Respondents Brief — North Carolina Utilities Commission, Petitioner v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Supreme Court briefSep 4, 2019
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No. 19-42
In the
Supreme Court of the United States
__________________
NORTH CAROLINA UTILITIES COMMISSION,
Petitioner,
v.
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION,
Respondent.
__________________
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit
__________________
Brief in Opposition for Respondent
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Company, LLC
__________________
Stephen A. Hatridge,
Vice President and
Assistant General Counsel
Nicole M. Turpen,
Managing Attorney
Transcontinental Gas
Pipe Line Company, LLC
P.O. Box 1396
Houston, Texas 77251
(713) 215-2000
Stephen.A.Hatridge@Williams.com
Nicole.Turpen@Williams.com
Michael J. Thompson
Counsel of Record
Andrew T. Swers
Wright & Talisman, P.C.
1200 G Street, N.W., Suite 600
Washington, D.C. 20005-3802
(202) 393-1200
thompson@wrightlaw.com
swers@wrightlaw.com
Counsel for Respondent
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Company, LLC
Becker Gallagher · Cincinnati, OH · Washington, D.C. · 800.890.5001
i
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Did the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) err by
requiring petitioner, a state agency, to demonstrate
injury in fact, or do Massachusetts v. Environmental
Protection Agency, 594 U.S. 497 (2007) and Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) offer
alternative criteria to establish standing for state
litigants under Article III of the U.S. Constitution?
2. Did the D.C. Circuit err by not addressing in its per
curiam judgement petitioner’s argument that, as a
state agency, it was entitled to “solicitude” under
Massachusetts, when the Court had already
determined that petitioner failed to demonstrate
injury in fact and therefore lacked standing under
Article III?
ii
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
Petitioner in this case is the North Carolina
Utilities Commission (NCUC), which was the petitioner
in the D.C. Circuit. Respondent is the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC or Commission), which
was the respondent in the D.C. Circuit.
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Company, LLC
(Transco) was an intervenor in the D.C. Circuit,
supporting FERC. The New York State Public Service
Commission participated as an intervenor in the D.C.
Circuit in support of NCUC. Also, Oglethorpe Power
Corporation was an intervenor in one of the
consolidated dockets in the D.C. Circuit.
iii
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Pursuant to Rule 29.6 of the Rules of the Supreme
Court of the United States, Transcontinental Gas Pipe
Line Company, LLC, (Transco) hereby provides this
Disclosure Statement.
1. Transco is a limited liability company organized
under the laws of the State of Delaware. Transco’s
principal place of business is 2800 Post Oak Boulevard,
Houston, TX 77056-6106.
2. Transco is an indirect, wholly owned subsidiary
of The Williams Companies, Inc., a publicly traded
Delaware corporation.
3. The general nature and purpose of Transco is the
transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce by
means of its interstate natural gas transmission
pipeline system. Transco is the interstate natural gas
pipeline company applicant in the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission proceedings that led to the
decision regarding which the petitioner in this matter
seeks a writ of certiorari.
iv
STATEMENT OF RELATED PROCEEDINGS
North Carolina Utilities Commission v. FERC, Nos. 181018, 18-1019, 18-1020 (consolidated) (D.C. Cir.)
(judgment entered April 3, 2019, mandate issued
June 3, 2019).
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co., Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission Docket Nos. CP15-138-000,
-001, and -004, 158 FERC ¶ 61,125 (certificate order
issued February 3, 2017); 161 FERC ¶ 61,250 (2017)
(order on rehearing issued December 6, 2017).
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co., Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission Docket Nos. CP15-117-000 and
-001, 156 FERC ¶ 61,092 (certificate order issued
August 3, 2016); 161 FERC ¶ 61,211 (order denying
rehearing issued November 21, 2017).
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co., Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission Docket Nos. CP15-118-000 and
-001, 156 FERC ¶ 61,022 (certificate order issued
July 7, 2016); 161 FERC ¶ 61,212 (order denying
rehearing issued November 21, 2017).
There are no additional proceedings in any court
that are directly related to this case.
