Respondents Brief — North Carolina Utilities Commission, Petitioner v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

Supreme Court briefSep 4, 2019

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No. 19-42

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

__________________

NORTH CAROLINA UTILITIES COMMISSION,

Petitioner,

v.

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION,

Respondent.

__________________

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia Circuit

__________________

Brief in Opposition for Respondent

Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Company, LLC

__________________

Stephen A. Hatridge,

Vice President and

Assistant General Counsel

Nicole M. Turpen,

Managing Attorney

Transcontinental Gas

Pipe Line Company, LLC

P.O. Box 1396

Houston, Texas 77251

(713) 215-2000

Stephen.A.Hatridge@Williams.com

Nicole.Turpen@Williams.com

Michael J. Thompson

Counsel of Record

Andrew T. Swers

Wright & Talisman, P.C.

1200 G Street, N.W., Suite 600

Washington, D.C. 20005-3802

(202) 393-1200

thompson@wrightlaw.com

swers@wrightlaw.com

Counsel for Respondent

Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Company, LLC

Becker Gallagher · Cincinnati, OH · Washington, D.C. · 800.890.5001

i

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Did the United States Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) err by

requiring petitioner, a state agency, to demonstrate

injury in fact, or do Massachusetts v. Environmental

Protection Agency, 594 U.S. 497 (2007) and Lujan v.

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) offer

alternative criteria to establish standing for state

litigants under Article III of the U.S. Constitution?

2. Did the D.C. Circuit err by not addressing in its per

curiam judgement petitioner’s argument that, as a

state agency, it was entitled to “solicitude” under

Massachusetts, when the Court had already

determined that petitioner failed to demonstrate

injury in fact and therefore lacked standing under

Article III?

ii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioner in this case is the North Carolina

Utilities Commission (NCUC), which was the petitioner

in the D.C. Circuit. Respondent is the Federal Energy

Regulatory Commission (FERC or Commission), which

was the respondent in the D.C. Circuit.

Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Company, LLC

(Transco) was an intervenor in the D.C. Circuit,

supporting FERC. The New York State Public Service

Commission participated as an intervenor in the D.C.

Circuit in support of NCUC. Also, Oglethorpe Power

Corporation was an intervenor in one of the

consolidated dockets in the D.C. Circuit.

iii

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Pursuant to Rule 29.6 of the Rules of the Supreme

Court of the United States, Transcontinental Gas Pipe

Line Company, LLC, (Transco) hereby provides this

Disclosure Statement.

1. Transco is a limited liability company organized

under the laws of the State of Delaware. Transco’s

principal place of business is 2800 Post Oak Boulevard,

Houston, TX 77056-6106.

2. Transco is an indirect, wholly owned subsidiary

of The Williams Companies, Inc., a publicly traded

Delaware corporation.

3. The general nature and purpose of Transco is the

transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce by

means of its interstate natural gas transmission

pipeline system. Transco is the interstate natural gas

pipeline company applicant in the Federal Energy

Regulatory Commission proceedings that led to the

decision regarding which the petitioner in this matter

seeks a writ of certiorari.

iv

STATEMENT OF RELATED PROCEEDINGS

North Carolina Utilities Commission v. FERC, Nos. 181018, 18-1019, 18-1020 (consolidated) (D.C. Cir.)

(judgment entered April 3, 2019, mandate issued

June 3, 2019).

Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co., Federal Energy

Regulatory Commission Docket Nos. CP15-138-000,

-001, and -004, 158 FERC ¶ 61,125 (certificate order

issued February 3, 2017); 161 FERC ¶ 61,250 (2017)

(order on rehearing issued December 6, 2017).

Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co., Federal Energy

Regulatory Commission Docket Nos. CP15-117-000 and

-001, 156 FERC ¶ 61,092 (certificate order issued

August 3, 2016); 161 FERC ¶ 61,211 (order denying

rehearing issued November 21, 2017).

Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co., Federal Energy

Regulatory Commission Docket Nos. CP15-118-000 and

-001, 156 FERC ¶ 61,022 (certificate order issued

July 7, 2016); 161 FERC ¶ 61,212 (order denying

rehearing issued November 21, 2017).

