Respondents Brief — United States Patent and Trademark Office, et al., Petitioners v. Booking.com B.V.
Supreme Court briefFeb 12, 2020
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No. 19-46
In the Supreme Court of the United States
UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS,
v.
BOOKING.COM B.V.,
RESPONDENT.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT
DAVID H. BERNSTEIN
JARED I. KAGAN
DEBEVOISE &
PLIMPTON LLP
919 Third Avenue
New York, NY 10022
JONATHAN E. MOSKIN
FOLEY & LARDNER LLP
90 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10016
LISA S. BLATT
Counsel of Record
SARAH M. HARRIS
EDEN SCHIFFMANN
JOHN B. SWANSON
WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY LLP
725 Twelfth Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 434-5000
lblatt@wc.com
QUESTION PRESENTED
Under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq., generic terms may not be registered as trademarks. The
question presented is as follows:
Whether the addition by an online business of a generic top-level domain (“.com”) to an otherwise generic
term can create a protectable trademark.
(I)
II
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
The parties to the proceeding are the United States
Patent and Trademark Office; Andrei Iancu, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director, United States Patent and Trademark Office; and
Booking.com B.V.
Respondent Booking.com B.V. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Booking Holdings Inc., a publicly-traded company.
III
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATEMENT ....................................................................... 1
A. Statutory Framework ............................................... 4
B. The Trademark Registration and Review
Process ........................................................................ 7
C. Factual and Procedural Background ................... 10
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ......................................... 15
ARGUMENT ....................................................................... 18
I. THE LANHAM ACT DOES NOT BAR
GENERIC.COM TRADEMARKS .............................. 18
A. The Act Mandates the Primary-Significance
Test To Assess the Genericness of All Marks,
Including Domain Names ...................................... 19
B. Applying the Primary-Significance Test to All
Types of Marks Furthers the Act’s Aims ............ 24
C. The Primary-Significance Inquiry Properly
Considers Survey Evidence ................................... 30
D. BOOKING.COM is Descriptive, Not Generic,
and Under the Primary-Significance Test .......... 34
II. GOODYEAR DOES NOT COMPEL A
CONTRARY RESULT............................................... 34
A. The Lanham Act Repudiated the Government’s
Per Se Rule............................................................... 35
B. The Government’s Per Se Rule Would Strip
Countless Marks of Trademark Protection and
Confer No Competitive Benefits........................... 46
CONCLUSION ................................................................... 50
(III)
IV
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases:
A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman,
808 F.2d 291 (3d Cir. 1986) ................................ 23, 32
Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting
World, Inc.,
537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976) .................................... 31, 32
Advertise.com, Inc. v. AOL Advert.
Inc.,
616 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2010) ........................... passim
Am. Univ. v. Am. Univ. of Kuwait,
Cancellation No. 92049706, slip op.
(T.T.A.B. Jan. 30, 2020) ........................................... 30
Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun
Grp.,
684 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1982) .................................. 23
Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co.,
272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) ...................................... 23
BellSouth Corp. v. Data Nat’l Corp.,
60 F.3d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1995) .................................. 20
Berner Int’l Corp. v. Mars Sales Co.,
987 F.2d 975 (3d Cir. 1993) ...................................... 30
Cal. Cooler, Inc. v. Loretto Winery,
Ltd.,
774 F.2d 1451 (9th Cir. 1985) .................................... 7
Columbia Mill Co. v. Alcorn,
150 U.S. 460 (1893) ................................................... 38
Comm’r v. Keystone Consol. Indus.,
508 U.S. 152 (1993) ................................................... 21
Corbin v. Gould, 133 U.S. 308 (1890) .......................... 38
Del. & Hudson Canal Co. v. Clark,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 311 (1871) ................................... 36
V
Page(s)
Cases—continued:
Elgin Nat’l Watch Co. v. Ill. Watch
Case Co., 179 U.S. 665 (1901),
abrogated on other grounds by
Hurn v. Oursler,
289 U.S. 238 (1933) ......................................... 5, 36, 39
Estate of P.D. Beckwith, Inc. v.
Comm’r of Patents,
252 U.S. 538 (1920) ................................................... 38
Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing
Co.,
124 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 1997) ................................ 23, 48
Goodyear’s Rubber Mfg. Co. v.
Goodyear Rubber Co.,
128 U.S. 598 (1888) .......................................... passim
Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli,
164 F.3d 806 (2d Cir. 1999) ...................................... 32
Helene Curtis Indus. v. Church &
Dwight Co.,
560 F.2d 1325 (7th Cir. 1977) .................................. 22
Howe Scale Co. v. Wyckoff, Seamans &
Benedict,
198 U.S. 229 (1905) ................................................... 38
Hunt Masters, Inc. v. Landry’s
Seafood Rest., Inc.,
240 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 2001) .................................... 32
Iancu v. Brunetti,
139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019) ........................................... 7, 47
In re 1800Mattress.com IP LLC,
586 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ................................ 45
In re ActiveVideo Networks, Inc.,
111 U.S.P.Q.2d 1581 (T.T.A.B. 2014) ..................... 20
VI
Page(s)
Cases—continued:
In re Analog Devices,
10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1879 (Fed. Cir.
1989) ........................................................................... 32
In re Hotels.com, L.P.,
573 F.3d 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ...................... 9, 24, 45
In re Martin Container, Inc.,
65 U.S.P.Q.2d 1058 (T.T.A.B. 2002) ....................... 44
In re Northland Aluminum Prods.,
777 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ................................ 32
In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP,
373 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 2004) .................... 43, 44, 45
In re Reed Elsevier Props., Inc.,
77 U.S.P.Q.2d 1649 (T.T.A.B. 2005) ................. 24, 45
In re Vacationfutures,
2016 WL 4775500 (T.T.A.B. 2016) .......................... 44
In re Wm. G. Coleman Co., 93
U.S.P.Q.2d 2019 (T.T.A.B. 2010) ............................ 42
Inwood Labs. v. Ives Labs., 456 U.S.
844 (1982) ................................................................... 40
Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co.,
305 U.S. 111 (1938) ................................................... 22
Lawrence Mfg. Co. v. Tenn. Mfg. Co.,
138 U.S. 537 (1891) ............................................. 38, 49
Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017)........................ 4, 7
Maremont Corp. v. Air Lift Co.,
463 F.2d 1114 (C.C.P.A. 1972) ................................ 21
Miller Brewing Co. v. Joseph Schlitz
Brewing Co.,
605 F.2d 990 (7th Cir. 1979) .................................... 32
Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep
Sys., Inc.,
874 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1989) ........................................ 48
VII
Page(s)
Cases—continued:
Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Def.,
138 S. Ct. 617 (2018) ................................................. 19
Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly,
Inc.,
469 U.S. 189 (1985) .......................................... passim
Princeton Vanguard, LLC v. Frito-Lay
N. Am., Inc.,
786 F.3d 960 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ............................ 20, 30
Q-Tips, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson,
108 F. Supp. 845 (D.N.J. 1952), aff’d,
206 F.2d 144 (3d Cir. 1953) ...................................... 22
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co.,
514 U.S. 159 (1995) .......................................... passim
Retail Servs., Inc. v. Freebies Publ’g,
364 F.3d 535 (4th Cir. 2004) .................................... 29
Roselux Chem. Co. v. Parsons
Ammonia Co.,
299 F.2d 855 (C.C.P.A. 1962) .................................. 22
Rotkiske v. Klemm,
140 S. Ct. 355 (2019) ................................................. 24
Royal Crown Co. v. The Coca-Cola Co.,
892 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ................................ 32
Schulmerich Elecs., Inc. v. J.C.
Deagan, Inc.,
202 F.2d 772 (C.C.P.A. 1953) .................................. 22
Schwan’s IP, LLC v. Kraft Pizza Co.,
460 F.3d 971 (8th Cir. 2006) .................................... 32
Skilling v. United States,
561 U.S. 358 (2010) ................................................... 21
Surgicenters of Am., Inc. v. Med.
Dental Surgeries, Co.,
601 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir. 1979) .................................. 22
VIII
Page(s)
Cases—continued:
Swatch AG v. Beehive Wholesale, LLC,
739 F.3d 150 (4th Cir. 2014) ...................................... 9
Tech. Publ’g Co. v. Lebhar-Friedman,
Inc.,
729 F.2d 1136 (7th Cir. 1984) .................................. 32
Telechron, Inc. v. Telicon Corp.,
198 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1952) ...................................... 22
TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg.
Displays, Inc.,
532 U.S. 23 (2001) ..................................................... 27
Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.,
505 U.S. 763 (1992) ..................................................... 6
Weiss Noodle Co. v. Golden Cracknel &
Specialty Co.,
290 F.2d 845 (C.C.P.A. 1961) .................................. 32
Welding Servs., Inc. v. Forman, 509
F.3d 1351 (11th Cir. 2007) ....................................... 41
Statutes and regulations:
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. ................ passim
§ 1051(a)(1) .................................................................. 7
§ 1052 ................................................................. passim
§ 1052(f) .................................................................. 6, 25
§ 1064(3) ............................................................ passim
§ 1065 ............................................................................ 6
§ 1070 ............................................................................ 9
§ 1071(a)(4) .................................................................. 9
§ 1071(b)(1) .................................................................. 9
§ 1091(a) ....................................................... 6, 8, 17, 39
§ 1125(a) ....................................................................... 7
§ 1125(d) ........................................................... 7, 25, 26
§ 1127 ................................................................. passim
28 U.S.C. § 1291 ............................................................... 9
37 C.F.R. § 2.141 .............................................................. 9
IX
Page(s)
Statutes and regulations—continued:
37 C.F.R. § 2.142 .............................................................. 9
2017 O.J. L. 154/8-9, Art. 7(1), (3)
(E.U.) .......................................................................... 11
Trade Marks Act 1994, c. 26, § 3 (U.K.) ..................... 11
Trade Marks Act 1995, pt IV div 2
(Austl.) ........................................................................ 11
Trade Marks Act 2002, s.18 (N.Z.) .............................. 11
Miscellaneous:
Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) ...................... 26
Booking Holdings Inc., Annual Report
(Form 10-K) (Feb. 27, 2019), available at https://ir.bookingholdings.com/node/24076/html ....................................... 10
Our Story, Booking.com,
https://careers.booking.com/aboutbooking (last visited Feb. 11, 2020) ........................ 10
William Henry Browne, A Treatise on
the Law of Trademarks
(2d ed. 1885) ............................................................... 37
Lanning G. Bryer et al., Intellectual
Property Strategies for the 21st
Century Corporation (2016) ..................................... 8
Lindsay Gellman, How Search Engines
Are Killing Clever URLs, The
Atlantic (Dec. 15, 2016),
https://tinyurl.com/uqhkcne .................................... 27
Norman F. Hesseltine, A Digest of the
Law of Trade-Marks and Unfair
Trade (1906) .................................................... 5, 36, 37
James Love Hopkins, The Law of
Trademarks, Tradenames and
Unfair Competition (4th ed. 1924) ........................ 37
X
Page(s)
Miscellaneous—continued:
J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on
Trademarks and Unfair
Competition (5th ed. 2018) ............................. passim
Harry S. Nims, The Law of Unfair
Competition and Trade-Marks
(2d ed. 1917) ............................................................... 37
Amasa C. Paul, The Law of
Trademarks & Unfair Competition
(1903) .......................................................................... 37
S. Rep. 98-627, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess. 1 (1984) .................................................. 21, 23
United States Patent and Trademark
Office, Trademark Manual of
Examining Procedure (Oct. 2018) ................. passim
Francis H. Upton, A Treatise on the
Law of Trade Marks (1860) .................................... 36
In the Supreme Court of the United States
No. 19-46
UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS,
v.
BOOKING.COM B.V.,
RESPONDENT.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT
STATEMENT
Under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq., the
consumer is king: trademark protection turns on whether
a mark permits consumers to distinguish one brand of
products from another. The Act thus denies protection to
generic names for categories of goods or services. Section
1064(3) states that a mark’s “primary significance … to
the relevant public … shall be the test for determining
whether the registered mark has become the generic
name of goods or services.” The Act nowhere suggests
that different rules govern compound phrases (like
(1)
2
“Booking Company”) or domain-name trademarks, including a generic root word coupled with “.com.”
Under the primary-significance test, whether a mark
is generic depends on whether relevant consumers believe
that the mark as a whole is the generic name for the class
of goods or services. Because that test requires assessing
what consumers think, courts and the Patent & Trademark Office (“PTO”) have long evaluated facts relevant to
consumer perceptions—especially survey evidence—to
resolve genericness case by case. The Fourth Circuit thus
properly asked whether consumers consider BOOKING.COM, as a whole, to signify the generic name for online
hotel-reservation services. The court credited the district
court’s factual finding that the answer was no, citing
(among other evidence) a survey showing that 74.8% of
relevant consumers consider BOOKING.COM a brand, not a
generic name, and the weakness of the PTO’s contrary evidence. That analysis should end this case. 1
The government instead urges a per se rule that a generic term like “cotton,” “grain,” or “reservation” coupled
with a suffix like “Company,” “Inc.,” “.com,” or “Store” is
always generic for those goods or services—even if overwhelming evidence shows that consumers believe the
mark as a whole is not generic. The government would
apparently extend this rule to any suffix denoting the type
of enterprise involved, like “Association,” “Shop,”
“House,” “Journal,” etc.
The government’s theory rests entirely on Goodyear’s
Rubber Manufacturing Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 128
The PTO registered all marks in small caps in this brief except
BOOKING.COM. Mark registrations can be found on PTO’s database,
https://www.uspto.gov/trademarks-application-process/searchtrademark-database.
1
3
U.S. 598 (1888), a decision the Lanham Act repudiated.
Goodyear embodied the common-law principle that no one
could trademark any name that could equally describe a
competitor’s products, no matter how much consumers
associated such names with a brand. Goodyear thus held
that names like “The Goodyear Company” could not be
trademarked. Any number of producers could claim the
name “Goodyear” (which described the process for vulcanizing rubber). The Lanham Act discarded that rule by
adopting the primary-significance test for genericness
and by mandating registration of any mark consumers
consider distinctive, including GOODYEAR itself.
Turning back the clock to 1888 would confuse over 300
million American consumers, who rely on hundreds of
PTO-registered marks that defy the government’s per se
rule. The national grocery chain FOODS CO is indeed a
company selling foods, just as THE WIG COMPANY is a
company selling wigs and THE FLAGPOLE COMPANY is a
company selling flagpoles. LAWYERS ALLIANCE is an alliance of lawyers, IRRIGATION ASSOCIATION is an association for the irrigation industry, and CAR WASH ENTERPRISES is an enterprise that washes cars.
Meanwhile, the national chain THE CONTAINER STORE
is a store for containers. THE MATTRESS SHOPPE and
THE MEDICINE SHOPPE sell exactly what their names
suggest. WAFFLE HOUSE is America’s top waffle purveyor. Self-explanatory depots (like OFFICE DEPOT and
THE HOME DEPOT) abound. Aptly named marts (e.g.,
BEAUTY MART) and warehouses (e.g., SPRINKLER WAREHOUSE) have flourished. TV GUIDE and CONSUMER REPORTS have been fixtures for generations. COFFEE REVIEW reviews coffee; WATCH JOURNAL chronicles
watches. Innumerable PTO-registered nonprofit marks
flunk the government’s test: ALZHEIMER’S FOUNDATION,
4
AUTISM SOCIETY, AMPUTEE COALITION, CHRISTIAN COALITION, CARING INSTITUTE, OUTDOOR ALLIANCE, WATER.ORG. The list goes on. Appx. A.
The government’s position would also decimate countless PTO-registered Generic.com marks, which pervade
every aspect of our lives. Seeking a date? Try DATING.COM. Want to impress with concert tickets? TICKETS.COM or CONCERT.COM can get them. Hoping for nice
weather? Check WEATHER.COM. Looking for the perfect
dinner spot? RESTAURANT.COM offers deals. Booking a
flight to meet the parents? FLIGHTS.COM can help. Need
entertainment? KARAOKE.COM has it covered. Considering a honeymoon cruise? There’s CRUISE.COM. Seeking
a bigger residence?
Try RENTALS.COM, RENTALHOUSES.COM,
or
HOMES.COM.
Expecting?
BABYSHOWER.COM assists with the traditional lead-up,
while CARE.COM finds nannies for the end result. More
interested in progenitors than progeny? ANCESTRY.COM
and GENEALOGY.COM trace family trees. For links lovers,
GOLF.COM offers golf news, golf travel, golf instruction,
and golf gear. For fitness buffs, WORKOUT.COM advises
on, yes, workouts. Lawyers turn to LAW.COM. For those
with more prurient interests, there is SEX.COM. Companies and nonprofits use these registered marks and others
to identify themselves to millions of Americans on websites, in mobile applications, and offline. The PTO even
registered COOKING.COM—but the government now insists BOOKING.COM is a bridge too far. This is nonsense.
A. Statutory Framework
Since antiquity, makers of various goods have placed
marks on their products to distinguish them from competitors’. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017). During
the nineteenth century, federal courts developed a federal
common law of trademarks. That body of law and its
5
state-law counterparts protected only technical trademarks, i.e., marks that inherently identified the provider
of a good or service. Elgin Nat’l Watch Co. v. Ill. Watch
Case Co., 179 U.S. 665, 673 (1901), abrogated on other
grounds by Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933); 1 J.
Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 4:3 (5th ed. 2018). Trademark law thus
excluded from protection marks that described a product’s attributes rather than its maker. Norman F. Hesseltine, A Digest of the Law of Trade-Marks and Unfair
Trade 31 (1906). Unprotected trade names received protection only under unfair-competition law, typically if
competitors fraudulently deceived consumers by trying to
seize the goodwill others had built behind their names.
Elgin, 179 U.S. at 674; Hesseltine, supra, at 209-10.
The 1946 Lanham Act transformed the law by creating a federal regime that “describes th[e] universe” of potential trademarks “in the broadest of terms.” Qualitex
Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995). Under the Act, a “trademark” includes “any word, name,
symbol, or device or any combination thereof” that a person uses “to identify and distinguish his or her goods …
from those manufactured or sold by others.” 15 U.S.C.
§ 1127; accord id. § 1052. The Act recognizes the following spectrum of trademarks:
Fanciful, arbitrary, or suggestive marks: At one end
are inherently distinctive marks that are “fanciful,” “arbitrary,” or “suggestive.” Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 162. Examples include fanciful, made-up names like ACCENTURE or
EXXON, arbitrary names like APPLE COMPUTER COMPANY for electronics, and suggestive names like
CHEWY.COM that indirectly connote pet-supply products.
“[T]heir intrinsic nature serves to identify a particular
6
source” of goods or services. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992). Pre-Lanham Act
common law only protected these “technical” trademarks.
McCarthy, supra, § 4:3.
Descriptive marks: In the middle of the spectrum are
marks that “describe[] the qualities or characteristics of a
good or service.” Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly,
Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985). The common law refused to
protect those marks. But under the Act, descriptive
marks can be registered in two ways. First, the PTO must
register marks on the principal register if they have acquired distinctiveness (or “secondary meaning”), i.e., they
“ha[ve] become distinctive of the applicant’s goods in commerce” and connote a specific brand to a significant proportion of consumers. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f); see McCarthy,
supra, §§ 4:14, 15:1. If the marks have not yet acquired
such distinctiveness but are still “capable of distinguishing [an] applicant’s goods or services” in some fashion, the
marks are “merely descriptive,” and the PTO must register them on the supplemental register. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1091(a); McCarthy, supra, § 19:32.
Generic terms: At the far end of the spectrum are unprotected “generic” terms, i.e., “the generic name for the
goods or services” as a class. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1064(3)
(subjecting “generic” marks to cancellation), 1065 (“generic” marks can be contested), 1127 (marks are “abandoned” if owner causes them to be “generic”).
Generic terms do not distinguish one producer’s goods
or services from another’s. If consumers understand “oranges” as the name for all spherical citrus fruits of that
color, an orchard cannot register “Oranges” as the name
for its particular specimens. Generic marks thus are not
registrable. See id. §§ 1052, 1091(a). And marks are subject to cancellation if “[t]he primary significance of the
7
registered mark to the relevant public … [is that] the
[mark] has become the generic name of goods or services
on or in connection with which it has been used.” Id.
