Opposition Brief — James F. Johnson, Petitioner v. Richard S. Tischner, Director, Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency, et al.

No. 19-5633

________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_______________

JAMES F. JOHNSON, PETITIONER

v.

RICHARD S. TISCHNER, DIRECTOR, COURT SERVICES AND OFFENDER

SUPERVISION AGENCY, ET AL.

_______________

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

_______________

BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION

_______________

NOEL J. FRANCISCO

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

JOSEPH H. Hunt

Assistant Attorney General

LEWIS S. YELIN

ASHLEY A. CHEUNG

Attorneys

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530-0001

SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj.gov

(202) 514-2217

________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the RookerFeldman doctrine

barred

both

it

and the district court

from

exercising jurisdiction to reverse a decision of the D.C. Superior

Court.

(I)

ADDITIONAL RELATED PROCEEDINGS

D.C. Superior Court:

Johnson v. CSOSA, No. F-33483-76 (Sept. 27, 2004)

D.C. Court of Appeals:

Johnson v. United States, No. 04-CO-1670 (June 23, 2005)

U.S. District Court (D.D.C.):

Johnson v. Gray, No. 12-0967 (Nov. 14, 2012)

U.S. Court of Appeals (D.C. Cir.):

Johnson v. Ware, No. 12-5388 (Apr. 30, 2013)

Supreme Court of the United States:

Johnson v. Ware, No. 13-6340 (Oct. 15, 2013)

(II)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_______________

No. 19-5633

JAMES F. JOHNSON, PETITIONER

v.

RICHARD S. TISCHNER, DIRECTOR, COURT SERVICES AND OFFENDER

SUPERVISION AGENCY, ET AL.

_______________

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

_______________

BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION

_______________

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1a-2a)1 is not

published in the Federal Reporter, but is reprinted at 767 Fed.

Appx. 10.

The order of the district court (Pet. App. 4a-5a) is

unreported.

The appendix to the petition for a writ of certiorari is

not paginated.

This brief treats the appendix as if it were

separately and sequentially paginated, with the first page of the

appendix as page 1a.

Petitioner’s “Exhibit One” is separately

marked in the original materials and is referenced as such.

1

2

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on April 19,

2019.

A petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc was denied

on June 14, 2019.

Pet. App. 3a; C.A. Doc. 1792940.

The petition

for a writ of certiorari was filed on August 2, 2019.

The

jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

STATEMENT

1.

The District of Columbia Sex Offender Registration Act

of 1999 (Act), D.C. Code § 22-4001 et seq. (LexisNexis 2012),

requires sex offenders to register with the Court Services and

Offender Supervision Agency for the District of Columbia (CSOSA).

Id. § 22-4014(1); see id. § 22-4001(1).

As relevant here, the Act

defines “sex offender” to include a person who lives in the

District of Columbia and who “[c]omitted a registration offense at

any time and is in custody or under supervision on or after July

11, 2000.”

turn,

is

including

Id. § 22-4001(9)(B).

defined

“forcible

to

A “registration offense,” in

encompass

rape.”

various

Id.

sex-related

§ 22-4001(8)(B).

crimes,

Certain

registration offenses, including “forcible rape,” are classified

as “lifetime registration offenses.”

Id. § 22-4001(6)(A).

Sex

offenders who commit lifetime registration offenses are required

to register with CSOSA for life.

Id. § 22-4002(b)(1).

The Act “gives to CSOSA the authority to decide whether

someone convicted of a sex crime prior to the law’s enactment

committed a registration offense.”

Anderson v. Holder, 647 F.3d

3

1165, 1170 (D.C. Cir. 2011).

CSOSA’s initial determination “is

subject to judicial review in [the D.C.] Superior Court.”

In re

W.M., 851 A.2d 431, 436 (D.C. 2004) (citing Section 22–4004).

If

the Superior Court rejects a convicted defendant’s challenge to

CSOSA’s initial determination, it “is required to enter an order

certifying that [the] person is a sex offender” and requiring the

person to register.

D.C. Code § 22-4003(d)(4) (LexisNexis 2012);

see id. §§ 22-4003(a), 22-4004(c)(2).

2.

In 1976, petitioner was convicted of rape while armed,

in addition to other crimes.

judgment).

Pet. App. 4a; Pet. Ex. 1 (copy of

In 2003, while petitioner was under supervision for

separate convictions, CSOSA informed him that, as a result of his

rape conviction, he was subject to lifetime registration under the

Act.

See

D.C.

Code

§§ 22-4001(6)(A),

(8)(B),

and

(9)(B),

22-4002(b)(1), 22-4014(1) (LexisNexis 2012). Petitioner challenged

CSOSA’s determination in D.C. Superior Court.

The court rejected

petitioner’s arguments and, as the Act mandates, entered an order

certifying petitioner as a sex offender and requiring him to

register for life.

See Johnson v. CSOSA, No. F-33483-76 (D.C.

Super. Ct. Sept. 27, 2004); see also Johnson v. Gray, et al., No.

12-civ-967, D. Ct. Doc. 7-3 (D.D.C. Aug. 3, 2012) (attaching Sept.

27, 2004 Superior Court decision).2

The D.C. Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner’s appeal as

untimely. Johnson v. United States, No. 04-CO-1670 (D.C. Ct. App.

June 23, 2005).

2

4

In 2012, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of mandamus

in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia

seeking to compel CSOSA to relieve him of his obligation to

register

as

registration

a

sex

offender

requirement

for

life

and

violated

the

Ex

arguing

Post

that

Facto

the

Clause.

Johnson v. Gray, 2012 WL 5512869, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 14, 2012).

