Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Elaine Ward, Petitioner v. City of New York, New York, et al.

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

(Filed Jun. 17, 2019)

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE

PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUM­

MARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1,

2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FED­

ERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1

AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN

CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT

FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE

EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELEC­

TRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUM­

MARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY

ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY

PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Ap­

peals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Mar­

shal United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the

City of New York, on the 17th day of June, two thou­

sand nineteen.

PRESENT:

DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,

GERARD E. LYNCH

RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,

Circuit Judges.

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Elaine Ward,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

17-2973

City of New York, Scott Stringer, New York City Comp­

troller, Bill de Blasio, New York City Mayor, Aisha Norflett, The NYC DOB, Director of Licensing Unit, Rick

Chandler, The NYC Department of Buildings Commis­

sioner, Michael Cardozo, Former Corporation Counsel,

Robert Limandri, Former NYC DOB Commissioner,

Drake Colley, NYC Law Department Sr. Appeals Attor­

ney, Louise Moed, NYC Law Department of Counsel,

Richard Paul Dearing, NYC Law Department Attor­

ney, Luiggy Gomez, NYC Law Department Messenger,

Moses Williams, NYC Law Department Notary, Debra

Herlica, NYC Building Special Investigations Director,

Patricia Pena, NYC BSIU Attorney, Zachary W. Carter,

Plumbing Foundation City of New York, Inc., Lawrence

Levine, Chairman of the board of Directors, Licensed

Master Plumber of the City of New York, Stewart

O’Brien, Executive Director of the Plumbing Founda­

tion, The Law Offices of Stuart A. Klein, Peter E. Sayer,

Esq., Stuart A. Klein, Esq., Par Plumbing, AKA The

PAR Group, LT. Terrance O’Brien, Assistant Deputy

Director of the Plumbing Foundation,

Defendants-Appellees.

FOR PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT

FOR DEFENDANTSAPPELLEES

City of New York, Scott

Stringer, New York City

Elaine Ward, pro se,

Flushing, NY.

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Comptroller, Bill de Blasio,

New York City Mayor,

Aisha Norflett, The NYC

DOB, Director of Licensing

Unit, Rick Chandler, The

NYC Department of

Buildings Commissioner,

Michael Cardozo, Former

Corporation Counsel,

Robert LiMandri, Former

NYC DOB Commissioner,

Drake Colley, NYC Law

Department Sr. Appeals

Attorney, Louise Moed,

NYC Law Department of

Counsel, Richard Paul

Dearing, NYC Law

Department Attorney,

Luiggy Gomez, NYC Law

Department Messenger,

Moses Williams, NYC Law

Department Notary, Debra Jane L. Gordon, Diana

Herlica, NYC Building

Lawless, of Counsel, for

Special Investigations

Zachary W. Carter,

Director, Patricia Pena,

Corporation Counsel of

NYC BSIU Attorney,

the City of New York,

and Zachary W. Carter:

New York, NY.

FOR DEFENDANTSAPPELLEES

The Law Offices of Stuart Christopher M. Slowik,

A Klein, Peter E. Sayer, Esq., Klein Slowik PLLC,

and Stuart A. Klein, Esq.: New York, NY.

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FOR DEFENDANTAPPELLEE

Par Plumbing Co., Inc.:

Don R. Sampen, Hillary

A. Fraenkel, Clausen Mil­

ler, PC., Florham Park, NJ.

FOR DEFENDANTSAPPELLEES

Plumbing Foundation City

of New York, Inc., Lawrence

Levine, Chairman of the

Board of Directors, Licensed

Master Plumber of the

City of New York, Stewart

O’Brien, Executive Director

of the Plumbing Foundation,

and Terrance O’Brien,

Aislinn S. McGuire, Kauff

Assistant Deputy Director McGuire & Margolis, LLP,

of the Plumbing Foundation New York, NY.

Appeal from a judgment of the United States Dis­

trict Court for the Southern District of New York (Castel, J).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the

judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Plaintiff-Appellant Elaine Ward (“Ward”), proceed­

ing pro se, appeals the district court’s judgment sua

sponte dismissing her amended complaint, in which she

asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, as

well as under state law, arising out of the revocation of

her master plumber’s license and subsequent state court

litigation. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

underlying facts, the procedural history of the case,

and the issues on appeal.

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In reviewing a district court’s dismissal of a com­

plaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, we review

factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de

novo, see Maloney v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 517 F.3d 70, 74

(2d Cir. 2008), and can consider documents attached to

the complaint and matters subject to judicial notice,

see Kramer v. Time Warner Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 773 (2d

Cir. 1991). Although this Court has not yet determined

whether a district court’s sua sponte dismissal of a

complaint as frivolous is reviewed de novo or for abuse

of discretion, we need not make such a determination

where the district court’s decision “easily passes mus­

ter under the more rigorous de novo review.” Fitzgerald

v. First E. Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 364

n.2 (2d Cir. 2000). This Court affords pro se litigants

“special solicitude” by interpreting pro se complaints

“to raise the strongest claims that [they] suggest[].”

Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116,122 (2d Cir. 2011) (inter­

nal alterations and quotation marks omitted).

Here, the district court properly dismissed most of

Ward’s federal claims as untimely. When filed in New

York, section 1983 and 1985 claims are subject to a

three-year statute of limitations, accruing “when the

plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury

which is the basis of [his or her] action.” Pearl v. City of

Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 79-80 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal

quotation marks omitted) (Section 1983); Cornwell v.

Robinson, 23 F.3d 694, 703 (2d Cir. 1994) (Section 1985).

Although untimeliness is an affirmative defense, a

complaint may be dismissed on this basis if the defense

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is plain from the face of the complaint. See Pino v.

Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 53-54 (2d Cir. 1995).

With the exception of some of Ward’s allegations

concerning state court proceedings, all of the events re­

counted in her complaint occurred and were known to

her prior to May 17,2014, which was three years before

she initiated this action. Thus, most of her claims are

untimely in the absence of equitable tolling. These un­

timely claims include all her allegations concerning:

discrimination and retaliation in the 1980s and 1990s;

the 2011 revocation of Ward’s master plumber’s license;

the alleged misconduct leading to the state court’s

April 2014 grant of leave to appeal; and her former at­

torney’s April 2014 initiation of a lawsuit against her.