§ 1064(3).
B. The Trademark Registration and Review Process
1. Federal trademark registration conveys “valuable
benefits.” Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2297 (2019).
Registration on the principal register confers evidentiary
advantages in court and the ability to stop imports of infringing articles. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1753. Registration
on the supplemental register, in turn, lets mark holders
pursue Lanham Act remedies against infringement if they
prove their mark has secondary meaning in infringement
litigation, or in subsequent registration applications. E.g.,
Cal. Cooler, Inc. v. Loretto Winery, Ltd., 774 F.2d 1451,
1454 (9th Cir. 1985). Even unregistered trademarks that
satisfy the definition of a trademark can receive protection against infringement under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) and
rights under the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, id. § 1125(d). Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1752-53.
The PTO processes trademark registration applications. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(1). PTO examiners apply the
PTO’s Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure (Oct.
2018) (“Examiner’s Manual”) to identify generic marks.
The PTO bears the burden of proving genericness. Examiner’s Manual § 1209.01(c)(i).
The PTO deems a mark generic if the “primary significance to the relevant public is the class or category of
goods or services.” Id. The primary-significance test involves determining (1) “the genus of goods or services at
issue,” and (2) whether “the relevant public understand[s]
the [trademark] designation primarily to refer to that genus of goods or services.” Id. “The test for genericness is
8
the same whether the mark is a compound term or a
phrase,” and requires assessing “the mark as a whole.”
Id. If the evidence reveals that consumers primarily view
the mark as a whole as the generic name for the goods or
services on offer (for example, if consumers believe “Oranges,” “Oranges Inc.,” or “Oranges Etc.” refer to oranges generally), examiners refuse registration.
The PTO applies the same primary-significance test to
Internet domain-name marks, asking “whether the relevant public would understand the mark as a whole to have
generic significance.” Id. §§ 1209.01(c)(i), 1215.05. 2 Only
if the “relevant public” would “understand the [domain
name] to refer to” the generic category of goods or services can the examiner deem the domain name generic.
Id. § 1209.01(c)(i). The manual disclaims any “per se rule
that the addition of a [suffix, like “.com”] to an otherwise
generic term can never under any circumstances operate
to create a registrable mark.” Id. § 1215.05.
As noted, supra p. 6, the PTO places on the supplemental register merely descriptive marks, i.e., marks that
are non-generic because they are capable of distinguishing an applicant’s products but are not yet associated with
a single source. 15 U.S.C. § 1091(a). The PTO registered
many marks in Appendix A on the supplemental register,
meaning the PTO found them not generic.
Domain names are strings of unique characters used to identify Internet websites; they commonly include a word or phrase followed by
a suffix such as “.com,” “.gov,” or “.edu.” Those suffixes are called the
“top level domains” (“TLD”). Over 1,500 such suffixes exist. While
only certain entities can register some suffixes (like “.gov”), “.com,”
“.net,” and “.org” are unrestricted. Lanning G. Bryer et al., Intellectual Property Strategies for the 21st Century Corporation 88 (2016).
2
9
If the mark is descriptive and has attained secondary
meaning, i.e., consumers identify the mark with a single
brand, the PTO registers the mark on the principal register. Examiner’s Manual §§ 1209.02, 1212.06(d). Primary
significance and secondary meaning are analytically distinct; a mark may clear the primary-significance test and
avoid rejection on genericness grounds, but must also
have secondary meaning to be on the principal register.
2. Applicants may appeal adverse decisions to the
Trademark Trial & Appeal Board (“TTAB”), which reviews the same record and assesses the examiner’s decision de novo. 15 U.S.C. § 1070; 37 C.F.R. §§ 2.141-2.142.
Applicants may challenge adverse TTAB decisions in the
Federal Circuit or federal district court.
Before the Federal Circuit, applicants proceed “on the
record before the [PTO].” 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a)(4). The
Federal Circuit “give[s] plenary review to the TTAB’s legal conclusions,” but “review[s] its factual findings” for
“substantial evidence.” In re Hotels.com, L.P., 573 F.3d
1300, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2009). That deferential standard for
factfinding applies to the TTAB’s genericness determinations, because the “primary significance of the … mark to
the relevant public” is a factual question. Id.
Proceeding to district court lets applicants introduce
new evidence and provides de novo review of law and
facts. 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(1); Swatch AG v. Beehive
Wholesale, LLC, 739 F.3d 150, 155 (4th Cir. 2014). The
losing party may appeal to the regional circuits, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, which review district court factfinding “for clear
error” and “legal conclusions de novo.” Swatch, 739 F.3d
at 154-55.
10
C. Factual and Procedural Background
1. Respondent Booking.com began in 1996 as a Dutch
company with a corresponding website called Bookings.nl. As its success grew, its scope expanded; to reflect
its global reach, the company in 2005 changed its name to
Booking.com, purchased the domain name “Booking.com,” and consolidated operations within that brand.
As part of that consolidation, respondent purchased the
BOOKINGS.COM trademark, which the PTO registered in
2004 on the supplemental register for online advertising
services (including advertising of booking services). See
Reg. No. 2,818,491.
Today, Booking.com is one of the world’s leading digital travel companies, counting more than 30 million
unique website visitors each month (10 million from the
United States). JA17 (2013-14 numbers). Respondent offers services in 224 jurisdictions and in 43 languages, all
through the Booking.com-branded website and mobile application. JA144. Respondent built this business through
enormous investments in customer service and advertising, and employs some 17,500 people in more than 200 offices worldwide. Our Story, Booking.com, https://careers.booking.com/about-booking (last visited Feb. 11,
2020). In 2018, respondent’s parent, Booking Holdings,
spent $4.4 billion on online advertising and $509 million on
other marketing, including television ads that associate
Booking.com with competitive prices, superior accommodations, and excellent customer service. Booking Holdings Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 38-39 (Feb. 27,
2019), available at https://ir.bookingholdings.com/node
/24076/html; JA18-20; JA24-29.
Respondent’s efforts have fostered strong brand
recognition, prompting 85 foreign jurisdictions to register
11
BOOKING.COM as a trademark. JA140-42. Those jurisdictions include the European Community, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand—which, like the United
States, refuse to register marks that consumers do not
consider distinctive. 2017 O.J. L. 154/8-9, Art. 7(1), (3)
(E.U.); Trade Marks Act 1994, c. 26, § 3 (U.K.); Trade
Marks Act 1995, pt IV div 2 s 41 (Austl.); Trade Marks Act
2002, s. 18 (N.Z.).
2. In 2011 and 2012, respondent filed four registration applications for BOOKING.COM and stylized versions
of the mark in connection with hotel-reservation and other
services. Pet.App.4a. The examiner refused registration
on the principal register, finding the marks merely descriptive. Pet.App.50a. Respondent produced evidence
that BOOKING.COM “had acquired distinctiveness” as a
brand. The examiner then deemed BOOKING.COM generic
and refused registration. Pet.App.50a.
The TTAB affirmed, reasoning that BOOKING.COM
was generic because consumers would understand its
“primary significance” as “an online reservation service
for lodgings” generally. JA312; JA347. The TTAB relied
on dictionary definitions of “booking” as a noun meaning
“a reservation for a room in a hotel” or “the service of arranging reservations for hotel rooms.” JA331. The TTAB
also relied on dictionary definitions of “.com” as a commercial website, JA336; respondent’s website describing
“booking” services; other websites and news articles; and
domain names containing “booking” and “.com” to sell
reservations (e.g., hotelbooking.com). JA319-26.
Respondent sought review of the TTAB’s decision in
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
and introduced additional evidence that consumers understand BOOKING.COM as a brand name, not a generic
term.
12
First, respondent introduced the report of statistician
Hal Poret, whom the TTAB, the Federal Trade Commission, and courts have accepted as an expert in survey research. JA35; JA41. Poret designed an industry-standard “Teflon survey” to determine whether consumers perceive BOOKING.COM as a generic term or brand. The survey presented various marks to “consumers who search
for or make hotel or travel arrangements online” and
asked them whether each mark is a generic term or brand.
JA43. Poret controlled for “concerns that survey respondents might answer that any DOT-COM name is a
brand” by including Washingmachine.com, which has no
associated brand, as a control. JA43. While 30% of respondents identified Washingmachine.com as a brand,
“74.8% … identified BOOKING.COM to be a brand name.”
JA53. Poret concluded: “[T]hese results strongly establish that BOOKING.COM is not perceived by consumers to
be a generic term.” JA54.
Second, respondent introduced the report of Dr. Sarah-Jane Leslie, a Princeton professor with expertise in
linguistics. Leslie explained that under basic linguistics
principles, even if “booking” and “.com” were generic
terms in isolation, consumers would not necessarily understand BOOKING.COM to refer to all hotel-reservation
services. JA138-39. And just because “booking.com” appears within terms like “dubai-travelbooking.com” does
not show that consumers consider BOOKING.COM to mean
all hotel-reservation services. JA139.
Finally, respondent introduced evidence of its reputation, marketing, and commercial success to demonstrate
that consumers do not view BOOKING.COM as a generic
name for hotel-reservation services but rather identify it
with respondent’s brand. E.g., JA17-18.
13
3. The district court held that BOOKING.COM is not
generic for hotel-reservation services, and further held
that BOOKING.COM is entitled to registration on the principal register because consumers associate it with respondent specifically. 3
The court first determined that BOOKING.COM is not
generic. Like the TTAB, the court looked to whether “the
primary significance of the mark to the relevant public is
to identify the class of product or the service to which the
mark relates.” Pet.App.60a. Like the TTAB, the court
defined the relevant public as “consumers who use travel,
tour, and hotel reservation services offered via the internet or in person.” Pet.App.63a. The court agreed that “by
itself, the word ‘booking’ is generic,” Pet.App.67a, but
adding “.com” made a difference because a unique domain
name “is generally a descriptive mark.” Pet.App.74a.
Rather than relying on a presumption that domain
names are descriptive, the court examined the evidence
and concluded that consumers would not primarily understand BOOKING.COM to signify all hotel-reservation services. The court emphasized “the absence of evidence that
consumers or producers use the term ‘booking.com’ to describe” booking services generically. Pet.App.85a. The
court found respondent’s survey “persuasive evidence
that the consuming public understands BOOKING.COM to
be a specific brand, not a generic name for online booking
services.” Pet.App.88a.
Because the court determined that BOOKING.COM is
descriptive, the court next considered whether consumers
associate the BOOKING.COM mark with respondent, such
that the mark is sufficiently distinctive to register, i.e., has
3
The court rejected registration of BOOKING.COM for general travel
services. That ruling is not before the Court.
14
secondary meaning. Pet.App.96a. The court found respondent’s evidence “more than sufficient” on this score.
Pet.App.116a.
4. The Fourth Circuit affirmed in a divided opinion.
The government “concede[d] that if BOOKING.COM may
properly be deemed descriptive, the district court’s finding that it has acquired secondary meaning was warranted.” Pet.App.8a. The question on appeal was thus
“whether the district court erred in finding that BOOKING.COM is not generic,” Pet.App.8a, “a question of fact …
to which the district court … is accorded great deference.”
Pet.App.13a.
The Fourth Circuit resolved that question using the
primary-significance test. The court applied that test by
(1) “identify[ing] the class of product or service to which
the use of the mark is relevant,” (2) “identify[ing] the relevant consuming public,” and (3) determining whether the
“primary significance of the mark to the relevant public”
is the general class of product or service. Pet.App.9a-10a
& n.6. Only the third question—“the public’s understanding of what the term BOOKING.COM primarily refers to”—
was disputed. Pet.App.11a.
The Fourth Circuit held that the district court did not
clearly err “in finding that the PTO failed to satisfy its
burden of proving that the relevant public understood
BOOKING.COM, taken as a whole, to refer to general online
hotel reservation services rather than Booking.com the
company.” Pet.App.12a. The court declined to adopt the
district court’s conclusion that a unique domain name
“generally
has
source-identifying
significance.”
Pet.App.20a & n.9. Instead, the court relied on “the
PTO’s lack of evidence demonstrating that the public uses
‘booking.com’ generically.” Pet.App.13a. Further, the
PTO no longer “contest[ed] the validity” of respondent’s
15
Teflon survey showing that consumers do not understand
BOOKING.COM as a generic term for hotel-reservation services. Pet.App.16a. The court stressed the “dearth of evidence” that BOOKING.COM was in common use or commonly understood as generic before respondent took the
name as its brand. Pet.App.17a.
The Fourth Circuit rejected the government’s argument that, under Goodyear, a generic term plus “‘.com’ is
analytically indistinct from ‘company,’” and can never be
a trademark. Pet.App.18a-19a. The court noted that
Goodyear pre-dated the Lanham Act and “crucially, did
not apply the primary significance test.” Pet.App.19a.
The court observed that every other circuit has rejected
the PTO’s per se rule against trademarking generic terms
coupled with “.com.” Pet.App.19a, 22a.
Judge Wynn concurred in part and dissented in part.
He “agree[d] with much of the analysis in the majority
opinion,” including its rejection of the government’s “per
se rule against protecting” Generic.com names.
Pet.App.29a & n.2. He dissented because he believed the
district court’s statement that a domain name “generally
has source-identifying significance” improperly colored
its factfinding. Pet.App.32a.
5. The Fourth Circuit denied rehearing en banc. Pet.
App.225a-26a.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.A. The 1946 Lanham Act prescribes one test only for
whether a mark is generic: whether its “primary significance … to the relevant public” is the category of goods
or services to which the mark applies. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3).
This test asks whether relevant consumers understand
the mark as a whole as the name of a class of goods or
services, based on empirical evidence. While the primary-
16
significance test appears in the Act’s cancellation section,
that test governs initial registration, too.
Since 1946, courts and the PTO have interpreted the
Act as mandating the primary-significance test for registrations and cancellations alike, and for all types of
marks—whether they are single words, combined terms
like WAFFLE HOUSE, or domain names like
WEATHER.COM. Congress codified the primary-significance test in 1984 to preserve that established meaning
and to overrule a single, aberrant Ninth Circuit decision.
B. By making consumer perceptions the key to genericness, the primary-significance test vindicates the Act’s
objectives. The test helps consumers navigate the marketplace by ruling out marks that do not distinguish between competitors while protecting those that do. The
test likewise encourages mark owners to build goodwill
behind particular brands. Conferring trademark protection on domain-name marks is particularly important;
merely owning a domain name provides little protection
against the rampant diversion, confusion, and fraud that
the Internet makes possible.
C. Because the primary-significance test looks to how
consumers perceive a mark as a whole, courts and the
PTO have long considered survey evidence the best evidence of consumers’ beliefs. The government’s objections
to survey evidence are nonsensical and would upend
courts’ and the PTO’s longstanding approach to genericness.
D. The Fourth Circuit followed the primary-significance test to a T and deemed BOOKING.COM non-generic.
The court properly credited the district court’s factual determination that respondent’s survey evidence—which
showed that consumers overwhelmingly do not consider
17
BOOKING.COM the generic name for hotel-reservation services—was more persuasive than the PTO’s evidence.
II. The Lanham Act forecloses the government’s per
se rule that a generic term coupled with “Company,”
“Inc.,” “.com,” or similar suffixes can never be trademarked.
A. The government’s position rests on this Court’s
1888 Goodyear decision, which grouped “Goodyear’s Rubber Manufacturing Company,” “Goodyear Rubber Company,” and “The Goodyear’s Company” with “Cotton
Company” and “Lackawanna coal” and held that none of
these terms could be trademarks. None of those terms,
Goodyear reasoned, would pinpoint the exact maker of
those goods. Any competitor could claim to produce those
same products with equal truth. Adding “Company”
made no difference because any competitor could conceivably claim that corporate designation, too.
The Lanham Act rejected every premise underpinning the government’s per se rule. The Act repudiated the
common-law rule protecting only technical trademarks
that only one maker could truthfully claim, and instead
extended trademark protection to descriptive terms. The
Act tethered trademark protection to consumers’ perceptions of particular marks. The Act did that by mandating
the fact-specific primary-significance test for genericness,
15 U.S.C. § 1064(3), and by tying registration to whether
consumers could or do associate a mark with a particular
brand, id. §§ 1052, 1091(a).
Further, the Act mandated consideration of how consumers view the mark as a whole, thus rejecting any per
se assumption that adding suffixes like “Company,”
“Inc.,” or “.com” to a generic term can never add distinctiveness. This Court has recognized that the Act overrode
18
related per se common-law rules. Nothing suggests that
Goodyear alone survived.
B. The government’s per se rule would threaten with
cancellation hundreds of Generic Company and Generic.com marks that the PTO has registered for decades.
See Appx. A. And the government’s rule has no logical
stopping point. If synonyms for corporate structure
never add significance to a generic term, every “generic”
Association, Partnership, Society, Alliance, Group, or
Foundation mark could be cancelled anytime. If “.com”
adds nothing, neither do “.org,” “.net,” “.biz,” and similar
suffixes. The government has grouped “Store” alongside
“Company” and “.com,” so those “generic” marks—plus
related
“Marts,” “Houses,” “Markets,” “Depots,”
“Guides,” “News”—could be on the chopping block.
Such cancellations would squander billions of dollars
that some of the country’s most famous brands have invested in cultivating consumer goodwill. Such cancellations would also risk massive consumer confusion by eliminating trademark protection for marks consumers depend on to differentiate among competing products, and
would open the floodgates to schemes to defraud and deceive consumers. This Court should reject the government’s per se rule, which has never been the law under the
Lanham Act.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE LANHAM ACT DOES
NERIC.COM TRADEMARKS
NOT
BAR
GE-
The Lanham Act mandates that the primary-significance test governs whether a phrase is generic and cannot
serve as a trademark. That test requires ascertaining,
based on evidence, whether relevant consumers primarily
understand the mark as a whole as the name of a category
19
of goods or services. Sometimes the evidence will establish that a Generic.com mark is generic; sometimes not.
Applying the primary-significance test makes this a
straightforward case. The petition presented solely the
question whether the government’s per se rule applies;
the government never argued that BOOKING.COM is generic under the primary-significance test. And, as the
Fourth Circuit held, the district court did not clearly err
in crediting ample record evidence that consumers do not
perceive BOOKING.COM as a generic term for all online hotel-reservation services.
A. The Act Mandates the Primary-Significance Test To
Assess the Genericness of All Marks, Including Domain Names
Section 1064(3) states that “the primary significance”
of the mark “to the relevant public … shall be the test” for
genericness. This fact-based test applies both to initial
registration determinations and to cancellation, and to all
types of marks. Nothing in the Act permits a different
rule for domain names.
1. Statutory interpretation “begins with the statutory
text,” Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Def., 138 S. Ct. 617,
631 (2018), and the text resolves this case. Section 1064(3)
provides: “The primary significance of the registered
mark to the relevant public rather than purchaser motivation shall be the test for determining whether the registered mark has become the generic name of goods or
services on or in connection with which it has been used.”
15 U.S.C. § 1064(3).
Section 1064(3) appears in the provision governing
cancellation, but the same test for genericness necessarily
controls initial registration determinations regarding
whether a mark is generic in the first place. Section
20
1064(3) authorizes cancellation of generic marks any time
after registration if the mark “has become the generic
name” for a class of products, including if the mark was
generic at the time of initial registration. It would make
no sense for the Act to embrace a different, unstated test
prohibiting initial registration of generic names, yet to
provide for immediate cancellation of generic marks that
fail the primary-significance test. Indeed, while the government (at 37-38) suggests the tests might differ, it concludes (at 43) that the primary-significance test governs
the “usual” genericness inquiry for initial registration,
without attempting to reconcile this discrepancy.
“[T]here is no reason not to apply [section 1064(3)’s
test for genericness] with equal force to the initial attempt
to register an allegedly generic term.” McCarthy, supra,
§ 12:57. We know of no case suggesting that the test for
initial registration and cancellation could differ. Courts
and the PTO consistently interpret section 1064(3) as
mandating application of the primary-significance test in
the registration context.
E.g., BellSouth Corp. v.
DataNational Corp., 60 F.3d 1565, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1995);
Examiner’s Manual § 1209.01(c)(i); In re ActiveVideo Networks, Inc., 111 U.S.P.Q.2d 1581, 1600 (T.T.A.B. 2014).
