Petition for Writ of Certiorari — George Maurice Steele, Petitioner v. United States

APPENDIX 1

Case 3:02-cr-00120-TSL Document 77 Filed 04/26/19 Page 1 of 6

AO 24SD (Rev, 11/16) fudgment ina Criminal Case for Revocations JNo

Sheet }

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Southem District of Mississippi APR 26 2019

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Judgment in a Criminal Case "ARTHUR JOHNSTON

v. (For Revocation of Probation or Supervised R DEPUTY!

George Maurice Steele

Case No. 3:02cr120TSL-LRA-001

USM No, 98747-043

Attomey Abby Brumley

‘THE DEFENDANT: en my

OC admitted guilt to violation of condition(s) of the term of supervision.

24 was found in violation of condition(s) count(s) Mandatory Conditions after denial of guilt.

The defendant is adjudicated guilty of these violations:

Yiglation Number Nature of Violation Violation Ended

Mandatory Condition The defendant shall not commit another federal, state orlocal 12/12/2018

crime.

On 12/12/2018 the Jackson Police Department arrested the

(Continue on Page 2)

The defendant is sentenced es provided in pages 2 through 6 of this judgment. The sentence is imposed pursuant to

the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.

O The defendent has not violated condition(s) and is discharged as to such violation(s) condition.

It ts ordered that the defendant must notify the United States attomey fc this district within 30 day Vf

change i oteed residence, or mailing address dd on allt _ ines, restitution, costs, sn and assessments im posed " posed By is judgment are

fully pai to pay ae eta the nda me ust nowy the court and United States attorney of materi

economic circumstances,

Last Four Digits of Defendant's Soc. Sec. No.: 1553 04/18/2019

: Date of Imposition of Judgment

Defendant's Year of Birth: _ 1983

City and State of Defendant's Residence: nd Signature of Judge

Jackson, Mississippi

The Honorable Tom S. Lea Senior U.S. District Judge

Name and Title of Judge

o/re/ 29

7 ? Date

Case 3:02-cr-00120-TSL Document 77 Filed 04/26/19 Page 2 of 6

AD 245D (Rev. 11/16) Fudgment in a Criminal Case for Revocations

Sudgment—Poge 2 6

DEFENDANT: George Maurice Steele

CASE NUMBER: 3:02cri20TSL-LRA-001

ADDITIONAL VIOLATIONS

Violation Number =» Natureof Violation

Mandatory Condition

Coane for Domestic Aggravated Assault and shooting into an Occupied

elling.

The defendant shall not possess a firearm, destructive device, or any other

dangerous weapon.

On 12/12/2016 the defandant was In possession of a firearm prior to his

arrest for Domestic Aggravated Assault and Shooting Inte an Occupied

Dwelling

Violation

Concluded

12/42/2018

Case 3:02-cr-00120-TSL Document 77 Filed 04/26/19 Page 3 of 6

AO245D (Rev, 11/18) Judgment in a Criminal Case for Revecations

Sheet 2—

Judgment — Page 3 of 6

DEFENDANT: George Maurice Steele

CASE NUMBER: 3:02¢r120TSL-LRA-OD1

IMPRISONMENT

The defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a total

term of:

30 Months as to Count 1, 18 Months as to Count 2, 30 Months as to Count 3, and 30 Months as to Count 4 to run

consecutively, for a total of 108 Months.

O The court makes the following recommendations to the Bureau of Prisons:

& The defendant is remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal.

© The defendant shall surrender to the United States Marshal for this district:

D at O am O pm on

© as notified by the United States Marshal.

O The defendant shall surrender for service of sentence at the institution designated by the Bureau of Prisons:

© _sbefore 2 p.m. on

Cs asnotified by the United States Marshal.

as notified by the Probation or Pretrial Services Office.

RETURN

Ihave executed this judgment as follows:

Defendant delivered on to

at with a certified copy of this judgment.

