Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Andrey L. Bridges, Petitioner v. David W. Gray, Warden

Supreme Court briefJan 16, 2020

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

-f'W

19-774

NO.

♦

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

ANDREYL. BRIDGES,

JAN 16 2020

Petitioner-Appellant,

£E2££oftheclerk

DAVID GRAY, WARDEN,

Respondent-Appellee,

♦

On Petition for a writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

ANDREY L. BRIDGES #A650493

Belmont Correctional Institution

P.0. Box 540

68518 Bannock Road

St. Clairsville, Ohio 43950

IN PROPRIA PERSONA

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

I: Does the State affirmative defense of Res Judicata defeats Amendment Fifth;

Sixth; Eighth, and Fourteenth of the United States Constitution?

II: If a free standing claim show Factual Innocence, or Actual Innocence, should

it be allowed to be heard and reviewed in “all” courtfsl. when the free standing

claim shows a manifest injustice of Due Process, and Equal Protection[s] of the Law,

as protected by Amendment 5th, 6th, and 14th of the United States Constitution?

Ill: In a circumstantial case, if record produces speculation on the elements of

charge[s] and on the evidence, does speculation holds as set forth in O’Laushlin v.

O’Brian, 568 F.3d 287, 304,308, and Brown v. Palmer. 441 F.3d 347, 351 and

makes a conviction “unconstitutional, contrary, and unreasonable to federal law?

IV: Under Schuln v. Delo. 513 U.S. 298, 330 (1995); holding: the assessment of

witness credibility is beyond the scope of [habeas review], “But” when the witness

credibility and evidence is flawed should Schulp; be left open to habeas review as

Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623, and Murray v. Carrier. All U.S. at 496?

V: If the record shows counsel was deficient and resulted in actual prejudice, as

held by the United States Supreme Court precedent in Strickland v. Washington.

466 U. S. 668, 688, did the lower court[s], in reviewing this claim; violate

Constitutional rights of Petitioner when it made exceptions to and by passed Due

Process of law as held by 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution?

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

The parties to the proceeding in which is asked to be reviewd are, Andrey L.

Bridges Petitioner, at: Belmont Correctional Institution, P.O. Box 540, St.

Clairsville, Ohio 43950,

Brigham Sloan warden of Erie Correctional Institution, at: 501 Thompson Road,

Conneaut, Ohio 44030, and David Gray warden of Belmont Correctional Instituion,

at: P.O. Box 540 St. Clairsville, Ohio 430950, and Attorney General AssistanceStephanie L. Watson, and Attorney General Assistance Paul Kerridge, at: the Office

of Criminal Justice Section, 150 E. Gray street 16th Floor, Columbus, Ohio 43215.

Judges; Eugene E. Siler, John M. Rogers, Joan L. Larsen, Ralph B. Cole,

Richard Griffen, and Ramond M. Kethledge of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals,

at: Potter Stewart US Courthouse, 100 E. 5th Street Room540, Cincinnati, Ohio

45202;

Judge Jack Zouhary, and Magistrate Judge William H. Boughman, of the

Northern District Court of Ohio Eastern Division, at; Carl B. Stokes US Court

House, 801 W. Superior Ave. Rm, 161, Clevland, Ohio 44113,

Judges Tim McCormack, Sean C. Gallagher, Patricia Ann Blackmon, Anita

Laster Mays, Mary Eileen Kilbane, Mary J. Boyle, Frank Celebrezze, Larry A.

Jones Sr., Eileen T. Gallagher, at: The Eighth District Appellate Court of Cuyahoga

County, 1 Lakeside Ave, Cleveland, Ohio 44113,

Judge Hollie L. Gallagher, at: Cuyahoga Common Pleas Court Justice Center

1200 Ontario St. Ste. 16A, Rm. Cleveland, Ohio, 44113.

• 9

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page[s]

QUESTION[S] PRESENTED

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

OPENIONS BELOW.

1-3

JURISDICTION

STATUES AND CONSTITUTIONAL

PROVSIONS INVOLVED..............

3-4

INTRODUCTION

5-8

STATEMENT OF THE CASE and FACTS

8-11, and 12-17

REASON FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

17-21

The Issue [s] Presented Are of Importance:

I., Does convicting someone who is factual or actually innocent, violates the

Constitution, and if, so should a freestanding claim be heard if it proves innocence?

II. This case involves principles which is moved to settlement of which is of

importance to public as distinguished from parties, and in cases, where there is real

and embarrassing conflict of opinion and authority between courts of appeals.

III. Does the Lower court[s] Affirmative defense of res judicata, violates

Amendment Fifth; Sixth; Eighth, and Fourteenth of the United States Constitution.

CONCLUSION

APPENDIX: Submitted in reported and unreported form[s] for review

Appendix A: Trial court cases and order[s], set in voluminous

Appendix B: Appeal Court cases and order[s], set in voluminous

Appendix C: Ohio Supreme Court cases and order[s], set in voluminous

Appendix D: District Court and Sixth Circuit Order[s], set in voluminous

♦ * f

til

□

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES AND CASErSl FOR REVIEW

CASETS1:

