Petition for Writ of Certiorari — B. T. D., Petitioner v. Alabama
Supreme Court briefJan 4, 2019
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ALABAMA COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2018-2019
_________________________
CR-17-1171
_________________________
State of Alabama
v.
B.T.D.
__________________
B.T.D.
v.
State of Alabama
Appeal from Tuscaloosa Circuit Court
(CC-17-3009)
McCOOL, Judge.
CR-17-1171
The State of Alabama appeals a judgment of the Tuscaloosa
Circuit Court dismissing an indictment charging B.T.D. with
second-degree assault, see § 13A-6-21, Ala. Code 1975, based
on the circuit court's conclusion that § 12-15-204, Ala. Code
1975, is unconstitutional.
B.T.D. cross-appeals.
For the
reasons set forth herein, we reverse the judgment and remand
the cause for further proceedings.
Facts and Procedural History
On
August
25,
2017,
a
Tuscaloosa
County
grand
jury
returned an indictment charging B.T.D. with the second-degree
assault of C.H.
Although B.T.D. was 17 years old at the time
of the alleged assault, in which C.H. allegedly suffered a
broken leg, § 12-15-204 required that B.T.D. be tried as an
adult for the alleged assault.
Specifically, § 12-15-204(a)
provides:
"(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
any person who has attained the age of 16 years at
the time of the conduct charged and who is charged
with the commission of any act or conduct, which if
committed by an adult would constitute any of the
following, shall not be subject to the jurisdiction
of juvenile court but shall be charged, arrested,
and tried as an adult:
"(1) A capital offense.
"(2) A Class A felony.
2
CR-17-1171
"(3) A felony which has as an element
thereof the use of a deadly weapon.
"(4) A felony which has as an element
thereof the causing of death or serious
physical injury.
"(5) A felony which has as an element
thereof the use of a dangerous instrument
against any person who is one of the
following:
"a.
A
law
enforcement
officer or official.
"b. A correctional officer
or official.
"c. A parole or probation
officer or official.
"d.
A
juvenile
court
probation officer or official.
"e. A district attorney or
other prosecuting officer or
official.
"f. A
official.
judge
or
judicial
"g. A
official.
court
officer
or
"h. A person who is a grand
juror, juror, or witness in any
legal proceeding of whatever
nature when the offense stems
from, is caused by, or is related
to the role of the person as a
juror, grand juror, or witness.
3
CR-17-1171
"i. A teacher, principal, or
employee of the public education
system of Alabama.
"(6) Trafficking in drugs in violation
of Section 13A-12-231, or as the same may
be amended.
"(7) Any lesser included offense of
the above offenses charged or any lesser
felony offense charged arising from the
same facts and circumstances and committed
at the same time as the offenses listed
above. Provided, however, that the juvenile
court shall maintain original jurisdiction
over these lesser included offenses if the
grand jury fails to indict for any of the
offenses enumerated in subsections (a)(1)
to (a)(6), inclusive. The juvenile court
shall also maintain original jurisdiction
over these lesser included offenses,
subject to double jeopardy limitations, if
the court handling criminal offenses
dismisses
all
charges
for
offenses
enumerated in subsections (a)(1) to (a)(6),
inclusive."
(Emphasis added.)
On December 6, 2017, B.T.D. filed a motion seeking to
have the circuit court dismiss the indictment and to declare
§ 12-15-204 unconstitutional.
204
violates
the
Due
According to B.T.D., § 12-15-
Process
Clauses
of
the
Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. I, § 6,
of the Alabama Constitution of 1901.
In support of that
argument, B.T.D. cited Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541
4
CR-17-1171
(1966), in which, he said, the United States Supreme Court
"held that the transfer of a child from juvenile to adult
court
imposes
a
significant
deprivation
of
liberty"
and
therefore "made clear that a transfer proceeding must provide
due process protections."
(C. 44.)
Specifically, B.T.D.
contended that Kent requires the juvenile court to make a
"full investigation ... into the facts of the alleged offense"
and consider certain factors before a juvenile offender can be
tried as an adult.
204,
which
(C. 45.)
automatically
Thus, B.T.D. argued, § 12-15-
requires
that
certain
juvenile
offenders be tried as an adult, "lacks the core requirements
of Kent" (C. 45) because "procedural protections ... [are]
nonexistent." (C. 49.) In further support of his due-process
claim, B.T.D. also argued that juveniles have "a substantive
due process right to have their youthfulness and its attendant
characteristics considered as a mitigating factor at every
stage of delinquency and criminal proceedings, ... especially
regarding automatic transfer."
(C. 55.)
In support of that
argument, B.T.D. cited Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005);
Graham
v.
Florida,
560
U.S.
48
(2010);
J.D.B.
v.
North
Carolina, 564 U.S. 261 (2011); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460
5
CR-17-1171
(2012); and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct.
718 (2016).
According to B.T.D., in those cases, the United
States Supreme Court "repeatedly emphasized the importance of
the hallmark features of adolescence to our laws of criminal
procedure" (C. 42) and "demanded individualized consideration
of those features before children can be exposed to the
harshest consequences of the adult criminal justice system."
(C. 42-43.)
B.T.D. also argued that § 12-15-204 violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.1
In support of that argument, B.T.D.
noted that, under § 12-15-203, Ala. Code 1975, a juvenile
offender who is 14 or 15 years old can be tried as an adult,
regardless of the offense, only after a hearing at which the
1
Although the Alabama Constitution does not contain an
equal-protection clause, B.T.D. also argued that § 12-15-204
violates equal-protection guarantees that, he said, are
guaranteed collectively by Art. I, §§ 1, 6, and 22, of the
Alabama Constitution. However, although that proposition was
once recognized in Alabama, see, e.g., Cooley v. Knapp, 607
So. 2d 146, 148 n.5 (Ala. 1992), the Alabama Supreme Court has
since held that those sections do not guarantee equal
protection of the laws. See Ex parte Melof, 735 So. 2d 1172,
1181-86 (Ala. 1999).
6
CR-17-1171
juvenile court must consider certain factors.2
However,
2
Section 12-15-203 provides, in part:
"(a) A prosecutor, before a hearing on a
delinquency petition on its merits and after
notifying, verbally or in writing, the juvenile
probation officer, may file a motion requesting the
juvenile court judge to transfer a child for
criminal prosecution to the circuit or district
court, if the child was 14 or more years of age at
the time of the conduct charged and is alleged to
have committed an act which would constitute a
criminal offense as defined by this code if
committed by an adult.
"(b) The juvenile court judge shall conduct a
hearing on all motions for the purpose of
determining whether it is in the best interests of
the child or the public to grant the motion.
"....
"(d) Evidence of the following and other
relevant factors shall be considered in determining
whether the motion shall be granted:
"(1) The nature of the present alleged
offense.
"(2) The extent and nature of the
prior delinquency record of the child.
"(3) The nature of past treatment
efforts and the nature of the response of
the child to the efforts.
"(4) Demeanor.
"(5) The extent and nature of the
physical and mental maturity of the child.
7
CR-17-1171
B.T.D. noted, a juvenile who has attained the age of 16 years
and is charged with an offense enumerated in § 12-15-204 is
automatically prosecuted as an adult.
Relying on Roper,
Graham, J.D.B., Miller, and Montgomery, B.T.D. argued that "no
ground can be conceived to justify the distinctions drawn
between older and younger children" in § 12-15-204.
(C. 57.)
Finally, B.T.D. argued that § 12-15-204(a)(4) –- the
specific paragraph of § 12-15-204 mandating that he be tried
as an adult –- is unconstitutionally vague and overly broad.
As noted, § 12-15-204(a)(4) requires that a juvenile offender
who has attained the age of 16 years be tried as an adult for
committing "[a] felony which has as an element thereof the
causing of death or serious physical injury."
According to
B.T.D., however, the phrase "serious physical injury" lacks
sufficient clarity and is "so broad and vague that it invites
arbitrary ... prosecution."
(C. 54.)
The State filed a response to B.T.D.'s motion in which it
argued
that
this
Court
has
already
decided
"(6) The interests of the community
and of the child requiring that the child
be
placed
under
legal
restraint
or
discipline."
8
the
CR-17-1171
constitutionality of § 12-15-34.1, Ala. Code 1975 –- the
predecessor to § 12-15-204 –- in Price v. State, 683 So. 2d 44
(Ala. Crim. App. 1996).3
On June 25, 2018, the circuit court
heard oral arguments from the parties regarding B.T.D.'s dueprocess and equal-protection challenges to § 12-15-204 and his
vagueness and overbreadth challenges to § 12-15-204(a)(4).
On August 30, 2018, the circuit court entered a judgment
dismissing the indictment against B.T.D. based on the court's
findings that § 12-15-204 violates a juvenile offender's dueprocess rights and that § 12-15-204(a)(4), specifically, is
unconstitutionally vague and overly broad.
In support of its
conclusion that § 12-15-204 violates due-process principles,
the circuit court relied on Roper, Graham, J.D.B., Miller, and
Montgomery to find that a juvenile has "a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in his status as a juvenile."
(C.
1248.) (For ease of reference in this opinion, we hereinafter
refer to Roper, Graham, J.D.B., Miller, and Montgomery as "the
Roper line of cases.")
In reaching that conclusion, the
3
Section 12-15-34.1 was amended and renumbered as § 12-15204 by Act No. 2008-277, Alabama Acts 2008. The provisions of
§ 12-15-34.1 relevant to this case remained the same in § 1215-204.
9
CR-17-1171
circuit
court
reasoned
that
the
Roper
line
of
cases
"recognized that youth are developmentally different from
adults" (C. 1241) and therefore "mandate[s] an individualized
approach before youth may be subjected to adult consequences."
(C. 1243.)
Specifically, the circuit court contended that
Kent "listed several factors that should be considered before
a child may be transferred to adult criminal court."
(C.
1246.) Thus, the circuit court concluded, because § 12-15-204
"does not allow for consideration of any of the Kent factors,"
the statute "violates due process by mandating that certain
children
automatically
be
treated
as
adults,
thereby
foreclosing any consideration of their individual attributes
and circumstances."4
(C. 1247.)
specifically,
circuit
the
As to § 12-15-204(a)(4),
court
concluded
that
the
legislature's use of the phrase "serious physical injury"
renders
§
12-15-204(a)(4)
overly-broad."