UNITED STATES MARSHAL

By

DEPUTY UNITED STATES MARSHAL

Case 3:02-cr-00120-TSL Document 77 Filed 04/26/19 Page 4 of 6

AQ 245D (Rev. 11/16) Judgment in « Criminal Case for Revocations

Sheet 3 — Supervised Release

So — hlgeeaPigs 4 ot

DEFENDANT: George Maurice Steele

CASE NUMBER: 3:02cr120TSL-LRA-001

SUPERVISED RELEASE

Upon release from imprisonment, you will be on supervised release for aterm of: _5-year term of supervised release as to

Count 1 and an 18-month term of supervised release as to Counts 2, 3, and 4 to run concurrently.

MANDATORY CONDITIONS

|, You must not commit another federal, state or local crime,

2. ‘You must not unlawfully possess a controlled substance.

3. You must refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance. You must submit to one drug test within 15 days of release

from imprisonment and st least two periodic drug tests thereafter, as determined by the court.

C The above drug testing condition is suspended, based on the court's determination that you pose a low risk of future

substance abuse. (check if applicable)

4 Wf Youmust cooperate in the collection of DNA as directed by the probation officer. (check (fapplicable)

5. © Youmust comply with the requirements of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (42 U.S.C, § 16901, et seg.)

as directed by the probation officer, the Bureau of Prisons, or any state sex offender registration agency in the location

where you reside, work, are a student, or were convicted of a qualifying offense. (check fapplicable

6. You must participate in an epproved program for domestic violence. (check fopplicable)

You must comply with the standard conditions that have been sdopted by this court as well as with any other conditions on the

attached page.

Case 3:02-cr-00120-TSL Document 77 Filed 04/26/19 Page 5 of 6

. °

AO 245D (Rev. 11/16) Judgment in.a Criminal Case for Revocations

Sheet 3A — Supervised Release

Judgmeni—Page 3s 6

DEFENDANT: —_ George Maurice Steele

CASE NUMBER: 3:02¢r120TSL-LRA-001

STANDARD CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

As part of your supervised release, you must comply with the following standard conditions of supervision. These conditions are

imposed because they establish the basic expectations for your behavior while on supervision and identify the minimum tools

needed by probation officers to keep informed, report to the court about, and bring about improvements in your conduct and

condition.

ye Pop

You must report to the probation office in the federal judicial district where you are authorized to reside within 72 hours of

your release from imprisonment, unless the probation officer instructs you to report to a different probation office or within a

different time frame.

After initially reporting to the probation office, you will receive instructions from the court or the probation officer about how

and when you must report to the probation officer, and you must report to the probation officer es instructed.

You must not knowingly leave the federal judicial district where you are authorized to reside without first getting permission

from the court or the probation officer.

You must answer truthfully the questions asked by your probation officer.

You must live at a place approved by the probation officer. [f you plan to change where you live or anything about your living

arrangements (such as the people you live with), you must notify the probation officer at least 10 days before the change. If

notifying the probation officer in advance is not possible due to unanticipated circumstances, you must notify the probation

officer within 72 hours of becoming aware of a change or expected change.

You must allow the probation officer to visit you at any time at your home or elsewhere, and you must permit the probation

Officer to take any items prohibited by the conditions of your supervision that he or she observes in plain view.

You must work full time (at Jeast 30 hours per week) at a tawful type of employment, unless the probation officer excuses you

from doing so. If you do not have full-time employment you must try to find full-time employment, unless the probation

officer excuses you from doing so. If you plan to change where you work or anything about your work (such as your position

or your job responsibilities), you must notify the probation officer at least 10 days before the change, If notifying the

probation officer at Ieast 10 days in advance is not possible due to unanticipated circumstances, you must notify the probation

officer within 72 hours of becoming aware of a change or expected change.

You must not communicate or interact with someone you know is engaged in criminal activity. [f you know someone has

been convicted of a felony, you must not knowingly communicate or interact with that person without first getting the

permission of the probation officer.

If you are arrested or questioned by a law enforcement officer, you must notify the probation officer within 72 hours.

You must not own, possess, or have access ¢o a firearm, ammunition, destructive device, or dangerous weapon (i.c., anything

that was designed, or was modified for, the spectfic purpose of causing bodily injury or death to another person such as

nunchakus or tasers).

You must not act or make any agreement with a law enforcement agency to act as a confidential human source or informant

without first getting the permission of the court.