There are no additional proceedings in any court

that are directly related to this case.

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT . . . . . iii

STATEMENT OF RELATED PROCEEDINGS . . . iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION FOR RESPONDENT

TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS PIPE LINE

COMPANY, LLC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

OPINIONS BELOW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

JURISDICTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

A. Transco’s Expansion Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

B. Proceedings Below . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

A. Neither Lujan Nor Massachusetts Supports

NCUC’s Contention That a State May

Exercise a Procedural Right to Challenge

Agency Action Absent a Showing of Injury in

Fact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

B. There Exists No Split Among the Circuits

Concerning the Fundamental Requirement

that a Petitioner Must Establish Injury in

Fact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

vi

C. Petitioner Failed to Raise Below the

Questions It Now Presents to this Court . . . 14

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Conn.,

564 U.S. 410 (2011). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Atl. Ref. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y.,

360 U.S. 378 (1959). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dep’t of the

Interior, 563 F.3d 466 (D.C. Cir. 2009) . . . . . . . 14

City of Orrville v. FERC,

147 F.3d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1998). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

“Complex” Consol. Ed. Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. FERC,

165 F.3d 992 (D.C. Cir. 1999). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Conn. v. Am. Elec. Power Co.,

582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12, 13

Del. Dep’t of Nat. Res. & Envtl. Control v. FERC,

558 F.3d 575 (D.C. Cir. 2009). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Gov’t of Manitoba v. Bernhardt,

923 F.3d 173 (D.C. Cir. 2019). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

In re Trump,

928 F.3d 360 (4th Cir. 2019). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Kan. Corp. Comm’n v. FERC,

881 F.3d 924 (D.C. Cir. 2018). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,

504 U.S. 555 (1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 7, 8, 12

Mass. v. EPA,

594 U.S. 497 (2007). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim

viii

N.Y. Reg’l Interconnect, Inc. v. FERC,

634 F.3d 581 (D.C. Cir. 2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

N.C. Utils. Comm’n v. FERC,

761 Fed. App’x. 9 (D.C. Cir. 2019) . . . 1, 2, 5, 6, 10

Sierra Club v. EPA,

292 F.3d 895 (D.C. Cir. 2002). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Tex. v. U.S.,

809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas &

Elec., 549 U.S. 443 (2007). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14, 15

U.S. v. Tex.,

136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Wyo. v. U.S. Dept. of Interior,

674 F.3d 1220 (10th Cir. 2012). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

ADMINISTRATIVE CASES

Natural Gas Pipeline Negotiated Rate Policies and

Practices, 104 FERC ¶ 61,134 (2003) . . . . . . . . . . 4

Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co.,

156 FERC ¶ 61,022 (2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 3, 5

Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co.,

156 FERC ¶ 61,092 (2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 3, 4

Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co.,

158 FERC ¶ 61,125 (2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 3, 4, 5

Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co.,

161 FERC ¶ 61,211 (2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 4

ix

Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co.,

161 FERC ¶ 61,212 (2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 5

Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co.,

161 FERC ¶ 61,250 (2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 4

STATUTES

15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

15 U.S.C. § 717r(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

15 U.S.C. § 717r(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 10

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 62-32 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 62-36.01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 62-133.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

1

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION FOR

RESPONDENT TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS

PIPE LINE COMPANY, LLC

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the D.C. Circuit (App. to Pet. for

Cert. 1a-4a) was not published, in accordance with D.C.

Circuit Rule 36. It is available at North Carolina

Utilities Commission v. FERC, 761 Fed. App’x. 9 (D.C.

Cir. 2019) (NCUC). The orders of the Federal Energy

Regulatory Commission (FERC or Commission) are

reported at:

(1)

Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co., 156

FERC ¶ 61,092 (2016) (App. to Pet. for Cert.

5a-80a);

(2)

Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co., 161

FERC ¶ 61,211 (2017) (App. to Pet. for Cert.

81a-90a);

(3)

Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co., 156

FERC ¶ 61,022 (2016) (App. to Pet. for Cert.

91a-129a);

(4)

Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co., 161

FERC ¶ 61,212 (2017) (App. to Pet. for Cert.