More broadly, every circuit to consider the issue has concluded that “there is only one legal standard for genericness … whether the public understands the mark, as a
whole, to refer to” the “genus of goods or services at issue.” Princeton Vanguard, LLC v. Frito-Lay N. Am.,
Inc., 786 F.3d 960, 966 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 4
4
Accord Pet.App.9a-10a & n.6 (collecting cases); McCarthy, supra,
§ 12:4 (“the key issue in determining genericness” is “what does the
public think the word connotes—the generic name of the product or
a mark indicating merely one source of that product?”).
21
Finally, in determining “[t]he primary significance of
the registered mark to the relevant public,” the Act requires consideration of the mark as a whole. A “mark”
includes “any trademark,” e.g., “any word … or any combination” of words that “identify and distinguish” one
maker’s products from others’. 15 U.S.C. § 1127. Because
combined words can mean something different from each
word in isolation, the Act mandates assessing the mark in
its entirety. Dissecting the mark into its constituent subparts is improper. McCarthy, supra, § 11:27; Examiner’s
Manual §§ 1209.01(c)(1), 1209.03(m).
2. By making the test for genericness “[t]he primary
significance of the registered mark to the relevant public,”
the Lanham Act in 1984 codified the primary-significance
test that courts had applied since the Act’s inception to
determine genericness. See Skilling v. United States, 561
U.S. 358, 404 (2010) (courts “look to the doctrine developed” prior to the amendment “to ascertain the meaning
of the phrase” in question); accord Comm’r v. Keystone
Consol. Indus., 508 U.S. 152, 159 (1993).
Until 1982, courts and the PTO consistently interpreted the test for genericness under the Act as whether
consumers primarily perceived the mark as a whole as the
name of the class of goods or services. E.g., S. Rep. 98627, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1984) (primary-significance
test has “generally been the controlling test used by the
courts to determine genericism”). If consumers instead
primarily believed that the mark could serve as a means
of distinguishing between brands, the mark was descriptive. Courts and the PTO applied this same test to both
initial registrations and cancellation. 5
5
E.g., Maremont Corp. v. Air Lift Co., 463 F.2d 1114, 1118 (C.C.P.A.
22
That approach makes sense in light of the Act’s fundamental changes to the common law. Recall that descriptive terms were unprotected under trademark common
law, but received some protection under unfair-competition law. Supra p. 5. The seminal pre-Lanham Act case
of Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938),
articulated the primary-significance test in the unfaircompetition context to explain when unfair-competition
law protected descriptive terms. Id. at 116. In Kellogg,
Nabisco had argued that Kellogg’s use of the term
“Shredded Wheat” unfairly seized the goodwill Nabisco
had built behind its similarly named product. Id. at 120.
In rejecting Nabisco’s claim, the Court explained that
Nabisco had failed to “show that the primary significance
of the term [Shredded Wheat] in the minds of the consuming public is not the product but the producer.” Id. at 118
(emphasis added). Accordingly, when the Lanham Act extended trademark protection to descriptive terms but not
generic terms, courts and the PTO relied on Kellogg’s primary-significance test to distinguish between those two
categories. 6
1972) (initial registration); Telechron, Inc. v. Telicon Corp., 198 F.2d
903, 907 (3d Cir. 1952) (trademark infringement); Q-Tips, Inc. v.
Johnson & Johnson, 108 F. Supp. 845, 863 (D.N.J. 1952) (cancellation), aff’d, 206 F.2d 144 (3d Cir. 1953); Schulmerich Elecs., Inc. v.
J.C. Deagan, Inc., 202 F.2d 772, 778 (C.C.P.A. 1953) (initial registration); Helene Curtis Indus. v. Church & Dwight Co., 560 F.2d 1325,
1332 & n.5 (7th Cir. 1977) (trademark infringement); accord McCarthy, supra, § 12:6 (collecting cases).
E.g., Surgicenters of Am., Inc. v. Med. Dental Surgeries, Co., 601
F.2d 1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 1979); Roselux Chem. Co. v. Parsons Ammonia Co., 299 F.2d 855, 863 (C.C.P.A. 1962); Schulmerich Elecs., 202
F.2d at 777-78; McCarthy, supra, § 12:6 (Kellogg “stated the rule” for
“whether a term is a generic name or is a mark”). Some courts looked
6
23
Congress in 1984 codified the primary-significance
test for genericness because, in 1982, the Ninth Circuit
departed from the primary-significance test to cancel
Parker Brothers’ registration of MONOPOLY. See AntiMonopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., 684 F.2d 1316,
1323-26 (9th Cir. 1982). Section 1064(3) legislatively overruled that decision, mandating the primary-significance
test for genericness and rejecting “the purchaser-motivation test” the Ninth Circuit had applied. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1064(3), 1127; see S. Rep. 98-627 at 1 (amendment “confirms that the established test for genericism is whether
the primary significance of the mark to consumers … is to
identify a product or service which emanates from a particular source … or whether the mark merely functions as
a common descriptive name”). The 1984 amendment thus
“restore[d] the traditional test of genericness” that courts
had long applied. McCarthy, supra, § 5:8. 7
3. Section 1064(3) makes the primary-significance test
the test for genericness in all contexts and for all marks,
further back to Judge Learned Hand’s decision in Bayer Co. v.
United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921), which similarly stated
that “[t]he single question” in determining whether generic and descriptive names receive protection against unfair competition is
“What do the buyers understand by the word for whose use the parties are contending?” Id. at 509; see McCarthy, supra, § 12:4.
7
Neither Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F.3d 137,
144-45 (2d Cir. 1997), nor A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d
291 (3d Cir. 1986), challenges the applicability of the primary-significance test in all contexts. Contra U.S. Br. 38. Genesee calls the primary-significance test “the law of the land” and notes its “codifi[cation] … [in] 15 U.S.C. § 1064.” 124 F.3d at 144; accord Canfield, 808
F.2d at 299-300 (similar). Those cases refine the primary-significance
test in the inapposite situation involving how to define the class of
goods and services at issue.
24
and carves out no domain-name exception. When Congress enacts a clear, categorical rule, courts do not provide “[a]textual judicial supplementation.” Rotkiske v.
Klemm, 140 S. Ct. 355, 360-61 (2019). Thus, under the primary-significance test, whether a domain name composed
of a purportedly generic term (“booking”) and a suffix
(“.com”) is generic depends on whether relevant consumers consider the mark as a whole the name of a class of
goods or services. Pet.App.9a-10, 12a, 22a; see Advertise.com, Inc. v. AOL Advert., Inc., 616 F.3d 974, 977-78,
982 (9th Cir. 2010); In re Hotels.com, 573 F.3d at 1302-03;
Examiner’s Manual §§ 1209.01(c)(i), 1215.05.
B. Applying the Primary-Significance Test to All Types of
Marks Furthers the Act’s Aims
1. The primary-significance test advances the Lanham Act’s objectives of protecting consumers and rewarding trademark owners for building goodwill behind their
brands. E.g., Park ’N Fly, 469 U.S. at 198. Tying the
question of whether a mark is generic to whether consumers perceive it as the name for the category of goods or
services prevents enterprises from claiming a name that
effectively occupies the field of their product (e.g., “orange” for the eponymous fruit). The primary-significance
test also fosters competition and rewards investments in
building brand recognition by encouraging enterprises to
use marks that consumers consider meaningful in differentiating among brands.
By definition, the primary-significance test produces
different outcomes for similar names. BEDANDBREAKFAST.COM met the test, but Hotels.com failed. In re Hotels.com, 573 F.3d at 1303-06. The PTO found that
LAW.COM, 1800LAWYERS.COM, LAWYERSHOP, and LAW
FACTORY satisfied the test, but not Lawyers.com. In re
Reed Elsevier Props., Inc., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d 1649 (T.T.A.B.
25
2005). Different sets of consumers perceive different
words in different ways, and different litigants marshal
different evidence. Unsurprisingly, different factual records produce different results.
Determining case by case whether relevant consumers consider a mark as the generic name for a class of
goods or services winnows out marks that lack any sourceidentifying function without indiscriminately rejecting
marks that help consumers navigate the marketplace.
And, far from opening the floodgates to improper trademarks, the primary-significance test is just the first hurdle for marks to clear to receive the full panoply of Lanham Act protections. A mark can pass the primary-significance test and avoid rejection on genericness grounds,
but the applicant must still show secondary meaning—
that consumers associate the mark with a single source—
to obtain registration on the principal register. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052(f); supra p. 6.
The primary-significance test makes particular sense
for domain names, where the price of denying trademark
protection is steep. While only one entity can hold a domain name at a time, the Internet has created new avenues for confusion, diversion, dilution, and fraud. Congress recognized trademarks’ particular vulnerability to
infringing domain names by amending the Lanham Act
with the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1125(d). Section 1125(d) protects trademarks by
imposing civil liability against anyone who “in bad faith …
registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name … confusingly similar to that mark,” and authorizes forfeiture, cancellation, or transfer of the infringing domain name.
Domain-name trademarks are readily susceptible to
Internet-based fraud and confusion. Merely purchasing
the exclusive right to use a domain name does not prevent
26
“spoofing,” i.e., “[t]he creation of a website that has … a
similar URL, in order to mislead visitors about who created the website.” Spoofing, Black’s Law Dictionary
(11th ed. 2019). Nor does domain-name ownership protect
against typosquatting, i.e., registering “domain names
that are close misspellings of a frequently used domain
name in order to catch and exploit traffic intended for the
other website.” Typosquatting, Black’s Law Dictionary,
supra. Infringers could replace an “o” in Booking.com
with a “0”—“B0oking.com”—to fool unsuspecting customers, or register the typo “Bookng.com,” and respondent’s control of Booking.com would be no help. Only if respondent held a trademark in BOOKING.COM would the
Lanham Act afford injunctive and monetary relief against
such deceptive schemes. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d).
Trademark protection is also essential to prevent
brick-and-mortar entities from trading on a domain-name
mark holder’s goodwill. Respondent needs those protections to prevent competitors from opening storefront
Booking.com travel agencies, or from diluting its brand by
selling Booking.com-themed travel products in airport
shops. The government (at 30) is thus wrong that the only
point of protecting domain-name trademarks is to “impede rivals from using similar terms.”
2. The government (at 32-33) suggests that domainname trademarks deserve second-class status because domain names function as unique addresses and an entity’s
exclusive right to those addresses already confers “substantial competitive advantage[s].” That argument would
undercut trademark protection for all 10,000 registered
domain-name marks, not just Generic.com names. And
the Act forbids the government from injecting policy ar-
27
guments into registration decisions: Congress commanded that “[n]o trademark … shall be refused registration” if it is distinctive. 15 U.S.C. § 1052.
The government’s argument would also extend to 1800 and 1-888 marks. Like domain names, consumers
type in phone-number marks to connect to the relevant
business. Like domain names, only one entity can hold
rights to a phone number at a time. Yet the government
has registered 1-800-FLOWERS, 1800CONTACTS, and
many others. Appx. A, 13a-16a. 8
Moreover, the advantages of domain names as addresses are diminishing. Domain-name marks continue to
identify brands, but consumers no longer just type in
those names to the Internet to access goods or services.
Consumers increasingly depend on apps or search results.
Lindsay Gellman, How Search Engines Are Killing
Clever URLs, The Atlantic (Dec. 15, 2016), https://tinyurl.com/uqhkcne; see JA144.
Nor does protecting Generic Company, Generic Inc.,
or Generic.com trademarks stymie competitors’ marketing and sales of competing versions of the same products.
Contra U.S. Br. 26-27. TRAVEL.COM (registered for making hotel and flight reservations) has not thwarted TRAVELOCITY.COM or TRAVELO.COM, let alone DIRECT TRAVEL,
8
Amicus Electronic Frontier Foundation (at 13-16) contends that
because consumers can use “.com” marks as addresses to enter a
website, they violate the doctrine that trademark law does not protect
functional features. But that doctrine focuses on prohibiting the use
of trademark law to protect functional elements of product design and
other trade dress. E.g., TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc.,
532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001). EFF’s argument would stretch the functionality doctrine past its breaking point and invalidate all domain-name
marks, as well as all 1-800 marks (which consumers can dial to buy
goods or services) or street address marks.
28
TRAVEL AND TRANSPORT, TRAVEL EDGE, or FLIGHT CENTRE,
or online competitors like ORBITZ.COM,
FLIGHTS.COM, and EXPEDIA.COM.
Consumers pick
among these brands without defaulting to the many Generic.com names in the travel arena. Meanwhile, CANINE
REVIEW and CANINE JOURNAL compete for dog-loving
subscribers, and ALZHEIMER’S FOUNDATION, ALZHEIMER’S SOCIETY, and ALZHEIMER’S ASSOCIATION all
fight the same disease.
Protecting Generic.com marks also does not deter
competitors from using similar domain names, lest they
face infringement suits.
Contra U.S. Br. 27-30.
WEATHER.COM and ACCUWEATHER.COM coexist, while
TENNIS.COM and PLAYTENNIS.COM share the same turf.
LAW.COM,
LAWLINE.COM, LAWPATHS.COM, LAWCASH.COM, and SCHOOLLAW.COM offer legal news and information. RENT.COM has not crowded out 123RENT.COM,
RENTUSANOW.COM, or FORRENT.COM. Nor has TICKETS.COM prevented TICKETMASTER.COM, CHEAPTICKTOTALTICKETS.COM,
TICKETSTUB.COM,
ETS.COM,
TICKETZOOM.COM, or TICKETENTERTAINMENT.COM from
offering similar services. Competitors realize the difficulties that holders of descriptive marks face in prevailing in
infringement suits, Pet.App.24a, or are confident that
their registrations would survive. Either way, competitors have registered variants on purportedly generic
marks in droves, apparently without incident. Respondent’s reference to EBOOKING.COM as a “potentially” infringing mark before the PTO examiner, JA192, is consistent with this point. Contrary to the government’s contention (at 28), respondent has no objection to EBOOKING.COM as a mark, or to its registration. The statement
before the examiner signified only that, if consumers confused BOOKING.COM and EBOOKING.COM, EBOOKING.COM—as the mark that came into existence later—
29
could infringe BOOKING.COM, not the other way around.
Accordingly, EBOOKING.COM was not persuasive evidence
that “BOOKING.COM” was in common usage. JA192. 9
If the consequences of protecting purportedly generic
marks were so dire, one would expect the PTO to stop registering such marks after the government petitioned for
certiorari on July 5, 2019. But see, e.g., CEREALS &
GRAINS ASSOCIATION; PARKINSON’S FOUNDATION; READERS.COM; RENTALS.COM; TAILOR HOUSE; THE DRIVEWAY
COMPANY; THE LASH FIRM; THE PREGNANCY COMPANY. Or after this Court granted certiorari on November 8, 2019. But see, e.g., AUTO BOUTIQUE; CARPET EXCHANGE; CONCERT.COM; MILITARY PARTS EXCHANGE;
OPERA NEWS; ROOMMATES.COM; WEDDING DIGEST. Or
at least after the government filed its opening brief on
January 6, 2020. But see, e.g., CANINE REVIEW; COOK’S
EMPORIUM; FRAGRANCE OUTLET. And if Generic.com
marks stifled competition, one would anticipate some outcry (or evidence) from the 85 jurisdictions, including the
European Union and United Kingdom, that registered
BOOKING.COM. JA140-42. The government points to
nothing of the sort.
The government (at 26-27) cites the statement in Advertise.com that
protecting a Generic.com mark “would potentially reach almost any
use of the generic term in a domain name.” 616 F.3d at 981. But the
court still concluded that Generic.com names could be marks. Id.
And the PTO’s registration of many overlapping domain names suggests the absence of any chilling effect. Retail Services, Inc. v. Freebies Publishing (U.S. Br. 27) merely cited numerous domain names
incorporating “freebies” to show that consumers perceive “freebies”
to mean giveaways in general. 364 F.3d 535, 545-46 (4th Cir. 2004).
9
30
C. The Primary-Significance Inquiry Properly Considers
Survey Evidence
1. Because the primary-significance test looks to
whether consumers believe a mark as a whole signifies the
name of a class of goods or services, the test demands that
courts assess what consumers actually think. Courts and
the PTO agree that whether any mark—domain name or
not—is generic is a factual question. McCarthy, supra,
§ 12:12 & n.1; Examiner’s Manual § 1209.01(c)(i). And, because the point is to figure out what impression a given
mark makes on consumers of the goods or services, courts
and the PTO rely on a variety of probative evidence. Such
evidence includes how the applicant uses the mark; how
competitors use it; dictionary definitions of terms comprising the mark; media usage; and testimony from those
in the industry. McCarthy, supra, § 12:13; Am. Univ. v.
Am. Univ. of Kuwait, Cancellation No. 92049706, slip op.
at 31 (T.T.A.B. Jan. 30, 2020).
Above all, survey evidence often plays a starring evidentiary role. “Consumers surveys have become almost
de rigueur in litigation over genericness.” McCarthy, supra, § 12:14; Princeton Vanguard, 786 F.3d at 965
(“[C]onsumer surveys may be a preferred method of proving genericness.”); Berner Int’l Corp. v. Mars Sales Co.,
987 F.2d 975, 982-83 (3d Cir. 1993) (“consumer surveys
[are] … preferable to indirect forms of evidence”). The
“most judicially accepted format for testing for genericness” is the Teflon survey, which teaches survey respondents the difference between generic terms and brands,
then asks respondents to identify terms as generic or as
likely brands. McCarthy, supra, § 12:16.
Courts and the PTO thus recognize that consumer
surveys—especially Teflon surveys—may tip the scales
when determining genericness. The Ninth Circuit held
31
that, although Advertising.com seemed generic on the
limited record before it, further evidence could change the
outcome: “[C]onsumer surveys or other evidence might
ultimately demonstrate that [the domain mark] is valid
and protectable.” Advertise.com, 616 F.3d at 982. Similarly, the PTO examiner twice refused to register WAFFLE HOUSE on genericness grounds, relying largely on
dictionary definitions of “waffle” and “house.” But the
PTO reversed course after reviewing additional evidence,
including a Teflon survey showing 92% brand recognition,
and registered WAFFLE HOUSE on the principal register.
(Reg. No. 2,965,520). Respondent’s Teflon survey is thus
exactly the type of evidence courts and the PTO have relied on when applying the primary-significance test.
2. The government (at 40-41) contends that courts
should never consider “evidence of consumer understanding”—especially survey evidence—when assessing genericness. That contention largely rests on the government’s
mistaken per se rule classifying all Generic.com names as
inherently generic, no matter how consumers perceive the
mark. Infra pp. 35-36.
The government (at 36, 41) also cites Abercrombie &
Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir.
1976), for the proposition that no amount of evidence of
consumer perceptions can make generic terms non-generic. But the Abercrombie line of cases involves whether
a mark that has already become generic can be resurrected with evidence of secondary meaning, i.e., a secondary association with a brand in consumers’ eyes. Abercrombie said no, reasoning that no producer should be
32
able to remove a generic term from the linguistic commons once the public primarily understands it as the common name for a whole class of goods or services. Id. at 9. 10
Abercrombie assumes away the dispute here, which is
whether a Generic.com name is generic in the first place.
Whether a generic term can move back to descriptive status is irrelevant in this case. The Fourth Circuit agreed:
“Once a term is deemed generic, it cannot subsequently
become non-generic.” Pet.App.10a. But no judicial decision previously deemed BOOKING.COM generic. Nor, as
the district court found, was BOOKING.COM commonly
used or understood as a generic term before respondent
Most of the government’s cases (at 41-43) similarly hold that consumer perceptions cannot salvage phrases that were generic before
specific enterprises used them. See Hunt Masters, Inc. v. Landry’s
Seafood Rest., Inc., 240 F.3d 251, 254-55 & n.1 (4th Cir. 2001) (“crab
house” was generic because term “was commonly used prior to its association” with plaintiff’s restaurant); Schwan’s IP, LLC v. Kraft
Pizza Co., 460 F.3d 971, 976 (8th Cir. 2006) (“brick-oven” was in common use before applicant’s trademark); Harley-Davidson, Inc. v.
Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806, 810-11 (2d Cir. 1999) (“hog” was common
slang for motorcycle before applicant used term); In re Analog Devices, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1879, 1879 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (similar for
“analog devices”); In re Northland Aluminum Prods., 777 F.2d 1556,
1559-60 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (similar for “bundt”); Miller Brewing Co. v.
Falstaff Brewing Corp., 655 F.2d 5, 7-8 & n.2 (1st Cir. 1981) (prior
holding that plaintiff’s “LITE” beer trademark was generic made evidence of consumer perceptions irrelevant); Miller Brewing Co. v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 605 F.2d 990, 995 (7th Cir. 1979) (similar
for “LITE” beer); Weiss Noodle Co. v. Golden Cracknel & Specialty
Co., 290 F.2d 845, 848 (C.C.P.A. 1961) (same for “egg noodles”). Others simply observe that evidence of secondary meaning does not render a generic term protectable. Royal Crown Co. v. The Coca-Cola
Co., 892 F.3d 1358, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Tech. Publ’g Co. v. LebharFriedman, Inc., 729 F.2d 1136, 1139 (7th Cir. 1984); Canfield, 808
F.2d at 297.
10
33
popularized it. Pet.App.10a-11a, 16a-17a. The government (at 44) disagrees, citing longer domain names containing “booking.com.” But the district court’s factfinding
deserves deference, and the government’s factbound argument departs from the question presented.
The government (at 40) argues that consumers may
inherently consider “.com” names more distinctive, skewing survey results. That objection is another broadside
against all domain-name marks. Regardless, the government abandoned all objections to the validity of respondent’s survey, Pet.App.16a, and its speculation is groundless. As the district court found, respondent’s Teflon survey showed that consumers differentiate among domain
names by testing BOOKING.COM against Washingmachine.com. JA54. Whereas 74.8% of survey respondents
identified BOOKING.COM as a brand, Washingmachine.com connoted a brand to just 30%. JA53.
The government’s concessions about how “useful” survey evidence is “in a variety of contexts” underscore the
incongruity of its position. The government (at 42-43)
agrees that Teflon surveys can show whether a descriptive term has acquired secondary meaning. The government (at 43) concurs that Teflon surveys can show
whether fanciful “coined” marks (like “Teflon” itself) have
“become generic through widespread use.” The government then concedes (at 43) that courts usually assess genericness by looking to “whether consumers understand”
a mark “as the common name of a class of products or services.” Given the government’s acknowledgments of the
importance consumer perceptions play in resolving virtually every other trademark-eligibility question, evidence
of consumer perceptions (including surveys) should play
an equally prominent role in determining genericness.
34
D. BOOKING.COM Is Descriptive, Not Generic, Under the
Primary-Significance Test
Whether the courts below correctly applied the primary-significance test is not before this Court. The petition presented only the question whether the government’s proposed per se rule renders BOOKING.COM generic. The government (at 43-44) obliquely asserts that
consumers would understand BOOKING.COM to refer only
to a class of services, but offers no reason why.
Regardless, the Fourth Circuit correctly followed the
Lanham Act’s primary-significance test for genericness.
The court explained that whether BOOKING.COM is generic depends on whether relevant consumers primarily
consider the mark as a whole as the name of a class of
goods or services. Pet.App.9a-12a & n.6; id. 22a. Here,
the PTO did not meet its burden to show genericness. The
Fourth Circuit properly deferred to the district court’s
finding that respondent’s Teflon survey showing that
74.8% of consumers do not perceive BOOKING.COM as generic was more compelling than the PTO’s competing evidence. Pet.App.13a-18a, 25a; JA53. Courts agree that
“majority usage controls,” so the survey establishes that
BOOKING.COM is descriptive. McCarthy, supra, § 12:6.
The PTO has waived any objection to the survey’s validity
or methodology. Pet.App.16a. And the PTO conceded
that if BOOKING.COM is not generic, it is entitled to registration as a descriptive term that has acquired distinctiveness (or secondary meaning). Pet.App.12a.
II. GOODYEAR DOES NOT COMPEL A CONTRARY
RESULT
The government contends that, under this Court’s
1888 Goodyear decision, a generic term coupled with a
corporate designation like “Company,” or by extension
35
“.com,” can never create a trademark. Adding such a suffix, or synonyms like “Inc.,” “Store,” “House,” etc., purportedly does nothing to differentiate a producer’s goods
or services from competitors’. But the Lanham Act rejected the government’s premises, and mandates the primary-significance test for genericness across the board.
The government (at 22) is wrong that respondent “has
never suggested that the core holding of Goodyear no
longer applies,” nor has respondent conceded that “Booking Company” or “Booking Inc.” cannot be trademarks.
See Br. in Opp. 11-13; Resp. CA4 Br. 31-32. Adopting the
government’s atextual per se rule would unleash a trademark apocalypse, stripping hundreds of registered marks
of protection and creating massive consumer confusion.
A.
The Lanham Act Repudiated the Government’s Per
Se Rule
1. Goodyear is a classic exemplar of the pre-Lanham
Act common law of trademarks, where trademark protection was narrow and judges distinguished between protected and unprotected names without regard to consumer perceptions. In Goodyear, the Goodyear Rubber
Company sought to prevent Goodyear’s India Rubber
Glove Manufacturing Company and others from using
“Goodyear’s Rubber Manufacturing Company,” “Goodyear Rubber Company,” “The Goodyear’s Company,” or
similar names. 128 U.S. at 600-01.
The Court concluded that neither party could claim a
trademark: “[T]he name of ‘Goodyear Rubber Company’
is not one capable of exclusive appropriation” because
“‘Goodyear Rubber’ are terms descriptive of well-known
classes of goods produced by the process known as ‘Goodyear’s Invention’” (the common method for vulcanizing
rubber). Id. at 602 (emphasis added). The common law
was that “[n]ames which are thus descriptive of a class of
36
goods cannot be exclusively appropriated by any one.” Id.
(emphasis added). Adding “the word ‘Company’” did not
make the ensuing phrase “Goodyear’s Rubber Company”
a trademark, because “‘Company’ … only indicates that
parties have formed an association or partnership to deal
in such goods.” Id.
Goodyear’s holding that the descriptive words “Goodyear’s Rubber,” “Goodyear Rubber Company,” and “The
Goodyear’s Company” could not be trademarks encapsulated nineteenth-century common-law rules. The law
then protected only technical trademarks designating
“the manufacturer who has adopted” the name. Francis
H. Upton, A Treatise on the Law of Trade Marks 98
(1860). Significantly, Goodyear relied on the Court’s decision in Del. & Hudson Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 311 (1871), for the dispositive legal rule: “‘[T]he
trade-mark must … point distinctively to the origin or
ownership of the article to which it is applied,’” so “a generic name, or a name merely descriptive of an article of
trade, of its qualities, ingredients, or characteristics, [cannot] be employed as a trade-mark.” 128 U.S. at 603-04
(quoting Canal Co., 80 U.S. at 323). The nineteenth-century rule was thus that “no sign or form of words can be
appropriated as a valid trademark which … others may
employ with equal truth and with equal right for the same
purpose.” Elgin, 179 U.S. at 673; Hesseltine, supra, at 3132. Or, as the government observes, Goodyear rests on
“the equal right of others engaged in similar business to
use similar designations,” U.S. Br. 19 (quoting Goodyear,
128 U.S. at 603); see id. at 28.
Goodyear thus rejected trademark protection for any
descriptive names (like “Goodyear’s Rubber”) because
such names might also describe other competitors’ prod-
37
ucts. See 128 U.S. at 602-03. Likewise, under this antiquated rule, adding corporate designations like “Company” did nothing to isolate a single producer; multiple
producers might truthfully claim to be a company. See id.
Goodyear accordingly analogized “Goodyear Rubber
Company” to “‘Wine Company,’ ‘Cotton Company,’ or
‘Grain Company,’” as well as descriptive geographical
names like “Lackawanna coal” or “Pennsylvania wheat.”
Id. Even though some of these names might be generic
and some descriptive in modern-day parlance, they were
all infirm at common law. Competitors could conceivably
claim any of those names to describe their products with
equal truth. Id. at 602-04.
Goodyear tracked similar common-law prohibitions on
trademarking proper names. Harry D. Nims, The Law of
Unfair Competition & Trade-Marks § 206 (2d ed. 1917).
The Court’s pre-Lanham Act cases expressed skepticism
about trademarking colors on the same basis. Qualitex,
514 U.S. at 170-71 (surveying cases). That is why, like
Goodyear itself, common-law treatises treated generic
and descriptive terms interchangeably. E.g., James Love
Hopkins, The Law of Trademarks, Tradenames and Unfair Competition § 46 (4th ed. 1924) (“generic term[s]”
mean words “too general and comprehensive in [their]
meaning” for one producer to claim, including “geographical names, proper names, and descriptive words”); William Henry Browne, A Treatise on the Law of TradeMarks § 134, at 146 (2d ed. 1885).
Pre-Lanham Act cases and treatises accordingly understood Goodyear as barring trademark protection for
all descriptive terms. 11 This Court said so, repeatedly.
E.g., Hesseltine, supra, at 207-08; Amasa C. Paul, The Law of
Trademarks & Unfair Competition § 60 n.1 (1903).
11
38
The Court in 1893 cited Goodyear as one of many cases
“establish[ing] … [t]hat if the … mark … was adopted …
for the purpose of identifying [the product’s] class, grade,
style, or quality, or for any purpose other than a reference
to or indication of its ownership, it cannot be sustained as
a valid trade-mark.” Columbia Mill Co. v. Alcorn, 150
U.S. 460, 463-64 (1893); see Corbin v. Gould, 133 U.S. 308,
314 (1890) (Goodyear exemplifies rule protecting only
technical trademarks); Lawrence Mfg. Co. v. Tenn. Mfg.
Co., 138 U.S. 537, 547 (1891) (same). Similarly, Howe
Scale Co. v. Wyckoff, Seamans & Benedict, 198 U.S. 118
(1905), “cit[ed] Goodyear with approval,” U.S. Br. 19—
again to illustrate that “such descriptive names” as
“Goodyear Rubber” could not be trademarks. Howe, 198
U.S. at 137. And this Court in 1920 cited Goodyear for the
“settled” rule that “the law would not secure to any person
the exclusive use of a trade-mark consisting merely of
words descriptive of the qualities, ingredients, or characteristics of an article of trade.” Estate of P.D. Beckwith,
Inc. v. Comm’r of Patents, 252 U.S. 538, 543-44 (1920).
In sum, Goodyear does not say that a generic name for
a class of goods or services, coupled with “Company” or
“Inc.,” cannot be a trademark because the combined
phrase remains generic. Goodyear recites a different and
more sweeping rule that descriptive terms can never be
trademarked. As such, adding another descriptive word
like “Company” or “Inc.” still results in a descriptive mark
that cannot pinpoint a product’s manufacturer or source
the way the common law required. That is why the Court
held that “Goodyear Rubber Company”—a descriptive
name in modern parlance—could not be trademarked.
The government cannot claim the mantle of a purportedly
unbroken 130-year history when its position revamps
Goodyear into an ahistorical rule.
39
2. The Lanham Act overrode every premise animating
Goodyear. Unlike at common law, the Act allows registration of descriptive terms. Supra p. 6; Qualitex, 514
U.S. at 171; Br. for U.S. at 8-9, Qualitex, 514 U.S. 159 (No.
93-1577); Park ’N Fly, 469 U.S. at 193-94. Whether a
trademark could theoretically describe competitors’ products is no longer controlling. The touchstone now is
whether the name “distinguishe[s]” the applicant’s goods
“from the goods of others.” 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (defining
trademarks eligible for principal register); see id.
§ 1091(a) (marks must be “capable of distinguishing applicant’s goods or services” for supplemental registration);
Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 171. Likewise, the Act makes consumer perceptions dispositive to the primary-significance
test for genericness. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3); supra pp. 19-24.
The Act thus repudiates Goodyear and its ilk, which
treated consumer perceptions as irrelevant to whether
the “words … in and of themselves indicate anything in
the nature of origin, manufacture, or ownership.” See Elgin, 179 U.S. at 673; U.S. Br. 38-40.
Further, the Act rejects any per se rule that adding
“Company,” “.com,” or other suffixes can never add further meaning. That notion rested on the discarded common-law rule that no one can trademark names that could
equally describe competitors. Because adding “Company” just “indicates that parties ha[d] formed an association or partnership,” Goodyear, 128 U.S. at 602, adding
“Company” to a generic (or even descriptive) term could
never produce a name that innately referred to the product’s origin, manufacture, or ownership, so courts had no
need to consider the mark as a whole. But the Act requires courts and the PTO to look at the combined effect
of the “mark,” by defining a mark to include any “combination” of words. 15 U.S.C. § 1127; supra p. 21. Courts
40
can no longer look at words in isolation, deem them linguistic filler, and disregard whether relevant consumers
might perceive the mark as a whole differently.
The primary-significance test is incompatible with
Goodyear. The proof is in the pudding: if Goodyear survived the Lanham Act, presumably its core holding—that
terms like “Goodyear” could not be trademarked—endured. In the government’s view (at 41), once this Court
deemed “Goodyear” variants generic, no amount of ensuing consumer recognition should have created a valid
trademark. Yet the PTO has registered multiple GOODYEAR trademarks for decades. If Goodyear categorically
bars “Cotton Company,” why register COTTON EMPORIUM and COTTON COLLECTION? If Goodyear forever
tanked “Wine Company,” why not MARGARITA COMPANY?
And the government’s portrayal (at 4) of Crab House as
generic as a matter of law, despite its previous registration of THE CRAB PLACE, is fishy in every respect.
3. The government (at 21) suggests that the Lanham
Act preserved Goodyear because its “purpose … was to
codify and unify the common law of unfair competition and
trademark protection” (quoting Inwood Labs. v. Ives
Labs., 456 U.S. 844, 861 n.2 (1982) (White, J., concurring
in the result)). But the Act achieved that synthesis by rejecting major premises of the common law of trademarks
to create a more protective body of federal trademark law.
Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 171; Park ’N Fly, 469 U.S. at 193.
The government (at 21) states that this Court “has neither overruled Goodyear nor suggested that it has been
superseded by later statutory enactments.” But this
Court has recognized that the Lanham Act superseded related per se rules. Qualitex thus rejected the common-law
rule against trademarking colors, notwithstanding “many
older cases—including Supreme Court cases—in support
41
of” that rule. 514 U.S. at 170. The Court explained that
those cases “interpreted trademark law as it existed before 1946” and did not reflect the Act’s dramatic expansion
of trademark protection beyond common-law technical
trademarks. Id.; see Br. for U.S. at 21-22, Qualitex, 514
U.S. 159 (No. 93-1577) (“[T]he Act superseded prior common law doctrines,” including this Court’s precedent
“predat[ing] the Lanham Act by 40 years.”). Likewise, no
one thinks that the common-law prohibition on trademarking proper names survived the Lanham Act—hence
YO-YO MA, ADELE, and MADONNA are marks. It is hard
to fathom how Goodyear alone survived this sea change.
The government’s citations hardly substantiate a supposedly entrenched 130-year-old rule. The government
invokes one Eleventh Circuit decision, a treatise, and a
TTAB decision purportedly “appl[ying] Goodyear.” U.S.
Br. 21-22. This Court in Qualitex dismissed similar modern precedents, explaining that “the Lanham Act’s
changes left the courts free to reevaluate the preexisting
legal precedent,” including pre-Lanham Act Supreme
Court opinions. 514 U.S. at 173. The government’s authorities are weak regardless. Welding Services, Inc. v.
Forman, 509 F.3d 1351 (11th Cir. 2007), never mentions
Goodyear. That case relied on a TTAB decision and treatise for the footnoted assertion that adding “Inc.” to a
name “does not make generic words protectable.” Id. at
1359 n.4.
The government cites Professor McCarthy, who
states that adding “Company,” “Inc.,” or “Partners” to “a
generic name” cannot create a trademark but grounds
that rule in modern TTAB decisions. McCarthy § 12:39.
McCarthy characterizes Goodyear as holding that “adding designations such as ‘Company,’ ‘Corp.,’ or ‘Inc.’ does
not add any trademark significance to a designation which
42
does not otherwise qualify as a trademark.” Id. That
comports with his observation that Goodyear is “not
clear” whether “Goodyear Rubber” is generic or descriptive in modern parlance, id. § 12:32; he adds that Goodyear may rest on the obsolete common-law rule against
protecting descriptive terms, id. Regardless, McCarthy
concludes that the primary-significance test is the test for
genericness, and does not explain how Goodyear could
square with that conclusion. Id. § 12:4.
Finally, the government cites In re Wm. B. Coleman
Co., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d 2019, 2025 (T.T.A.B. 2010). There, the
TTAB relied on Goodyear for the proposition that “Company” does not add source-identifying significance to the
words “Electric Candle.” Id. But the TTAB ultimately
rested on consumer perceptions to deem “Electric Candle
Company” generic, reasoning that “the relevant public
would nonetheless understand ELECTRIC CANDLE
COMPANY to refer to a company that sells electric candles, and public understanding is critical.” Id. at 2021.
The government’s position is also incoherent as to
when the Lanham Act’s primary-significance test applies
and when (and how) its Goodyear rule takes over. The
government seemingly agrees that the primary-significance test governs whether a root word (like “grain”) is
generic. U.S. Br. 7-8, 15. And, as noted, the government
concedes (at 43) that the primary-significance test is the
“usual” test for genericness. Yet the government refuses
to apply the primary-significance test to certain compound phrases, insisting (at 44) that Grain Inc., Grain
Company, and Grain.com are all generic under Goodyear,
“even though consumers could understand [them] to refer
to a specific company.” That reasoning presupposes that
the government’s per se rule supplants the Lanham Act’s
43
primary-significance test. But the government never explains how to achieve this atextual feat through conventional methods of statutory interpretation.
4. Even if a Goodyear-based per se rule against “Generic Company” or “Generic Inc.” survived the Lanham
Act, no sound basis exists for equating a “Company” or
“Inc.” suffix with “.com” and extending the rule to domain
names. And if the Court went that far, that rule would
necessarily sweep in “.org,” “.biz,” “.net” and other domain-name suffixes. Further, domain names differ from
corporate designations in significant ways—not least because their purpose is to facilitate online activities, and because each domain name is unique. Supra p. 25; AIPLA
Br. 14. Expanding a Goodyear-based per se rule beyond
the “Company” or “Inc.” contexts would break new
ground, with no stopping point in sight.
The government (at 22) contends that TTAB and appellate decisions establish that “a ‘generic.com’ domain
name generally is not eligible” for trademark registration.
Saying that a rule is “generally” true but sometimes not
is a roundabout admission that there is no per se rule. See
U.S. Br. 25 n.6. And the government’s position is even
weaker than that: every circuit to consider the question
has rejected a per se rule against Generic.com trademarks. Pet.App.18a; e.g., In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP,
373 F.3d 1171, 1175 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (no such per se rule);
Advertise.com, Inc., 616 F.3d at 982 (same). The government (at 25 n.6) dismisses courts’ endorsements of Generic.com marks “in the ‘rare’ case where the combined
term carries additional meaning,” saying the Court need
not resolve “the propriety or scope of such an exception.”
But that is the question presented: “Whether the addition … of [‘.com’] to an otherwise generic term can create
a protectable trademark.” U.S. Br. i.
44
The government’s authorities (at 22-25) also belie its
position. Start with the PTO’s own manual, which never
cites Goodyear in provisions discussing when domain
names are generic. Examiner’s Manual §§ 1209.03(m),
1215.05, 1215.08(a). Nor does the part of the manual discussing Goodyear mention domain names.
Id.
§ 1209.03(d) (citing Goodyear for proposition that “[t]he
addition of an entity designator (e.g., Corporation, Corp.,
Co., Inc., Ltd., etc.) to a descriptive term does not alter
the term’s descriptive significance”). And the government omits that the manual states that “there is no per se
rule” that adding “.com” to “an otherwise generic term” is
grounds for refusing registration. Id. § 1215.05; see
AIPLA Br. 11-12. PTO examiners have faithfully followed the PTO’s instructions, registering COOKING.COM,
FRUITS.COM, ART.COM, and scores of similar marks while
rejecting others. Appx. A.