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT . . . . . iii
STATEMENT OF RELATED PROCEEDINGS . . . iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION FOR RESPONDENT
TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS PIPE LINE
COMPANY, LLC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
OPINIONS BELOW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
JURISDICTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
A. Transco’s Expansion Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
B. Proceedings Below . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
A. Neither Lujan Nor Massachusetts Supports
NCUC’s Contention That a State May
Exercise a Procedural Right to Challenge
Agency Action Absent a Showing of Injury in
Fact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
B. There Exists No Split Among the Circuits
Concerning the Fundamental Requirement
that a Petitioner Must Establish Injury in
Fact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
vi
C. Petitioner Failed to Raise Below the
Questions It Now Presents to this Court . . . 14
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Conn.,
564 U.S. 410 (2011). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Atl. Ref. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y.,
360 U.S. 378 (1959). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dep’t of the
Interior, 563 F.3d 466 (D.C. Cir. 2009) . . . . . . . 14
City of Orrville v. FERC,
147 F.3d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1998). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
“Complex” Consol. Ed. Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. FERC,
165 F.3d 992 (D.C. Cir. 1999). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Conn. v. Am. Elec. Power Co.,
582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12, 13
Del. Dep’t of Nat. Res. & Envtl. Control v. FERC,
558 F.3d 575 (D.C. Cir. 2009). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Gov’t of Manitoba v. Bernhardt,
923 F.3d 173 (D.C. Cir. 2019). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
In re Trump,
928 F.3d 360 (4th Cir. 2019). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Kan. Corp. Comm’n v. FERC,
881 F.3d 924 (D.C. Cir. 2018). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555 (1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 7, 8, 12
Mass. v. EPA,
594 U.S. 497 (2007). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim
viii
N.Y. Reg’l Interconnect, Inc. v. FERC,
634 F.3d 581 (D.C. Cir. 2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
N.C. Utils. Comm’n v. FERC,
761 Fed. App’x. 9 (D.C. Cir. 2019) . . . 1, 2, 5, 6, 10
Sierra Club v. EPA,
292 F.3d 895 (D.C. Cir. 2002). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Tex. v. U.S.,
809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas &
Elec., 549 U.S. 443 (2007). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14, 15
U.S. v. Tex.,
136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Wyo. v. U.S. Dept. of Interior,
674 F.3d 1220 (10th Cir. 2012). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
ADMINISTRATIVE CASES
Natural Gas Pipeline Negotiated Rate Policies and
Practices, 104 FERC ¶ 61,134 (2003) . . . . . . . . . . 4
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co.,
156 FERC ¶ 61,022 (2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 3, 5
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co.,
156 FERC ¶ 61,092 (2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 3, 4
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co.,
158 FERC ¶ 61,125 (2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 3, 4, 5
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co.,
161 FERC ¶ 61,211 (2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 4
ix
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co.,
161 FERC ¶ 61,212 (2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 5
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co.,
161 FERC ¶ 61,250 (2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 4
STATUTES
15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
15 U.S.C. § 717r(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
15 U.S.C. § 717r(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 10
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 62-32 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 62-36.01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 62-133.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION FOR
RESPONDENT TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS
PIPE LINE COMPANY, LLC
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the D.C. Circuit (App. to Pet. for
Cert. 1a-4a) was not published, in accordance with D.C.
Circuit Rule 36. It is available at North Carolina
Utilities Commission v. FERC, 761 Fed. App’x. 9 (D.C.
Cir. 2019) (NCUC). The orders of the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC or Commission) are
reported at:
(1)
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co., 156
FERC ¶ 61,092 (2016) (App. to Pet. for Cert.
5a-80a);
(2)
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co., 161
FERC ¶ 61,211 (2017) (App. to Pet. for Cert.
81a-90a);
(3)
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co., 156
FERC ¶ 61,022 (2016) (App. to Pet. for Cert.
91a-129a);
(4)
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co., 161
FERC ¶ 61,212 (2017) (App. to Pet. for Cert.
130a-135a);
(5)
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co., 158
FERC ¶ 61,125 (2017) (App. to Pet. for Cert.
