Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Christopher Isaac Simmons, Petitioner v. Grissom, et al.

Supreme Court briefAug 7, 2019

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Text

.......

No.

-•

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

filed'

AU6 0 1 2019

t- SUPRF^p CQIJRT^n^4'

CHRISTOPHER ISAAC SIMMONS*

_ — PETFnONEK^^J

(Your Name)

vs.

i- 1

l.i i i L v./ii i i 1 t

R. GRISSOM, et al.

— RESPONDENT(S)

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT* EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

(NAME OF COURT THAT LAST RULED ON MERITS.OF YOUR CASE)

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

• •*

Christopher Isaac Simmons

(Your Name)

1600 California Dr., P.O. Box 2500

(Address)

‘

Vacaville, Calif, 95696-2500

(City, State, Zip Code)

none available N/A

(Phone Number)

^<3bESlFlQ:N(^yfefe|^D 1 *■

Did the Ninth Circuit impermissibly revoke Appellant's In Forma Pauperis

. (IFP) Status under 28 U.S.C. 1915(g) where Heat Risk prisoner clearly, made

allegations of ongoing pattern of conduct with supporting evidence conduct

demonstrated significant, and "imminent danger of serious physical injury?"

Has the Nitfth Circuit decision to revoke Appellant's IFP Status who

alleged ongoing threat of imminent danger of serious physical injury "a clear

departure from the accepted and; usual" course of judicial proceedings ami Ninth

Circuit's own binding precedents"? If so*

By Revoking IFP Status did the Ninth Circuit improperly "immunize” the

district court's alleged "clearly erroneous" decision by denying review on

appeal and refused to entertain any further motion(s)?

If the Appellees raise issue of Appellant's "Vexatious Litigant" history

under 28 O.S.C. § 1915(g), is Appellant [Petitioner] entitled to assert "New

Argument" in defense showing State Governmental actor's Perpetual pattern of

"Direct Obstruction and.Interference" with„:Prisoner's Access tovthe Courts and

legal nail tampering, had .motive, to intentionally cause legal injury resulting

in "STRIKES" against..,Prisoner?" If . so,

Does

that 3. same

pattern

of., conduct

resulted

strike

dismissals

substantiate "Vexatious Litigant" Branding?; and

Does it immunized the judgments entered against the. victim of "State

Governmental Official*s..impermissible conduct causing those injuries?"

NOTE: This court has held that the constitution requires the waiver of filing

..,fees3i-ah":criminal:;:casea.ss“'«ay»r-Vife:?Chicagb;;-^4©4;;VD*Sg;;?i89,:'f92SS^Ct-^:41Q;"'Griffin v.t,

Illinois, 351 D;S*

In the civil context, however, the Consti^v; : ;#'—

tution only requires waiver of filing fees for indigent persons who are challen

ging termination oi their parental rights,_.id., or seeking a divorce, See Boddie =

v. Connecticut, 401U.S. 371 however, this petitioner is currently denied filing

in both state and federal courts with no other means to acquire redress.

ii. r - (

LIST OF PARTIES

[ ] All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page.

[jd All parties do not appear in the Caption of the case on the cover page. A list of

all parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is the subject of this

petition is as follows:

Anthony Hedgpeth

Warden-Kern Valley State Prison (KVSP)

Associate Warden (KVSP)

Nate Dill/ Jr * *

R. Grissom/

Associate Warden (KVSP)

Jonathan Akanno/ M.D.

Physician (KVSP)

Correctional Plant Manager (KVSP)

P. Keiley

Chief Engineer (KVSP)

A. StLucia

L. Sauceda, LVN

Medical Personnel (KVSP)

T. Ellstrum/ LVN

Medical Personnel (KVSP)

Rufino/ LVN

Medical Personnel (KVSP)

J. Jey/ RN

Rubles/

Correctional Officer (KVSP)

M. Rients

Correctional Officer (KVSP)

NURSES-Medical Personnel (KVSP)

DOES 1 to 10

Correctional Officers (KVSP)

DOES 11 to 20

Correctional Sergeants (KVSP)

DOES 21-22

• • • • • ....... Administrative/ Custodial/ and Employees (KVSP)

DOES 23 to 50

NOTE: Second Amended Complaint named previously unidentified DOES/ however/ it

not permitted to proceed-Motion for Leave denied

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

OPINIONS BELOW

JURISDICTION

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

CONCLUSION

INDEX TO APPENDICES

APPENDIX A * • • January 23, 2019, ORDER Revoking Appellant’s "In Forma

Pauperis Status under 1915(g) [Alleged "Clearly Erroneous" Revocation • • and

Contrary to Ninth Circuit's own Binding Authorities/Precedents]

APPENDIX B • • • Appellant’s "RESPONSE TO APPELLEE'S MOTION TO REVOKE IN

FQRMA PAUPERIS STATUS [all exhibits attached to this 'Response' cannot be timely

-jFOUHP due to issues with storage in CMF Main Property for "Legal Materials")

APPENDIX C • * • March 13, 2019 ORDER—Acting as "MANDATE OF THE COURT"

APPENDIX D * * * Appellant's Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52

Motion dated February 21, 2019 [Based on Allegation—"CLEARLY ERRONEOUS"]

APPENDIX E • • • APPELLEE'S "Reply in Support of Motion to Revoke" with

Attached "Summary of SIMMONS' EXHIBITS"

APPENDIX F • • • PETITIONER'S Supporting Exhibits previously attached to his

"Response*•a good faith att^pt tb reconstruct has been attempted;[Ex&iA to F].

NOTE: This Petitioner is quite unsure of the proper documents to include for

addressing an issue not reviewed on the merits, but dismissed on the

procedural grounds perpetually used by opponents to avoid review of f

the court's alleged "Clearly Erroneous" decisions, as here. Petitioner

suspects the documents are "mixed-up" within six boxes currently stored.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES

PAGE NUMBER

CASES

[Exhaustion]

S-Ct.

U.S.

Booth v- Churner,

Bruce v. Samuels/ 136 S.Ct. 627 •• ..................................

. ... ii

Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S; 371, 374, 91 S.Ct. 780 • *

Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 1491 • • • • •

• • • •

Bronson v. Schulten, 104 U.S. 410, 26 L.Ed. 797 • • • • • • • •

California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508

• •

« •

• • 6

Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 122 S.Ct. 2179 •

Cleburne v* Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432, 439 ..............*

. . 4

Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S."348, 116 S.Ct. 1373 • •

Engguist v. Oregon Dept, of Agr., 553 U.S. 591, 128 S.Ct. 2146

3, 21

Ex Part Young, 09 U.SS. 123, 28 SS.Ct. 441................. ...

Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct.585 ........................

Hazel-Atlas Glass v. 4 !artford-Empire Co •, 322 U.S. 238, 64 S.Ct. 997 • 5, 6, 27

In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 109 S.Ct. 993

Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 • • •

Lebron v. Nat'l Railroa Passenger Corp • I 573 U.S. 374, 115 S.Ct. 961 • •

Marine Insurance Company v. Hodgson, 7 Cranch 332, 3 L.Ed. 362 • * • • •

Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U.S. 589, 12 S.Ct. 62 ........................................

• • 9

Martin v. District Court of Appeals, 506 U.S. 1, 2, 113 S.Ct. 397 • • *

Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 92 S^Ct. 410 • ..............

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.319, 324, 109 S.Ct. 1827 • •

. . 4, 5

Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 I # 86 S.Ct. 836 .................

Picford v. Talbott, 225 U.S. 657, 32 S.Ct. 687

Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S.202, 216, 102 S.Ct. 2382

3, 21

Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683

Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 101 S.Ct. 1074 .............................

Shieh v. Kalita, 517 U.S. 343, 116 S.Ct. 1311 .................................

Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 43 S.Ct. 190 • ■

Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254 .............................

United States v. Thtbkmtorton, 98 U.S. 61, 25 L.Ed. 93....................

• • 25

United States v. United States Gypsum Co*., 333-U.S. 364,; 68 S.Ct. 525

•

’

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

CASES

PAGE NUMBER

. .4

U.S. Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 101 S.Ct. 453 • •

Universal Oil Products v. Root Refining Co • t 328 U.S. 575, 66 S.Ct. 1176 • * • 6

Village of Willow Brook v. olech, 528 U.S. 562, 120 S.Ct. 1073

4, 7

Vince v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 S.Ct. 959 .................... ... •

Yee v. Esconaido, 502 U.S. 519, 112 S.Ct. 1522 ....................

United States Court of Appeal Cases

Abdul-Akbar v. McKelcie, 239 F.3d 307, 314 (3d Cir.2001)...........................

Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir.2007) • • • ..............

Ashley v. Dilworth, 147 F.3d 715 (8th Cir.1998) .....i ....................

Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344 (11th Cir.2004)........................................ 8, 15

Byrd v. Maricopa Co. Shef's Dept., 565 F.3d 1205, 1212 (9th Cir.2009) ♦ • • • 4

Carson v. Johnson, 112 F.3d 818, 821 (9th Cir.1997) .................................