State v. Bridges, CR-13-574201,

2, 8, 9 and “See” Appendix

State v. Bridges. CA-14-101938,

1, 9 and “See” Appendix

State v. Bridges, CA-101938,

1, 9 and “See” Appendix

State v. Bridges, CA-102930

2, 9 and “See” Appendix

State v. Bridges. CA-103090

2, 9 and “See” Appendix

State v. Bridges. CA-103634,

2, 9 and “See” Appendix

State v. Bridges, CA-104506,

2, 9 and “See” Appendix

State v. Bridses, Case No. 14-2074

2, and “See” Appendix

State v. Bridges. Case No. 14-2063

2, 10, and “See” Appendix

State v. Bridges, Case No. 15-0718

2, 10, and “See” Appendix

State v. Bridges, Case No. 16-0030

2, 3, and “See” Appendix

State v. Bridges. Case No. 16-1621

2, 3, 10, and “See” Appendix

Bridges u. Sloan. Case No. l:15-cv-02556

Bridges v. Gray. Case No 19-13297

3, 10, 16 and “See” Appendix

In re Bridges, 2019 U.S. App. Lexis 38172

Bridges v. Gray. 2019 U.S. App. Lexis 38285

State v. Bridges. 2014-ohio 4570,

3 and “See” Appendix

2, 3, 16 and “See” Appendix

2, and “See” Appendix

Bridges v. Gray. 2020, U.S. App. Lexis 387,

Bridges v. Sloan, 2019 U.S. Dist. Lexis 29542,

2 and “See” Appendix

State v. 2?rtc/ges.2018-Ohio-4113

2 and “See” Appendix

State v. Bridges. 2015-Ohio-1447

2, 10, 11 and “See” Appendix

Bridges v. Sloan. 2018 U.S. dist. Lexis 221744

2 and “See” Appendix

State v. Bridges. 2018-Ohio-4325

2 and “See” Appendix

State v. Bridges, 2015-Ohio-5428

2 and “See” Appendix

State v. Bridges. 2016-Ohio-7298

2, 11, and “See” Appendix

State v. Bridges. 2014-Ohio-Misc. Lexis 23569

2, 9, and “See” Appendix

State v. Bridges. 2015-Ohio-Misc. Lexis 21136

2 and “See” Appendix

State v. Bridges. 2015-Ohio-Misc. Lexis 21137

2 and “See” Appendix

State v. Bridges. 2015-Ohio-Misc. Lexis 22600

2 and “See” Appendix

State v. Bridges. 2015-Ohio-Misc. Lexis 22588

2 and “See” Appendix

State v. Bridges. 2015-Ohio-Misc. Lexis 21146

2 and “See” Appendix

State v. Bridges. 2015-Ohio-Misc. Lexis 21096

2 and “See” Appendix

State v. Bridges. 2015-Ohio-Misc. Lexis 21146

2 and “See” Appendix

State v. Bridges. 2015-Ohio-Misc. Lexis 21096

2 and “See” Appendix

State v. Bridges, 2014-Ohio-Misc. Lexis 23636

2 and “See” Appendix

State v. Bridges. 2014-Ohio-Misc. Lexis 23529

2 and “See” Appendix

State v. Bridges. 2015-Ohio-Misc. Lexis 21141

2 and “See” Appendix

OTHER AUTHORITIES FOR REVIEW THAT ARE IN QUESTION

McOuiggin v. Perkins. 569 U.S. 383, 392 (2013)

Calderon, v. Thompson. 523 U.s. 538, 558

5, 20

Blonder Tongue Lab v. University of Illinois. (1971) 402, U.S. 313

Triplett v. Lowell. (19360 297 U.S. 638, 56

Herrera v. Collins. 506 U.S. 390, 404-05 (1993)

5, 6, 19, 20, 28, 29

Cress. 484 F.3d at 854,

Schulo. 513 U.S. at 316

5, 7, 22, 24, 26, 26, 28, 29

Murray v. Carrier. 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986)

Montgomery v. Bqgley. 482 F. Supp. 2d 919,

6, 28, 29

Creel v. Johnson. 162 f.3d 385, 395 (5th Cir. 1998),

6, 28, 29

Sellers v. Ward. 135 F. 3d 385, 395 (10th Cir. 1998),

6, 28, 29

Guinan v. United States. 6 F. 3d 468, 470 (7th Cir. 1993), ....6

Meadows v. Delo. 99 F. 3d 280, 283 *8th Cir. 1996)

Carriger v. Stewart. 132 f. 3d 463 (9th Cir. 1997) en banc

Cornell v. Nix. 119 F. 3d 1329 (8th Cir. 1999)

6, 28, 29

6, 29

O’dell v. Netherland. 95 F.3d 1214, 1246 n. 25 (4th Cir. 1996),

Ake v. Oklahoma, (1995) 470 U.S. 68, 77

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 37

26, 27

16, 18, 26, 27

Strickland, v. Washington. 446 U.S. 668,

Rivas v. Fisher. 687, F. 3d 514, 552,

16, 26, 27

16, 26, 27, 28, 29

Durr v. Mitchell. 487 F.3d 423, 434-35,

17, 26, 27

Richey v. Bradshaw. 498 F.3d 344, 359 (6th Cir. 2007),

17, 26, 27

O’Laughlin v. O’Brian. 568-F. 3d 287.-304,- 308. ...-—17,-25, 26r27—

Brown v. Palmer. 441 F. 3d 347, 351 (5th Cir. 2006)

In re Winshin. 397 U.S. at 364,

17, 25, 26, 27

Johnson v. Coyle. 200 F. 3d 987 991 (6th Cir. 2000),

Basby v. Sowders. 894 F.2d 792, 794 (6th Cir. 1990),

United states v. Paise. 470 F. 3d 603, 608 (6th Cir. 1990),

State v. Jenks. 61-Ohio-St. 3d 259, 254 N.E. (1991)

State v. Smith, 80-Ohio-St. 3d 89, 102 n.4 (1997)

Bouslev v. United States. 523 U.S. 614, 623, 118 S. Ct. (1998),

House. 547, U.S. at 537-38,

Colman v. Thomason. 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S. Ct. 853,

STATUES

Ohio Rev. Code Ann §2903.02 (A),

8, 4, 19

Ohio Rev. Code Ann §2903.11 (A)(1),

8, 4, 19

Ohio Rev. Code Ann §2921.12 (A)(1),

8, 4, 19

Ohio Rev. Code Ann §2927.01 (B),

8, 4, 19

§2254 Habeas Corpus

American jurisprudence 2d

Actual Innocence,

1-30

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

United states constitution Amendment 5,

4, 22

United states constitution Amendment 6,

4, 22

United states constitution Amendment 8,

4, 22

United states constitution Amendment 14,

4, 22

VII

NO.

♦

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

♦

ANDREYL. BRIDGES,

Petitioner-Appellant,

DAVID GRAY, WARDEN,

Respondent-Appellee,

♦

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Based on upholding the United States Constitution and on this court

interpretation of manifest injustice [s], and miscarriage of justice [s], that violates

the United States Constitution; Andrey L. Bridges respectfully asks that a writ of

certiorari issue to review the lower courts order[s], and remand to trial court for a

new trial, or dismiss all actions against Andrey L. Bridges and give him relief....

“FREEDOM” from further unlawful imprisonment.

OPINIONS BELOW

At issue [s] in this petition is ongoing violations of the 5th, 6th, 8th, and 14th

Amendments] of the United States Constitution and a violation to the United

States Constitution right of Due Process, and violation of Equal Protection of the

“Law[s]”, that is Govern by the United States Constitution.

The violation[s] started May 5, 2013; in Case No. State of Ohio v. Audrey L.

Bridges. 1 CR-13-574201 of the Cuyahoga County of Common Pleas Court, of

Cleveland Ohio; Attached to that case of violation[s] are also in the Cuyahoga

County Court of Appeals, Cleveland , Ohio State v. Audrey L. Bridges Case[s] No.