130a-135a);

(5)

Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co., 158

FERC ¶ 61,125 (2017) (App. to Pet. for Cert.

136a-273a); and

(6)

Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co., 161

FERC ¶ 61,250 (2017) (App. to Pet. for Cert.

274a-344a).

2

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the D.C. Circuit was entered on

April 3, 2019. The petition for a writ of certiorari was

filed on July 2, 2019. This Court’s jurisdiction is

invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NCUC has never identified any ratepayer or

customer in North Carolina who would be harmed by

the recourse rates approved in FERC’s orders granting

certificates of public convenience and necessity to

construct and operate Transco’s Atlantic Sunrise,

Dalton, and Virginia Southside expansion projects.

Nonetheless, NCUC appealed FERC’s orders granting

certificates for these projects. The D.C. Circuit

dismissed NCUC’s petitions for review because NCUC

“failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish injury

in fact” and therefore, lacked standing. NCUC at *10

(App. to Pet. for Cert. 3a).

A. Transco’s Expansion Projects

In March 2015, Transco filed applications for

certificates of public convenience under section 7(c) of

the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c), for three

proposals to expand its pipeline system: the Virginia

Southside Expansion Project II, the Dalton Expansion

Project, and the Atlantic Sunrise Project. These

projects generally are designed to ship natural gas

produced from the Marcellus Shale region of

Pennsylvania to various delivery points in the southern

United States. The Virginia Southside Expansion

Project II provides transportation service from pipeline

interconnections in New Jersey and Virginia to a

3

delivery point in Virginia, serving a single Virginia

electricity generation plant. Transcontinental Gas Pipe

Line Co., 156 FERC ¶ 61,022, at P 4 (2016) (App. to

Pet. for Cert. 92a). The Dalton Expansion Project

transports gas from a pipeline interconnection in New

Jersey to delivery points in Mississippi and Georgia,

and the capacity is fully subscribed by two Georgia

utilities. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co., 156

FERC ¶ 61,092, at PP 4-5 (2016) (App. to Pet. for Cert.

8a). The Atlantic Sunrise Project transports gas from

northern Pennsylvania to Alabama and Florida.

Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co., 158 FERC

¶ 61,125, at P 4 (2017) (App. to Pet. for Cert. 137a).

NCUC has not shown that any of the nine Atlantic

Sunrise shippers will sell or deliver gas in North

Carolina.

All three expansion projects are

incrementally priced, meaning that only the shippers

using the expansion capacity of each particular project

will pay rates that include the costs of the incremental

capacity created by that project. See “Complex” Consol.

Ed. Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. FERC, 165 F.3d 992, 995 n.2

(D.C. Cir. 1999) (explaining incremental pricing of

pipeline expansion services). The incremental capacity

created by each of these expansion projects is fully

subscribed by shippers that have agreed to pay

negotiated rates under long-term, firm transportation

contracts. None of these contracts is for shipment of

gas to North Carolina. And, because all of the capacity

created by the expansion projects is fully subscribed

under negotiated rates, no shipper will pay the

“recourse” rates approved for such projects. The

recourse rates were the sole focus of NCUC’s challenge

to FERC’s orders.

4

B. Proceedings Below

NCUC regulates the retail rates for natural gas

service paid by North Carolina customers. As NCUC

explained in its initial brief before the D.C. Circuit,

“[i]ts sphere of interest includes the rates that North

Carolina public utilities, including local distribution

companies, pay to interstate natural gas pipelines

because those costs are passed on to North Carolina

customers.” Final Initial Brief of Petitioner at 27, N.C.

Utils. Comm’n v. FERC (D.C. Cir., Sept. 4, 2018) (Nos.

18-1018, et al.) (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 62-32, 6236.01, 62-133.4). Under FERC policy, pipelines may

negotiate rates with shippers so long as the shippers

have the opportunity to take service at cost-based

“recourse” rates published in the pipeline’s tariff.

Natural Gas Pipeline Negotiated Rate Policies and

Practices, 104 FERC ¶ 61,134, at P 2 (2003). The

shippers’ option to take service at the cost-based

recourse rate forecloses the pipeline’s ability to exercise

market power in rate negotiations. Id. NCUC, along

with another state regulatory agency, protested

Transco’s certificate applications on the ground that

the initial recourse rates proposed in the certificate

applications were based on an allegedly excessive pretax rate of return.