(C. 1251.)
unconstitutionally
"vague
and
According to the circuit court,
4
Although the circuit court interpreted Kent to provide
that there are eight factors a juvenile court must consider in
a Kent hearing, Kent does not set forth any particular factors
to consider in such a hearing but, rather, merely generally
provides that a Kent hearing "must measure up to the
essentials of due process and fair treatment." Kent, 383 U.S.
at 562.
10
CR-17-1171
under § 12-15-204(a)(4), "[a] child can be deprived of her/his
liberty
interest
in
remaining
in
juvenile
court
...
in
virtually every circumstance involving allegations of a felony
with an injury."
(C. 1251-52.)
Finally, the circuit court
rejected the State's argument that this Court upheld the
constitutionality of § 12-15-204 in Price.
According to the
circuit court, this Court did not address the appellant's dueprocess arguments in Price because those arguments had been
waived for appellate review.
The circuit court also noted
that Price "makes no mention of Kent" and "was decided ...
before the current automatic transfer provision, § 12-15-204,
was even adopted, and without the Supreme Court's current
doctrinal view of children's constitutional rights under the
Constitution."
(C. 1252-53.)
The State filed a timely notice of appeal in which it
argues that the circuit court erred by holding that § 12-15204 violates due-process principles and by holding that § 1215-204(a)(4) is vague and overly broad. B.T.D. filed a crossappeal in which he argues that the circuit court erred by
refusing to find § 12-15-204 unconstitutional in its entirety.
However, B.T.D.'s cross-appeal is due to be dismissed because
11
CR-17-1171
there is no adverse ruling to B.T.D. from which he can appeal.
It is true that B.T.D. requested the circuit court find § 1215-204 unconstitutional in its entirety, and it is also true
that, in the introductory paragraph of its judgment, the
circuit court stated that § 12-15-204(a)(4) violates dueprocess principles but that the court was denying B.T.D.'s
request
to
entirety.
declare
§
12-15-204
(C. 1238-39.)
unconstitutional
in
its
However, it is evident from the
substance of the circuit court's judgment that, although the
court's vagueness and overbreadth analysis is specific to §
12-15-204(a)(4), its due-process analysis is applicable to §
12-15-204 in its entirety.
That is to say, if § 12-15-
204(a)(4) "violates due process by mandating that certain
children automatically be treated as adults" (C. 1247), as the
circuit court concluded, then § 12-15-204 in its entirety
violates due-process principles for the same reason.
Thus,
because the circuit court's statement that it did not find §
12-15-204 unconstitutional in its entirety is inconsistent
with
the
court's
constitutes dicta.
due-process
analysis,
that
statement
See Brookwood Health Servs., Inc. v.
Affinity Hosp., LLC, 101 So. 3d 1221, 1224 (Ala. Civ. App.
12
CR-17-1171
2012).
As a result, B.T.D. received the relief he sought –-
a judgment declaring § 12-15-204 unconstitutional –- and
therefore did not receive an adverse ruling from which he can
appeal.
Id.
Accordingly, we dismiss the cross-appeal and
proceed with a discussion of the constitutionality of § 12-15204.
Standard of Review
"The Alabama Supreme Court has discussed the
principles applicable to a challenge to the
constitutionality of a statute, noting first that
review of a challenge is de novo.
State ex rel.
King v. Morton, 955 So. 2d 1012, 1017 (Ala. 2006).
The Court stated:
"'[A]cts
of the legislature are
presumed constitutional. State v. Alabama
Mun. Ins. Corp., 730 So. 2d 107, 110 (Ala.
1998).
See also Dobbs v. Shelby County
Econ. & Indus. Dev. Auth., 749 So. 2d 425,
428
(Ala.
1999)
("In
reviewing
the
constitutionality of a legislative act,
this Court will sustain the act '"unless it
is clear beyond reasonable doubt that it is
violative of the fundamental law."'" White
v. Reynolds Metals Co., 558 So. 2d 373, 383
(Ala. 1989) (quoting Alabama State Fed'n of
Labor v. McAdory, 246 Ala. 1, 9, 18 So. 2d
810, 815 (1944))).
We approach the
question of the constitutionality of a
legislative act "'"with every presumption
and intendment in favor of its validity,
and seek to sustain rather than strike down
the enactment of a coordinate branch of the
government."'" Monroe v. Harco, Inc., 762
So. 2d 828, 831 (Ala. 2000) (quoting Moore
13
CR-17-1171
v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So. 2d 156,
159 (Ala. 1991), quoting in turn McAdory,
246 Ala. at 9, 18 So. 2d at 815).
"'Moreover, in order to overcome the
presumption of constitutionality, ... the
party asserting the unconstitutionality of
the Act ... bears the burden "to show that
[the Act] is not constitutional." Board of
Trustees of Employees' Retirement Sys. of
Montgomery v. Talley, 291 Ala. 307, 310,
280 So. 2d 553, 556 (1973). See also Thorn
v. Jefferson County, 375 So. 2d 780, 787
(Ala. 1979) ("It is the law, of course,
that a party attacking a statute has the
burden of overcoming the presumption of
constitutionality ....").'
"955 So. 2d at 1017."
State v. Worley, 102 So. 3d 435, 448–49 (Ala. Crim. App.
2011).
Discussion
The issues before this Court are whether § 12-15-204
violates
due-process
whether
§
and
equal-protection
12-15-204(a)(4),
specifically,
principles
and
violates
the
doctrines of vagueness and overbreadth. 5
5
Although the circuit court did not conclude that § 12-15204 violates equal-protection principles, B.T.D. asserted that
argument below and has asserted it on appeal as a basis for
this Court to conclude that the statute is unconstitutional.
With certain exceptions not applicable here, an appellate
court may affirm a judgment for any valid reason. Fowler v.
Johnson, 961 So. 2d 122, 135 n.12 (Ala. 2006).
Thus, we
14
CR-17-1171
I. Due Process and Equal Protection
"The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits state governments from depriving 'any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ....'
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
This clause has two components:
the procedural due process and the substantive due process
components."
1999).
Singleton v. Cecil, 176 F.3d 419, 424 (8th Cir.
Although procedural and substantive due process "are
not mutually exclusive" doctrines, Becker v. Kroll, 494 F.3d
904, 918 n.8 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Albright v. Oliver, 510
U.S. 266, 301 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting)), "[t]he two
components are distinct from each other because each has
different
objectives,
and
each
imposes
different
constitutional limitations on government power."
Howard v.
Grinage, 82 F.3d 1343, 1349 (6th Cir. 1996).
"'[P]rocedural
due
process,
protected
by
the
Constitutions of the United States and this State, requires
notice
and
an
opportunity
to
be
heard
when
one's
life,
liberty, or property interest are about to be affected by
governmental action.'" Ex parte Fountain, 842 So. 2d 726, 729
include an equal-protection discussion in our analysis.
15
CR-17-1171
(Ala. 2001) (quoting Brown's Ferry Waste Disposal Ctr., Inc.
v. Trent, 611 So. 2d 226, 228 (Ala. 1992)).
Thus, the
essential threshold inquiry in a procedural due-process claim
is
whether
the
claimant
can
establish
governmental
interference with a protected liberty or property interest.
See Stephenson v. Lawrence Cty. Bd. of Educ., 782 So. 2d 192,
200 (Ala. 2000) (noting that a "protected property interest"
is "an essential threshold requirement for establishing a
claim based on an alleged deprivation of procedural due
process"); and Crawford v. State, 92 So. 3d 168, 171 (Ala.
Crim.
App.
2011)
(noting
that,
"[t]o
prevail
on
a
procedural-due-process claim," the claimant "must show that
the
[government]
deprive[d]
him
of
a
protected
liberty
interest"). In the absence of a protected liberty or property
interest,
procedural
due
process
is
not
required
in
conjunction with government interference. See Stephenson, 782
So. 2d at 201 (holding that the appellant was not entitled to
procedural due process because she did not have a "protectable
property interest" in her employment); and Crawford, 92 So. 3d
at 172 (considering whether the appellant satisfied "the first
prong
of
the
procedural
due-process
16
analysis,"
i.e.,
CR-17-1171
establishing
a
"protected
considering
"whether
deprivation
of
adequate").
See also Rezaq v. Nalley, 677 F.3d 1001, 1017
his
the
liberty
liberty
interest,"
procedure
accompanying
interest
was
before
the
constitutionally
(10th Cir. 2012) (holding that, because the appellants "lack
a cognizable liberty interest" in avoiding transfer between
prisons, "no due process protections were required before they
were transferred"); and Cucciniello v. Keller, 137 F.3d 721,
724 (2d Cir. 1998) ("Since no protected liberty interest is
being impaired, no due process is required.").
The substantive due-process component of the Fourteenth
Amendment, on the other hand, "protects individual liberty
against 'certain government actions regardless of the fairness
of the procedures used to implement them.'"
Collins v. City
of Harker Heights, Texas, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (quoting
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (emphasis
added)).
It
prohibits
individual
liberty
that
governmental
is
interference
"unreasonable,
with
arbitrary,
or
capricious," Walter v. City of Gulf Shores, 829 So. 2d 181,
186 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001), by "forc[ing] courts to step
beyond merely assuring ... that a state actor fairly followed
17
CR-17-1171
a particular procedure (procedural due process) and to examine
whether the particular outcome was itself 'fair' or whether it
was
impermissibly
'arbitrary
or
conscience
shocking.'"
Alabama Republican Party v. McGinley, 893 So. 2d 337, 344
(Ala. 2004) (quoting Waddell v. Hendry Cty. Sheriff's Office,
329
F.3d
1300,
1305
(11th
Cir.
2003)).
In
doing
so,
substantive due process "protects those fundamental rights and
liberties which are, objectively, 'deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition,' and 'implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty,' such that 'neither liberty nor justice
would
exist
if
they
were
sacrificed.'"
Washington
v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (citations omitted).
Of
course,
prohibition
substantive
of
due
governmental
process
is
interference
not
an
with
absolute
individual
liberty but, rather, requires courts to balance the sanctity
of
individual
liberty
against
the
necessity
government's interference with that liberty.
of
the
Hernandez v.
