Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Boaz Pleasant-Bey, Petitioner v. Shelby County, Tennessee, et al.

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No.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

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BOAZ PLEASANT-BEY

Petitioner

V.

SHELBY COUNTY GOVERNMENT, ET AL„

Respondents.

On Petition For Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Boaz Pleasant-Bey #473110

T.T.C.C.

140 Macon Way

Hartsville, Tennessee 37074

BECeW®

DEC 18 *

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

I.) WHETHER RLUIPA'S “APPROPRIATE RELIEF” CLAUSE ENCOMPASSES THE

REQUESTED RELIEF OF A TRIAL ON THE MERITS AND IF SO, DID PLAINTIFF'S

REQUEST OF A TRIAL ON THE MERITS IN HIS COMPLAINT ENTITLE HIM TO THE

APPROPRIATE RELIEF OF A TRIAL ON THE MERITS CONCERNING RLUIPA, AND

DID THE SIXTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN FAILING TO CONSIDER

PLAINTIFF’S APPROPRIATE RELIEF ARGUMENT IN HIS REPLY BRIEF?

II.) WHETHER THE 1st CIRCUIT'S RULING IN SPRATT AND THE 6th CIRCUIT'S RULING IN

SPIES CONFLICT EACHOTHER CONCERNING WHETHER INMATE-LED IS

CONSTITUTIONAL AND/OR PERMISSIBLE UNDER RLUIPA, AND IF SO, IS THE

SPRATT COURT CORRECT AND IF NOT, WHY IS THE SPIES COURT CORRECT?

III.) WHETHER THE GENERAL APPELLATE RULE THAT PROHIBITS CLAIMS FROM

BEING ADDRESSED BY APPELLATE COURTS ARE NOT RAISED ON APPEAL APPLY

TO A DEFENDANT’S DEFENSES AND A PLAINTIFF'S ISSUES, AND IF SO DID THE

DEFENDANTS FAILURE TO TAKE THEIR TWO OPPORTUNITIES TO RAISE THEIR

QUALIFIED IMMUNITY ARGUMENTS TO THE 6th CIRCUIT OF THE APPEALS IN

THE TWO APPEALS IN THIS CASE CAUSE THAT DEFENSE TO BE WAIVED ON

REMAND?

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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING BELOW

The following parties were named as Defendants in the United States District Court, and

Appellees in the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit: Shelby County, Robert Moore,

Roy Rodgers, J. Hawkins, E. Coleman, Rod Bowers, and Charline McGhee. Mr. Boaz Pleasant-Bey

was the Plaintiff in the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee, Western

Division, and he was the Appellant in the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED..........................

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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING BELOW.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

in

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

IV

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

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OPINIONS BELOW AND JURSIDICTION

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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

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STATEMENT

1-3

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

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CONCLUSION

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I.) RLUIPA'S “APPROPRIATE RELIEF” CLAUSE ENCOMPASSES PLAINTIFF'S

REQUESTED RELIEF OF ALLOWING A TRIAL ON THE MERITS ON CLAIMS HE

BROUGHT PRUSUANT TO IT. RLUIPA'S APPROPRIATE RELIEF CLAUSE IS NOT

ONLY LIMITED TO INJUNCTIVE RELIEF. THE DEFENDANTS ALSO DEMANDED A

TRIAL ON THE MERITS.

II.) ONE OF THE REASONS FOR GRANTING CERTIORARI IS THE NEED TO MAKE

UNIFORM LAW CONCERNING CONFLICTING OPINIONS AMONGST THE U.S.

CIRCUIT COURTS ON THE SAME MATTER. THE 6th CIRCUIT HELD IN SPIES THAT

INMATES CANNOT HAVE INMATE-LED RELIGIOUS SERVICES. THE Is' CIRCUIT

HELD THAT INMATE-LED SERVICES, IN THE PRESENCE OF THE PRISON

CHAPLAIN, IS NOT A THREAT TO INSTITUTIONAL SECURITY, AND PROHIBITING

SUCH ACTIVITY IN THE PRESENCE OF THE PRISON CHAPLAIN WOULD BE

VIOLATIVE OF THE 1 ST AMENDMENT FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE AND RLUIPA.

