Respondents Brief — United States Patent and Trademark Office, et al., Petitioners v. Booking.com B.V.

Supreme Court briefFeb 12, 2020

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No. 19-46

In the Supreme Court of the United States

UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, ET AL.,

PETITIONERS,

v.

BOOKING.COM B.V.,

RESPONDENT.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT

DAVID H. BERNSTEIN

JARED I. KAGAN

DEBEVOISE &

PLIMPTON LLP

919 Third Avenue

New York, NY 10022

JONATHAN E. MOSKIN

FOLEY & LARDNER LLP

90 Park Avenue

New York, NY 10016

LISA S. BLATT

Counsel of Record

SARAH M. HARRIS

EDEN SCHIFFMANN

JOHN B. SWANSON

WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY LLP

725 Twelfth Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20005

(202) 434-5000

lblatt@wc.com

QUESTION PRESENTED

Under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq., generic terms may not be registered as trademarks. The

question presented is as follows:

Whether the addition by an online business of a generic top-level domain (“.com”) to an otherwise generic

term can create a protectable trademark.

(I)

II

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

The parties to the proceeding are the United States

Patent and Trademark Office; Andrei Iancu, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director, United States Patent and Trademark Office; and

Booking.com B.V.

Respondent Booking.com B.V. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Booking Holdings Inc., a publicly-traded company.

III

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

STATEMENT ....................................................................... 1

A. Statutory Framework ............................................... 4

B. The Trademark Registration and Review

Process ........................................................................ 7

C. Factual and Procedural Background ................... 10

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ......................................... 15

ARGUMENT ....................................................................... 18

I. THE LANHAM ACT DOES NOT BAR

GENERIC.COM TRADEMARKS .............................. 18

A. The Act Mandates the Primary-Significance

Test To Assess the Genericness of All Marks,

Including Domain Names ...................................... 19

B. Applying the Primary-Significance Test to All

Types of Marks Furthers the Act’s Aims ............ 24

C. The Primary-Significance Inquiry Properly

Considers Survey Evidence ................................... 30

D. BOOKING.COM is Descriptive, Not Generic,

and Under the Primary-Significance Test .......... 34

II. GOODYEAR DOES NOT COMPEL A

CONTRARY RESULT............................................... 34

A. The Lanham Act Repudiated the Government’s

Per Se Rule............................................................... 35

B. The Government’s Per Se Rule Would Strip

Countless Marks of Trademark Protection and

Confer No Competitive Benefits........................... 46

CONCLUSION ................................................................... 50

(III)

IV

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases:

A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman,

808 F.2d 291 (3d Cir. 1986) ................................ 23, 32

Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting

World, Inc.,

537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976) .................................... 31, 32

Advertise.com, Inc. v. AOL Advert.

Inc.,

616 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2010) ........................... passim

Am. Univ. v. Am. Univ. of Kuwait,

Cancellation No. 92049706, slip op.

(T.T.A.B. Jan. 30, 2020) ........................................... 30

Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun

Grp.,

684 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1982) .................................. 23

Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co.,

272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) ...................................... 23

BellSouth Corp. v. Data Nat’l Corp.,

60 F.3d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1995) .................................. 20

Berner Int’l Corp. v. Mars Sales Co.,

987 F.2d 975 (3d Cir. 1993) ...................................... 30

Cal. Cooler, Inc. v. Loretto Winery,

Ltd.,

774 F.2d 1451 (9th Cir. 1985) .................................... 7

Columbia Mill Co. v. Alcorn,

150 U.S. 460 (1893) ................................................... 38

Comm’r v. Keystone Consol. Indus.,

508 U.S. 152 (1993) ................................................... 21

Corbin v. Gould, 133 U.S. 308 (1890) .......................... 38

Del. & Hudson Canal Co. v. Clark,

80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 311 (1871) ................................... 36

V

Page(s)

Cases—continued:

Elgin Nat’l Watch Co. v. Ill. Watch

Case Co., 179 U.S. 665 (1901),

abrogated on other grounds by

Hurn v. Oursler,

289 U.S. 238 (1933) ......................................... 5, 36, 39

Estate of P.D. Beckwith, Inc. v.

Comm’r of Patents,

252 U.S. 538 (1920) ................................................... 38

Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing

Co.,

124 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 1997) ................................ 23, 48

Goodyear’s Rubber Mfg. Co. v.

Goodyear Rubber Co.,

128 U.S. 598 (1888) .......................................... passim

Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli,

164 F.3d 806 (2d Cir. 1999) ...................................... 32

Helene Curtis Indus. v. Church &

Dwight Co.,

560 F.2d 1325 (7th Cir. 1977) .................................. 22

Howe Scale Co. v. Wyckoff, Seamans &

Benedict,

198 U.S. 229 (1905) ................................................... 38

Hunt Masters, Inc. v. Landry’s

Seafood Rest., Inc.,

240 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 2001) .................................... 32

Iancu v. Brunetti,

139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019) ........................................... 7, 47

In re 1800Mattress.com IP LLC,

586 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ................................ 45

In re ActiveVideo Networks, Inc.,

111 U.S.P.Q.2d 1581 (T.T.A.B. 2014) ..................... 20

VI

Page(s)

Cases—continued:

In re Analog Devices,

10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1879 (Fed. Cir.

1989) ........................................................................... 32

In re Hotels.com, L.P.,

573 F.3d 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ...................... 9, 24, 45

In re Martin Container, Inc.,

65 U.S.P.Q.2d 1058 (T.T.A.B. 2002) ....................... 44

In re Northland Aluminum Prods.,

777 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ................................ 32

In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP,

373 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 2004) .................... 43, 44, 45

In re Reed Elsevier Props., Inc.,

77 U.S.P.Q.2d 1649 (T.T.A.B. 2005) ................. 24, 45

In re Vacationfutures,

2016 WL 4775500 (T.T.A.B. 2016) .......................... 44

In re Wm. G. Coleman Co., 93

U.S.P.Q.2d 2019 (T.T.A.B. 2010) ............................ 42

Inwood Labs. v. Ives Labs., 456 U.S.

844 (1982) ................................................................... 40

Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co.,

305 U.S. 111 (1938) ................................................... 22

Lawrence Mfg. Co. v. Tenn. Mfg. Co.,

138 U.S. 537 (1891) ............................................. 38, 49

Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017)........................ 4, 7

Maremont Corp. v. Air Lift Co.,

463 F.2d 1114 (C.C.P.A. 1972) ................................ 21

Miller Brewing Co. v. Joseph Schlitz

Brewing Co.,

605 F.2d 990 (7th Cir. 1979) .................................... 32

Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep

Sys., Inc.,

874 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1989) ........................................ 48

VII

Page(s)

Cases—continued:

Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Def.,

138 S. Ct. 617 (2018) ................................................. 19

Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly,

Inc.,

469 U.S. 189 (1985) .......................................... passim

Princeton Vanguard, LLC v. Frito-Lay

N. Am., Inc.,

786 F.3d 960 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ............................ 20, 30

Q-Tips, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson,

108 F. Supp. 845 (D.N.J. 1952), aff’d,

206 F.2d 144 (3d Cir. 1953) ...................................... 22

Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co.,

514 U.S. 159 (1995) .......................................... passim

Retail Servs., Inc. v. Freebies Publ’g,

364 F.3d 535 (4th Cir. 2004) .................................... 29

Roselux Chem. Co. v. Parsons

Ammonia Co.,

299 F.2d 855 (C.C.P.A. 1962) .................................. 22

Rotkiske v. Klemm,

140 S. Ct. 355 (2019) ................................................. 24

Royal Crown Co. v. The Coca-Cola Co.,

892 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ................................ 32

Schulmerich Elecs., Inc. v. J.C.

Deagan, Inc.,

202 F.2d 772 (C.C.P.A. 1953) .................................. 22

Schwan’s IP, LLC v. Kraft Pizza Co.,

460 F.3d 971 (8th Cir. 2006) .................................... 32

Skilling v. United States,

561 U.S. 358 (2010) ................................................... 21

Surgicenters of Am., Inc. v. Med.

Dental Surgeries, Co.,

601 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir. 1979) .................................. 22

VIII

Page(s)

Cases—continued:

Swatch AG v. Beehive Wholesale, LLC,

739 F.3d 150 (4th Cir. 2014) ...................................... 9

Tech. Publ’g Co. v. Lebhar-Friedman,

Inc.,

729 F.2d 1136 (7th Cir. 1984) .................................. 32

Telechron, Inc. v. Telicon Corp.,

198 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1952) ...................................... 22

TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg.

Displays, Inc.,

532 U.S. 23 (2001) ..................................................... 27

Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.,

505 U.S. 763 (1992) ..................................................... 6

Weiss Noodle Co. v. Golden Cracknel &

Specialty Co.,

290 F.2d 845 (C.C.P.A. 1961) .................................. 32

Welding Servs., Inc. v. Forman, 509

F.3d 1351 (11th Cir. 2007) ....................................... 41

Statutes and regulations:

Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. ................ passim

§ 1051(a)(1) .................................................................. 7

§ 1052 ................................................................. passim

§ 1052(f) .................................................................. 6, 25

§ 1064(3) ............................................................ passim

§ 1065 ............................................................................ 6

§ 1070 ............................................................................ 9

§ 1071(a)(4) .................................................................. 9

§ 1071(b)(1) .................................................................. 9

§ 1091(a) ....................................................... 6, 8, 17, 39

§ 1125(a) ....................................................................... 7

§ 1125(d) ........................................................... 7, 25, 26

§ 1127 ................................................................. passim

28 U.S.C. § 1291 ............................................................... 9

37 C.F.R. § 2.141 .............................................................. 9

IX

Page(s)

Statutes and regulations—continued:

37 C.F.R. § 2.142 .............................................................. 9

2017 O.J. L. 154/8-9, Art. 7(1), (3)

(E.U.) .......................................................................... 11

Trade Marks Act 1994, c. 26, § 3 (U.K.) ..................... 11

Trade Marks Act 1995, pt IV div 2

(Austl.) ........................................................................ 11

Trade Marks Act 2002, s.18 (N.Z.) .............................. 11

Miscellaneous:

Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) ...................... 26

Booking Holdings Inc., Annual Report

(Form 10-K) (Feb. 27, 2019), available at https://ir.bookingholdings.com/node/24076/html ....................................... 10

Our Story, Booking.com,

https://careers.booking.com/aboutbooking (last visited Feb. 11, 2020) ........................ 10

William Henry Browne, A Treatise on

the Law of Trademarks

(2d ed. 1885) ............................................................... 37

Lanning G. Bryer et al., Intellectual

Property Strategies for the 21st

Century Corporation (2016) ..................................... 8

Lindsay Gellman, How Search Engines

Are Killing Clever URLs, The

Atlantic (Dec. 15, 2016),

https://tinyurl.com/uqhkcne .................................... 27

Norman F. Hesseltine, A Digest of the

Law of Trade-Marks and Unfair

Trade (1906) .................................................... 5, 36, 37

James Love Hopkins, The Law of

Trademarks, Tradenames and

Unfair Competition (4th ed. 1924) ........................ 37

X

Page(s)

Miscellaneous—continued:

J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on

Trademarks and Unfair

Competition (5th ed. 2018) ............................. passim

Harry S. Nims, The Law of Unfair

Competition and Trade-Marks

(2d ed. 1917) ............................................................... 37

Amasa C. Paul, The Law of

Trademarks & Unfair Competition

(1903) .......................................................................... 37

S. Rep. 98-627, 98th Cong.,

2d Sess. 1 (1984) .................................................. 21, 23

United States Patent and Trademark

Office, Trademark Manual of

Examining Procedure (Oct. 2018) ................. passim

Francis H. Upton, A Treatise on the

Law of Trade Marks (1860) .................................... 36

In the Supreme Court of the United States

No. 19-46

UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, ET AL.,

PETITIONERS,

v.

BOOKING.COM B.V.,

RESPONDENT.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT

STATEMENT

Under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq., the

consumer is king: trademark protection turns on whether

a mark permits consumers to distinguish one brand of

products from another. The Act thus denies protection to

generic names for categories of goods or services. Section

1064(3) states that a mark’s “primary significance … to

the relevant public … shall be the test for determining

whether the registered mark has become the generic

name of goods or services.” The Act nowhere suggests

that different rules govern compound phrases (like

(1)

2

“Booking Company”) or domain-name trademarks, including a generic root word coupled with “.com.”

Under the primary-significance test, whether a mark

is generic depends on whether relevant consumers believe

that the mark as a whole is the generic name for the class

of goods or services. Because that test requires assessing

what consumers think, courts and the Patent & Trademark Office (“PTO”) have long evaluated facts relevant to

consumer perceptions—especially survey evidence—to

resolve genericness case by case. The Fourth Circuit thus

properly asked whether consumers consider BOOKING.COM, as a whole, to signify the generic name for online

hotel-reservation services. The court credited the district

court’s factual finding that the answer was no, citing

(among other evidence) a survey showing that 74.8% of

relevant consumers consider BOOKING.COM a brand, not a

generic name, and the weakness of the PTO’s contrary evidence. That analysis should end this case. 1

The government instead urges a per se rule that a generic term like “cotton,” “grain,” or “reservation” coupled

with a suffix like “Company,” “Inc.,” “.com,” or “Store” is

always generic for those goods or services—even if overwhelming evidence shows that consumers believe the

mark as a whole is not generic. The government would

apparently extend this rule to any suffix denoting the type

of enterprise involved, like “Association,” “Shop,”

“House,” “Journal,” etc.

The government’s theory rests entirely on Goodyear’s

Rubber Manufacturing Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 128

The PTO registered all marks in small caps in this brief except

BOOKING.COM. Mark registrations can be found on PTO’s database,

https://www.uspto.gov/trademarks-application-process/searchtrademark-database.

1

3

U.S. 598 (1888), a decision the Lanham Act repudiated.

Goodyear embodied the common-law principle that no one

could trademark any name that could equally describe a

competitor’s products, no matter how much consumers

associated such names with a brand. Goodyear thus held

that names like “The Goodyear Company” could not be

trademarked. Any number of producers could claim the

name “Goodyear” (which described the process for vulcanizing rubber). The Lanham Act discarded that rule by

adopting the primary-significance test for genericness

and by mandating registration of any mark consumers

consider distinctive, including GOODYEAR itself.

Turning back the clock to 1888 would confuse over 300

million American consumers, who rely on hundreds of

PTO-registered marks that defy the government’s per se

rule. The national grocery chain FOODS CO is indeed a

company selling foods, just as THE WIG COMPANY is a

company selling wigs and THE FLAGPOLE COMPANY is a

company selling flagpoles. LAWYERS ALLIANCE is an alliance of lawyers, IRRIGATION ASSOCIATION is an association for the irrigation industry, and CAR WASH ENTERPRISES is an enterprise that washes cars.

Meanwhile, the national chain THE CONTAINER STORE

is a store for containers. THE MATTRESS SHOPPE and

THE MEDICINE SHOPPE sell exactly what their names

suggest. WAFFLE HOUSE is America’s top waffle purveyor. Self-explanatory depots (like OFFICE DEPOT and

THE HOME DEPOT) abound. Aptly named marts (e.g.,

BEAUTY MART) and warehouses (e.g., SPRINKLER WAREHOUSE) have flourished. TV GUIDE and CONSUMER REPORTS have been fixtures for generations. COFFEE REVIEW reviews coffee; WATCH JOURNAL chronicles

watches. Innumerable PTO-registered nonprofit marks

flunk the government’s test: ALZHEIMER’S FOUNDATION,

4

AUTISM SOCIETY, AMPUTEE COALITION, CHRISTIAN COALITION, CARING INSTITUTE, OUTDOOR ALLIANCE, WATER.ORG. The list goes on. Appx. A.

The government’s position would also decimate countless PTO-registered Generic.com marks, which pervade

every aspect of our lives. Seeking a date? Try DATING.COM. Want to impress with concert tickets? TICKETS.COM or CONCERT.COM can get them. Hoping for nice

weather? Check WEATHER.COM. Looking for the perfect

dinner spot? RESTAURANT.COM offers deals. Booking a

flight to meet the parents? FLIGHTS.COM can help. Need

entertainment? KARAOKE.COM has it covered. Considering a honeymoon cruise? There’s CRUISE.COM. Seeking

a bigger residence?

Try RENTALS.COM, RENTALHOUSES.COM,

or

HOMES.COM.

Expecting?

BABYSHOWER.COM assists with the traditional lead-up,

while CARE.COM finds nannies for the end result. More

interested in progenitors than progeny? ANCESTRY.COM

and GENEALOGY.COM trace family trees. For links lovers,

GOLF.COM offers golf news, golf travel, golf instruction,

and golf gear. For fitness buffs, WORKOUT.COM advises

on, yes, workouts. Lawyers turn to LAW.COM. For those

with more prurient interests, there is SEX.COM. Companies and nonprofits use these registered marks and others

to identify themselves to millions of Americans on websites, in mobile applications, and offline. The PTO even

registered COOKING.COM—but the government now insists BOOKING.COM is a bridge too far. This is nonsense.

A. Statutory Framework

Since antiquity, makers of various goods have placed

marks on their products to distinguish them from competitors’. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017). During

the nineteenth century, federal courts developed a federal

common law of trademarks. That body of law and its

5

state-law counterparts protected only technical trademarks, i.e., marks that inherently identified the provider

of a good or service. Elgin Nat’l Watch Co. v. Ill. Watch

Case Co., 179 U.S. 665, 673 (1901), abrogated on other

grounds by Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933); 1 J.

Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 4:3 (5th ed. 2018). Trademark law thus

excluded from protection marks that described a product’s attributes rather than its maker. Norman F. Hesseltine, A Digest of the Law of Trade-Marks and Unfair

Trade 31 (1906). Unprotected trade names received protection only under unfair-competition law, typically if

competitors fraudulently deceived consumers by trying to

seize the goodwill others had built behind their names.

Elgin, 179 U.S. at 674; Hesseltine, supra, at 209-10.

The 1946 Lanham Act transformed the law by creating a federal regime that “describes th[e] universe” of potential trademarks “in the broadest of terms.” Qualitex

Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995). Under the Act, a “trademark” includes “any word, name,

symbol, or device or any combination thereof” that a person uses “to identify and distinguish his or her goods …

from those manufactured or sold by others.” 15 U.S.C.

§ 1127; accord id. § 1052. The Act recognizes the following spectrum of trademarks:

Fanciful, arbitrary, or suggestive marks: At one end

are inherently distinctive marks that are “fanciful,” “arbitrary,” or “suggestive.” Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 162. Examples include fanciful, made-up names like ACCENTURE or

EXXON, arbitrary names like APPLE COMPUTER COMPANY for electronics, and suggestive names like

CHEWY.COM that indirectly connote pet-supply products.

“[T]heir intrinsic nature serves to identify a particular

6

source” of goods or services. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992). Pre-Lanham Act

common law only protected these “technical” trademarks.

McCarthy, supra, § 4:3.

Descriptive marks: In the middle of the spectrum are

marks that “describe[] the qualities or characteristics of a

good or service.” Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly,

Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985). The common law refused to

protect those marks. But under the Act, descriptive

marks can be registered in two ways. First, the PTO must

register marks on the principal register if they have acquired distinctiveness (or “secondary meaning”), i.e., they

“ha[ve] become distinctive of the applicant’s goods in commerce” and connote a specific brand to a significant proportion of consumers. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f); see McCarthy,

supra, §§ 4:14, 15:1. If the marks have not yet acquired

such distinctiveness but are still “capable of distinguishing [an] applicant’s goods or services” in some fashion, the

marks are “merely descriptive,” and the PTO must register them on the supplemental register. 15 U.S.C.

§ 1091(a); McCarthy, supra, § 19:32.

Generic terms: At the far end of the spectrum are unprotected “generic” terms, i.e., “the generic name for the

goods or services” as a class. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1064(3)

(subjecting “generic” marks to cancellation), 1065 (“generic” marks can be contested), 1127 (marks are “abandoned” if owner causes them to be “generic”).

Generic terms do not distinguish one producer’s goods

or services from another’s. If consumers understand “oranges” as the name for all spherical citrus fruits of that

color, an orchard cannot register “Oranges” as the name

for its particular specimens. Generic marks thus are not

registrable. See id. §§ 1052, 1091(a). And marks are subject to cancellation if “[t]he primary significance of the

7

registered mark to the relevant public … [is that] the

[mark] has become the generic name of goods or services

on or in connection with which it has been used.” Id.

