foster v. Xerox Corp. (1985) 40
Cal.Sd 306. 308 (Foster); accord, Arriaga v. County of Alameda
(1995) 9 CaL4th 1055, 1060 [“when a complaint affirmatively
alleges facts indicating that the Act applies, no civil action will,
lie, and the complaint is subject to a general demurrer unless it
states additional facts that negate application of the exclusive
remedy rule”].) i;[T]his rule of exclusivity is. based on the
‘“presumed ■compensation bargain,'"* in which “(t]he employee
is afforded relatively swift and certain payment of benefits to
cure or relieve the effects of industrial injury without having to
prove fault but, in exchange, gives up the wider range of damages
potentially available in tort.”*’ (Torres v. Parkhouse Tire Service,
Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.dth 995, 1001 (Torres).)
“An employee who suffers an injury in the course of his
employment may recover damages in an action at law only if he
comes within certain exceptions to the workers' compensation .
law. [Citations.] One of these exceptions is embodied in [Labor
Code section 3602, subdivision (b)(2)]. It provides that an action
at law may be brought ‘Where the employee’s injury is
aggravated by the employer’s fraudulent concealment of the
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9
existence of the injury and its connection with the employment,
in which case the employer’s liability shall be limited to those
damages proximately caused by the aggravation.” (Foster, supra,
40 Cal 3d at p. 308, fa. omitted.)
The fraudulent concealment exception is extremely
limited;’ (Jensen v. Amgen, Inc. (2003) 105 CaLApp.4th 1322,
1326.) To maintain a civil action against an employer under the
fraudulent concealment exception, a plaintiff must “in general
terms” plead three essential facts: (1) the employer knew of the
plaintiffs work-related injury; <2) the employer concealed the
knowledge from the plaintiff; and (3) the injury was aggravated
as a result of such concealment. (Foster, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p.
312; accord, Palestini v. General Dynamics Carp. (2002) 99
Cal.App.4th 80, 89-90.) If any one of these elements is lacking,
the exception does not apply and the employer is entitled to
dismissal of the lawsuit. (Hughes Aircraft Go. v. Superior Court
(1896) 44 Cal.App.4th 1790, 1797.)
As for on-the-job injury lawsuits brought not against
employers but co-employees, the Legislature in 1959 provided co
employees immunity from such suits for conduct committed
within the scope of employment. (Torres, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p.
1002.) The only exceptions to this rule are those created by
statute: “willful and unprovoked physical aet[s] of aggression or
“intoxication” by the other employee. (Lab. Code, § 3601, subd.
(a)(l)-(2); Hendy v. Lasse (1991) 54 Cal.3d 723, 738-739;; Oliva o.
Heath (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 926, 931-932.)
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10
C.
The Trial Court Correctly Found the Bulk ofDevtlles
Claims Are Barred by Workers’ Compensation
Exclusivity Principles
L
As alleged, any injury Deville suffered arose out
of and in the course of his employment
Courts apply a two-prong test in determining whether an
injured employee’s claim is preempted by the Act’s exclusive
remedy provisions. First, the injury must “arise[ ] out of and m
the course of the employment.” (Lab. Code, § 3600, subd. (a),
Shoemaker v. Myers (1990) 52 Cal.Sd 1,15.) “To be within the
scope of employment, the incident giving rise to the injury must
be an outgrowth of the employment.... 19 (Torres, supra, 26
Cal.4th atp, 1008.) Second, the acts or events giving rise to the
.
injury must constitute u‘a risk reasonably encompassed within
the compensation bargain.’” <Charles J, Vacanti, M.D., Int o.
State Comp. Ins. Fund (2001) 24 Cal.4th 800. 819-20.) “If they do
not, then the exclusive remedy provisions are inapplicable^
because the malfeasor is no longer acting as on ‘employer.” (Id.
at p. 820.)