136a-273a); and
(6)
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co., 161
FERC ¶ 61,250 (2017) (App. to Pet. for Cert.
274a-344a).
2
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the D.C. Circuit was entered on
April 3, 2019. The petition for a writ of certiorari was
filed on July 2, 2019. This Court’s jurisdiction is
invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NCUC has never identified any ratepayer or
customer in North Carolina who would be harmed by
the recourse rates approved in FERC’s orders granting
certificates of public convenience and necessity to
construct and operate Transco’s Atlantic Sunrise,
Dalton, and Virginia Southside expansion projects.
Nonetheless, NCUC appealed FERC’s orders granting
certificates for these projects. The D.C. Circuit
dismissed NCUC’s petitions for review because NCUC
“failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish injury
in fact” and therefore, lacked standing. NCUC at *10
(App. to Pet. for Cert. 3a).
A. Transco’s Expansion Projects
In March 2015, Transco filed applications for
certificates of public convenience under section 7(c) of
the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c), for three
proposals to expand its pipeline system: the Virginia
Southside Expansion Project II, the Dalton Expansion
Project, and the Atlantic Sunrise Project. These
projects generally are designed to ship natural gas
produced from the Marcellus Shale region of
Pennsylvania to various delivery points in the southern
United States. The Virginia Southside Expansion
Project II provides transportation service from pipeline
interconnections in New Jersey and Virginia to a
3
delivery point in Virginia, serving a single Virginia
electricity generation plant. Transcontinental Gas Pipe
Line Co., 156 FERC ¶ 61,022, at P 4 (2016) (App. to
Pet. for Cert. 92a). The Dalton Expansion Project
transports gas from a pipeline interconnection in New
Jersey to delivery points in Mississippi and Georgia,
and the capacity is fully subscribed by two Georgia
utilities. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co., 156
FERC ¶ 61,092, at PP 4-5 (2016) (App. to Pet. for Cert.
8a). The Atlantic Sunrise Project transports gas from
northern Pennsylvania to Alabama and Florida.
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co., 158 FERC
¶ 61,125, at P 4 (2017) (App. to Pet. for Cert. 137a).
NCUC has not shown that any of the nine Atlantic
Sunrise shippers will sell or deliver gas in North
Carolina.
All three expansion projects are
incrementally priced, meaning that only the shippers
using the expansion capacity of each particular project
will pay rates that include the costs of the incremental
capacity created by that project. See “Complex” Consol.
Ed. Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. FERC, 165 F.3d 992, 995 n.2
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (explaining incremental pricing of
pipeline expansion services). The incremental capacity
created by each of these expansion projects is fully
subscribed by shippers that have agreed to pay
negotiated rates under long-term, firm transportation
contracts. None of these contracts is for shipment of
gas to North Carolina. And, because all of the capacity
created by the expansion projects is fully subscribed
under negotiated rates, no shipper will pay the
“recourse” rates approved for such projects. The
recourse rates were the sole focus of NCUC’s challenge
to FERC’s orders.
4
B. Proceedings Below
NCUC regulates the retail rates for natural gas
service paid by North Carolina customers. As NCUC
explained in its initial brief before the D.C. Circuit,
“[i]ts sphere of interest includes the rates that North
Carolina public utilities, including local distribution
companies, pay to interstate natural gas pipelines
because those costs are passed on to North Carolina
customers.” Final Initial Brief of Petitioner at 27, N.C.
Utils. Comm’n v. FERC (D.C. Cir., Sept. 4, 2018) (Nos.
18-1018, et al.) (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 62-32, 6236.01, 62-133.4). Under FERC policy, pipelines may
negotiate rates with shippers so long as the shippers
have the opportunity to take service at cost-based
“recourse” rates published in the pipeline’s tariff.
Natural Gas Pipeline Negotiated Rate Policies and
Practices, 104 FERC ¶ 61,134, at P 2 (2003). The
shippers’ option to take service at the cost-based
recourse rate forecloses the pipeline’s ability to exercise
market power in rate negotiations. Id. NCUC, along
with another state regulatory agency, protested
Transco’s certificate applications on the ground that
the initial recourse rates proposed in the certificate
applications were based on an allegedly excessive pretax rate of return.