§ 1064(3).

B. The Trademark Registration and Review Process

1. Federal trademark registration conveys “valuable

benefits.” Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2297 (2019).

Registration on the principal register confers evidentiary

advantages in court and the ability to stop imports of infringing articles. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1753. Registration

on the supplemental register, in turn, lets mark holders

pursue Lanham Act remedies against infringement if they

prove their mark has secondary meaning in infringement

litigation, or in subsequent registration applications. E.g.,

Cal. Cooler, Inc. v. Loretto Winery, Ltd., 774 F.2d 1451,

1454 (9th Cir. 1985). Even unregistered trademarks that

satisfy the definition of a trademark can receive protection against infringement under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) and

rights under the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, id. § 1125(d). Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1752-53.

The PTO processes trademark registration applications. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(1). PTO examiners apply the

PTO’s Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure (Oct.

2018) (“Examiner’s Manual”) to identify generic marks.

The PTO bears the burden of proving genericness. Examiner’s Manual § 1209.01(c)(i).

The PTO deems a mark generic if the “primary significance to the relevant public is the class or category of

goods or services.” Id. The primary-significance test involves determining (1) “the genus of goods or services at

issue,” and (2) whether “the relevant public understand[s]

the [trademark] designation primarily to refer to that genus of goods or services.” Id. “The test for genericness is

8

the same whether the mark is a compound term or a

phrase,” and requires assessing “the mark as a whole.”

Id. If the evidence reveals that consumers primarily view

the mark as a whole as the generic name for the goods or

services on offer (for example, if consumers believe “Oranges,” “Oranges Inc.,” or “Oranges Etc.” refer to oranges generally), examiners refuse registration.

The PTO applies the same primary-significance test to

Internet domain-name marks, asking “whether the relevant public would understand the mark as a whole to have

generic significance.” Id. §§ 1209.01(c)(i), 1215.05. 2 Only

if the “relevant public” would “understand the [domain

name] to refer to” the generic category of goods or services can the examiner deem the domain name generic.

Id. § 1209.01(c)(i). The manual disclaims any “per se rule

that the addition of a [suffix, like “.com”] to an otherwise

generic term can never under any circumstances operate

to create a registrable mark.” Id. § 1215.05.

As noted, supra p. 6, the PTO places on the supplemental register merely descriptive marks, i.e., marks that

are non-generic because they are capable of distinguishing an applicant’s products but are not yet associated with

a single source. 15 U.S.C. § 1091(a). The PTO registered

many marks in Appendix A on the supplemental register,

meaning the PTO found them not generic.

Domain names are strings of unique characters used to identify Internet websites; they commonly include a word or phrase followed by

a suffix such as “.com,” “.gov,” or “.edu.” Those suffixes are called the

“top level domains” (“TLD”). Over 1,500 such suffixes exist. While

only certain entities can register some suffixes (like “.gov”), “.com,”

“.net,” and “.org” are unrestricted. Lanning G. Bryer et al., Intellectual Property Strategies for the 21st Century Corporation 88 (2016).

2

9

If the mark is descriptive and has attained secondary

meaning, i.e., consumers identify the mark with a single

brand, the PTO registers the mark on the principal register. Examiner’s Manual §§ 1209.02, 1212.06(d). Primary

significance and secondary meaning are analytically distinct; a mark may clear the primary-significance test and

avoid rejection on genericness grounds, but must also

have secondary meaning to be on the principal register.

2. Applicants may appeal adverse decisions to the

Trademark Trial & Appeal Board (“TTAB”), which reviews the same record and assesses the examiner’s decision de novo. 15 U.S.C. § 1070; 37 C.F.R. §§ 2.141-2.142.

Applicants may challenge adverse TTAB decisions in the

Federal Circuit or federal district court.

Before the Federal Circuit, applicants proceed “on the

record before the [PTO].” 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a)(4). The

Federal Circuit “give[s] plenary review to the TTAB’s legal conclusions,” but “review[s] its factual findings” for

“substantial evidence.” In re Hotels.com, L.P., 573 F.3d

1300, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2009). That deferential standard for

factfinding applies to the TTAB’s genericness determinations, because the “primary significance of the … mark to

the relevant public” is a factual question. Id.

Proceeding to district court lets applicants introduce

new evidence and provides de novo review of law and

facts. 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(1); Swatch AG v. Beehive

Wholesale, LLC, 739 F.3d 150, 155 (4th Cir. 2014). The

losing party may appeal to the regional circuits, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291, which review district court factfinding “for clear

error” and “legal conclusions de novo.” Swatch, 739 F.3d

at 154-55.

10

C. Factual and Procedural Background

1. Respondent Booking.com began in 1996 as a Dutch

company with a corresponding website called Bookings.nl. As its success grew, its scope expanded; to reflect

its global reach, the company in 2005 changed its name to

Booking.com, purchased the domain name “Booking.com,” and consolidated operations within that brand.

As part of that consolidation, respondent purchased the

BOOKINGS.COM trademark, which the PTO registered in

2004 on the supplemental register for online advertising

services (including advertising of booking services). See

Reg. No. 2,818,491.

Today, Booking.com is one of the world’s leading digital travel companies, counting more than 30 million

unique website visitors each month (10 million from the

United States). JA17 (2013-14 numbers). Respondent offers services in 224 jurisdictions and in 43 languages, all

through the Booking.com-branded website and mobile application. JA144. Respondent built this business through

enormous investments in customer service and advertising, and employs some 17,500 people in more than 200 offices worldwide. Our Story, Booking.com, https://careers.booking.com/about-booking (last visited Feb. 11,

2020). In 2018, respondent’s parent, Booking Holdings,

spent $4.4 billion on online advertising and $509 million on

other marketing, including television ads that associate

Booking.com with competitive prices, superior accommodations, and excellent customer service. Booking Holdings Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 38-39 (Feb. 27,

2019), available at https://ir.bookingholdings.com/node

/24076/html; JA18-20; JA24-29.

Respondent’s efforts have fostered strong brand

recognition, prompting 85 foreign jurisdictions to register

11

BOOKING.COM as a trademark. JA140-42. Those jurisdictions include the European Community, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand—which, like the United

States, refuse to register marks that consumers do not

consider distinctive. 2017 O.J. L. 154/8-9, Art. 7(1), (3)

(E.U.); Trade Marks Act 1994, c. 26, § 3 (U.K.); Trade

Marks Act 1995, pt IV div 2 s 41 (Austl.); Trade Marks Act

2002, s. 18 (N.Z.).

2. In 2011 and 2012, respondent filed four registration applications for BOOKING.COM and stylized versions

of the mark in connection with hotel-reservation and other

services. Pet.App.4a. The examiner refused registration

on the principal register, finding the marks merely descriptive. Pet.App.50a. Respondent produced evidence

that BOOKING.COM “had acquired distinctiveness” as a

brand. The examiner then deemed BOOKING.COM generic

and refused registration. Pet.App.50a.

The TTAB affirmed, reasoning that BOOKING.COM

was generic because consumers would understand its

“primary significance” as “an online reservation service

for lodgings” generally. JA312; JA347. The TTAB relied

on dictionary definitions of “booking” as a noun meaning

“a reservation for a room in a hotel” or “the service of arranging reservations for hotel rooms.” JA331. The TTAB

also relied on dictionary definitions of “.com” as a commercial website, JA336; respondent’s website describing

“booking” services; other websites and news articles; and

domain names containing “booking” and “.com” to sell

reservations (e.g., hotelbooking.com). JA319-26.

Respondent sought review of the TTAB’s decision in

the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia

and introduced additional evidence that consumers understand BOOKING.COM as a brand name, not a generic

term.

12

First, respondent introduced the report of statistician

Hal Poret, whom the TTAB, the Federal Trade Commission, and courts have accepted as an expert in survey research. JA35; JA41. Poret designed an industry-standard “Teflon survey” to determine whether consumers perceive BOOKING.COM as a generic term or brand. The survey presented various marks to “consumers who search

for or make hotel or travel arrangements online” and

asked them whether each mark is a generic term or brand.

JA43. Poret controlled for “concerns that survey respondents might answer that any DOT-COM name is a

brand” by including Washingmachine.com, which has no

associated brand, as a control. JA43. While 30% of respondents identified Washingmachine.com as a brand,

“74.8% … identified BOOKING.COM to be a brand name.”

JA53. Poret concluded: “[T]hese results strongly establish that BOOKING.COM is not perceived by consumers to

be a generic term.” JA54.

Second, respondent introduced the report of Dr. Sarah-Jane Leslie, a Princeton professor with expertise in

linguistics. Leslie explained that under basic linguistics

principles, even if “booking” and “.com” were generic

terms in isolation, consumers would not necessarily understand BOOKING.COM to refer to all hotel-reservation

services. JA138-39. And just because “booking.com” appears within terms like “dubai-travelbooking.com” does

not show that consumers consider BOOKING.COM to mean

all hotel-reservation services. JA139.

Finally, respondent introduced evidence of its reputation, marketing, and commercial success to demonstrate

that consumers do not view BOOKING.COM as a generic

name for hotel-reservation services but rather identify it

with respondent’s brand. E.g., JA17-18.

13

3. The district court held that BOOKING.COM is not

generic for hotel-reservation services, and further held

that BOOKING.COM is entitled to registration on the principal register because consumers associate it with respondent specifically. 3

The court first determined that BOOKING.COM is not

generic. Like the TTAB, the court looked to whether “the

primary significance of the mark to the relevant public is

to identify the class of product or the service to which the

mark relates.” Pet.App.60a. Like the TTAB, the court

defined the relevant public as “consumers who use travel,

tour, and hotel reservation services offered via the internet or in person.” Pet.App.63a. The court agreed that “by

itself, the word ‘booking’ is generic,” Pet.App.67a, but

adding “.com” made a difference because a unique domain

name “is generally a descriptive mark.” Pet.App.74a.

Rather than relying on a presumption that domain

names are descriptive, the court examined the evidence

and concluded that consumers would not primarily understand BOOKING.COM to signify all hotel-reservation services. The court emphasized “the absence of evidence that

consumers or producers use the term ‘booking.com’ to describe” booking services generically. Pet.App.85a. The

court found respondent’s survey “persuasive evidence

that the consuming public understands BOOKING.COM to

be a specific brand, not a generic name for online booking

services.” Pet.App.88a.

Because the court determined that BOOKING.COM is

descriptive, the court next considered whether consumers

associate the BOOKING.COM mark with respondent, such

that the mark is sufficiently distinctive to register, i.e., has

3

The court rejected registration of BOOKING.COM for general travel

services. That ruling is not before the Court.

14

secondary meaning. Pet.App.96a. The court found respondent’s evidence “more than sufficient” on this score.

Pet.App.116a.

4. The Fourth Circuit affirmed in a divided opinion.

The government “concede[d] that if BOOKING.COM may

properly be deemed descriptive, the district court’s finding that it has acquired secondary meaning was warranted.” Pet.App.8a. The question on appeal was thus

“whether the district court erred in finding that BOOKING.COM is not generic,” Pet.App.8a, “a question of fact …

to which the district court … is accorded great deference.”

Pet.App.13a.

The Fourth Circuit resolved that question using the

primary-significance test. The court applied that test by

(1) “identify[ing] the class of product or service to which

the use of the mark is relevant,” (2) “identify[ing] the relevant consuming public,” and (3) determining whether the

“primary significance of the mark to the relevant public”

is the general class of product or service. Pet.App.9a-10a

& n.6. Only the third question—“the public’s understanding of what the term BOOKING.COM primarily refers to”—

was disputed. Pet.App.11a.

The Fourth Circuit held that the district court did not

clearly err “in finding that the PTO failed to satisfy its

burden of proving that the relevant public understood

BOOKING.COM, taken as a whole, to refer to general online

hotel reservation services rather than Booking.com the

company.” Pet.App.12a. The court declined to adopt the

district court’s conclusion that a unique domain name

“generally

has

source-identifying

significance.”

Pet.App.20a & n.9. Instead, the court relied on “the

PTO’s lack of evidence demonstrating that the public uses

‘booking.com’ generically.” Pet.App.13a. Further, the

PTO no longer “contest[ed] the validity” of respondent’s

15

Teflon survey showing that consumers do not understand

BOOKING.COM as a generic term for hotel-reservation services. Pet.App.16a. The court stressed the “dearth of evidence” that BOOKING.COM was in common use or commonly understood as generic before respondent took the

name as its brand. Pet.App.17a.

The Fourth Circuit rejected the government’s argument that, under Goodyear, a generic term plus “‘.com’ is

analytically indistinct from ‘company,’” and can never be

a trademark. Pet.App.18a-19a. The court noted that

Goodyear pre-dated the Lanham Act and “crucially, did

not apply the primary significance test.” Pet.App.19a.

The court observed that every other circuit has rejected

the PTO’s per se rule against trademarking generic terms

coupled with “.com.” Pet.App.19a, 22a.

Judge Wynn concurred in part and dissented in part.

He “agree[d] with much of the analysis in the majority

opinion,” including its rejection of the government’s “per

se rule against protecting” Generic.com names.

Pet.App.29a & n.2. He dissented because he believed the

district court’s statement that a domain name “generally

has source-identifying significance” improperly colored

its factfinding. Pet.App.32a.

5. The Fourth Circuit denied rehearing en banc. Pet.

App.225a-26a.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

I.A. The 1946 Lanham Act prescribes one test only for

whether a mark is generic: whether its “primary significance … to the relevant public” is the category of goods

or services to which the mark applies. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3).

This test asks whether relevant consumers understand

the mark as a whole as the name of a class of goods or

services, based on empirical evidence. While the primary-

16

significance test appears in the Act’s cancellation section,

that test governs initial registration, too.

Since 1946, courts and the PTO have interpreted the

Act as mandating the primary-significance test for registrations and cancellations alike, and for all types of

marks—whether they are single words, combined terms

like WAFFLE HOUSE, or domain names like

WEATHER.COM. Congress codified the primary-significance test in 1984 to preserve that established meaning

and to overrule a single, aberrant Ninth Circuit decision.

B. By making consumer perceptions the key to genericness, the primary-significance test vindicates the Act’s

objectives. The test helps consumers navigate the marketplace by ruling out marks that do not distinguish between competitors while protecting those that do. The

test likewise encourages mark owners to build goodwill

behind particular brands. Conferring trademark protection on domain-name marks is particularly important;

merely owning a domain name provides little protection

against the rampant diversion, confusion, and fraud that

the Internet makes possible.

C. Because the primary-significance test looks to how

consumers perceive a mark as a whole, courts and the

PTO have long considered survey evidence the best evidence of consumers’ beliefs. The government’s objections

to survey evidence are nonsensical and would upend

courts’ and the PTO’s longstanding approach to genericness.

D. The Fourth Circuit followed the primary-significance test to a T and deemed BOOKING.COM non-generic.

The court properly credited the district court’s factual determination that respondent’s survey evidence—which

showed that consumers overwhelmingly do not consider

17

BOOKING.COM the generic name for hotel-reservation services—was more persuasive than the PTO’s evidence.

II. The Lanham Act forecloses the government’s per

se rule that a generic term coupled with “Company,”

“Inc.,” “.com,” or similar suffixes can never be trademarked.

A. The government’s position rests on this Court’s

1888 Goodyear decision, which grouped “Goodyear’s Rubber Manufacturing Company,” “Goodyear Rubber Company,” and “The Goodyear’s Company” with “Cotton

Company” and “Lackawanna coal” and held that none of

these terms could be trademarks. None of those terms,

Goodyear reasoned, would pinpoint the exact maker of

those goods. Any competitor could claim to produce those

same products with equal truth. Adding “Company”

made no difference because any competitor could conceivably claim that corporate designation, too.

The Lanham Act rejected every premise underpinning the government’s per se rule. The Act repudiated the

common-law rule protecting only technical trademarks

that only one maker could truthfully claim, and instead

extended trademark protection to descriptive terms. The

Act tethered trademark protection to consumers’ perceptions of particular marks. The Act did that by mandating

the fact-specific primary-significance test for genericness,

15 U.S.C. § 1064(3), and by tying registration to whether

consumers could or do associate a mark with a particular

brand, id. §§ 1052, 1091(a).

Further, the Act mandated consideration of how consumers view the mark as a whole, thus rejecting any per

se assumption that adding suffixes like “Company,”

“Inc.,” or “.com” to a generic term can never add distinctiveness. This Court has recognized that the Act overrode

18

related per se common-law rules. Nothing suggests that

Goodyear alone survived.

B. The government’s per se rule would threaten with

cancellation hundreds of Generic Company and Generic.com marks that the PTO has registered for decades.

See Appx. A. And the government’s rule has no logical

stopping point. If synonyms for corporate structure

never add significance to a generic term, every “generic”

Association, Partnership, Society, Alliance, Group, or

Foundation mark could be cancelled anytime. If “.com”

adds nothing, neither do “.org,” “.net,” “.biz,” and similar

suffixes. The government has grouped “Store” alongside

“Company” and “.com,” so those “generic” marks—plus

related

“Marts,” “Houses,” “Markets,” “Depots,”

“Guides,” “News”—could be on the chopping block.

Such cancellations would squander billions of dollars

that some of the country’s most famous brands have invested in cultivating consumer goodwill. Such cancellations would also risk massive consumer confusion by eliminating trademark protection for marks consumers depend on to differentiate among competing products, and

would open the floodgates to schemes to defraud and deceive consumers. This Court should reject the government’s per se rule, which has never been the law under the

Lanham Act.

ARGUMENT

I.

THE LANHAM ACT DOES

NERIC.COM TRADEMARKS

NOT

BAR

GE-

The Lanham Act mandates that the primary-significance test governs whether a phrase is generic and cannot

serve as a trademark. That test requires ascertaining,

based on evidence, whether relevant consumers primarily

understand the mark as a whole as the name of a category

19

of goods or services. Sometimes the evidence will establish that a Generic.com mark is generic; sometimes not.

Applying the primary-significance test makes this a

straightforward case. The petition presented solely the

question whether the government’s per se rule applies;

the government never argued that BOOKING.COM is generic under the primary-significance test. And, as the

Fourth Circuit held, the district court did not clearly err

in crediting ample record evidence that consumers do not

perceive BOOKING.COM as a generic term for all online hotel-reservation services.

A. The Act Mandates the Primary-Significance Test To

Assess the Genericness of All Marks, Including Domain Names

Section 1064(3) states that “the primary significance”

of the mark “to the relevant public … shall be the test” for

genericness. This fact-based test applies both to initial

registration determinations and to cancellation, and to all

types of marks. Nothing in the Act permits a different

rule for domain names.

1. Statutory interpretation “begins with the statutory

text,” Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Def., 138 S. Ct. 617,

631 (2018), and the text resolves this case. Section 1064(3)

provides: “The primary significance of the registered

mark to the relevant public rather than purchaser motivation shall be the test for determining whether the registered mark has become the generic name of goods or

services on or in connection with which it has been used.”

15 U.S.C. § 1064(3).

Section 1064(3) appears in the provision governing

cancellation, but the same test for genericness necessarily

controls initial registration determinations regarding

whether a mark is generic in the first place. Section

20

1064(3) authorizes cancellation of generic marks any time

after registration if the mark “has become the generic

name” for a class of products, including if the mark was

generic at the time of initial registration. It would make

no sense for the Act to embrace a different, unstated test

prohibiting initial registration of generic names, yet to

provide for immediate cancellation of generic marks that

fail the primary-significance test. Indeed, while the government (at 37-38) suggests the tests might differ, it concludes (at 43) that the primary-significance test governs

the “usual” genericness inquiry for initial registration,

without attempting to reconcile this discrepancy.

“[T]here is no reason not to apply [section 1064(3)’s

test for genericness] with equal force to the initial attempt

to register an allegedly generic term.” McCarthy, supra,

§ 12:57. We know of no case suggesting that the test for

initial registration and cancellation could differ. Courts

and the PTO consistently interpret section 1064(3) as

mandating application of the primary-significance test in

the registration context.

E.g., BellSouth Corp. v.