If the probation officer determines that you pose a risk to another person (including an organization), the probation officer

may require you to notify the person about the risk and you must comply with that instruction. The probation officer may

contact the person and confirm that you have notified the person about the risk.

. You must follow the instructions of the probation officer related to the conditions of supervision.

U.S. Probation Office Use Only

A US. probation officer has instructed me on the conditions specified by the court and has provided me with a written copy of this

judgment containing these conditions. For further information regarding these conditions, see Overview of Probation and

Supervised Release Conditions, available at: www.uscourts.gov.

Defendant's Signature Date

Case 3:02-cr-00120-TSL Document 77 Filed 04/26/19 Page 6 of 6

se

AO 24SD (Rev. 11/16) Judgment ina Criminal Case for Revocations

Sheet 3D — Supervised Release

Judgment—Page 6 of a

DEFENDANT: George Maurice Steele

CASE NUMBER: 3;02cr120TSL-LRA-001

SPECIAL CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

(A) You must submit to substance abuse testing to determine if you have used prohibited substances. You must not

attempt to obstruct or tamper with the testing methods.

(8) You must participate in a substance abuse treatment program and follow the rules and regulations of the program.

The probation officer will supervise your participation in the program. You shall contribute to the cost of any substance

abuse treatment program to the best of your ability.

(C) You must not knowingly purchase, possess, distribute, administer, or otherwise use any psychoactive substances

(e.g., synthetic marijuana, bath satts, etc.) that impair a person's physical or mental functioning, whether or not intended

for human consumption, except with the prior approval of the probation officer, or prescribed by a licansed medical

practitioner.

(D) You must submit your person, property, house, residence, vehicle, papers, or office, to a search conducted by a United

States probation officer. Failure to submit to a search may be grounds for revocation of release. You must warn any other

occupants that the premises may be subject to searches pursult to this condition.

The probation officer may conduct a search under this condition only when reasonable suspicion exists that you have

violated a condition of supervision and that the areas to be searched contain evidence of this violation. Any search must

be conducted at a reasonable time and In a reasonable manner.

(E) You must participate in a mental health treatment program and follow the rules and regufations of that program. The

probation officer, in consultation with the treatment provider, will supervise your participation in the program.

APPENDIX 2

Case: 19-60288 Document: 00515181978 Page:1 Date Filed: 10/31/2019

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

No. 19-60288 FILED

Summary Calendar October 31, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Clerk

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

GEORGE MAURICE STEELE,

Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 3:02-CR-120-1

Before BARKSDALE, ELROD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

In challenging the revocation of his term of supervised release and the

sentence imposed following that revocation, George Maurice Steele asserts:

the district court committed reversible error by permitting certain hearsay

statements at his revocation hearing; and his revocation sentence is

unreasonable because the court imposed consecutive terms of imprisonment

for each of the four underlying counts of conviction.

* Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir.

R. 47.5.4.

Case: 19-60288 Document: 00515181978 Page:2 Date Filed: 10/31/2019

No. 19-60288

Steele commenced a term of supervised release in February 2016. In

December 2018, his probation officer filed a petition for an arrest warrant,

alleging Steele violated two mandatory conditions of his supervised-release

term: being arrested for domestic-aggravated assault and shooting into an

occupied dwelling; and being in possession of a firearm prior to this arrest.

During Steele’s revocation hearing, the court heard testimony from two

residents of the occupied dwelling into which it was alleged Steele fired. Both

residents testified to seeing him in possession of a firearm; they also testified

their neighbor (the victim’s young child) stated his mother had been shot by

Steele.

Steele contends the court erred by overruling his objection and allowing

the residents’ testimony regarding the young child’s statement. He claims this

violated his right to confront the witness.

“A district court may revoke a defendant’s supervised release if it finds

by a preponderance of the evidence that a condition of release has been

violated.” United States v. McCormick, 54 F.3d 214, 219 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing

18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3)). Although a decision to revoke supervised release is

reviewed for abuse of discretion, McCormick, 54 F.3d at 219 (citation omitted),

whether the court violated the constitutional right to confrontation in a

revocation proceeding is reviewed de novo, subject to harmless-error analysis.

United States v. Minnitt, 617 F.3d 327, 332 (5th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).