Ciarpaglini v. Saini, 352 F.3d 328, 330 (7th Cir.2003) • • ........................ 8, 15

Crofton v, Roe, 170 F.3d 957, 961 (9th Cir.1999) <

Delong v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir.1990)

Gibbs v. Cross, 160 F.3d 962, 965 (3d Cir.1998) <

8, 15

•• * « ' * •

. . 15

Hart v Massinhari, 266 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir.2001) •’

Ibrahim v. District of Columbia, 463 F.3d 3 • • • ' • •«

Martin v. Shelton; 3*9 3T'104S£•lO50,*--(Sfch'‘^i2QO3)'V>A** •

* * •

Maynard v. City of San Jose, 37 F.3d 1396’ (9tiTCir.l994) v W • • •

Monteiro v. Tempe Union High School District, 158 F.3d 1396 (9th Cir.1998)

Morello v. James, B10 F.3d 344 (2d Cir.1987) •

•- •

Pickens v. Merriam, 242 F.3d 363 (9th Cir. 1917) • *

Rivera v. Allin, \L44 F»3d 719 tilth Oit.1998)" • * > i •

. . . « ••

Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176 • • • - • • '• •

Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071 (9th ,Cir.2003) • • ♦

Simmons v. Hedgpeth, U.S. Court of Appeals No. 08-15143

Simmons v. Sacramento Superior Ct., 318 F.3d 1156 (9th Cir.2003) • • 16, 18, 21

Squaw Valley Dev. Co. v. Goldberg, 375 F.3d 936

•

• r«

•#

• «

■ #

•

• ••♦

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

PAGE NUMBER

CASES

Thomas v. Holder, 750 F.3d 899, 409 US App. D.C. 403 ........................ 8, 15, 26

United States v. Pallares-Galan, 359 F.3d 1088, 1095 ( 9th Cir.2004) • • ... 15 *

.«

• • 7, 15, 26

Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir.2014) • • • .

Witherow v. Palf, 52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir.1995) •

United States District Court Cases

• * 12, 21

Armstrong v. Schwartznegger, USDC Norther No. 94-cvr02307 t v • • •

.... 13

• • ;• •

Simmons v. Akanno, USDC, Eastern No. 08-cv-00659 • •

• • 19, 21, 22

Simmons v. Clark, USDC,. Northern No. 99~cv-03293 ♦ • • e • . _ • • . •

Simmons v.Clark, USDC Northern No. 01-cv-03078 • • • • • • • • • •. , • 19, 22, 23

•

» 19, 21, 23, 24

Simmons v. Hambly,USDC Eastern No. 97-cv-01165

Simmons v. Sacramento County Superior Court, USDC Eastern no* 99-cv-*00789 • • 21

i'i '

' ■ l'‘; P

California Cases

iv ■

. . 5

People v. Laudermilk (1967) 67 Cal.2d 272 • •

People v. Simmons, Sacramento Superior No. 96F00053 * • • 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 24

22, 23

Simmons v. Clark, Monterey Co. Superior No. M-64369

Simmons v. Mirante,

Sacramento Superior No. 96AS01528 • • • • 18, 19 , 20, 23 , 24

■■l

18 U.S.C.,

§ 1702

Federal Statutes

•

28 U.S.C.

§1254(1) ....................

§ 1292 .......

§ 1651 [All Writs Act]

§ 1915(g) .................

§ 2072 ........................

§ 2254 .....................

42 U.S.C.

§ 1983

’

ii, iv, 2, 7, 9, 14, 15, 22, 26

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

PAGE NUMBER

................ 4,: 24

§ 12001 to 31 (ADA)

.... United States Supreme Court Rules

Rule 10

? 25

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

9./. 15/ 25

.25

Rule I «

Rule 52 •

Rule 59 •

Federal Rules of Evidence

Rule 201

(b)

(d)

........ l2l 20

12, 13, 14/ 16, 18, 20

Rule 803(6)

California Penal Code

§ 459 [burglary]* • •

§ 496 ....... •

Health & Safety Code § 11350

Vehicle Code § 10851

•

V.' 4

; *-•

' '4. ■. •

• *

California Rules of Court

Rule 4.130 •

OTHER

Rule of Equity/Term Rule • • • 5, 6

viii

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment below.

OPINIONS BELOW

[X] For cases from federal courts:

The opinion of the United States court of appeals appears at Appendix -"&«

the petition and is a ORDER-Revoking IBP Status-“before reaching merits

[ ] reported at

; or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

lx] is unpublished. ORDER

The opinion of the United States district court appears at Appendix_____ to

the petition 'and is Not included~|^l^tSE»abfej:evi^bn-the merits before

ijatte^wass^Dismissed* • Revocation of IFP, Status in 9th Cir. only.

; or,

[ ] has been;'designated for publication but is not' yet reported; or,

[ ] is unpublished.

[ ] For cases from state courts:

The opinion of the highest: state court to review the merits appears at

Appendix-------- to the petition and is

[ ] reported at_______ •'

_______________ ________ / .;pr,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[ ] is unpublished.

The opinion of the _

appears at Appendix

to the petition and is

[ ] reported at ____

or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[ ] is unpublished.

court

JURISDICTION

[X] For cases from federal courts:

The date on which the United States Court of Appeals decided my case

was !IStayed -pending resolution of § 1915(g) matters*••Certiorari review

*. .

[X] No petition for rehearing was timely filed iirmy case./ a Rule 52] itotion.

["Clearly erroneous^iR«rocationl was filed Peb^ 21, 2019, instead.

[ ] A timely petition for rehearing was denied by the United States Court of

Appeals on the following date:. March 13. 2019 ORDER , and a copy of the

order denying rehearing appears at Appendix "C"

[x] An ex-tension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted

to and including August 10. 2niQ

(date) on April 14.

(date)

in Application No. -- 18 A 1138

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1254(1).

■

**'■

NOKI: This , matter includes allegations of Governmental "Obstruction" of

Legal Mail, Access to the Courts [including research, etc,j Mail Tamperinq, and

Censoring Legal/Confidential Mail.

[ ] For cases from state courts:

The date on which the highest state court decided my case was

A copy of that decision appears at Appendix______

[ ] A timely petition for rehearing was thereafter denied on the following date:

, and a copy of the order denying rehearing

appears at Appendix

[ ] An extension of time to file the petition for a wit of certiorari was granted

to and including____

(date) on

(date)in

Application No. __ A

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1257(a).

[^CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

U. S- Constitution/ First Amendment provides:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion# or

prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridge the freedom of speech#

or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assenble# and to

petition the government for a redress of grievances.

Petitioner# a state prisoner has a right of access to the courts to

vindicate violations of his Constitutional rights [Bounds v. Smith# 430

U.S. 817; Johnson v. Avery# 393 U.S. 483; California Motor Transp. Co. v.

Trucking Unlimited# 404 U.S. 508 (both physical and obstruction legal

access)]# have the right to send and receive confidential/legal mail

[Turner v. Safley 482 U.S. 78# 89# 107 S.Ct. 2254 (1987); Witherow v.

Pafl# 52 F.3d 264# 265 (9th Cir.1995); Crofton v. Roe, 170 F.3d 957# 961

99th Cir.1999)]# the First Amendment among the most fundamental. The scope

of denial of access to the courts include not only physical prevention

from filing# but obstruction as well [Morello v. James# 810 F.2d 344 (2d

Cirl987). Petitioner submitted unrebutted evidence which demonstrated that

jail and prison officials have#

since October 1998

[original

discovery-Sacramento County jail]# through to date# regularly# routinely#

and illegally# opened Petitioner’s incoming and outgoing legal mail

outside his presence; destroyed outgoing legal mail addressed to the

courrts# attorneys# other governmental agencies# and during these events#

have removed direct unrebutted admissible evidence tending to demonstrate

asserted facts# allegations# etc.# clear and convincingly and that these

events are directly related to this Petitioner's unlawful branding as a

"vexatious litigant#" in furtherance of the "unconscionable Plan/Scheme".

Because the lower courts have refused to even consider such events could

occur# demonstrates the success of this carefully executed Plan/Scheme

currently causing extreme prejudice to this Petitioner. Therefore#

pursuant to Ex Parte Young# 209 U.S. 123# 28 S.Ct. 441; Scheuer v. Rhodes#

416 U.S. 232# 94 S.Ct. 1683# when a governmental official comes into

conflict with the Supreme Authority of the Constitution and law of the

Land# "he is to be stripped of his official representative capacity" and

held to answer in his person. No "State" can impart an immunity to a

governmental official when they come into conflict with that Supreme

Authority.

V, :

Petitioner has alleged an "Unconscionable PLAN/SCHEME and supported these

allegations

with

unrebutted

evidence

that

several

identified

governmental/prison officials and agents thereof have and continue to

violate Petitioner's fundamental right of access to the court and have

caused an "injury in fact#" for which relief may be granted.

U. S. Constitution# Fourteenth Amendment provides:

All persons born or naturalized in the United States# and subject t the

jurisdiction thereof# are citizens of the United States and of the State

wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall

abridge the privileges or imminities of citizens of the United States; nor

shall any State deprive any person of life# liberty# or property# without

due process of law# nor deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal

protection of the laws.

Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands

that no State shall/ "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal

protection of the laws*" which is essentially a direction that "all

persons similarly situated should be treated alike." City of Cleburne/ Tex

v. Cleburne Living Center/ 473 U.S. 432/ 439 (1985); Plyler v. Doe/ 457

U.S. 202/ 216/ 102 S.Ct. 2382 (1982). The general rule is that legislation

is presumed to be valid and will be sustained of the classification drawn

by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest

[Schweiker v. Wilson/ 450 U.S. 221/ 101 S.Ct. 1074; United States Railroad

Retirement Board v. Fritz* 449 U.S. i66/ 101 S.Ct. 453; Vince v. Bradley/

440 U.S. 93/ 99 S.Ct. 939.). Thus/ when it appears that an individual^!®'•

being singled out by the government* the specter of arbitrary

classification is fairly raised/ and the Equal Protection Clause requires

a "rational basis for the difference on treatment [Engquist v. Oregon

Dept. of Agr * t 553 U.S. 591/ 128 S.Ct. 2146 (citing Village of Willow

Brook v. Olech* 528 U.S. 562/ 120 S.Ct. 1073). Prisoners are protected

under theEqual Protection Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment from

invidious discrimination ..." To state a viable claim under the Equal

Protection Clause* however* a prisoner must plead intentional unlawful

discrimination or allege facts that are at least susceptible of an

inference of discriminatory intent." Byrd. v. Maricopa County Sheriff's

Dept.* 565 F.3d 1205* 1212 (9th Cir.2009) (-quoting Monteiro v. Tempe Union

High School District* 158 F.3d 1022 '(9th Cir.1998). "intentional

discrimination means that a defendant acted at least in part because of a

plaintiff's protected status." Serrano v. Francis* 345 F.3d 1071 (9th

Cir.2003)

(quoting Maynard v. City of San Jose* 37 F.3d 1396 (9th

Cir.1994)). Petitioner suffers from an "identifiable depressive disorder

protected under 42 U.S.C. § 12031 [American's With Disability Act)* and

was denied meaningful assistance from someone knowledgeable in law to

assist him during preparation of the early complaints filed in the federal

courts; was denied physical access to conduct meaningful research to

prepare adequate allegations to meet the pleading standards* and prison

officials repeatedly destroyed both incoming and outgoing legal filings to

the courts during critical stages of the litigation to create the

"Strikes" against this Petitioner and control his free access to the

courts (1FP) because of his impoverished status* no family support* or

financial means.

This Petitioner's clearly identified "protected status" existed at the

time he was intentionally targeted by court officer(s) and governmental

officials in the conspiracy to violate his United States and California

Constitutional rights* by* among other things* presenting "fraudulently

produced documents to present in a court proceeding; suppressing documents

demonstrating the issue surrounding the State's "Jurisdiction over the

party" factually demonstrated an absence of authority to act but in one

single manner [California Rules of Court* Rule 4.130]* suspend all

proceedings and order a competency hearing a second separate

evaluation/hearing* presented with "substantial evidence of incompetence

(GAL appointment). By discussing the very case showing that "substantial

evidence of incompetence" and failing to act as required by law [Pate v.

Robinson* 383 U.S. 375; Cooper v. Oklahoma* 517 U.S. 3H%], the trial court

acted without jurisdiction* which cannot be waived by a defendant's

counsel, or the court. Thus, this Petitioner alleged that these facts

support his allegations of the "Unconscionable Plan and/or Scheme designed

to prevent this Petitioner from meaningful access to the court to

vindicate the ongoing violation of his United States Constitutional

rights.

Because the Plan/Scheme involves the intentional denial of access, and

impairment thereof (fraudulent branding as "Vexatious"), contrary to

Respondent's assertion that the facts surrounding this Petitioner's

conviction having no bearing on this matter is a mischaracterization of

the unrebutted factual showing made by this Petitioner in response to

Respondent initiating the issue of this Petitioner proceeding IFP. Belied

by the facts established from unrebutted documentary evidence prison

officials repeatedly obstruct from being reviewed by the courts, or

intentionally disregarded by courts of original jurisdiction legally bound

to determine a question properly before the courts.

At no time can "JURISDICTION" over the party(ies) be waived [Pate v.

Robinson, 383 U.S. 375; People v. Laudermilk (1967) 67 Cal.2d 272, nor can

jurisdiction be time barred. Petitioner's evidence establishes that at the

time of his criminal trial the judge, prosecutor, and public defender

discussed a matter involving an erroneous dismissal of a action where

jurisdiction to act was limited to ordering a competency determination

(only act on substantial evidence of incompetence-but in one manner

alone); not to try a defendant while a significant question remained

regarding

his

competency

being

issue.

Evidence

that

"Guardian-Ad-Litem" had remained in place by an appointment of a superior

court judge, constituting "significant evidence" that this Petitioner's

competency remained at issue [after the "Certificate of Restoration of

Mental Competence" had been issued] in a separate civil matter. No hearing

on record was held, by the criminal trial judge to make findings that this

Petitioner was actually restored to competence. This forms the basis or

motivation for the "UNCONSCIONABLE PLAN/SCHEME" Petitioner alleged that is

unrebutted by Respondent that "is relevant" to Petitioner being branded as

a "Vexatious Litigant" repeatedly used in each action resulting in

dismissal to preclude reaching the merits and/or making specific findings.

28 U.S.C. § 1651 [All Writs Act-Rule of Equity] provides;

In Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 64 S.Ct.

997, this Court held that:

"Federal courts, both trial and appellate, long ago established the

general rule that they would not alter or set aside their judgments after

the expiration of the term at which the judgments were finally entered.

Bronson v. Schulten, 104 U.S. 410, 26 L.Ed. 797. This salutary general

rule springs from the belief that in most instances society is best served

by putting an end to litigation after a case has been tried and judgment

entered. This has not meant, however, that a judgment finally entered has

ever been regarded as completely immune from impeachment after the term.

From the beginning there has existed along side the term rule a rule of

equity to the effect that under certain circumstances, one of which is

after-discovered fraud/ relief will be granted against judgments

regardless of the term of their entry. Marine Insurance Company v.

Hodgson/ 7 Cranch 332/ 3 L.Ed. 362j Marshall v. Holmes/ 141 U.S. 589/ 12

S.Ct. 62/ ^Christopher V. ;Haid3^/L536^U.S^j403, /I22 S:^. 2179/ ‘

' 7

This equity rule/ which was firmly established in English practice long

before the foundation of our Republic/ the courts have developed and

fashioned to fulfill a universally recognized need for correcting

injustices which/ in certain instances/ are deemed sufficiently gross to

demand a departure from rigid adherence to the term rule. Out of deference

to the deep rooted policy in favor of the repose of judgments entered

during past terms/ courts of equity,.have been cautious in exercising their

power over such judgments. United^States v. Throkmorton/ 98 U.S. 61/ 25

L.Ed. 93. But where the occasion^as demanded/ where enforcement of the

judgment is ’manifestly [322 U.S. 245] unconscionable/’ Picford v.

Talbott/ 225 U.S. 651/ 657/ 32 S.Ct. 687/ they have wielded the power

without hesitation. Pickens v. Merriam/ 242 F. 363 (9th Cir.1917); ..."

This ’historic power of equity to set aside fraudulently begotten

judgments/’ id. is necessary to the integrity of the courts/ for tampering

with the administration of justice in [this] manner ... involves more than

an injury to a single litigant, id./ at 246/ 64 S.Ct. at 1001. It is a

wrong against the institutions set up to protect and safeguard the

public.’ id. at 246/ 64 |Sj.Ct. 1001. Moreover/ a court has the power to

conduct an independent investigation in order to determine whether it has

been the victim of fraud. Universal Oil Products Co. v. Root Refining Co./

328 U.S. 575/ 580/ 66 S.Ct. 1176. A party seeking to invoke the Court's

equitable powers "must come into court with clean hands."

It is alleged that from October 1998 (initial discovery) through to this

current date/ that this Petitioner's Confidential Legal mail has regularly

and routinely been opened outside his presence/ documents removed during

the critical stages of litigation (such as summary judgment and/or

proceedings which would result in dismissal)/ prison officials

intentionally and recklessly obstruct and/or interfere with the outgoing

and incoming legal mail [18 U.S.C. § 1702]/ by among other things/

destroying sealed filings to the courts/ removing direct supporting

evidence from submissions/ failing to deliver legal mail timely (upto and

including three weeks after service)/ and may have actually changed the

substance of the moving and/or opposing papers filed by this Petitioner.

An example is the Ninth Circuit's January 23/ 2019 Order indicating this

Petitioner failed to allege "imminent danger of serious physical injury.

This Petitioner having lodged the allegation in his Notice of Appeal/

followed by his "Response to Appelle's Motion to Revoke" this Petitioner's

IFP Status. Respondents supported this in Appellee's Reply in Support/

which

actually

referenced

the

supporting

documents

while

mis-characterizing this Petitioner's arguments and evidentiary showing

[See Appendix C; Jan. 23/ 2019 ORDER; Appellee's Reply/ Appdx. D].