DataNational Corp., 60 F.3d 1565, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1995);

Examiner’s Manual § 1209.01(c)(i); In re ActiveVideo Networks, Inc., 111 U.S.P.Q.2d 1581, 1600 (T.T.A.B. 2014).

More broadly, every circuit to consider the issue has concluded that “there is only one legal standard for genericness … whether the public understands the mark, as a

whole, to refer to” the “genus of goods or services at issue.” Princeton Vanguard, LLC v. Frito-Lay N. Am.,

Inc., 786 F.3d 960, 966 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 4

4

Accord Pet.App.9a-10a & n.6 (collecting cases); McCarthy, supra,

§ 12:4 (“the key issue in determining genericness” is “what does the

public think the word connotes—the generic name of the product or

a mark indicating merely one source of that product?”).

21

Finally, in determining “[t]he primary significance of

the registered mark to the relevant public,” the Act requires consideration of the mark as a whole. A “mark”

includes “any trademark,” e.g., “any word … or any combination” of words that “identify and distinguish” one

maker’s products from others’. 15 U.S.C. § 1127. Because

combined words can mean something different from each

word in isolation, the Act mandates assessing the mark in

its entirety. Dissecting the mark into its constituent subparts is improper. McCarthy, supra, § 11:27; Examiner’s

Manual §§ 1209.01(c)(1), 1209.03(m).

2. By making the test for genericness “[t]he primary

significance of the registered mark to the relevant public,”

the Lanham Act in 1984 codified the primary-significance

test that courts had applied since the Act’s inception to

determine genericness. See Skilling v. United States, 561

U.S. 358, 404 (2010) (courts “look to the doctrine developed” prior to the amendment “to ascertain the meaning

of the phrase” in question); accord Comm’r v. Keystone

Consol. Indus., 508 U.S. 152, 159 (1993).

Until 1982, courts and the PTO consistently interpreted the test for genericness under the Act as whether

consumers primarily perceived the mark as a whole as the

name of the class of goods or services. E.g., S. Rep. 98627, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1984) (primary-significance

test has “generally been the controlling test used by the

courts to determine genericism”). If consumers instead

primarily believed that the mark could serve as a means

of distinguishing between brands, the mark was descriptive. Courts and the PTO applied this same test to both

initial registrations and cancellation. 5

5

E.g., Maremont Corp. v. Air Lift Co., 463 F.2d 1114, 1118 (C.C.P.A.

22

That approach makes sense in light of the Act’s fundamental changes to the common law. Recall that descriptive terms were unprotected under trademark common

law, but received some protection under unfair-competition law. Supra p. 5. The seminal pre-Lanham Act case

of Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938),

articulated the primary-significance test in the unfaircompetition context to explain when unfair-competition

law protected descriptive terms. Id. at 116. In Kellogg,

Nabisco had argued that Kellogg’s use of the term

“Shredded Wheat” unfairly seized the goodwill Nabisco

had built behind its similarly named product. Id. at 120.

In rejecting Nabisco’s claim, the Court explained that

Nabisco had failed to “show that the primary significance

of the term [Shredded Wheat] in the minds of the consuming public is not the product but the producer.” Id. at 118

(emphasis added). Accordingly, when the Lanham Act extended trademark protection to descriptive terms but not

generic terms, courts and the PTO relied on Kellogg’s primary-significance test to distinguish between those two

categories. 6

1972) (initial registration); Telechron, Inc. v. Telicon Corp., 198 F.2d

903, 907 (3d Cir. 1952) (trademark infringement); Q-Tips, Inc. v.

Johnson & Johnson, 108 F. Supp. 845, 863 (D.N.J. 1952) (cancellation), aff’d, 206 F.2d 144 (3d Cir. 1953); Schulmerich Elecs., Inc. v.

J.C. Deagan, Inc., 202 F.2d 772, 778 (C.C.P.A. 1953) (initial registration); Helene Curtis Indus. v. Church & Dwight Co., 560 F.2d 1325,

1332 & n.5 (7th Cir. 1977) (trademark infringement); accord McCarthy, supra, § 12:6 (collecting cases).

E.g., Surgicenters of Am., Inc. v. Med. Dental Surgeries, Co., 601

F.2d 1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 1979); Roselux Chem. Co. v. Parsons Ammonia Co., 299 F.2d 855, 863 (C.C.P.A. 1962); Schulmerich Elecs., 202

F.2d at 777-78; McCarthy, supra, § 12:6 (Kellogg “stated the rule” for

“whether a term is a generic name or is a mark”). Some courts looked

6

23

Congress in 1984 codified the primary-significance

test for genericness because, in 1982, the Ninth Circuit

departed from the primary-significance test to cancel

Parker Brothers’ registration of MONOPOLY. See AntiMonopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., 684 F.2d 1316,

1323-26 (9th Cir. 1982). Section 1064(3) legislatively overruled that decision, mandating the primary-significance

test for genericness and rejecting “the purchaser-motivation test” the Ninth Circuit had applied. 15 U.S.C.

§§ 1064(3), 1127; see S. Rep. 98-627 at 1 (amendment “confirms that the established test for genericism is whether

the primary significance of the mark to consumers … is to

identify a product or service which emanates from a particular source … or whether the mark merely functions as

a common descriptive name”). The 1984 amendment thus

“restore[d] the traditional test of genericness” that courts

had long applied. McCarthy, supra, § 5:8. 7

3. Section 1064(3) makes the primary-significance test

the test for genericness in all contexts and for all marks,

further back to Judge Learned Hand’s decision in Bayer Co. v.

United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921), which similarly stated

that “[t]he single question” in determining whether generic and descriptive names receive protection against unfair competition is

“What do the buyers understand by the word for whose use the parties are contending?” Id. at 509; see McCarthy, supra, § 12:4.

7

Neither Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F.3d 137,

144-45 (2d Cir. 1997), nor A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d

291 (3d Cir. 1986), challenges the applicability of the primary-significance test in all contexts. Contra U.S. Br. 38. Genesee calls the primary-significance test “the law of the land” and notes its “codifi[cation] … [in] 15 U.S.C. § 1064.” 124 F.3d at 144; accord Canfield, 808

F.2d at 299-300 (similar). Those cases refine the primary-significance

test in the inapposite situation involving how to define the class of

goods and services at issue.

24

and carves out no domain-name exception. When Congress enacts a clear, categorical rule, courts do not provide “[a]textual judicial supplementation.” Rotkiske v.

Klemm, 140 S. Ct. 355, 360-61 (2019). Thus, under the primary-significance test, whether a domain name composed

of a purportedly generic term (“booking”) and a suffix

(“.com”) is generic depends on whether relevant consumers consider the mark as a whole the name of a class of

goods or services. Pet.App.9a-10, 12a, 22a; see Advertise.com, Inc. v. AOL Advert., Inc., 616 F.3d 974, 977-78,

982 (9th Cir. 2010); In re Hotels.com, 573 F.3d at 1302-03;

Examiner’s Manual §§ 1209.01(c)(i), 1215.05.

B. Applying the Primary-Significance Test to All Types of

Marks Furthers the Act’s Aims

1. The primary-significance test advances the Lanham Act’s objectives of protecting consumers and rewarding trademark owners for building goodwill behind their

brands. E.g., Park ’N Fly, 469 U.S. at 198. Tying the

question of whether a mark is generic to whether consumers perceive it as the name for the category of goods or

services prevents enterprises from claiming a name that

effectively occupies the field of their product (e.g., “orange” for the eponymous fruit). The primary-significance

test also fosters competition and rewards investments in

building brand recognition by encouraging enterprises to

use marks that consumers consider meaningful in differentiating among brands.

By definition, the primary-significance test produces

different outcomes for similar names. BEDANDBREAKFAST.COM met the test, but Hotels.com failed. In re Hotels.com, 573 F.3d at 1303-06. The PTO found that

LAW.COM, 1800LAWYERS.COM, LAWYERSHOP, and LAW

FACTORY satisfied the test, but not Lawyers.com. In re

Reed Elsevier Props., Inc., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d 1649 (T.T.A.B.

25

2005). Different sets of consumers perceive different

words in different ways, and different litigants marshal

different evidence. Unsurprisingly, different factual records produce different results.

Determining case by case whether relevant consumers consider a mark as the generic name for a class of

goods or services winnows out marks that lack any sourceidentifying function without indiscriminately rejecting

marks that help consumers navigate the marketplace.

And, far from opening the floodgates to improper trademarks, the primary-significance test is just the first hurdle for marks to clear to receive the full panoply of Lanham Act protections. A mark can pass the primary-significance test and avoid rejection on genericness grounds,

but the applicant must still show secondary meaning—

that consumers associate the mark with a single source—

to obtain registration on the principal register. 15 U.S.C.

§ 1052(f); supra p. 6.

The primary-significance test makes particular sense

for domain names, where the price of denying trademark

protection is steep. While only one entity can hold a domain name at a time, the Internet has created new avenues for confusion, diversion, dilution, and fraud. Congress recognized trademarks’ particular vulnerability to

infringing domain names by amending the Lanham Act

with the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15

U.S.C. § 1125(d). Section 1125(d) protects trademarks by

imposing civil liability against anyone who “in bad faith …

registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name … confusingly similar to that mark,” and authorizes forfeiture, cancellation, or transfer of the infringing domain name.

Domain-name trademarks are readily susceptible to

Internet-based fraud and confusion. Merely purchasing

the exclusive right to use a domain name does not prevent

26

“spoofing,” i.e., “[t]he creation of a website that has … a

similar URL, in order to mislead visitors about who created the website.” Spoofing, Black’s Law Dictionary

(11th ed. 2019). Nor does domain-name ownership protect

against typosquatting, i.e., registering “domain names

that are close misspellings of a frequently used domain

name in order to catch and exploit traffic intended for the

other website.” Typosquatting, Black’s Law Dictionary,

supra. Infringers could replace an “o” in Booking.com

with a “0”—“B0oking.com”—to fool unsuspecting customers, or register the typo “Bookng.com,” and respondent’s control of Booking.com would be no help. Only if respondent held a trademark in BOOKING.COM would the

Lanham Act afford injunctive and monetary relief against

such deceptive schemes. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d).

Trademark protection is also essential to prevent

brick-and-mortar entities from trading on a domain-name

mark holder’s goodwill. Respondent needs those protections to prevent competitors from opening storefront

Booking.com travel agencies, or from diluting its brand by

selling Booking.com-themed travel products in airport

shops. The government (at 30) is thus wrong that the only

point of protecting domain-name trademarks is to “impede rivals from using similar terms.”

2. The government (at 32-33) suggests that domainname trademarks deserve second-class status because domain names function as unique addresses and an entity’s

exclusive right to those addresses already confers “substantial competitive advantage[s].” That argument would

undercut trademark protection for all 10,000 registered

domain-name marks, not just Generic.com names. And

the Act forbids the government from injecting policy ar-

27

guments into registration decisions: Congress commanded that “[n]o trademark … shall be refused registration” if it is distinctive. 15 U.S.C. § 1052.

The government’s argument would also extend to 1800 and 1-888 marks. Like domain names, consumers

type in phone-number marks to connect to the relevant

business. Like domain names, only one entity can hold

rights to a phone number at a time. Yet the government

has registered 1-800-FLOWERS, 1800CONTACTS, and

many others. Appx. A, 13a-16a. 8

Moreover, the advantages of domain names as addresses are diminishing. Domain-name marks continue to

identify brands, but consumers no longer just type in

those names to the Internet to access goods or services.

Consumers increasingly depend on apps or search results.

Lindsay Gellman, How Search Engines Are Killing

Clever URLs, The Atlantic (Dec. 15, 2016), https://tinyurl.com/uqhkcne; see JA144.

Nor does protecting Generic Company, Generic Inc.,

or Generic.com trademarks stymie competitors’ marketing and sales of competing versions of the same products.

Contra U.S. Br. 26-27. TRAVEL.COM (registered for making hotel and flight reservations) has not thwarted TRAVELOCITY.COM or TRAVELO.COM, let alone DIRECT TRAVEL,

8

Amicus Electronic Frontier Foundation (at 13-16) contends that

because consumers can use “.com” marks as addresses to enter a

website, they violate the doctrine that trademark law does not protect

functional features. But that doctrine focuses on prohibiting the use

of trademark law to protect functional elements of product design and

other trade dress. E.g., TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc.,

532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001). EFF’s argument would stretch the functionality doctrine past its breaking point and invalidate all domain-name

marks, as well as all 1-800 marks (which consumers can dial to buy

goods or services) or street address marks.

28

TRAVEL AND TRANSPORT, TRAVEL EDGE, or FLIGHT CENTRE,

or online competitors like ORBITZ.COM,

FLIGHTS.COM, and EXPEDIA.COM.

Consumers pick

among these brands without defaulting to the many Generic.com names in the travel arena. Meanwhile, CANINE

REVIEW and CANINE JOURNAL compete for dog-loving

subscribers, and ALZHEIMER’S FOUNDATION, ALZHEIMER’S SOCIETY, and ALZHEIMER’S ASSOCIATION all

fight the same disease.

Protecting Generic.com marks also does not deter

competitors from using similar domain names, lest they

face infringement suits.

Contra U.S. Br. 27-30.

WEATHER.COM and ACCUWEATHER.COM coexist, while

TENNIS.COM and PLAYTENNIS.COM share the same turf.

LAW.COM,

LAWLINE.COM, LAWPATHS.COM, LAWCASH.COM, and SCHOOLLAW.COM offer legal news and information. RENT.COM has not crowded out 123RENT.COM,

RENTUSANOW.COM, or FORRENT.COM. Nor has TICKETS.COM prevented TICKETMASTER.COM, CHEAPTICKTOTALTICKETS.COM,

TICKETSTUB.COM,

ETS.COM,

TICKETZOOM.COM, or TICKETENTERTAINMENT.COM from

offering similar services. Competitors realize the difficulties that holders of descriptive marks face in prevailing in

infringement suits, Pet.App.24a, or are confident that

their registrations would survive. Either way, competitors have registered variants on purportedly generic

marks in droves, apparently without incident. Respondent’s reference to EBOOKING.COM as a “potentially” infringing mark before the PTO examiner, JA192, is consistent with this point. Contrary to the government’s contention (at 28), respondent has no objection to EBOOKING.COM as a mark, or to its registration. The statement

before the examiner signified only that, if consumers confused BOOKING.COM and EBOOKING.COM, EBOOKING.COM—as the mark that came into existence later—

29

could infringe BOOKING.COM, not the other way around.

Accordingly, EBOOKING.COM was not persuasive evidence

that “BOOKING.COM” was in common usage. JA192. 9

If the consequences of protecting purportedly generic

marks were so dire, one would expect the PTO to stop registering such marks after the government petitioned for

certiorari on July 5, 2019. But see, e.g., CEREALS &

GRAINS ASSOCIATION; PARKINSON’S FOUNDATION; READERS.COM; RENTALS.COM; TAILOR HOUSE; THE DRIVEWAY

COMPANY; THE LASH FIRM; THE PREGNANCY COMPANY. Or after this Court granted certiorari on November 8, 2019. But see, e.g., AUTO BOUTIQUE; CARPET EXCHANGE; CONCERT.COM; MILITARY PARTS EXCHANGE;

OPERA NEWS; ROOMMATES.COM; WEDDING DIGEST. Or

at least after the government filed its opening brief on

January 6, 2020. But see, e.g., CANINE REVIEW; COOK’S

EMPORIUM; FRAGRANCE OUTLET. And if Generic.com

marks stifled competition, one would anticipate some outcry (or evidence) from the 85 jurisdictions, including the

European Union and United Kingdom, that registered

BOOKING.COM. JA140-42. The government points to

nothing of the sort.

The government (at 26-27) cites the statement in Advertise.com that

protecting a Generic.com mark “would potentially reach almost any

use of the generic term in a domain name.” 616 F.3d at 981. But the

court still concluded that Generic.com names could be marks. Id.

And the PTO’s registration of many overlapping domain names suggests the absence of any chilling effect. Retail Services, Inc. v. Freebies Publishing (U.S. Br. 27) merely cited numerous domain names

incorporating “freebies” to show that consumers perceive “freebies”

to mean giveaways in general. 364 F.3d 535, 545-46 (4th Cir. 2004).

9

30

C. The Primary-Significance Inquiry Properly Considers

Survey Evidence

1. Because the primary-significance test looks to

whether consumers believe a mark as a whole signifies the

name of a class of goods or services, the test demands that

courts assess what consumers actually think. Courts and

the PTO agree that whether any mark—domain name or

not—is generic is a factual question. McCarthy, supra,

§ 12:12 & n.1; Examiner’s Manual § 1209.01(c)(i). And, because the point is to figure out what impression a given

mark makes on consumers of the goods or services, courts

and the PTO rely on a variety of probative evidence. Such

evidence includes how the applicant uses the mark; how

competitors use it; dictionary definitions of terms comprising the mark; media usage; and testimony from those

in the industry. McCarthy, supra, § 12:13; Am. Univ. v.

Am. Univ. of Kuwait, Cancellation No. 92049706, slip op.

at 31 (T.T.A.B. Jan. 30, 2020).

Above all, survey evidence often plays a starring evidentiary role. “Consumers surveys have become almost

de rigueur in litigation over genericness.” McCarthy, supra, § 12:14; Princeton Vanguard, 786 F.3d at 965

(“[C]onsumer surveys may be a preferred method of proving genericness.”); Berner Int’l Corp. v. Mars Sales Co.,

987 F.2d 975, 982-83 (3d Cir. 1993) (“consumer surveys

[are] … preferable to indirect forms of evidence”). The

“most judicially accepted format for testing for genericness” is the Teflon survey, which teaches survey respondents the difference between generic terms and brands,

then asks respondents to identify terms as generic or as

likely brands. McCarthy, supra, § 12:16.

Courts and the PTO thus recognize that consumer

surveys—especially Teflon surveys—may tip the scales

when determining genericness. The Ninth Circuit held

31

that, although Advertising.com seemed generic on the

limited record before it, further evidence could change the

outcome: “[C]onsumer surveys or other evidence might

ultimately demonstrate that [the domain mark] is valid

and protectable.” Advertise.com, 616 F.3d at 982. Similarly, the PTO examiner twice refused to register WAFFLE HOUSE on genericness grounds, relying largely on

dictionary definitions of “waffle” and “house.” But the

PTO reversed course after reviewing additional evidence,

including a Teflon survey showing 92% brand recognition,

and registered WAFFLE HOUSE on the principal register.

(Reg. No. 2,965,520). Respondent’s Teflon survey is thus

exactly the type of evidence courts and the PTO have relied on when applying the primary-significance test.

2. The government (at 40-41) contends that courts

should never consider “evidence of consumer understanding”—especially survey evidence—when assessing genericness. That contention largely rests on the government’s

mistaken per se rule classifying all Generic.com names as

inherently generic, no matter how consumers perceive the

mark. Infra pp. 35-36.

The government (at 36, 41) also cites Abercrombie &

Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir.

1976), for the proposition that no amount of evidence of

consumer perceptions can make generic terms non-generic. But the Abercrombie line of cases involves whether

a mark that has already become generic can be resurrected with evidence of secondary meaning, i.e., a secondary association with a brand in consumers’ eyes. Abercrombie said no, reasoning that no producer should be

32

able to remove a generic term from the linguistic commons once the public primarily understands it as the common name for a whole class of goods or services. Id. at 9. 10

Abercrombie assumes away the dispute here, which is

whether a Generic.com name is generic in the first place.

Whether a generic term can move back to descriptive status is irrelevant in this case. The Fourth Circuit agreed:

“Once a term is deemed generic, it cannot subsequently

become non-generic.” Pet.App.10a. But no judicial decision previously deemed BOOKING.COM generic. Nor, as

the district court found, was BOOKING.COM commonly

used or understood as a generic term before respondent

Most of the government’s cases (at 41-43) similarly hold that consumer perceptions cannot salvage phrases that were generic before

specific enterprises used them. See Hunt Masters, Inc. v. Landry’s

Seafood Rest., Inc., 240 F.3d 251, 254-55 & n.1 (4th Cir. 2001) (“crab

house” was generic because term “was commonly used prior to its association” with plaintiff’s restaurant); Schwan’s IP, LLC v. Kraft

Pizza Co., 460 F.3d 971, 976 (8th Cir. 2006) (“brick-oven” was in common use before applicant’s trademark); Harley-Davidson, Inc. v.

Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806, 810-11 (2d Cir. 1999) (“hog” was common

slang for motorcycle before applicant used term); In re Analog Devices, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1879, 1879 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (similar for

“analog devices”); In re Northland Aluminum Prods., 777 F.2d 1556,

1559-60 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (similar for “bundt”); Miller Brewing Co. v.

Falstaff Brewing Corp., 655 F.2d 5, 7-8 & n.2 (1st Cir. 1981) (prior

holding that plaintiff’s “LITE” beer trademark was generic made evidence of consumer perceptions irrelevant); Miller Brewing Co. v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 605 F.2d 990, 995 (7th Cir. 1979) (similar

for “LITE” beer); Weiss Noodle Co. v. Golden Cracknel & Specialty

Co., 290 F.2d 845, 848 (C.C.P.A. 1961) (same for “egg noodles”). Others simply observe that evidence of secondary meaning does not render a generic term protectable. Royal Crown Co. v. The Coca-Cola

Co., 892 F.3d 1358, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Tech. Publ’g Co. v. LebharFriedman, Inc., 729 F.2d 1136, 1139 (7th Cir. 1984); Canfield, 808

F.2d at 297.

10

33

popularized it. Pet.App.10a-11a, 16a-17a. The government (at 44) disagrees, citing longer domain names containing “booking.com.” But the district court’s factfinding

deserves deference, and the government’s factbound argument departs from the question presented.

The government (at 40) argues that consumers may

inherently consider “.com” names more distinctive, skewing survey results. That objection is another broadside

against all domain-name marks. Regardless, the government abandoned all objections to the validity of respondent’s survey, Pet.App.16a, and its speculation is groundless. As the district court found, respondent’s Teflon survey showed that consumers differentiate among domain

names by testing BOOKING.COM against Washingmachine.com. JA54. Whereas 74.8% of survey respondents

identified BOOKING.COM as a brand, Washingmachine.com connoted a brand to just 30%. JA53.

The government’s concessions about how “useful” survey evidence is “in a variety of contexts” underscore the

incongruity of its position. The government (at 42-43)

agrees that Teflon surveys can show whether a descriptive term has acquired secondary meaning. The government (at 43) concurs that Teflon surveys can show

whether fanciful “coined” marks (like “Teflon” itself) have

“become generic through widespread use.” The government then concedes (at 43) that courts usually assess genericness by looking to “whether consumers understand”

a mark “as the common name of a class of products or services.” Given the government’s acknowledgments of the

importance consumer perceptions play in resolving virtually every other trademark-eligibility question, evidence

of consumer perceptions (including surveys) should play

an equally prominent role in determining genericness.

34

D. BOOKING.COM Is Descriptive, Not Generic, Under the

Primary-Significance Test

Whether the courts below correctly applied the primary-significance test is not before this Court. The petition presented only the question whether the government’s proposed per se rule renders BOOKING.COM generic. The government (at 43-44) obliquely asserts that

consumers would understand BOOKING.COM to refer only

to a class of services, but offers no reason why.

Regardless, the Fourth Circuit correctly followed the

Lanham Act’s primary-significance test for genericness.

The court explained that whether BOOKING.COM is generic depends on whether relevant consumers primarily

consider the mark as a whole as the name of a class of

goods or services. Pet.App.9a-12a & n.6; id. 22a. Here,

the PTO did not meet its burden to show genericness. The

Fourth Circuit properly deferred to the district court’s

finding that respondent’s Teflon survey showing that

74.8% of consumers do not perceive BOOKING.COM as generic was more compelling than the PTO’s competing evidence. Pet.App.13a-18a, 25a; JA53. Courts agree that

“majority usage controls,” so the survey establishes that

BOOKING.COM is descriptive. McCarthy, supra, § 12:6.

The PTO has waived any objection to the survey’s validity

or methodology. Pet.App.16a. And the PTO conceded

that if BOOKING.COM is not generic, it is entitled to registration as a descriptive term that has acquired distinctiveness (or secondary meaning). Pet.App.12a.

II. GOODYEAR DOES NOT COMPEL A CONTRARY

RESULT

The government contends that, under this Court’s

1888 Goodyear decision, a generic term coupled with a

corporate designation like “Company,” or by extension

35

“.com,” can never create a trademark. Adding such a suffix, or synonyms like “Inc.,” “Store,” “House,” etc., purportedly does nothing to differentiate a producer’s goods

or services from competitors’. But the Lanham Act rejected the government’s premises, and mandates the primary-significance test for genericness across the board.

The government (at 22) is wrong that respondent “has

never suggested that the core holding of Goodyear no

longer applies,” nor has respondent conceded that “Booking Company” or “Booking Inc.” cannot be trademarks.

See Br. in Opp. 11-13; Resp. CA4 Br. 31-32. Adopting the

government’s atextual per se rule would unleash a trademark apocalypse, stripping hundreds of registered marks

of protection and creating massive consumer confusion.

A.

The Lanham Act Repudiated the Government’s Per

Se Rule

1. Goodyear is a classic exemplar of the pre-Lanham

Act common law of trademarks, where trademark protection was narrow and judges distinguished between protected and unprotected names without regard to consumer perceptions. In Goodyear, the Goodyear Rubber

Company sought to prevent Goodyear’s India Rubber

Glove Manufacturing Company and others from using

“Goodyear’s Rubber Manufacturing Company,” “Goodyear Rubber Company,” “The Goodyear’s Company,” or

similar names. 128 U.S. at 600-01.

The Court concluded that neither party could claim a

trademark: “[T]he name of ‘Goodyear Rubber Company’

is not one capable of exclusive appropriation” because

“‘Goodyear Rubber’ are terms descriptive of well-known

classes of goods produced by the process known as ‘Goodyear’s Invention’” (the common method for vulcanizing

rubber). Id. at 602 (emphasis added). The common law

was that “[n]ames which are thus descriptive of a class of

36

goods cannot be exclusively appropriated by any one.” Id.

(emphasis added). Adding “the word ‘Company’” did not

make the ensuing phrase “Goodyear’s Rubber Company”

a trademark, because “‘Company’ … only indicates that

parties have formed an association or partnership to deal

in such goods.” Id.

Goodyear’s holding that the descriptive words “Goodyear’s Rubber,” “Goodyear Rubber Company,” and “The

Goodyear’s Company” could not be trademarks encapsulated nineteenth-century common-law rules. The law

then protected only technical trademarks designating

“the manufacturer who has adopted” the name. Francis

H. Upton, A Treatise on the Law of Trade Marks 98

(1860). Significantly, Goodyear relied on the Court’s decision in Del. & Hudson Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. (13

Wall.) 311 (1871), for the dispositive legal rule: “‘[T]he

trade-mark must … point distinctively to the origin or

ownership of the article to which it is applied,’” so “a generic name, or a name merely descriptive of an article of

trade, of its qualities, ingredients, or characteristics, [cannot] be employed as a trade-mark.” 128 U.S. at 603-04

(quoting Canal Co., 80 U.S. at 323). The nineteenth-century rule was thus that “no sign or form of words can be

appropriated as a valid trademark which … others may

employ with equal truth and with equal right for the same

purpose.” Elgin, 179 U.S. at 673; Hesseltine, supra, at 3132. Or, as the government observes, Goodyear rests on

“the equal right of others engaged in similar business to

use similar designations,” U.S. Br. 19 (quoting Goodyear,

128 U.S. at 603); see id. at 28.

Goodyear thus rejected trademark protection for any

descriptive names (like “Goodyear’s Rubber”) because

such names might also describe other competitors’ prod-

37

ucts. See 128 U.S. at 602-03. Likewise, under this antiquated rule, adding corporate designations like “Company” did nothing to isolate a single producer; multiple

producers might truthfully claim to be a company. See id.

Goodyear accordingly analogized “Goodyear Rubber

Company” to “‘Wine Company,’ ‘Cotton Company,’ or

‘Grain Company,’” as well as descriptive geographical

names like “Lackawanna coal” or “Pennsylvania wheat.”

Id. Even though some of these names might be generic

and some descriptive in modern-day parlance, they were

all infirm at common law. Competitors could conceivably

claim any of those names to describe their products with

equal truth. Id. at 602-04.

Goodyear tracked similar common-law prohibitions on

trademarking proper names. Harry D. Nims, The Law of

Unfair Competition & Trade-Marks § 206 (2d ed. 1917).

The Court’s pre-Lanham Act cases expressed skepticism

about trademarking colors on the same basis. Qualitex,

514 U.S. at 170-71 (surveying cases). That is why, like

Goodyear itself, common-law treatises treated generic

and descriptive terms interchangeably. E.g., James Love

Hopkins, The Law of Trademarks, Tradenames and Unfair Competition § 46 (4th ed. 1924) (“generic term[s]”

mean words “too general and comprehensive in [their]

meaning” for one producer to claim, including “geographical names, proper names, and descriptive words”); William Henry Browne, A Treatise on the Law of TradeMarks § 134, at 146 (2d ed. 1885).

Pre-Lanham Act cases and treatises accordingly understood Goodyear as barring trademark protection for

all descriptive terms. 11 This Court said so, repeatedly.

E.g., Hesseltine, supra, at 207-08; Amasa C. Paul, The Law of

Trademarks & Unfair Competition § 60 n.1 (1903).

11

38

The Court in 1893 cited Goodyear as one of many cases

“establish[ing] … [t]hat if the … mark … was adopted …

for the purpose of identifying [the product’s] class, grade,

style, or quality, or for any purpose other than a reference

to or indication of its ownership, it cannot be sustained as

a valid trade-mark.” Columbia Mill Co. v. Alcorn, 150

U.S. 460, 463-64 (1893); see Corbin v. Gould, 133 U.S. 308,

314 (1890) (Goodyear exemplifies rule protecting only

technical trademarks); Lawrence Mfg. Co. v. Tenn. Mfg.

Co., 138 U.S. 537, 547 (1891) (same). Similarly, Howe

Scale Co. v. Wyckoff, Seamans & Benedict, 198 U.S. 118

(1905), “cit[ed] Goodyear with approval,” U.S. Br. 19—

again to illustrate that “such descriptive names” as

“Goodyear Rubber” could not be trademarks. Howe, 198

U.S. at 137. And this Court in 1920 cited Goodyear for the

“settled” rule that “the law would not secure to any person

the exclusive use of a trade-mark consisting merely of

words descriptive of the qualities, ingredients, or characteristics of an article of trade.” Estate of P.D. Beckwith,

Inc. v. Comm’r of Patents, 252 U.S. 538, 543-44 (1920).

In sum, Goodyear does not say that a generic name for

a class of goods or services, coupled with “Company” or

“Inc.,” cannot be a trademark because the combined

phrase remains generic. Goodyear recites a different and

more sweeping rule that descriptive terms can never be

trademarked. As such, adding another descriptive word

like “Company” or “Inc.” still results in a descriptive mark

that cannot pinpoint a product’s manufacturer or source

the way the common law required. That is why the Court

held that “Goodyear Rubber Company”—a descriptive

name in modern parlance—could not be trademarked.

The government cannot claim the mantle of a purportedly

unbroken 130-year history when its position revamps

Goodyear into an ahistorical rule.

39

2. The Lanham Act overrode every premise animating

Goodyear. Unlike at common law, the Act allows registration of descriptive terms. Supra p. 6; Qualitex, 514

U.S. at 171; Br. for U.S. at 8-9, Qualitex, 514 U.S. 159 (No.

93-1577); Park ’N Fly, 469 U.S. at 193-94. Whether a

trademark could theoretically describe competitors’ products is no longer controlling. The touchstone now is

whether the name “distinguishe[s]” the applicant’s goods

“from the goods of others.” 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (defining

trademarks eligible for principal register); see id.

§ 1091(a) (marks must be “capable of distinguishing applicant’s goods or services” for supplemental registration);

Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 171. Likewise, the Act makes consumer perceptions dispositive to the primary-significance

test for genericness. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3); supra pp. 19-24.

The Act thus repudiates Goodyear and its ilk, which

treated consumer perceptions as irrelevant to whether

the “words … in and of themselves indicate anything in

the nature of origin, manufacture, or ownership.” See Elgin, 179 U.S. at 673; U.S. Br. 38-40.

Further, the Act rejects any per se rule that adding

“Company,” “.com,” or other suffixes can never add further meaning. That notion rested on the discarded common-law rule that no one can trademark names that could

equally describe competitors. Because adding “Company” just “indicates that parties ha[d] formed an association or partnership,” Goodyear, 128 U.S. at 602, adding

“Company” to a generic (or even descriptive) term could

never produce a name that innately referred to the product’s origin, manufacture, or ownership, so courts had no

need to consider the mark as a whole. But the Act requires courts and the PTO to look at the combined effect

of the “mark,” by defining a mark to include any “combination” of words. 15 U.S.C. § 1127; supra p. 21. Courts

40

can no longer look at words in isolation, deem them linguistic filler, and disregard whether relevant consumers

might perceive the mark as a whole differently.

The primary-significance test is incompatible with

Goodyear. The proof is in the pudding: if Goodyear survived the Lanham Act, presumably its core holding—that

terms like “Goodyear” could not be trademarked—endured. In the government’s view (at 41), once this Court

deemed “Goodyear” variants generic, no amount of ensuing consumer recognition should have created a valid

trademark. Yet the PTO has registered multiple GOODYEAR trademarks for decades. If Goodyear categorically

bars “Cotton Company,” why register COTTON EMPORIUM and COTTON COLLECTION? If Goodyear forever

tanked “Wine Company,” why not MARGARITA COMPANY?

And the government’s portrayal (at 4) of Crab House as

generic as a matter of law, despite its previous registration of THE CRAB PLACE, is fishy in every respect.

3. The government (at 21) suggests that the Lanham

Act preserved Goodyear because its “purpose … was to

codify and unify the common law of unfair competition and

trademark protection” (quoting Inwood Labs. v. Ives

Labs., 456 U.S. 844, 861 n.2 (1982) (White, J., concurring

in the result)). But the Act achieved that synthesis by rejecting major premises of the common law of trademarks

to create a more protective body of federal trademark law.

Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 171; Park ’N Fly, 469 U.S. at 193.

The government (at 21) states that this Court “has neither overruled Goodyear nor suggested that it has been

superseded by later statutory enactments.” But this

Court has recognized that the Lanham Act superseded related per se rules. Qualitex thus rejected the common-law

rule against trademarking colors, notwithstanding “many

older cases—including Supreme Court cases—in support

41

of” that rule. 514 U.S. at 170. The Court explained that

those cases “interpreted trademark law as it existed before 1946” and did not reflect the Act’s dramatic expansion

of trademark protection beyond common-law technical

trademarks. Id.; see Br. for U.S. at 21-22, Qualitex, 514

U.S. 159 (No. 93-1577) (“[T]he Act superseded prior common law doctrines,” including this Court’s precedent

“predat[ing] the Lanham Act by 40 years.”). Likewise, no

one thinks that the common-law prohibition on trademarking proper names survived the Lanham Act—hence

YO-YO MA, ADELE, and MADONNA are marks. It is hard

to fathom how Goodyear alone survived this sea change.

The government’s citations hardly substantiate a supposedly entrenched 130-year-old rule. The government

invokes one Eleventh Circuit decision, a treatise, and a

TTAB decision purportedly “appl[ying] Goodyear.” U.S.

Br. 21-22. This Court in Qualitex dismissed similar modern precedents, explaining that “the Lanham Act’s

changes left the courts free to reevaluate the preexisting

legal precedent,” including pre-Lanham Act Supreme

Court opinions. 514 U.S. at 173. The government’s authorities are weak regardless. Welding Services, Inc. v.

Forman, 509 F.3d 1351 (11th Cir. 2007), never mentions

Goodyear. That case relied on a TTAB decision and treatise for the footnoted assertion that adding “Inc.” to a

name “does not make generic words protectable.” Id. at

1359 n.4.

The government cites Professor McCarthy, who

states that adding “Company,” “Inc.,” or “Partners” to “a

generic name” cannot create a trademark but grounds

that rule in modern TTAB decisions. McCarthy § 12:39.

McCarthy characterizes Goodyear as holding that “adding designations such as ‘Company,’ ‘Corp.,’ or ‘Inc.’ does

not add any trademark significance to a designation which

42

does not otherwise qualify as a trademark.” Id. That

comports with his observation that Goodyear is “not

clear” whether “Goodyear Rubber” is generic or descriptive in modern parlance, id. § 12:32; he adds that Goodyear may rest on the obsolete common-law rule against

protecting descriptive terms, id. Regardless, McCarthy

concludes that the primary-significance test is the test for

genericness, and does not explain how Goodyear could

square with that conclusion. Id. § 12:4.

Finally, the government cites In re Wm. B. Coleman

Co., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d 2019, 2025 (T.T.A.B. 2010). There, the

TTAB relied on Goodyear for the proposition that “Company” does not add source-identifying significance to the

words “Electric Candle.” Id. But the TTAB ultimately

rested on consumer perceptions to deem “Electric Candle

Company” generic, reasoning that “the relevant public

would nonetheless understand ELECTRIC CANDLE

COMPANY to refer to a company that sells electric candles, and public understanding is critical.” Id. at 2021.

The government’s position is also incoherent as to

when the Lanham Act’s primary-significance test applies

and when (and how) its Goodyear rule takes over. The

government seemingly agrees that the primary-significance test governs whether a root word (like “grain”) is

generic. U.S. Br. 7-8, 15. And, as noted, the government

concedes (at 43) that the primary-significance test is the

“usual” test for genericness. Yet the government refuses

to apply the primary-significance test to certain compound phrases, insisting (at 44) that Grain Inc., Grain

Company, and Grain.com are all generic under Goodyear,

“even though consumers could understand [them] to refer

to a specific company.” That reasoning presupposes that

the government’s per se rule supplants the Lanham Act’s

43

primary-significance test. But the government never explains how to achieve this atextual feat through conventional methods of statutory interpretation.

4. Even if a Goodyear-based per se rule against “Generic Company” or “Generic Inc.” survived the Lanham

Act, no sound basis exists for equating a “Company” or

“Inc.” suffix with “.com” and extending the rule to domain

names. And if the Court went that far, that rule would

necessarily sweep in “.org,” “.biz,” “.net” and other domain-name suffixes. Further, domain names differ from

corporate designations in significant ways—not least because their purpose is to facilitate online activities, and because each domain name is unique. Supra p. 25; AIPLA

Br. 14. Expanding a Goodyear-based per se rule beyond

the “Company” or “Inc.” contexts would break new

ground, with no stopping point in sight.

The government (at 22) contends that TTAB and appellate decisions establish that “a ‘generic.com’ domain

name generally is not eligible” for trademark registration.

Saying that a rule is “generally” true but sometimes not

is a roundabout admission that there is no per se rule. See

U.S. Br. 25 n.6. And the government’s position is even

weaker than that: every circuit to consider the question

has rejected a per se rule against Generic.com trademarks. Pet.App.18a; e.g., In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP,

373 F.3d 1171, 1175 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (no such per se rule);

Advertise.com, Inc., 616 F.3d at 982 (same). The government (at 25 n.6) dismisses courts’ endorsements of Generic.com marks “in the ‘rare’ case where the combined

term carries additional meaning,” saying the Court need

not resolve “the propriety or scope of such an exception.”

But that is the question presented: “Whether the addition … of [‘.com’] to an otherwise generic term can create

a protectable trademark.” U.S. Br. i.

44

The government’s authorities (at 22-25) also belie its

position. Start with the PTO’s own manual, which never

cites Goodyear in provisions discussing when domain

names are generic. Examiner’s Manual §§ 1209.03(m),

1215.05, 1215.08(a). Nor does the part of the manual discussing Goodyear mention domain names.

Id.

§ 1209.03(d) (citing Goodyear for proposition that “[t]he

addition of an entity designator (e.g., Corporation, Corp.,

Co., Inc., Ltd., etc.) to a descriptive term does not alter

the term’s descriptive significance”). And the government omits that the manual states that “there is no per se

rule” that adding “.com” to “an otherwise generic term” is

grounds for refusing registration. Id. § 1215.05; see

AIPLA Br. 11-12. PTO examiners have faithfully followed the PTO’s instructions, registering COOKING.COM,

FRUITS.COM, ART.COM, and scores of similar marks while

rejecting others. Appx. A.