Foster, 657 F.3d 463, 478 (7th Cir. 2011); Norris v. Engles,
494 F.3d 634, 638 (8th Cir. 2007).
Similarly, although the
Equal Protection Clause provides, as its name implies, that
the government shall not "deny to any person within its
18
CR-17-1171
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws," U.S. Const.,
Amend. XIV, § 1, the right to equal protection of the laws is
not absolute.
See Wilkins v. Gaddy, 734 F.3d 344, 347 (4th
Cir. 2013) (noting that the right to equal protection of the
laws "is not and cannot be absolute" (citing Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996))); and Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600,
612 (1974) (noting that "there are obviously limits beyond
which the equal protection analysis may not be pressed").
As
in a substantive due-process analysis, courts addressing an
equal-protection claim must weigh competing interests, i.e.,
the
burden
imposed
by
the
discriminatory
classification
against the government's justification for the discrimination.
Van Allen v. Cuomo, 621 F.3d 244, 248 (2d Cir. 2010).
With these general principles in mind, we turn to a
discussion of whether § 12-15-204 violates due-process or
equal-protection principles.
A. Procedural Due Process
As
noted,
the
threshold
question
in
addressing
a
procedural due-process claim is whether the claimant has been
deprived of a protected liberty or property interest.
In
concluding that § 12-15-204 violates due process, the circuit
19
CR-17-1171
court relied on Kent and the Roper line of cases to conclude
that juvenile offenders have "a constitutionally protected
liberty interest in [their] status as a juvenile" and, as a
result, are entitled to the procedural due process set forth
in Kent before they can be prosecuted in "adult court."
However, the circuit court's reliance on Kent and the Roper
line of cases is misplaced.
We begin by noting that, contrary to the circuit court's
conclusion, it is widely recognized that "treatment as a
juvenile is not an inherent right but one granted by the state
legislature[;] therefore, the legislature may restrict or
qualify that right as it sees fit, as long as no arbitrary or
discriminatory
classification
is
involved."
Wainwright, 556 F.2d 781, 785 (5th Cir. 1977).
Woodard
v.
See, e.g.,
C.B. v. State, 406 S.W.3d 796, 800 (Ark. 2012) (same, quoting
Woodard); Brazill v. State, 845 So. 2d 282, 287 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2003) (noting that "there is no absolute right
conferred by common law, constitution, or otherwise, requiring
children to be treated in a special system for juvenile
offenders"); State v. B.B., 300 Conn. 748, 752-53, 17 A.3d 30,
33-34 (2011) ("Any liberty interest in status as a defendant
20
CR-17-1171
on
the
youthful
offender
docket
...
results
only
from
statutory authority.
'Any [special treatment] accorded to a
juvenile
his
because
proceedings
statutory
of
relative
to
authority,
[or
a
her]
criminal
rather
than
age
with
offense
from
any
respect
results
inherent
to
from
or
constitutional right.'" (footnote and citation omitted));
Cuvas v. State, 306 Ga. App. 679, 683, 703 S.E.2d 116, 120
(2010) (noting that there is "no inherent right to be treated
as a juvenile"); State v. Coleman, 271 Kan. 733, 735, 26 P.3d
613, 616 (2001) (noting that "adjudication as a juvenile is
not a fundamental interest" and that the "special treatment of
juvenile offenders on account of age is not an inherent or
constitutional
right
but
rather
results
from
statutory
authority, which can be withdrawn"); Stout v. Commonwealth, 44
S.W.3d 781, 785 (Ky. Ct. App. 2000) ("It is axiomatic that a
juvenile offender has no constitutional right to be tried in
juvenile court."); and In re J.F., 714 A.2d 467, 472 (Pa.
1998) (recognizing that there is "no constitutional right to
treatment as a juvenile").
Of
course,
as
some
of
those
cases
note,
a
state's
legislature can choose to provide juvenile offenders with a
21
CR-17-1171
statutorily
protected
adjudication.
liberty
interest
in
juvenile-court
"If the Legislature provides a juvenile with a
statutory right to 'exclusive' juvenile court jurisdiction,
... the juvenile does have a protectable liberty interest in
a juvenile adjudication, which attaches when the juvenile
court attains jurisdiction."
511, 517 (Minn. 2012).
State v. Grigsby, 818 N.W.2d
However, "[a]bsent a statutory right
to 'exclusive' juvenile court jurisdiction, a child does not
have any recognized protectable liberty interest in a juvenile
adjudication."
Id.
The Alabama Juvenile Justice Act, § 12-15-101 et seq.,
Ala. Code 1975, provides, in pertinent part:
"(a) This chapter shall be known as the Alabama
Juvenile Justice Act. The purpose of this chapter
is to facilitate the care, protection,
and
discipline
of
children
who
come
under
the
jurisdiction
of
the
juvenile
court,
while
acknowledging the responsibility of the juvenile
court to preserve the public peace and security."
§
12-15-101(a)
(emphasis
added).
Section
§
12-15-204
provides, in pertinent part:
"(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
any person who has attained the age of 16 years at
the time of the conduct charged and who is charged
with the commission of any act or conduct, which if
committed by an adult would constitute any of the
following, shall not be subject to the jurisdiction
22
CR-17-1171
of juvenile court but shall be charged, arrested,
and tried as an adult:
"....
"(4) A felony which has as an element
thereof the causing of death or serious
physical injury."
(Emphasis added.)
Thus, our legislature has expressly provided that not all
juveniles will "come under the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court." § 12-15-101(a). Specifically, juvenile offenders who
have attained the age of 16 years and who are charged with an
offense enumerated in § 12-15-204 are not subject to the
jurisdiction
of
the
juvenile
court
but,
instead,
are
automatically to be tried in "adult court." Consequently, our
legislature has not provided such juvenile offenders with a
statutorily
protected
liberty
interest
in
juvenile-court
adjudication but, in fact, has expressly denied them such a
liberty interest. Accordingly, in Alabama, juveniles who have
attained the age of 16 years and who are charged with an
offense
enumerated
in
§
12-15-204
have
neither
a
constitutionally nor statutorily protected liberty interest in
juvenile-court
adjudication
that
would
entitle
them
to
procedural due process before they can be subjected to the
23
CR-17-1171
jurisdiction of the "adult court."
Contrary to the circuit
court's conclusion, Kent and the Roper line of cases do not
conflict with this conclusion.
In Kent, the United States Supreme Court considered a
challenge to a District of Columbia statute under which the
juvenile
court
had
exclusive
jurisdiction
over
juvenile
offenders but could, "'after full investigation,'" waive its
jurisdiction over a juvenile who had attained the age of 16
years and who was charged with certain enumerated offenses and
could transfer the juvenile to "adult court" for prosecution
as an adult.
Kent, 383 U.S. at 547.
Thus, unless and until
the juvenile court elected to waive its jurisdiction, a
juvenile offender had a "statutory right to the 'exclusive'
jurisdiction" of the juvenile court.
added).
Given
that
juveniles
had
Id. at 557 (emphasis
been
provided
with
a
statutory right to juvenile-court adjudication, the Court held
that the "full investigation" required by the statute must
include certain procedural safeguards, including a hearing
that "must measure up to the essentials of due process," id.
at 562, before the juvenile court could waive its jurisdiction
and
transfer
a
juvenile
offender
24
to
"adult
court."
CR-17-1171
Accordingly, the holding in Kent was clearly based on the
existence of a statutory right to juvenile-court adjudication
and thus cannot be interpreted as recognizing a constitutional
right to juvenile-court adjudication.
Furthermore, because
the procedural due process required by Kent was based on the
existence of a statutory right, such process is not required
in jurisdictions where the legislature has denied certain
juvenile
offenders
a
statutory
right
to
juvenile-court
adjudication and has instead vested the "adult court" with
exclusive
jurisdiction
over
such
juveniles.
Multiple
jurisdictions have considered and rejected such an extension
of Kent.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit first addressed this issue in United States
v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
At issue in Bland
was a statute that defined a "child" as an individual under 18
years of age but excluded from the definition of "child" an
individual who had attained the age of 16 years and who was
charged by the United States Attorney with certain enumerated
offenses.
Id. at 1330.
The court rejected the argument that
Kent had rendered the statute unconstitutional, stating:
25
CR-17-1171
"Appellee's attempt to equate the United States
Attorney's decision in the case at bar with the
transfer of an individual from the jurisdiction of
the juvenile court to that of adult court is
unavailing. In contrast to such a situation, the
case at bar involves no initial juvenile court
jurisdiction; the United States Attorney's decision
to charge an individual sixteen years of age or
older with certain enumerated offenses operates
automatically to exclude that individual from the
jurisdiction of the Family Division.
The cases
cited by the appellee[, including Kent,] are equally
inapposite."
Bland, 472 F.2d at 1336 n.26 (some emphasis added).
The Connecticut Supreme Court addressed this issue in
further detail in State v. Angel C., 245 Conn. 93, 715 A.2d
652
(1998),
in
which
the
appellants
relied
on
Kent
to
challenge the constitutionality of a statute "mandating an
automatic transfer to the regular criminal docket ... for any
individual who has attained the age of fourteen years and is
charged with certain enumerated offenses."
715 A.2d at 656.
245 Conn. at 96,
In upholding the constitutionality of the
statute, the court stated:
"The defendants rely heavily upon Kent v. United
States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S. Ct. 1045, 16 L. Ed. 2d
84 (1966), arguing that it mandates a hearing prior
to any transfer of a juvenile to the criminal
docket. We conclude, however, that the defendants
misinterpret the scope of Kent. Kent simply stands
for the proposition that if a statute vests a
juvenile with the right to juvenile status, then
26
CR-17-1171
that right constitutes a liberty interest, of which
the juvenile may not be deprived without due
process, i.e., notice and a hearing.
Id., at
556–58, 86 S. Ct. at 1054–55.
If the statute at
issue does not create a liberty interest, Kent is
inapposite.
"The statutory scheme in Kent was far different
from that of Connecticut.