One of Petitioner's specific allegations regarding the PLAN/SCHEME is that

his criminal conviction is inexplicably tied to all of the civil rights

actions designed to distract this Petitioner from pursuing the major

JURISDICTIONAL QUESTION the State courts refuse to make specific findings

in; because the matter was specifically discussed between the criminal

trial judge# prosecutor# and defense attorney on the public trial record

[See Exhibit |a,") pp. 1-6] - Because the trial court did not have

jurisdiction to try this Petitioner and proceeded anyway# he was without

jurisdiction to do so and constitutes a "conspiracy to violate this

Petitioner's Constitutional rights. This Petitioner has been deliberately

and intentionally branded a "Vexatious Litigant" early in his litigation

history to control his free access to the courts and defile the courts by

wrongfully influencing the court's ability to render decisions which is an

important legal and social interest# and thereby control the outcomes.

This Petitioner previously lacked evidence to sufficiently allege and

support allegations of the PLAN/SCHEME early on# but has since then

acquired that evidence and is currently being obstructed from presenting

that evidence fully and fairly# making this a "CLASS OF ONE" Equal

Protection claim [Village of Willow Brook v. Olech# 528 U.S. 562# 120

S.Ct. 1073 (2000); Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County# 260 U.S. 441#

43 S.Ct. 190; Squaw Valley Dev. Co. v. Goldberg# 375 F.3d 936.

28 U.S-C. §; 1915(g) provides;

"In nb event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in

a civil action or proceeding under this-section if the prisoner has# on 3

or more prior occasions# while incarcerated or detained in any facility#

brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was

dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous# malicious# or fails to sate

a claim upon which relief may be granted# unless the prisoner is under

imminent danger of serious physical injury."

A prisoner can meet the "imminent danger of serious physical injury

requirement by alleging a condition which places the prisoner imminently

or about to suffer serious physical harm. There is no holding that

requires the prisoner to sue for that imminent danger in order to proceed

with an action# only that the prisoner faced "imminent danger of serious

physical injury at the time of the filing." This must be so# because not

every danger a prisoner faces is actionable because there must also be an

"injury in fact" in order to obtain relief. There is no holding that held

there must be an actual injury in order for a "vexatious litigant" to

proceed In Forma Pauperis. Note: 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) provides that ; "The

Supreme Court may prescribe rules# in accordance with section 2072 of

this title [28 U.S.C. § 2072]# to provide for an appeal of an

interlocutory decision to the courts of appeals that is not otherwise

provided for under sibsection (a)-(d)."

In Williams v. Paramo# 775 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir.2014), opinion by Stephen

Reinhardt stated"

"The limited office of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) in determining whether a

prisoner can proceed in forma pauperis counsels against an overly detailed

inquiry into the allegations that qualify for the exception ... This is

even more so when an inquiry must be conducted by a court of appeals#

which# unlike a district court# is ill-equipped to engage in satellite

litigation and adjudicate disputed factual matters. It is thus the

prisoner's facial allegations and that these allegations be liberally

construed. ... We do so reluctantly because if a prisoner is denied forma

pauperis status on appeal on the ground that he no longer faces an

imminent danger, his inability to pay the filing fee may deprive a court

of appeals of the opportunity to correct any errors committed by the

district court. Although the PLRA was intended to impose the costs of

litigation on prisoners, its purposes do not extend as far as immunizing

erroneous district court decisions. See Abdul-Akbar v. McKelcie, 239 F.3d

307, 314 (3d Cir.2001). Moreover, as scholars and judges have ..noted, the

three-strikes provision raises grave constitutional concerns. ^See, e.g • /

Thomas v. Holder, 750 F.3d 899, 904-09, 409 U.S. App. D.C. 403 (D-C.

Cir.2014){ld., 775 F.3d at 1190-91].

Thus, we hold, consistent with Andrews, that a prisoner subject to the

three strikes provision may meet the imminent danger exception and proceed

in forma pauperis on appeal if he alleges and ongoing danger at the time

the notice of appeal is filed. ..."

We are not suggesting that a prisoner must always allege that the

continuing practice has caused past harms in order to constitute an

"ongoing danger." Such a look to history is simply one was a prisoner can

make the dispositive showing that the ongoing practice, if continued,

"evidenc[es] the likelihod of serious physical injury" at the moment the

complaint was filed. Martin, 319 F.3d at 1050. The harm from some ongoing

practices may be sufficiently obvious without showing a past injury

resulting from it. See Brown, 387 F.3d at 1350 (finding the alleged denial

of medicaion to treat HIV and hepatitis constituted "imminent danger"

because of "the alleged danger of more serious afflictions if he is not

treated"); Gibbs

Cross, 160 F.3d 962, 965 (3d Cirl998)(finding the

imminent danger requirement satisfied when an inmate alleged he was forced

to breathe particles of dust and lint whicn were continuously being

dispersed into his cell theough the ventilation system," because it is

common knowledge that improper ventilation and the inhalation of dust and

lint particles can cause disease.").

In Ibrahim v. District of Columbia, 463 F.3d 3, Opinion by Circuit Judge

Griffith-holding;

"Jibril Ibrahim, who is serving a life sentence . • • / filed a pro se suit

... claiming they denied him adequate medical treatment for Hepatitis C

and Prostrate Cancer, • • * In his complaint, Ibrahim alleges that

defendants have "fail[ed] . * * and refused to treat him with "possible

eradication treatment" for his Hepatitis C, placing him in the posture of

serious physical injury or humiliating death and suffering." Amicus argues

that these allegations satisfy the "imminent danger" requirement.

We agree. The PLRA does not define the term "Imminent Danger," and we have

not previously addresed whether allegations of an ongoing injury, or a

pattern of misconduct likely to produce harm—the allegations Ibrahim and

his amicus press here—are sufficient to satisfy the requirement. We need

not resolve the precise contours of "imminent danger" in this case because

we think it clear that failure to provide adequate treatment for Hepatitis

C, a chronic and potentially fatal disease, constitutes "imminent

danger."... That surely is sufficient to constitute "imminent danger." See

Ciarpaglini v. Saini, 352 F.3d 328, 330 (7th Cir.2003); Ashley v.

Dilworth, 147 F.3d 715, 717 (8th Cir.1998)."

Petitioner has alleged in his Notice of Appeal; followed by his Response

to Appellee's Motion to Revoke/ that he was under imminent danger of

serious physical injury and "remains under imminent danger of serious

physical injury [See/ Notice of Appeal file dated July 18/ 2019;

Appellant's Response dated Oct. 17. 2018—Appendix 13/]. The Ninth Circuit

revoked this Petitioner's IFP in its "clearly erroneous" Order dated

January 23/ 2019—stating that "Petitioner failed to allege imminent

danger of serious physical injury. Further/ the Ninth Circuit refused to

hear a timely Rule 52 Motion properly before it/ asserting "Clear Error."

[See

©]. Petitioner asserts that/ based on the totality of his

application

1915(g)

circumstances/

this matter

unconstitutional. ..

NOTE; Rodriguez v. Cook/ 169 F.3d 1176: In fact/

two circuit courts have

specifically addressed whether § 1915(g) violates a prisoner's access to

the courts. Both courts have found the three strikes rule to be

constitutional. In Carson v. Johnson/ 112 F.3d 818/ 821 (5th Cir.1997) the

fifth circuit held that the three-strikes rule does not violate the Fifth

Amendment due prooess clause because it does not prohibit prisoners from

filing a lawsuit/ it only denies them IFP status. Likewise in Rivera v.

Allin/ 144 F.3d 719/ 723044 (11th Cir.1998) the Eleventh Circuit held that

IFP sttus is a privilege/ not a right/ and that § 1915(g) does not

unconstitutionally aburden a prisoner's access to the

courts.

Significantly/ the Supreme Court has at times prospectively denied IFP

status to prisoners filing for writs of certiorari because those prisoners

had filed numerous frivolous writs. See Shieh V/ Kakita/ 517 U.S. 343/

343-44/ 116 S.Ct. 1311 (1996); Martin v. Distruct of Columbia Court of

Appeals/ 506 U.S. 1/ 2, 113 S.Ct. 397 (1992); In re McDonald/ 489 U.S. 180

[169 F.3d 1180] 109 S.Ct. 993 (1989).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Christopher

Isaac

ABOUT THE PETITIONER

Simmons,

Petitioner

hereafter,

suffers

from

identifiable major mental disorder and a form of dyslexia which actively affects

his construction and transference of sentences from his mind to documents being

prepared for submission to the courts and various other entities. Because of

this impediment, it may at times require additional time and may be confusing,

especially chronologically recording the breadith of 24 years of facts.

Petitioner most times is very descriptive and may be repetitive in doing s€>* the

fact "petitioner

has

Family,

financial

means or

outside

support"

notwithstanding the prison job he is allowed at -08C per hour just recently

increased, and is prevented from marketing exceptional art Petitioner creates

for financial gain. [See Exhibit (Exh.) "A", pp 1-2; EXh. "C, p 1 (Supvr.Rep. ].

Petitioner maintains his actual innocence, and is serving a sentence of

175 years to life for a non-violent offense, and is currently attacking the

judgment on lack of jurisdiction grounds [Tried a "Incompetent Defendant"].