III.) THE GENERAL APPELLATE RULE THAT CLAIMS NOT RAISED ON APPEAL ARE

NOT REVIEWABLE ON APPEAL OR ON REMAND AFTER APPEAL IS EQUALLY

APPLICABLE TO A DEFENDANT'S DEFENSE AS WELL AAS A PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS.

THE NEED FOR THIS RULE IS TO MINIMIZE UNNECESSARY JUDICIAL

RESOURCES BY REARGUING DIFFERENT DEFENSES, OR REARGUING THE SAME

. DEFENSES AS A STRATEGY TO PROLONG PROCEEDINGS, HAMPER PLAINTIFF'S

CASE, OR CAUSE UNDULY DELAY.

in

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loans Ass'n V. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 112 (1991)

Murphy V. Mo. Dep't of Corn. 372 F.3d 979, 988 (8th Cir. 2004)

Pleasant-Bey V. Shelby Co., et al.. No. 18-6063 (Order of 6th Cir. Filed Nov. 7th 2019)

Spies V. Voinovich. 173 F.3d 398, 405-06 (6th Cir. 1999)

Spratt V Rhode Island Department of Corrections, 482 F.3d 33, 39 (1st Cir. 2007)

Turner V. Safley. 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)

STATUTES

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2

28 U.S.C. § 2101(e)

IV

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner Boaz Pleasant-Bey respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the

judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.

OPINIONS BEEOW AND JURISDICTION

The unpublished opinion from the United States District Court as: Pleasant-Bey V. Shelby

County, et ah, 2018 U.S. Dist. FEXIS 152864, No. 2:llcv-02138-TEP-tmp (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 7, 2018)

and the unpublished opinion from the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is annexed

hereto as Exhibit A. The United States Supreme Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1)

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free

exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people

peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. Const.

Amend. 1

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Statement of the Case

The Petitioner filed suit in 2011 against Shelby County, the Sheriff of Shelby County,

Commander Rodgers, Chaplain Hawkins, Chief James Coleman, Chief Robert Moore, Chief Rod

Bowers and Chief Charline McGhee. Pleasant-Bey “a Muslim then housed on the fourth floor of the

Jail, asserted that the defendants violated his civil rights”. Ex. A Pleasant-Bey V. Shelby County, et al..

Cir. No. 18-6063, at Pg. 1 (6th Cir. Nov. 7"' 2019) The district court granted the Petitioner's motion to

amend and entered a partial order of dismissal. Id at Pg 2 The remaining Defendants moved for

summary judgment and the Petitioner filed a hybrid response and motion for judgment on the pleadings

with a second motion to amend. The district court granted Defendants motion based upon grounds that

Petitioner's claims were unexhausted. Ibid The 6"’ Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part, finding

that “there were genuine factual disputes regarding exhaustion” and “vacated the denial of the second

motion to amend.” Id at Pg. 3 On remand Defendants moved for summary judgment again and the

Petitioner filed a cross-motion for summary judgment with three motions to amend. The motions to

amend were denied and the district court granted Defendants summary judgment in favor of defendants

concluding that the Petitioner was not entitled to relief under § 1983. Id at Pg. 3-4 Petitioner appealed

to the 6lh Circuit Court of Appeals and the 6th Circuit reversed in part and remanded in part. Id at Pg. 910 The Petitioner now petitions to the United States Supreme Court to partial review the ruling of the

6ih Circuit Court of Appeals' Order Nov. 7th 2019.

Statement of Facts

The Petitioner was housed on the 4th Floor of the Shelby County Jail “Jail” in 2010-2011. While

he was housed there, he noticed that the Defendants Shelby County, Robert Moore, Chief Rod Bowers,

Chief Charline McGhee, Commander Roy Rodgers, Chaplain Hawkins, and Chaplain Davis prohibited

the Islamic practice of Traditional Jumu'ah Sendees. Traditional Jumu'ah Services consists of a

Khutbah [Sermon] divided into two halves, followed by Jumu'ah Salah [Prayer]. Jumu'ah Salah

consists of two Rak'ah [Units of Prayer]. Any change in the Traditional structure and practices of