In Kent, the statute
vested 'original and exclusive jurisdiction' in the
juvenile court; id., at 556, 86 S. Ct. at 1054–55;
and
permitted
the
juvenile
court
to
waive
jurisdiction only after 'full investigation.' Id.,
at 558, 86 S. Ct. at 1055. The court noted that the
'Juvenile Court Act confers upon the child a right
to avail himself of that court's exclusive
jurisdiction .... [I]t is implicit in [the juvenile
court] scheme that non-criminal treatment is to be
the rule –- and the adult criminal treatment, the
exception which must be governed by the particular
factors of individual cases.' (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., at 560–61, 86 S. Ct. at 1057.
It went on to conclude that by placing jurisdiction
over all juveniles initially, and presumptively
permanently, in the juvenile court, and permitting
the court to waive its jurisdiction only after a
full
investigation,
the
statute
created
a
substantial and vested liberty interest in juvenile
status.
Id., at 561, 86 S. Ct. at 1057.
That
liberty interest could be divested by means of
transfer to the criminal docket, but only after the
requirements of procedural due process were met.
Id.
"Conversely, § 46b–127(a)[, Conn. Gen. Stat.
Ann.,] does not provide for exclusive jurisdiction
in the juvenile court or a waiver of that
jurisdiction by the court.
A juvenile who has
reached the age of fourteen and is charged with one
or more of the enumerated offenses has no right to
avail himself of juvenile court jurisdiction because
the statute expressly precludes the exercise of
27
CR-17-1171
jurisdiction by the juvenile court .... Moreover,
it is implicit in § 46b–127(a), unlike the statute
in Kent, that adult treatment is the rule for such
juveniles and that juvenile treatment is a narrow
exception.
The applicability of Kent cannot be
expanded,
therefore,
beyond
the
scope
of
discretionary
transfer
statutes
to
mandatory
transfer statutes.
Section 46b–127 (a) is a
mandatory, not discretionary, transfer statute. It
is an automatic, mandatory transfer statute with the
transfer based exclusively on the age of the
defendant and the offense charged. ... We conclude,
therefore, that Kent does not require the conclusion
that § 46b–127(a) violates the defendants' rights to
due process."
Angel C., 245 Conn. at 106-08, 715 A.2d at 661-62 (some
emphasis added; footnotes omitted).
The Utah Supreme Court reached the same conclusion in
State v. Angilau, 245 P.3d 745 (Utah 2011), in which the
appellant
challenged
the
constitutionality
of
a
statute
providing that "'[t]he district court has exclusive original
jurisdiction over all persons 16 years of age or older charged
with ... an offense which would be murder or aggravated murder
if committed by an adult.'
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-701(1)
(Supp. 2010)."
The court concluded, however,
Id. at 749.
that the appellant had no liberty interest in juvenile-court
adjudication and thus was not entitled to procedural due
process,
28
CR-17-1171
"because he was never entitled to juvenile
jurisdiction once he met the criteria in the
automatic waiver statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A6-701(1)(a).
One cannot hold an interest in
something to which one was never entitled. Just as
a person who allegedly commits a crime at the age of
18 cannot hold an interest in being tried in
juvenile court, neither can someone who meets the
qualifications outlined in the automatic waiver
statute."
Angilau, 245 P.3d at 750 (emphasis added; internal citation
omitted).
The court was unpersuaded by the appellant's
argument that Kent requires "that all juveniles must first
receive some procedural due process in the juvenile court
before they may be prosecuted as adults," id.:
"The critical difference between Kent and Kelley
[v. Kaiser, 992 F.2d 1509 (10th Cir. 1993)], and
this case, is that in the federal cases the juvenile
court was at least initially presumed to have proper
jurisdiction over the minors involved and transfer
to adult court was at issue. See Kent, 383 U.S. at
552, 86 S. Ct. 1045; Kelley, 992 F.2d at 1511.
Thus, the minors in those cases possessed a liberty
interest created by statute that they were in danger
of losing.
"....
"By contrast, in Utah's statutory scheme, the
legislature has bypassed the juvenile system
entirely, giving original jurisdiction to adult
courts under certain circumstances .... Because Mr.
Angilau was sixteen years old and was charged with
murder, he fell under Utah's automatic waiver
statute and was immediately subject to the district
court's jurisdiction.
See Utah Code Ann. §
29
CR-17-1171
78A–6–701(1)(a).
He did not possess any initial
statutory rights associated with juvenile court
protections and thus could not be deprived of rights
he never held.
"Because Mr. Angilau held no initial right
(statutory or constitutional) to be brought before
a juvenile court, there was no need for a hearing
before charging him in adult court. The automatic
waiver
statute,
therefore,
does
not
violate
procedural due process."
245 P.3d at 751 (emphasis added; footnotes omitted).
More recently, the Washington Supreme Court addressed
this issue in State v. Watkins, 191 Wash. 2d 530, 423 P.3d 830
(2018), in which the appellant relied on Kent to challenge the
constitutionality of a statute providing "that juvenile courts
must automatically decline jurisdiction over 16 and 17 year
olds charged with enumerated offenses."
423 P.3d at 832.
191 Wash. 2d at 533,
The court succinctly stated, however, why
the holding in Kent is inapplicable in jurisdictions with such
statutes:
"Careful
consideration
of
the
statutory
framework underlying the Kent decision suggests that
Kent's holding is limited to circumstances where a
juvenile court has statutory discretion to retain or
transfer jurisdiction. The statute in Kent provided
the juvenile court with jurisdiction over all
juvenile proceedings and the discretion to waive
jurisdiction over a particular class of juvenile
defendants.
In contrast, former RCW 13.04.030(1)
(2009) precludes our juvenile courts from presiding
30
CR-17-1171
over a particular class of juveniles.
Kent's
hearing requirement makes sense in the context of
the D.C. statute because the juvenile court was
vested with discretion to make a jurisdictional
decision. But a hearing requirement would be absurd
under Washington law because our juvenile court is
statutorily precluded from presiding over this type
of case. Thus, Kent's holding must be limited to
circumstances where a juvenile court has statutory
authority to hear a particular case. Because Kent
is distinguishable on statutory grounds, its holding
has no bearing on the constitutionality of former
RCW 13.04.030(1) (2009)."
Watkins, 191 Wash. 2d at 540-41, 423 P.3d at 835-36 (emphasis
added;
footnotes
and
internal
citation
omitted).
Other
jurisdictions have similarly distinguished Kent in upholding
the constitutionality of statutes that automatically exclude
certain
juvenile
offenders
from
the
jurisdiction
of
the
juvenile court and instead vest jurisdiction in the "adult
court."
See, e.g., Woodard, supra; Russell v. Parratt, 543
F.2d 1214 (8th Cir. 1976); Cox v. United States, 473 F.3d 334
(4th Cir. 1973); State v. Aalim, 150 Ohio St. 3d 489, 83
N.E.3d 883 (2017); People v. Salas, 356 Ill. Dec. 442, 961
N.E.2d 831 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011); State v. Perique, 439 So. 2d
1060 (La. 1983); People v. Thorpe, 641 P.2d 935 (Colo. 1982);
Vega v. Bell, 47 N.Y.2d 543, 419 N.Y.S.2d 454, 393 N.E.2d 450
(1979); and State v. Berard, 401 A.2d 448 (R.I. 1979).
31
CR-17-1171
We need not belabor the point further.
Although the
above-cited cases are not binding on this Court, we find them
persuasive in concluding that the procedural due process
required by Kent is applicable only in jurisdictions where the
legislature has granted juvenile offenders a statutory right
to
juvenile-court
adjudication,
waiver by the juvenile court.
hearing
is
necessary
to
subject
to
discretionary
In such jurisdictions, a
protect
a
juvenile
offender's
statutory right by ensuring that a juvenile court does not
arbitrarily exercise its discretion in determining whether to
retain jurisdiction over the juvenile or to transfer the
juvenile to "adult court." In Alabama, however, juveniles who
have attained the age of 16 years and who are charged with an
offense enumerated in § 12-15-204 do not have a statutory
right
to
juvenile-court
adjudication,
and
there
is
no
jurisdictional determination for the juvenile court to make
because the legislature has already settled that issue by
statutorily
vesting
the
"adult
court"
with
exclusive
jurisdiction over such juveniles. Thus, a Kent hearing is not
required.
Indeed, as the Washington Supreme Court concluded,
it "would be absurd" to require a juvenile court to hold a
32
CR-17-1171
hearing to determine whether to waive jurisdiction it is
statutorily precluded from exercising in the first place.
Watkins, 191 Wash. 2d at 541, 423 P.3d at 836.
Accordingly,
we hold (1) that Kent does not recognize a constitutionally
protected right to juvenile-court adjudication and (2) that
the procedural due process required by Kent is not applicable
in jurisdictions such as Alabama, where the legislature has
statutorily precluded certain juvenile offenders from the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
Likewise, the Roper line of cases does not recognize a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in juvenile-court
adjudication.
To be sure, as the circuit court noted, the
United States Supreme Court has recognized
"that 'children are constitutionally different from
adults for purposes of sentencing.' [Miller,] 567
U.S., at 460, 132 S .Ct., at 2464 (citing Roper,
supra, at 569–570, 125 S. Ct. 1183; and Graham,
supra, at 68, 130 S. Ct. 2011). These differences
result from children's 'diminished culpability and
greater prospects for reform,' and are apparent in
three primary ways:
"'First, children have a "lack of maturity
and
an
underdeveloped
sense
of
responsibility," leading to recklessness,
impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking.
Second, children "are more vulnerable to
negative influences and outside pressures,"
including from their family and peers; they
33
CR-17-1171
have limited "control over their own
environment" and lack the ability to
extricate
themselves
from
horrific,
crime-producing settings.
And third, a
child's character is not as "well formed"
as an adult's; his traits are "less fixed"
and his actions less likely to be "evidence
of irretrievable depravity."' 567 U.S., at
471, 132 S. Ct., at 2464 (quoting Roper,
supra, at 569–570, 125 S. Ct. 1183;
alterations, citations, and some internal
quotation marks omitted)."
Montgomery, 577 U.S. at ___, 136 S. Ct. at 733.
However, although the United States Supreme Court has
unquestionably
recognized
certain
differences
between
juveniles and adults, the Court did not hold in the Roper line
of cases, nor has it held in any other case, that a juvenile
offender has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in
juvenile-court adjudication.