The government cites In re Martin Container, Inc.,
65 U.S.P.Q.2d 1058 (T.T.A.B. 2002), but the Federal Circuit repudiated the TTAB’s reasoning for wrongly interpreting Goodyear to rule out all Generic.com trademarks.
Oppedahl, 373 F.3d at 1173, 1175-77. Later TTAB decisions acknowledge there is no per se rule against registering Generic.com names. E.g., In re Vacationfutures, 2016
WL 4775500, at *8 (T.T.A.B. 2016).
The government (at 23-24) invokes the Federal Circuit’s Oppedahl decision, involving “patents.com.” That
decision cites Goodyear and analogizes the effect of adding “.com” to an “otherwise descriptive or generic term”
to adding “Corp.” or “Inc.” to such terms. 373 F.3d at
1173, 1175. Oppedahl then states that it would be “legal
error” to adopt a per se rule that adding “.com” to a term
never adds additional meaning. Id. at 1175. Such a cate-
45
gorical rule would flout the cardinal principle that registrability depends on how consumers perceive the mark as
a whole. Id. at 1174. The court held: “[T]he per se rule in
Goodyear that ‘Corp.’, etc. never possess source-indicating significance does not operate as a per se rule, but more
as a general rule, with respect to [.com].” Id. at 1175.
Oppedahl thus rejected reliance on a “Goodyear analysis,” instead relying on evidence of consumer perceptions
to “conclud[e] that the combination of ‘patents’ and ‘.com’
does not render the mark as a whole distinctive.” Id. at
1176. The Federal Circuit similarly affirmed registration
denials for mattress.com, lawyers.com, and hotels.com
only because evidence showed that consumers primarily
perceive those marks as generic. 12
The Ninth Circuit also rejects the government’s per se
rule. Advertise.com cited Goodyear to show that adding
“.com” to “a generic term … does not suffice to establish
that the component is distinctive.” 616 F.3d at 982. But
respondent’s position is not that appending “.com” automatically transforms a generic term into a distinctive one.
Rather, respondent’s position is that there is “no per se
rule against the use of domain names, even ones formed
by combining generic terms with [.com].” Id. As the
Ninth Circuit concluded, courts must “look to the mark as
a whole and … the combination of generic terms may, in
some instances, result in a distinctive mark,” depending
on the evidence. Id. at 978.
12
In re 1800Mattress.com IP LLC, 586 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir.
2009); In re Hotels.com, 573 F.3d at 1304, 1306; In re Reed Elsevier
Props., 482 F.3d at 1381.
46
B.
The Government’s Per Se Rule Would Strip Countless Marks of Trademark Protection and Confer No
Competitive Benefits
Adopting the government’s per se rule would usher in
a mass extinction event for registered trademarks. The
PTO has spent decades registering marks that violate the
government’s rule that a generic root term, coupled with
“Company” or “.com,” can never be a trademark. THE
WIG COMPANY, THE CAP COMPANY, THE SASH COMPANY,
THE FLAGPOLE COMPANY, and THE RAG COMPANY would
all face cancellation if the government’s position became
law. See 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (authorizing cancellation on
genericness grounds at any time). Applying the government’s per se rule to domain names would jeopardize
scores of “.com” marks, too. Appx. A, 1a-11a.
The government’s onslaught against PTO-registered
marks would not end there. If synonyms for corporate
structure never add distinctiveness, then coupling generic
terms with “Association,” “Partnership,” “Society,” “Alliance,” “Group,” “Foundation,” or “Coalition” is verboten—which would be news to ALZHEIMER’S ASSOCIATION,
ARTHRITIS FOUNDATION, CHRISTIAN COALITION, AUTISM SOCIETY, EPILEPSY FOUNDATION, THE HEART
FOUNDATION, etc. If “.com” is an empty suffix, so are
“.biz,” “.net,” and “.org.” And, just as “.com” can refer to
a virtual place for commerce, so can 1-800 refer to a telephone hotline for purchases—so no more 1-800-FLOWERS,
1800CONTACTS, 1800HOTELS, or 1800MATTRESS.
The government’s per se rule would apparently prohibit combining a generic term with “Store,” see Pet. 4;
Gov’t CA4 Br. 6—ending THE CONTAINER STORE’s 38year-old trademark. If “Store” is out, generic terms
paired with any “Store” synonyms presumably would not
survive—so no more OFFICE DEPOT, PAPER SOURCE,
47
THE CHEESECAKE FACTORY, FISH MART, FRAGRANCEMARKET, WATCH WAREHOUSE, or SKIRT OUTLET. If Crab
House fails the government’s test, see U.S. Br. 4, then
WAFFLE HOUSE is toast. Absent some elusive distinction
between houses and more humble abodes, SUNGLASS
HUT, RADIOSHACK, and SHAKE SHACK are doomed. The
government (at 25 n.7) also suggests that publications
consisting of generic terms plus “News,” “Journal,” or
“Guide” can never be marks—so goodbye TV GUIDE,
CLERGY JOURNAL, and OPERA NEWS, and presumably
SKI MAGAZINE, GOLF DIGEST, and BICYCLING.
All told, the government’s per se rule threatens hundreds of registered marks that respondent has identified,
including many of the country’s most famous brands. See
Appx. A. The PTO registered CONSUMER REPORTS in the
1950s; PIZZA HUT in the 1960s; 1-800-FLOWERS in the
1970s; THE CONTAINER STORE in the 1980s; and JEWISH.COM in the 1990s. The PTO even registered BOOKINGS.COM in the 2000s.
Yet the government suggests that protecting these
marks was ultra vires all along. U.S. Br. 18-20. The government (at 33) blames companies and nonprofits for proceeding at their peril and not picking names that satisfy
the government’s new per se rule. But it is hard to fault
mark holders for taking the Lanham Act at its word. The
PTO signed off on these registrations for decades, and the
government cannot credibly claim hundreds of accidents.
These registrations are the product of examiners following the PTO’s manual, including by reversing initial genericness determinations after applicants produced survey evidence rebutting those conclusions. Supra pp. 2425; see Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2301 (declining to interpret
48
statute based on government’s assertion that registrations exhibiting viewpoint bias were “PTO examiners’
mistakes”).
Not to worry, the government (at 34-35) says: anyone
denied trademark protection could invoke unfair-competition law to prevent “third parties from passing off their
goods or services.” But the availability of unfair-competition “[p]rotection … does not justify artificially constricting the scope of protection under the Act’s trademark provisions.” Br. for U.S. at 21-22, Qualitex, 514 U.S. 159 (No.
93-1577). Unfair-competition laws are no substitute for
the rights the Lanham Act extends to mark-holders, id.,
which “should not be denied based on a per se rule that
prohibits registration based on the nature of the mark,
where neither the statute nor compelling policy reasons
support such a denial,” id. Further, as the government’s
citations show, state unfair-competition claims typically
bar relief absent actual fraud, making relief unlikely in
most cases. E.g., Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing
Co., 124 F.3d 137, 149 (2d Cir. 1997); Murphy Door Bed
Co. v. Interior Sleep Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d 95, 102 (2d Cir.
1989). The government’s suggestion (at 35) that applicants could register “stylized elements” of their brands as
design marks is less helpful still. Unless applicants can
register domain-name marks, they lack key protections
against Internet-based deception and infringement.
The government’s per se rule would also cost consumers dearly. The PTO registered all the marks the government now considers trademark-ineligible because the evidence showed that consumers believe these marks could
or do identify specific producers. Without trademark protections, countless easily remembered marks that avoid
consumer confusion would be far harder to protect
against infringement, both in cyberspace and the physical
49
world. Given the difficulties of pursuing unfair-competition claims, bad actors might decide that the rewards of
pirating famous brands are worth the risk—and that piracy is even easier to accomplish online. Little would stop
copycats from launching knockoff Container Stores, Office Depots, and Pizza Huts in the same shopping malls,
or from falsely claiming affiliation with CARE.COM, CHRISTIAN COALITION, or FLIGHTS.COM.
Further, if the government’s per se rule governs
trademark protection going forward, enterprises would
never invest in fostering recognition of brand names that
others could seize with near-impunity. Instead of easilyremembered marks that avoid consumer confusion, the
government would incentivize a return to the bygone days
of elaborate technical trademarks like BOKER’S STOMACH
BITTERS, COE’S SUPERPHOSPHATE OF LIME, and DR.
DRAKE’S GERMAN CROUP REMEDY. That would eviscerate the Lanham Act’s central premise that trademark law
should reward enterprises that develop recognizable
brands, rather than superimposing artificial, judge-made
rules on the market. Park ’N Fly, 469 U.S. at 198.
At bottom, the government sees unfairness in allowing
one enterprise to claim to a name that “‘others may employ with equal truth.’” U.S. Br. 28 (quoting, e.g., Lawrence Mfg., 138 U.S. at 547). That is another way of saying
that the government prefers to protect only technical
trademarks, not descriptive terms. For 70 years, however, trademark law has proceeded from the premise that
the best way to avoid granting monopolies on the common
name for a product is to avoid trademarking the words
that consumers actually consider the common name for
the product. If the government wants to undo that choice,
its recourse lies with Congress, not this Court.
50
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the Fourth Circuit should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
DAVID H. BERNSTEIN
JARED I. KAGAN
DEBEVOISE &
PLIMPTON LLP
919 Third Avenue
New York, NY 10022
JONATHAN E. MOSKIN
FOLEY & LARDNER LLP
90 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10016
FEBRUARY 12, 2020
LISA S. BLATT
Counsel of Record
SARAH M. HARRIS
EDEN SCHIFFMANN
JOHN B. SWANSON
WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY
LLP
725 Twelfth Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 434-5000
lblatt@wc.com
APPENDIX
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Appendix of Trademarks:
.COM ...............................................................................1a
.COM (cont’d) ................................................................7a
Company ......................................................................11a
1-800 ..............................................................................13a
Alliance .........................................................................16a
Association ...................................................................17a
Boutique .......................................................................19a
Bulletin .........................................................................19a
Coalition .......................................................................19a
Collection......................................................................20a
Corporation ..................................................................20a
Council ..........................................................................20a
Depot ............................................................................22a
Digest............................................................................22a
Enterprise ....................................................................23a
Emporium ....................................................................24a
Establishment .............................................................24a
Exchange......................................................................24a
Factory .........................................................................26a
Federation....................................................................29a
Firm ..............................................................................30a
Foundation ...................................................................30a
Fund ..............................................................................32a
Group ............................................................................33a
Guide .............................................................................33a
House ............................................................................34a
Hut ................................................................................36a
Institute ........................................................................37a
(Ia)
IIa
Journal ..........................................................................38a
Magazine ......................................................................40a
Market ..........................................................................41a
Mart ..............................................................................41a
Monthly ........................................................................43a
News .............................................................................43a
.ORG .............................................................................45a
Other Publications ......................................................46a
Outlet ............................................................................47a
Partnership ..................................................................48a
Place ..............................................................................48a
Report ...........................................................................51a
Review ..........................................................................51a
Shack ............................................................................52a
Shop ..............................................................................54a
Shoppe ..........................................................................55a
Source ...........................................................................56a
Society ..........................................................................56a
Store..............................................................................58a
Supply ...........................................................................59a
Warehouse ...................................................................60a
.COM
ART.COM, online retail store services for art
Reg. No. 3,601,346 (Apr. 7, 2009)
BABYSHOWER.COM, online directory featuring
information about baby showers
Reg. No. 4,638,694 (Nov. 11, 2014)
BACKGROUNDCHECKS.COM, public records search
service
Reg. No. 2,888,037 (Sept. 24, 2004)
BATTERIES.COM, retail and wholesale services for
batteries
Reg. No. 2,427,670 (Feb. 6, 2001)
BEAUTY.COM, online retail store services featuring
personal fragrances, cosmetics, and toiletries
Reg. No. 3,178,835 (Dec. 5, 2006)
BEDANDBREAKFAST.COM, promoting real estate
properties
Reg. No. 4,430,129 (Nov. 5, 2013)
real-estate listing services
Reg. No. 4,430,130 (Nov. 5, 2013)
BUSES.COM, online directory listing bus companies
Reg. No. 2,526,294 (Jan. 1, 2002)
CARE.COM, information about personal care providers
Reg. No. 3,745,521 (Feb. 2, 2010)
online searchable database of childcare
information
Reg. No. 5,070,881 (Nov. 1, 2016)
providing employers with family-care-related
services for their employees
Reg. No. 5,070,880 (Nov. 1, 2016)
(1a)
2a
CARING.COM, online information directory in the field
of eldercare facilities, eldercare services, and
related resources
Reg. No. 4,741,631 (May 26, 2015)
CONCERT.COM, ticket agency services for sporting and
entertainment events
Reg. No. 5,923,099 (Nov. 26, 2019)
COOKING.COM, retail store services featuring foodpreparation goods
Reg. No. 2,657,525 (Oct. 10, 2002)
CRUISE.COM, travel agency services, namely, making
reservations and bookings for transportation
Reg. No. 2,684,818 (Feb. 4, 2003)
DATING.COM, dating services
Reg. No. 2,580,467 (June 11, 2002)
DEBT.COM, online information in the field of personal
credit and finance
Reg. No. 3,231,761 (Apr. 17, 2002)
DENTIST.COM, dissemination of advertising for dentists
Reg. No. 2,229,685 (Mar. 2, 1999)
DENTISTRY.COM, online referral services for medical
and dental professionals
Reg. No. 3,452,622 (June 24, 2008)
FLIGHTS.COM, travel agency services
Reg. No. 3,155,349 (Oct. 10, 2006)
FRUITS.COM, website featuring information on fruits
and fruit products
Reg. No. 2,511,298 (Nov. 20, 2001)
GENEALOGY.COM, family history information services
Reg. No. 2,521,336 (Dec. 18, 2001)
GOLF.COM, online consumer information for products
and services of interest to golfers
Reg. No. 3,534,205 (Nov. 18, 2008)
3a
GOVERNING.COM, an online magazine about and of
interest to state and local governments
Reg. No. 4,424,177 (Oct. 29, 2013)
HEALTHLABS.COM, medical and pharmamedical
diagnostic testing and reporting services
Reg. No. 5,836,631 (Aug. 13, 2019)
HOMES.COM, software for access to real-estate listing
information
Reg. No. 2,554,323 (Mar. 26, 2002)
real estate listings via a global communications
network
Reg. No. 2,226,864 (Feb. 23, 1999)
HOTELS.COM, travel agency services
Reg. No. 3,015,723 (Nov. 15, 2005)
INC.COM, information in the field of business
organization via a global computer network.
Reg. No. 2,395,391 (Oct. 17, 2000)
INTERNSHIPS.COM, job placement and internship
placement and recruiting services
Reg. No. 2,835,595 (Apr. 20, 2004)
JEWISH.COM, information on issues of interest to the
Jewish community via a global computer
network
Reg. No. 2,080,381 (July 15, 1997)
KARAOKE.COM, online distributorship services, for
karaoke-related equipment
Reg. No. 2,740,894 (July 29, 2003)
KITCHENS.COM, blogs in the field of kitchens
Reg. No. 3,443,793 (June 10, 2008)
LAW.COM, online newspapers, magazines, and
newsletters in the field of law
Reg. No. 3,413,772 (Apr. 15, 2008)
4a
LEISURE.COM, travel reservation services
Reg. No. 4,589,234 (Aug. 19, 2014)
LIFEINSURE.COM, life insurance brokerage
Reg. No. 4,549,487 (June 10, 2014)
LEGAL.COM, online publication providing information
about the law and law study
Reg. No. 2,360,864 (June 20, 2000)
NOZZLEANDHOSE.COM, online retail store for garden
hoses and nozzles
Reg. No. 5,211,129 (May 23, 2017)
PARENTS.COM, online magazines in the fields of child
development and parenting
Reg. No. 2,146,754 (Mar. 24, 1998)
READERS.COM, online retail store services featuring
eyeglasses and eyeglass accessories
Reg. No. 5,841,345 (Aug. 20, 2019)
RENT.COM, website guide for owners and managers to
promote their properties to prospective tenants
Reg. No. 2,857,033 (June 22, 2004)
RENTALHOUSES.COM, real estate website to rent
property
Reg. No. 4,810,385 (Sept. 8, 2015)
RENTALS.COM, real estate marketing services
Reg. No. 5,860,767 (Sept. 17, 2019)
interactive real estate website that promotes
rental properties
Reg. No. 4,599,140 (Sept. 2, 2014)
online directory publications for housing and
rentals
Reg. No. 4,586,295 (Aug. 12, 2014)
5a
RESTAURANT.COM, marketing, advertising, and
business consulting services for others’
restaurants; designing, implementing, hosting,
and maintaining restaurant websites
Reg. No. 3,141,323 (Sept. 12, 2006)
ROOMMATES.COM, website enabling users to find
roommates
Reg. No. 5,579,277 (Oct. 19, 2018)
SALARY.COM, online journals in the field of employee
compensation and performance
Reg. No. 5,754,229 (May 21, 2019)
SEX.COM, computer data base in the field of adultoriented subject matter
Reg. No. 3,284,052 (Aug. 28, 2007)
electronic bulletin board in the field of adult
entertainment
Reg. No. 3,122,247 (Aug. 1, 2006)
SHAVERS.COM, online mail order services featuring
electric shavers and accessories
Reg. No. 3,356,401 (Dec. 18, 2007)
Reg. No. 2,407,495 (Nov. 21, 2000)
SOFTWARE.COM, computer software facilitating
communications over computer networks
Reg. No. 2,252,250 (June 15, 1999)
STAMPS.COM, retail store services featuring postage
Reg. No. 4,085,625 (Nov. 1, 2011)
TENNIS.COM, interactive databases featuring tennis
news and information; computer tennis bulletin
board
Reg. No. 2,226,886 (Feb. 23, 1999)
TICKETS.COM, ticketing operations and management
software
Reg. No. 2,963,959 (June 28, 2005)
6a
TRAVEL.COM, travel agency services
Reg. No. 2,652,850 (Nov. 19, 2002)
TRIP.COM, travel agency services
Reg. No. 2,696,186 (Mar. 11, 2003)
TURKISHTOWELS.COM, online retail store services
featuring Turkish towels
Reg. No. 3,903,955 (Jan. 11, 2011)
TUTOR.COM, online research and reference services
Reg. No. 3,860,755 (Oct. 12, 2010)
promoting the goods and services of others to
students, parents, teachers, and business people
Reg. No. 3,819,846 (July 13, 2010)
VACATION.COM, membership services for professional
travel agencies
Reg. No. 2,903,217 (Aug. 24, 2004)
WAITTIME.COM, website that enabling consumers to
upload and share user-contributed wait-time
information
Reg. No. 5,047,167 (Sept. 20, 2016)
WEATHER.COM, meteorological instruments and
instruments for weather forecasts and alerts
Reg. No. 3,927,183 (Mar. 8, 2011)
online meteorology and climatology publications
Reg. No. 2,699,088 (Mar. 25, 2003)
WEB.COM, registration of domain names to identify
users on a global computer network
Reg. No. 3,666,813 (May 26, 2009)
WEDDING.COM, online magazine featuring wedding
planning and wedding-related goods and
services
Reg. No. 2,603,086 (July 30, 2002)
7a
WINDSHIELDS.COM, cost comparison shopping services
in the field of auto-glass repair and replacement
Reg. No. 3,510,252 (Sept. 30, 2008)
WORKOUT.COM, information about exercise programs
and weight training
Reg. No. 4,460,827 (Jan. 7, 2014)
WRESTLINGFIGURES.COM, online retail store services
featuring wrestling action figures
Reg. No. 4,824,929 (Oct. 6, 2015)
.COM (cont’d)
1-800-BASKETS.COM, online retail shop featuring gift
baskets
Reg. No. 2,782,517 (Nov. 11, 2003)
1-800-CANDIES.COM, candy and confectionary products
Reg. No. 2,976,683 (July 26, 2005)
1800CEILING.COM, online retail store services featuring
parts for ceilings and ceiling repair
Reg. No. 5,461,041 (May 1, 2018)
1800CONTACTS.COM, online retail store and telephone
order services featuring contact lenses
Reg. No. 3,833,549 (Aug. 17, 2010)
1-800-DENTIST.COM, online referrals of and marketing
for medical and dental professionals
Reg. No. 3,877,773 (Nov. 16, 2010)
1-800-DOCTORS.COM, information about health care
providers
Reg. No. 2,490,017 (Sept. 18, 2001)
1-800-DOGBONE.COM, online shopping site in the field
of dog supplies and treats
Reg. No. 4,397,937 (Sept. 3, 2013)
1800FLOWERS.COM, receiving online orders for flowers
and floral products
Reg. No. 2,825,367 (Mar. 23, 2004)
8a
1800LAWYERS.COM, online marketing and promotional
services for the legal industry
Reg. No. 3,970,491 (May 31, 2011)
Reg. No. 3,005,192 (Oct. 4, 2005)
1-800 LENS.COM, online retail store and mail order
services featuring contact lenses
Reg. No. 3,875,337 (Nov. 16, 2010)
1-800LIGHTING.COM, online retail store services
featuring lighting
Reg. No. 4,242,006 (Nov. 13, 2012)
1-800-VEHICLES.COM, dealership selling used cars
Reg. No. 3,684,647 (Sept. 15, 2009)
800WINE.COM, online retail services featuring wine and
wine accessories
Reg. No. 5,789,921 (June 25, 2019)
BATTERYDEPOT.COM, services including online,
batteries and battery-related goods
Reg. No. 2,979,732 (July 26, 2005)
BEAUTYHUT.COM, online retail store services featuring
health and beauty products
Reg. No. 4,718,095 (Apr. 7, 2015)
BLINDSONLINE.COM, online retail store services
featuring custom window blinds and shades
Reg. No. 3,552,359 (Dec. 28, 2008)
CABLESONLINE.COM, computer cables
Reg. No. 4,810,448 (Sept. 8, 2015)
CARPARTSWAREHOUSE.COM, online retail store
services featuring auto parts
Reg. No. 4,405,428 (Sept. 24, 2013)
CATHOLICSUPPLY.COM, online retail store services
featuring religious affiliated items
Reg. No. 3,195,289 (Jan. 2, 2007)
9a
FOODSERVICEWAREHOUSE.COM, retail and online retail
store services featuring restaurant, foodservice, and beverage equipment and supplies
Reg. No. 4,531,767 (May 20, 2014)
HEALTHWAREHOUSE.COM, online retail store services
featuring prescription drugs, pharmaceuticals,
over-the-counter medicine, health products,
nutritional supplements, etc.