Ward’s theory of equitable tolling is that DefendantsAppellees allegedly concealed their actions from her

and colluded with her former attorney to do so. How­

ever, Ward alleged that she knew about the conceal­

ment and her attorney’s improper relationship with

the other Defendants-Appellees by April 2014, which

was still more than three years before she filed the

original complaint in this case on May 17, 2017. Thus,

even if Ward were entitled to tolling on her claims until

April 2014, most of her claims would still be untimely.

See Pearl, 296 F.3d at 79-80; Cornwell, 23 F.3d at 703.

Those of Ward’s claims that are not time-barred

are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Under

that doctrine, federal courts lack subject matter juris­

diction over claims that, in effect, challenge state

court judgments. See District of Columbia Court ofAp­

peals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486-87 (1983); Rooker

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v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923). A

claim brought in federal court is barred under RookerFeldman when (1) the plaintiff lost in state court;

(2) the plaintiff complains of injuries caused by a state

court judgment; (3) the plaintiff invites the federal

court to review and reject that state court judgment;

and (4) the state court judgment was rendered prior to

the commencement of proceedings in federal court.

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S.

280, 284 (2005).

The thrust of Ward’s complaint regarding the

events of May 2014 and thereafter is that DefendantsAppellees, together with state court judges, thwarted

her efforts to challenge New York City’s appeal and to

obtain a traverse hearing, which she contends that she

was entitled to based on Defendants-Appellees’ earlier

wrongdoing. But each element of Rooker-Feldman is

satisfied here. Ward lost in state court prior to initiat­

ing this action. See Ward v. City of New York, 23 N.Y.3d

1046 (2014); Ward v. City of New York, 138 A.D.3d 629

(1st Dep’t 2016). Ward’s alleged injuries, relating to the

loss of her professional license and denial of requested

hearings, are injuries resulting from the state court

judgments. And she now seeks reversal of those judg­

ments, including an order reversing the state court de­

cision not to hold a traverse hearing. Although Ward

contends that she is alleging injuries flowing from

Defendants-Appellees’ misconduct before the state court,

rather than from the state court judgments them­

selves, her fraud claims allege actions predating the

state court’s April 2014 grant of leave to appeal. Her

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allegations concerning events thereafter are that state

court judges (who are not parties to this action) issued

or refused to issue orders knowing that the City was

not entitled to appeal. Such claims “require the federal

court to review the state proceedings and determine

that the . . . [orders were] issued in error” and are thus

barred by Rooker-Feldman. Vossbrinck v. Accredited

Home Lenders, Inc., 773 F.3d 423, 427 (2d Cir. 2014).

Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed Ward’s

amended complaint.1

The district court also did not err in declining

to grant Ward leave to file a second amended com­

plaint. Denials of leave to amend based on futility

are reviewed de novo. Hutchison v. Deutsche Bank Sec.

Inc., 647 F.3d 479, 490 (2d Cir. 2011). A pro se plaintiff

should be “grant [ed] leave to amend at least once when

a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication

that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu,

222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation

marks omitted). But the district court was not obli­

gated to grant leave to amend a second time after

Ward’s first amended complaint failed to cure the de­

fects that the court identified in its order to amend. See

Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988).

1 To the extent that Ward’s amended complaint may be con­

strued to also assert state law claims, Ward abandoned these

claims by failing to address in her appellate brief the district

court’s decision not to exercise jurisdiction over them. See LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d Cir. 1995) (is­

sues not addressed in pro se appellate brief are abandoned).

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Finally, Ward’s claim that the district court was

improperly influenced by Defendants-Appellees and

was biased against her is meritless and based entirely

on her dissatisfaction at the court’s adverse rulings.

See Chen u. Chen Qualified Settlement Fund, 552 F.3d

218, 227 (2d Cir. 2009).2

We have considered all of Ward’s remaining argu­

ments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly,

we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

FOR THE COURT:

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,

Clerk of Court

[SEAL]

/s/ Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe

2 Ward moves to strike the appellees’ briefs, oral argument

statements, and various certificates of service, to disqualify and

sanction counsel, and to amend this Court’s docket. These mo­

tions are denied as moot.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

ELAINE WARD,

Plaintiff,

-againstTHE CITY OF NEW YORK;

SCOTT STRINGER, NEW YORK

CITY COMPTROLLER; BILL

DE BLASIO, NEW YORK CITY

MAYOR; AISHA NORFLETT,

NYC DOB DIRECTOR OF

LICENSING UNIT; RICK

CHANDLER, NYC DEPARTMENT

OF BUILDINGS COMMIS­

SIONER; ROBERT LIMANDRI,

17-CV-3710 (PKC)

FORMER NYC DOB COMMIS­

ORDER OF

SIONER; ZACHARY CARTER,

DISMISSAL

CORPORATION COUNSEL;

MICHAEL CARDOZO, FORMER (Filed Sep. 18,2017)

CORPORATION COUNSEL;

DRAKE COLLEY, NYC LAW

DEPARTMENT SR. APPEALS

ATTORNEY; LOUISE MOED,

NYC LAW DEPARTMENT OF

COUNSEL; RICHARD DEARING,

NYC LAW DEPARTMENT

ATTORNEY; LUIGGY GOMEZ,

NYC LAW DEPARTMENT

MESSENGER; MOSES WILLIAMS,

NYC LAW DEPARTMENT

NOTARY; DEBRA HERLICA,

NYC BUILDING SPECIAL

INVESTIGATIONS DIRECTOR;

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PATRICIA PENA, NYC BSIU

ATTORNEY; THE PLUMBING

FOUNDATION OF THE CITY OF

NEW YORK, INC.; LAWRENCE

LEVINE, CHAIRMAN OF THE

BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND

LICENSED MASTER PLUMBER

OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK;

STEWART O’BRIEN, EXECUTIVE

DIRECTOR OF THE PLUMBING

FOUNDATION; LT. TERRENCE

O’BRIEN, ASSISTANT DEPUTY

DIRECTOR OF THE PLUMBING

FOUNDATION; LAWRENCE

LEVINE; PAR PLUMBING, INC.