During this 24 year incarceration, Petitioner has been subjected to several life

threatening circumstances, deliberately infected with Hepatitis C Virus, forced

a prisoner with TB who refused to take medications into Petitioner's cell

infecting Petitioner, an many other instances placing his safety and life at

issue. Petitioner is an actual innocent citizen improperly branded a vexatious

litigant to prejudice his credibility and prevent vindication.' [fexh. "C" p 2-6].

Petitioner's clearly identified "Legal Mail" has been perpetually opened

outside his presence dating back to incarceration as a "pretrial detainee" at

the Sacramento County Jail, and is perpetrated to intentionally obstruct and/or

interfere with the rights and privileges to freely access the courts. As a

direct result, Petitioner has suffered two "Injuries In Fact," including, but

not United to/ improperly branded a *VexatiouS Litiganti " pre3udiced throughout

all courts# and; thereforePetitionerhadfiled numerous dvilrights complaints/

and- hereby allegesaperpetual:"UnconscionablePlanand/er=#cheme"“perpetrated

. against Petiticme^ l^id«iyb$i«d^k3)a^t)f£ioers»V; Governmenta^^^Of£i«ial8i/» 4iheir

•?r

agents/ employeesand othersworkingon their behalf.;

Consider the prisoner where the totality of . his cirdsnstances has been^

manipulated by law enforcement professionals using their expertise to completely

undermine a "actually innocent citizen" from exposing a "Racially Motivated

Conviction#” where-they?lacfeed the-jurisdiction to proceed with a criminal trial,

of*a mentallyincbmpetentdefendantunable t©^defend his innocence because he is

not mentally present during those proceedings? While the claim say scms far

fetched# that is precisely the sin$>licity of this perpetualunconscionable plan.

Very simple but well supported with stigma and professional expertise in law

enforcement procedures and criminal prosecutions. So prejudiced# Petitioner

cannot receive an impartial meaningful hearing on the merits.

To assist thejCoiurt with a greater understanding* • the breadith of a 24

year history is essential in explaining the nexus of the "underlying injuries in

fact" with "the instant matter# and all previously filed complaints# including#

but not limited to# the unconscionable plan/schemer governmental'obstruction of

legal access to the courts, communications seeking relief .from governmental

officials able to correct the abuses# etc. Petitioner asserts the "Root Cause"

is the State "never had JURISDICTION OVER THIS PRISONER#" and conspired to

fraudulently convict Petitioner. Who will believe a "Mentally Ill Convicted

Felon?"

Imminent Danger* UpOhlFilir^?Tbis7 Appeal -

First an foremost# Petitioner made specific allegations that he was under

"imminent danger of serious physical injury" twice during the appeal [See Notice

of Appeal; Appellant’s Response to Appellee's Motion to Revoke Appellant's In

Forma Pauperis Status {"Mot. to Revoke"); Judicial Notice (Jud.Not.) 201(b) t

Sa>

Facts Of The Case [District Court Proceedings];

On October 14, 2005, Petitioner was transferred from Salinas Valley State

Prison (SVSP) to Kern Valley State Prison (KVSP) (Successors in Interest).

Petitioner had been suffering under retaliatory treatment from officials at SVSP

prior to the transfer to KVSP,

and had previously been suffering under

retaliatory treatment from jail officials at the Sacramento County Jail. Most of

the acts and/or omissions were alleged in the civil rights complaints filed by

Petitioner, however, many were dismissed by the district courts.

On July 17, 2007, Petitioner filed the instant action as a 28 U.S.C. §

2254 seeking injunctive relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651 of the "All Writs

Act." Petitioner sought to enforce an Injunction issued by the Honorable Claudia

Wilken,

United

States

District

Judge

the

matter

Armstrong

Schwartzenegger, Case No. 94-cv~02307, file dated January 17, 2007, to require

the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) and KVSP to

transfer the ADA Plaintiff class identified in the injunction, exercising a

protected activity.

Judicial Notice requested,

Federal Rules of Evidence

(Fed.R.Evid) Rule 201(d).

The district court dismissed, and Petitioner appealed. During the appeal

in the Ninth Circuit, Petitioner was forced to file numerous moving papers

seeking relief from increased retaliatory treatment by prison officials,

including,

but not limited to,

Immediate Injunctive Relief, a Temporary

Restraining Order (TRO), Leave to Amend to a Rule 23 Calss Action. Denying these

motions,

the Ninth Circuit did,

however,

indicate that "nothing prevents

Appellant from fling a Section 1983 during this appeal." [$ee 9th Cir. Case No.

08-15143; Jud.Not. requested 201(d)].,

In the Injunction issued by the court on January 18, 2007, the court found

that defendant California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR)

"continued to injure the Plaintiff Class through increased risk of injury

causing serious harm" and stated in its Order the following in pertinent part:

Finding:

”[T]he court hereby finds and Orders: ... Contrary to law, the

permanent injunction, and the Armstrong Remedial Plan, defendants [CDCR]

are systematically failing to provide safe, accessible housing to

prisqners with mobility impairments, resulting in significant harm to the

Plaintiff Class, including through increased risk of injury. ...

Remedy:

Starting immediately, defendants shall not house DPW, DPO, and

DPM prisoners in the CIM dayrooms or Kern Valley State Prison until those

locations have adequate accessible housing, including working accessible

toilets and showers."

This Order included such issues as: i) Inaccessible Housing; ii) Denial of

Language Interpreters;

Devices;

iv)

Late

iii)

and

Confiscation of Medically Prescribed Assistive

Inadequate Disability Grievance Responses;

and v)

Inadequate Disability'Tracking. Each having sub-issues inclusive in the Order.

Petitioner had also filed a state tort action against several KVSP

custodial and medical personnel, and was subjected to increased retaliatory

treatment,

culminating

into Petitioner having been found "unconscious" and

"unresponsive" on his cell floor, regaining consciousness hours later at the

local hospital,

as a result of the retaliatory treatment Petitioner filed

Simmons v. Akanno, USDC Eastern Case No. 08-cv-00659 [fcitli*

During summary judgment proceedings, Petitioner submitted a report from a

governmental agency "which directly contradicted the evidence submitted

defendants, including Petitioner’s evidence that defendants fraudulently altered

the recorded temperatures from 90 degrees and above inside, to 79 to 89 degrees

while misrepresenting that the "evaporative coolers on the roof were working,

when their own evidence demonstrated that they were not during the „f".Heat

Wave of

2006"

reported to

have

claimed

350

lives

in California.

Petitioner,

identified "Heat Risk" prisoner was forced to draw air from under the two inch

, 13

gap under the cell door to survive heat in excess of 105°. with NO AIR coning

through the ventilation system, no ice# cold water fountain access* •witnessed by

54 other inmates in the building. This evidence Petitioner was denied. (J.N.)

requested# Federal Rules of Evidence (Fed:R.Evid.) Rule 201(b) and (d) ("201"

hereafter).

The district court erroneously granted stannary judgment to all defendants

despite clear and convincing evidence, to the contrary#

including# but not

limited to# an Official "REVIEW -OF JULY 2006. HEAT WAVE RELATED FATALITIES IN

CALIFORNIA" prepared by Roger B. Trent# Ph.D.# California Department of Health

Services Epidemiology and Prevention for Injury Control Branch#" judicial notice

had been requested' presented unde? Rules of Evidence

[mandatory request].

Petitioner alleged the order is "clearly erroneous" as a matter of face and law.

The district court entered judgment on June 21# 2018. Petitioner filed a

timely "Notice of Appeal—stamp filed on July 18 I 4 2018. The Notice of Appeal

specifically set out an allegation "Plaintiff was found to be under imminent

danger of serious physical injury# and remain under imminent danger of serious

physical injury" • e •

Section 1915(g) Applied To This Appeal:

Following receipt of the "Scheduling Order" from the Ninth Circuit#

Appellees immediately filed a "Motion to Revoke Appellant's In Forma Paupris

Status and Request for Stay" to avail themselves of this meritorious action# as

the "State" has perpetually done in each action filed once improperly declared

"Vexatious Litigant." [Request for judicial notice of § 1915(g) dismissal®}#

In addition to allegations in his notice of appeal# Petitioner's IFP

Status has never been revoked in the district court in this case. Petitioner

filed a timely "Response to Appellees's Motion to Revoke on October 18# 2018.

Appellee's filed a "Reply in Support of Motion to Revoke and attached

Appellant's "Exhibits” supporting his Response. The Ninth Circuit, contrary to

its own binding precedents,

revoked this Petitioner's IFP Status stating

"Appellant has not alleged imminent danger of serious physical injury. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(g),” on January 23, 2019, dismissing this appeal.

Ill

IMPROPER MANIPULATION OF 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g):

Petitioner asserts and submits that utilizing statues which are designed

to apply to genuine "vexatious litigants" rather than an individual genuinely

seeking relief and is caught-up in retaliatory treatment which "manipulates" the

boundaries between protecting the court

system

governmental

are

officials

who

actually

from

abusing

"abuse"

the

elected

court

process

unethically—to reach unconstitutional results requires this Court's attention.