CA-13-100805, affirming the trial court conviction, and denying the Application for

reopening, and reply brief, and Case No[s] State v. Bridges. Ca-14-101938, State

v. Bridges, Ca-101938; State u. Bridges. CA-102930, State v. Bridges. CA103090; State v. Bridges. CA-103634; State v. Bridges, CA-104506; Denying void

judgement[s] and Actual Innocence and ineffective assistance of counsel, Due

process violations and constitutional rights guaranteed by the 5th, 6th, 8th, and 14th,

Amendment of the United States Constitution.

Also in The Ohio Supreme Court: in State of Ohio v. Audrey Bridges. Case

No[s], 14-2074, Memorandum in Support of Jurisdiction and reconsideration; and

State v. Bridges. 14-2063, Memorandum in support of jurisdiction and

Reconsideration; and State v. Bridges. 15-0718, Memorandum in Support of

1 NOTE: There has been middle initials left out in some of petitioner case[s] so case[s] well be

State of Ohio v. Audrey L. Bridges, and State of Ohio v. Andrey Bridges.

Jurisdiction and Reconsideration; and State v. Bridges. 16-0030, Memorandum in

Support of Jurisdiction and reconsideration; and State u. Bridges. 16-1621

Memorandum in Support of Jurisdiction and reconsideration.

Also in the United States District Court for the Northern District Court of the

Eastern Division, Bridges v. Sloan. Case No. l:15-cv-02556, Petition, Return of

Writ by Respondent, Traverse of Petitioner, and all attached documents, and Report

and Recommendation by the magistrate Judge, Reply to the Report and

Recommendation by Petitioner, and order by the District Judge.

Also in the United States Court of appeals for the Sixth Circuit Court, Case # 1913297, Bridges v. Gray. Petitioner request for certificate of Appealabilty , and

attached filings, and the order of the lower court. All to which were denied.

JURISDICTION

ON December 10, 2015; Petitioner filed his timely habeas petition to all his state

exhausted claims above. The Northern District of the Eastern Division of Ohio “See”

Bridges v. Sloan. Case no. U15-cv-02556. On February 25, 2019; the District

Court denied that petition. On Marchl8, 2019, Petitioner appealed by request of

certificate of Appealabilty to The United States Appeals Court of the Sixth Circuit

“See” Case No 19-3297). On November 21, 2019; the certificate of Appealabilty was

denied, and On December 2, 2019; Petitioner filed a timely en banc rehearing to

that court order-On January 07, 2020; The-court denied the timely en banc

rehearing, and this court now have Jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.§ 1254(1).

STATUES AND CONSTITUTIONAL

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Amendment 5 of the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent

part: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of

law.

Amendment 6 of the United States Constitution provides, in relevant

part: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to have

compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have Assistance of

Counsel for his defense.

Amendment 8 of the United States Constitution prohibits, in relevant

part: the infliction “cruel and unusual punishments.”

Amendment 14 of the United States Constitution provides, in relevant

part: “No state... shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due

process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of

the laws.”

The statutory provisions that are relevant to this petition, Ohio Rev.

Code Ann §2903.02(A), Rev. Code Ann §2903.11(A)(1), Rev. Code Ann §2921.12

(A)(1), Rev. Code Ann §2927.01 (B), §2254 petition for habeas corpus; American

Jurisprudence 2d, 569-570, Factual innocence---freestanding actual innocence.

INTRODUCTION

This court has not yet determined whether a prisoner may be entitled to habeas

corpus relief based on freestanding claim of actual innocence.” See” Mcauiesin v.

Perkins. 569 U.S. 383, 392 (2013)) citing Herrera v. Collins. 506 U.S. 390, 404-05

(1993)): see also Cress. 484 F.3d at 854.

Yet it had been determined in Schulv. 513 U.S. at 316, that to demonstrate

actual innocence, a petitioner must “present evidence of innocence so strong that a

court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also

satisfied that a trial was free of non-harmless error. A showing of actual innocence

must rely on “new reliable evidence-whether it be exculpatory, scientific evidence,

trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence that was not

presented in trial, and to show cause and prejudice.

However, in Murray v. Carrier. 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986) held: in any

extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the

conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal court may grant the writ even

in the absence of showing cause for the procedural default.

There is confusion on whether granting a freestanding claim on non-death

penalty cases and how the rule is applied or must be applied as to what is exactly

an extraordinary case, and how Schulp. is determined and how Murray v.

Carrier, is determined as to the means of actual innocence and showing of

innocence, and manifest injustice, and miscarriage of justice.

Not only that, the lower court[s] have recognized a freestanding claim of actual

innocence, “See” Montgomery v. Bagiev. 482 F. Supp.2d. 919; that court held: In

making a "free standing" claim of actual innocence, Montgomery relied on Herrera

v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 113 S. Ct. 853, 122 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1993). But that court

also held that the circuit courts are split on whether Herrera. recognizes such a

claim.

Several courts have read Herrera as invalidating free-standing actual innocence

claims in habeas. Creel v. Johnson. 162 F.3d 385, 395 (5th Cir. 1998); Sellers v.

Ward. 135 F.3d 1333, 1338-39 (10th Cir. 1998); Guinan v. United States. 6 F.3d 468,

470 (7th Cir. 1993); Meadows v. Delo. 99 F.3d 280, 283 (8th Cir. 1996).

Other courts have read Herrera as authorizing a free-standing claim of actual

innocence, or have at least assumed for the sake of argument that habeas courts

could consider free-standing claims of actual innocence. Carriser v, Stewart. 132 F.3d

463, 476 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (holding that "free-standing" actual innocence is a

proper claim but not finding sufficient evidence of it); Cornell v. Nix. 119 F.3d 1329

(8th Cir. 1999); O'Dell v. Netherland. 95 F.3d 1214, 1246 n. 25 (4th Cir. 1996)

(assuming for the sake of argument that "free standing" actual innocence states a

claim but noting that the Herrera opinion at 506 U.S. at 416-17 seems to dictate

otherwise.)

For purposes of this analysis, the court assumed in Montgomery that he could

raise a "free-standing" claim of actual innocence, and The Supreme Court indicated

that if such a claim exists, a petitioner must convince the Court "that those new

facts unquestionably establish innocence." Schlup v. Delo. 513 U.S. 298, 316-17,

115 S. Ct. 851, 130 L. Ed. 2d 808 (1995).

There is confusion in the actual innocence realm of law, and the need for

this court to interpret if a freestanding claim can be entertained in habeas

corpus or in collateral proceedings, and how and when it should be

applied and to what standard [s] of law that shall or must be applied.

This case is the ideal vehicle for resolving the important issues as stated above

and below. Because there are multiple manifest injustices that sits at the United

States Constitution door, and many Americans, those who rely on the law and the

Constitution, and those who up hold the law and the Constitution, is

confused.