Reg. No. 5,873,238 (Oct. 1, 2019)
INSURANCECOMPANY.COM, online insurance agent
referral services
Reg. No. 2,835,595 (Aug. 20, 2004)
INSUREONLINE.COM, insurance information
Reg. No. 4,924,570 (Oct. 2, 2010)
LAWMART.COM, online retail store services featuring
legal forms
Reg. No. 3,134,050 (Aug. 22, 2006)
LAWNMOWINGONLINE, website for connecting buyers
with lawn care and lawn mowing providers
Reg. No. 5,098,862 (Dec. 13, 2016)
lawn mowing services
Reg. No. 4,416,286 (Oct. 8, 2013)
OFFICEMART.COM, online retail store services
featuring office supplies and office equipment
Reg. No. 4,745,390 (May 26, 2015)
ONLINELABELS.COM, address and shipping labels
Reg. No. 3,674,811 (Aug. 25, 2009)
ONLINEMETALS.COM, processing, fabrication, and
cutting of metal and plastic stock materials
Reg. No. 3,585,577 (Mar. 10, 2009)
ONLINESHOES, online shoe retail store services
Reg. No. 4,263,330 (Dec. 25, 2012)
10a
PLASTIC-MART.COM, plastic storage containers for
commercial or industrial use
Reg. No. 4,630,962 (Nov. 4, 2014)
RUNNINGSTORE.COM, online store services for athletic
clothing and sporting goods
Reg. No. 2,726,061 (June 10, 2003)
SCAFFOLDMART.COM, online retail store services for
scaffolding and related accessories
Reg. No. 4,017,595 (Aug. 30, 2011)
SEWING PARTS ONLINE, online ordering services for
replacement parts for sewing machines and
related parts
Reg. No. 4,666,104 (Jan. 6, 2015)
SIGNWAREHOUSE.COM, online retail store services for
signage supplies
Reg. No. 2,376,302 (Aug. 8, 2000)
SUNSCREENWAREHOUSE.COM, online ordering services
for sunscreen creams and lotions
Reg. No. 4,527,234 (May 6, 2014)
THELUBRICANTSTORE.COM, online retail store services
for petroleum products, lubricants, and related
automotive items
Reg. No. 5,014,892 (Aug. 2, 2016)
THESHOEMART.COM, online retail store services for
footwear
Reg. No. 3,053,352 (Jan. 31, 2006)
WIRELESSSTORE.COM, online retail store services for
wireless and mobile handheld devices
Reg. No. 3,878,344 (Nov. 16, 2010)
WWW.LAWFIRMONLINE.COM, legal services
Reg. No. 5,139,168 (Feb. 7, 2017)
11a
YOGAOUTLET.COM, online retail store services
for clothing, including yoga apparel
Reg. No. 5,584,077 (Oct. 16, 2018)
Company
FOODS CO., retail grocery store services
Reg. No. 3,044,478 (Jan. 17, 2006)
GARDENERS’ SUPPLY COMPANY, online retail store
services featuring gardening products
Reg. No. 2,523,984 (Jan. 1, 2002)
MARGARITA COMPANY, restaurant and broker services
Reg. No. 4,466,670 (Jan. 14, 2014)
PHOTOBOOTH SUPPLY CO., cameras and photography
equipment
Reg. No. 4,783,718 (July 28, 2015)
SEAFOOD SUPPLY COMPANY, wholesale distributorships
featuring seafood
Reg. No. 4,746,840 (June 2, 2015)
THE AGENT’S COMPANY, services for insurance agents
Reg. No. 5,910,844 (Nov. 12, 2019)
THE CAP COMPANY, plastic caps and other protective
parts for use in industrial settings
Reg. No. 2,472,508 (July 24, 2001)
THE CUTTING COMPANY, cutting and welding torches
Reg. No. 4,618,919 (Oct. 7, 2014)
THE DRIVEWAY COMPANY, concrete maintenance and
repair on driveways
Reg. No. 5,867,399 (Sept. 24, 2019)
THE FLAGPOLE COMPANY, retail and online store
services featuring flagpoles, flags, etc.
Reg. No. 3,411,374 (Apr. 15, 2008)
THE FERTILITY COMPANY, physician-assisted
reproduction services
Reg. No. 2,665,787 (Dec. 24, 2002)
12a
THE LITERACY COMPANY, consulting services in the
field of reading skills and reading
comprehension, retention, and recall
Reg. No. 4,349,278 (June 11, 2013)
THE MOISTURE COMPANY, body scrub; skin care
creams and lotions
Reg. No. 5,347,433 (Nov. 28, 2017)
THE MOTION PICTURE COMPANY, video and film
production
Reg. No. 4,426,871 (Oct. 29, 2013)
THE ORGANISM COMPANY, custom manufacturing and
custom synthesis in the nature of genetically
engineered DNA, biological organisms
Reg. No. 5,893,479 (Oct. 22, 2019)
THE PHILLIPS SCREW COMPANY, metal hardware,
including Phillips screws
Reg. No. 5,857,599 (Sept. 10, 2019)
THE POETRY COMPANY, poetry writing service
Reg. No. 4,519,474 (Sept. 10, 2019)
THE PREGNANCY COMPANY, medical diagnostic testing
services to detect pregnancy complications
Reg. No. 5,853,620 (Sept. 3, 2019)
THE PUPPET COMPANY LTD, dolls and puppets
Reg. No. 4,184,460 (Sept. 10, 2019)
THE RAG COMPANY, premium articles for cleaning,
including microfiber cloths, mitts of fabric
Reg. No. 5,791,324 (July 2, 2019)
THE SASH COMPANY, sashes
Reg. No. 5,361,623 (Dec. 19, 2017)
THE SHAVING CO., bar soap; bath soaps; cleaning
agents and preparations
Reg. No. 5,521,328 (July 17, 2018)
13a
THE TRUCKERS’ COMPANY, freight transportation by
truck
Reg. No. 5,699,640 (Mar. 12, 2019)
THE UPGRADE COMPANY, upgrading hardware in
consumer electronics
Reg. No. 4,848,266 (Nov. 3, 2015)
THE VOCAL COMPANY, services relating to music
Reg. No. 5,522,398 (July 24, 2018)
THE WATERING COMPANY, garden hoses
Reg. No. 4,919,728 (Mar. 15, 2016)
THE WIG COMPANY, hairpieces and wigs
Reg. No. 5,278,404 (Aug. 29, 2017)
THE WISDOM COMPANY, workshops and seminars in
personal awareness
Reg. No. 5,912,955 (Nov. 19, 2019)
WOOD CARVERS’ SUPPLY INC., mail order services
featuring wood carving supplies
Reg. No. 1,990,603 (July 30, 1996)
1-800
1800ACCOUNTANT, tax preparation
Reg. No. 4,697,397 (Mar. 3, 2015)
1-800-AUTOSHOP, promoting automobile servicing
Reg. No. 4,247,660 (Nov. 20, 2012)
1800BACKPAIN, website featuring information about
back pain
Reg. No. 4,519,387 (Apr. 22, 2014)
1-800-BARTEND, classes, seminars, workshops in the
field of bartending
Reg. No. 4,916,787 (Mar. 15, 2016)
1-800-BOATING, pleasure boating and sport fishing
equipment services
Reg. No. 1,437,536 (Apr. 21, 1987)
14a
1800BUNKBED, business consulting services in the field
of furniture construction featuring bunk beds
Reg. No. 4,327,890 (Apr. 30, 2013)
1-800 CAR-LOAN, automobile loan financing services
Reg. No. 1,885,240 (Mar. 21, 1995)
1-800-CHIROPRACTOR, marketing chiropractors
Reg. No. 3,170,295 (Nov. 7, 2006)
1 800 CHOCOLATE, online retail store featuring
specialty chocolates
Reg. No. 5,024,273 (Aug. 16, 2016)
1-800-CLEANING, cleaning services
Reg. No. 3,826,658 (July 27, 2010)
1800CONTACTS, contact lenses
Reg. No. 2,675,866 (Jan. 21, 2003)
1-800-COOKIES, cookies, chocolates, candies, etc.
Reg. No. 2,741,280 (July 29, 2003)
1-800-DENTIST, advertising services for dentists
Reg. No. 3,371,531 (Jan. 22, 2008)
1-800-DETECTIVE, referrals in the field of detectives
Reg. No. 1,990,571 (June 30, 1996)
1-800-DRYCLEAN, dry-cleaning services
Reg. No. 3,748,305 (Feb. 16, 2010)
1-800-FITNESS, health-club services
Reg. No. 2,374,747 (Aug. 8, 2000)
1-800-FLOORING, wood flooring
Reg. No. 3,697,879 (Oct. 20, 2009)
1-800-FLOWERS, receiving and placing orders for
flowers and floral products
Reg. No. 1,009,717 (Apr. 29, 1975)
1-800-FURNITURE, retail furniture-store services
Reg. No. 2,821,840 (Mar. 9, 2004)
15a
1-800-GOLF-COURSE, promoting the services of golf
courses through telephone messages
Reg. No. 2,317,336 (Feb. 8, 2000)
1-800-GOLFING, online retail store services featuring
golf equipment and accessories
Reg. No. 5,420,240 (Mar. 6, 2018)
1800HANDYMAN, advertising for home repair services
Reg. No. 2,637,533 (Oct. 15, 2002)
1800HOTELS, hotel reservation services
Reg. No. 3,727,287 (Dec. 22, 2009)
1.800.LIFEINSURANCE, life insurance brokerage
services offered via telephone and online
Reg. No. 2,562,630 (Apr. 16, 2002)
1-800LOANMART, money lending
Reg. No. 4,087,230 (Jan. 17, 2012)
1800 LOOSE DIAMONDS, retail and online services
featuring jewelry
Reg. No. 4,643,534 (Nov. 25, 2014)
1800MATTRESS, telephone shop-at-home retail services
in the field of mattresses, bedding, and furniture
Reg. No. 2,915,478 (Jan. 4, 2005)
1-800-MOSQUITOES, mosquito and insect control
Reg. No. 4,611,481 (Sept. 23, 2014)
1-800-MUFFINS, muffins
Reg. No. 4,787,650 (Aug. 4, 2015)
1-800-PAINTERS, painting contractor services
Reg. No. 5,934,415 (Dec. 10, 2019)
1-800-PLUMBER, promoting plumbing services
Reg. No. 3,113,312 (July 11, 2006)
1-800-PLUMBING, plumbing services and mechanical
contracting services
Reg. No. 1,774,439 (June 1, 1993)
16a
1-800-SHOWERS, installation services for showers
Reg. No. 3,732,955 (Dec. 29, 2009)
1-800 TELEPHONE, merchandising of telephone and
wireless equipment
Reg. No. 2,774,333 (Oct. 21, 2003)
1-800-WATCHES, online retail store services featuring
watches and watch bands
Reg. No. 3,447,109 (June 10, 2008)
1-800-WEDDING, wedding reception planning and
coordination services
Reg. No. 4,477,333 (Feb. 4, 2014)
1-800-WINDOWS, retail, mail order, and online services
featuring replacement windows
Reg. No. 3,152,374 (Oct. 3, 2006)
1800WINDOWS, retail, mail order, and online services
featuring replacement windows
Reg. No. 3,166,929 (Oct. 31, 2006)
Alliance
AUTO ALLIANCE, information related to the automobile
manufacturing industry; association services,
promoting interests of auto manufacturers
Reg. No. 4,007,859 (Aug. 9, 2011)
BATTERY ALLIANCE, batteries, batteries for vehicles,
distribution services including battery delivery
Reg. No. 5,217,958 (June 6, 2017)
BEAUTY ALLIANCE, wholesale distributorship in the
field of beauty supplies
Reg. No. 2,411,386 (Dec. 5, 2000)
COLON CANCER ALLIANCE, emotional support services
for individuals affected by colon and rectal
cancers; related support groups
Reg. No. 4,591,794 (Aug. 26, 2014)
17a
LAW FIRM ALLIANCE, association services, promoting
interests of independent and member law firms
Reg. No. 4,749,802 (June 2, 2015)
LAWYERS ALLIANCE, association services, promoting
interests of organizations providing pro bono
legal services; legal services
Reg. No. 5,701,755 (Mar. 19, 2019)
OUTDOOR ALLIANCE, public advocacy to promote
awareness and protection of outdoor resources;
association services, namely, promoting public
awareness of the need for wildlife preservation
Reg. No. 5,221,143 (June 13, 2017)
RETAIL ALLIANCE, membership organization of
consumer-oriented retail businesses
Reg. No. 2,951,020 (May 17, 2005)
THE SENIOR ALLIANCE, promoting the interests of
senior citizens
Reg. No. 3,585,254 (Mar. 10, 2009)
Association
ALZHEIMER’S AND DEMENTIA ASSOCIATION,
association services, promoting the interests of
those with neuro-degenerative brain disease
Reg. No. 5,687,823 (Feb. 26, 2019)
ALZHEIMER’S ASSOCIATION, association services,
promoting the interests of those with neurodegenerative brain disease
Reg. No. 2,850,223 (June 8, 2004)
AUTOCARE ASSOCIATION, association services relating
to motor-vehicle aftermarket industry
Reg. No. 4,557,675 (June 24, 2014)
18a
CANNABIS BUSINESS ASSOCIATION, association
services, promoting the interests of members in
the cannabis business
Reg. No. 5,783,812 (June 18, 2019)
CEREALS & GRAINS ASSOCIATION, association services
relating to cereal grain science
Reg. No. 5,887,460 (Oct. 15, 2019)
FINANCIAL PLANNING ASSOCIATION, indicate
membership in an association of financial
planning and investment advisors
Reg. No. 2,904,075 (Nov. 23, 2004)
HEMP INDUSTRIES ASSOCIATION, association services
relating to the hemp industry
Reg. No. 5,604,670 (Nov. 13, 2018)
IRRIGATION ASSOCIATION, association services,
promoting interests of the irrigation industry
Reg. No. 2,673,647 (Jan. 14, 2003)
MUSEUM STORE ASSOCIATION (multiple TMs),
association services, promoting the interests of
the museum-store industry
Reg. No. 3,816,102 (July 13, 2010)
SECURITY INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, association services
relating to security industry
Reg. No. 4,843,640 (Nov. 3, 2015)
SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, association
services relating to the semiconductor industry
Reg. No. 5,553,143 (Sept. 4, 2018)
THE INTERNET ASSOCIATION, association services,
promoting the general interests of the Internet
industry and its global community of users
Reg. No. 4,452,684 (Dec. 17, 2013)
19a
WIRE ASSOCIATION, association services, promoting
interests of wire industry
Reg. No. 1,124,185 (Aug. 14, 1979)
Boutique
AUTO BOUTIQUE, automobile dealerships
Reg. No. 5,946,458 (Dec. 24, 2019)
BALLOON BOUTIQUE, receiving orders for balloons,
balloon bouquets, and arrangements
Reg. No. 2,213,896 (Dec. 29, 1998)
CHOCOLATE BOUTIQUE, chocolates and candy
Reg. No. 2,661,297 (Dec. 17, 2002)
THE CHILDREN’S BOUTIQUE, retail store services
featuring children’s clothing, jewelry, and toys
Reg. No. 2,487,003 (Sept. 11, 2001)
WATCH ACCESSORIES BOUTIQUE, watch parts
Reg. No. 5,687,924 (Feb. 26, 2019)
Bulletin
GENERICS BULLETIN, periodicals in the field of
pharmaceuticals
Reg. No. 3,816,376 (July 13, 2010)
HEALTH BULLETIN, magazine columns or sections
about health
Reg. No. 3,022,218 (Nov. 29, 2005)
NOTARY BULLETIN, newsletters about notary services
Reg. No. 3,844,840 (Sept. 7, 2010)
PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN, printed journal pertaining
to the psychological and social sciences
Reg. No. 1,855,720 (Sept. 27, 1994)
Coalition
AMPUTEE COALITION, promoting interests of and
advocating for people with limb loss
Reg. No. 5,011,861 (Aug. 2, 2016)
20a
CHRISTIAN COALITION, promoting public awareness of
Christian issues in society
Reg. No. 1,767,080 (Apr. 20, 1993)
COLON CANCER COALITION, includes charitable
fundraising services, by means of organizing
and conducting projects and events to promote
awareness of colon cancer
Reg. No. 4,288,080 (Feb. 12, 2013)
MATERNITY CARE COALITION, information on seminars
and educational training concerning or of
interest to pregnant women and families
Reg. No. 2,661,079 (Dec. 17, 2002)
SENIORS COALITION, association services, promoting
the interests of elderly and senior Americans
Reg. No. 1,843,984 (July 5, 1994)
SHALE COALITION, trade-association services,
promoting and advocating the interest of gas
producers and their service providers
Reg. No. 5,139,059 (Feb. 7, 2017)
VENOUS DISEASE COALITION, advocacy, promoting the
interests of those with venous diseases
Reg. No. 3,773,728 (Apr. 6, 2010)
Collection
COTTON COLLECTION, unisex cotton sportswear
Reg. No. 5,753,693 (May 14, 2019)
Corporation
THE APPLICATION CORPORATION, application service
provider
Reg. No. 5,766,118 (May 28, 2019)
Council
DAIRY COUNCIL, information and teaching aids about
dairy foods
Reg. No. 1,504,399 (Feb. 2, 1988)
21a
FABRIC ARTS COUNCIL, promoting interests of fabric
industry manufacturers, designers, and retailers
Reg. No. 4,792,139 (Aug. 11, 2015)
FERTILITY COUNCIL, marketing and promotion
services in the field of fertility
Reg. No. 4,482,866 (Dec. 24, 2013)
GORILLA COUNCIL, fundraising relating to the
preservation and protection of the world’s
mountain gorillas, research, and conservation
Reg. No. 5,144,209 (Feb. 21, 2017)
HEALTHCARE COUNCIL, healthcare consulting services
Reg. No. 4,709,732 (Mar. 24, 2015)
HUNGER COUNCIL, providing food to the needy
Reg. No. 4,313,707 (Nov. 15, 2011)
MATTRESS RECYCLING COUNCIL, promoting the
interests of those engaged in mattress recycling
Reg. No. 4,661,212 (Dec. 23, 2014)
PAPERBOARD PACKAGING COUNCIL, association
services, promoting interests of paperboard
packaging industry
Reg. No. 3,766,575 (Mar. 30, 2010)
STARTUP COUNCIL, association services promoting the
interests of startup companies
Reg. No. 5,958,030 (Jan. 7, 2020)
THE DATING COUNCIL, coaching services in the field of
relationships, dating, etc.