The government cites In re Martin Container, Inc.,

65 U.S.P.Q.2d 1058 (T.T.A.B. 2002), but the Federal Circuit repudiated the TTAB’s reasoning for wrongly interpreting Goodyear to rule out all Generic.com trademarks.

Oppedahl, 373 F.3d at 1173, 1175-77. Later TTAB decisions acknowledge there is no per se rule against registering Generic.com names. E.g., In re Vacationfutures, 2016

WL 4775500, at *8 (T.T.A.B. 2016).

The government (at 23-24) invokes the Federal Circuit’s Oppedahl decision, involving “patents.com.” That

decision cites Goodyear and analogizes the effect of adding “.com” to an “otherwise descriptive or generic term”

to adding “Corp.” or “Inc.” to such terms. 373 F.3d at

1173, 1175. Oppedahl then states that it would be “legal

error” to adopt a per se rule that adding “.com” to a term

never adds additional meaning. Id. at 1175. Such a cate-

45

gorical rule would flout the cardinal principle that registrability depends on how consumers perceive the mark as

a whole. Id. at 1174. The court held: “[T]he per se rule in

Goodyear that ‘Corp.’, etc. never possess source-indicating significance does not operate as a per se rule, but more

as a general rule, with respect to [.com].” Id. at 1175.

Oppedahl thus rejected reliance on a “Goodyear analysis,” instead relying on evidence of consumer perceptions

to “conclud[e] that the combination of ‘patents’ and ‘.com’

does not render the mark as a whole distinctive.” Id. at

1176. The Federal Circuit similarly affirmed registration

denials for mattress.com, lawyers.com, and hotels.com

only because evidence showed that consumers primarily

perceive those marks as generic. 12

The Ninth Circuit also rejects the government’s per se

rule. Advertise.com cited Goodyear to show that adding

“.com” to “a generic term … does not suffice to establish

that the component is distinctive.” 616 F.3d at 982. But

respondent’s position is not that appending “.com” automatically transforms a generic term into a distinctive one.

Rather, respondent’s position is that there is “no per se

rule against the use of domain names, even ones formed

by combining generic terms with [.com].” Id. As the

Ninth Circuit concluded, courts must “look to the mark as

a whole and … the combination of generic terms may, in

some instances, result in a distinctive mark,” depending

on the evidence. Id. at 978.

12

In re 1800Mattress.com IP LLC, 586 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir.

2009); In re Hotels.com, 573 F.3d at 1304, 1306; In re Reed Elsevier

Props., 482 F.3d at 1381.

46

B.

The Government’s Per Se Rule Would Strip Countless Marks of Trademark Protection and Confer No

Competitive Benefits

Adopting the government’s per se rule would usher in

a mass extinction event for registered trademarks. The

PTO has spent decades registering marks that violate the

government’s rule that a generic root term, coupled with

“Company” or “.com,” can never be a trademark. THE

WIG COMPANY, THE CAP COMPANY, THE SASH COMPANY,

THE FLAGPOLE COMPANY, and THE RAG COMPANY would

all face cancellation if the government’s position became

law. See 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (authorizing cancellation on

genericness grounds at any time). Applying the government’s per se rule to domain names would jeopardize

scores of “.com” marks, too. Appx. A, 1a-11a.

The government’s onslaught against PTO-registered

marks would not end there. If synonyms for corporate

structure never add distinctiveness, then coupling generic

terms with “Association,” “Partnership,” “Society,” “Alliance,” “Group,” “Foundation,” or “Coalition” is verboten—which would be news to ALZHEIMER’S ASSOCIATION,

ARTHRITIS FOUNDATION, CHRISTIAN COALITION, AUTISM SOCIETY, EPILEPSY FOUNDATION, THE HEART

FOUNDATION, etc. If “.com” is an empty suffix, so are

“.biz,” “.net,” and “.org.” And, just as “.com” can refer to

a virtual place for commerce, so can 1-800 refer to a telephone hotline for purchases—so no more 1-800-FLOWERS,

1800CONTACTS, 1800HOTELS, or 1800MATTRESS.

The government’s per se rule would apparently prohibit combining a generic term with “Store,” see Pet. 4;

Gov’t CA4 Br. 6—ending THE CONTAINER STORE’s 38year-old trademark. If “Store” is out, generic terms

paired with any “Store” synonyms presumably would not

survive—so no more OFFICE DEPOT, PAPER SOURCE,

47

THE CHEESECAKE FACTORY, FISH MART, FRAGRANCEMARKET, WATCH WAREHOUSE, or SKIRT OUTLET. If Crab

House fails the government’s test, see U.S. Br. 4, then

WAFFLE HOUSE is toast. Absent some elusive distinction

between houses and more humble abodes, SUNGLASS

HUT, RADIOSHACK, and SHAKE SHACK are doomed. The

government (at 25 n.7) also suggests that publications

consisting of generic terms plus “News,” “Journal,” or

“Guide” can never be marks—so goodbye TV GUIDE,

CLERGY JOURNAL, and OPERA NEWS, and presumably

SKI MAGAZINE, GOLF DIGEST, and BICYCLING.

All told, the government’s per se rule threatens hundreds of registered marks that respondent has identified,

including many of the country’s most famous brands. See

Appx. A. The PTO registered CONSUMER REPORTS in the

1950s; PIZZA HUT in the 1960s; 1-800-FLOWERS in the

1970s; THE CONTAINER STORE in the 1980s; and JEWISH.COM in the 1990s. The PTO even registered BOOKINGS.COM in the 2000s.

Yet the government suggests that protecting these

marks was ultra vires all along. U.S. Br. 18-20. The government (at 33) blames companies and nonprofits for proceeding at their peril and not picking names that satisfy

the government’s new per se rule. But it is hard to fault

mark holders for taking the Lanham Act at its word. The

PTO signed off on these registrations for decades, and the

government cannot credibly claim hundreds of accidents.

These registrations are the product of examiners following the PTO’s manual, including by reversing initial genericness determinations after applicants produced survey evidence rebutting those conclusions. Supra pp. 2425; see Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2301 (declining to interpret

48

statute based on government’s assertion that registrations exhibiting viewpoint bias were “PTO examiners’

mistakes”).

Not to worry, the government (at 34-35) says: anyone

denied trademark protection could invoke unfair-competition law to prevent “third parties from passing off their

goods or services.” But the availability of unfair-competition “[p]rotection … does not justify artificially constricting the scope of protection under the Act’s trademark provisions.” Br. for U.S. at 21-22, Qualitex, 514 U.S. 159 (No.

93-1577). Unfair-competition laws are no substitute for

the rights the Lanham Act extends to mark-holders, id.,

which “should not be denied based on a per se rule that

prohibits registration based on the nature of the mark,

where neither the statute nor compelling policy reasons

support such a denial,” id. Further, as the government’s

citations show, state unfair-competition claims typically

bar relief absent actual fraud, making relief unlikely in

most cases. E.g., Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing

Co., 124 F.3d 137, 149 (2d Cir. 1997); Murphy Door Bed

Co. v. Interior Sleep Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d 95, 102 (2d Cir.

1989). The government’s suggestion (at 35) that applicants could register “stylized elements” of their brands as

design marks is less helpful still. Unless applicants can

register domain-name marks, they lack key protections

against Internet-based deception and infringement.

The government’s per se rule would also cost consumers dearly. The PTO registered all the marks the government now considers trademark-ineligible because the evidence showed that consumers believe these marks could

or do identify specific producers. Without trademark protections, countless easily remembered marks that avoid

consumer confusion would be far harder to protect

against infringement, both in cyberspace and the physical

49

world. Given the difficulties of pursuing unfair-competition claims, bad actors might decide that the rewards of

pirating famous brands are worth the risk—and that piracy is even easier to accomplish online. Little would stop

copycats from launching knockoff Container Stores, Office Depots, and Pizza Huts in the same shopping malls,

or from falsely claiming affiliation with CARE.COM, CHRISTIAN COALITION, or FLIGHTS.COM.

Further, if the government’s per se rule governs

trademark protection going forward, enterprises would

never invest in fostering recognition of brand names that

others could seize with near-impunity. Instead of easilyremembered marks that avoid consumer confusion, the

government would incentivize a return to the bygone days

of elaborate technical trademarks like BOKER’S STOMACH

BITTERS, COE’S SUPERPHOSPHATE OF LIME, and DR.

DRAKE’S GERMAN CROUP REMEDY. That would eviscerate the Lanham Act’s central premise that trademark law

should reward enterprises that develop recognizable

brands, rather than superimposing artificial, judge-made

rules on the market. Park ’N Fly, 469 U.S. at 198.

At bottom, the government sees unfairness in allowing

one enterprise to claim to a name that “‘others may employ with equal truth.’” U.S. Br. 28 (quoting, e.g., Lawrence Mfg., 138 U.S. at 547). That is another way of saying

that the government prefers to protect only technical

trademarks, not descriptive terms. For 70 years, however, trademark law has proceeded from the premise that

the best way to avoid granting monopolies on the common

name for a product is to avoid trademarking the words

that consumers actually consider the common name for

the product. If the government wants to undo that choice,

its recourse lies with Congress, not this Court.

50

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the Fourth Circuit should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

DAVID H. BERNSTEIN

JARED I. KAGAN

DEBEVOISE &

PLIMPTON LLP

919 Third Avenue

New York, NY 10022

JONATHAN E. MOSKIN

FOLEY & LARDNER LLP

90 Park Avenue

New York, NY 10016

FEBRUARY 12, 2020

LISA S. BLATT

Counsel of Record

SARAH M. HARRIS

EDEN SCHIFFMANN

JOHN B. SWANSON

WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY

LLP

725 Twelfth Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20005

(202) 434-5000

lblatt@wc.com

APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Appendix of Trademarks:

.COM ...............................................................................1a

.COM (cont’d) ................................................................7a

Company ......................................................................11a

1-800 ..............................................................................13a

Alliance .........................................................................16a

Association ...................................................................17a

Boutique .......................................................................19a

Bulletin .........................................................................19a

Coalition .......................................................................19a

Collection......................................................................20a

Corporation ..................................................................20a

Council ..........................................................................20a

Depot ............................................................................22a

Digest............................................................................22a

Enterprise ....................................................................23a

Emporium ....................................................................24a

Establishment .............................................................24a

Exchange......................................................................24a

Factory .........................................................................26a

Federation....................................................................29a

Firm ..............................................................................30a

Foundation ...................................................................30a

Fund ..............................................................................32a

Group ............................................................................33a

Guide .............................................................................33a

House ............................................................................34a

Hut ................................................................................36a

Institute ........................................................................37a

(Ia)

IIa

Journal ..........................................................................38a

Magazine ......................................................................40a

Market ..........................................................................41a

Mart ..............................................................................41a

Monthly ........................................................................43a

News .............................................................................43a

.ORG .............................................................................45a

Other Publications ......................................................46a

Outlet ............................................................................47a

Partnership ..................................................................48a

Place ..............................................................................48a

Report ...........................................................................51a

Review ..........................................................................51a

Shack ............................................................................52a

Shop ..............................................................................54a

Shoppe ..........................................................................55a

Source ...........................................................................56a

Society ..........................................................................56a

Store..............................................................................58a

Supply ...........................................................................59a

Warehouse ...................................................................60a

.COM

ART.COM, online retail store services for art

Reg. No. 3,601,346 (Apr. 7, 2009)

BABYSHOWER.COM, online directory featuring

information about baby showers

Reg. No. 4,638,694 (Nov. 11, 2014)

BACKGROUNDCHECKS.COM, public records search

service

Reg. No. 2,888,037 (Sept. 24, 2004)

BATTERIES.COM, retail and wholesale services for

batteries

Reg. No. 2,427,670 (Feb. 6, 2001)

BEAUTY.COM, online retail store services featuring

personal fragrances, cosmetics, and toiletries

Reg. No. 3,178,835 (Dec. 5, 2006)

BEDANDBREAKFAST.COM, promoting real estate

properties

Reg. No. 4,430,129 (Nov. 5, 2013)

real-estate listing services

Reg. No. 4,430,130 (Nov. 5, 2013)

BUSES.COM, online directory listing bus companies

Reg. No. 2,526,294 (Jan. 1, 2002)

CARE.COM, information about personal care providers

Reg. No. 3,745,521 (Feb. 2, 2010)

online searchable database of childcare

information

Reg. No. 5,070,881 (Nov. 1, 2016)

providing employers with family-care-related

services for their employees

Reg. No. 5,070,880 (Nov. 1, 2016)

(1a)

2a

CARING.COM, online information directory in the field

of eldercare facilities, eldercare services, and

related resources

Reg. No. 4,741,631 (May 26, 2015)

CONCERT.COM, ticket agency services for sporting and

entertainment events

Reg. No. 5,923,099 (Nov. 26, 2019)

COOKING.COM, retail store services featuring foodpreparation goods

Reg. No. 2,657,525 (Oct. 10, 2002)

CRUISE.COM, travel agency services, namely, making

reservations and bookings for transportation

Reg. No. 2,684,818 (Feb. 4, 2003)

DATING.COM, dating services

Reg. No. 2,580,467 (June 11, 2002)

DEBT.COM, online information in the field of personal

credit and finance

Reg. No. 3,231,761 (Apr. 17, 2002)

DENTIST.COM, dissemination of advertising for dentists

Reg. No. 2,229,685 (Mar. 2, 1999)

DENTISTRY.COM, online referral services for medical

and dental professionals

Reg. No. 3,452,622 (June 24, 2008)

FLIGHTS.COM, travel agency services

Reg. No. 3,155,349 (Oct. 10, 2006)

FRUITS.COM, website featuring information on fruits

and fruit products

Reg. No. 2,511,298 (Nov. 20, 2001)

GENEALOGY.COM, family history information services

Reg. No. 2,521,336 (Dec. 18, 2001)

GOLF.COM, online consumer information for products

and services of interest to golfers

Reg. No. 3,534,205 (Nov. 18, 2008)

3a

GOVERNING.COM, an online magazine about and of

interest to state and local governments

Reg. No. 4,424,177 (Oct. 29, 2013)

HEALTHLABS.COM, medical and pharmamedical

diagnostic testing and reporting services

Reg. No. 5,836,631 (Aug. 13, 2019)

HOMES.COM, software for access to real-estate listing

information

Reg. No. 2,554,323 (Mar. 26, 2002)

real estate listings via a global communications

network

Reg. No. 2,226,864 (Feb. 23, 1999)

HOTELS.COM, travel agency services

Reg. No. 3,015,723 (Nov. 15, 2005)

INC.COM, information in the field of business

organization via a global computer network.

Reg. No. 2,395,391 (Oct. 17, 2000)

INTERNSHIPS.COM, job placement and internship

placement and recruiting services

Reg. No. 2,835,595 (Apr. 20, 2004)

JEWISH.COM, information on issues of interest to the

Jewish community via a global computer

network

Reg. No. 2,080,381 (July 15, 1997)

KARAOKE.COM, online distributorship services, for

karaoke-related equipment

Reg. No. 2,740,894 (July 29, 2003)

KITCHENS.COM, blogs in the field of kitchens

Reg. No. 3,443,793 (June 10, 2008)

LAW.COM, online newspapers, magazines, and

newsletters in the field of law

Reg. No. 3,413,772 (Apr. 15, 2008)

4a

LEISURE.COM, travel reservation services

Reg. No. 4,589,234 (Aug. 19, 2014)

LIFEINSURE.COM, life insurance brokerage

Reg. No. 4,549,487 (June 10, 2014)

LEGAL.COM, online publication providing information

about the law and law study

Reg. No. 2,360,864 (June 20, 2000)

NOZZLEANDHOSE.COM, online retail store for garden

hoses and nozzles

Reg. No. 5,211,129 (May 23, 2017)

PARENTS.COM, online magazines in the fields of child

development and parenting

Reg. No. 2,146,754 (Mar. 24, 1998)

READERS.COM, online retail store services featuring

eyeglasses and eyeglass accessories

Reg. No. 5,841,345 (Aug. 20, 2019)

RENT.COM, website guide for owners and managers to

promote their properties to prospective tenants

Reg. No. 2,857,033 (June 22, 2004)

RENTALHOUSES.COM, real estate website to rent

property

Reg. No. 4,810,385 (Sept. 8, 2015)

RENTALS.COM, real estate marketing services

Reg. No. 5,860,767 (Sept. 17, 2019)

interactive real estate website that promotes

rental properties

Reg. No. 4,599,140 (Sept. 2, 2014)

online directory publications for housing and

rentals

Reg. No. 4,586,295 (Aug. 12, 2014)

5a

RESTAURANT.COM, marketing, advertising, and

business consulting services for others’

restaurants; designing, implementing, hosting,

and maintaining restaurant websites

Reg. No. 3,141,323 (Sept. 12, 2006)

ROOMMATES.COM, website enabling users to find

roommates

Reg. No. 5,579,277 (Oct. 19, 2018)

SALARY.COM, online journals in the field of employee

compensation and performance

Reg. No. 5,754,229 (May 21, 2019)

SEX.COM, computer data base in the field of adultoriented subject matter

Reg. No. 3,284,052 (Aug. 28, 2007)

electronic bulletin board in the field of adult

entertainment

Reg. No. 3,122,247 (Aug. 1, 2006)

SHAVERS.COM, online mail order services featuring

electric shavers and accessories

Reg. No. 3,356,401 (Dec. 18, 2007)

Reg. No. 2,407,495 (Nov. 21, 2000)

SOFTWARE.COM, computer software facilitating

communications over computer networks

Reg. No. 2,252,250 (June 15, 1999)

STAMPS.COM, retail store services featuring postage

Reg. No. 4,085,625 (Nov. 1, 2011)

TENNIS.COM, interactive databases featuring tennis

news and information; computer tennis bulletin

board

Reg. No. 2,226,886 (Feb. 23, 1999)

TICKETS.COM, ticketing operations and management

software

Reg. No. 2,963,959 (June 28, 2005)

6a

TRAVEL.COM, travel agency services

Reg. No. 2,652,850 (Nov. 19, 2002)

TRIP.COM, travel agency services

Reg. No. 2,696,186 (Mar. 11, 2003)

TURKISHTOWELS.COM, online retail store services

featuring Turkish towels

Reg. No. 3,903,955 (Jan. 11, 2011)

TUTOR.COM, online research and reference services

Reg. No. 3,860,755 (Oct. 12, 2010)

promoting the goods and services of others to

students, parents, teachers, and business people

Reg. No. 3,819,846 (July 13, 2010)

VACATION.COM, membership services for professional

travel agencies

Reg. No. 2,903,217 (Aug. 24, 2004)

WAITTIME.COM, website that enabling consumers to

upload and share user-contributed wait-time

information

Reg. No. 5,047,167 (Sept. 20, 2016)

WEATHER.COM, meteorological instruments and

instruments for weather forecasts and alerts

Reg. No. 3,927,183 (Mar. 8, 2011)

online meteorology and climatology publications

Reg. No. 2,699,088 (Mar. 25, 2003)

WEB.COM, registration of domain names to identify

users on a global computer network

Reg. No. 3,666,813 (May 26, 2009)

WEDDING.COM, online magazine featuring wedding

planning and wedding-related goods and

services

Reg. No. 2,603,086 (July 30, 2002)

7a

WINDSHIELDS.COM, cost comparison shopping services

in the field of auto-glass repair and replacement

Reg. No. 3,510,252 (Sept. 30, 2008)

WORKOUT.COM, information about exercise programs

and weight training

Reg. No. 4,460,827 (Jan. 7, 2014)

WRESTLINGFIGURES.COM, online retail store services

featuring wrestling action figures

Reg. No. 4,824,929 (Oct. 6, 2015)

.COM (cont’d)

1-800-BASKETS.COM, online retail shop featuring gift

baskets

Reg. No. 2,782,517 (Nov. 11, 2003)

1-800-CANDIES.COM, candy and confectionary products

Reg. No. 2,976,683 (July 26, 2005)

1800CEILING.COM, online retail store services featuring

parts for ceilings and ceiling repair

Reg. No. 5,461,041 (May 1, 2018)

1800CONTACTS.COM, online retail store and telephone

order services featuring contact lenses

Reg. No. 3,833,549 (Aug. 17, 2010)

1-800-DENTIST.COM, online referrals of and marketing

for medical and dental professionals

Reg. No. 3,877,773 (Nov. 16, 2010)

1-800-DOCTORS.COM, information about health care

providers

Reg. No. 2,490,017 (Sept. 18, 2001)

1-800-DOGBONE.COM, online shopping site in the field

of dog supplies and treats

Reg. No. 4,397,937 (Sept. 3, 2013)

1800FLOWERS.COM, receiving online orders for flowers

and floral products

Reg. No. 2,825,367 (Mar. 23, 2004)

8a

1800LAWYERS.COM, online marketing and promotional

services for the legal industry

Reg. No. 3,970,491 (May 31, 2011)

Reg. No. 3,005,192 (Oct. 4, 2005)

1-800 LENS.COM, online retail store and mail order

services featuring contact lenses

Reg. No. 3,875,337 (Nov. 16, 2010)

1-800LIGHTING.COM, online retail store services

featuring lighting

Reg. No. 4,242,006 (Nov. 13, 2012)

1-800-VEHICLES.COM, dealership selling used cars

Reg. No. 3,684,647 (Sept. 15, 2009)

800WINE.COM, online retail services featuring wine and

wine accessories

Reg. No. 5,789,921 (June 25, 2019)

BATTERYDEPOT.COM, services including online,

batteries and battery-related goods

Reg. No. 2,979,732 (July 26, 2005)

BEAUTYHUT.COM, online retail store services featuring

health and beauty products

Reg. No. 4,718,095 (Apr. 7, 2015)

BLINDSONLINE.COM, online retail store services

featuring custom window blinds and shades

Reg. No. 3,552,359 (Dec. 28, 2008)

CABLESONLINE.COM, computer cables

Reg. No. 4,810,448 (Sept. 8, 2015)

CARPARTSWAREHOUSE.COM, online retail store

services featuring auto parts

Reg. No. 4,405,428 (Sept. 24, 2013)

CATHOLICSUPPLY.COM, online retail store services

featuring religious affiliated items

Reg. No. 3,195,289 (Jan. 2, 2007)

9a

FOODSERVICEWAREHOUSE.COM, retail and online retail

store services featuring restaurant, foodservice, and beverage equipment and supplies

Reg. No. 4,531,767 (May 20, 2014)

HEALTHWAREHOUSE.COM, online retail store services

featuring prescription drugs, pharmaceuticals,

over-the-counter medicine, health products,

nutritional supplements, etc.