Thus leaving Constitutional violations standing for this courts attention on

which; and how the courts shall apply freestanding, actual innocence, miscarriage of

justice and what is a manifest injustice, and how innocence is applied and not

applied, and when a showing of innocence is freestanding, whether it shall be or not

be heard.

Here, Petitioner case meets this exceptional questionjs], and hereby asks this

Honorable “Justice[s]" of this United States Supreme Court to determine on the

stated. Because not only the factors and questions is based on freestanding claim of

Factual and Actual innocence, “But” also free standing claim[s] also consists and

involves ineffective assistance of counsels], procedural defaults], speculation^] on

evidence and elements], circumstantial evidence and on state res judicata.

Example:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner submitted before trial began as set forth in Case No. Cr-13-574201A, October 9th, 2013 (T. 1-9) that his counsel does not have a defense nor is willing

to apply one, the trial court denied his motion and denied him the right to appeal

that denial.

Trial proceeded and on the trial date of October 28, 2013 in Case No. CR-13574201-A; Trial counsel requested for an investigator to defend and give petitioner

due process of law to investigate the state’s case and the circumstances surrounding

the murder. The trial court ignored the motion because counsel filed it after the jury

was impaneled.

On November 13, 2013; The trial court of Cuyahoga County Common Pleas court

of Ohio, found petitioner guilty for asserting he violated Ohio Rev. Code Ann

§2903.02(A) (murder), Rev. Code Ann §2903.11(A)(1) (felonious assault) , Rev. Code

Ann §2921.12 (A)(1) (Tampering with evidence), and Rev. Code Ann §2927.01

(B)(gross abuse of corpse).

In which he was sentenced a life sentence with eligibility of parole after 18 years

and 6 months.

Petitioner, lost in trial and court appointed counsel for appeal, “See” Court of

Appeals of the Eighth Appellate Division District of Cuyahoga County, Ohio; Case

No. State v. Bridges. 2015-Ohio-1447, C.A. No. 100805. Raising the argument

that the state convicted him unlawfully and the evidence is based on unsupported

testimony, against the weight of the evidence and insufficient evidence. In which

that court affirmed the conviction based on circumstantial evidence, of murder

tampering with evidence and gross abuse of corpse.

Petitioner then filed an application for ineffective assistance of counsel, stating

appellant counsel were ineffective for not raising that trial counsel prejudiced him

by not giving him effective assistance of counsel “See” Case No. State of Ohio v.

Audrey L. Bridges. 2 CR-13-574201 of the Cuyahoga County of Common Pleas

Court, of Cleveland Ohio; Attached to that case of violation[s] are also in the

Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals, Cleveland , Ohio State v. Audrey L. Bridges

Case[s] No. CA-13-100805, affirming the trial court conviction, and denying the

Application for reopening, and reply brief, and Case No[s] State v. Bridges. Ca-14101938, State v. Bridges. Ca-101938; State v. Bridges. CA-102930, State v.

Bridges, CA-103090; State v. Bridges. CA-103634; State v. Bridges, CA-104506;

Denying void judgement[s] and Actual Innocence and ineffective assistance of

2 NOTE: There has been middle initials left out in some of petitioner case[s] so case[s] well be

State of Ohio v. Andrey L. Bridges, and State of Ohio v. Andrey Bridges.

counsel, Due process violations and Constitutional rights guaranteed by

Amendment 5th, 6th, 8th, and 14th, of the United States Constitution.

Also in The Ohio Supreme Court: in State of Ohio v. Audrey Bridges. Case

No[s], 14-2074, Memorandum in Support of Jurisdiction and reconsideration; and

State v. Bridges. 14-2063, Memorandum in support of jurisdiction and

Reconsideration; and State v. Bridges. 15-0718, Memorandum in Support of

Jurisdiction and Reconsideration; and State v . Bridges. 16-0030, Memorandum in

Support of Jurisdiction and reconsideration; and State v. Bridges. 16-1621

Memorandum in Support of Jurisdiction and reconsideration.

Also in the United States District Court for the Northern District Court of the

Eastern Division, Bridges v. Sloan. Case No. l:15-cv-02556, Petition, Return of

Writ by Respondent, Traverse of Petitioner, and all attached documents, and Report

and Recommendation by the magistrate Judge, Reply to the Report and

Recommendation by Petitioner, and order by the District Judge.

Also in the United States Court of appeals for the Sixth Circuit Court, Case # 1913297, Bridges v. Gray, Petitioner request for certificate of Appealabilty, and

attached filings, and the order of the lower court.

Petitioner have submitted that the courts in entertaining the ineffective

assistance of counsel claims, murder, tampering with evidence and gross abuse of

corpse; are violating his Equal protection of the laws by holding his claims res

judicata, and are stipulating them as procedural defaulted, and over stepping the

United States Constitution.

Petitioner have submitted that no courts are hearing his claim properly and have

shown that all opinions and orders are in conflict with one another. “See” above

Case[s], opinions and order[s], “and” Appendix’s”.

Prime example is shown when petitioner shown the courts he is being ping

ponged on the claims placing and replacing the claims on the record and then when

raised in the proper avenue re-placing the claims outside the record, in collateral

proceeding^]. “Compare” State v. Bridges. 2015-Ohio-1447, to State v. Bridses.

2015-Ohio-5428; and State v. Bridses. 2016-Ohio-7298. and State v. Bridses.

2014 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 23569.

No matter where petitioner allege his rights the courts then stipulate the claims

as holding them res judicata.

Petitioner, have then found as held under the Supreme Court of the United

States showing due diligence that he is Factual innocent of the crime [s] he is

convicted of, the lower court[s] then placed a burden on him saying his claims are

set in a freestanding claim, and no court can hear his case under that statue.

Petitioner have submitted that evidence that was used to support the conviction

and sentence is unconstitutional, because the state evidence is not corroborative to

the elements of the charge[s] and had demonstrated the prejudice and shown the

courts-how the evidence is flawed—T-he courts still up held the conviction and'ruled

that petitioner case is overwhelming.

Even when petitioner shown prejudice, showing that no expert testified as to the

evidence that dna, or a weapon, or place or location can by a shadow of a doubt that

connect petitioner to the crime or Location. The only connection was a phone call in

which the experts could not determine if it was petitioner on the other end of the

call talking to the victim. (Trial Transcript 553-15141. EXAMPLE

STATEMENT OF FACTS

(T.l-12) Petitioner requesting effective assistance of counsel before trial, stating

counsel do not have a defense, they argue and he did not do the crime. The trial

court denied the motion and denied him the right to appeal the denial.