A long line of California cases has held that workplace
safety failures, including those related to exposure to hazardous - •
chemicals, are a risk reasonably encompassed within the
compensation bargain. (See, e.f„ dohns-ManviUe Products Corp
v. Superior Court (1980) 27 Cal.3d 465, 467-475 (Johns-Manmlle);
Gunnell v. Metrocolor Laboratories, Inc. (2001) 92 CaLApp.4th
710, 719-723 [workers compensation is exclusive remedy for
employee injured by exposure to dangerous chemical substances
even though, employer concealed dangers .from employee]; Wright
v.. FMC Corp. (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 777, 779 [workers’
compensation is exclusive remedy for employee injured by
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11
exposure to noxious chemicals even though employer “concealed
and misrepresented the hazard to induce [employee] to accept
employment”];, and Buitner v. American Bell Tel. Co. (1040) 41
Cal.App.2d 581. 582, 584 [workers’ compensation is exclusive
. remedy for employee injured by exposure to carbon tetrachloride
even though employer represented exposure was “harmless ].) In
Johns-Mdnville. for instance, the plaintiff employee alleged an
asbestos manufacturer employer knew the dangers of long
exposure to asbestos yet concealed this knowledge 'from the
employee, assured the employee that it was safe to work with
■asbestos, failed to provide adequate protective devices, and
violated government regulations governing dust levels at the
workplace. ' (Johns-ManvUle, supra, 27 Cal.3d atp. 469.) Our
Supreme Court held such intentional employer misconduct m
failing to provide a safe workplace is not actionable in a civil suit
' for damages. (Id. at pp. 474-475.) The court reasoned that it is
not an uncommon aspect of the employment relationship for an
employer to know of the existence of a danger to an employee yet
fail to take corrective action. (Id. at p. 474.) If civil lawsuits were
allowed for such employer misconduct, the Court found, the
workers’ compensation system would be undermined. (Ibid.;
accord, Fermino v. Fedco, Inc. (1997) 7 Cal4th 701, 723, fa. 7
[“regulatory crimes such as violations of health and safety
standards or special orders’ are actions within the norma course
of employment].)
Deville’s operative complaint alleges facts that put his
claims squarely within the exclusive remedy constraints of the
Workers’ Compensation Act. -The.complaint alleges he sustained
his injury -during the 29 years he worked.at the Vernon plant. It
further alleges Deville was injured during the course of normal -
23 •
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12
business operations at the plant. The fact that he was allegedly
injured by defendants’ failure to safeguard Exide’s employees
from hazardous chemicals does not remove his claim from the
Act’s purview. As our high court has made clear, the risk of
injury from defendants’ .alleged safety failures is one reasonably
encompassed within the compensation bargain. (Johns-Manville,
supra, 27 Cal.3d at pp. 474-476.) Thus, to maintain his lawsuit
the burden was on Deville to allege facts showing his claims fell
within an exception to workers' compensation exclusivity
principles.0
2.
The operative complaint does not adequately
plead an. exception to workers’compensation
exclusivity
As to the Individual Defendants, the operative complaint is
devoid of any allegations sufficient to invoke the two statutory
exceptions to co-employee civil suit immunity for workplace
injury. The operative complaint nowhere alleges or even implies
that any Individual Defendant injured Deville by willful and
5
Deville s assertion that he was diagnosed with lead
poisoning three years after he stopped working at the Vernon
facility does not put him outside the workers’ compensation
system. Numerous California cases have held that diseases
which manifest after employment ends are nonetheless subject to
workers’ compensation. (See, e.g., Chevron U.SA.Inc. v.
Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1999) 19 CaL4th 1182,1186-1189,
1199 [asbestos-related disease diagnosed after worker no longer
employed by defendant is industrial injury covered ^yworkers
compensation]; Ashdown v. Ameron Internal, Corn. (2000) 84
Cal.App.4th 868, 874-878.)
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■
f
revoked acts of physical aggression or while intoxicated. The
un
trial court therefore properly sustained the Individual
Defendants' demurrer to Deville’s first through fifth causes of
action (he., all but his unfair competition claim). (Lab. Code
§ 3601, subd. (a); Bendy v, Lorn, supra, 64 Cal.3d at pp. 738-739;
Oliva o. Heath, supra, 35 Cal App.4th at pp. 931-932.)
As to Exide, the operative complaint’s allegations that the.
company knew there were risks to employees like Deville from
lead and other chemicals are insufficient, to invoke the fraudulent
concealment exception to workers’ compensation exclusivity' for
claims against employers. (McDonald v. Superior Court
(FUtUkoie Co.) (1986) 180 CaLA*p.3d 207, 803 ("Plaintiff alleged
in the complaint that Flintkote knew of.and fraudulently
concealed the ‘risk of the development of pulmonary disease5 and
‘risk of asbestos exposure.’ But be did not allege that flintkote
knew and concealed that plaintiff was suffering from the disease,
thereby aggravating that injury by its fraud. Such knowledge of
an existing work-related injury is essential to establish a claim
under [section 3602,] subdivision (b)(2)”].) It is “ [a] n employer’s.
actual knowledge of the existence of an employee s injury
connected with the employment [that] is a necessary prerequisite
to establishing a claim against the employer for fraudulent
concealment under section 3602(b)(2);’ (Palestini v. General
Dynamics Carp., supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 93, citing Foster,
supra, 40 Cal,3d at p. 312.)
..