ALSO KNOWN AS THE PAR

GROUP; STUART A. KLEIN

ESQ.; PETER E. SAYER ESQ.,

AND THE LAW OFFICES OF

STUART A. KLEIN, ESQ.,

Defendants.

CASTEL, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Elaine Ward brings this pro se action, for

which the filing fee has been paid, alleging violations

of her constitutional rights in connection with the 2012

revocation of her master plumbers license. By order

dated June 13, 2017, the Court detailed Plaintiff’s al­

legations against more than twenty defendants, which

included New York City, city agencies, present and for­

mer city employees and officials, and private individu­

als, and directed Plaintiff to file an amended complaint

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to address deficiencies in her original pleading.1 Plain­

tiff filed an amended complaint on August 11, 2017,

and the Court his reviewed it. The amended complaint

is dismissed for the reasons set forth below.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court has the authority to dismiss a com­

plaint, even when the plaintiff has paid the filing fee,

if it determines that the action is frivolous, Fitzgerald

v. First E. Seventh Tenants. Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363-64

(2d Cir. 2000) {per curiam) (citing Pillay v. INS, 45

F.3d 14,16-17 (2d Cir. 1995) {per curiam) (holding that

Court of Appeals has inherent authority to dismiss

frivolous appeal)), or that the Court lacks subject mat­

ter jurisdiction, Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526

U.S. 574, 583 (1999). The Court is obliged, however, to

construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572

F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise

the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v.

Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir.

1 When Plaintiff filed this action, there was no indication

that the Clerk of Court had issued summonses to Plaintiff. In the

June 13, 2017 order, the Court directed that no summons should

issue. Docket entries dated August 22, 2017, however, show that

summonses were in fact issued to Plaintiff when she filed the

case. On August 23, 2017, Plaintiff submitted twenty-three affir­

mations of service. The Court extended Defendants’ time to an­

swer until October 20, 2017. (ECF Nos. 12, 38.) In light of this

order dismissing the amended complaint, any orders directing

Defendants to answer the amended complaint are vacated as

moot.

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2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)

(emphasis in original).

BACKGROUND

A. The Original Complaint

In her 47-page complaint, filed on May 17, 2017,

Plaintiff alleged that Defendants conspired to violate

her due process rights in connection with the loss of

her master plumbers license, discriminated against

her on the basis of her gender, and retaliated against

her for complaining about that discrimination.

Plaintiff became an apprentice plumber in 1986,

and was promoted to journeyman plumber in 1990. De­

fendant Larry Levine fired Plaintiff from her job at Par

Plumbing in retaliation for testifying before the New

York City Division of Human Rights about gender dis­

crimination in the plumbing trade. Because Plaintiff

continued speaking out about gender bias, she was un­

able to find work, and she left New York in 1991. Plain­

tiff returned to New York in 1997, and she became a

master plumber in 2001. Plaintiff alleges, and the

Court does not doubt, that very few women achieve

this goal.

Plaintiff successfully ran her own business until

2010, when the Plumbing Foundation of the City of

New York (“Plumbing Foundation”), a non-profit or­

ganization involved in setting plumbing industry

standards, asked the New York City Department of

Buildings (“DOB”) to revoke her license. According to

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Plaintiff, the Plumbing Foundation sought to elimi­

nate Plaintiff as a competitor for contracts set aside

for women-run businesses. In February 2011, the DOB

served Plaintiff with a petition containing three charges.

One of those charges, lodged at the instigation of the

Plumbing Foundation, was that Plaintiff had applied

for a plumbing permit for work at a property, knowing

that the owner had hired her to supervise his own

worker, rather than one under her direct supervision.

The DOB offered to settle the matter without revoking

Plaintiff’s license on the following conditions: that

Plaintiff plead guilty, waive her right to future litiga­

tion, pay a fine, and submit to a one-year suspension.

Plaintiff declined to settle, and she hired an attorney,

Stuart Klein, to represent her before the Office of Ad­

ministrative Trials and Hearings (OATH). At a hear­

ing in July 2011, the OATH administrative law judge

determined that Plaintiff’s license should be revoked

because of the charge lodged by the Plumbing Founda­

tion, and DOB Commissioner LiMandri upheld that

decision on September 13, 2011.

In November 2011, Klein filed on Plaintiff’s behalf

an Article 78 petition in New York County Supreme

Court. The matter was transferred to the New York Su­

preme Court, Appellate Division, First Department,

which held that while there was “substantial evidence”

that Plaintiff had committed the violation, the revoca­

tion of her license for that one infraction was an “ex­

cessive penalty.” Ward v. City of New York, 111 A.D.3d

498 (1st Dep’t Nov. 14, 2013). The New York Court of

Appeals granted leave to appeal to the City, however,

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and then reversed the Appellate Division’s order. 23

N.Y.3d 1046 (Aug. 28, 2014). (“We cannot say that “the

penalty of [revoking petitioner’s master plumbers li­

cense] . . . shocks the judicial conscience”).

Plaintiff has unsuccessfully challenged the Court

of Appeals decision reinstating the revocation of her

license. See Ward u. City of New York, 138 A.D.3d 629

(1st Dep’t Apr. 28,2016) (the “Supreme Court correctly

found that it lacked authority to overturn the order of

the Court ofAppeals,” and “Petitioner’s appeal from the

order denying her attempt to enforce an order of this

Court was rendered moot by the Court of Appeals’ re­

versal of this Court’s order”), lu. denied, 28 N.Y.3d 1070

(Nov. 22, 2016), reargument denied, 28 N.Y.3d 1135

(Jan. 12, 2017). In addition, in 2012, Plaintiff applied

for a DOB “filing representative ID,” which apparently

would have allowed Plaintiff to work in the plumbing

industry in some capacity. The DOB denied Plaintiff’s

application due to “bad moral character.” Plaintiff also

filed a notice of claim against the City on August 16,

2016, and a “50-H hearing” took place on November 18,

2016. The outcome of that hearing is not clear.

The gist of Plaintiff’s original complaint was that

Defendants conspired to violate her due process rights

because she refused to settle with the DOB, and that

she was and continues to be the victim of gender bias.