(T. 553-592) On April 17, 2013, the body of Carl Acoff Jr. was found in a pond

behind an apartment located at 7168 Mckenzie Road, in Olmsted township. Jeffrey

Bland, who was living at the residence upon finding or discovering the body

testified in trial. He moved at the resident sometime late January 2013. He walks

by the pond everyday going and coming to and from work. He never seen the body

in the pond before. He first seen the body floating in the pond on the first day,

which was more in the middle of the pond. On the Second day he seen the body

floating closer to the shore line. He threw a stick at the body and hit the crotch area

and notice oil coming from the body and went to the Landlord house and told him

what he found. Then he went to the police department.

(T. 707-1514) All experts testified that they do not know or have a location of

where the murder happened, or a day location or time.

(T. 707-1514) trial experts concluded that there was one presence of dna from the

victim on a cord of a space heater. Any other dna was inconclusive except touch dna

that belonged to Jeffrey Bland the person who found the body.

(T. 1100-1193) Jason Quinones - the lease holder testified that he always is at

his girlfriend house (Ireans), but on January 5, 2013; came to the apartment at

12pm and seen petitioner standing in freezing cold in a T-shirt standing next to a

fire pit, burning objects that was not his (Jason’s). Andrey the petitioner, tried to

stop him from going into the apartment, but he went in anyway. Going to the

apartment he seen drops of blood coming from the finger of Andrey’s on the stairs

going up to the apartment. He only stayed for Five to Seven minutes. He told

Andrey to clean up the apartment and to leave, because his house was dirty. Andrey

moved out then.

(T. 1214-1311) Bill king arrived at the apartment with Jason at 12pm. he seen

Andrey- Petitioner standing next to a fire pit and when Jason went into the

apartment. He then started taking pictures of petitioner because he knows a killer

look and he thought petitioner killed someone. He testified that he also was taking

pictures that weekend because he discovered an app, so that was the reason he took

—the picture because the fire-looked cool in-a-negative. He-also testified they only

stayed for Five to seven minutes.

(T. 1100-1193, and 1214-1311) stated that they left Ireans house- (Jason

girlfriend) around 11am, and came to the apartment around 12:pm after paying

for a gas bill, and to collect money from Bridges for the bills.

(1194-1218) Irean Liptke Corroborated both Jason and Bill statement.

( T.1219-1240) Candice Perachio the girlfriend of Ireans son, testified that Bill

was not there that night. Irean, Jason, her and the kids were the only ones

there that night or weekend. She testified she remember this day because it was

a day she went to work for an interview, she just stated. Ireane and Jason was

there that weekend, and they were playing rummy, Bill was never there. She did

not see him either when she left or when she came back, in fact she thought Jason

was at the home the entire day.

(T1355-1398) Christine Ross expert for the state testified that there was calls

from Petitioner call to the victims and that she is not sure who was on the other

end of the calls talking. The victim did make a call at 12:20pm on January 5,

2013 to a 440 number. However, she can only go on what information she

was given, she is also not trained in triangular system, that is when calls can

jump to other satellites.

(1100-1039) Timothy Lewis, the taxi driver was not 100% sure he recognized

recognized both victim and petitioner from January 5th, 2013, but they

looked familiar. He did not recall any arguments, or don’t remember the cloths or

any other thing pertaining to the victim and petitioner.

He did not remember if the victim was a female or male.

(T. 789-810) Martha Acoff, the mother testified no one had her son Facebook

account but him.

(812-835) Nicole Cantie, the cousin of victim testified she saw Facebook posting

after January 5, 2013. It was on January 22, 2013 saying good night world.

(311-1332) David Roose, states expert for the photos testified the photos are not

modified and the time that Bill took the photos are at 15:27:45 that is 3:27:45 nm.

(T.1458-1514) Detective who investigated the case testified, that there is a

corroborating statement connected to petitioner mentioning Jason and Bill are the

killers, and that petitioner statement shows a fear of Jason and Bill.

On October 28, 2013 during trial, trial counsel requested in motion to the court

that they need appointment of investigator, to defend petitioner, and give him a due

process right and to investigate the case. The trial continued and petitioner was left

without defense or due process to test the state’s case.

In multiple attempts petitioner raised Ake u. Oklahoma. (19851 470 U.S. 68, 77,

105 S. Ct. 1087, 84 L. Ed. 2d 53, 62, holding that indigent defendants have the right

to effective assistance of counsel and is entitled to defense of the state’s case, and

that it was necessary to prepare for an effective defense. That the trial court denied

him that right, and that his counsel was ineffective. For not timely moving for an

investigator.

Petitioner then threw his own diligence discovered that the victim was still alive

after the state said he was murdered. By showing two posting of the victim

Facebook account and other statements within the police reports that the detective

stated he did not himself investigate. Petitioner also submitted how his dna made

its presence in the apartment, after trial and this was also to the facts he is

innocent, and showing the courts that he did have ineffective assistance of

counsels]. The sixth Circuit had misapplied this fact of the new evidnce, “See”

Bridges v. Sloan. Case No. l:15-cv-02556; Bridges v. Gray. Case # No. 19-13297,

In re Bridges. 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 38172 ; Bridges v. Gray. 2019 U.S. App.

LEXIS 38285; Bridges v. Gray. 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 387; Bridges v. Sloan.

2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29542.

Petitioner also demonstrated through the record that the detective also stated he

requested evidence to be tested but they never were. And that the recording of

petitioner statement was broken, yet still played in trial court. That shown

petitioner innocence.

Petitioner also demonstrated the time Jason and Bill arrived to the apartment

were different from the expert states evidence that were used to convict him, and

placed the states witnesses to the location with the victim, and how their alibi is

flawed and the state’s evidence is insufficient, speculated and flawed, and that his

conviction is against the United States Constitution, and against the standards set

-in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 37; and' Strickland v. Washington. 446 U.S.

668. And against Rivas v. Fisher. 687, F.3d 514, 552 where compelling evidence

called into serious doubt linking petitioner to the crime.

The lower courts then ping ponged all the claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel claims, denied his actual innocence claim by using res judicata.

Petitioner then in turn in his hurdles raised and shown the court that pursuant

to Durr v. Mitchell, 487 F.3d 423, 434-35, and Richey v. Bradshaw. 498 F.3d

344, 359 (6th Cir. 2007); where a court incorrectly applies res judicata the state rule

then, is not considered reliance on an adequate and independent rule, the issues

was reserved for proper review, yet the Sixth Circuit, failed to de novo the claims

that was not procedural defaulted.