The Commission denied NCUC’s challenges.

Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co., 158 FERC

¶ 61,125 (2017) (App. to Pet. for Cert. 136a-273a), order

on reh’g, 161 FERC ¶ 61,250 (2017) (App. to Pet. for

Cert. 274a-344a); Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co.,

156 FERC ¶ 61,092 (2016) (App. to Pet. for Cert. 5a80a), order denying reh’g, 161 FERC ¶ 61,211 (2017)

5

(App. to Pet. for Cert. 81a-90a); Transcontinental Gas

Pipe Line Co., 156 FERC ¶ 61,022 (2016) (App. to Pet.

for Cert. 91a-129a), order denying reh’g, 161 FERC

¶ 61,212 (2017) (App. to Pet. for Cert. 130a-135a). The

Commission applied the same reasoning to all three

proceedings, holding that the proposed pre-tax return

was consistent with longstanding FERC precedent and

this Court’s decision in Atlantic Refining Co. v. Public

Service Commission of New York, 360 U.S. 378 (1959).

See, e.g., Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co., 158

FERC ¶ 61,125, at PP 38-41 (App. to Pet. for Cert.

159a-163a).

Despite the fact that no utility subject to the

regulatory oversight of NCUC, nor any North Carolina

customer, will pay, directly or indirectly, the recourse

rates approved by the Commission for these three

expansion projects, and despite the fact that there is no

evidence that any of the capacity of these expansion

projects will serve North Carolina customers, NCUC

appealed FERC’s orders granting the certificates of

public convenience and necessity. Both FERC and

Transco challenged NCUC’s standing to obtain judicial

review of FERC’s orders.

In a per curiam judgment issued on April 3, 2019,

the D.C. Circuit dismissed NCUC’s petition for review,

finding that NCUC lacked standing because it “failed

to provide sufficient evidence to establish injury in

fact.” NCUC at *10 (App. to Pet. for Cert. 3a). The

D.C. Circuit pointed out that, “with respect to the

Dalton Expansion or Virginia Southside Expansion

Projects, [NCUC] offer[ed] no evidence of injury.” Id. at

*11 (App. to Pet. for Cert. 3a). Regarding the Atlantic

6

Sunrise Project, the D.C. Circuit ruled that NCUC

failed to show a “‘substantial probability’ that any

capacity . . . will flow into [North Carolina], nor ha[s]

[NCUC] shown that any end-users in the[] state[] will

pay higher rates as a result of the project.” Id. (App. to

Pet. for Cert. 3a) (quoting Kan. Corp. Comm’n v. FERC,

881 F.3d 924, 930 (D.C. Cir. 2018).

ARGUMENT

NCUC’s petition to this Court does not challenge

the D.C. Circuit’s judgment that NCUC “failed to

provide sufficient evidence to establish injury in fact.”

NCUC at *10 (App. to Pet. for Cert. 3a). Indeed, NCUC

premises its questions presented on, and does not

contest, the D.C. Circuit’s holding that NCUC failed to

demonstrate injury in fact. Pet. for Cert. at i-ii. Since

NCUC does not claim that this holding is incorrect, its

sole argument to this Court is that, because it is a state

agency that has a statutory procedural right to appeal

a FERC action if aggrieved, it does not have to

demonstrate injury in fact. Id. However, neither Lujan

v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), nor

Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549

U.S. 497 (2007), on which NCUC principally relies,

supports NCUC’s claim that a State can meet the

Article III standing requirements without showing it

has suffered harm.

7

A. Neither Lujan Nor Massachusetts Supports

NCUC’s Contention That a State May

Exercise a Procedural Right to Challenge

Agency Action Absent a Showing of Injury

in Fact

In Lujan, this Court stated that “the core

component of standing is an essential and unchanging

part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article

III.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. Injury in fact is one of

three factors constituting the “irreducible

constitutional minimum of standing.” Id. Such an

injury must be “concrete and particularized” and

“actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”

Id. (citation omitted). The Court further recognized

that each element of standing is “an indispensable part

of the plaintiff’s case” which “[t]he party invoking

federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing.”