Plaintiff accuses city attorneys of committing fraud

and misconduct during the administrative hearings

and state court litigation. According to Plaintiff, those

attorneys withheld documents and information from

her attorney, and failed to inform her attorney that

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they were seeking leave from the Court of Appeals. For

these reasons, Plaintiff does not accept the validity of

the Court of Appeals decision reinstating the revoca­

tion of her license. Plaintiff asked for $18 million in

damages.

B. The June 17 Order to Amend

In its 11-page order granting Plaintiff leave to

amend her complaint, the Court explained why Plain­

tiff’s complaint did not comply with Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 8. The Court assumes familiarity with

that order, but in short summary, the Court explained

that even accepting Plaintiff’s factual allegations as

true and drawing all reasonable inferences in her fa­

vor, the alleged facts did not make it plausible that

Plaintiff was entitled to the relief sought from the

named defendants. Specifically, the Court held that:

(1) Plaintiff’s claims arising directly out of the state

court proceedings, and seeking judicial review of state

court orders, were precluded by the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine; (2) many of Plaintiff’s constitutional claims

were untimely; (3) there were no facts in the complaint

supporting Plaintiff’s conspiracy claims; (4) Plaintiff

failed to assert facts suggesting that the private de­

fendants had acted under color of state law for the pur­

poses of finding liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and

(5) Plaintiff had failed to state a municipal liability

claim against New York City. In deference to Plaintiff’s

pro se status, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to

amend her complaint.

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C. The Amended Complaint

In the amended pleading, filed on August 11,2017,

Plaintiff details her allegations and provides addi­

tional supporting documentation. Plaintiff alleges that

the DOB has a “custom and practice” of discriminatory

practices with respect to issuing master plumbers li­

censes, that she was the first and only female master

plumber certified, and that the city does not want to

certify women because of the DOB “agenda” (ECF No.

10-1, ^2-5.) Plaintiff further asserts that the Law De­

partment committed fraud to conceal in deference to

the DOB agenda of keeping women out of the plumbing

trade. Attached to the amended complaint is a 1993 re­

port outlining discrimination against women and mi­

norities in the building trades, Plaintiff’s notice of

claim, and email exchanges that she claims show that

due to the misconduct of Law Department attorneys,

the New York Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction over

her case. (ECF 10-2,26-29.) Plaintiff asserts that a sixyear statute of limitations applies to her fraud claims,

and that her challenge to the denial of her requests for

a traverse hearing are not time-barred.

DISCUSSION

In deference to Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court

liberally construes her amended complaint to assert

the strongest claims it suggests, and assumes the truth

of her assertions. Even through that lens, however,

the amended complaint does not remedy the problems

plaguing Plaintiff’s original pleading.

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After the DOB administratively revoked Plain­

tiff’s master plumbers license in 2011, Plaintiff filed an

Article 78 proceeding in state court. The Appellate Di­

vision determined that revocation was an excessive

penalty, Ward v. City of New York, 111 A.D.3d 498 (1st

Dep’t Nov. 14, 2013), but the New York Court of Ap­

peals determined that it was not. 23 N.Y.3d 1046 (Aug.

28, 2014). As explained in its prior order, the RookerFeldman doctrine precludes this Court from reviewing

the state court judgments under just these circum­

stances. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus.

Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (holding that federal

district courts are barred from deciding cases “brought

by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused

by state-court judgments rendered before the district

court proceedings commenced and inviting district

court review and rejection of those judgments.”). Plain­

tiff’s argument that she is challenging the fraud and

misconduct of city attorneys, and not the state court

judgments, is unavailing.2 Moreover, for the same rea­

sons set forth in the prior order, the amended com­

plaint does not show that Defendants conspired against

Plaintiff, or that the private defendants acted under

color of state law.

If and to the extent that any of her federal claims

challenge the circumstances underlying the revocation

2 Plaintiff has raised the issue of attorney misconduct in the

state courts, Ward v. City of New York, 138 A.D.3d 629 (1st Dep’t

Apr. 28, 2016), Iv. denied, 28 N.Y.3d 1070 (Nov. 22, 2016), reargu­

ment denied, 28 N.Y.3d 1135 (Jan. 12, 2017), and in a notice of

claim filed with the city.

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of her master plumbers license by the DOB in 2011,

they are time-barred. The statute of limitations for

claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 is found in

the “general or residual [state] statute [of limitations]

for personal injury actions.” Pearl v. City ofLong Beach,

296 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Owens v. Okure,

488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989)). In New York, that period

is three years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5). Plaintiff filed

this complaint on May 17,2017. Any § 1983 and § 1985

claims arising before May 18, 2014, are thus timebarred. Although given an opportunity to do so, Plain­

tiff did not provide any basis for tolling the limitations

period. While plaintiff’s litigation battle continues in

state court with applications made as recently as Feb­

ruary 2017, federal claims that challenge the actions

of the DOB in revoking her master plumbers license or

actions of any public official prior to May 18, 2014, are

time-barred. The Court declines to exercise supple­

mental jurisdiction over any state law claims.3

3 To the extent Plaintiff is asserting state-law claims with

longer limitations periods, a district court may decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over such claims when it “has dismissed

all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367(c)(3). Generally, “when the federal-law claims have dropped

out of the lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law claims

remain, the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdic­

tion.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7

(1988)). Having dismissed the federal claims over which the Court

has original jurisdiction, the Court declines to exercise its supple­

mental jurisdiction over any state-law claims Plaintiff may be

asserting. See Kolari v. New York Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d

118, 122 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Subsection (c) of § 1367 ‘confirms the

discretionary nature of supplemental jurisdiction by enumer­

ating the circumstances in which district courts can refuse its

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District courts generally grant a pro se plaintiff

leave to amend a complaint to cure its defects, but

leave to amend may be denied if the plaintiff has al­

ready been given an opportunity to amend but has

failed to cure the complaint’s deficiencies. See Ruotolo

v. City of New York, 514 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2008);

Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988).