There is no allegation in the operative complaint that Exide
had actual knowledge that the only two specific health-related
episodes Deville identifies were symptoms of lead poisoning. In
Deville alleges facts suggesting Exide did not know he had
fact,
been poisoned by exposure to lead or any other hazardous
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chemicals at the plant: after he visited Exide’s medical &dHty
following the loss of consciousness episode, the complaint alleges
the company doctor cleared him to return to work the following
day. Although Deville alleged he had reported prior episodes of
dizziness to Exide, no facts were alleged tying those prior
episodes to chemical exposure, as opposed to any other cause like
heat, dehydration, or exhaustion. And as for the black urme
episode, Deville never alleged he told anyone at Exide
managers, coworkers, or medical, personnel—about it.
The operative complaint also alleges no facts that would
permit an inference Deville can satisfy the two remaining
elements of the fraudulent concealment exception, i.e., that Exide
concealed its supposed knowledge of DeviUe’s injury from Deville
himself and that Devxlie’s injury was aggravated as a result of
such concealment To state the obvious, if Deville is complaining
about injuries in the form of losing consciousness and producing
black urine, these are not injuries Exide could have concealed
from Deville even if the company wanted to.
The bottom line is Deville’s allegations about defendants
knowledge of risks and their failure to implement proper safety
measures do not provide a proper basis to believe Deville can
maintain his civil action under Labor Code section 3602,
subdivision (b)(1). The trial court was therefore correct to sustain
Exide’s demurrer to his first through fifth causes of action.
_D.
The Issue of Leave to Amend Is Forfeited
In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion
by sustaining defendants’ demurrers w ithout leave to amend, we
assess whether “there is a reasonable probability that the
com plaint could have been amended to cure its defects.
26
IS
[Citation.] ‘[T]he burden is on the piainti&io show in what
manner the complaint can be amended and how such an
amendment would cure the defect.’ [Citation.]” (Vasquez «.
Franklin Management Real Estate Fund, Inc. (2013) 222
Cal.App.4th 819, 826.) “To meet this burden, a plaintiff must
submit a proposed amended complaint or, on appeal, enumerate
the facts and demonstrate how those facts establish a cause of
action. [Citations.] Absent such a showing, the appellate courtcannot assess whether or not the trial court abused its discretion
by denying leave to amend.” {Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp.
(1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 857, 890; accord, Goodman v. Kennedy
(1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349 [“Plaintiff must show in what manner
he can amend his complaint and how that amendment will
change the legal effect of his pleading”].)
Deville has not come close to making the showing necessary
to warrant leave to amend. The proposed amendments he
identified in the trial court concerned only statute of limitations
issues, not the critical points concerning the fraudulent
concealment and coworker exceptions to workers’ compensation
exclusivity. Deville’s opening brief does not discuss or request
leave to amend the operative complaint at all, and his reply brief
includes only a conclusory request for leave to amend that does
not specify what facts he would allege or how they would avoid
the workers’ compensation exclusivity bar. He has therefore
forfeited the issue and we need not discuss why there was no
abuse of discretion in denying leave to amend. (Reid v. City of
San Diego (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 343, 369; Brown v. Deutsche
Bank National Trust Co. (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 275, 282; see
also Rakestraw v. California Physicians’ Service (2000) 81
Cal.App.4th 39, 44 [“Where the appellant offers no allegations to
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support the possibility of amendment and no legal authority
showing the viability of new causes of action, there is nohasis for
finding the trial court abused its discretion, whet it sustained the
demurrer without leave to. amend ]•)
E,
Demile fs Insufficiently Presented- Challenge to the
Trial Courfs Muling m -His Unfair Competition
Claim Is Waived
As to the Individual Defendants;, the trial court; granted
judgment on the pleadings on Devffle’s Unfair Competition Law
claim, ruling there was no conduqt.it could then enjoin:- The-trial
court’s minute order on Exide’s demurrer does not expressly
reference the unfair competition claim but sustains, the demurrer
without leave to amend and orders “this case” dismissed. On
appeal. Devilled argument in his opening brief regimdmg the
unfair competition claim is limited to two condusmy paragraphs
that mainly recite general law on the nature of an unfair
competition violation and the remedies available. The reply brief
repeats these paragraphs nearly verbatim, though adding a
sentence and an unavailing (and incomplete); case citation. The
challenge to this aspect of the trial hurt’s rulingis insufficiently
presented and, accordingly, waived. (See, e-g-, Mores, supra. 224
Cal.App.4fch at pp. 204-205; Cahill v. 8m Diego Gas & Electric
Co. (2011): 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956.)
28
If
■
*
' DISPOSITION
_ inal court is directed to eater a judgaetii of dismissal
Tlie
fo'tunc as of the date of the orders sustaining the
.
flUB.C p
■demurrers without- leave to amend Hie judipents are affirm®^
Defendants shall recover their costs on appeal.
NOT TO
BE. PUBLISHED IN THE Qfmm KWBIS
.BAKER, Actihi P* &
We concur:
mooiw:.
29
IS
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