Petitioner asserted "New Argument" in defense of his IFP Status pursuant

to this Court's holding in Yee v. Esconaido, 503 U.S. 519, 112 S.Ct. 1522, and

Ninth Circuit's holding in United States v. Pallares-Galan, 359 F.3d 1088, 1095

(9th Cir.2004) ("It is claims that are deemed waived ... not arguments ...").

The Ninth Circuit's revocation of Appellant's IFP Status is contrary to its' own

binding precedents [See Hart v. Massinnari,

266 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir.2001);

Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir.2014); Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d

3: DeLong v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir.1990)], including several sister

circuits holdings [Ibrahim v. District of Columbia, 463 F.3d 3; Brown v.

Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344 (11th Cir.2004); Ciarpaglini v. Saini, 352 F.3d 328 (7th

Cir.2003); Gibbs v. Cross, 160 F.2d'96 (3d Cir.1998)],

among others.

FACTS SUMMARIZING UNDERLYING CLAIMS/UNCONSCIONABLE PLAN/SCHEME:

Following the January 23,, 2019 Order4, Appellant filed a timely "Rule 52

Motion" tinder the federal rules of civil procedure [FRCP] advising the Ninth

Circuit of the "clearly erroneous" decision. Additionally, the 1/23/19 Order

provides support to Appellant's "New Argument" regarding obstruction of mail:

i) opened outside his presence; ii) knowingly destroyed identified critical

filings;

iii) obstructed from receiving court orders timely,

receiving legal pleadings from opponents,

serving and

{from prison officials) once the

institution receives it from clearly recognized confidential sources; and

vi)

maintaining the integrity 'of the pleadings Petitioner has submitted (Documents

and evidence being removed prior to reaching the addressees). These violations

commenced while confined at the Sacramento county jail and, continues as

demonstrated herein. (See also, Aplnt's "Respons & Exh.'s; Reply SSE; J.N. 201].

On December 30, 1995, Petitioner was arrested with five (5) baskets of his

and his daughter's laundry, [presently] unaware he had rented a car that was

stolen and unconscious of the fact he was [presently] suffering from his major

mental impairment. He was given keys to the car,

its condition gave no

indication of its stolen status. Hie car was not altered which would alert any

average person to the vehicle's actual status. When arrested Petitioner did not

griVe any false information-did not attempt to flee from the arresting officer,

and apparently directed the officer to his residence (his mother lived next

door—she immediately told Petitioner not to make any statement).

At the Sacramento main jail during booking and screening process to

determine whether Petitioner was "fit for incarceration," the Reception Nurse

V.P

found ‘petitioner was a "psych referral," however, failed to ensure -Petitioner

was immediately examined by a mental health professional and prescribed

necessary medications. Not until over a year later was Petitioner officially

given a "mental health assessment" or "evaluation" (February 1997), despite

clear evidence raising a doubt regarding his competence. Petitioner was charged

with Penal Code § 496a, Health and Safety Code (H&S) § 11350a, and Vehicle Code

§ 10851a at that time. See, Simmons v. Sacto.Sup.Ct • i 318 F.3d 1156; Reply SSE.

On February 12, 1996, Petitioner obtained a $50,000.00 bail to undergo

t16

back surgery [previously scheduled at o*fc* Davis Medical Center by his family

member(s)] stemming from the April 10, 1995, MIRANTE accident that occurred more

than eight months before Petitioner was arrested or charged with any crime.

Petitioner was a full time-above average Business Administration college student

when he presented "President’s /Honors" to successfully discharged parole March

28, 1995.

Petitioner was interrogated by a Sheriff Detective [Dect.) ^Stephen Hughes

an hour and a half before arraignment. Hughes was investigating a "rare series

of burgalary cases" involving 40 or more "unique night-time 'cat burglaries," in

and around the city and county of Sacramento and had NO SUSPECTS. After

‘I

Petitioner bailed out, .Hughes discovered Petitioner made bail rearrested and

charged Petitioner with nine

(9)

of the 40+ rare/unique night-time cat

burglaries [PC §4593-Hughes had provided "fraudulent, probable Cause Evidence" to .

the Magistrate judge to obtain Petitioner’s February 27, 1996 arrest warrant.

After

several

court

ordered

examinations, Petitioner

was

found

"Incompetent" on July 13, 1997, but not actually transferred for treatment until

November 17, 1997, long after the first mandated initial 90 day Report was due

despite an order of commitment for treatment at Atascadero State Hospital (ASH).

Petitioner

was

returned

for

further

proceedings March 8,

1998,

with a

"Certificate of Restoration of Mental Competence," however, he was never found

competent by the originating court and "remained incompetent" according to a

superior court judge's order on April 10, 1998, made a finding confirming that

Petitioner remained "incompetent" by substituting Petitioner's brother Michael

Simmons,

the

current

"Guardian

Ad-Litem"

{GAL)

who

was

replaced

with

Petitioner's mother Mary Bennett. This remained in place until the matter was

•fraudulently dismissed on September 21, 1998. _Exh. A pp 1-8; Appdx E Reply SSE.

On December 1, 1998, in People v. Simmons, Sacto.Sup. No. 96F00053, the

trial judge "Michael Garcia," prosecutor "Marjorie Roller*" and Public Defender

"Peter Vlautin," combined, confederated, and/or conspired to unconstitutionally

convict Petitioner, by, with the entire court file physically present, each of

them discussed the matter of "SIMMONS v. MIRANTE, Sacto.Sup. No. 96AS01528"

during the criminal trial taken against Petitioner., This entire shewing has been

placed properly before the "state and federal courts/" and specifically before

the Ninth Circuit in Appellant's Response to' Appellee's ^Motion to Revoke,

including examples of the continuous governmental obstruction of meaningful

access

support

of Petitioner's

"New Argument"

regarding

his

improper

s vexatious litigant branding as intentional, erroneous and has been improperly

created for repeated use. Appdx. B, Response; E, Reply SSE; Exh. A, 1-13; 201(d)

IV.

Underlying Injuries:

Marjorie Roller, the prosecutor insisted on using the.fraudulent dismissal

of Simmons v.

Mirante,

dismissal was

based

No.

on R.

96AS01528 in Petitioner's criminal trial

[The

Duane Skelton's fraudulent representation that

[Plaintiff] abandoned the case—to obtain judgment in favor of the defense they

were not

entitled., to

by.,-law"],

despite, clear awareness of Petitioner's

unresolved incompetence and standing GAL (People v, Simmons Case No. 96F00053 at

RT 359-60, 409-10, 412; Exh. A, 1-13; Sinmons v. Sacramento Co. Superior Court,

et al • i 318 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir.2003); Simmons v. Mirante, Case No. 96AS01528;

Jud.Not. requested, 201(d)]. Petitioner lacked the mental awareness to provide a

meaningful defense at these proceedings,, particularly'''mentally present to be

heard. [Exh. A 1-13; Appdx. E, Reply SSE,. 1-6, 21-23; Jud.Not. 201(d)).

Understanding one jday^ Petitioner would-regain his mental competence and

discover "some evidence" of wrongdoing, the creation of an "Unconscionable Plan

and/or Scheme" was necessary as

means to prevent Petitioner from attacking the

fraudulent judgments entered againsf "him, including, but not . limited, to., People

;

Sacto.Sup.

v. Simm ons,

No.

96F00053;

Simmons v.

Mirante,

Sacto.Sup.

No.

96AS01528; Simmons v. Hambly, USDC Eastern No. 97-01165; SIMMONS v. CLARK, (both

State and Federal Cases), and numerous others filed by Petitioner. These cases

were deliberately and intentionally obstructed and/or interfered with to create

"Dismissals"

for the purpose of producing "STRIKES" and prejudice against

Petitioner to impair Petitioner's privileges of freely accessing the courts, and

to injure his credibility in the courts as demonstrated by a pattern of

governmental obstruction since 1998.

The supporting

documents of

specific

unrebutted evidence left unchallenged by any Defendant(s) or any Respondent(s)

is as follows:

Petitioner alleges three separate categories of governmental obstruction

and interference with meaningful access to the courts violations, causing an

"injury in fact" and "strikes." 1) selectively destroying critical moving,

opposing papers, supporting documents, complaints, and communications seeking

relief;

opening

clearly

identified

incoming

and

outgoing

legal

and

confidential mail outside Petitioner's presence for censoring, tampering and

delaying legal mail matter to cause injury;

and 3) intentional denial of

meaningful access to research and legal materials, denial of assistance from

someone trained and/or knowledgeable in the law prior to Petitioner's self

education in the law, including instruction on stating proper elements to a

legitimate claim for relief, .

every

action

■«

Petitioner

filed,

routine,

continuous obstruction,

destruction and delaying moving and opposing legal documents, delivery of

court orders during the most critical stage or review on the merits has

caused

injury.

each

complaint

filed,

jail

and prison officials

intentionally caused their dismissals prior to review on the merits, or

appellate review of a district court’s "clearly erroneous" decision to

obtain

judgment

their

favor,

to add

a strike and prejudice against

Petitioner. The following is part of a more substantial showing of unrebutted

admissible evidence petitioner:possesses, for example:

Petitioner was unable to consistently file, serve, and receive

important legal mail from the courts, opposing parties, and other

confidential sources timely, and at times not at all [such as in

Simmons v. Mirante, Sacto.Sup. No. 96AS01528 below], while at the

Sacramento County Jail (SCJ). As a result, Petitioner created a

"Outgoing Legal Mail Log (OLML) to maintain a record of his outgoing

legal mail that the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department who was

running the Jail (SCJ) did not, and would not document. This OLML

contains chronological entries, starting at One (1) through 1070, a

"complete true copy" of the OLML is attached as Exhibit "8" ending

on September 20, 2008, because retaliation against Petitioner

increased significantly, the threat to his health and safety made it

almost impossible to continue to accurately maintain. Each legal

entry can be verified, and should be verified. [See Appellee's Reply

Attachments—Summary of Simmons' Exhibits ("Reply SSE") # 8; Exhibit

"BP; Judicial Notice (Jud.Not.) requested, Federal Rules of

Evidence, Rule 201(b) and (d) (F.R.E. 201 hereafter)].