For the reasons discussed in this order, it does not ap­

pear that the defects in Plaintiff’s complaint can be

cured with an amendment. Accordingly, the Court de­

clines to grant Plaintiff leave to file a second amended

complaint.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth here and in the June 13,

2017 order, the complaint in its entirety is dismissed

as to all defendants for failure to state a claim on which

relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(c)(2)(B)(ii). The

Court denies as moot any pending requests for assis­

tance with subpoenas or with obtaining other discov­

ery. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a copy of this

order to Plaintiff, and note service on the docket.

The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3)

that any appeal from this order would not be taken in

good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status is

denied for the purpose of an appeal. Cf. Coppedge v.

United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding

exercise.’”) (quoting City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll, of Surgeons, 522

U.S. 156, 173 (1997)).

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that an appellant demonstrates good faith when he

seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue).

SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 15, 2017

New York, New York

/s/

R Kevin Castel

P. KEVIN CASTEL

United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

ELAINE WARD,

Plaintiff,

-againstTHE CITY OF NEW YORK;

SCOTT STRINGER, NEW YORK

CITY COMPTROLLER; BILL

DE BLASIO, NEW YORK CITY

MAYOR; AISHA NORFLETT,

NYC DOB DIRECTOR OF

LICENSING UNIT; RICK

CHANDLER, NYC DEPARTMENT

OF BUILDINGS COMMIS­

SIONER; ROBERT LIMANDRI,

17-CV-3710 (PKC)

FORMER NYC DOB COMMIS­

ORDER TO

SIONER; ZACHARY CARTER,

AMEND

CORPORATION COUNSEL;

MICHAEL CARDOZO, FORMER (Filed Jun. 13,2017)

CORPORATION COUNSEL;

DRAKE COLLEY, NYC LAW

DEPARTMENT SR. APPEALS

ATTORNEY; LOUISE MOED,

NYC LAW DEPARTMENT OF

COUNSEL; RICHARD DEARING,

NYC LAW DEPARTMENT

ATTORNEY; LUIGGY GOMEZ,

NYC LAW DEPARTMENT

MESSENGER; MOSES WILLIAMS,

NYC LAW DEPARTMENT

NOTARY; DEBRA HERLICA,

NYC BUILDING SPECIAL

INVESTIGATIONS DIRECTOR;

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PATRICIA PENA, NYC BSIU

ATTORNEY; THE PLUMBING

FOUNDATION OF THE CITY OF

NEW YORK, INC.; LAWRENCE

LEVINE, CHAIRMAN OF THE

BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND

LICENSED MASTER PLUMBER

OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK;

STEWART O’BRIEN, EXECUTIVE

DIRECTOR OF THE PLUMBING

FOUNDATION; LT. TERRENCE

O’BRIEN, ASSISTANT DEPUTY

DIRECTOR OF THE PLUMBING

FOUNDATION; LAWRENCE

LEVINE; PAR PLUMBING, INC.

ALSO KNOWN AS THE PAR

GROUP; STUART A. KLEIN

ESQ.; PETER E. SAYER ESQ.,

AND THE LAW OFFICES OF

STUART A. KLEIN, ESQ.

Defendants.

P. KEVIN CASTEL, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Elaine Ward brings this pro se action, for

which the filing fee has been paid, alleging violations

of her constitutional rights in connection with the 2012

revocation of her master plumbers license. For the rea­

sons set forth below, the Court directs Plaintiff to file

an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of

this order.

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court has the authority to dismiss a com­

plaint, even when the plaintiff has paid the filing fee,

if it determines that the action is frivolous, Fitzgerald

v. First E. Seventh Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363-64

(2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (citing Pillay v. INS, 45 F.3d

14,16-17 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (holding that Court

of Appeals has inherent authority to dismiss frivolous

appeal)), or that the Court lacks subject matter juris­

diction, Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574,

583 (1999). The Court is obliged, however, to construe

pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66,

72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the

“strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v.

Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir.

2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)

(emphasis in original).

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants conspired to vio­

late her due process rights, discriminated against her

on the basis of her gender, and retaliated against her

for complaining about that discrimination. Named as

Defendants are the City of New York, Comptroller

Scott Stringer, Mayor Bill de Blasio, Department of

Buildings (DOB) Director of Licensing Unit Aisha

Norflett, DOB Commissioner Rick Chandler, former

DOB Commissioner Robert LiMandri, DOB Special

Investigations Director Debra Herlica, DOB Special

Investigations attorney Patricia Pena, the Plumbing

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Foundation of the City of New York, Inc., Lawrence Lev­

ine, Stewart O’Brien, Lt. Terrence O’Brien, Par Plumb­

ing, Inc., Corporation Counsel Zachary Carter, former

Corporation Counsel Michael Cardozo, Law Depart­

ment attorneys Drake Colley, Louise Moed, and Richard

Dearing, Law Department messenger Luiggy Gomez,

NYC Law Department Notary Moses Williams, Stuart

A. Klein Esq., and Peter E. Sayer Esq.

The 47-page complaint contains the following

facts. Plaintiff was an apprentice plumber from 1986

until 1990, and during that time she worked for Larry

Levine at Par Plumbing. In 1990, Plaintiff was pro­

moted to journeyman plumber. That same year, Levine

fired Plaintiff in retaliation for her testifying before

the New York City Division of Human Rights about

gender discrimination in the plumbing trade. Plaintiff

left New York for a number of years because the indus­

try had “blackballed” her for her outspokenness about

gender issues. Plaintiff returned to New York in 1997,

and in 2001, she was issued a master plumbers license,

one of “very few females” to achieve that goal. (Compl.

H 38-39.) Plaintiff ran her own business for the next

ten years without incident. In 2010, the Plumbing

Foundation of the City of New York (Plumbing Foun­

dation), a non-profit organization that sets plumbing

industry standards, asked the DOB to revoke Plain­

tiff’s license so that Plaintiff would be eliminate [ed] as

a “possible future competitor for public work requiring

participation by women licensed plumbers.” (Compl.

f 43.) In February 2011, the DOB served Plaintiff

with a petition containing three charges. One of those

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charges was that Plaintiff had applied for a plumbing

permit for work at a property, knowing that the owner

had hired her to supervise his own worker, rather than

one under her direct supervision. According to Plain­

tiff, the Plumbing Foundation played a role in bringing

that charge to the DOB’s attention.