In Roper, the Court held that
the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of the death
penalty for juvenile offenders.
Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.
In
Graham, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the
imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole for a juvenile offender who did not
commit homicide.
Graham, 560 U.S. at 82.
Similarly, in
Miller, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits a
sentencing
scheme
that
mandates
34
a
sentence
of
life
CR-17-1171
imprisonment without the possibility of parole for a juvenile
offender, Miller, 567 U.S. at 479, and in Montgomery, the
Court
held
that
Miller
announced
a
substantive
rule
of
constitutional law that applies retroactively to cases on
collateral review. Montgomery, 577 U.S. at ___, 136 S. Ct. at
734.
In J.D.B., the Court addressed "whether the age of a
child subjected to police questioning is relevant to the
custody analysis of" Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),
J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 264, and held that "so long as the child's
age
was
known
to
the
officer
at
the
time
of
police
questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to a
reasonable officer, its inclusion in the custody analysis is
consistent with the objective nature of that test."
564 U.S.
at 277.
Although those cases recognize, and are grounded upon,
the differences between juveniles and adults, each of those
cases, with the exception of J.D.B., is grounded upon the
Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment
and
addresses
the
significance
of
considering
juvenile
characteristics in sentencing; J.D.B. merely holds that a
juvenile's age is relevant in making a custody determination
35
CR-17-1171
for purposes of Miranda.
None of those cases hold that a
juvenile offender has a constitutionally protected liberty
interest in juvenile-court adjudication that requires the
protections of procedural due process before he or she can be
subjected to the jurisdiction of the "adult court."
Although
the circuit court interpreted the Court's recognition of the
differences
between
acknowledgment
of
juveniles
a
and
adults
constitutionally
as
an
implicit
protected
liberty
interest in juvenile-court adjudication, at least two state
supreme courts have rejected that proposition.
In People v. Patterson, 388 Ill. Dec. 834, 25 N.E.3d 526
(Ill. 2014), the Illinois Supreme Court stated:
"We first address defendant's due process claim.
As both parties recognize, this court rejected a
similar claim challenging the predecessor to section
5–130 in People v. J.S., 103 Ill. 2d 395, 83 Ill.
Dec. 156, 469 N.E.2d 1090 (1984).
In that
consolidated case, the three defendants were each 16
years old when the offenses were committed, and they
were automatically transferred to criminal court
under the statute.
The trial court in each case
found the transfer statute unconstitutional, and on
direct appeal to this court, the defendants argued
it violated both procedural and substantive due
process.
J.S., 103 Ill. 2d at 402, 83 Ill. Dec.
156, 469 N.E.2d 1090.
"In
rejecting
that
claim,
this
court
distinguished Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541,
86 S. Ct. 1045, 16 L. Ed. 2d 84 (1966), where the
36
CR-17-1171
United States Supreme Court invalidated a District
of Columbia statute allowing minors to be tried as
adults, potentially exposing some of them to the
death penalty or life imprisonment, if the trial
court determined that juvenile court jurisdiction
should be waived after a 'full investigation.'
Kent, 383 U.S. at 547, 86 S. Ct. 1045. The Court
held that due process was violated because the
statute did not provide sufficient guidance in
deciding
when
waiver
was
proper,
permitting
potentially arbitrary rulings, and because the
statute did not provide juveniles with a hearing
before that determination was made. Kent, 383 U.S.
at 561–62, 86 S. Ct. 1045.
We concluded in J.S.
that Illinois's automatic transfer statute did not
suffer from the same failing because it required all
15– and 16–year–olds charged with the listed
offenses to be transferred to criminal court, thus
eliminating the potential for the use of unguided
discretion in the juvenile court that was found to
be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. J.S., 103
Ill. 2d at 405, 83 Ill. Dec. 156, 469 N.E.2d 1090.
...
"....
"Here, however, defendant asserts that J.S. is
no longer valid law in light of the United States
Supreme Court's subsequent rulings in Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 161 L. Ed.
2d 1 (2005), Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.
Ct. 2011, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010), and Miller v.
Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed.
2d 407 (2012). Defendant argues that this court's
reliance on the absence of any statutory judicial
discretion in J.S. to uphold the transfer statute
supports his allegation of a due process violation
in this case because those Supreme Court decisions
emphasized
a
need
to
recognize
the
unique
characteristics of youthful offenders that is
inconsistent with an automatic transfer.
37
CR-17-1171
"As previously discussed, in J.S., the defendant
unsuccessfully attempted to support his due process
argument by distinguishing the Supreme Court's due
process analysis in Kent.
J.S., 103 Ill. 2d at
404–05, 83 Ill. Dec. 156, 469 N.E.2d 1090.
In
contrast, here defendant is attempting to support
his due process argument by relying on the Supreme
Court's eighth amendment analysis in Roper, Graham,
and Miller. Defendant's constitutional argument is
crafted from incongruous components. Although both
the Supreme Court and defendant have emphasized the
distinctive nature of juveniles, the applicable
constitutional standards differ considerably between
due process and eighth amendment analyses. A ruling
on a specific flavor of constitutional claim may not
justify a similar ruling brought pursuant to another
constitutional provision. See People v. Davis, 2014
IL 115595, ¶ 45, 379 Ill. Dec. 381, 6 N.E.3d 709
(finding the juvenile defendant's sentence violated
the eighth amendment but declining to consider his
state due process and proportionate penalties
challenges).
In other words, a constitutional
challenge raised under one theory cannot be
supported by decisional law based purely on another
provision. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259,
272 n.7, 117 S. Ct. 1219, 137 L. Ed. 2d 432 (1997).
Accordingly, we reject defendant's reliance on the
Supreme Court's eighth amendment case law to support
his procedural and substantive due process claims."
Patterson, 388 Ill. Dec. at 856-57, 25 N.E.3d at 548-49
(emphasis added).
Similarly, in Watkins, supra, the Washington Supreme
Court addressed the appellant's argument that Roper, Graham,
J.D.B., and Miller "require more than simply taking into
account a defendant's youthfulness at sentencing –- he argues
38
CR-17-1171
that they establish a substantive due process right to a Kent
hearing before being transferred to adult court."
191 Wash. 2d at 546, 423 P.3d at 838.
Watkins,
However, the court
rejected that argument:
"The principle that juveniles are developmentally
different from adults factors into a court's
decision
regarding
a
youthful
defendant's
culpability, like in Roper, Miller, and Graham, or
a youthful defendant's subjective mental state, like
in J.D.B. That principle does not factor into our
determination of whether a jurisdictional statute
like former RCW 13.04.030 (2009) is constitutional
because resolving this issue does not require us to
assess a youthful defendant's culpability or
subjective mental state. To resolve this issue we
need decide only whether the legislature has the
authority to define the scope of juvenile court
jurisdiction. The answer is yes –- the legislature
can define the scope of juvenile court jurisdiction
because the legislature itself created the juvenile
court system and there is no constitutional right to
be tried in juvenile court."
Watkins, 191 Wash. 2d at 546, 423 P.3d at 838-39 (emphasis
added; emphasis omitted).6
See also State v. Jensen, 385 P.3d
5 (Idaho Ct. App. 2016) ("Jensen had no statutory right and no
expectation, from either legislation or state conduct, that he
6
In fact, the Washington Supreme Court noted that, in
Miller, the United States Supreme Court "discussed automatic
adult court statutes ... and made no indication that the
statutes are unconstitutional." Watkins, 191 Wash. 2d at 540
n.9, 423 P.3d at 835 n.9. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 487-88.
39
CR-17-1171
could be proceeded against as a minor. Consequently, since he
was never entitled to be charged or tried as a juvenile, he
never had a liberty interest in being placed in the juvenile
court system.
Without a liberty interest deprivation, the
Fourteenth Amendment is not implicated.
Further, [Roper,
Graham, and Miller] dealt with sentences of life without
parole or capital punishment and are not directly relevant to
a determination whether the automatic waiver violates due
process.
The cases, while dealing with the importance of
youthful considerations in sentencing, do not support a claim
of
a
liberty
interest
in
being
charged
and
tried
as
a
juvenile." (emphasis added; internal citation omitted)).
Once again, we find the above-cited cases persuasive.
A
juvenile offender does not have a constitutionally protected
liberty
interest
in
juvenile-court
adjudication,
and
the
narrow holdings in the Roper line of cases do not provide
otherwise.
To hold that those cases recognized such a right
would require us to expand the narrow holdings of those cases
to issues the United States Supreme Court did not expressly
address in them, and state courts should "be very careful when
considering new constitutional interests and remain reluctant
40
CR-17-1171
to deviate from United States Supreme Court determinations of
what
are,
rights."
and
what
are
not,
fundamental
constitutional
Morris v. Brandenburg, 356 P.3d 564, 578 (N.M. Ct.
App. 2015).
To date, the Court has not recognized a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in juvenile-court adjudication.
Thus,
because
juveniles
do
not
have
a
constitutionally
protected liberty interest in juvenile-court adjudication and
because our legislature has not statutorily provided such a
liberty interest for juveniles who have attained the age of 16
years and who are charged with an offense enumerated in § 1215-204, such juveniles cannot point to a protected liberty
interest in juvenile-court adjudication that entitles them to
procedural due process.
Stephenson, supra; and Crawford,
supra. Accordingly, we hold that § 12-15-204 does not violate
procedural due-process principles, a holding consistent with
the
well-settled
rule
that
this
Court
will
not
hold
a
legislative act unconstitutional unless it is clear beyond a
41
CR-17-1171
reasonable doubt that it violates fundamental law.7
Worley,
supra.
B. Substantive Due Process and Equal Protection
As noted previously, in addressing a substantive dueprocess
or
equal-protection
challenge
to
a
statute,
the
reviewing court must balance the challenger's alleged liberty
interest
against
the
government's
justification
statute.
Norris, supra; Hernandez, supra.
for
the
To balance these
competing interests, courts employ one of three tests.
"'The United States Supreme
Court has established two tests
to determine whether a statute
draws a classification which
violates the Equal Protection
Clause
of
the
Fourteenth
Amendment or whether that statute
denies a person substantive due
process of law.