The Commission denied NCUC’s challenges.
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co., 158 FERC
¶ 61,125 (2017) (App. to Pet. for Cert. 136a-273a), order
on reh’g, 161 FERC ¶ 61,250 (2017) (App. to Pet. for
Cert. 274a-344a); Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co.,
156 FERC ¶ 61,092 (2016) (App. to Pet. for Cert. 5a80a), order denying reh’g, 161 FERC ¶ 61,211 (2017)
5
(App. to Pet. for Cert. 81a-90a); Transcontinental Gas
Pipe Line Co., 156 FERC ¶ 61,022 (2016) (App. to Pet.
for Cert. 91a-129a), order denying reh’g, 161 FERC
¶ 61,212 (2017) (App. to Pet. for Cert. 130a-135a). The
Commission applied the same reasoning to all three
proceedings, holding that the proposed pre-tax return
was consistent with longstanding FERC precedent and
this Court’s decision in Atlantic Refining Co. v. Public
Service Commission of New York, 360 U.S. 378 (1959).
See, e.g., Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co., 158
FERC ¶ 61,125, at PP 38-41 (App. to Pet. for Cert.
159a-163a).
Despite the fact that no utility subject to the
regulatory oversight of NCUC, nor any North Carolina
customer, will pay, directly or indirectly, the recourse
rates approved by the Commission for these three
expansion projects, and despite the fact that there is no
evidence that any of the capacity of these expansion
projects will serve North Carolina customers, NCUC
appealed FERC’s orders granting the certificates of
public convenience and necessity. Both FERC and
Transco challenged NCUC’s standing to obtain judicial
review of FERC’s orders.
In a per curiam judgment issued on April 3, 2019,
the D.C. Circuit dismissed NCUC’s petition for review,
finding that NCUC lacked standing because it “failed
to provide sufficient evidence to establish injury in
fact.” NCUC at *10 (App. to Pet. for Cert. 3a). The
D.C. Circuit pointed out that, “with respect to the
Dalton Expansion or Virginia Southside Expansion
Projects, [NCUC] offer[ed] no evidence of injury.” Id. at
*11 (App. to Pet. for Cert. 3a). Regarding the Atlantic
6
Sunrise Project, the D.C. Circuit ruled that NCUC
failed to show a “‘substantial probability’ that any
capacity . . . will flow into [North Carolina], nor ha[s]
[NCUC] shown that any end-users in the[] state[] will
pay higher rates as a result of the project.” Id. (App. to
Pet. for Cert. 3a) (quoting Kan. Corp. Comm’n v. FERC,
881 F.3d 924, 930 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
ARGUMENT
NCUC’s petition to this Court does not challenge
the D.C. Circuit’s judgment that NCUC “failed to
provide sufficient evidence to establish injury in fact.”
NCUC at *10 (App. to Pet. for Cert. 3a). Indeed, NCUC
premises its questions presented on, and does not
contest, the D.C. Circuit’s holding that NCUC failed to
demonstrate injury in fact. Pet. for Cert. at i-ii. Since
NCUC does not claim that this holding is incorrect, its
sole argument to this Court is that, because it is a state
agency that has a statutory procedural right to appeal
a FERC action if aggrieved, it does not have to
demonstrate injury in fact. Id. However, neither Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), nor
Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549
U.S. 497 (2007), on which NCUC principally relies,
supports NCUC’s claim that a State can meet the
Article III standing requirements without showing it
has suffered harm.
7
A. Neither Lujan Nor Massachusetts Supports
NCUC’s Contention That a State May
Exercise a Procedural Right to Challenge
Agency Action Absent a Showing of Injury
in Fact
In Lujan, this Court stated that “the core
component of standing is an essential and unchanging
part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article
III.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. Injury in fact is one of
three factors constituting the “irreducible
constitutional minimum of standing.” Id. Such an
injury must be “concrete and particularized” and
“actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”
Id. (citation omitted). The Court further recognized
that each element of standing is “an indispensable part
of the plaintiff’s case” which “[t]he party invoking
federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing.”