The district court denied the petition for mandamus and dismissed

the case, id. at *2; the D.C. Circuit summarily affirmed, 2013 WL

2395115, at *1 (Apr. 30, 2013); and this Court denied the petition

for a writ of certiorari, 571 U.S. 969 (2013).

3.

In 2018, petitioner brought this suit again challenging

the requirement that he register as a sex offender.

5a.

Pet. App. 4a-

The district court dismissed the complaint, explaining that

petitioner had already unsuccessfully challenged his designation

as a sex offender in D.C. Superior Court and that it was without

jurisdiction to disturb that court’s ruling.

Pet. App. 5a. The

court of appeals summarily affirmed, concluding that “[l]ower

federal

courts

are

precluded

from

exercising

jurisdiction over final state-court judgments.”

appellate

Pet. App. 1a

(quoting Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 463 (2006) (per curiam)).

The court of appeals subsequently denied petitioner’s petition for

rehearing, Pet. App. 3a, and rehearing en banc, C.A. Doc. 1792940.

ARGUMENT

Petitioner contends (Pet. 3-6) that the court of appeals erred

in

concluding

that

both

it

and

the

district

court

lacked

5

jurisdiction to review the D.C. Superior Court’s decision.

That

argument fails under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which precludes

the lower federal courts from reviewing state-court judgments.

Further review is unwarranted for the additional reasons that

petitioner seeks mere error correction and this case is a poor

vehicle

for

resolving

the

questions

presented.

Although

petitioner also raises (Pet. 1-2) various questions regarding the

merits of his claims, none is properly presented here.

1.

a.

This

Court

has

long

recognized

that

the

lower

federal courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction to review final

state-court decisions, as well as decisions of the courts of the

District of Columbia.

Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 531–532

(2011); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S.

462, 482–486 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413,

415–416

(1923).

That

principle,

called

the

Rooker-Feldman

doctrine, is grounded in 28 U.S.C. 1257, which grants this Court

exclusive jurisdiction to review such decisions.

See, e.g., Exxon

Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 292

(2005) (“[28 U.S.C.] 1257, as long interpreted, vests authority to

review a state court’s judgment solely in this Court.”).

As a doctrine of jurisdiction, Rooker-Feldman departs in

certain ways from standard preclusion principles.

Corp., 544 U.S. at 292–293.

Exxon Mobil

For instance, it does not apply to

parallel state and federal litigation, ibid., nor does it bar

actions by a nonparty to the earlier state suit, see Lance v.

6

Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 464–466 (2006) (per curiam).

Additionally,

if the plaintiff presents an “‘independent claim,’” “it is not an

impediment to the exercise of federal jurisdiction that the ‘same

or a related question’ was earlier aired between the parties in

state court.”

Skinner, 562 U.S. at 532 (citation omitted).

For

example, although “a state-court decision is not reviewable by

lower federal courts,

* * *

a statute or rule governing the

decision may be challenged in a federal action.”

Ibid.

Thus, at

bottom, the doctrine is limited to lawsuits “brought by statecourt

losers

complaining

of

injuries

caused

by

state-court

judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced

and

inviting

judgments.”

district

court

review

and

rejection

of

those

Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 284.

That is precisely what this case is.

After CSOSA designated

petitioner a sex offender subject to lifetime registration, he

sought review in the D.C. Superior Court.

That court rejected

petitioner’s arguments and, pursuant to the Act’s requirements,

certified him as a sex offender subject to lifetime registration

and ordered him to register.

See p. 3, supra.

It was the Superior

Court’s order that triggered the consequences of which petitioner

now complains.

Because the current suit is, “in essence,

* * *

an attempt to obtain direct review of the” Superior Court’s order,

it is barred by Rooker-Feldman.

ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S.

605, 622 (1989); see Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 288 n.2 (“The

injury of which the petitioners (the losing parties in state court)

7

could have complained in the hypothetical federal suit would have

been caused by the state court’s invalidation of their mineral

leases, and the relief they would have sought would have been to

undo the state court’s invalidation of the statute.”).

Petitioner offers no reason to doubt this conclusion.

This

suit thus represents a quintessential example of a “case[] brought

by [a] state-court loser[] complaining of injuries caused by [a]

state-court

judgment[]

proceedings

commenced

rendered

and

before

inviting

rejection of [that] judgment[].”

the

district

district

court

court

review

and

Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at

284.

b.

Petitioner also appears to contend (Pet. 1, 6) that the

government waived any argument based on Rooker-Feldman.

contention is meritless.

This

Because Rooker-Feldman governs the scope

of the lower federal courts’ subject-matter jurisdiction, it “can

never be forfeited or waived.”

Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S.

500, 514 (2006) (citation omitted); see Exxon Mobil Corp., 544

U.S. at 284.

Although the court of appeals addressed the basic

jurisdictional question, it did not rule on the waiver issue

petitioner now raises.

See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S.

36, 41 (1992) (This Court’s “traditional rule

grant of certiorari

* * *

* * *

precludes a

when the ‘question presented was not

pressed or passed upon below.’”) (citation omitted).

c.

Review is unwarranted for the additional reason that

petitioner seeks mere error correction.

He does not identify any

8

circuit split on the jurisdictional issue or provide any reason to

believe that it arises frequently.

2.

various

questions

related to the merits of his registration obligations.

(Pet. 1-

2.)

Petitioner

also

seeks

review

of

Because the district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction

and the court of appeals affirmed on the same basis without

addressing

the

presented here.

merits,

none

of

those

questions

is

properly

See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 718 n.7

(“[W]e are a court of review, not of first view.”).

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

NOEL J. FRANCISCO

Solicitor General

JOSEPH H. Hunt

Assistant Attorney General

LEWIS S. YELIN

ASHLEY A. CHEUNG

Attorneys

DECEMBER 2019