Id. at 561. As the D.C. Circuit’s decision confirms and

NCUC implicitly concedes, NCUC has failed to carry

its burden to establish this “indispensable” aspect of its

case. Accordingly, NCUC’s petition could be denied on

this ground alone.

Ignoring the unmistakable instruction of Lujan,

NCUC focuses on the Court’s statement that, “[t]he

person who has been accorded a procedural right to

protect his concrete interests can assert that right

without meeting all of the normal standards for

redressability and immediacy.” Pet. for Cert. at 10-11

(quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7). NCUC points out

that the Natural Gas Act provides a party “aggrieved”

by a FERC order with the right to obtain rehearing by

the Commission and judicial review by the court of

8

appeals. Pet. for Cert. at 1, 4, 6, 11 (referencing 15

U.S.C. §§ 717r(a), (b) (App. to Pet. for Cert. 347a349a)). However, as footnote seven in Lujan explains,

the mere existence of a procedural right to challenge a

government action does not mean any party may

invoke that procedural right. The existence of a

procedural right does not grant “standing for persons

who have no concrete interests affected.” Lujan, 504

U.S. at 572 n.7. The Court added that a party can

exercise procedural rights “so long as the procedures in

question are designed to protect some threatened

concrete interest of his that is the ultimate basis of his

standing.” Id. at 573 n.8.

Contrary to NCUC’s suggestion, nothing in

Massachusetts changes these bedrock principles of

Article III standing. In Massachusetts, the Court found

that Massachusetts had standing to challenge the

Environmental Protection Agency’s denial of a

rulemaking petition to regulate greenhouse gas

emissions from new motor vehicles. In reaching this

conclusion, the Court examined all three elements of

Article III standing set forth in Lujan, including injury

in fact. The Court determined that Massachusetts “has

alleged a particularized injury in its capacity as a

landowner” because it “owns a substantial portion of

the state’s coastal property,” which is threatened by the

rise in “global sea levels” associated with climate

change. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 522 (citation

omitted). Thus, “EPA’s steadfast refusal to regulate

greenhouse gas emissions presents a risk of harm to

Massachusetts that is both ‘actual’ and ‘imminent.’” Id.

at 521 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). The harm

9

Massachusetts alleged was therefore integral to the

Court’s finding of standing.

NCUC’s characterization of the D.C. Circuit’s

judgment below as “in direct conflict with this Court’s

decision in Massachusetts,” Pet. for Cert. at 7, is plainly

incorrect. It is true that the Court stated, “the

Commonwealth is entitled to special solicitude in our

standing analysis” because it possesses a procedural

right under the Clean Air Act to challenge the EPA’s

decision and because it has a “stake in protecting its

quasi-sovereign interests.” Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at

520. But, whatever “solicitude” the Court afforded

Massachusetts, it clearly did not obviate or circumvent

the Article III requirement that a State must allege an

“actual,” “imminent,” and “concrete” injury as a

predicate to exercising its procedural right under the

Clean Air Act. Massachusetts does not suggest that a

state litigant which has suffered no injury, such as

NCUC, can exercise a procedural right to challenge an

agency action simply because it is a State.

Indeed, NCUC itself cannot articulate the purpose

for its petition without acknowledging that injury is

necessary to its case. For example, NCUC states that

Massachusetts “requires courts to afford State litigants

special solicitude . . . to challenge federal agency

actions that negatively impact the State[].” Pet. for

Cert. at 7 (emphasis added). Likewise, “it is imperative

that North Carolina be afforded access to federal courts

to challenge FERC actions that harm North Carolina’s

. . . interests.” Id. at 9 (emphasis added). Also, NCUC

alleges the D.C. Circuit’s decision “deprives a State

litigant of access to federal courts to challenge federal

10

agency actions that impact the State’s . . . interests.”

Id. at 12 (emphasis added). However, NCUC did not

show any “negative impact,” “harm,” or “impact” to its

interests because it failed to demonstrate that any of

the capacity of Transco’s expansion projects will serve

North Carolina customers, or that North Carolina

customers will pay higher rates as a result of any of the

projects as FERC approved them. NCUC at *11 (App.

to Pet. for Cert. 3a).