Id. at 561. As the D.C. Circuit’s decision confirms and
NCUC implicitly concedes, NCUC has failed to carry
its burden to establish this “indispensable” aspect of its
case. Accordingly, NCUC’s petition could be denied on
this ground alone.
Ignoring the unmistakable instruction of Lujan,
NCUC focuses on the Court’s statement that, “[t]he
person who has been accorded a procedural right to
protect his concrete interests can assert that right
without meeting all of the normal standards for
redressability and immediacy.” Pet. for Cert. at 10-11
(quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7). NCUC points out
that the Natural Gas Act provides a party “aggrieved”
by a FERC order with the right to obtain rehearing by
the Commission and judicial review by the court of
8
appeals. Pet. for Cert. at 1, 4, 6, 11 (referencing 15
U.S.C. §§ 717r(a), (b) (App. to Pet. for Cert. 347a349a)). However, as footnote seven in Lujan explains,
the mere existence of a procedural right to challenge a
government action does not mean any party may
invoke that procedural right. The existence of a
procedural right does not grant “standing for persons
who have no concrete interests affected.” Lujan, 504
U.S. at 572 n.7. The Court added that a party can
exercise procedural rights “so long as the procedures in
question are designed to protect some threatened
concrete interest of his that is the ultimate basis of his
standing.” Id. at 573 n.8.
Contrary to NCUC’s suggestion, nothing in
Massachusetts changes these bedrock principles of
Article III standing. In Massachusetts, the Court found
that Massachusetts had standing to challenge the
Environmental Protection Agency’s denial of a
rulemaking petition to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions from new motor vehicles. In reaching this
conclusion, the Court examined all three elements of
Article III standing set forth in Lujan, including injury
in fact. The Court determined that Massachusetts “has
alleged a particularized injury in its capacity as a
landowner” because it “owns a substantial portion of
the state’s coastal property,” which is threatened by the
rise in “global sea levels” associated with climate
change. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 522 (citation
omitted). Thus, “EPA’s steadfast refusal to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions presents a risk of harm to
Massachusetts that is both ‘actual’ and ‘imminent.’” Id.
at 521 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). The harm
9
Massachusetts alleged was therefore integral to the
Court’s finding of standing.
NCUC’s characterization of the D.C. Circuit’s
judgment below as “in direct conflict with this Court’s
decision in Massachusetts,” Pet. for Cert. at 7, is plainly
incorrect. It is true that the Court stated, “the
Commonwealth is entitled to special solicitude in our
standing analysis” because it possesses a procedural
right under the Clean Air Act to challenge the EPA’s
decision and because it has a “stake in protecting its
quasi-sovereign interests.” Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at
520. But, whatever “solicitude” the Court afforded
Massachusetts, it clearly did not obviate or circumvent
the Article III requirement that a State must allege an
“actual,” “imminent,” and “concrete” injury as a
predicate to exercising its procedural right under the
Clean Air Act. Massachusetts does not suggest that a
state litigant which has suffered no injury, such as
NCUC, can exercise a procedural right to challenge an
agency action simply because it is a State.
Indeed, NCUC itself cannot articulate the purpose
for its petition without acknowledging that injury is
necessary to its case. For example, NCUC states that
Massachusetts “requires courts to afford State litigants
special solicitude . . . to challenge federal agency
actions that negatively impact the State[].” Pet. for
Cert. at 7 (emphasis added). Likewise, “it is imperative
that North Carolina be afforded access to federal courts
to challenge FERC actions that harm North Carolina’s
. . . interests.” Id. at 9 (emphasis added). Also, NCUC
alleges the D.C. Circuit’s decision “deprives a State
litigant of access to federal courts to challenge federal
10
agency actions that impact the State’s . . . interests.”
Id. at 12 (emphasis added). However, NCUC did not
show any “negative impact,” “harm,” or “impact” to its
interests because it failed to demonstrate that any of
the capacity of Transco’s expansion projects will serve
North Carolina customers, or that North Carolina
customers will pay higher rates as a result of any of the
projects as FERC approved them. NCUC at *11 (App.
to Pet. for Cert. 3a).