Then ignored all relevant issues and evidence stating petitioner is raising a

freestanding claim. The sixth circuit held that the lower court did not violate

petitioner sixth Amendment right nor any other Constitutional rights and denied

petitioner stating he did not raise a constitutional violation, and so Petitioner comes

to this court for fairness.

The lower court[s] also held that the evidence was not prejudicial and was

supported by circumstantial evidence, even though the evidence was all based on

speculation. As held in O’Laushlin v. O'Brian. 568 F. 3d. 287, 304, 308 also as

held in Brown v. Palmer. 441, F.3d 347, 351 (5th Cir. 2006), holding when

evidence is speculated the conviction is unconstitutional.

. This court has-heldf An allegation that a-verdict was entered upon'insufficient “

evidence, as opposed to a freestanding claim of actual innocence, states a claim

under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution. Jackson v. Virginia. 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560

(1979); In re Winshin. 397 U.S. 358, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368

(1970); Johnson v. Coyle/200 F.3d 987, 991 (6th Cir. 2000); Basby v. Sowders. 894

F.2d 792, 794 (6th Cir. 1990)(en banc).

In order for a conviction to be constitutionally sound, every element of the crime

must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship. 397 U.S. at 364.

Jackson v. Virginia. 443 U.S. at 319; United States v. Paisc. 470 F.3d 603, 608

(6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Somerset, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76699 (S.D. Ohio

2007).

This rule was recognized in Ohio law at State v. Jenks. 61 Ohio St. 3d 259, 574

N.E.2d 492 (1991)(paragraph two of the syllabus), superseded on other grounds by

state constitutional amendment as stated in State v. Smith. 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 102

n.4, 1997- Ohio 355, 684 N.E.2d 668 (1997).

Of course, it is state law which determines the elements of offenses, but once the

State has adopted the elements, it must then prove each of them beyond a

reasonable doubt. “See” In re Winshin. supra.

Under Ohio Law, the charges petitioner was convicted of had to be proved that

under § 2903.02 Murder he (A) No person shall purposely cause the death of

another or-the unlawful termination of another’spregnancy, and'under Ohio Law

he had to be proved that he, under §2903.11 Felonious assault, (A) No person

shall knowingly do either of the following:

(1) Cause serious physical harm to another or to another’s unborn;

(2) Cause or attempt to cause physical harm to another or to another’s unborn by

means of a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance. And Under Ohio Law

§2921.12 Tampering with evidence, petitioner had to A) No person, knowing

that an official proceeding or investigation is in progress, or is about to be or likely

to be instituted, shall do any of the following: (1) Alter, destroy, conceal, or remove

any record, document, or thing, with purpose to impair its value or availability as

evidence in such proceeding or investigation; and Under Ohio Law petitioner had to

§2927.01 Abuse of a corpse, (B) No person, except as authorized by law, shall treat

a human corpse in a way that would outrage reasonable community sensibilities. In

order to be convicted of such charges.

Petitioner, shown the lower court[s] that he is actually and factually innocent of

the crimes for which he was convicted and sentenced. Yet the lower court[s] have

stated, a claim of actual innocence is not itself a constitutional claim but instead a

gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred

constitutional claim considered on the merits. Herrera v. Collins. 506 U.S. 390,

404, 113 S. Ct. 853, 122 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1993). The actual innocence exception is very

narrow in scope and requires proof of factual innocence, not just legal

—insufficiency. Bouslev v. United States. 523 U:S. 614; 623, 118 S. Ct. 1604; 140 L.

Ed. 2d 828 (1998).

In this case, the petitioner is hurdling the systematic denial[s] from the lower

courtfs] when determining the freestanding actual innocence claim, and ask this

court, to determine if it is cognizable. Because courts are in conflict with whether it

should be heard or not heard, any departure hearing these issues are dangerous,

because while showing facts that proves such innocence, and showing violations of

due process rights, the court[s] are not reviewing them because there is not a place

to come, or go to be heard in the instance.

Although the Supreme Court has suggested that it may recognize freestanding

actual innocence claims in capital cases, see Herrera. 506 U.S. at 417, it has not

done so in non-capital cases such as this one.

This departure is not only dangerous to the constitution, but also in the realm of

law, because while the Supreme Court has never held that a "freestanding" actual

innocence claim is cognizable in a non-capital case, it has recognized that a

"freestanding" actual innocence claim could be possible in a capital case. Herrera v.

Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417, 113 S. Ct. 853, 122 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1993) ("in a capital

case a truly persuasive demonstration of'actual innocence’ made after trial would

render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional, and warrant federal habeas

relief if there were no state avenue open to process such a claim."); see also House,

54 / U.S. at 554-55.

_ However, in Herrera, the Supreme, Court reasoned that the "threshold showing

for such an [*21] assumed right would necessarily be extraordinarily high." 506

<310

U.S. at 417. In House, the Supreme Court declined to resolve the issue of whether

there is a cognizable "freestanding" actual innocence claim, but concluded that if

there was, the showing of actual innocence would require more convincing proof

than the "gateway" actual innocence claim espoused in Schlup v. Delo. 513 U.S.

298, 115 S. Ct. 851, 130 L. Ed. 2d 808 (1995).

The, only case regarding freestanding claim in the United States Supreme Court

are McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383 however in this case it only determines

the exceptions of untimely as held: The Court has not resolved whether a prisoner

may be entitled to habeas relief based on a freestanding actual innocence claim

Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404-405, 113 S. Ct. 853, 122 L. Ed. 2d 203, but it

has recognized that a prisoner “otherwise subject to defenses of abusive or

successive use of the writ may have his federal constitutional claim considered on

the merits if he makes a proper showing of actual innocence,” id., at 404, 113 S. Ct.

853, 122 L. Ed. 2d 203.

The Court has already applied this “fundamental miscarriage of justice

exception” to overcome various procedural defaults, including, failure to observe

state procedural rules, such as filing deadlines. See Coleman v. Thompson. 501

U.S. 722, 750, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 115 L. Ed. 2d 640.

The exception, the Court's decisions bear out, survived AEDPA's passage. See,

e.g„_Calderon v. Thompson. 52-3 U.S. 5387-558,T18 S: Ct. 1489, 140 LfEd. 2d

728; House, 547 U.S., at 537-538, 126 S. Ct. 2064, 165 L. Ed. 2d 1.

These decisions “see[k] to balance the societal interests in finality, comity, and

conservation of scarce judicial resources with the individual interest in justice that

arises in the extraordinary case.” Schluv. 513 U.S., at 324, 115 S. Ct. 851, 130 L.