The DOB offered to settle the matter without re­

voking Plaintiff’s license on the following conditions:

that Plaintiff plead guilty, waive her right to future lit­

igation, pay a $7,500 fine, and submit to a one-year

suspension. Plaintiff declined to settle, and she hired

an attorney, Stuart Klein, to represent her before the

Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings (OATH).

At a hearing in July 2011, the City immediately

dropped two charges, but the OATH administrative

law judge determined that Plaintiff’s license should be

revoked in connection with the allegation purportedly

raised by the Plumbing Foundation. DOB Commis­

sioner LiMandri upheld that decision on September

13,2011.

In November 2011, Klein filed on Plaintiff’s behalf

an Article 78 petition in New York County Supreme

Court. The matter was transferred to the New York

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department,

which held that while there was “substantial evidence”

that Plaintiff had committed the violation, the revoca­

tion of her license for that one infraction was an “ex­

cessive penalty.” Ward u. City of New York, 111 A.D.3d

498 (1st Dep’t Nov. 14, 2013). The New York Court of

Appeals granted leave to appeal to the City, however,

and reversed. 23 N.Y.3d 1046 (Aug. 28, 2014). (“We

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cannot say that “the penalty of [revoking petitioner’s

master plumbers license] . . . shocks the judicial con­

science”).

Since then, Plaintiff has made several attempts to

challenge the Court of Appeals decision reinstating the

revocation of her license. See Ward v. City of New York,

138 A.D.3d 629 (1st Dept. Apr. 28, 2016) (“Petitioner’s

appeal from the order denying her attempt to enforce

an order of this Court was rendered moot by the Court

of Appeals’ reversal of this Court’s order”), Iv. denied,

28 N.Y.3d 1070 (Nov. 22, 2016), reargument denied, 28

N.Y.3d 1135 (Jan. 12,2017). In addition, in 2012, Plain­

tiff applied to the DOB for a “filing representative ID,”

which presumably would have allowed her to work in

the plumbing industry in some capacity. Norflett de­

nied Plaintiff’s application due to “bad moral charac­

ter.” Plaintiff also filed a notice of claim against the

City on August 16, 2016, and a “50-H hearing” took

place on November 18, 2016. The complaint does not

indicate the outcome of that hearing.

The gist of Plaintiff’s complaint is that Defend­

ants conspired to violate her due process rights be­

cause she refused to settle with the DOB. Plaintiff

claims that the city attorneys named as defendants

withheld documents, failed to communicate with her

attorney, and committed other misconduct and fraud

during the state court litigation, and for this reason

she does not accept the validity of the Court of Appeals

decision. Plaintiff further alleges that her attorney,

Klein, tried to coerce her into paying him more money

to represent her in the Article 78 proceeding, and that

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when she refused, he failed to perfect her appeal with

the Appellate Division. Plaintiff had to retain another

attorney, who successfully moved to extend her time to

appeal and represented her in that matter. Plaintiff ac­

cuses Klein of “abuse of process” and with colluding

with her adversaries. Plaintiff seeks $18 million in

damages.

DISCUSSION

A. Rule 8 and Section 1983

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure re­

quires a complaint to make a short and plain state­

ment showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. A

complaint states a claim for relief if the claim is plau­

sible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,678-79 (2009) (cit­

ing BellAtl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

To review a complaint for plausibility, the Court ac­

cepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and

draws all reasonable inferences in the pleader’s favor.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at

555). But the Court need not accept “[tjhreadbare re­

citals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are

essentially legal conclusions. Id. at 678 (citing Twombly,

550 U.S. at 555). After separating legal conclusions

from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must

determine whether those facts make it plausible - not

merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief.

Id.

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plain­

tiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the

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Constitution or laws of the United States was violated,

and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under

the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins,

487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). For the following reasons,

Plaintiff’s complaint fails to comply with federal plead­

ing rules, and thus her pleading fails to state a claim

on which relief may be granted.

B. Challenge to State Court Judgments

To the extent that Plaintiff is challenging statecourt decisions, the Rocker-Feldman doctrine bars any

such claims. The doctrine - created by two Supreme

Court cases, Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413,

415-16 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Ap­

peals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-86 (1983) - pre­

cludes federal district courts from reviewing final

judgments of the state courts. Exxon Mobil Corp. v.

Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)

(holding that federal district courts are barred from de­

ciding cases “brought by state-court losers complaining

of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered

before the district court proceedings commenced and

inviting district court review and rejection of those

judgments.”).

The Rocker-Feldman doctrine applies where the

federal-court plaintiff: (1) lost in state court, (2) com­

plains of injuries caused by the state-court judgment,

(3) invites the district court to review and reject the

state court judgment, and (4) commenced the district

court proceedings after the state-court judgment was

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rendered. Vossbrinck v. Accredited Home Lenders, Inc.,

773 F.3d 423, 426 (2d Cir. 2014).

Plaintiff’s claims arising directly from the statecourt proceedings are precluded by Rocker-Feldman.

Although the Appellate Division, First Department,

held that the revocation of Plaintiff’s master plumbers

license was an excessive penalty, the New York Court,

of Appeals reversed that decision. Plaintiff brought

this action seeking reversal of the decision of the Court

of Appeals. In so doing, she essentially asks this Court

to review and reject the decision of the New York State

Court of Appeals reinstating the revocation. Finally,

Plaintiff alleges that the state-court judgment was

rendered before she commenced this federal action.

Federal district courts do not provide a forum for

reviewing errors in state court proceedings. See, e.g.,

Exxon, 544 U.S. at 284. Plaintiff’s remedy, which she

pursued, was to seek reconsideration in the New York

Court of Appeals. This Court cannot review any of the

state court orders, and any allegations against defend­

ants based on their compliance with the Court of Ap­

peals decision fail to state a claim on which relief can

be granted.