Jumu'ah Services is Bidda' [A Prohibited Innovation] and Haram [Strictly Forbidden]. If Jumu'ah

Services are changed within it's structure, it is no longer Jumu'ah Service within the meaning of the

Qur'an and Sunnah of Prophet Muhammad ®|, but another form of Religion not practiced by Muslims

around the world. (D.E. No. 59-2, Pg. 1-2 Affidavit of Plaintiff at 1-2); D.E. No. 59-6 (Affidavit of

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Hamud at Pg. 1 -2)

Those Defendants implemented Shelby County Sheriffs Office [SCSO] Policy 502.08 (l)-(2)

that mandated all Religious Services at the Jail had to be conducted by a Religious Leader [Chaplain]

or an approved volunteer, and no inmates will be placed in a position of religious aughority or

leadership over another inmate for group services. D.E. No. 59-7 at Pg. 12 (SCSO Policy 502.02 (1)(2)) The Defendants hired three (3) Christian Chaplains to assure that weekly Christian Services were

conducted on the 4"' Floor of the Jail despite the fact that the 4th Floor is considered to be where

inmates are housed who have the highest security risks and/or have a history involving assaultive

behavior. D.E. 59-7 AT Pg. 5 Affidavit of Moore1; D.E. No. 59-7 at Pg. 2 (“The SCSO Provides paid

volunteer Chaplains or Religious Leaders”)

At the time this case commenced, there were three hired Chaplains who were paid by the SCSO

to give weekly Church Services on the 4"’ Floor, but there were no Muslim Chaplains hired by the

SCSO to give equal Jumu'ah Services every week. D.E. No. 59-7 at Pg. 2 (“An effort is underway to

hire an Imam to provide services at the Jail.”); D.E. No. 1 Compl. Pg. 4 (Defendants “Refused to

ensure the Plaintiff and Muslim inmates have regular weekly Jumu'ah Services by hiring a qualified

Imam who is available in Memphis to be hired at the Jail.”) In light of SCSO Policy 502.08 (l)-(2), the

Plaintiff was unable to have weekly Jumu'ah Services from February 15th 2010 to February 15th 2011

because Hassan, the volunteer Imam was unable to provide services that year, except for three Fridays

for only about fifteen (15) minutes. D.E. No. 59-2 at Pg. 2 and Pg. 4) The Defendants never made any

attempts to hire Hassan, who was qualified to provide weekly Traditional Jumu'ah Services, but they

hired Chaplain D. Muhammad who follows the Nation of Islam2. Ex. A Pleasant-Bey V. Shelby Co., et

ah, No. 18-6063, Order of 6th Cir. Filed Nov. 7th 2019 at Pg. 6 (Noting that in 2012, “the Jail was able”

to hire a Muslim Imam)

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All of the Defendants have submitted the same affidavits. D.E. No. 59-7; D.E. No. 59-8; D.E. No. 59-9; D.E. No. 59-10;

D.E. No. 59-11; D.E. No. 59-12 and D.E. No. 59-13

2 The Nation of Islam does not have Traditional Jumu'ah Services every week, and they are an ethnic group that believes

Elijah Muhammad was like a prophet to the black man in America. The Petitioner does not hold beliefs of the Nation of

Islam, but holds beliefs of following the Qur'an and Sunnah of Prophet Muhammad Ibn Abdullah n bom in 570 C.E.

2

The Jail’s Own Prayer Only Service

The Defendants in light of SCSO Policy 502.08 (l)-(2) changed the structure of Traditional

Jumu'ah Service to be a “Prayer Only Service” [Hereinafter “JPOS”] without any Khutbah, only with a

Salah. D.E. 59-7 at pg. 6 (“If the Imam is unable to attend, the inmates join in communal prayer for as

long as they wish, usually less than 20 minutes. A full-time Religious Leader or Chaplain is typically

present.”) The JPOS was governed by the Gang Intelligence Unit [GIU] who would limit those services

to having only nine (9) inmates from three (3) pods [housing units] and would usually be shortened to

only five (5) to seven (7) minutes. D.E. 69-4 Affidavit of Robinson (“The Muslims had to pray for

about 5-7 minutes and return back to their pods. The GIU was present at all of the Friday Muslim

Jumu'ah Services and security governed those services in a manner that did not allow the Muslims to

have proper services for an hour and a half like the Christian Services.”); Affidavit of Moore 59-7, Pg.