Ed. 2d 808.

Sensitivity to the injustice of incarcerating an innocent individual should not

abate when the impediment is The Supremacy Clause of the Federal

Constitution, U.S. Const, art. VI, cl. 2, proclaims that the Constitution, and

the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof shall be

the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bond thereby,

anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.

Therefore, state laws and constitutional provisions that conflict with the Federal

Constitution are without effect.

In other words, a state may not legislate in an area in which it is preempted by

the Federal Constitution or federal law. Under America's federal system of

government, the states possess sovereignty concurrent with that of the federal

government, subject only to the limitations imposed by the supremacy clause of

the United States Constitution.

Although the legislative authority in the states consists of the full and complete

power as it rests in, and may be exercised by, the sovereign power of any country,

any state law or constitutional-provision is still subject to the limitations which are

contained in the Constitution of the United States.

That same prohibition applies even when the challenged law is authorized under

a state constitutional provision.

A state constitution must give way to requirements of the Supremacy Clause

when there is a conflict with the Federal Constitution.

When the state recognition of a miscarriage of justice exception would render a

claim to proceed.

But when the state makes exceptions as to set vague and incomplete defenses for

reasons to deny would render futile responses that lead to constitutional

violations.

Many petitions have been denied that could not pass through the actualinnocence gateway, in a freestanding claim. Congress' inclusion of a miscarriage of

justice exception is not fully determined, yet courts recognize a due process violation

of equal protection of the law and the right to effective assistance of counsel in

§§2244(b)(2)(B) and 2254(e)(2) indicate an intent to hear cases courts from

applying the exception of denial of constitutional rights.

Congress did not simply incorporate the miscarriage of justice exception to hear

every claim, but it inherited law to review rather a constitutional claim is present,

harmful, and how the affects harms the constitution.

If this court does not take jurisdiction unrestricted constitutional violations will

stand and still stand-in the door way of-this court yelling for justice and fairness.

The barriers not to hear freestanding claims of innocence claim will never invoke

the miscarriage of justice exception. Nor does Due Process sit in the instance of

innocence.

Schlup, 513 U.S., at 327, 115 S. Ct. 851, 130 L. Ed. 2d 808. Bears the burden

on constitutional law, an unexplained delay in reserving constitutional claims.

Taking account of the delay in'the context of the merits of a petitioner's actualinnocence claim, rather than treating timeliness as a threshold inquiry, is tuned to

the exception's underlying rationale of ensuring “that federal constitutional errors

do not result in the incarceration of innocent persons.” Herrera, 506 U.S., at 404,

113 S. Ct. 853, 122 L. Ed. 2d 203. Pp. 398-400, 185 L. Ed. 2d, at 1034-1035.3.

Here, it is not insufficient to rewrite Schlup's actual-innocence standard[s]; or to

deny whether, a freestanding claim is constitutional. There is cause to and should

be where, how, and when a freestanding claim is vital to state a constitutional

claim. Like in petitioner case; There is conflict in decisions of courts of

appeals. Triplett v. Lowell (1936) 297 US 638, 56 S Ct 645, 80 L. Ed 949, reh

den (1936) 298 US 691, 56 S Ct 745, 80 L Ed 1409 and (ovrld in part on other

grounds by Blonder-Tonsue Lab, v University of Illinois Found. (1971) 402 US

313, 91 S Ct 1434, 28 L Ed 2d 788, 169 USPQ 513, 1971 CCH Trade Cases P 73565).

Under Schlup's demanding standard, the gateway should still be open when a

petition-presents “evidence of innocence as strong that a court cannot have

confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial

was free of non-harmless constitutional error.” 513 U.S., at 316, 115 S. Ct. 851, 130

L. Ed. 2d 808. Pp. 400-401, 185 L. Ed. 2d, at 1035-1036.

The sixth circuit held that the lower court did not violate petitioner sixth

Amendment right nor any other Constitutional rights and denied petitioner stating

he did not raise a constitutional violation, and so Petitioner comes to this court for

fairness.

The lower court also held that the evidence was not prejudicial and was

supported by circumstantial evidence, even though the evidence was all based on

speculation. As held in O’Laushlin v. O’Brian. 568 F. 3d. 287, 304, 308 also as

held in Brown v. Palmer. 441, F.3d 347, 351 (5th Cir. 2006), holding when

evidence is speculated the conviction is unconstitutional.

REASON FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I: The issues presented are of importance in The Constitutional and

Uniform Administration of Innocence and manifest miscarriage of justice.

Ohio statue of res judicata is unconstitutional because it defeats Amendment

Fifth; Sixth; Eighth, and Fourteenth of the United States Constitution

A: The lower United States court of appeals has entered a decision in

conflict with the decision of another United States court of appeals on the

same import ant matter;

Ohio, ignoring a free standing claim that shows a manifest injustice of Due Process,

and Equal Protections] of the Law, as protected by Amendment 5, 6, and 14; of the

United States Constitution is unconstitutional. Because it denies a United states

citizen fairness and deprive life and liberty and shorten reliance on justice in the

court[s] of law.

B: The lower court has decided an important matter; and has decided an

important federal question in a way that conflicts with a decision by

court(s) of last resort,

Ineffective assistance of counsel, Strickland v. Washington. 446 U.S. 668, Ake

v. Oklahoma. (1985) 470 U.S. 68, 77, 105 S. Ct. 1087, 84 L. Ed. 2d 53, 62; Right to

be heard fairly, Durr v. Mitchell. 487 F.3d 423, 434-35, and Richey v. Bradshaw.

498 F.3d 344, 359 (6th Cir. 2007); Proof beyond a reasonable doubt, Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 37; prejudicial circumstantial evidence O’Laughlin v.

O’Brian, 568 F. 3d. 287, 304, 308 also as held in Brown v. Palmer. 441, F.3d 347

351 (5th Cir. 2006), factual and actual innocence, under Schuln v. Delo. 513 U.S.

298, 330 (1995); Schulp; Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623, and Murray v. Carrier. 477

U.S. at 496? Rivas v. Fisher, 687, F.3d 514, 552 where compelling evidence called

into serious doubt linking petitioner to the crime.

C: has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial

proceeding, as to call for an exercise of this Court[s] supervisory power.

Ineffective assistance of counsel, Strickland v. Washington. 446 U.S. 668, Ake

v. Oklahoma, (1985) 470 U.S. 68, 77, 105 S. Ct. 1087, 84 L. Ed. 2d 53, 62; Right to

be heard fairly, Durr v. Mitchell 487 F.3d 423, 434-35, and Richey v. Bradshaw.