Reg. No. 5,873,238 (Oct. 1, 2019)

INSURANCECOMPANY.COM, online insurance agent

referral services

Reg. No. 2,835,595 (Aug. 20, 2004)

INSUREONLINE.COM, insurance information

Reg. No. 4,924,570 (Oct. 2, 2010)

LAWMART.COM, online retail store services featuring

legal forms

Reg. No. 3,134,050 (Aug. 22, 2006)

LAWNMOWINGONLINE, website for connecting buyers

with lawn care and lawn mowing providers

Reg. No. 5,098,862 (Dec. 13, 2016)

lawn mowing services

Reg. No. 4,416,286 (Oct. 8, 2013)

OFFICEMART.COM, online retail store services

featuring office supplies and office equipment

Reg. No. 4,745,390 (May 26, 2015)

ONLINELABELS.COM, address and shipping labels

Reg. No. 3,674,811 (Aug. 25, 2009)

ONLINEMETALS.COM, processing, fabrication, and

cutting of metal and plastic stock materials

Reg. No. 3,585,577 (Mar. 10, 2009)

ONLINESHOES, online shoe retail store services

Reg. No. 4,263,330 (Dec. 25, 2012)

10a

PLASTIC-MART.COM, plastic storage containers for

commercial or industrial use

Reg. No. 4,630,962 (Nov. 4, 2014)

RUNNINGSTORE.COM, online store services for athletic

clothing and sporting goods

Reg. No. 2,726,061 (June 10, 2003)

SCAFFOLDMART.COM, online retail store services for

scaffolding and related accessories

Reg. No. 4,017,595 (Aug. 30, 2011)

SEWING PARTS ONLINE, online ordering services for

replacement parts for sewing machines and

related parts

Reg. No. 4,666,104 (Jan. 6, 2015)

SIGNWAREHOUSE.COM, online retail store services for

signage supplies

Reg. No. 2,376,302 (Aug. 8, 2000)

SUNSCREENWAREHOUSE.COM, online ordering services

for sunscreen creams and lotions

Reg. No. 4,527,234 (May 6, 2014)

THELUBRICANTSTORE.COM, online retail store services

for petroleum products, lubricants, and related

automotive items

Reg. No. 5,014,892 (Aug. 2, 2016)

THESHOEMART.COM, online retail store services for

footwear

Reg. No. 3,053,352 (Jan. 31, 2006)

WIRELESSSTORE.COM, online retail store services for

wireless and mobile handheld devices

Reg. No. 3,878,344 (Nov. 16, 2010)

WWW.LAWFIRMONLINE.COM, legal services

Reg. No. 5,139,168 (Feb. 7, 2017)

11a

YOGAOUTLET.COM, online retail store services

for clothing, including yoga apparel

Reg. No. 5,584,077 (Oct. 16, 2018)

Company

FOODS CO., retail grocery store services

Reg. No. 3,044,478 (Jan. 17, 2006)

GARDENERS’ SUPPLY COMPANY, online retail store

services featuring gardening products

Reg. No. 2,523,984 (Jan. 1, 2002)

MARGARITA COMPANY, restaurant and broker services

Reg. No. 4,466,670 (Jan. 14, 2014)

PHOTOBOOTH SUPPLY CO., cameras and photography

equipment

Reg. No. 4,783,718 (July 28, 2015)

SEAFOOD SUPPLY COMPANY, wholesale distributorships

featuring seafood

Reg. No. 4,746,840 (June 2, 2015)

THE AGENT’S COMPANY, services for insurance agents

Reg. No. 5,910,844 (Nov. 12, 2019)

THE CAP COMPANY, plastic caps and other protective

parts for use in industrial settings

Reg. No. 2,472,508 (July 24, 2001)

THE CUTTING COMPANY, cutting and welding torches

Reg. No. 4,618,919 (Oct. 7, 2014)

THE DRIVEWAY COMPANY, concrete maintenance and

repair on driveways

Reg. No. 5,867,399 (Sept. 24, 2019)

THE FLAGPOLE COMPANY, retail and online store

services featuring flagpoles, flags, etc.

Reg. No. 3,411,374 (Apr. 15, 2008)

THE FERTILITY COMPANY, physician-assisted

reproduction services

Reg. No. 2,665,787 (Dec. 24, 2002)

12a

THE LITERACY COMPANY, consulting services in the

field of reading skills and reading

comprehension, retention, and recall

Reg. No. 4,349,278 (June 11, 2013)

THE MOISTURE COMPANY, body scrub; skin care

creams and lotions

Reg. No. 5,347,433 (Nov. 28, 2017)

THE MOTION PICTURE COMPANY, video and film

production

Reg. No. 4,426,871 (Oct. 29, 2013)

THE ORGANISM COMPANY, custom manufacturing and

custom synthesis in the nature of genetically

engineered DNA, biological organisms

Reg. No. 5,893,479 (Oct. 22, 2019)

THE PHILLIPS SCREW COMPANY, metal hardware,

including Phillips screws

Reg. No. 5,857,599 (Sept. 10, 2019)

THE POETRY COMPANY, poetry writing service

Reg. No. 4,519,474 (Sept. 10, 2019)

THE PREGNANCY COMPANY, medical diagnostic testing

services to detect pregnancy complications

Reg. No. 5,853,620 (Sept. 3, 2019)

THE PUPPET COMPANY LTD, dolls and puppets

Reg. No. 4,184,460 (Sept. 10, 2019)

THE RAG COMPANY, premium articles for cleaning,

including microfiber cloths, mitts of fabric

Reg. No. 5,791,324 (July 2, 2019)

THE SASH COMPANY, sashes

Reg. No. 5,361,623 (Dec. 19, 2017)

THE SHAVING CO., bar soap; bath soaps; cleaning

agents and preparations

Reg. No. 5,521,328 (July 17, 2018)

13a

THE TRUCKERS’ COMPANY, freight transportation by

truck

Reg. No. 5,699,640 (Mar. 12, 2019)

THE UPGRADE COMPANY, upgrading hardware in

consumer electronics

Reg. No. 4,848,266 (Nov. 3, 2015)

THE VOCAL COMPANY, services relating to music

Reg. No. 5,522,398 (July 24, 2018)

THE WATERING COMPANY, garden hoses

Reg. No. 4,919,728 (Mar. 15, 2016)

THE WIG COMPANY, hairpieces and wigs

Reg. No. 5,278,404 (Aug. 29, 2017)

THE WISDOM COMPANY, workshops and seminars in

personal awareness

Reg. No. 5,912,955 (Nov. 19, 2019)

WOOD CARVERS’ SUPPLY INC., mail order services

featuring wood carving supplies

Reg. No. 1,990,603 (July 30, 1996)

1-800

1800ACCOUNTANT, tax preparation

Reg. No. 4,697,397 (Mar. 3, 2015)

1-800-AUTOSHOP, promoting automobile servicing

Reg. No. 4,247,660 (Nov. 20, 2012)

1800BACKPAIN, website featuring information about

back pain

Reg. No. 4,519,387 (Apr. 22, 2014)

1-800-BARTEND, classes, seminars, workshops in the

field of bartending

Reg. No. 4,916,787 (Mar. 15, 2016)

1-800-BOATING, pleasure boating and sport fishing

equipment services

Reg. No. 1,437,536 (Apr. 21, 1987)

14a

1800BUNKBED, business consulting services in the field

of furniture construction featuring bunk beds

Reg. No. 4,327,890 (Apr. 30, 2013)

1-800 CAR-LOAN, automobile loan financing services

Reg. No. 1,885,240 (Mar. 21, 1995)

1-800-CHIROPRACTOR, marketing chiropractors

Reg. No. 3,170,295 (Nov. 7, 2006)

1 800 CHOCOLATE, online retail store featuring

specialty chocolates

Reg. No. 5,024,273 (Aug. 16, 2016)

1-800-CLEANING, cleaning services

Reg. No. 3,826,658 (July 27, 2010)

1800CONTACTS, contact lenses

Reg. No. 2,675,866 (Jan. 21, 2003)

1-800-COOKIES, cookies, chocolates, candies, etc.

Reg. No. 2,741,280 (July 29, 2003)

1-800-DENTIST, advertising services for dentists

Reg. No. 3,371,531 (Jan. 22, 2008)

1-800-DETECTIVE, referrals in the field of detectives

Reg. No. 1,990,571 (June 30, 1996)

1-800-DRYCLEAN, dry-cleaning services

Reg. No. 3,748,305 (Feb. 16, 2010)

1-800-FITNESS, health-club services

Reg. No. 2,374,747 (Aug. 8, 2000)

1-800-FLOORING, wood flooring

Reg. No. 3,697,879 (Oct. 20, 2009)

1-800-FLOWERS, receiving and placing orders for

flowers and floral products

Reg. No. 1,009,717 (Apr. 29, 1975)

1-800-FURNITURE, retail furniture-store services

Reg. No. 2,821,840 (Mar. 9, 2004)

15a

1-800-GOLF-COURSE, promoting the services of golf

courses through telephone messages

Reg. No. 2,317,336 (Feb. 8, 2000)

1-800-GOLFING, online retail store services featuring

golf equipment and accessories

Reg. No. 5,420,240 (Mar. 6, 2018)

1800HANDYMAN, advertising for home repair services

Reg. No. 2,637,533 (Oct. 15, 2002)

1800HOTELS, hotel reservation services

Reg. No. 3,727,287 (Dec. 22, 2009)

1.800.LIFEINSURANCE, life insurance brokerage

services offered via telephone and online

Reg. No. 2,562,630 (Apr. 16, 2002)

1-800LOANMART, money lending

Reg. No. 4,087,230 (Jan. 17, 2012)

1800 LOOSE DIAMONDS, retail and online services

featuring jewelry

Reg. No. 4,643,534 (Nov. 25, 2014)

1800MATTRESS, telephone shop-at-home retail services

in the field of mattresses, bedding, and furniture

Reg. No. 2,915,478 (Jan. 4, 2005)

1-800-MOSQUITOES, mosquito and insect control

Reg. No. 4,611,481 (Sept. 23, 2014)

1-800-MUFFINS, muffins

Reg. No. 4,787,650 (Aug. 4, 2015)

1-800-PAINTERS, painting contractor services

Reg. No. 5,934,415 (Dec. 10, 2019)

1-800-PLUMBER, promoting plumbing services

Reg. No. 3,113,312 (July 11, 2006)

1-800-PLUMBING, plumbing services and mechanical

contracting services

Reg. No. 1,774,439 (June 1, 1993)

16a

1-800-SHOWERS, installation services for showers

Reg. No. 3,732,955 (Dec. 29, 2009)

1-800 TELEPHONE, merchandising of telephone and

wireless equipment

Reg. No. 2,774,333 (Oct. 21, 2003)

1-800-WATCHES, online retail store services featuring

watches and watch bands

Reg. No. 3,447,109 (June 10, 2008)

1-800-WEDDING, wedding reception planning and

coordination services

Reg. No. 4,477,333 (Feb. 4, 2014)

1-800-WINDOWS, retail, mail order, and online services

featuring replacement windows

Reg. No. 3,152,374 (Oct. 3, 2006)

1800WINDOWS, retail, mail order, and online services

featuring replacement windows

Reg. No. 3,166,929 (Oct. 31, 2006)

Alliance

AUTO ALLIANCE, information related to the automobile

manufacturing industry; association services,

promoting interests of auto manufacturers

Reg. No. 4,007,859 (Aug. 9, 2011)

BATTERY ALLIANCE, batteries, batteries for vehicles,

distribution services including battery delivery

Reg. No. 5,217,958 (June 6, 2017)

BEAUTY ALLIANCE, wholesale distributorship in the

field of beauty supplies

Reg. No. 2,411,386 (Dec. 5, 2000)

COLON CANCER ALLIANCE, emotional support services

for individuals affected by colon and rectal

cancers; related support groups

Reg. No. 4,591,794 (Aug. 26, 2014)

17a

LAW FIRM ALLIANCE, association services, promoting

interests of independent and member law firms

Reg. No. 4,749,802 (June 2, 2015)

LAWYERS ALLIANCE, association services, promoting

interests of organizations providing pro bono

legal services; legal services

Reg. No. 5,701,755 (Mar. 19, 2019)

OUTDOOR ALLIANCE, public advocacy to promote

awareness and protection of outdoor resources;

association services, namely, promoting public

awareness of the need for wildlife preservation

Reg. No. 5,221,143 (June 13, 2017)

RETAIL ALLIANCE, membership organization of

consumer-oriented retail businesses

Reg. No. 2,951,020 (May 17, 2005)

THE SENIOR ALLIANCE, promoting the interests of

senior citizens

Reg. No. 3,585,254 (Mar. 10, 2009)

Association

ALZHEIMER’S AND DEMENTIA ASSOCIATION,

association services, promoting the interests of

those with neuro-degenerative brain disease

Reg. No. 5,687,823 (Feb. 26, 2019)

ALZHEIMER’S ASSOCIATION, association services,

promoting the interests of those with neurodegenerative brain disease

Reg. No. 2,850,223 (June 8, 2004)

AUTOCARE ASSOCIATION, association services relating

to motor-vehicle aftermarket industry

Reg. No. 4,557,675 (June 24, 2014)

18a

CANNABIS BUSINESS ASSOCIATION, association

services, promoting the interests of members in

the cannabis business

Reg. No. 5,783,812 (June 18, 2019)

CEREALS & GRAINS ASSOCIATION, association services

relating to cereal grain science

Reg. No. 5,887,460 (Oct. 15, 2019)

FINANCIAL PLANNING ASSOCIATION, indicate

membership in an association of financial

planning and investment advisors

Reg. No. 2,904,075 (Nov. 23, 2004)

HEMP INDUSTRIES ASSOCIATION, association services

relating to the hemp industry

Reg. No. 5,604,670 (Nov. 13, 2018)

IRRIGATION ASSOCIATION, association services,

promoting interests of the irrigation industry

Reg. No. 2,673,647 (Jan. 14, 2003)

MUSEUM STORE ASSOCIATION (multiple TMs),

association services, promoting the interests of

the museum-store industry

Reg. No. 3,816,102 (July 13, 2010)

SECURITY INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, association services

relating to security industry

Reg. No. 4,843,640 (Nov. 3, 2015)

SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, association

services relating to the semiconductor industry

Reg. No. 5,553,143 (Sept. 4, 2018)

THE INTERNET ASSOCIATION, association services,

promoting the general interests of the Internet

industry and its global community of users

Reg. No. 4,452,684 (Dec. 17, 2013)

19a

WIRE ASSOCIATION, association services, promoting

interests of wire industry

Reg. No. 1,124,185 (Aug. 14, 1979)

Boutique

AUTO BOUTIQUE, automobile dealerships

Reg. No. 5,946,458 (Dec. 24, 2019)

BALLOON BOUTIQUE, receiving orders for balloons,

balloon bouquets, and arrangements

Reg. No. 2,213,896 (Dec. 29, 1998)

CHOCOLATE BOUTIQUE, chocolates and candy

Reg. No. 2,661,297 (Dec. 17, 2002)

THE CHILDREN’S BOUTIQUE, retail store services

featuring children’s clothing, jewelry, and toys

Reg. No. 2,487,003 (Sept. 11, 2001)

WATCH ACCESSORIES BOUTIQUE, watch parts

Reg. No. 5,687,924 (Feb. 26, 2019)

Bulletin

GENERICS BULLETIN, periodicals in the field of

pharmaceuticals

Reg. No. 3,816,376 (July 13, 2010)

HEALTH BULLETIN, magazine columns or sections

about health

Reg. No. 3,022,218 (Nov. 29, 2005)

NOTARY BULLETIN, newsletters about notary services

Reg. No. 3,844,840 (Sept. 7, 2010)

PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN, printed journal pertaining

to the psychological and social sciences

Reg. No. 1,855,720 (Sept. 27, 1994)

Coalition

AMPUTEE COALITION, promoting interests of and

advocating for people with limb loss

Reg. No. 5,011,861 (Aug. 2, 2016)

20a

CHRISTIAN COALITION, promoting public awareness of

Christian issues in society

Reg. No. 1,767,080 (Apr. 20, 1993)

COLON CANCER COALITION, includes charitable

fundraising services, by means of organizing

and conducting projects and events to promote

awareness of colon cancer

Reg. No. 4,288,080 (Feb. 12, 2013)

MATERNITY CARE COALITION, information on seminars

and educational training concerning or of

interest to pregnant women and families

Reg. No. 2,661,079 (Dec. 17, 2002)

SENIORS COALITION, association services, promoting

the interests of elderly and senior Americans

Reg. No. 1,843,984 (July 5, 1994)

SHALE COALITION, trade-association services,

promoting and advocating the interest of gas

producers and their service providers

Reg. No. 5,139,059 (Feb. 7, 2017)

VENOUS DISEASE COALITION, advocacy, promoting the

interests of those with venous diseases

Reg. No. 3,773,728 (Apr. 6, 2010)

Collection

COTTON COLLECTION, unisex cotton sportswear

Reg. No. 5,753,693 (May 14, 2019)

Corporation

THE APPLICATION CORPORATION, application service

provider

Reg. No. 5,766,118 (May 28, 2019)

Council

DAIRY COUNCIL, information and teaching aids about

dairy foods

Reg. No. 1,504,399 (Feb. 2, 1988)

21a

FABRIC ARTS COUNCIL, promoting interests of fabric

industry manufacturers, designers, and retailers

Reg. No. 4,792,139 (Aug. 11, 2015)

FERTILITY COUNCIL, marketing and promotion

services in the field of fertility

Reg. No. 4,482,866 (Dec. 24, 2013)

GORILLA COUNCIL, fundraising relating to the

preservation and protection of the world’s

mountain gorillas, research, and conservation

Reg. No. 5,144,209 (Feb. 21, 2017)

HEALTHCARE COUNCIL, healthcare consulting services

Reg. No. 4,709,732 (Mar. 24, 2015)

HUNGER COUNCIL, providing food to the needy

Reg. No. 4,313,707 (Nov. 15, 2011)

MATTRESS RECYCLING COUNCIL, promoting the

interests of those engaged in mattress recycling

Reg. No. 4,661,212 (Dec. 23, 2014)

PAPERBOARD PACKAGING COUNCIL, association

services, promoting interests of paperboard

packaging industry

Reg. No. 3,766,575 (Mar. 30, 2010)

STARTUP COUNCIL, association services promoting the

interests of startup companies

Reg. No. 5,958,030 (Jan. 7, 2020)

THE DATING COUNCIL, coaching services in the field of

relationships, dating, etc.