Had revocation been based solely on the residents’ testimony regarding

their observations of Steele in possession of a firearm, the court would not have

abused its discretion in finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Steele

possessed a firearm as provided in the second allegation of the revocation

petition. This finding required the mandatory revocation of Steele’s term of

supervised release, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g)(2). Therefore, any error in

Case: 19-60288 Document: 00515181978 Page:3 Date Filed: 10/31/2019

No. 19-60288

the admission of separate hearsay evidence was harmless. See, e.g., United

States v. Kindred, 918 F.2d 485, 487-88 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding any error in

revoking supervised release based on improper grounds was harmless because

§ 3583(g) mandated revocation).

For the challenge to consecutive, rather than concurrent, sentences

being imposed for each underlying count of conviction, sentences imposed upon

revocation of supervised release are reviewed under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(4)’s

“plainly unreasonable” standard, which is more deferential than the

reasonableness standard applicable to sentences imposed upon conviction.

United States v. Warren, 720 F.3d 321, 326, 329 (5th Cir. 2013) (citations

omitted). Pursuant to this standard, we “first ensure that the district court

committed no significant procedural error”. United States v. Kippers, 685 F.3d

491, 497 (5th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Next,

we consider the “substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed”. Id.

(citation omitted). A presumption of reasonableness applies to within-

Guidelines revocation sentences. United States v. Lopez-Velasquez, 526 F.3d

804, 809 (5th Cir. 2008). If we conclude the revocation sentence is

unreasonable, we may reverse only if “the error was obvious under existing

law”. United States v. Miller, 634 F.3d 841, 843 (5th Cir. 2011) (citation

omitted).

Conceding the district court properly calculated the revocation

sentencing range for each of the four underlying counts of conviction and

imposed a within-Guidelines sentence, Steele acknowledges the presumptive

reasonableness of the sentence. In imposing the sentence, the court explained

it addressed the need “to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct while

on supervised release and to protect the public from further crimes committed

by [Steele]”. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B), (C).

Case: 19-60288 Document: 00515181978 Page:4 Date Filed: 10/31/2019

No. 19-60288

As stated in his brief: “One reason for [challenging his sentence’s length]

on appeal is to preserve the issue in case there is a change of law before the

appeal is final”. Other than this reason, Steele claims only that “[iJmposing a

revocation sentence that is sixty percent of the very lengthy 180-month

sentence served on the underlying conviction is unreasonable”. Steele has

shown neither procedural error or substantive unreasonableness, let alone an

obvious error in the application of existing law.

AFFIRMED.

Case: 19-60288 Document: 00515181982 Page:1 Date Filed: 10/31/2019

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

Dees octoberai 2018

Summary Calendar ,

Lyle W. Cayce

D.C. Docket No. 3:02-CR-120-1 Clerk

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

GEORGE MAURICE STEELE,

Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Mississippi

Before BARKSDALE, ELROD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

JUDGMENT

This cause was considered on the record on appeal and the briefs on file.

It is ordered and adjudged that the judgment of the District Court is

affirmed.

APPENDIX 3

United States v. Steele, 783 Fed.Appx. 423 (2019)

783 Fed.Appx. 423 (Mem)

This case was not selected for

publication in West's Federal Reporter.

See Fed. Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1

generally governing citation of judicial decisions

issued on or after Jan. 1, 2007. See also

U.S.Ct. of App. 5th Cir. Rules 28.7 and 47.5.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee

ve

George Maurice STEELE, Defendant - Appellant

No.

Summary Calendar

|

FILED October 31, 2019

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern

District of Mississippi, USDC No. 3:02-CR-120-1

Attorneys and Law Firms

Gregory Layne Kennedy, Esq.. Assistant U.S. Attorney, Carla

J. Clark, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney's Office,

Southern District of Mississippi, Jackson, MS, for Plaintiff -

Appellee

Abby Webber Brumley, Esq., Assistant Federal Public

Defender, Thomas Creagher Turner, Jr., Esq., Federal Public

Defender’s Office, Southern District of Mississippi, Jackson,

MS, for Defendant - Appellant

Before BARKSDALE, ELROD, and DUNCAN, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion

PER CURIAM: °

, Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th

Cir. R. 47.5.4.