Reg. No. 4,553,101 (June 17, 2014)
THE VISION COUNCIL, association services, promoting
the interests of the vision-care industry
Reg. No. 3,604,727 (Apr. 7, 2009)
22a
Depot
BEVERAGE DEPOT, online and retail store services
featuring beer, wine, and distilled spirits
Reg. No. 5,671,842 (Feb. 5, 2019)
CONDOM DEPOT, online retail store services featuring
adult products, including condoms
Reg. No. 5,529,508 (July 31, 2018)
HOTEL SUPPLY DEPOT, online retail store featuring
hotel and hospitality supplies
Reg. No. 5,227,451 (June 20, 2017)
LINEN DEPOT, bath linen and bed linen
Reg. No. 5,682,291 (Feb. 19, 2019)
OFFICE DEPOT, retail office-supply store services
Reg. No. 1,449,065 (July 21, 1987)
THE HOME DEPOT, retail and online retail store
featuring home improvement goods and services
Reg. No. 4,438,588 (Nov. 26, 2013)
Digest
AUTOMOTIVE DIGEST, global computer network
automotive industry information
Reg. No. 2,342,028 (Apr. 11, 2000)
BEVERAGE DIGEST, website featuring business
information about the beverage industry
Reg. No. 3,586,119 (Mar. 10, 2009)
CONSUMER DIGEST, magazine including articles on a
variety of subjects of interest to consumers
Reg. No. 1,642,060 (Apr. 23, 1991)
GOLF DIGEST, information, features, and advertising,
all relating to golf and golf products
Reg. No. 2,206,400 (Dec. 1, 1998)
GUN DIGEST, reference books and other publications,
all in the field of guns
Reg. No. 3,284,836 (June 17, 1997)
23a
HOMELIFE DIGEST, website featuring blogs and nondownloadable publications concerning homes,
home care, and related products and services
Reg. No. 5,940,444 (Dec. 17, 2019)
INCOME DIGEST, newsletter featuring financial and
investment advice
Reg. No. 2,018,513 (Nov. 19, 1996)
INVENTORS DIGEST, magazines featuring information
relating to innovation, inventions and inventors
Reg. No. 3,645,838 (June 30, 2009)
MOTOR DIGEST, magazines of general circulation
containing classified ads relating to automobiles
Reg. No. 2,322,583 (Feb. 22, 2000)
ONCOLOGY DIGEST, newsletter of recent advances in
oncology
Reg. No. 2,244,075 (May 4, 1999)
READER’S DIGEST, downloadable electronic
publications of general interest, magazines and
books
Reg. No. 5,391,988 (Jan. 30, 2018)
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DIGEST, books and
pamphlets containing digests of Supreme Court
legal opinions
Reg. No. 1,247,072 (Aug. 2, 1983)
WEDDING DIGEST, website featuring blogs and articles
in the field of weddings
Reg. No. 5,917,094 (Nov. 19, 2019)
YOGA DIGEST, online instruction about yoga and
wellness
Reg. No. 4,906,344 (Feb. 23, 2016)
Enterprise
CAR WASH ENTERPRISES, vehicle washing services
Reg. No. 2,801,587 (Dec. 30, 2003)
24a
DOCKET ENTERPRISE, computer software, namely,
calendaring, docketing and task management
software used in the field of law
Reg. No. 5,116,182 (Jan. 3, 2017)
WEALTH ENTERPRISE, wealth-management services
Reg. No. 5,923,936 (Sept. 17, 2019)
Emporium
COOKS’ EMPORIUM, retail services and online retail
store services featuring culinary equipment,
cookware, bakeware, etc.
Reg. No. 5,965,047 (Jan. 21, 2020)
COTTON EMPORIUM, clothing made largely of cotton
Reg. No. 2,512,082 (Nov. 27, 2001)
DENTAL EMPORIUM, online retail store services
featuring dental supplies
Reg. No. 5,461,093 (May 1, 2018)
FITNESS EMPORIUM, wholesale and retail store
services featuring fitness equipment
Reg. No. 4,024,225 (Sept. 6, 2011)
NECKTIE EMPORIUM, neckties
Reg. No. 5,619,489 (Nov. 27, 2018)
Establishment
THE WEDDING ESTABLISHMENT, wedding reception
planning and coordination services
Reg. No. 5,229,734 (June 20, 2017)
Exchange
BEER EXCHANGE, bar services featuring beer, wine,
cocktails
Reg. No. 5,127,838 (Jan. 24, 2017)
BIRDERS’ EXCHANGE, association services promoting
the interests of ornithologists and educational
services relating to ornithology
Reg. No. 2,842,323 (May 18, 2004)
25a
CARPET EXCHANGE, retail store and online services for
flooring and flooring accessory products
Reg. No. 5,947,876 (Dec. 31, 2019)
COFFEE EXCHANGE, retail shop and mail order
services for coffee
Reg. No. 1,896,628 (May 30, 1995)
CONCRETE EXCHANGE, retail store services featuring
concrete mixes, sealers, coatings, stains, etc.
Reg. No. 5,362,864 (Dec. 26, 2017)
ENERGY EXCHANGE, website featuring energy usage
management information regarding various
energy sources and client energy usage data
Reg. No. 4,647,972 (Dec. 2, 2014)
FITNESS EXCHANGE, retail and online store featuring
fitness equipment, accessories, and supplements
Reg. No. 2,793,305 (Dec. 9, 2003)
MATTRESS EXCHANGE, retail stores with mattresses
Reg. No. 3,741,207 (Jan. 19, 2010)
MILITARY PARTS EXCHANGE, retail store and online
services for parts, components, equipment,
replacement parts, and replacement
components for military aircraft and vehicles
Reg. No. 5,936,348 (Dec. 17, 2019)
THE ADOPTION EXCHANGE, adoption placement
services
Reg. No. 3,387,960 (Feb. 26, 2008)
THE BEER EXCHANGE, bar services featuring wine,
beer, restaurant and café services
Reg. No. 4,683,819 (Feb. 10, 2015)
THE CURTAIN EXCHANGE, draperies
Reg. No. 2,315,218 (Feb. 8, 2000)
26a
THE DEBT EXCHANGE, commercial lending and loan
brokerage services, loan management services
Reg. No. 5,568,088 (Sept. 25, 2018)
THE LABOR EXCHANGE, job and personnel placement
Reg. No. 4,832,929 (Oct. 13, 2015)
THE LASH EXCHANGE, retail stores for eyelash
extension products
Reg. No. 5,268,258 (Aug. 15, 2017)
THE PAIN EXCHANGE, online forum and blogs with
information on chronic pain and treatments
Reg. No. 4,412,541 (Oct. 1, 2013)
Reg. No. 4,412,540 (Oct. 1, 2013)
Factory
BAGEL FACTORY, bagels
Reg. No. 3,788,890 (May 11, 2010)
BOOKFACTORY, publication of texts, books, journals
Reg. No. 3,460,821 (July 8, 2008)
FABRIC FACTORY, retail fabric store
Reg. No. 3,084,169 (Apr. 25, 2006)
FENCE FACTORY, installation and rental of fences
Reg. No. 3,964,203 (May 24, 2011)
FLATBREAD FACTORY, manually operated press for
tortillas and other flatbreads and bread wraps
Reg. No. 4,771,666 (July 14, 2015)
GREETING CARD FACTORY, software for making
greeting cards
Reg. No. 2,498,083 (Oct. 16, 2001)
JAVA FACTORY, coffee
Reg. No. 4,721,869 (Apr. 14, 2015)
JEWELRY FACTORY, wholesale and retail store services
for jewelry sales
Reg. No. 2,258,187 (June 29, 1999)
27a
LAW FACTORY, legal services
Reg. No. 5,419,455 (Mar. 6, 2018)
MEMORY FOAM FACTORY, online and retail store
services featuring foam cushioning products
Reg. No. 2,952,393 (May 17, 2005)
PHOTO FACTORY, photography and photography
services
Reg. No. 4,711,214 (Mar. 31, 2015)
SOFT PRETZEL FACTORY, soft pretzels
Reg. No. 2,885,994 (Sept. 21, 2004)
SMOOTHIE FACTORY, retail store services for
smoothies, etc.
Reg. No. 4,379,473 (Aug. 6, 2013)
THE ARTWORK FACTORY, art pictures
Reg. No. 5,230,145 (June 27, 2017)
THE BAG FACTORY, various bags
Reg. No. 2,765,955 (Sept. 16, 2013)
THE BATH FACTORY, bath soaps in many forms
Reg. No. 4,884,768 (Jan. 12, 2016)
THE BARBER FACTORY, barbershop services
Reg. No. 4,727,650 (Feb. 10, 2015)
THE CHEESECAKE FACTORY, cakes and restaurant
services
Reg. No. 1,549,370 (July 25, 1989)
THE CHOCOLATE FACTORY, chocolate bakery goods
and products
Reg. No. 3,875,027 (Nov. 9, 2010)
THE CHIP FACTORY, tortilla chips
Reg. No. 5,211,188 (May 23, 2017)
THE CLOSET FACTORY, custom design and
development of cabinets, closets, furniture,
shelves, etc.
Reg. No. 4,862,364 (Dec. 1, 2015)
28a
THE DRY CLEANING FACTORY, dry cleaning services
Reg. No. 2,673,345 (Jan. 7, 2003)
THE GARDEN FACTORY, online retail store services for
lawn, garden, and landscaping supplies
Reg. No. 5,349,633 (Dec. 5, 2017)
THE GEMSTONE FACTORY, wholesale and distribution
services for minerals, rocks, and stones
Reg. No. 4,587,766 (Aug. 19, 2014)
THE JELLY BEAN FACTORY, jelly beans and candies
Reg. No. 1,270,118 (Mar. 13, 1984)
THE KINK FACTORY, adult sexual stimulation aids
Reg. No. 5,217,615 (June 6, 2017)
THE LOAN FACTORY, mortgage brokerage and lending
Reg. No. 5,688,491 (Mar. 5, 2019)
THE MILK SHAKE FACTORY, milk shakes
Reg. No. 3,934,138 (Mar. 22, 2011)
THE OLIVE OIL FACTORY, extra virgin olive oil
Reg. No. 3,078,876 (Apr. 11, 2006)
THE PAYROLL FACTORY, payroll services
Reg. No. 5,227,113 (June 20, 2017)
THE PEARL FACTORY, retail store services featuring
pearls
Reg. No. 2,279,284 (Sept. 21, 1999)
THE PILLOW FACTORY, pillows, pillow cases, bed sheets
Reg. No. 3,026,030 (Dec. 13, 2015)
THE POPCORN FACTORY, online retail store services
featuring popcorn
Reg. No. 4,086,790 (Jan. 17, 2012)
mail/catalog order services for merchandise
such as popcorn
Reg. No. 1,902,060 (June 27, 1995)
popped popcorn confections
Reg. No. 1,110,635 (Jan. 2, 1979)
29a
THE POSTCARD FACTORY, postcards, posters, etc.
Reg. No. 1,802,057 (Aug. 10, 1993)
THE RIBBON FACTORY, ribbons of textile materials
Reg. No. 5,687,761 (Feb. 26, 2019)
THE ROOF FACTORY, roofing services
Reg. No. 4,904,797 (Feb. 23, 2016)
THE SINK FACTORY, wash basins and toilet tanks
Reg. No. 1,725,374 (Oct. 20, 1992)
Reg. No. 1,402,642 (July 22, 1986)
THE TAPE FACTORY, retail and wholesale stores in the
field of adhesive tapes and tape dispensers
Reg. No. 5,142,091 (Feb. 14, 2017)
TRADEMARK FACTORY, trademark-related legal
services
Reg. No. 4,635,555 (Nov. 11, 2014)
Federation
CIGAR FEDERATION, social networking services in the
field of cigars
Reg. No. 4,223,488 (Oct. 9, 2012)
COASTAL AND ESTUARINE RESEARCH FEDERATION,
association services, promoting awareness of
estuaries and coasts
Reg. No. 4,465,028 (Jan. 14, 2014)
FREEDOM FEDERATION, association services,
preserving freedom and justice
Reg. No. 4,123,410 (Apr. 10, 2012)
WATER ENVIRONMENT FEDERATION, association
services, water preservation and enhancement,
and related environmental issues.
Reg. No. 5,544,209 (Aug. 21, 2018)
30a
Firm
FURNITURE FIRM, retail store services featuring
chairs, recliners, and massage chairs
Reg. No. 4,657,971 (Dec. 16, 2014)
THE LASH FIRM, false eyelashes
Reg. No. 5,895,707 (Oct. 29, 2019)
YOGA FIRM, yoga instruction
Reg. No. 4,630,894 (Nov. 4, 2014)
Foundation
AUTISM SCIENCE FOUNDATION, promoting public
awareness of autism spectrum disorders
Reg. No. 4,666,951 (Jan. 6, 2015)
ALZHEIMER’S FOUNDATION, promoting public interest
and awareness of and understanding of
Alzheimer’s disease and related illnesses
Reg. No. 4,661,324 (Dec. 23, 2014)
ARTHRITIS FOUNDATION, association services,
promoting elimination and control of arthritis
Reg. No. 3,043,606 (Jan. 17, 2006)
BRAIN ANEURYSM FOUNDATION, association and
charitable fundraising relating to brain
aneurysms
Reg. No. 3,297,709 (Sept. 25, 2007)
CELIAC DISEASE FOUNDATION, public advocacy to
promote awareness of celiac disease
Reg. No. 5,103,620 (Dec. 20, 2016)
COLON CANCER FOUNDATION, charitable fundraising
services for colorectal cancer research
Reg. No. 5,273,095 (Aug. 22, 2017)
FETAL HEALTH FOUNDATION, charitable fundraising
promoting research and education relating to
fetal syndromes
Reg. No. 4,903,095 (Feb. 16, 2016)
31a
EPILEPSY FOUNDATION, association services,
promoting the interests of people with epilepsy
Reg. No. 2,297,602 (Dec. 7, 1999)
IMMUNE DEFICIENCY FOUNDATION, medical research
relating to primary immune deficiency disease
and its diagnosis and treatment
Reg. No. 3,290,969 (Sept. 11, 2007)
MELANOMA RESEARCH FOUNDATION, efforts to
achieve advances in melanoma research
Reg. No. 4,572,350 (July 22, 2014)
PARKINSON’S FOUNDATION, research, and providing
information, about Parkinson’s disease
Reg. No. 5,859,251 (Sept. 10, 2019)
PEDIATRIC BRAIN TUMOR FOUNDATION, charitable
fundraising relating to childhood brain tumors
Reg. No. 3,479,084 (Aug. 5, 2008)
RHEUMATOLOGY RESEARCH FOUNDATION, charitable
fundraising services relating to rheumatology
Reg. No. 4,725,531 (Apr. 21, 2015)
THE BREAST CANCER RESEARCH FOUNDATION,
charitable fundraising for breast cancer
research
Reg. No. 3,097,128 (May 30, 2006)
THE CHEMOTHERAPY FOUNDATION, association
services, raising funds, and sponsoring research
relating to cancer treatment and allied diseases
by chemotherapy
Reg. No. 1,209,166 (Sept. 14, 1982)
THE CHILDREN’S CANCER FOUNDATION, charitable
services, namely fund raising
Reg. No. 2,733,684 (July 8, 2003)
32a
THE EYE CANCER FOUNDATION, promoting public
awareness of eye care and wearing sunglasses
Reg. No. 4,881,988 (Jan. 5, 2016)
THE GLAUCOMA FOUNDATION, charitable fundraising
services, and promoting public awareness of
glaucoma and treatments for glaucoma
Reg. No. 5,362,591 (Dec. 26, 2017)
THE OCEAN FOUNDATION, association services and
charitable foundation services relating to
marine conservation and healthy ocean
ecosystems
Reg. No. 4,829,726 (Oct. 13, 2015)
THE ORAL CANCER FOUNDATION, charitable
foundation services; cancer screening services
Reg. No. 3,913,529 (Feb. 1, 2011)
THE SOLAR FOUNDATION, workshops and webinars in
the field of solar energy technologies
Reg. No. 4,401,946 (Sept. 10, 2013)
THE SPINA BIFIDA FOUNDATION, association services,
promoting interests of people with Spina Bifida
Reg. No. 3,685,691 (Sept. 22, 2009)
VASCULAR DISEASE FOUNDATION, association and
charitable fundraising services relating to
vascular disease
Reg. No. 4,401,946 (Sept. 10, 2013)
Fund
CHILDFUND, disbursing money to promote the welfare
of children
Reg. No. 3,584,579 (Mar. 3, 2009)
OVARIAN CANCER RESEARCH FUND, charitable
fundraising to support education and research
concerning cancer detection, treatment and cure
Reg. No. 4,193,004 (Aug. 21, 2012)
33a
Group
CAMPGROUP, summer camp services, recreational camp
services, sport camp services, etc.
Reg. No. 2,620,116 (Sept. 17, 2002)
HOUSING SERVICES GROUP, real estate property
cleaning, maintenance, and repair services
Reg. No. 4,351,735 (June 11, 2013)
LAWFINANCE GROUP, financial investment in the field
of civil litigation
Reg. No. 2,511,455 (Nov. 27, 2001)
THE BUILDING GROUP, real estate services
Reg. No. 2,560,592 (Apr. 9, 2002)
THE FIDUCIARY GROUP, wealth management services
for individuals and families
Reg. No. 3,464,813 (July 8, 2008)
THE INTERNET LAW GROUP, legal consulting services
in the field of e-commerce
Reg. No. 4,151,990 (May 29, 2012)
THE OFFICE GROUP, leasing and rental of office space
Reg. No. 5,747,729 (May 7, 2019)
THE RETIREMENT GROUP, investment advice and
financial planning advisory services
Reg. No. 4,820,766 (Sept. 29, 2015)
TRANSPORTATION FUNDING GROUP, financial services
for the transportation industry
Reg. No. 3,226,245 (Apr. 3, 2007)
Guide
BASS GUIDE, periodical magazines about fishing
Reg. No. 2,090,267 (Aug. 19, 1997)
BEACH GUIDE, printed guide books featuring rental
vacation property listings
Reg. No. 4,920,429 (Mar. 22, 2016)
34a
CAR AND DRIVER BUYERS GUIDE, magazine
Reg. No. 1,041,307 (June 15, 1976)
CATFISH GUIDE, magazines about fishing
Reg. No. 2,029,380 (Jan. 7, 1997)
EMPLOYER’S GUIDE, series of books on employment
law and regulations
Reg. No. 2,337,979 (Apr. 4, 2000)
GOLFER’S GUIDE, magazines related to golf
Reg. No. 2,148,503 (Apr. 7, 1998)
MOVER’S GUIDE, a booklet containing relocation advice,
change of address forms, and advertisements
Reg. No. 2,614,173 (Sept. 3, 2002)
TV GUIDE, magazines containing information with
respect to TV programming
Reg. No. 1,767,448 (Apr. 27, 1993)
House
ANIMAL HOUSE, dog kennels
Reg. No. 4,810,439 (Sept. 8, 2015)
AREPAS HOUSE, arepas and restaurant services
Reg. No. 5,567,514 (Sept. 18, 2018)
CHARCOAL HOUSE, online and retail store services
featuring charcoal-related products
Reg. No. 5,825,053 (Aug. 6, 2019)
CHESS HOUSE, chess games, chess pieces, chess sets
Reg. No. 5,195,269 (May 2, 2017)
HELMET HOUSE, storage, distribution, packing,
shipping of motorsport helmets, etc.