Reg. No. 4,553,101 (June 17, 2014)

THE VISION COUNCIL, association services, promoting

the interests of the vision-care industry

Reg. No. 3,604,727 (Apr. 7, 2009)

22a

Depot

BEVERAGE DEPOT, online and retail store services

featuring beer, wine, and distilled spirits

Reg. No. 5,671,842 (Feb. 5, 2019)

CONDOM DEPOT, online retail store services featuring

adult products, including condoms

Reg. No. 5,529,508 (July 31, 2018)

HOTEL SUPPLY DEPOT, online retail store featuring

hotel and hospitality supplies

Reg. No. 5,227,451 (June 20, 2017)

LINEN DEPOT, bath linen and bed linen

Reg. No. 5,682,291 (Feb. 19, 2019)

OFFICE DEPOT, retail office-supply store services

Reg. No. 1,449,065 (July 21, 1987)

THE HOME DEPOT, retail and online retail store

featuring home improvement goods and services

Reg. No. 4,438,588 (Nov. 26, 2013)

Digest

AUTOMOTIVE DIGEST, global computer network

automotive industry information

Reg. No. 2,342,028 (Apr. 11, 2000)

BEVERAGE DIGEST, website featuring business

information about the beverage industry

Reg. No. 3,586,119 (Mar. 10, 2009)

CONSUMER DIGEST, magazine including articles on a

variety of subjects of interest to consumers

Reg. No. 1,642,060 (Apr. 23, 1991)

GOLF DIGEST, information, features, and advertising,

all relating to golf and golf products

Reg. No. 2,206,400 (Dec. 1, 1998)

GUN DIGEST, reference books and other publications,

all in the field of guns

Reg. No. 3,284,836 (June 17, 1997)

23a

HOMELIFE DIGEST, website featuring blogs and nondownloadable publications concerning homes,

home care, and related products and services

Reg. No. 5,940,444 (Dec. 17, 2019)

INCOME DIGEST, newsletter featuring financial and

investment advice

Reg. No. 2,018,513 (Nov. 19, 1996)

INVENTORS DIGEST, magazines featuring information

relating to innovation, inventions and inventors

Reg. No. 3,645,838 (June 30, 2009)

MOTOR DIGEST, magazines of general circulation

containing classified ads relating to automobiles

Reg. No. 2,322,583 (Feb. 22, 2000)

ONCOLOGY DIGEST, newsletter of recent advances in

oncology

Reg. No. 2,244,075 (May 4, 1999)

READER’S DIGEST, downloadable electronic

publications of general interest, magazines and

books

Reg. No. 5,391,988 (Jan. 30, 2018)

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DIGEST, books and

pamphlets containing digests of Supreme Court

legal opinions

Reg. No. 1,247,072 (Aug. 2, 1983)

WEDDING DIGEST, website featuring blogs and articles

in the field of weddings

Reg. No. 5,917,094 (Nov. 19, 2019)

YOGA DIGEST, online instruction about yoga and

wellness

Reg. No. 4,906,344 (Feb. 23, 2016)

Enterprise

CAR WASH ENTERPRISES, vehicle washing services

Reg. No. 2,801,587 (Dec. 30, 2003)

24a

DOCKET ENTERPRISE, computer software, namely,

calendaring, docketing and task management

software used in the field of law

Reg. No. 5,116,182 (Jan. 3, 2017)

WEALTH ENTERPRISE, wealth-management services

Reg. No. 5,923,936 (Sept. 17, 2019)

Emporium

COOKS’ EMPORIUM, retail services and online retail

store services featuring culinary equipment,

cookware, bakeware, etc.

Reg. No. 5,965,047 (Jan. 21, 2020)

COTTON EMPORIUM, clothing made largely of cotton

Reg. No. 2,512,082 (Nov. 27, 2001)

DENTAL EMPORIUM, online retail store services

featuring dental supplies

Reg. No. 5,461,093 (May 1, 2018)

FITNESS EMPORIUM, wholesale and retail store

services featuring fitness equipment

Reg. No. 4,024,225 (Sept. 6, 2011)

NECKTIE EMPORIUM, neckties

Reg. No. 5,619,489 (Nov. 27, 2018)

Establishment

THE WEDDING ESTABLISHMENT, wedding reception

planning and coordination services

Reg. No. 5,229,734 (June 20, 2017)

Exchange

BEER EXCHANGE, bar services featuring beer, wine,

cocktails

Reg. No. 5,127,838 (Jan. 24, 2017)

BIRDERS’ EXCHANGE, association services promoting

the interests of ornithologists and educational

services relating to ornithology

Reg. No. 2,842,323 (May 18, 2004)

25a

CARPET EXCHANGE, retail store and online services for

flooring and flooring accessory products

Reg. No. 5,947,876 (Dec. 31, 2019)

COFFEE EXCHANGE, retail shop and mail order

services for coffee

Reg. No. 1,896,628 (May 30, 1995)

CONCRETE EXCHANGE, retail store services featuring

concrete mixes, sealers, coatings, stains, etc.

Reg. No. 5,362,864 (Dec. 26, 2017)

ENERGY EXCHANGE, website featuring energy usage

management information regarding various

energy sources and client energy usage data

Reg. No. 4,647,972 (Dec. 2, 2014)

FITNESS EXCHANGE, retail and online store featuring

fitness equipment, accessories, and supplements

Reg. No. 2,793,305 (Dec. 9, 2003)

MATTRESS EXCHANGE, retail stores with mattresses

Reg. No. 3,741,207 (Jan. 19, 2010)

MILITARY PARTS EXCHANGE, retail store and online

services for parts, components, equipment,

replacement parts, and replacement

components for military aircraft and vehicles

Reg. No. 5,936,348 (Dec. 17, 2019)

THE ADOPTION EXCHANGE, adoption placement

services

Reg. No. 3,387,960 (Feb. 26, 2008)

THE BEER EXCHANGE, bar services featuring wine,

beer, restaurant and café services

Reg. No. 4,683,819 (Feb. 10, 2015)

THE CURTAIN EXCHANGE, draperies

Reg. No. 2,315,218 (Feb. 8, 2000)

26a

THE DEBT EXCHANGE, commercial lending and loan

brokerage services, loan management services

Reg. No. 5,568,088 (Sept. 25, 2018)

THE LABOR EXCHANGE, job and personnel placement

Reg. No. 4,832,929 (Oct. 13, 2015)

THE LASH EXCHANGE, retail stores for eyelash

extension products

Reg. No. 5,268,258 (Aug. 15, 2017)

THE PAIN EXCHANGE, online forum and blogs with

information on chronic pain and treatments

Reg. No. 4,412,541 (Oct. 1, 2013)

Reg. No. 4,412,540 (Oct. 1, 2013)

Factory

BAGEL FACTORY, bagels

Reg. No. 3,788,890 (May 11, 2010)

BOOKFACTORY, publication of texts, books, journals

Reg. No. 3,460,821 (July 8, 2008)

FABRIC FACTORY, retail fabric store

Reg. No. 3,084,169 (Apr. 25, 2006)

FENCE FACTORY, installation and rental of fences

Reg. No. 3,964,203 (May 24, 2011)

FLATBREAD FACTORY, manually operated press for

tortillas and other flatbreads and bread wraps

Reg. No. 4,771,666 (July 14, 2015)

GREETING CARD FACTORY, software for making

greeting cards

Reg. No. 2,498,083 (Oct. 16, 2001)

JAVA FACTORY, coffee

Reg. No. 4,721,869 (Apr. 14, 2015)

JEWELRY FACTORY, wholesale and retail store services

for jewelry sales

Reg. No. 2,258,187 (June 29, 1999)

27a

LAW FACTORY, legal services

Reg. No. 5,419,455 (Mar. 6, 2018)

MEMORY FOAM FACTORY, online and retail store

services featuring foam cushioning products

Reg. No. 2,952,393 (May 17, 2005)

PHOTO FACTORY, photography and photography

services

Reg. No. 4,711,214 (Mar. 31, 2015)

SOFT PRETZEL FACTORY, soft pretzels

Reg. No. 2,885,994 (Sept. 21, 2004)

SMOOTHIE FACTORY, retail store services for

smoothies, etc.

Reg. No. 4,379,473 (Aug. 6, 2013)

THE ARTWORK FACTORY, art pictures

Reg. No. 5,230,145 (June 27, 2017)

THE BAG FACTORY, various bags

Reg. No. 2,765,955 (Sept. 16, 2013)

THE BATH FACTORY, bath soaps in many forms

Reg. No. 4,884,768 (Jan. 12, 2016)

THE BARBER FACTORY, barbershop services

Reg. No. 4,727,650 (Feb. 10, 2015)

THE CHEESECAKE FACTORY, cakes and restaurant

services

Reg. No. 1,549,370 (July 25, 1989)

THE CHOCOLATE FACTORY, chocolate bakery goods

and products

Reg. No. 3,875,027 (Nov. 9, 2010)

THE CHIP FACTORY, tortilla chips

Reg. No. 5,211,188 (May 23, 2017)

THE CLOSET FACTORY, custom design and

development of cabinets, closets, furniture,

shelves, etc.

Reg. No. 4,862,364 (Dec. 1, 2015)

28a

THE DRY CLEANING FACTORY, dry cleaning services

Reg. No. 2,673,345 (Jan. 7, 2003)

THE GARDEN FACTORY, online retail store services for

lawn, garden, and landscaping supplies

Reg. No. 5,349,633 (Dec. 5, 2017)

THE GEMSTONE FACTORY, wholesale and distribution

services for minerals, rocks, and stones

Reg. No. 4,587,766 (Aug. 19, 2014)

THE JELLY BEAN FACTORY, jelly beans and candies

Reg. No. 1,270,118 (Mar. 13, 1984)

THE KINK FACTORY, adult sexual stimulation aids

Reg. No. 5,217,615 (June 6, 2017)

THE LOAN FACTORY, mortgage brokerage and lending

Reg. No. 5,688,491 (Mar. 5, 2019)

THE MILK SHAKE FACTORY, milk shakes

Reg. No. 3,934,138 (Mar. 22, 2011)

THE OLIVE OIL FACTORY, extra virgin olive oil

Reg. No. 3,078,876 (Apr. 11, 2006)

THE PAYROLL FACTORY, payroll services

Reg. No. 5,227,113 (June 20, 2017)

THE PEARL FACTORY, retail store services featuring

pearls

Reg. No. 2,279,284 (Sept. 21, 1999)

THE PILLOW FACTORY, pillows, pillow cases, bed sheets

Reg. No. 3,026,030 (Dec. 13, 2015)

THE POPCORN FACTORY, online retail store services

featuring popcorn

Reg. No. 4,086,790 (Jan. 17, 2012)

mail/catalog order services for merchandise

such as popcorn

Reg. No. 1,902,060 (June 27, 1995)

popped popcorn confections

Reg. No. 1,110,635 (Jan. 2, 1979)

29a

THE POSTCARD FACTORY, postcards, posters, etc.

Reg. No. 1,802,057 (Aug. 10, 1993)

THE RIBBON FACTORY, ribbons of textile materials

Reg. No. 5,687,761 (Feb. 26, 2019)

THE ROOF FACTORY, roofing services

Reg. No. 4,904,797 (Feb. 23, 2016)

THE SINK FACTORY, wash basins and toilet tanks

Reg. No. 1,725,374 (Oct. 20, 1992)

Reg. No. 1,402,642 (July 22, 1986)

THE TAPE FACTORY, retail and wholesale stores in the

field of adhesive tapes and tape dispensers

Reg. No. 5,142,091 (Feb. 14, 2017)

TRADEMARK FACTORY, trademark-related legal

services

Reg. No. 4,635,555 (Nov. 11, 2014)

Federation

CIGAR FEDERATION, social networking services in the

field of cigars

Reg. No. 4,223,488 (Oct. 9, 2012)

COASTAL AND ESTUARINE RESEARCH FEDERATION,

association services, promoting awareness of

estuaries and coasts

Reg. No. 4,465,028 (Jan. 14, 2014)

FREEDOM FEDERATION, association services,

preserving freedom and justice

Reg. No. 4,123,410 (Apr. 10, 2012)

WATER ENVIRONMENT FEDERATION, association

services, water preservation and enhancement,

and related environmental issues.

Reg. No. 5,544,209 (Aug. 21, 2018)

30a

Firm

FURNITURE FIRM, retail store services featuring

chairs, recliners, and massage chairs

Reg. No. 4,657,971 (Dec. 16, 2014)

THE LASH FIRM, false eyelashes

Reg. No. 5,895,707 (Oct. 29, 2019)

YOGA FIRM, yoga instruction

Reg. No. 4,630,894 (Nov. 4, 2014)

Foundation

AUTISM SCIENCE FOUNDATION, promoting public

awareness of autism spectrum disorders

Reg. No. 4,666,951 (Jan. 6, 2015)

ALZHEIMER’S FOUNDATION, promoting public interest

and awareness of and understanding of

Alzheimer’s disease and related illnesses

Reg. No. 4,661,324 (Dec. 23, 2014)

ARTHRITIS FOUNDATION, association services,

promoting elimination and control of arthritis

Reg. No. 3,043,606 (Jan. 17, 2006)

BRAIN ANEURYSM FOUNDATION, association and

charitable fundraising relating to brain

aneurysms

Reg. No. 3,297,709 (Sept. 25, 2007)

CELIAC DISEASE FOUNDATION, public advocacy to

promote awareness of celiac disease

Reg. No. 5,103,620 (Dec. 20, 2016)

COLON CANCER FOUNDATION, charitable fundraising

services for colorectal cancer research

Reg. No. 5,273,095 (Aug. 22, 2017)

FETAL HEALTH FOUNDATION, charitable fundraising

promoting research and education relating to

fetal syndromes

Reg. No. 4,903,095 (Feb. 16, 2016)

31a

EPILEPSY FOUNDATION, association services,

promoting the interests of people with epilepsy

Reg. No. 2,297,602 (Dec. 7, 1999)

IMMUNE DEFICIENCY FOUNDATION, medical research

relating to primary immune deficiency disease

and its diagnosis and treatment

Reg. No. 3,290,969 (Sept. 11, 2007)

MELANOMA RESEARCH FOUNDATION, efforts to

achieve advances in melanoma research

Reg. No. 4,572,350 (July 22, 2014)

PARKINSON’S FOUNDATION, research, and providing

information, about Parkinson’s disease

Reg. No. 5,859,251 (Sept. 10, 2019)

PEDIATRIC BRAIN TUMOR FOUNDATION, charitable

fundraising relating to childhood brain tumors

Reg. No. 3,479,084 (Aug. 5, 2008)

RHEUMATOLOGY RESEARCH FOUNDATION, charitable

fundraising services relating to rheumatology

Reg. No. 4,725,531 (Apr. 21, 2015)

THE BREAST CANCER RESEARCH FOUNDATION,

charitable fundraising for breast cancer

research

Reg. No. 3,097,128 (May 30, 2006)

THE CHEMOTHERAPY FOUNDATION, association

services, raising funds, and sponsoring research

relating to cancer treatment and allied diseases

by chemotherapy

Reg. No. 1,209,166 (Sept. 14, 1982)

THE CHILDREN’S CANCER FOUNDATION, charitable

services, namely fund raising

Reg. No. 2,733,684 (July 8, 2003)

32a

THE EYE CANCER FOUNDATION, promoting public

awareness of eye care and wearing sunglasses

Reg. No. 4,881,988 (Jan. 5, 2016)

THE GLAUCOMA FOUNDATION, charitable fundraising

services, and promoting public awareness of

glaucoma and treatments for glaucoma

Reg. No. 5,362,591 (Dec. 26, 2017)

THE OCEAN FOUNDATION, association services and

charitable foundation services relating to

marine conservation and healthy ocean

ecosystems

Reg. No. 4,829,726 (Oct. 13, 2015)

THE ORAL CANCER FOUNDATION, charitable

foundation services; cancer screening services

Reg. No. 3,913,529 (Feb. 1, 2011)

THE SOLAR FOUNDATION, workshops and webinars in

the field of solar energy technologies

Reg. No. 4,401,946 (Sept. 10, 2013)

THE SPINA BIFIDA FOUNDATION, association services,

promoting interests of people with Spina Bifida

Reg. No. 3,685,691 (Sept. 22, 2009)

VASCULAR DISEASE FOUNDATION, association and

charitable fundraising services relating to

vascular disease

Reg. No. 4,401,946 (Sept. 10, 2013)

Fund

CHILDFUND, disbursing money to promote the welfare

of children

Reg. No. 3,584,579 (Mar. 3, 2009)

OVARIAN CANCER RESEARCH FUND, charitable

fundraising to support education and research

concerning cancer detection, treatment and cure

Reg. No. 4,193,004 (Aug. 21, 2012)

33a

Group

CAMPGROUP, summer camp services, recreational camp

services, sport camp services, etc.

Reg. No. 2,620,116 (Sept. 17, 2002)

HOUSING SERVICES GROUP, real estate property

cleaning, maintenance, and repair services

Reg. No. 4,351,735 (June 11, 2013)

LAWFINANCE GROUP, financial investment in the field

of civil litigation

Reg. No. 2,511,455 (Nov. 27, 2001)

THE BUILDING GROUP, real estate services

Reg. No. 2,560,592 (Apr. 9, 2002)

THE FIDUCIARY GROUP, wealth management services

for individuals and families

Reg. No. 3,464,813 (July 8, 2008)

THE INTERNET LAW GROUP, legal consulting services

in the field of e-commerce

Reg. No. 4,151,990 (May 29, 2012)

THE OFFICE GROUP, leasing and rental of office space

Reg. No. 5,747,729 (May 7, 2019)

THE RETIREMENT GROUP, investment advice and

financial planning advisory services

Reg. No. 4,820,766 (Sept. 29, 2015)

TRANSPORTATION FUNDING GROUP, financial services

for the transportation industry

Reg. No. 3,226,245 (Apr. 3, 2007)

Guide

BASS GUIDE, periodical magazines about fishing

Reg. No. 2,090,267 (Aug. 19, 1997)

BEACH GUIDE, printed guide books featuring rental

vacation property listings

Reg. No. 4,920,429 (Mar. 22, 2016)

34a

CAR AND DRIVER BUYERS GUIDE, magazine

Reg. No. 1,041,307 (June 15, 1976)

CATFISH GUIDE, magazines about fishing

Reg. No. 2,029,380 (Jan. 7, 1997)

EMPLOYER’S GUIDE, series of books on employment

law and regulations

Reg. No. 2,337,979 (Apr. 4, 2000)

GOLFER’S GUIDE, magazines related to golf

Reg. No. 2,148,503 (Apr. 7, 1998)

MOVER’S GUIDE, a booklet containing relocation advice,

change of address forms, and advertisements

Reg. No. 2,614,173 (Sept. 3, 2002)

TV GUIDE, magazines containing information with

respect to TV programming

Reg. No. 1,767,448 (Apr. 27, 1993)

House

ANIMAL HOUSE, dog kennels

Reg. No. 4,810,439 (Sept. 8, 2015)

AREPAS HOUSE, arepas and restaurant services

Reg. No. 5,567,514 (Sept. 18, 2018)

CHARCOAL HOUSE, online and retail store services

featuring charcoal-related products

Reg. No. 5,825,053 (Aug. 6, 2019)

CHESS HOUSE, chess games, chess pieces, chess sets

Reg. No. 5,195,269 (May 2, 2017)

HELMET HOUSE, storage, distribution, packing,

shipping of motorsport helmets, etc.