The Court
applies the "strict scrutiny
7
After concluding that juvenile offenders have a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in juvenile-court
adjudication, the circuit court analyzed § 12-15-204 pursuant
to Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), which provides
three factors to consider in determining whether the
government has provided adequate procedures once a proceduraldue-process claimant has demonstrated the existence of a
protected interest. Id. at 335. Because juvenile offenders
who have attained the age of 16 years and who are charged with
an offense enumerated in § 12-15-204 do not have a protected
liberty interest in juvenile-court adjudication, the Mathews
test is inapplicable.
42
CR-17-1171
test" where the classification is
based on "suspect criteria" or
affects some fundamental right.
...
[When the] case involves
neither a "suspect class" nor a
"fundamental right," the rational
basis test is the proper test to
apply to either a substantive due
process challenge or an equal
protection challenge.'
"Gideon v. Alabama State Ethics Comm'n, 379 So. 2d
570, 573–74 (Ala. 1980). See also Hutchins v. DCH
Reg. Med. Ctr., 770 So. 2d 49 (Ala. 2000)."
Herring v. State, 100 So. 3d 616, 622 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011)
(footnote omitted).
"A fundamental right has been defined as one
which has its origins in the constitution. Scott v.
Dunn, 419 So. 2d 1340 (Ala. 1982). A suspect class
was defined by the United States Supreme Court in
San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 28, 93 S. Ct. 1278, 36 L. Ed. 2d 16
(1973), as a class 'saddled with such disabilities,
or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal
treatment, or relegated to such a position of
political powerlessness as to command extraordinary
protection
from
the
majoritarian
political
process.'"
State v. C.M., 746 So. 2d 410, 414 n.6 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999).
"Between these extremes of rational basis review and strict
scrutiny
lies
a
level
of
intermediate
scrutiny,
which
generally has been applied to discriminatory classifications
based on sex or illegitimacy."
43
Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456,
CR-17-1171
461 (1988).
See also Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1315 n.4
(11th Cir. 2011) (noting that intermediate scrutiny "applies
to classifications based on sex or illegitimacy").
Because § 12-15-204 is not a classification based on sex
or illegitimacy, it must be tested for purposes of substantive
due process and equal protection under either the strictscrutiny test or the rational-basis test.
This Court has
already determined in Price, supra, that § 12-15-34.1 –- the
predecessor to § 12-15-204 –- "is scrutinized under the
'rational review' standard."
Price, 683 So. 2d at 45.
That
was so, and remains true today, because, as we have already
noted, juvenile offenders do not have a fundamental right to
juvenile-court adjudication, and neither the United States
Supreme Court nor Alabama has recognized juveniles as a
suspect class.
See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470
(1991) ("This Court has said repeatedly that age is not a
suspect classification under the Equal Protection Clause.");
and C.M., 746 So. 2d at 415 (noting that juveniles are not a
suspect class).
Thus, § 12-15-204 must satisfy only the
rational-basis test to survive a substantive due-process or
equal-protection challenge.
44
CR-17-1171
"'Under the rational basis test the Court asks: (a)
Whether the classification furthers a proper governmental
purpose, and (b) whether the classification is rationally
related to that purpose.'"
Northington v. Alabama Dep't of
Conservation & Natural Res., 33 So. 3d 560, 564 (Ala. 2009)
(quoting Gideons v. Alabama State Ethics Comm'n, 379 So. 2d
570, 574 (Ala. 1980)). Thus, a statute survives the rationalbasis test "if there is a rational relationship between the
disparity
of
treatment
and
some
legitimate
governmental
purpose."
St. Clair Cty. Home Builders Ass'n v. City of Pell
City, 61 So. 3d 992, 1011 (Ala. 2010) (quoting Heller v. Doe,
509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993)).
"Under rational basis review, we apply 'a strong
presumption of validity,' Heller v. Doe by Doe, 509
U.S. 312, 319, 113 S. Ct. 2637, 125 L. Ed. 2d 257
(1993), and narrowly inquire if the 'enacting
government body could have been purs[u]ing' 'a
legitimate government purpose,' United States v.
Ferreira, 275 F.3d 1020, 1026 (11th Cir. 2001)
(quoting Joel v. City of Orlando, 232 F.3d 1353,
1358 (11th Cir. 2000)). If we discern a legitimate
goal, we then ask only 'whether a rational basis
exists for the enacting governmental body to believe
that the legislation would further the hypothesized
purpose.'
Id. (quoting Joel, 232 F.3d at 1358).
This inquiry occurs entirely in the abstract because
'[t]he
actual
motivations
of
the
enacting
governmental body are entirely irrelevant,' as is
whether
the
legitimate
'basis
was
actually
considered by the legislative body.' Id. (quoting
45
CR-17-1171
Joel, 232 F.3d at 1358).
Indeed, the government
'has no obligation to produce evidence to sustain
the rationality of a statutory classification,'
Heller, 509 U.S. at 320, 113 S. Ct. 2637, and the
complaining party has the burden to 'negat[e] every
conceivable basis which might support it,' id.
(quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co.,
410 U.S. 356, 364, 93 S. Ct. 1001, 35 L. Ed. 2d 351
(1973)).
Unsurprisingly, '[a]lmost every statute
subject to the very deferential rational basis
standard is found to be constitutional.' [Doe v.]
Moore, 410 F.3d [1337,] 1346–47 [(11th Cir. 2005)]
(alteration adopted) (quoting Williams v. Pryor, 240
F.3d 944, 948 (11th Cir. 2001))."
United States v. Castillo, 899 F.3d 1208, 1213 (11th Cir.
2018).
This Court has already concluded that the predecessor to
§ 12-15-204 "has a rational basis relating to a legitimate
governmental interest, i.e., retribution for serious crimes in
addition to having the deterrent effect that facing an adult
trial would have on juveniles ...."
Price, 683 So. 2d at 45.
See also Perkins v. Commonwealth, 511 S.W.3d 380, 388 (Ky. Ct.
App. 2016) (noting that there is "an obvious legitimate
governmental
interest
in
curtailing
violent
crimes
juveniles and protecting the public from harm").
by
Although
that statement was made in the context of addressing only an
equal-protection claim, both an equal-protection claim and a
substantive
due-process
claim,
46
if
neither
involves
a
CR-17-1171
fundamental right or a suspect class, are subject to the same
rational-basis test.
See Leib v. Hillsborough Cty. Pub.
Transp. Comm'n, 558 F.3d 1301, 1308 (11th Cir. 2009) ("Since
the Commission's rules survived rational basis review for
purposes of Leib's equal protection claim, it follows a
fortiori that the rules survive rational basis review [for
substantive due process] as well."); Executive Air Taxi Corp.
v. City of Bismarck, N.D., 518 F.3d 562, 569 (8th Cir. 2008)
("A rational basis that survives equal protection scrutiny
also satisfies substantive due process analysis."); and Powers
v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1215 (10th Cir. 2004) ("[B]ecause a
substantive due process analysis proceeds along the same lines
as
an
equal
protection
analysis,
our
equal
protection
discussion sufficiently addresses both claims.").
Thus, our
equal-protection analysis in Price adequately addresses a
substantive due-process challenge to § 12-15-204 in that it
concluded that § 12-15-204 is rationally related to the
legitimate governmental interest of punishing and deterring
the commission of serious offenses by juveniles who have
attained the age of 16 years.
today.
We reiterate that conclusion
As the Illinois Court of Appeals has concluded:
47
CR-17-1171
"Almost 18 years ago, the Illinois Supreme Court
addressed the issue of whether the automatic
transfer provision contained in the Illinois
Juvenile Court Act violates the constitutional
guarantee of substantive due process that provides
that the accused may not be deprived of liberty
without due process of law in the case of People v.
J.S., 103 Ill. 2d 395, 83 Ill. Dec. 156, 469 N.E.2d
1090 (1984).
The supreme court applied the
'rational basis' test as the appropriate method to
evaluate whether the automatic transfer provision
comported with the defendant's substantive due
process guarantee. People v. J.S., 103 Ill. 2d at
402–03, 83 Ill. Dec. 156, 469 N.E.2d 1090. ... In
J.S., our supreme court held that because the
automatic transfer provision included only the more
heinous Class X felonies of murder, rape, deviate
sexual assault and armed robbery with a firearm and
limited its application to 15– and 16–year–old
defendants, it was a rational classification because
it was 'rationally based on the age of the offender
and the threat posed by the offense to the victim
and the community because of its violent nature and
frequency of commission. People v. J.S., 103 Ill.
2d at 404, 83 Ill. Dec. 156, 469 N.E.2d 1090. The
court held that the automatic transfer provision
does not violate any due process requirements
because it is reasonably drafted to remedy the evils
that society has determined to be a threat to public
health, safety and welfare due to the violent nature
of the crimes."
People v. Jackson, 358 Ill. Dec. 552, 557-58, 965 N.E.2d 623,
628-29 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (emphasis added).
Similarly, the scope of § 12-15-204 includes only serious
offenses -- i.e., capital offenses, Class A felonies, felonies
that involve the use of a deadly weapon, felonies that cause
48
CR-17-1171
death or serious physical injury, felonies that involve the
use of a dangerous instrument against a limited category of
individuals, and trafficking in drugs -- and is limited to
only those juvenile offenders who have attained the age of 16
years -- i.e., older juveniles who the legislature could have
reasonably concluded are more culpable for, and more prone to
and more capable of, committing such offenses.
Thus, the
Alabama Legislature drafted § 12-15-204 with a limited scope
that
is
rationally
interest:
imposing
commission
of,
related
to
retribution
serious
offenses
a
legitimate
for,
and
by
ensuring
governmental
deterring
that
the
those
juveniles who are most culpable and most likely to commit such
offenses are prosecuted in "adult court," where they are
subject to more severe punishments than they could receive in
juvenile court.
Accordingly, as this Court determined more
than 20 years ago in Price, § 12-15-204 passes the rationalbasis test and therefore does not violate substantive dueprocess principles.
Nevertheless, B.T.D. argues that § 12-15-204 violates the
Equal Protection Clause and that its disparate treatment of
juvenile offenders fails the rational-basis test because, he
49
CR-17-1171
says, there is no rational basis for making a distinction
between those juveniles who have attained the age of 16 years
and those who have not.