Importantly, NCUC neglects that the procedural

right to appeal FERC orders under the Natural Gas

Act—which it here invokes—is reserved for parties

“aggrieved by an order issued by the Commission.” 15

U.S.C. § 717r(b) (App. to Pet. for Cert. 348a-349a). To

be “aggrieved,” a party must satisfy the criteria for

Article III standing. City of Orrville v. FERC, 147 F.3d

979, 985-86 (D.C. Cir. 1998). NCUC is not aggrieved

because it has suffered no harm from FERC’s orders.

The fact that NCUC intervened in the underlying

FERC proceedings does not confer Article III standing

because “the constitutional requirement that [a

petitioner] have standing kicks in” when “the petitioner

later seeks judicial review.” Sierra Club v. EPA, 292

F.3d 895, 899 (D.C. Cir. 2002); see N.Y. Reg’l

Interconnect, Inc. v. FERC, 634 F.3d 581, 586 (D.C. Cir.

2001) (“[A] party does not acquire a ‘direct stake in a

litigation’ simply by participating in antecedent

administrative proceedings.”); City of Orrville, 147 F.3d

at 985 (same). Thus, the procedural right on which

NCUC relies, of itself, requires that NCUC establish

injury in fact.

11

NCUC attempts to obscure the lack of injury to any

North Carolina gas customer or ratepayer by

repeatedly pointing out that some of Transco’s

expansion facilities are located in North Carolina. See,

e.g., Pet. for Cert. at 2, 3, 5, 7, 9-10, 11, 12. While

capacity created by Transco’s expansion projects may

flow through North Carolina, and a limited number of

facilities in North Carolina were upgraded as part of

the expansions, these facts do not indicate that anyone

in North Carolina will pay, or be affected by, the rates

negotiated by the shippers subscribing to this capacity

or the recourse rates included in the certificates FERC

issued. Because the services provided on the expansion

facilities are incrementally priced, the expansion

certificates do not affect the rates and services on other

portions of Transco’s system, including the portions

that actually serve North Carolina.

NCUC challenged the FERC orders below based on

an allegedly excessive pre-tax rate of return, asserting

a parens patriae interest in protecting ratepayers

under its jurisdiction from excessive rates. But NCUC

did not allege that the physical presence of Transco’s

facilities within North Carolina affected any

proprietary interest of the State, nor did it even allege

that it is the proper North Carolina entity to assert any

such proprietary interest. Thus, the parens patriae

interest NCUC purported to assert clearly diverged

from the proprietary interest in coastal land that the

Court recognized in Massachusetts.

The D.C. Circuit did not err. Because NCUC did

not establish injury, it lacked standing regardless of

any “solicitude” under Massachusetts. In the absence

12

of injury in fact, there is no case or controversy under

Article III. Thus, the Court need not examine here the

nature of any solicitude that might be accorded to a

State under Massachusetts.

B. There Exists No Split Among the Circuits

Concerning the Fundamental Requirement

that a Petitioner Must Establish Injury in

Fact

NCUC alleges that the Circuits are split on the

meaning of Massachusetts, particularly the decision’s

impact on parens patriae standing. Pet. for Cert. at 1214. NCUC also asserts that, “had the North Carolina

Commission’s appeal been addressed by the Fifth

Circuit, instead of the District of Columbia Circuit, it

is likely that North Carolina would not have been

denied the ability to challenge FERC orders that

directly impact its quasi-sovereign and parens patriae

interests.” Id. at 14. However, even putting aside

NCUC’s erroneous assertion of any impact to its

interests, there is no split among the Circuits on the

centrality of injury in fact to the standing analysis,

regardless of whatever “solicitude” a State may be

afforded.

The courts of appeals have uniformly required state

litigants to demonstrate injury in fact, and none have

indicated that solicitude under Massachusetts is a free

pass to avoid the Article III standing criteria set forth

in Lujan. E.g., Wyo. v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 674 F.3d

1220, 1238 (10th Cir. 2012) (solicitude does not exempt

state petitioner from establishing injury); Conn. v. Am.

Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 340-44 (2d Cir. 2009)

(finding state litigants demonstrated both present and

13

future injury due to greenhouse gas emissions),

jurisdiction aff’d by an equally divided Court, 564 U.S.

410, 420 (2011); Del. Dep’t of Nat. Res. & Envtl. Control

v. FERC, 558 F.3d 575, 579 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (under

the Natural Gas Act, “special solicitude does not

eliminate the state petitioner’s obligation to establish

concrete injury”). Even in the case NCUC highlights as

indicative of a Circuit split, the U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit (Fifth Circuit) applied the

traditional standing criteria and found that Texas

demonstrated injury in fact. Tex. v. U.S., 809 F.3d 134,

155 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally divided Court,

136 S. Ct. 2271, 2272 (2016). Because the Texas Court

expressly required injury sufficient to confer Article III

standing, it is far from likely that NCUC’s appeal

would have fared differently in the Fifth Circuit.

NCUC further notes, Pet. for Cert. at 13, that the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Second

Circuit), in Connecticut, questioned whether

Massachusetts “muddled” the distinction between State

proprietary and parens patriae standing, pointing out

that this Court “analyzed state standing . . . in

Massachusetts’ capacity as a property owner, not as a

quasi-sovereign.” Connecticut, 582 F.3d at 337-38. But

the Second Circuit is hardly alone in its view that the

solicitude afforded by Massachusetts is limited to state

litigants that sue to protect their proprietary interests.

See In re Trump, 928 F.3d 360, 377 (4th Cir. 2019)

(stating that, in Massachusetts, “the Supreme Court

relied on Massachusetts’s own ‘particularized injury in

its capacity as a landowner’”); Gov’t of Manitoba v.

Bernhardt, 923 F.3d 173, 182 (D.C. Cir. 2019)

(“Massachusetts did not sue in its parens patriae

14

capacity.”); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dep’t of

the Interior, 563 F.3d 466, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“[I]t

was critical that Massachusetts sought to assert its

own rights as a state . . . and was not seeking to protect

the rights of its citizens.”). However, the Court need

not delve into this issue here, because NCUC has

shown no injury at all. For the purposes of NCUC’s

petition, the Court need only recognize that there is no

divergence in the lower courts regarding a state

agency’s need to establish injury in fact to demonstrate

Article III standing.

C. Petitioner Failed to Raise Below the

Questions It Now Presents to this Court

An additional ground for denying NCUC’s petition

is that NCUC did not argue before the D.C. Circuit

that, under Massachusetts, a State has standing even

if it fails to demonstrate injury. Rather, NCUC argued

below that “affording special solicitude to NCUC

means, at a minimum, that close calls as to whether

NCUC met each prong of the traditional standing test

should be decided in NCUC’s favor.” Final Reply Brief

of Petitioner at 20, N.C. Utils. Comm’n v. FERC (D.C.

Cir., Sept. 4, 2018) (Nos. 18-1018, et al.). The D.C.

Circuit did not find that this case was a “close call,” in

which state solicitude would tip the balance in favor of

NCUC, and the facts would not support such a

conclusion. NCUC did not argue below that, in this

situation, the D.C. Circuit should rule that NCUC has

standing notwithstanding the absence of injury.

NCUC’s failure to clearly articulate this argument

below is fatal to its petition for certiorari. Travelers

Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas & Elec., 549 U.S.

15

443, 455 (2007) (“[W]e ordinarily do not consider claims

that were neither raised nor addressed below.”).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny

the petition for a writ of certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

Michael J. Thompson

Counsel of Record

Andrew T. Swers

Wright & Talisman, P.C.

1200 G Street, N.W., Suite 600

Washington, D.C. 20005-3802

(202) 393-1200

thompson@wrightlaw.com

swers@wrightlaw.com

Stephen A. Hatridge,

Vice President and

Assistant General Counsel

Nicole M. Turpen,

Managing Attorney

Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Company, LLC

P.O. Box 1396

Houston, Texas 77251

(713) 215-2000

Stephen.A.Hatridge@Williams.com

Nicole.Turpen@Williams.com

Counsel for Respondent

Transcontinental Gas

Pipe Line Company, LLC

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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