Reg. No. 3,523,178 (Oct. 28, 2008)

HOUSE OF BRUSSELS CHOCOLATES, fine chocolates and

chocolate truffles

Reg. No. 2,926,189 (Feb. 15, 2005)

35a

HOUSE OF CUPCAKES, retail shops featuring baked

goods

Reg. No. 4,479,742 (Feb. 11, 2014)

HOUSE OF FITNESS, health and fitness club services

Reg. No. 4,377,737 (July 30, 2013)

HOUSE OF HERBS, various herbs

Reg. No. 0,769,655 (May 12, 1964)

HOUSE OF JERKY, jerky

Reg. No. 4,972,470 (June 7, 2016)

HOUSE OF KEBAB, restaurant services

Reg. No. 4,736,970 (May 12, 2015)

HOUSE OF MARBLES, marbles

Reg. No. 1,291,320 (Aug. 21, 1984)

HOUSE OF MUFFLERS & BRAKES, automotive

maintenance and repairs

Reg. No. 3,789,580 (May 18, 2010)

HOUSE OF PIES, pies of all kinds

Reg. No. 1,302,940 (Oct. 30, 1984)

HOUSE OF SMOKE, retail store services featuring glass

pipes, cigars, and novelties

Reg. No. 4,596,268 (Sept. 2, 2014)

ICE CREAM HOUSE, retail store services featuring ice

cream

Reg. No. 5,111,850 (Jan. 3, 2017)

INSURANCE HOUSE, insurance agency services

Reg. No. 4,473,947 (Jan. 28, 2014)

KNIFE HOUSE, retail store services featuring knives

Reg. No. 5,081,567 (Nov. 15, 2016)

LINEN HOUSE, linen and textile goods

Reg. No. 3,485,283 (Aug. 12, 2008)

MAPLE HOUSE, syrups, including maple syrup

Reg. No. 1,673,576 (Jan. 28, 1992)

36a

PAPER HOUSE, online retail store services featuring

stationery, etc.

Reg. No. 5,608,070 (Nov. 13, 2018)

SOFTWARE HOUSE, computer hardware, software, etc.

Reg. No. 3,010,766 (Nov. 1, 2005)

TAILOR HOUSE, clothes tailoring

Reg. No. 5,830,494 (Aug. 6, 2019)

TAX HOUSE, tax preparation and accounting services

Reg. No. 5,784,873 (June 25, 2019)

TELECOM HOUSE, telecommunications services

Reg. No. 2,622,459 (Sept. 17, 2002)

THE LIQUOR HOUSE, retail store services featuring

wine, liquor, beer, beverages

Reg. No. 5,745,489 (May 7, 2019)

THE MALT HOUSE, bar and restaurant services

Reg. No. 4,453,189 (Dec. 24, 2013)

THE ONION HOUSE, onions

Reg. No. 2,969,606 (July 19, 2005)

THE SALAD HOUSE, restaurant services

Reg. No. 4,434,056 (Nov. 12, 2013)

THE WIPE HOUSE, flushable wipes holder

Reg. No. 4,428,661 (Nov. 5, 2013)

TOOL HOUSE, hand tools

Reg. No. 4,505,779 (Apr. 1, 2014)

WAFFLE HOUSE, restaurant services

Reg. No. 2,965,520 (July 12, 2005)

Hut

BIKINI HUT, retail store services featuring bikinis, etc.

Reg. No. 5,390,669 (Jan. 30, 2018)

DIAMOND HUT, various services featuring jewelry

Reg. No. 5,254,419 (Aug. 1, 2017)

37a

GLOVE HUT, glove display rack

Reg. No. 2,573,016 (May 28, 2002)

GOLF HUT, retail store for golf equipment

Reg. No. 2,016,526 (Nov. 12, 1996)

PIZZA HUT, restaurant services

Reg. No. 0,729,847 (Apr. 10, 1962)

SUNGLASS HUT, retail optical store services

Reg. No. 1,475,511 (Feb. 2, 1988)

TACO HUT, restaurant services for Mexican-type foods

Reg. No. 0,852,058 (July 2, 1968)

TROPHY HUT, online and retail store services in the

field of trophies

Reg. No. 3,449,957 (June 17, 2008)

VITAMIN HUT, online and retail store services featuring

vitamins and nutritional supplements

Reg. No. 4,807,284 (Sept. 8, 2015)

Institute

ANIMAL WELFARE INSTITUTE, educational services

related to protection and well-being of animals

Reg. No. 5,877,544 (Oct. 8, 2019)

BEER INSTITUTE, association promoting the beer

industry

Reg. No. 4,391,238 (Aug. 27, 2013)

CANNABINOID RESEARCH INSTITUTE, scientific

research in the field of cannabinoid-based

medicines

Reg. No. 5,765,928 (May 28, 2019)

CARING INSTITUTE, promoting acts of caring

Reg. No. 5,583,546 (Oct. 16, 2018)

FOODSERVICE INSTITUTE, training of people in the

food service industry

Reg. No. 5,343,056 (Nov. 21, 2017)

38a

HEALTH & SAFETY INSTITUTE, educational services in

the field of emergency medical response and

environmental, health, and safety training

Reg. No. 5,460,918 (May 1, 2018)

THE DATING INSTITUTE, dating services

Reg. No. 4,636,734 (Nov. 11, 2014)

THE FERTILIZER INSTITUTE, association services,

promoting the interests of the fertilizer industry

Reg. No. 2,853,120 (June 15, 2004)

THE HAND AND WRIST INSTITUTE, surgical and other

treatments for conditions of the hand and wrist

Reg. No. 5,111,511 (Dec. 27, 2016)

THE SPORTS INSTITUTE, programs about sports safety

Reg. No. 5,899,395 (Oct. 29, 2019)

THE TRAVEL INSTITUTE, travel-related courses

Reg. No. 5,573,436 (Oct. 2, 2018)

TRANSGENDER LAW INSTITUTE, educational seminars

on issues concerning the transgender

community

Reg. No. 5,435,800 (Apr. 3, 2018)

Journal

CANINE JOURNAL, website covering pet breeds, pet

food, pet medical concerns, and pet insurance

Reg. No. 4,410,479 (Oct. 1, 2013)

CAREER JOURNAL, newspaper column in the field of

employment and business

Reg. No. 2,470,768 (July 17, 2001)

CLERGY JOURNAL, journals of interest to ministers

Reg. No. 1,929,220 (Oct. 24, 1995)

COWBOY JOURNAL, online journals featuring

biographical and rodeo stories

Reg. No. 5,588,408 (Oct. 16, 2018)

39a

FARM JOURNAL, magazines about agribusiness

Reg. No. 5,140,218 (Feb. 14, 2017)

FLIGHT JOURNAL, magazine about aviation

Reg. No. 2,200,766 (Oct. 27, 1998)

JOURNAL OF ASTHMA, journal covering asthma

Reg. No. 2,634,805 (Oct. 15, 2002)

JOURNAL OF NEUROSURGERY, periodical about

neurosurgery

Reg. No. 2,773,359 (Oct. 14, 2003)

JOURNAL OF PHYSICS, periodicals about science and

physics

Reg. No. 4,431,340 (Nov. 12, 2013)

JOURNAL OF SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASES,

articles about sexually transmitted diseases

Reg. No. 4,492,787 (Mar. 4, 2014)

OIL & GAS JOURNAL, magazine about oil and gas

Reg. No. 3,981,599 (June 21, 2011)

THE BEVERAGE JOURNAL, magazines featuring

alcoholic brand and pricing information

Reg. No. 5,466,460 (May 8, 2018)

THE EQUESTRIAN JOURNAL, journals in the field of

equestrian and horse services

Reg. No. 5,759,660 (May 21, 2019)

THE GOLFER’S JOURNAL, journals about sports,

namely golf

Reg. No. 5,917,053 (Nov. 19, 2019)

THE HOUSING JOURNAL, journals related to housing

Reg. No. 5,139,186 (Feb. 7, 2017)

THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, journals concerning

various financial topics

Reg. No. 3,533,255 (Nov. 18, 2008)

40a

THE JOURNAL OF HYPNOTISM, newsletters about

hypnotism

Reg. No. 4,178,482 (July 24, 2012)

THE JOURNAL OF NEUROSCIENCE, journal dealing with

neuroscience research

Reg. No. 2,959,143 (June 7, 2005)

THE JOURNAL OF NUTRITION, journals relating to

nutritional sciences

Reg. No. 3,238,971 (May 8, 2007)

THE JOURNAL OF UROLOGY, magazines about urology

Reg. No. 4,358,075 (June 25, 2013)

THE LINGERIE JOURNAL, trade magazine covering

intimate apparel

Reg. No. 5,146,088 (Feb. 21, 2017)

THE PARALEGAL JOURNAL, magazine covering

paralegal education

Reg. No. 4,394,176 (Aug. 27, 2013)

WATCH JOURNAL, magazines and journals featuring

information about watches

Reg. No. 4,137,184 (May 1, 2012)

Magazine

DANCE MAGAZINE, magazines about dance

Reg. No. 2,023,369 (Dec. 17, 1996)

GLASS MAGAZINE, magazines dealing with glass

industry

Reg. No. 1,686,384 (May 12, 1992)

GOLF MAGAZINE, monthly magazine

Reg. No. 1,521,775 (Jan. 24, 1989)

MASSAGE MAGAZINE, magazines about massage

Reg. No. 5,334,734 (Nov. 14, 2017)

ONCOLOGISTICS MAGAZINE, industry news of interest

in the operation of oncology practices

Reg. No. 4,148,140 (May 29, 2012)

41a

SILVER MAGAZINE, magazines directed to collecting

antiques and articles of silver

Reg. No. 2,448,886 (May 8, 2001)

SKI MAGAZINE, magazine

Reg. No. 1,630,827 (Jan. 8, 1991)

Market

FRAGRANCEMARKET, retail store services featuring

perfume and cologne, among other goods

Reg. No. 2,763,335 (Sept. 16, 2003)

HOLIDAY MARKET, holiday decorations

Reg. No. 3,763,588 (Mar. 23, 2010)

SALMON MARKET, caviar, fish fillets, fish roe, prepared,

fish, canned, among other goods

Reg. No. 5,718,291 (Apr. 2, 2019)

SKINMARKET, online retail store featuring cosmetics

and bath and body products

Reg. No. 5,676,914 (Feb. 12, 2019)

THE BEER MARKET, bar services

Reg. No. 4,255,483 (Dec. 4, 2012)

THE SOUP MARKET, soups, stews

Reg. No. 4,647,800 (Dec. 2, 2014)

THE YACHT MARKET, advertising of boats, yachts, and

other water vehicles

Reg. No. 4,929,246 (Mar. 29, 2016)

Mart

BEAUTY MART, retail and wholesale services in the field

of beauty supplies

Reg. No. 1,635,090 (Feb. 12, 1991)

BRIDAL MART, retail store services in the field of

women’s clothing and accessories

Reg. No. 2,596,271 (July 16, 2002)

42a

CONVENIENT FOOD MART, retail store services

featuring convenience store items and gasoline;

retail delicatessen services

Reg. No. 3,222,097 (Mar. 27, 2007)

DECORATING MART, retail store services featuring

wallpaper, wallcoverings, blinds, fabric, etc.

Reg. No. 2,042,467 (Mar. 4, 1997)

DOOR-MART, installation, maintenance and repair of

garage doors, and accessories

Reg. No. 4,067,057 (Dec. 6, 2011)

FENCESMART, online retail store featuring fence parts

Reg. No. 5,828,945 (Aug. 6, 2019)

FISH MART, various services featuring fish, pets,

plants, and aquatic supplies

Reg. No. 2,763,335 (Sept. 16, 2003)

LINGERIE MART, lingerie retail and wholesale store

services

Reg. No. 3,048,590 (Jan. 24, 2006)

PAPER MART, various services relating to offices

supplies and packaging supplies

Reg. No. 3,698,151 (Oct. 20, 2009)

Reg. No. 2,704,421 (Apr. 8, 2003)

ROBEMART, online and retail store services featuring

home textiles, spa accessories, and robes

Reg. No. 5,075,472 (Nov. 1, 2016)

SOFA MART, retail furniture store services

Reg. No. 2,416,878 (Jan. 2, 2001)

SPICEMART, retail and wholesale store services in the

field of spices

Reg. No. 4,600,427 (Sept. 9, 2014)

STONE MART, retail store for natural stone products

Reg. No. 4,249,839 (Nov. 27, 2012)

43a

THE BANK MART, banking services

Reg. No. 1,290,437 (Aug. 14, 1984)

TRUCK INSURANCE MART, insurance agencies and

insurance consultation

Reg. No. 3,404,518 (Apr. 1, 2008)

WELDINGMART, online and retail store services

featuring welders and welding supplies

Reg. No. 3,556,608 (Jan. 6, 2009)

Monthly

CANCER MONTHLY, health information about cancer

Reg. No. 3,762,383 (Mar. 23, 2010)

MUSIC MONTHLY, online interview and review of music

Reg. No. 4,344,435 (May 28, 2013)

WINE BUSINESS MONTHLY, magazine about wine and

wine-related businesses

Reg. No. 3,057,812 (Feb. 7, 2006)

News

ANTHROPOLOGY NEWS, newsletters on anthropology

Reg. No. 2,966,046 (July 12, 2005)

ASSOCIATION NEWS, magazine concerning meeting,

planning arrangements and conferences

Reg. No. 2,642,022 (Oct. 29, 2002)

BEDDINGS NEWS & DESIGN, magazine featuring new

developments in sleep products

Reg. No. 2,250,657 (June 1, 1999)

CARDIOLOGY NEWS, online magazines covering medical

and cardiology news

Reg. No. 3,824,563 (July 27, 2010)

CATHOLIC NEWS SERVICE, current events from a

Catholic perspective

Reg. No. 2,630,640 (Oct. 8, 2002)

44a

COLLEGE NEWS, printed periodicals in the field of

higher education and academics

Reg. No. 4,285,218 (Feb. 5, 2013)

CRUISE INDUSTRY NEWS, newsletters and reference

manuals focusing on the cruise industry

Reg. No. 2,118,588 (Dec. 2, 1997)

E-DOCUMENT NEWS, online newsletters for the

electronic document industry

Reg. No. 2,993,506 (Sept. 6, 2005)

ENDOCRINE NEWS, printed periodicals and newsletters

in the field of endocrinology

Reg. No. 4,022,870 (Sept. 6, 2011)

FRAME BUILDING NEWS, magazines relating to the

post-frame building construction industry

Reg. No. 3,229,797 (Apr. 17, 2007)

GOURMET NEWS, newspapers for the gourmet food

industry

Reg. No. 2,272,049 (Aug. 24, 1999)

INVESTMENTNEWS, newspapers and newsletters for

the financial services industry

Reg. No. 3,135,672 (Aug. 29, 2006)

JOB NEWS, magazines about available employment

Reg. No. 2,580,875 (June 18, 2002)

MODEL AIRPLANE NEWS, magazines and newsletters

about model aircraft

Reg. No. 2,473,014 (July 31, 2001)

MOTORCYCLE PRODUCT NEWS, magazine for the retail

motorcycle industry

Reg. No. 2,363,575 (July 4, 2000)

NURSERY NEWS, newspaper directed to the nursery

and landscaping industry

Reg. No. 1,478,141 (Feb. 23, 1988)

45a

OPERA NEWS, magazines containing news and features

about classical music

Reg. No. 5,906,585 (Nov. 12, 2019)

PET PRODUCT NEWS, magazines about pet products

Reg. No. 1,967,786 (Apr. 16, 1996)

POKER NEWS, hosting digital content relating to

gaming and online casinos

Reg. No. 4,264,771 (Dec. 25, 2012)

RELIGIOUS PRODUCT NEWS, magazine providing

information on products and services to

churches

Reg. No. 2,984,318 (Aug. 9, 2005)

SCIENCE NEWS, magazine

Reg. No. 1,155,569 (May 26, 1981)

SECURITIES INDUSTRY NEWS, newspaper providing

information on the financial industry

Reg. No. 2,290,723 (Nov. 2, 1999)

SECURITY SYSTEMS NEWS, newspapers featuring

products and services in the field of security

Reg. No. 2,959,161 (June 7, 2005)

SENIOR LIVING NEWS, industry news newsletters in

the field of senior and assisted living

Reg. No. 5,802,775 (July 9, 2019)

SUPERMARKET NEWS, business information for food

distribution industry

Reg. No. 4,950,209 (May 3, 2016)

WOODSHOP NEWS, website in the field of woodworking

Reg. No. 4,069,020 (Dec. 13, 2011)

.ORG

ACNE.ORG, acne treatment preparations

Reg. No. 3,578,273 (Feb. 17, 2009)

46a

BREASTCANCER.ORG, online electronic bulletin boards

and chat rooms for women concerning breast

cancer

Reg. No. 2,828,665 (Mar. 30, 2004)

BROADWAY.ORG, the live theatrical shows of others

Reg. No. 5,954,814 (Jan. 7, 2020)

CHANGE.ORG, website promoting social change

Reg. No. 4,713,278 (Mar. 31, 2015)

CREDIT.ORG, credit counseling

Reg. No. 5,434,972 (Mar. 27, 2018)

HEALTHCARE.ORG, insurance underwriting in the field

of auto, life, health, home, and motorcycle

Reg. No. 4,802,526 (Sept. 1, 2015)

WATER.ORG, educational services, namely, providing

training in the fields of hygiene, safe water

Reg. No. 3,801,355 (June 8, 2010)

WWW.TEENPREGNANCY.ORG, promoting the awareness

of the consequences of teen pregnancy

Reg. No. 2,557,481 (Apr. 2, 2002)

Other Publications

BICYCLING, magazine having a subject matter of

interest to bicycles

Reg. No. 1,079,823 (Dec. 20, 1977)

BOATING, downloadable electronic publications in the

nature of a magazine in the field of boating

Reg. No. 4,430,298 (Nov. 5, 2013)

FLYING, downloadable electronic publications in the

nature of a magazine in the field of aviation

Reg. No. 4,355,777 (June 18, 2013)

PARENTING, information on pregnancy, child rearing,

child development, parent/child relationships,

family health and related topics

Reg. No. 2,026,010 (Dec. 24, 1996)

47a

POETRY, magazines and books about poetry

Reg. No. 2,198,539 (Oct. 20, 1998)

SCOUTING, magazine for adult leaders in scouting

Reg. No. 1,197,851 (June 15, 1982)

SKIING, magazine published seven times a year

Reg. No. 0,909,613 (Mar. 9, 1971)

Outlet

FRAGRANCE OUTLET, retail store services featuring

perfume, cologne

Reg. No. 5,970,209 (Jan. 28, 2020)

GENTLEMEN’S SUIT OUTLET, retail store services

featuring men’s clothing

Reg. No. 5,923,030 (Nov. 26, 2019)

HAM RADIO OUTLET, retail store services featuring

amateur radio and electronics equipment

Reg. No. 5,911,801 (Nov. 19, 2019)

INSURANCE OUTLET, insurance agency and brokerage

Reg. No. 3,777,204 (Apr. 20, 2010)

SKIRT OUTLET, clothing, including skirts

Reg. No. 5,676,914 (Feb. 12, 2019)

THE COSMETIC OUTLET, online and retail store

services with skin and body topical lotions,

creams and oils for cosmetic use, and cosmetic

products

Reg. No. 3,976,461 (June 14, 2011)

THE MARKET OUTLET, discount stores for retail store

services for close-out of supermarket items

Reg. No. 3,743,466 (Jan. 26, 2010)

THE UNIFORM OUTLET, uniforms

Reg. No. 4,903,001 (Feb. 16, 2016)

THE VACATION OUTLET, travel agency services

Reg. No. 1,519,447 (Jan. 3, 1989)

48a

THE WINE CELLAR OUTLET, retail store services

featuring wine

Reg. No. 5,694,800 (Mar. 12, 2019)

VIOLIN OUTLET, online and retail stores featuring

musical instruments, including violins and other

stringed instruments

Reg. No. 3,751,042 (Feb. 23, 2010)

Partnership

AUTISM PARTNERSHIP, behavioral health serv

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Respondents Brief — United States Patent and Trademark Office, et al., Petitioners v. Booking.com B.V. | Frix