5-6 (Swearing that, “On the 4th Floor, officers assigned to the...GIU provide security for Jumu'ah

Services...if inmates are committing institutional violations [i.e. giving a Khutbah (Sermon)] they will

intervene...”)

Jumu'ah Salah Defined

Muslims cannot make communal Salah unless they elect an Imam [Leader] from amongst

themselves to pray because the Imam leads the others in Salah while they follow his instructions

through the prayer while they are structured in rows upon rows behind him. D.E. 59-6 at Pg.l Affidavit;

of Hamud (“The Imam who leads congregational Salah is in front while the Muslims align themselves ,

in rows upon rows behind [him].”) The Plaintiff was continuously elected in a “leadership position as

Imam” to lead the JPOS every time the volunteer Imam was not present, leading eight other inmates in

violation of SCSO Policy 502.08 (l)-(2). D.E. No. 59-2 at Pg. 4 (“The JPOS held from Feb. 15th 2010

to Feb. 15th 2011 were usually led by me. I led the Muslim prayer for the JPOS. According to Islamic

tradition, no group worship can be held without an Imam being elected to lead the Salah. I was elected

as the Imam to lead the JPOS. I was in a leadership position leading the JPOS every week from Feb.

15th 2010 - Feb. 15th 2011.”) The Defendants imposed SCSO Policy 502.08 (l)-(2) to prohibit the

Plaintiff from reading the Qur'an and rejoicing about the worship of Allah to the inmates at the Jail.

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REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I.) RLUIPA'S “APPROPRIATE RELIEF” CLAUSE ENCOMPASSES PLAINTIFF'S

REQUESTED RELIEF OF ALLOWING A TRIAL ON THE MERITS ON CLAIMS HE

BROUGHT PRUSUANT TO IT. RLUIPA'S APPROPRIATE RELIEF CLAUSE IS NOT

ONLY LIMITED TO INJUNCTIVE RELIEF. THE DEFENDANTS ALSO DEMANDED A

TRIAL ON THE MERITS.

“[A] person may assert a violation of this Act as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and

obtain appropriate relief against a government.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2 (a) In this case, the Plaintiff

sought both injunctive relief and relief of a trial on the merits. D.E. 1 Compl. at Pg. 7 (Plaintiffs relief

requested “Set this case for trial.”); D.E. No. 32 at Pg. 1 Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

(Front Page in Bold Letters “Jury Demanded”); D.E. 59-7 et seq. Defendant's Affidavits (“Jury

Demanded”) Injunctive relief is moot due to Petitioner being transferred from the Jail to the Tennessee

Department of Corrections. However, a trial on the merits is the appropriate requested relief which does

not dissipate with transference of the Petitioner from one facility or prison to another. Also, a requested

trial on the merits allows RLUIPA claims to be addressed despite Petitioner's transfer to another

facility. Otherwise, prisons and jails would just transfer a RLUIPA claimant in retaliation to the case to

avoid being responsible for their actions, causing the actions to continue to go on after transfer of the

claimant. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2 (a); Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loans Ass'n V. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 112

(1991) (“we construe statutes, where possible so as to avoid rendering superfluous any parts thereof’.)

RLUIPA's appropriate relief provision is not in any way written to circumscribe it's bounty to the only

the circumference of the jurisdictional limitations of injunctive relief. Id The Petitioner raised

RLUIPA's appropriate relief provision regarding the issue of his request for a trial on the merits in his

reply brief in the 6th Circuit, but the 6th Circuit did not address the issue before it. D.E. 1 Compl. at Pg.

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II.) ONE OF THE REASONS FOR GRANTING CERTIORARI IS THE NEED TO MAKE

UNIFORM LAW CONCERNING CONFLICTING OPINIONS AMONGST THE U.S.