In SIMMONS v. MIRANTE, Sacramento Superior Court, Case No.

96-AS-01528, Petitioner submitted a "Motion to Set New Trial" in the

Superior Court, County of Sacramento, located at 720 Ninth Street,

Sacramento, Calif. 95814, and served a true copy on R. Duane

Skelton, Mirante's attorney of record. On February 10, 1999,

Petitioner submitted a subsequent "Motion to Set New Trial Date" to

the same court, servicing Skelton, however, Petitioner never

received any response to either motion [See, OLML #'s 7-8, 18-19;

Reply SSE, # 8; Jud.Not. F.R.E. 201(b) and (d)]

In Simmons v. Mirante, Petitioner submitted "Case Status Requests

(CSR) on May 12, August 12, 15, 1999, to the Superior Court, County

of Sacramento. Unresponsive, Petitioner submitted a "Motion to

Vacate Judgment" on September 29, 1999, and served a true coy on

R.Duane Skelton [See OLML #'s 60, 89, 115-16, respectively; Reply

SSE #'s 9, 11, 21; Jud.Not. 201(b) and (d)].

In Mirante, Petitioner again submitted a CSR to the Superior Court,

County of Sacramento inquiring into the status of his "Motion to

Vacate Judgment" filed on September 29, 1999, however, the Court

Clerk returned the motion with instructions to make corrections.

After completing the corrections, Petitioner resubmitted the motion

on November 22, 1999. On December 16, 1999, Petitioner received from

the Sacramento Superior Court Clerk, a "Memorandum" indicating that:

"Your Motion to Vacate Judgment, Memorandum of Law, and Affidavit in

Support of Motion to Vacate Judgment" have been forwarded to

Department 58 for review." Included was an "Order on Waiver of Fees

and Costs" file dated Dec. 8, 1999. On January 19, 2001, Petitioner

received a "Memorandum" indicating: "Case Dismissed on 9/21/98. No

record of Motion to Vacate for this case number.*' [See OLML #'s 135/

160/180; Reply SSE #'s 8/ 21/ 22, respectively; Jud.Not. 201(b) and

(d) i- fexh. "A" 1- 13; Simmons v.~ Sacto.Sup.Ct.■, 318 F.3d 1156).

Petitioner initiated Simmons v.

Hambly/ USDC Eastern No.

97-cv-01165/ his first 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ever. Petitioner was denied

meaningful access to legal research and materials during critical

stages such as discovery/ pretrial motions/ and summary judgment

proceedings. Examples of governmental obstruction and denial of

access to legal research and legal materials is evident by scrutiny

of Petitioner's early pleadings/ during the trial stage/ throughout

the appeal/ Petitioner presented evidence of repeated allegations

and complaints of denial of access/ during critical stages of that

litigation destruction of mail matter/ delaying and tampering

continued. This began at the SCJ and continued at Salinas Valley

State Prison (SVSP)/ throughout the Ninth Circuit and the United

States Supreme Court during preparation of the "Petition for Writ of

Certiorari" filed on April 12/ 2002. This case is material to People

v. Sirrinons, No. 96F00053 [Allegations of the denial of medically

necessary Walking-Assistive Devices during the criminal trial" was

created for false evidence to obtain Petitioner's unconstitutional

conviction. [j$xhV E»/, 5^2:2;. Jud.Not. 201(d) of early pleadings filed;

Reply SSE #’s 13-17, 30).

In Simmons v. Sacramento County Superior Court [the first attempt]

USDC, Eastern No. 99-CV-00789, Petitioner was denied meaningful

access to the courts, including, but not limited to, assistance from

someone experienced with conducting legal research, preparing legal

documents, a meaningful complaint which properly states a bona fide

"claim for which relief may be granted." The facility was on

lockdown and prison officials used it as reason to obstruct

Petitioner from asserting his

First Amendment right to Petition.

While a judicial officer may be irrmune from damages [notwithstanding

Ex Parte Young, Shceuer v. Rhodes], they are not immune from

injunctive relief. Petitioner wasdenied material facts suppressed by

perpetrators of the "unconscionable plan/scheme, without research

.... See Simmons v. Sacramento Superior Court, 318 F.3d 1156 (9th).

On June 15, 1999, Petitioner initiated Simmons v. Clark, et al • i

Case no. 99-cv-03293, a § 1983 Complaint in the wrong United States

District Court at 501 I Street, because he lacked sufficient

information on venue, however, it was forwarded to the Northern

District Court.' An order indicated that Petitioner's "Motion to

Vacate was denied.

Petitioner's "In Forma Pauperis" application

submitted simultaneously was destroyed to cause a dismissal injury.

Ths first one was destroyed, the second delayed and rejected by the

Northern District Court causing by prison official's obstruction of

mail matter [See, No. 20 to Appellee's "Reply in Support Attachment"

(Reply Attmt.; Exh. E, -pp;2f*'3; Judd.Not. 201(d)].

On April 22, 28, May 21, Jun 30, July 27, an August 12/15, 1999,

Ptitioner. sent letters to his "Criminal Appellate Attorney"

representing his "Direct Appeal" with specific information and

documentation In People v. Simmons# Sacto.Sup. No- 96F00053#

however# Petitioner was forced to mail the 8/12/99 letter through

his neighbor in A-142 in order to reach his attorney and advise him

In the matter of Simmons v. Clark# Monterey Co. No. M-64369#

Petitioner was obstructed from pursuing this case through

governmental destruction of critical opposing pleadings ’£a State

actor is not entitled to "qualified immunity” as that is only

available in a "federal civil rights suit]] ^taring the opposition of

the sgmroarv.. iudaraent motion? Petitioner's nKStii^/td-'yadate^- "lost./

by the U.S. Postal Service--served by

Willie Jamison on Petitioner's behalf during critical stages of this

matter [See, Exh. F ; Jud.Not. of Case No. M-64369].

In the matter of Simmons v. Clark# USDC# Northern No. 01-cv-03078

Northern District Judge Martin J. Jenkins improperly delayed that

decision on the existing "exhaustion doctrine" until this Court's

decision in Booth v. Churnner#[] was decided# thereafter dismissing

the case for failure to exhaust all available remedies—causing an

additional "strike" and "prejudice" when the decision should have

been made pursuant to Rule One (1) of the federal rules of civil

procedure's "speedy determination clause#" on the existing rule

prior to that decision—as Petitioner filed the case long before it

became the "new rule of exhaustion." Every dismissal following this

was an improper accumulation designed to further injure and

prejudice Petitioner—but for the unconscionable plan to violate

Petitioner's Constitutional rights; incur an accumulation of 1915(g)

"Strikes" designed to impair Petitioner's rights# a malicious

prejudicial branding as a "Vexatious Litigant."

Other instances which show that Petitioner's legal mail has been

obstructed from timely reaching the intended addressee# and at times

not at all are (stored by Prison Officials in Main Property at CMF. If tf

Below is a list of examples where Petitioner's legal mail was illegally,

and unduely delayed or destroyed. Petitioner had filed numerous complaints with

CDCR and various outside agencies and,, the courts [See Exh. "Q" pp 1-6 (not a

complete list/showing)]. See also# OLML*entries • • « outside governmental agencies.

On August 12# 1999# T. Richardson# a correctional officer (C/O)

refused to "pick up" Petitioner's legal mail for depositing in the

United States Postal Service. That mail was the In Forma Pauperis

application to the matter of Simmons v. Dr. David S. Clark# et al • t

USDC Northern No. 99-03293. Kept out of the legal library Petitioner

was prevented from acquiring the proper information resulting in the

dismissal [See Exh."E" pp 1-2].

ii)

On January 24, 2002# Petitioner sent a letter to "Prentice & Scott#

attorneys at law seeking assistance with' prosecuting Simmons

L.L.P

v. Clark/ et al * i USDC/ Northern No. 01-03078. The letter was mailed

Jan. 24/ 2002/ however/ the addressee received it on March 13/ 2002/

their previous letters were not received. ’[JExh. E> p 4].