C. Conspiracy

The Court also dismisses Plaintiff’s claims that

Defendants conspired against her. To state a conspiracy

claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege

(1) an agreement between two or more government ac­

tors or between a government actor and another entity;

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(2) to act in concert to inflict an unconstitutional

injury; and (3) an overt act done in furtherance of

that goal causing damages. See Ciambriello v. Cnty. of

Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 324-25 (2d Cir. 2002); see also

Deskovic v. City of Peekskill, 894 F. Supp. 2d 443, 465

(S.D.N.Y. 2012). Allegations of conspiracy are deemed

“baseless” where a plaintiff “offers not a single fact to

corroborate her allegation of a ‘meeting of the minds’

among the coconspirators.” Gallop v. Cheny, 642 F.3d

364, 369 (2d Cir. 2011); Ciambriello, 292 F.3d at 325

(“[C]omplaints containing only conclusory, vague, or

general allegations that defendants have engaged in a

conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of his constitutional

rights are properly dismissed.”) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

To state a conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985,

a plaintiff must allege facts that plausibly show that

there exists: (1) a conspiracy (2) for the purpose of de­

priving the plaintiff of the equal protection of the laws,

or the equal privileges or immunities under the laws;

(3) an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and

(4) an injury to his person or property, or a deprivation

of his right or privilege as a citizen of the United

States. Thomas u. Roach, 165 F.3d 137, 146 (2d Cir.

1999). “[T]he [§ 1985(3)] conspiracy must also be moti­

vated by some racial or perhaps otherwise class-based,

invidious discriminatory animus behind the conspira­

tors’ action.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted).

Plaintiff does not allege any facts suggesting that

Defendants colluded to violate her constitutional or

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statutory rights. The Court therefore dismisses any

claims of conspiracy Plaintiff seeks to bring under

§ 1983 or § 1985(3).

D. Private Actors

Plaintiff names as defendants a number of private

individuals. A claim for relief under § 1983 must allege

facts showing that each defendant acted under the

color of a state “statute, ordinance, regulation, custom

or usage.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Private individuals do not

qualify as state actors, and an attorney’s legal repre­

sentation does not constitute the degree of state in­

volvement or interference necessary to state action for

purposes of § 1983. See Bourdon v. Laughren, 386 F.3d

88, 90 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454

U.S. 312, 324-25 (1981)); see also Schnabel v. Abram­

son, 232 F.3d 83, 87 (2d Cir. 2000). As previously dis­

cussed, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state

a conspiracy claim. Because the private parties named

as defendants do not qualify as state actors, Plaintiff

therefore fails to state § 1983 claims against them.

E. Claims Against the City of New York

When a plaintiff sues a municipality under § 1983,

it is not enough for the plaintiff to allege that one of

the municipality’s employees or agents engaged in

some wrongdoing. The plaintiff must show that the

municipality itself caused the violation of the plain­

tiff’s rights. See Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350,

1359 (2011) (“A municipality or other local government

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may be liable under this section [1983] if the govern­

mental body itself‘subjects’ a person to a deprivation

of rights or ‘causes’ a person ‘to be subjected’ to such

deprivation.”) (quoting Monell v. Dep of Soc. Servs. of

City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978)); Cash v.

Cnty. of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 333 (2d Cir. 2011). In other

words, to state a § 1983 claim against a municipality,

the plaintiff must allege facts showing (1) the existence

of a municipal policy, custom, or practice, and (2) that

the policy, custom, or practice caused the violation of

the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Jones v. Town

of East Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2012); Bd. of

Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397,

403 (1997) (internal citations omitted).

Plaintiff sues the City of New York, but she fails to

allege that any of her injuries were the result of a mu­

nicipal policy, custom, or practice.

F.

Timeliness of § 1983 Claims

The statute of limitations for claims under § 1983

and § 1985 is found in the “general or residual [state]

statute [of limitations] for personal injury actions.”

Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir.

2002) (quoting Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50

(1989)). In New York, that period is three years. See

N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5). Such claims generally accrue

when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the

injury that is the basis of the claim. Hogan v. Fischer,

738 F.3d 509, 518 (2d Cir. 2013).

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Plaintiff filed this complaint on May 17, 2017, and

any claims that arose more than three years before the

filing date generally are time-barred. Plaintiff’s claims

arising before May 18, 2014, are thus time-barred un­

less there is some basis for tolling the limitations pe­

riod.

The doctrine of equitable tolling permits a court,

“under compelling circumstances, [to] make narrow

exceptions to the statute of limitations in order ‘to

prevent inequity.’”In re U.S. Lines, Inc., 318 F.3d 432,

436 (2d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). The statute of

limitations may be equitably tolled when a defendant

fraudulently conceals from a plaintiff the fact that the

plaintiff has a cause of action, or when the plaintiff

is induced by the defendant to forego a lawsuit until

the statute of limitations has expired. See Pearl, 296

F.3d at 82-83. New York also provides by statute for

other circumstances in which a limitations period may

be tolled. See, e.g., C.P.L.R. § 204(a) (where commence­

ment of an action has been stayed by court order), id.

at § 204 (where a dispute has been submitted to arbitra­

tion but is ultimately determined to be non-arbitrable),

id. at § 207(3) (defendant is outside New York at the

time the claim accrues), id, at § 208 (plaintiff is disa­

bled by infancy or insanity), id. at § 210 (death of plain­

tiff or defendant).

To the extent Plaintiff asserts any claims not

barred by Rocker-Feldman, he does not provide any

facts suggesting that the statute of limitations should

be equitably tolled in this case. Because the failure

to file an action within the limitations period is an

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affirmative defense, a plaintiff is generally not re­

quired to plead that the case is timely filed. Cortes v.

City of New York, 700 F. Supp. 2d 474, 482 (S.D.N.Y.

2010). Dismissal is appropriate, however, where the ex­

istence of an affirmative defense, such as the statute of

limitations, is plain from the face of the pleading. See

Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1995) (affirming

sua sponte dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) on stat­

ute of limitations grounds); Baker u. Cuomo, 58 F.3d

814, 818-19 (2d Cir. 1995) (sua sponte dismissal is “ap­

propriate if it appears from the face of the complaint

that the action is barred ... by the statute of limita­

tions”), vacated in part on other grounds, 85 F.3d 919

(2d Cir. 1996). If Plaintiff wishes to pursue the claims

that appear to be time-barred, her amended complaint

must allege facts showing that the applicable limita­

tions period should be equitably tolled.