498 F.3d 344, 359 (6th Cir. 2007); Proof beyond a reasonable doubt, Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 37; prejudicial circumstantial evidence O’Laughlin v.

O’Brian, 568 F. 3d. 287, 304, 308 also as held in Brown v. Palmer. 441, F.3d 347

351 (5th Cir. 2006), factual and actual innocence, under Schuln v. Delo. 513 U.S.

298, 330 (1995); Schulp; Bouslev, 523 U.S. at 623, and Murray v. Carrier. All

U.S. at 496? Rivas v. Fisher, 687, F.3d 514, 552 where compelling evidence called

into serious doubt linking petitioner to the crime.

II: A. State court of last resort has decided an important federal

question in a way that conflicts with the decision of another state court of

last resort or of a United States Court of Appeals.

Ineffective assistance of counsel, Strickland v. Washington. 446 U.S. 668, Ake

v. Oklahoma, (1985) 470 U.S. 68, 77, 105 S. Ct. 1087, 84 L. Ed. 2d 53, 62; Right to

be heard fairly, Durr v. Mitchell, 487 F.3d 423, 434-35, and Richey v. Bradshaw.

498 F.3d 344, 359 (6th Cir. 2007); Proof beyond a reasonable doubt, Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 37; prejudicial circumstantial evidence O’Laughlin v.

O’Brian, 568 F. 3d. 287, 304, 308 also as held in Brown v. Palmer. 441, F.3d 347,

351 (5t,h Cir. 2006), factual and actual innocence, under-Sehuln v. Delo. 513 U.S:

298, 330 (1995); Schulp; Bouslev, 523 U.S. at 623, and Murray v. Carrier. 477

U.S. at 496? Rivas v. Fisher, 687, F.3d 514, 552 where compelling evidence called

into serious doubt linking petitioner to the crime.

Ill: A. State court and United States court of appeals has decided an

important question of federal law that has not yet been decided, but

should be, settled by this court

This court has not yet determined whether a prisoner may be entitled to habeas

corpus relief based on freestanding claim of actual innocence “See” Montgomery v.

Bag ley, 482 F. Supp.2d. 919; that court held: In making a "free standing" claim of

actual innocence, Montgomery relied on Herrera v, Collins. 506 U.S. 390, 113 S.

Ct. 853, 122 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1993). But that court also held that the circuit courts are

split on whether Herrera. recognizes such a claim.

Several courts have read Herrera as invalidating free-standing actual innocence

claims in habeas. Creel v, Johnson. 162 F.3d 385, 395 (5th Cir. 1998); Sellers v.

Ward, 135 F.3d 1333, 1338-39 (10th Cir. 1998); Guinan v. United States. 6 F.3d 468,

470 (7th Cir. 1993); Meadows v. Delo. 99 F.3d 280, 283 (8th Cir. 1996).

Other courts have read Herrera as authorizing a free-standing claim of actual

innocence, or have at least assumed for the sake of argument that habeas courts

could consider free-standing claims of actual innocence. Carriser v. Stewart. 132 F.3d

463, 476 (9th-Cir; 1997) (en-banc) (holding-that"free-standing- -actual-innocence is a

proper claim but not finding sufficient evidence of it); Cornell v. Nix, 119 F.3d 1329

(8th Cir. 1999); O'Dell v. Netherland. 95 F.3d 1214, 1246 n. 25 (4th Cir. 1996)

(assuming for the sake of argument that "free standing" actual innocence states a

claim but noting that the Herrera opinion at 506 U.S. at 416-17 seems to dictate

otherwise.)

For purposes of this analysis, the court assumed in Montgomery that he could

raise a "free-standing" claim of actual innocence, and The Supreme Court indicated

that if such a claim exists, a petitioner must convince the Court "that those new

facts unquestionably establish innocence." Schlup v. Delo. 513 U.S. 298, 316-17

115 S. Ct. 851, 130 L. Ed. 2d 808 (1995)

B: Has decided an important question in a way that conflicts with relevant

decisions of this court,

Ineffective assistance of counsel, Strickland v. Washington. 446 U.S. 668, Ake

v. Oklahoma, (1985) 470 U.S. 68, 77, 105 S. Ct. 1087, 84 L. Ed. 2d 53, 62; Right to

be heard fairly, Durr v. Mitchell. 487 F.3d 423, 434-35, and Richey v. Bradshaw

498 F.3d 344, 359 (6th Cir. 2007); Proof beyond a reasonable doubt, Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 37; prejudicial circumstantial evidence O’Laughlin v.

O’Brian, 568 F. 3d. 287, 304, 308 also as held in Brown v. Palmer. 441, F.3d 347,

351 (5th Cir. 2006), factual and actual innocence, under Schuln v. Delo. 513 U.S.

298, 330 (1995); Schulp; Bouslev. 523 U.S. at 623, and Murray v. Carrier. All

U.S. at 496?, and

Rivas v. Fisher. 687, F.3d 514, 552 where compelling evidence called into serious

doubt linking petitioner to the crime.

CONCLUSION

Based on upholding the United States Constitution and on this court

interpretation of manifest injusticefs], and miscarriage of justice [s], that violates

the United States Constitution; Andrey L. Bridges respectfully asks that a writ of

certiorari issue to review the lower courts order[s], and remand to trial court for a

new trial, or dismiss all actions against Andrey L. Bridges and give him relief....

“FREEDOM” from further unlawful imprisonment.

Respectfully submitted,

ANDREY L. BRIDGES #40^0493

Belmont Correctional Institution

P.O. Box 540

68518 Bannock Road

St. Clairsville, Ohio 43950

IN PROPRIA PERSONA

fc <»

r”

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I. Andre\- Bridges, certify or state; that, a copy of the forgoing was placed in the

;/Th

H bvcM'a f

this~HLdav

fiTIEfcfe^2fr2T): and was sent to Brigham

prison mail box on

Sloan, warden of Lake Erie Correctional Institution, 501 Thompson Road,

Conneaut, Ohio 44030; and David Gray, warden of Belmont Correctional

Institution, P.O. Box 540 St. Clairsville, Ohio 43950; and Attorney General

Assistant Stephanie L. Watson, and Attorney General Assistant Paul Kerridge,

Ohio Attorney General Office Criminal Justice Section, 150 E. Gay Street, 16th,

Floor; Columbus, Ohio 43215. And to all other parties involved in such styled case.

The copies were sent pre-paid first class mail, by U.S. Mail service.

Respectfully submitted,

ANDREY L. BRIDGE^AA650493

Belmont Correctional Institution

P.O. Box 540

68518 Bannock Road

St. Clairsville, Ohio 43950

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.