Importantly, NCUC neglects that the procedural
right to appeal FERC orders under the Natural Gas
Act—which it here invokes—is reserved for parties
“aggrieved by an order issued by the Commission.” 15
U.S.C. § 717r(b) (App. to Pet. for Cert. 348a-349a). To
be “aggrieved,” a party must satisfy the criteria for
Article III standing. City of Orrville v. FERC, 147 F.3d
979, 985-86 (D.C. Cir. 1998). NCUC is not aggrieved
because it has suffered no harm from FERC’s orders.
The fact that NCUC intervened in the underlying
FERC proceedings does not confer Article III standing
because “the constitutional requirement that [a
petitioner] have standing kicks in” when “the petitioner
later seeks judicial review.” Sierra Club v. EPA, 292
F.3d 895, 899 (D.C. Cir. 2002); see N.Y. Reg’l
Interconnect, Inc. v. FERC, 634 F.3d 581, 586 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (“[A] party does not acquire a ‘direct stake in a
litigation’ simply by participating in antecedent
administrative proceedings.”); City of Orrville, 147 F.3d
at 985 (same). Thus, the procedural right on which
NCUC relies, of itself, requires that NCUC establish
injury in fact.
11
NCUC attempts to obscure the lack of injury to any
North Carolina gas customer or ratepayer by
repeatedly pointing out that some of Transco’s
expansion facilities are located in North Carolina. See,
e.g., Pet. for Cert. at 2, 3, 5, 7, 9-10, 11, 12. While
capacity created by Transco’s expansion projects may
flow through North Carolina, and a limited number of
facilities in North Carolina were upgraded as part of
the expansions, these facts do not indicate that anyone
in North Carolina will pay, or be affected by, the rates
negotiated by the shippers subscribing to this capacity
or the recourse rates included in the certificates FERC
issued. Because the services provided on the expansion
facilities are incrementally priced, the expansion
certificates do not affect the rates and services on other
portions of Transco’s system, including the portions
that actually serve North Carolina.
NCUC challenged the FERC orders below based on
an allegedly excessive pre-tax rate of return, asserting
a parens patriae interest in protecting ratepayers
under its jurisdiction from excessive rates. But NCUC
did not allege that the physical presence of Transco’s
facilities within North Carolina affected any
proprietary interest of the State, nor did it even allege
that it is the proper North Carolina entity to assert any
such proprietary interest. Thus, the parens patriae
interest NCUC purported to assert clearly diverged
from the proprietary interest in coastal land that the
Court recognized in Massachusetts.
The D.C. Circuit did not err. Because NCUC did
not establish injury, it lacked standing regardless of
any “solicitude” under Massachusetts. In the absence
12
of injury in fact, there is no case or controversy under
Article III. Thus, the Court need not examine here the
nature of any solicitude that might be accorded to a
State under Massachusetts.
B. There Exists No Split Among the Circuits
Concerning the Fundamental Requirement
that a Petitioner Must Establish Injury in
Fact
NCUC alleges that the Circuits are split on the
meaning of Massachusetts, particularly the decision’s
impact on parens patriae standing. Pet. for Cert. at 1214. NCUC also asserts that, “had the North Carolina
Commission’s appeal been addressed by the Fifth
Circuit, instead of the District of Columbia Circuit, it
is likely that North Carolina would not have been
denied the ability to challenge FERC orders that
directly impact its quasi-sovereign and parens patriae
interests.” Id. at 14. However, even putting aside
NCUC’s erroneous assertion of any impact to its
interests, there is no split among the Circuits on the
centrality of injury in fact to the standing analysis,
regardless of whatever “solicitude” a State may be
afforded.
The courts of appeals have uniformly required state
litigants to demonstrate injury in fact, and none have
indicated that solicitude under Massachusetts is a free
pass to avoid the Article III standing criteria set forth
in Lujan. E.g., Wyo. v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 674 F.3d
1220, 1238 (10th Cir. 2012) (solicitude does not exempt
state petitioner from establishing injury); Conn. v. Am.
Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 340-44 (2d Cir. 2009)
(finding state litigants demonstrated both present and
13
future injury due to greenhouse gas emissions),
jurisdiction aff’d by an equally divided Court, 564 U.S.
410, 420 (2011); Del. Dep’t of Nat. Res. & Envtl. Control
v. FERC, 558 F.3d 575, 579 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (under
the Natural Gas Act, “special solicitude does not
eliminate the state petitioner’s obligation to establish
concrete injury”). Even in the case NCUC highlights as
indicative of a Circuit split, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit (Fifth Circuit) applied the
traditional standing criteria and found that Texas
demonstrated injury in fact. Tex. v. U.S., 809 F.3d 134,
155 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally divided Court,
136 S. Ct. 2271, 2272 (2016). Because the Texas Court
expressly required injury sufficient to confer Article III
standing, it is far from likely that NCUC’s appeal
would have fared differently in the Fifth Circuit.
NCUC further notes, Pet. for Cert. at 13, that the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Second
Circuit), in Connecticut, questioned whether
Massachusetts “muddled” the distinction between State
proprietary and parens patriae standing, pointing out
that this Court “analyzed state standing . . . in
Massachusetts’ capacity as a property owner, not as a
quasi-sovereign.” Connecticut, 582 F.3d at 337-38. But
the Second Circuit is hardly alone in its view that the
solicitude afforded by Massachusetts is limited to state
litigants that sue to protect their proprietary interests.
See In re Trump, 928 F.3d 360, 377 (4th Cir. 2019)
(stating that, in Massachusetts, “the Supreme Court
relied on Massachusetts’s own ‘particularized injury in
its capacity as a landowner’”); Gov’t of Manitoba v.
Bernhardt, 923 F.3d 173, 182 (D.C. Cir. 2019)
(“Massachusetts did not sue in its parens patriae
14
capacity.”); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dep’t of
the Interior, 563 F.3d 466, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“[I]t
was critical that Massachusetts sought to assert its
own rights as a state . . . and was not seeking to protect
the rights of its citizens.”). However, the Court need
not delve into this issue here, because NCUC has
shown no injury at all. For the purposes of NCUC’s
petition, the Court need only recognize that there is no
divergence in the lower courts regarding a state
agency’s need to establish injury in fact to demonstrate
Article III standing.
C. Petitioner Failed to Raise Below the
Questions It Now Presents to this Court
An additional ground for denying NCUC’s petition
is that NCUC did not argue before the D.C. Circuit
that, under Massachusetts, a State has standing even
if it fails to demonstrate injury. Rather, NCUC argued
below that “affording special solicitude to NCUC
means, at a minimum, that close calls as to whether
NCUC met each prong of the traditional standing test
should be decided in NCUC’s favor.” Final Reply Brief
of Petitioner at 20, N.C. Utils. Comm’n v. FERC (D.C.
Cir., Sept. 4, 2018) (Nos. 18-1018, et al.). The D.C.
Circuit did not find that this case was a “close call,” in
which state solicitude would tip the balance in favor of
NCUC, and the facts would not support such a
conclusion. NCUC did not argue below that, in this
situation, the D.C. Circuit should rule that NCUC has
standing notwithstanding the absence of injury.
NCUC’s failure to clearly articulate this argument
below is fatal to its petition for certiorari. Travelers
Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas & Elec., 549 U.S.
15
443, 455 (2007) (“[W]e ordinarily do not consider claims
that were neither raised nor addressed below.”).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny
the petition for a writ of certiorari.
Respectfully submitted,
Michael J. Thompson
Counsel of Record
Andrew T. Swers
Wright & Talisman, P.C.
1200 G Street, N.W., Suite 600
Washington, D.C. 20005-3802
(202) 393-1200
thompson@wrightlaw.com
swers@wrightlaw.com
Stephen A. Hatridge,
Vice President and
Assistant General Counsel
Nicole M. Turpen,
Managing Attorney
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Company, LLC
P.O. Box 1396
Houston, Texas 77251
(713) 215-2000
Stephen.A.Hatridge@Williams.com
Nicole.Turpen@Williams.com
Counsel for Respondent
Transcontinental Gas
Pipe Line Company, LLC
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.