CIRCUIT COURTS ON THE SAME MATTER. THE 6th CIRCUIT HELD IN SPIES THAT

INMATES CANNOT HAVE INMATE-LED RELIGIOUS SERVICES. THE 1st CIRCUIT

HELD THAT INMATE-LED SERVICES, IN THE PRESENCE OF THE PRISON

CHAPLAIN, IS NOT A THREAT TO INSTITUTIONAL SECURITY, AND PROHIBITING

SUCH ACTIVITY IN THE PRESENCE OF THE PRISON CHAPLAIN WOULD BE

VIOLATIVE OF THE 1ST AMENDMENT FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE AND RLUIPA.

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The “prohibition on inmate-led groups” exists “to avoid the risks that would arise from

unsupervised inmate activity and the creation of an alternate, inmate-led power structure in the prison”.

Spies V. Voinovich, 173 F.3d 398, 405-06 (6th Cir. 1999); Exhibit A, Pleasant-Bey V. Shelby Co., et al..

No. 18-6063, at Pg. 7 (Order of 6th Cir. Filed Nov. 7th 2019) (citing Spies) In Spies, the 6th Circuit

upheld prison policy prohibiting “inmate-led” religious services. Id However, despite the Defendants

arguing that their policy prohibiting inmate-led religious services [inmate preaching] because they

have “a compelling state interest in maintaining prison security.” fSpratt V Rhode Island Department of

Corrections, 482 F.3d 33, 39 (1st Cir. 2007) In this case, the Defendants argued that the Jail's blanket

ban on inmate preaching was established because it “prohibits any and all prisoners from having a

position of religious leadership...over other prisoners or religious services...to maintain all prisoners on

an equal basis for security purposes.” Exhibit A, Pleasant-Bey, No. 18-6063 at Pg. 6-7 Similarly, the

Defendants in Spratt argued that: “...if Spratt is a preacher, he is a leader; having leaders in prison (even

those sanctioned by the administration is detrimental to prison security; thus, Spratt's preaching activity

is detrimental to prison security. 482 F. 3d at 39 (“But to prevail on summary judgment, RIDOC "must

do more than merely assert a security concern,”) (citing Murphy V. Mo. Dep't of Corr., 372 F.3d 979,

988 (8th Cir. 2004)).

The 1st Circuit held: “Whereas, it is quite easy to see how armed prisoners granted nearly

indiscriminate authority to brutalize fellow prisoners are a threat to institutional security, the same

cannot be said about a preacher who offers a weekly sermon under the direction of the prison

chaplain.” Ibid Clearly, the facts of this case distinguishes it from others because GIU [Security] was

present in the Friday Jumu'ah Services along with the Chaplain. D.E. 69-4 Affidavit of Robinson;

Exhibit A, Pleasant-Bey, No. 18-6063 at Pg. 7 (Moore “acknowledge that the GIU provided security at

Jumu'ah Services but stated that it did not intervene in the absence of an institutional violation [give a

Khtbah].”); D.E. 59-7 at pg. 6 (“If the Imam is unable to attend, the inmates join in communal prayer

for as long as they wish, usually less than 20 minutes. A full-time Religious Leader or Chaplain is

typically presentC) With security and the chaplain both present, the issue of a “security concern” is

removed, and it would be constitutionally unjust for the Peitioner to be denied the right to elect a

qualified inmate as Imam or to be elected as Imam to give a Khutbah and lead the Traditional Jumu'ah

Salah. Id; Exhibit A Pleasant-Bey. at Pg. 6 (“Pleasant-Bey contends that Jail Policy violated his Free

Exercise rights by prohibiting prisoners from conducting religious services, which deprived him of his

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religious right to elect a qualified prisoner to be the Imam and deprived him personally of the

opportunity to be elected Imam.”) With both security and the chaplain both present, depriving Plaintiff

of the right to be Imam or to elect a qualified Imam to give a Traditional Jumu'ah Service Khutbah and

lead Traditional Jumu'ah Salah is not “reasonably related to any legitimate penological interests”

(Turner V. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987); U.S. Const. Amend. I) nor is it “in furtherance of a

compelling governmental interest” or the “least restrictive means of furthering that compelling

governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-l(a)

Conclusively, due to the fact that the GIU and the Chaplain were both present at the Friday

Jumu'ah Services, “the risks that would arise from unsupervised inmate activity” and “the creation of

an alternate, inmate-led power structure in the” jail (Spies V. Voinovich, 173 F.3d 398, 405-06 (6th Cir.