G. Leave to Amend

District courts generally grant a pro se plaintiff

leave to amend a complaint to cure its defects, but

leave to amend may be denied if the plaintiff has al­

ready been given an opportunity to amend but has

failed to cure the complaint’s deficiencies. See Ruotolo

v. City of New York, 514 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2008);

Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988).

For the reasons discussed in this order, it does not ap­

pear that the defects in Plaintiff’s complaint can be

cured with an amendment. In an abundance of caution,

however, the Court grants Plaintiff an opportunity to

amend her complaint.

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CONCLUSION

The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a copy of this

order to Plaintiff, and note service on the docket. Plain­

tiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint that

complies with the standards set forth above. Plaintiff

must submit the amended complaint to this Court’s

Pro Se Intake Unit within sixty days of the date of this

order, caption the document as an “Amended Com­

plaint,” and label the document with docket number

17-CV-3710 (PKC). An Amended Complaint form is at­

tached to this order. No summons will issue at this

time. If Plaintiff fails to comply within the time al­

lowed and cannot show good cause to excuse such fail­

ure, the complaint will be dismissed for failure to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Court

certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal

from this order would not be taken in good faith, and

therefore informer pauperis status is denied for the

purpose of an appeal. Cf. Coppedge u. United States,

369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant

demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a

nonfrivolous issue).

SO ORDERED.

Dated: 6-13-17

New York, New York

/s/

P. Kevin Castel

P. KEVIN CASTEL

United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE

SECOND CIRCUIT

At a stated term of the United States Court of Ap­

peals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Mar­

shall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in

the City of New York, on the 23rd day of July, two thou­

sand nineteen.

Elaine Ward,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

City of New York, et al.,

ORDER

Docket No: 17-2973

Defendant - Appellees.

Appellant, Elaine Ward, filed a petition for panel

rehearing, or, in the alternative, for rehearing en banc.

The panel that determined the appeal has considered

the request for panel rehearing, and the active mem­

bers of the Court have considered the required for re­

hearing en banc.

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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition is de­

nied.

FOR THE COURT:

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,

Clerk

[SEAL]

/s/ Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe

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SUPREME COURT - STATE OF NEW YORK

NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK

CIVIL INDEX MINUTE BOOK INQUIRY

CCOAMINI

INDEX NO: 100341 2012

PURCHASE: 01112012

PLAINTIFF NAME:

WARD ELAINE

ATTORNEY:

KLEIN SLOWIK PLLC

90 BROAD ST, SUITE

NEW YORK, NY

212 564-7560

DATE: 03/29/2017

TIME: 12:16:09

DEFENDANT NAME:

CITY OF NY

ATTORNEY:

UNKNOWN

SEQ

0001

DATE

01112012

MINUTES

VERIFIED PETITION

0001

03052012

ORDER IAS PART 58 SEQ 01

TRANSFERRED TO APPELLATE

DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT

0002

0001

0002

0001

0001

03052012

03282012

03282012

11212013

04172014

NOTICE OF ENTRY

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE

SUBPEONA [sic] # 74

REMITTITUR

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE

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12/12/2014

£1 12/12/2014

a 12/12/2014

a 12/12/2014

12/12/2014

12/8/2014

11/21/2014

11/17/2014

a 11/12/2014

11/12/2014

11/3/2014

a 10/24/2014

M 10/24/2014

10/24/2014

10/24/2014

10/24/2014

■ 9/30/2014

M 9/19/2014

AFFIDAVIT reply

AFFIRMATION amended opposition

AFFIRMATION opposition

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE

ORDER SIGNED IAS PART 58

SEQ 04 MOTION IS DENIED.

AFFTS,NOTICE OF MOTION FEE

PAID

NOTICE OF APPEAL, COPY FOR­

WARDED TO

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE FEE PAID

ORDER SIGNED

AFFTS,NOTICE OF MOTION FEE

PAID

COPY OF ORDER W/NOTICE OF

ENTRY WITH AFFT OF SVC

LETTER. SEQ 04

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE

AFFIR. SEQ 004

ORDER SHOW CAUSE. SEQ 03

DECISION AND ORDER SEQ IAS

PT 58 SEQ 003 APPLICATION IS

DENIED AS MOOT

OTHER PAPERS Corrected Remittitur

PAPER FILED REMITTITUR

FROM COURT OF APPEALS

Legend: & Records Room ■ Scanned

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New York County Clerk’s Office

WARD ELAINE vs. NYC DEPT OF BUILDINGS

1/1/2012 Supreme Court General Index Reg. (General)

33 Actions

3/23/2017 COPY OF LETTER DATED

2/14/2017 WITH EXHIBITS

M 4/29/2016 ORDER SIGNED REMITTITUR #266

AFFIRMED AFTER ARGUMENT/

SUBMISSION (BOX 82 REC. RM)

£!■ 6/24/2015 Receipt from Appellate Division,

1st Department

M 5/19/2015 Appellate Division Receipt

M 5/4/2015

NOTICE OF APPEAL, COPY FOR­

WARDED TO

El 4/29/2015 Receipt from the Appellate Division

4/29/2015 COPY OF ORDER WITH NOTICE

OF ENTRY

4/20/2015 REPLY AFFIDAVIT TO RESPOND­

ENTS’ AFFIRMATION IN OPPOSI­

TION TO MOTION . . ., SEQ 006

4/20/2015 AFFTS,NOTICE OF MOTION FOR

A TRAVERSE HEARING, SEQ 006

l£S 4/20/2015 AFFIRMATION IN OPPOSITION

TO MOTION FOR TRAVERSE

HEARING, SEQ 006

M 4/20/2015 RECEIVED PAPERS SEQ 006

£■ 4/20/2015 DECISION AND ORDER SEQ 006

PT 58 MOTION IS DECIDED IN ACCORD.WITH THE ATTACH MEMO

3/4/2015

NOTICE OF APPEAL, COPY FOR­

WARDED TO

1/15/2015 ORDER W N ENTRY

12/12/2014 AFFTS,NOTICE OF MOTION