Specifically, B.T.D. argues:
"Alabama law does not treat similarly situated
children alike; 16- and 17-year-old children like
B.T.D. are afforded fewer rights than their 14- and
15-year-old peers charged with the same offenses.
Under § 12-15-203, 14- and 15-year-old children may
only be transferred to the adult court after a
hearing that considers [certain] factors .... These
factors are considered regardless of the child's
alleged offense. A 14- or 15-year-old child that
commits one or more of the same offenses delineated
in [§] 12-15-204 receives a transfer hearing that
would be denied to a child who may be only months,
weeks, or days older.
Under such a statutory
scheme, two youth who engage in the same conduct and
share similar developmental characteristics might be
subject to entirely different legal outcomes; the
one who receives the benefit of the individualized
standard in § 12-15-203 might be rehabilitated
through the juvenile system, while the youth who
fell within § 12-15-204 would be transferred and
subject to the harsh penalties and conditions of the
adult criminal justice system ...."
(B.T.D.'s brief, at 28-29.)
As we have already noted, however, the State has a
legitimate governmental interest in imposing retribution for,
and deterring the commission of, serious offenses by juveniles
who have attained the age of 16 years.
Contrary to B.T.D.'s
argument, making a distinction between older and younger
juveniles is rationally related to the fulfillment of that
50
CR-17-1171
objective,
because
all
juveniles
are
not
the
same.
In
reaching this conclusion, we find it helpful to look to the
Ohio Court of Appeals, which has twice considered and rejected
this specific argument.
In State v. McKinney, 46 N.E.3d 179 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015),
the appellant, a 16-year-old offender, challenged an Ohio
statute mandating that 16- and 17-year old offenders who are
charged with certain enumerated offenses be tried as an adult.
According to the appellant, the statute "violates his right to
equal protection under the law by treating similarly situated
minors differently based solely on their ages."
Id. at 186.
The Ohio Court of Appeals rejected that argument, however,
noting that "the General Assembly's choice to 'single out
older juvenile homicide offenders, who are potentially more
street-wise, hardened, dangerous, and violent, is rationally
related to this legitimate governmental purpose of protecting
society and reducing violent crime by juveniles.'"
(citation omitted)
Id.
The court again addressed this argument
two years later in In re M.I., 88 N.E.3d 1276 (Ohio Ct. App.
2017), in which the appellant, a 16-year-old sex offender,
challenged Ohio's juvenile-sex-offender laws, which provided
51
CR-17-1171
that "sex offenders 13 or younger may not be classified [as a
juvenile offender registrant], classification is discretionary
for 14– and 15–year–old sex offenders, and 16–and 17–year–old
sex
offenders
appellant
must
argued
be
that
classified."
Ohio's
Id.
at
1277.
The
juvenile-sex-offender
laws
violated equal-protection principles because, he said, "there
is no rational basis for treating juvenile sex offenders
differently based on their ages."
Id.
In holding that there
was no equal-protection violation, the court stated:
"[T]he purpose of sex-offender registration is to
protect the public. Those appellate courts finding
no equal-protection violation have reasoned that the
legislature's concerns for recidivism and public
safety provide a rational basis for treating
juvenile sex offenders differently based on their
ages. The courts have reasoned that it is a core
premise of the juvenile court system that as the
juvenile
ages,
he
is
more
responsible
and
accountable for his actions.
A juvenile who is
almost an adult has less time in the juvenile system
to be rehabilitated and may be less responsive to
rehabilitation. Therefore, more tracking is needed
after the juvenile ages out of the system. It is
not irrational to conclude that younger children are
less culpable and accountable for their actions and
less dangerous than older offenders.
Younger
children have more time in the juvenile system to be
rehabilitated and may be more susceptible to
rehabilitation than older children.
"We agree with this reasoning and hold that the
juvenile-sex-offender-classification
system
is
rationally related to the legitimate governmental
52
CR-17-1171
interest of protecting the public from sex
offenders.
Therefore, it does not violate M.I.'s
right to equal protection of the law."
In re M.I., 88 N.E.3d at 1277-78 (emphasis added; internal
citation omitted).
See also State v. Mann, 602 N.W.2d 785,
793 (Iowa 1999) (noting that the legislature "could reasonably
distinguish between juveniles of different ages based on their
presumed
maturity
and
judgment,
according
more
severe
punishment to older juveniles").
We
B.T.D.'s
agree
with
the
contention
Ohio
that
Court
all
of
Appeals.
juveniles
are
Despite
"similarly
situated," the legislature could have reasonably concluded
that 16- and 17-year-olds are generally more dangerous and
more culpable than younger juveniles; that 16- and 17-yearolds are therefore more likely to commit the type of serious
offenses enumerated in § 12-15-204 and are more culpable if
they do; and that, as a result, prosecuting and punishing
those older juvenile offenders as adults serves the legitimate
governmental
interest
of
imposing
retribution
for,
and
deterring the commission of, serious offenses by ensuring that
such juveniles are faced with the type of severe punishments
they could not receive in juvenile court.
53
Additionally, the
CR-17-1171
legislature could have reasonably concluded that 16- and 17year-olds who commit the type of serious offenses enumerated
in
§
12-15-204
are
less
amenable
than
younger
juvenile
offenders to the rehabilitative aspects of juvenile court. As
the Ohio Court of Appeals noted, a juvenile who is close to
adulthood will have less time in the juvenile system and
therefore
might
be
less
likely
to
rehabilitative aspects of that system.
respond
to
the
In re M.I., supra.
Furthermore, § 12-15-204 operates equally upon all juvenile
offenders falling within its purview; any individual who has
attained the age of 16 years and who is charged with an
offense enumerated in § 12-15-204 must be prosecuted as an
adult.
See Mann, 602 N.W.2d at 793-94 ("Moreover, section
232.8(1)(c)
operates
equally
upon
all
persons
similarly
situated: juveniles sixteen and over who commit forcible
felonies.
Because
232.8(1)(c)
is
the
reasonable
classification
and
operates
made
by
equally
section
upon
all
juveniles falling within the class, it does not violate the
Equal Protection Clause." (internal citation omitted)).
Granted, as B.T.D. notes, drawing the line of demarcation
at 16 years of age could result in a situation where a 15-
54
CR-17-1171
year-old juvenile who commits an offense enumerated in § 1215-204 is adjudicated in juvenile court, while a 16-year-old
juvenile, who theoretically might be only a few days older
than the 15-year-old offender, will automatically be tried as
an adult for committing the same offense.
However, such
situations
legislature's
alone
do
not
classification irrational.
render
the
As the Utah Supreme Court noted,
"[a] line drawn based on age will necessarily appear somewhat
arbitrary, because people close to the boundary on either side
may be very similarly situated.
United
States
Supreme
Court
But this court and 'the
[have]
held
that
age
is
a
permissible method of classifying individuals where a rational
basis exists.'"
Angilau, 245 P.3d at 753 (citation omitted).
Similarly, although the legislature's classification in § 1215-204 might appear irrational to juvenile offenders who are
"close to the boundary," id., we cannot say, for the reasons
set forth above, that the classification is not rationally
drawn to achieve the legislature's legitimate governmental
purpose
of
imposing
retribution
for,
and
deterring
the
commission of, serious offenses by juveniles who have attained
the age of 16 years, which is the only test it must meet to
55
CR-17-1171
withstand
supra.
B.T.D.'s
equal-protection
challenge.
Herring,
In fact, we note that B.T.D. has not cited a single
case in which a court has held that a statute drawing a
classification between older and younger juveniles violates
equal-protection principles.
See Worley, supra (noting that
the party challenging the constitutionality of a statute has
the
burden
of
demonstrating
that
the
statute
is
unconstitutional). Accordingly, we reiterate our holding from
Price that the classification drawn in § 12-15-204 between
older
and
younger
juveniles
is
rationally
related
to
a
legitimate governmental purpose and therefore does not violate
equal-protection principles.
II. Vagueness and Overbreadth
As to whether § 12-15-204(a)(4) is unconstitutionally
vague and overly broad, we begin by noting that B.T.D. and the
circuit court appear to have conflated the doctrines of
vagueness and overbreadth.
"While 'vagueness and overbreadth are
related constitutional concepts, they are
separate and distinct doctrines, subject in
application to different standards and
intended to achieve different purposes.'
United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057,
1070 (4th Cir. 1988).
'The vagueness
doctrine
is
rooted
in
due
process
56
CR-17-1171
principles and is basically directed at
lack of sufficient clarity and precision in
the statute; overbreadth, on the other
hand, would invalidate a statute when it
infringes on expression to a degree greater
than
justified
by
the
legitimate
governmental need which is the valid
purpose of the statute.' Id."
Willis v. Town of Marshall, N.C., 426 F.3d 251, 261 (4th Cir.
2005) (emphasis added).
"[A] criminal statute that 'fails to give a person
of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his
contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute,'
United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617, 74 S.
Ct. 808, 812, 98 L. Ed. 989 (1954), or is so
indefinite that 'it encourages arbitrary and erratic
arrests
and
convictions,'
Papachristou
v.
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162, 92 S. Ct. 839, 843,
31 L. Ed. 2d 110 (1972), is void for vagueness."
Colautti
v.
Franklin,
439
U.S.
379,
390
(1979).
The
overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, prevents a statute
that proscribes conduct from "casting a net so wide," Schultz
v. City of Cumberland, 228 F.3d 831, 848 (7th Cir. 2000), that
it "'sweep[s] unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade[s] the
area of protected freedoms.'"
Wallen v. City of Mobile, [CR-
17-0286, August 10, 2018] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Crim. App.
2018) (quoting Ross Neely Express, Inc. v. Alabama Dep't of
Evntl. Mgmt., 437 So. 2d 82, 85 (Ala. 1983)).
Thus, in short,
"vagueness concerns the lack of clarity in the language of a
57
CR-17-1171
statute, whereas overbreadth concerns the reach of a statute
...."
People v. Graves, 368 P.3d 317, 326 (Colo. 2016)
(emphasis added).