1999)) was no longer there because those services were closely monitored and supervised by GIU and

the Chaplain. (Id) These conflicting opinions amongst the sister circuit courts of appeals does prompt

this Court to decide the matter by granting certiorari, because the violation of Muslim rights, whether in

prison or in society,

III.) THE GENERAL APPELLATE RULE THAT CLAIMS NOT RAISED ON APPEAL ARE

NOT REVIEWABLE ON APPEAL OR ON REMAND AFTER APPEAL IS EQUALLY

APPLICABLE TO A DEFENDANT'S DEFENSE AS WELL AAS A PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS.

THE NEED FOR THIS RULE IS TO MINIMIZE UNNECESSARY JUDICIAL

RESOURCES BY REARGUING DIFFERENT DEFENSES, OR REARGUING THE SAME

DEFENSES AS A STRATEGY TO PROLONG PROCEEDINGS, HAMPER PLAINTIFF'S

CASE, OR CAUSE UNDULY DELAY.

“[Bjecause the district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on other grounds,

and...did not brief the issue on appeal...But the Defendants may take up the issue on remand.” PleasantBey, at Pg. 10 The 6th Circuit noted that the Defendants raised the qualified immunity defense in their

“initial motion to dismiss and again in their supplemental summary-judgment motion.” Id at pg. 9 The

Defendant failed to raise that defense on appeal in the first appeal in this case, and the second appeal.

(Id at Pg. 2 citing Pleasant-Bey. No. 12-6223 (6th Cir. Oct. 17th 2014); See 28 U.S.C. § 2101(e). Rule 11

of the Rules of the United States Supreme Court provide: “A petition for a writ of certiorari to review a

case pending in a United States court of appeals, before judgment is entered in that court, will be

granted only upon a showing that the case is of such imperative public importance as to justify

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deviation from normal appellate practice and to require immediate determination in this Court.” This

case involves depriving Muslims of their rights to practice the ability to equally do so, as they equally

do so.

“Issues raised in the district court but not raised on appeal are not considered these claims...”

and noting “Pleasant-Bey arguably brought claims 1, 4 and 5 pursuant to the Free Exercise and

Exercise ...” D.E. Pleasant-Bey Had Petitioner failed to bring those claims pursuant to both Free

Exercise, and Equal Protections happened to know these were present issue, he would have been told

by the 6th Circuit and the District Court that he cannot relitigate issues not raised on appeal, or on

remand after appeals over. Id This one-sided rule of law is often applied to always be bias towards a

Plaintiff rearguing those issues over and over again. This rule equally applies to the Defendants, who

are not above the law in this case.

CONCLUSION

Conclusively, RLUIPA's Appropriate Relief Clause does encompass the relief of a trial on the

merits on RLUIPA issues; this Court should grant the Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of

Appeals for the Sixth Circuit to make a uniform decision between the Is' Circuit and the 6lh Circuit

Court of Appeals; and the general rule that issues not raised on appeal are abandoned or waived is

applicable to a Defendant's Defense as well as a Plaintiffs claims and it does not discriminate between

the two parties.

WHEREFORE, THE PREMISES IS CONSIDERED, the Plaintiff thus requests that this Court

grant the Writ of Certiorari and schedule briefing in this case on the three issues enlisted above.

Respectfully Submittted,

V2L

Boaz Pleasant-Bey #473110

T.T.C.C

140 Macon Way

Hartsville, Tenneessee 37074

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Certificate of Compliance

I, Boaz Pleasant-Bey, certify and declare that the foregoing is in the best compliance to the United

States Supreme Court rules as I possibly can under the circumstances of my incarcerated conditions.

Certificate of Service

I, Boaz Pleasant-Bey. certify and declare that I have to mailed a copy, to Defense Counsel for Shelby

County and to the United States District Court Clerk on this J^ day

of

Pec

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EXHIBIT A

PLEAS ANT-BEY V. SHELBY COUNTY, ET AL,

NO. 18-6063 (Nov. 7th 2019 6th Cir.)

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