Reg. No. 3,523,178 (Oct. 28, 2008)
HOUSE OF BRUSSELS CHOCOLATES, fine chocolates and
chocolate truffles
Reg. No. 2,926,189 (Feb. 15, 2005)
35a
HOUSE OF CUPCAKES, retail shops featuring baked
goods
Reg. No. 4,479,742 (Feb. 11, 2014)
HOUSE OF FITNESS, health and fitness club services
Reg. No. 4,377,737 (July 30, 2013)
HOUSE OF HERBS, various herbs
Reg. No. 0,769,655 (May 12, 1964)
HOUSE OF JERKY, jerky
Reg. No. 4,972,470 (June 7, 2016)
HOUSE OF KEBAB, restaurant services
Reg. No. 4,736,970 (May 12, 2015)
HOUSE OF MARBLES, marbles
Reg. No. 1,291,320 (Aug. 21, 1984)
HOUSE OF MUFFLERS & BRAKES, automotive
maintenance and repairs
Reg. No. 3,789,580 (May 18, 2010)
HOUSE OF PIES, pies of all kinds
Reg. No. 1,302,940 (Oct. 30, 1984)
HOUSE OF SMOKE, retail store services featuring glass
pipes, cigars, and novelties
Reg. No. 4,596,268 (Sept. 2, 2014)
ICE CREAM HOUSE, retail store services featuring ice
cream
Reg. No. 5,111,850 (Jan. 3, 2017)
INSURANCE HOUSE, insurance agency services
Reg. No. 4,473,947 (Jan. 28, 2014)
KNIFE HOUSE, retail store services featuring knives
Reg. No. 5,081,567 (Nov. 15, 2016)
LINEN HOUSE, linen and textile goods
Reg. No. 3,485,283 (Aug. 12, 2008)
MAPLE HOUSE, syrups, including maple syrup
Reg. No. 1,673,576 (Jan. 28, 1992)
36a
PAPER HOUSE, online retail store services featuring
stationery, etc.
Reg. No. 5,608,070 (Nov. 13, 2018)
SOFTWARE HOUSE, computer hardware, software, etc.
Reg. No. 3,010,766 (Nov. 1, 2005)
TAILOR HOUSE, clothes tailoring
Reg. No. 5,830,494 (Aug. 6, 2019)
TAX HOUSE, tax preparation and accounting services
Reg. No. 5,784,873 (June 25, 2019)
TELECOM HOUSE, telecommunications services
Reg. No. 2,622,459 (Sept. 17, 2002)
THE LIQUOR HOUSE, retail store services featuring
wine, liquor, beer, beverages
Reg. No. 5,745,489 (May 7, 2019)
THE MALT HOUSE, bar and restaurant services
Reg. No. 4,453,189 (Dec. 24, 2013)
THE ONION HOUSE, onions
Reg. No. 2,969,606 (July 19, 2005)
THE SALAD HOUSE, restaurant services
Reg. No. 4,434,056 (Nov. 12, 2013)
THE WIPE HOUSE, flushable wipes holder
Reg. No. 4,428,661 (Nov. 5, 2013)
TOOL HOUSE, hand tools
Reg. No. 4,505,779 (Apr. 1, 2014)
WAFFLE HOUSE, restaurant services
Reg. No. 2,965,520 (July 12, 2005)
Hut
BIKINI HUT, retail store services featuring bikinis, etc.
Reg. No. 5,390,669 (Jan. 30, 2018)
DIAMOND HUT, various services featuring jewelry
Reg. No. 5,254,419 (Aug. 1, 2017)
37a
GLOVE HUT, glove display rack
Reg. No. 2,573,016 (May 28, 2002)
GOLF HUT, retail store for golf equipment
Reg. No. 2,016,526 (Nov. 12, 1996)
PIZZA HUT, restaurant services
Reg. No. 0,729,847 (Apr. 10, 1962)
SUNGLASS HUT, retail optical store services
Reg. No. 1,475,511 (Feb. 2, 1988)
TACO HUT, restaurant services for Mexican-type foods
Reg. No. 0,852,058 (July 2, 1968)
TROPHY HUT, online and retail store services in the
field of trophies
Reg. No. 3,449,957 (June 17, 2008)
VITAMIN HUT, online and retail store services featuring
vitamins and nutritional supplements
Reg. No. 4,807,284 (Sept. 8, 2015)
Institute
ANIMAL WELFARE INSTITUTE, educational services
related to protection and well-being of animals
Reg. No. 5,877,544 (Oct. 8, 2019)
BEER INSTITUTE, association promoting the beer
industry
Reg. No. 4,391,238 (Aug. 27, 2013)
CANNABINOID RESEARCH INSTITUTE, scientific
research in the field of cannabinoid-based
medicines
Reg. No. 5,765,928 (May 28, 2019)
CARING INSTITUTE, promoting acts of caring
Reg. No. 5,583,546 (Oct. 16, 2018)
FOODSERVICE INSTITUTE, training of people in the
food service industry
Reg. No. 5,343,056 (Nov. 21, 2017)
38a
HEALTH & SAFETY INSTITUTE, educational services in
the field of emergency medical response and
environmental, health, and safety training
Reg. No. 5,460,918 (May 1, 2018)
THE DATING INSTITUTE, dating services
Reg. No. 4,636,734 (Nov. 11, 2014)
THE FERTILIZER INSTITUTE, association services,
promoting the interests of the fertilizer industry
Reg. No. 2,853,120 (June 15, 2004)
THE HAND AND WRIST INSTITUTE, surgical and other
treatments for conditions of the hand and wrist
Reg. No. 5,111,511 (Dec. 27, 2016)
THE SPORTS INSTITUTE, programs about sports safety
Reg. No. 5,899,395 (Oct. 29, 2019)
THE TRAVEL INSTITUTE, travel-related courses
Reg. No. 5,573,436 (Oct. 2, 2018)
TRANSGENDER LAW INSTITUTE, educational seminars
on issues concerning the transgender
community
Reg. No. 5,435,800 (Apr. 3, 2018)
Journal
CANINE JOURNAL, website covering pet breeds, pet
food, pet medical concerns, and pet insurance
Reg. No. 4,410,479 (Oct. 1, 2013)
CAREER JOURNAL, newspaper column in the field of
employment and business
Reg. No. 2,470,768 (July 17, 2001)
CLERGY JOURNAL, journals of interest to ministers
Reg. No. 1,929,220 (Oct. 24, 1995)
COWBOY JOURNAL, online journals featuring
biographical and rodeo stories
Reg. No. 5,588,408 (Oct. 16, 2018)
39a
FARM JOURNAL, magazines about agribusiness
Reg. No. 5,140,218 (Feb. 14, 2017)
FLIGHT JOURNAL, magazine about aviation
Reg. No. 2,200,766 (Oct. 27, 1998)
JOURNAL OF ASTHMA, journal covering asthma
Reg. No. 2,634,805 (Oct. 15, 2002)
JOURNAL OF NEUROSURGERY, periodical about
neurosurgery
Reg. No. 2,773,359 (Oct. 14, 2003)
JOURNAL OF PHYSICS, periodicals about science and
physics
Reg. No. 4,431,340 (Nov. 12, 2013)
JOURNAL OF SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASES,
articles about sexually transmitted diseases
Reg. No. 4,492,787 (Mar. 4, 2014)
OIL & GAS JOURNAL, magazine about oil and gas
Reg. No. 3,981,599 (June 21, 2011)
THE BEVERAGE JOURNAL, magazines featuring
alcoholic brand and pricing information
Reg. No. 5,466,460 (May 8, 2018)
THE EQUESTRIAN JOURNAL, journals in the field of
equestrian and horse services
Reg. No. 5,759,660 (May 21, 2019)
THE GOLFER’S JOURNAL, journals about sports,
namely golf
Reg. No. 5,917,053 (Nov. 19, 2019)
THE HOUSING JOURNAL, journals related to housing
Reg. No. 5,139,186 (Feb. 7, 2017)
THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, journals concerning
various financial topics
Reg. No. 3,533,255 (Nov. 18, 2008)
40a
THE JOURNAL OF HYPNOTISM, newsletters about
hypnotism
Reg. No. 4,178,482 (July 24, 2012)
THE JOURNAL OF NEUROSCIENCE, journal dealing with
neuroscience research
Reg. No. 2,959,143 (June 7, 2005)
THE JOURNAL OF NUTRITION, journals relating to
nutritional sciences
Reg. No. 3,238,971 (May 8, 2007)
THE JOURNAL OF UROLOGY, magazines about urology
Reg. No. 4,358,075 (June 25, 2013)
THE LINGERIE JOURNAL, trade magazine covering
intimate apparel
Reg. No. 5,146,088 (Feb. 21, 2017)
THE PARALEGAL JOURNAL, magazine covering
paralegal education
Reg. No. 4,394,176 (Aug. 27, 2013)
WATCH JOURNAL, magazines and journals featuring
information about watches
Reg. No. 4,137,184 (May 1, 2012)
Magazine
DANCE MAGAZINE, magazines about dance
Reg. No. 2,023,369 (Dec. 17, 1996)
GLASS MAGAZINE, magazines dealing with glass
industry
Reg. No. 1,686,384 (May 12, 1992)
GOLF MAGAZINE, monthly magazine
Reg. No. 1,521,775 (Jan. 24, 1989)
MASSAGE MAGAZINE, magazines about massage
Reg. No. 5,334,734 (Nov. 14, 2017)
ONCOLOGISTICS MAGAZINE, industry news of interest
in the operation of oncology practices
Reg. No. 4,148,140 (May 29, 2012)
41a
SILVER MAGAZINE, magazines directed to collecting
antiques and articles of silver
Reg. No. 2,448,886 (May 8, 2001)
SKI MAGAZINE, magazine
Reg. No. 1,630,827 (Jan. 8, 1991)
Market
FRAGRANCEMARKET, retail store services featuring
perfume and cologne, among other goods
Reg. No. 2,763,335 (Sept. 16, 2003)
HOLIDAY MARKET, holiday decorations
Reg. No. 3,763,588 (Mar. 23, 2010)
SALMON MARKET, caviar, fish fillets, fish roe, prepared,
fish, canned, among other goods
Reg. No. 5,718,291 (Apr. 2, 2019)
SKINMARKET, online retail store featuring cosmetics
and bath and body products
Reg. No. 5,676,914 (Feb. 12, 2019)
THE BEER MARKET, bar services
Reg. No. 4,255,483 (Dec. 4, 2012)
THE SOUP MARKET, soups, stews
Reg. No. 4,647,800 (Dec. 2, 2014)
THE YACHT MARKET, advertising of boats, yachts, and
other water vehicles
Reg. No. 4,929,246 (Mar. 29, 2016)
Mart
BEAUTY MART, retail and wholesale services in the field
of beauty supplies
Reg. No. 1,635,090 (Feb. 12, 1991)
BRIDAL MART, retail store services in the field of
women’s clothing and accessories
Reg. No. 2,596,271 (July 16, 2002)
42a
CONVENIENT FOOD MART, retail store services
featuring convenience store items and gasoline;
retail delicatessen services
Reg. No. 3,222,097 (Mar. 27, 2007)
DECORATING MART, retail store services featuring
wallpaper, wallcoverings, blinds, fabric, etc.
Reg. No. 2,042,467 (Mar. 4, 1997)
DOOR-MART, installation, maintenance and repair of
garage doors, and accessories
Reg. No. 4,067,057 (Dec. 6, 2011)
FENCESMART, online retail store featuring fence parts
Reg. No. 5,828,945 (Aug. 6, 2019)
FISH MART, various services featuring fish, pets,
plants, and aquatic supplies
Reg. No. 2,763,335 (Sept. 16, 2003)
LINGERIE MART, lingerie retail and wholesale store
services
Reg. No. 3,048,590 (Jan. 24, 2006)
PAPER MART, various services relating to offices
supplies and packaging supplies
Reg. No. 3,698,151 (Oct. 20, 2009)
Reg. No. 2,704,421 (Apr. 8, 2003)
ROBEMART, online and retail store services featuring
home textiles, spa accessories, and robes
Reg. No. 5,075,472 (Nov. 1, 2016)
SOFA MART, retail furniture store services
Reg. No. 2,416,878 (Jan. 2, 2001)
SPICEMART, retail and wholesale store services in the
field of spices
Reg. No. 4,600,427 (Sept. 9, 2014)
STONE MART, retail store for natural stone products
Reg. No. 4,249,839 (Nov. 27, 2012)
43a
THE BANK MART, banking services
Reg. No. 1,290,437 (Aug. 14, 1984)
TRUCK INSURANCE MART, insurance agencies and
insurance consultation
Reg. No. 3,404,518 (Apr. 1, 2008)
WELDINGMART, online and retail store services
featuring welders and welding supplies
Reg. No. 3,556,608 (Jan. 6, 2009)
Monthly
CANCER MONTHLY, health information about cancer
Reg. No. 3,762,383 (Mar. 23, 2010)
MUSIC MONTHLY, online interview and review of music
Reg. No. 4,344,435 (May 28, 2013)
WINE BUSINESS MONTHLY, magazine about wine and
wine-related businesses
Reg. No. 3,057,812 (Feb. 7, 2006)
News
ANTHROPOLOGY NEWS, newsletters on anthropology
Reg. No. 2,966,046 (July 12, 2005)
ASSOCIATION NEWS, magazine concerning meeting,
planning arrangements and conferences
Reg. No. 2,642,022 (Oct. 29, 2002)
BEDDINGS NEWS & DESIGN, magazine featuring new
developments in sleep products
Reg. No. 2,250,657 (June 1, 1999)
CARDIOLOGY NEWS, online magazines covering medical
and cardiology news
Reg. No. 3,824,563 (July 27, 2010)
CATHOLIC NEWS SERVICE, current events from a
Catholic perspective
Reg. No. 2,630,640 (Oct. 8, 2002)
44a
COLLEGE NEWS, printed periodicals in the field of
higher education and academics
Reg. No. 4,285,218 (Feb. 5, 2013)
CRUISE INDUSTRY NEWS, newsletters and reference
manuals focusing on the cruise industry
Reg. No. 2,118,588 (Dec. 2, 1997)
E-DOCUMENT NEWS, online newsletters for the
electronic document industry
Reg. No. 2,993,506 (Sept. 6, 2005)
ENDOCRINE NEWS, printed periodicals and newsletters
in the field of endocrinology
Reg. No. 4,022,870 (Sept. 6, 2011)
FRAME BUILDING NEWS, magazines relating to the
post-frame building construction industry
Reg. No. 3,229,797 (Apr. 17, 2007)
GOURMET NEWS, newspapers for the gourmet food
industry
Reg. No. 2,272,049 (Aug. 24, 1999)
INVESTMENTNEWS, newspapers and newsletters for
the financial services industry
Reg. No. 3,135,672 (Aug. 29, 2006)
JOB NEWS, magazines about available employment
Reg. No. 2,580,875 (June 18, 2002)
MODEL AIRPLANE NEWS, magazines and newsletters
about model aircraft
Reg. No. 2,473,014 (July 31, 2001)
MOTORCYCLE PRODUCT NEWS, magazine for the retail
motorcycle industry
Reg. No. 2,363,575 (July 4, 2000)
NURSERY NEWS, newspaper directed to the nursery
and landscaping industry
Reg. No. 1,478,141 (Feb. 23, 1988)
45a
OPERA NEWS, magazines containing news and features
about classical music
Reg. No. 5,906,585 (Nov. 12, 2019)
PET PRODUCT NEWS, magazines about pet products
Reg. No. 1,967,786 (Apr. 16, 1996)
POKER NEWS, hosting digital content relating to
gaming and online casinos
Reg. No. 4,264,771 (Dec. 25, 2012)
RELIGIOUS PRODUCT NEWS, magazine providing
information on products and services to
churches
Reg. No. 2,984,318 (Aug. 9, 2005)
SCIENCE NEWS, magazine
Reg. No. 1,155,569 (May 26, 1981)
SECURITIES INDUSTRY NEWS, newspaper providing
information on the financial industry
Reg. No. 2,290,723 (Nov. 2, 1999)
SECURITY SYSTEMS NEWS, newspapers featuring
products and services in the field of security
Reg. No. 2,959,161 (June 7, 2005)
SENIOR LIVING NEWS, industry news newsletters in
the field of senior and assisted living
Reg. No. 5,802,775 (July 9, 2019)
SUPERMARKET NEWS, business information for food
distribution industry
Reg. No. 4,950,209 (May 3, 2016)
WOODSHOP NEWS, website in the field of woodworking
Reg. No. 4,069,020 (Dec. 13, 2011)
.ORG
ACNE.ORG, acne treatment preparations
Reg. No. 3,578,273 (Feb. 17, 2009)
46a
BREASTCANCER.ORG, online electronic bulletin boards
and chat rooms for women concerning breast
cancer
Reg. No. 2,828,665 (Mar. 30, 2004)
BROADWAY.ORG, the live theatrical shows of others
Reg. No. 5,954,814 (Jan. 7, 2020)
CHANGE.ORG, website promoting social change
Reg. No. 4,713,278 (Mar. 31, 2015)
CREDIT.ORG, credit counseling
Reg. No. 5,434,972 (Mar. 27, 2018)
HEALTHCARE.ORG, insurance underwriting in the field
of auto, life, health, home, and motorcycle
Reg. No. 4,802,526 (Sept. 1, 2015)
WATER.ORG, educational services, namely, providing
training in the fields of hygiene, safe water
Reg. No. 3,801,355 (June 8, 2010)
WWW.TEENPREGNANCY.ORG, promoting the awareness
of the consequences of teen pregnancy
Reg. No. 2,557,481 (Apr. 2, 2002)
Other Publications
BICYCLING, magazine having a subject matter of
interest to bicycles
Reg. No. 1,079,823 (Dec. 20, 1977)
BOATING, downloadable electronic publications in the
nature of a magazine in the field of boating
Reg. No. 4,430,298 (Nov. 5, 2013)
FLYING, downloadable electronic publications in the
nature of a magazine in the field of aviation
Reg. No. 4,355,777 (June 18, 2013)
PARENTING, information on pregnancy, child rearing,
child development, parent/child relationships,
family health and related topics
Reg. No. 2,026,010 (Dec. 24, 1996)
47a
POETRY, magazines and books about poetry
Reg. No. 2,198,539 (Oct. 20, 1998)
SCOUTING, magazine for adult leaders in scouting
Reg. No. 1,197,851 (June 15, 1982)
SKIING, magazine published seven times a year
Reg. No. 0,909,613 (Mar. 9, 1971)
Outlet
FRAGRANCE OUTLET, retail store services featuring
perfume, cologne
Reg. No. 5,970,209 (Jan. 28, 2020)
GENTLEMEN’S SUIT OUTLET, retail store services
featuring men’s clothing
Reg. No. 5,923,030 (Nov. 26, 2019)
HAM RADIO OUTLET, retail store services featuring
amateur radio and electronics equipment
Reg. No. 5,911,801 (Nov. 19, 2019)
INSURANCE OUTLET, insurance agency and brokerage
Reg. No. 3,777,204 (Apr. 20, 2010)
SKIRT OUTLET, clothing, including skirts
Reg. No. 5,676,914 (Feb. 12, 2019)
THE COSMETIC OUTLET, online and retail store
services with skin and body topical lotions,
creams and oils for cosmetic use, and cosmetic
products
Reg. No. 3,976,461 (June 14, 2011)
THE MARKET OUTLET, discount stores for retail store
services for close-out of supermarket items
Reg. No. 3,743,466 (Jan. 26, 2010)
THE UNIFORM OUTLET, uniforms
Reg. No. 4,903,001 (Feb. 16, 2016)
THE VACATION OUTLET, travel agency services
Reg. No. 1,519,447 (Jan. 3, 1989)
48a
THE WINE CELLAR OUTLET, retail store services
featuring wine
Reg. No. 5,694,800 (Mar. 12, 2019)
VIOLIN OUTLET, online and retail stores featuring
musical instruments, including violins and other
stringed instruments
Reg. No. 3,751,042 (Feb. 23, 2010)
Partnership
AUTISM PARTNERSHIP, behavioral health serv
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