In challenging the revocation of his term of supervised

release and the sentence imposed following that revocation,

WESTLAW

George Maurice Steele asserts: the district court committed

reversible error by permitting certain hearsay statements

at his revocation hearing; and his revocation sentence is

unreasonable because the court imposed consecutive terms

of imprisonment for each of the four underlying counts of

conviction.

Steele commenced a term of supervised release in February

2016. In December 2018, his probation officer filed a petition

for an arrest warrant, alleging Steele violated two mandatory

conditions of his supervised-release term: being arrested for

domestic-aggravated assault and shooting into an occupied

dwelling; and being in possession of a firearm prior to this

arrest.

During Steele’s revocation hearing, the court heard testimony

from two residents of the occupied dwelling into which it

was alleged Steele fired. Both residents testified *424 to

seeing him in possession of a firearm; they also testified their

neighbor (the victim’s young child) stated his mother had

been shot by Steele.

Steele contends the court erred by overruling his objection

and allowing the residents’ testimony regarding the young

child’s statement. He claims this violated his right to confront

the witness.

“A district court may revoke a defendant’s supervised release

if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that a condition

of release has been violated.” United States v. McCormick, 54

F.3d 214, 219 (Sth Cir. 1995) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3)).

Although a decision to revoke supervised release is reviewed

for abuse of discretion, AfcCormick, 54 F.3d at 219 (citation

omitted), whether the court violated the constitutional right to

confrontation in a revocation proceeding is reviewed de nove,

subject to harmless-error analysis. United States v. Minnitt,

617 F.3d 327, 332 (5th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).

Had revocation been based solely on the residents’ testimony

regarding their observations of Steele in possession of a

firearm, the court would not have abused its discretion in

finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Steele

possessed a firearm as provided in the second allegation of

the revocation petition. This finding required the mandatory

revocation of Steele’s term of supervised release, pursuant to

18 U.S.C, § 3583(g)(2). Therefore, any error in the admission

of separate hearsay evidence was harmless. See, e.g., United

States v. Kindred, 918 F.2d 485, 487-88 (Sth Cir. 1990)

(holding any error in revoking supervised release based on

United States v. Steele, 783 Fed.Appx. 423 (2019)

improper grounds was harmless because § 3583(g) mandated

revocation).

For the challenge to consecutive, rather than concurrent,

sentences being imposed for each underlying count of

conviction, sentences imposed upon revocation of supervised

release are reviewed under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(4)’s “plainly

unreasonable” standard, which is more deferential than the

reasonableness standard applicable to sentences imposed

upon conviction. United States v. Warren, 720 F.3d 321,

326, 329 (Sth Cir. 2013) (citations omitted), Pursuant

to this standard, we “first ensure that the district court

committed no significant procedural error”. United States

v. Kippers, 685 F.3d 491, 497 (5th Cir. 2012) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted), Next, we consider the

“substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed”. /d.

(citation omitted). A presumption of reasonableness applies

to within-Guidelines revocation sentences. United States ¥.

Lopes-Velasquez, 526 F.3d 804, 809 (Sth Cir. 2008). If we

conclude the revocation sentence is unreasonable, we may

reverse only if “the error was obvious under existing law”.

United States v. Miller, 634 F.3d 841, 843 (5th Cir. 2011)

{citation omitted).

WESTLAW

Conceding the district court properly calculated the

revocation sentencing range for each of the four

underlying counts of conviction and imposed a within-

Guidelines sentence, Steele acknowledges the presumptive

reasonableness of the sentence. In imposing the sentence,

the court explained it addressed the need “to afford adequate

deterrence to criminal conduct while on supervised release

and to protect the public from further crimes committed by

[Steele]”. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B), (C).

As stated in his brief; “One reason for [challenging his

sentence’s length] on appeal is to preserve the issue in case

there is a change of law before the appeal is final”. Other than

this reason, Steele claims only that “[i]Jmposing a revocation

sentence that is sixty percent of the very lengthy 180-

month sentence served on the *425 underlying conviction

is unreasonable”. Steele has shown neither procedural error

or substantive unreasonableness, let alone an obvious error in

the application of existing law.

AFFIRMED.

All Citations

783 Fed.Appx. 423 (Mem)