• §

(iii)

On March 17/ 2002/ Petitioner submitted a "Request for an Extension"

to prepare and file his Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Supreme Court in Simmons v. Hambly/ USDC No. 97-01165. In addition

to receiving a letter from "Porter Scott Weiberg & Delehant written

on June 6, 2002/ Petitioner had also been denied meaningful access

during proceedings in the Ninth Circuit. However/ SVSP prison

officials destroyed the copies of the "Extension request" served on

opposing parties/ they maliciously delayed the original addressed to

the office of the United States Supreme Court Clerk for months after

the time allowed had passsed [See Exh. "E" pp 3-;Q; Reply SSE. No.s

14-17; OLML No.’s 537-39 (Exh. B)J.

iv)

By letter on June 6, 2002/ a defendant in Simmons v. Hambly USDC

Eastern No. 97-01165 had written to advise Petitioner of his

"obligation to serve them with all documents submitted to the

Courts/" however/ evidence establishes Petitioner had served each

party to the action timely [See/ "3" above; Reply SSE # 14; OLML #'s

537-39].

On or about August 7 , 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court clerk sent a

letter to Petitioner advising him that the application for an

extension was received August 5/ 2002 [this was actually mailed

March 19/ 2002]/ and that the time allowed had since passed; again

causing legal injury and dismissal as a result of prison official's

obstruction of mail matter. [See Exh. "E" pp 5-12 ; Reply SSE #'s

15-17; Jud.Not 201(d)],

vi)

In Simmons v. Clark/ Monterey County Superior Court No. M64369/

Petitioner's "Motion to Vacate Order dated Aug. 12/ 2004" had been

served by "Willie Jamison" on August 25/ 2004 on Petitioner's

behalf. Pieces of it was found at the San Francisco Bulk Mail Center

listed as "Ordinary Mail" on 9/14/2004/ only a small portion of the

"Envelop" remained bearing the addressee' information prepared by

Petitioner/ and Willie Jamison prepared his own return address. The

meter stamp [No. 714/335] showed the cost was $4.75 post-marked on

Aug. 27/ 04. Jamison/ three cells over from Petitioner's had

previously served the Opposition to Summary Judgment (that did not

reach the court) on Petitioner's behalf during the most critical

stages [Summary Judgment]. However/ it should be noted that each of

Petitioner's "Title Pages" were clearly marked with his 'return

address' on the face of ,each stapled document [see Reply SSE No.

24]; Exh. F, pp 1-9; Jud.Not. requested/ 201(b) and (d)].

As a result of the above allegations/ Petitioner has suffered the following

"Injuries in fact:"

Petitioner was the prevailing party in Simmons v. Mirante/ Sacto.Sup. Case

No. 96AS01528 pursuant to a **$10,000.00 Arbitration Award" in "PLAINTIFF'S

FAVOR" (Petitioner rejected as grossly inadequate compensation for

damages), based upon the necessity for a surgical procedure, pain and

suffering,

property

damages,

etc.,

prior

the

fraudulent

misrepresentation made by an officer of the court—R. Duane Skelton on

September 21, 1998, to obtain a judgment defendant was not entitled to as

a matter of law. Immediately used by the prosecution to fraudulently

convict Petitioner, a "incompetent defendant"; [R.T. 359-60, 409-10, 412).

Petitioner suffered an unconstitutional conviction and was sentenced to a

Eighth Amendment excessive punishment of 175 years to life for a

nonviolent offense (a crime he did not commit) while he was legally

"unconscious" and mentally incompetent (supported by substantial

evidence*•*a "Guardian-Ad-Litem" remained in place during the criminal

trial—then discussed on the record in the criminal matter People v.

Simmons, Case No. 96F00053- Thereafter, unconstitutionally confined 24

years without jurisdiction; and

Petitioner was deprived of

successive bona fide civil actions—Simmons

v. Hambly, USDC Eastern No. 97-cv-01165, among others, under the

American's With Disabilities Act (ADA) for the denial of necessary Medical

Assistive devices following his April 10, 1995 accident caused by Michael

Mirante—used to manufacture false evidence to procure a fraudulent

conviction against Petitioner.

Petitioner

.has

presented,

best

could

under

His

current

circumstances, a small showing, of the mounds of evidence and supporting facts

not presented here, stored by prison officials at CMF, and was stored at each

preceding, prison. Petitioner has discovered that the "Book of

Legal Mail

Receipts' signed by the officer receiving his legal mail is now missing, or may

be misplaced and cannot be located • • • which supports each OLML entry until 2008

KVSP,

which

verified those mailings by an governmental CDCR Officer.

Petitioner reserves the latter "Obstructions" until further briefing is ordered,

if any..including six boxes of legal materials stored in CMF's Main Property.

Petitioner submits and asserts that this Petition for Writ of Certiorari

should be granted because it affects more than this petitioner alone, and our

judicial system needs to return to the integrity once our beacon of justice. It

was once said: "It is better to release a thousand guilty men, than to condemn

"one innocent man." Additionally, there are no Supreme Court "Heat Risk holdings."

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

Pursuant to Rule 10, subsections (a) and (c) of the Supreme Court Rules,

Petitioner respectfully submits the following reasons for requesting this Court

to exercise its "Supervisory Powers" in the above entitled cause.

CLEARLY ERRONEOUS DEPARTURE

Petitioner

asserts

and

submits

that

the Ninth .Circuit,

acting

Appellee's Motion to Revoke Appellant's In Forma pauperis Status" based on a

history created by jail and prison officials direct obstruction and interference

with the First Amendment right to access the courts and right to Petition as set

forth above. If permitted to stand, the Ninth Circuit would have been permitted

act in a manner contravening the United States Constitution, clearly established

law, and legalize a fraudulent means to deprive a .party with "clean hands" to be

denied the Equal Protection of the laws. Usurpation affects more than just one

litigant, it tarnishes the integrity of the entire judicial system.

In United States v. United State Gypsum Co., 333„ U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct.

525, this Court stated and held: "Although the meaning of the phrase "clearly

erroneous" is not immediately apparent, certain general principles governing the

exercise of the appellate.court's power to overturn findings of a district court

may be derived from our cases. The foremost of these principles; as the Fourth

Circuit itself -recognized,

is that *[a]

finding is clearly erroneous when

although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing, court cm the entire

evidence is left with the definite, and firm conviction that a mistake has been

committed." Under Rule 52(b) "On a party's motion filed no more than 28 days

after the entry of judgment, the court may amend its findings-or make additional,

findings-and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may accompany a

motion for new trial under Rule 59." The Ninth Circuit and district court failed

to follow this holding.

GENUINE "HEAT RISK" DISPUTE

Petitioner asserts and submits that there are no bona fide "Heat Risk"

cases in which the prisoner is actually designated "a heat risk patient" in the

prison setting# where numerous legal and procedural issues provide this Court

with an opportunity to instruct the lower courts on a very serious subject

matter that holds human life in the hands of arbitrary state action without firm

guidance from this Court/ the Nation's "Heat Risk" patients will be affected.

Ill

MANIPULATION OF 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)

Petitioner asserts and submits that utilizing statues which are designed

to-apply to genuine "vexatious litigants" rather than an individual genuinely

seeking relief and is caught-up in retaliatory treatment which "manipulates" the

boundaries between protecting the court

system from

"abuse"

to trusted

governmental officials who actually are abusing the ^court prooess unethically to

reach unconstitutional results requires this Court's attention

■m «

In William v. Paramo# 775 ,F. 3d" 1182* the Ninth, Circuit themselves stated:

"The limited

office of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) in determining whether a prisoner

can proceed in forma pauperis councils against an overly detailed inquiry into

the allegations that qualify for the exception.

« 0 •

Opinion by Stephen

Reinhardt—We do so reluctantly# because if a prisoner is denied forma pauperis

status on appeal on the ground that he no longer faces an imminent danger# his

inability to pay the filing fee may deprive a court of appeals of the

opportunity to correct- any errors committed by the district court • • a Moreover#

as scholars and judges have noted# the three-strikes provision raises grave

constitutional concerns. See# e.g.« Thomas v# Holder# 750 F.3d 899# 904-09# 409

U.S.

App.

D.C.

403

[Id.#

at 775 F.3d at 1190-91]." The district court

disregarded a "report by a governmental agency that contradicted the evidence

■

proffered by Defendants. Review by this Court on the 1915(g) issue is important

to wore than a single case and can become a new practice by governmental

officials.

LAWLESSNESS OR OOUPORMICT

Finally# Petitioner asserts end submits t that the courts are charged with

-i

enforcing the constitutional rights of its citizens. When they fail to do so#

miscarriages of justice is the least of that individual’ s concern. "Lawlessness"

is a concept that threatens humanity over the entire world.

This Court's holding in Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Etapire Co.# 322

U.S. 238# 64 S.Ct* 997# held that "a judgment finally entered has ever; been

I7.-

regarded as completely immune from impeachment after the term." In this regard#

despite it properly before the courts# and presenting this principle to the

■

lower courts*‘supported with sufficient facts and evidence# it apopears to have

fallen on deaf ears—or is merely because of the prejudice Petitioner has

suffered from being branded a "Vexatious Litigant?"

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted

Date:

/hr,

Z-O/9

•i

v .3 •

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