Consequently, a statute with sufficient
clarity to survive a vagueness challenge will still fail an
overbreadth challenge if it impermissibly reaches protected
conduct.
State v. Adams, 254 Kan. 436, 439, 866 P.2d 1017,
1020 (1994).
Likewise, a statute that does not encroach upon
protected conduct will survive an overbreadth challenge but
might still lack sufficient clarity to survive a vagueness
challenge.8
Florida Businessmen for Free Enter. v. City of
Hollywood, 673 F.2d 1213, 1218 (11th Cir. 1982).
Here, the circuit court found that the phrase "serious
physical
injury"
renders
§
12-15-204(a)(4)
both
unconstitutionally vague and overly broad because, the circuit
court
found,
"virtually
every
8
circumstance
involving
Generally, the overbreadth doctrine is limited to
challenges alleging an infringement upon First Amendment
freedoms. See United States v. Lebowitz, 676 F.3d 1000, 1012
n.6 (11th Cir. 2012). The Alabama Supreme Court, however, has
"recognized a broader application of the overbreadth
doctrine," noting that "'the overbreadth doctrine under the
Alabama Constitution has been applied in due process cases not
involving First Amendment freedoms.'" Scott & Scott, Inc. v.
City of Mountain Brook, 844 So. 2d 577, 594 (Ala. 2002)
(quoting Friday v. Ethanol Corp., 539 So. 2d 208, 215 (Ala.
1988) (emphasis added)).
58
CR-17-1171
allegations of a felony with an injury" will subject a 16- or
17-year-old
offender
to
prosecution
in
"adult
court."
However, although couched in terms of both vagueness and
overbreadth, that holding appears to be based solely on
vagueness, as there can be no question that inflicting injury
during the commission of a felony is not protected conduct.
Regardless, we note that this Court has already rejected
vagueness and overbreadth challenges to the predecessor to §
12-15-204 in Price, supra.
See Price, 683 So. 2d at 45.
Furthermore, we now hold that § 12-15-204 is not subject
to vagueness and overbreadth challenges. In Beckles v. United
States, ___ U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017), the United States
Supreme Court noted that it "has invalidated two kinds of
criminal laws as 'void for vagueness': laws that define
criminal offenses and laws that fix the permissible sentences
for criminal offenses."
Id. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 892.
Thus,
because the statute at issue in Beckles neither defined
criminal offenses nor fixed permissible sentences, the Court
held
that
the
statute
was
not
subject
to
a
vagueness
challenge.
Id.
See also State v. Roling, 191 Wis. 2d 754,
759, 530 N.W.2d 434, 436 (1995) (holding that a Wisconsin
59
CR-17-1171
statute that vested the "adult court" with jurisdiction over
juveniles who had attained the age of 16 years and were
charged with certain enumerated offenses was "a procedural,
not a penal, statute and thus [was] not a proper subject for
a 'void-for-vagueness' challenge"); Maun v. Department of
Prof'l Regulation, 299 Ill. App. 3d 388, 395-96, 233 Ill. Dec.
726, 732-33, 701 N.E.2d 791, 797-98 (1998) (holding that a
statute authorizing the suspension of a license to practice
medicine was not subject to a vagueness challenge because the
statute was not a penal statute); and People v. Lang, 113 Ill.
2d 407, 454, 101 Ill. Dec. 597, 618, 498 N.E.2d 1105, 1126
(1986) (holding, in a case where the appellant asserted a
vagueness challenge to a statute authorizing the involuntary
commitment of a person who is "mentally ill," that "[t]he
vagueness doctrine's requirement of 'fair notice' does not
apply ... since the statute does not proscribe any conduct").
Similarly, the overbreadth doctrine serves to ensure that
the government, in proscribing conduct, does not "cast[] a net
so wide" that it also prohibits protected conduct.
supra.
Schultz,
Thus, if a statute does not proscribe any conduct
whatsoever, it is not subject to an overbreadth challenge.
60
CR-17-1171
See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114 (1972)
(noting that a statute "may ... be 'overbroad' if in its reach
it prohibits constitutionally protected conduct"); Maass v.
Lee, 189 F. Supp. 3d 581, 586 (E.D. Va. 2016) (holding that
"the overbreadth doctrine is inapplicable here ... because
[the statute] ... does not prohibit or punish any conduct, let
alone constitutionally protected conduct" (emphasis added));
and Enriguez v. State, 858 So. 2d 338, 341 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2003) (noting that overbreadth "is an analysis that
applies only to statutes that proscribe conduct" (emphasis
added)).
Section 12-15-204 is not a penal statute; it does not
define
criminal
offenses,
permissible sentences.
proscribe
conduct,
or
fix
Rather, when a 16- or 17-year-old is
to be tried as an adult, the conduct for which he or she is
arrested and charged is proscribed by a section of the Alabama
Code other than § 12-15-204(a)(4). In this case, for example,
it is § 13A-6-21, not § 12-15-204(a)(4), that proscribes the
conduct with which B.T.D. was charged.
Section 12-15-204 is
merely a jurisdictional statute that sets forth which court
has jurisdiction over juveniles who have attained the age of
61
CR-17-1171
16 years and who are charged with certain offenses proscribed
by other sections of the Alabama Code. Thus, because § 12-15204 is purely a jurisdictional statute that does not define
criminal offenses, proscribe any conduct whatsoever, or fix
permissible sentences, it is not subject to vagueness and
overbreadth challenges.
Moreover, even if § 12-15-204 were subject to vagueness
and overbreadth challenges, those challenges would fail.
As
noted, § 12-15-204(a)(4) encompasses any "felony which has as
an element thereof the causing of death or serious physical
injury."
As a result, if a juvenile has attained the age of
16 years and is charged with an offense the Alabama Code (1)
defines as a felony and (2) includes as an element the causing
of
death
or
serious
physical
injury,
then
the
juvenile
offender must be tried as an adult under § 12-15-204(a)(4);
the statute is unequivocal in that regard. Thus, for example,
if a 16- or 17-year-old is charged with second-degree assault
in violation of § 13A-6-21, as B.T.D. was in this case, § 1215-204(a)(4) mandates that he or she be tried as an adult
because § 13A-6-21 provides that second-degree assault is a
Class C felony and occurs when a person, "[w]ith intent to
62
CR-17-1171
cause serious physical injury to another person, ... causes
serious physical injury to any person."
(emphasis added).
§ 13A-6-21(a)(1)
Likewise, as another example, if a 16- or
17-year-old is charged with second-degree elder abuse and
neglect in violation of § 13A-6-193, Ala. Code 1975, § 12-15204(a)(4) mandates that he or she be tried as an adult because
§
13A-6-193
provides
that
second-degree
elder
abuse
and
neglect is a Class B felony and occurs, among other instances,
when a person "[r]ecklessly abuses or neglects any elderly
person and the abuse or neglect causes serious physical injury
to the elderly person."
§ 13A-6-193(a)(2) (emphasis added).
Thus, even if § 12-15-204(a)(4) were subject to vagueness and
overbreadth challenges, the statute is not unconstitutionally
vague given that it provides clear notice that it encompasses
only those offenses that are felonies and have the specific
element of causing "serious physical injury," which can be
easily determined by referencing the charging statute, and it
certainly is not overly broad given that no felonies are
protected conduct.
We recognize that B.T.D. argued, and the circuit court
concluded, that it is the definition of "serious physical
63
CR-17-1171
injury" that renders § 12-15-204(a)(4) unconstitutionally
vague and overly broad.
However, challenges to the clarity
and reach of the definition of "serious physical injury" are
challenges to the clarity and reach of a charging statute that
includes the causing of serious physical injury as an element.
As noted in the preceding paragraph, the enforcement of § 1215-204(a)(4) merely requires a determination of whether the
charged offense is classified as a felony and whether the
elements of the offense include the causing of a serious
physical injury.
The definition of "serious physical injury"
is not relevant to that determination.
Indeed, to determine
whether a 16- or 17-year-old offender charged with a felony
must be tried as an adult under § 12-15-204(a)(4), one need
not even be cognizant of the definition of "serious physical
injury" but, instead, need only consult the charging statute
itself to determine whether the elements of the offense
include the causing of serious physical injury.
Accordingly,
the use of "serious physical injury" does not render § 12-15204(a)(4) unconstitutionally vague or overly broad. 9
9
Although B.T.D. did not challenge the constitutionality
of § 13A-8-61, which includes the causing of "serious physical
injury" as an element of second-degree assault, we note that,
64
CR-17-1171
Conclusion
Section 12-15-204 does not violate due-process principles
under either the United States Constitution or the Alabama
Constitution, nor does it violate the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Additionally, § 12-15-204(a)(4),
which is a jurisdictional statute, is not subject to vagueness
and
overbreadth
doctrines
even
challenges
if
it
were
but
does
subject
not
to
violate
such
those
challenges.
to withstand a vagueness challenge, a statute must define a
criminal offense "with sufficient definiteness that ordinary
people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a
manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement." Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).
The Alabama Legislature has defined "serious physical injury"
as "[p]hysical injury which creates a substantial risk of
death, or which causes serious and protracted disfigurement,
protracted impairment of health, or protracted loss or
impairment of the function of any bodily organ." § 13A-12(14), Ala. Code 1975.
That definition is sufficiently
definite to give "ordinary people" notice of what conduct is
prohibited and to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement. See Andrason v. Sheriff, Washoe Cty., 88 Nev.
589, 591, 503 P.2d 15, 16 (1972) ("The words 'serious physical
injury' are words of ordinary significance and readily
understood by men of ordinary intelligence. Accordingly, the
statutory language accommodates constitutional commands."
(internal citations omitted)); Lum v. State, 281 Ark. 495,
498-99, 665 S.W.2d 265, 267 (1984) (holding that a statutory
definition of "serious physical injury" substantively
identical to that of § 13A-1-2(14) was not unconstitutionally
vague); and State v. Moyle, 299 Or. 691, 699-700, 705 P.2d
740, 746 (1985) (same).
65
CR-17-1171
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court and
remand the case with instructions for the circuit court to
reinstate the indictment against B.T.D.
APPEAL REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS; CROSSAPPEAL DISMISSED.
Windom, P.J., and Kellum, Cole, and Minor, JJ., concur.
66
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