Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Lawrence T. Newman, Petitioner v. Robert W. York, as Personal Representative, et al.

Supreme Court briefSep 13, 2019

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Text

19-375 l

No.

FILED

SEP t 3 2M9

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

SUPREME COURT. U.S.

92?

g>upmnr Court of tlje United States

IN RE SUPERVISED ESTATE OF AL KATZ:

LAWRENCE T. NEWMAN

Petitioner,

ROBERT W. YORK

as Personal Representative,

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, and

STATE OF INDIANA

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

LAWRENCE T. NEWMAN

Pro Se

4102 66th Street Circle West

Bradenton, FL 34209

(317) 397-5258

RECEIVED

SEP 17 2019

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Whether the refusal of the trial court to hear

Newman’s administrative expense motions violates

the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and

other Constitutional provisions.

Whether the Indiana Court of Appeals’ and

Indiana Supreme Court’s decisions, which denied

Newman a genuine bona fide Appeal on the merits,

violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process

Clause and other Constitutional provisions.

RELATED CASES

United States Supreme Court

Case No. 19-89

Indiana Supreme Court

Case No. 49A05-1710-ES-2475

Supervised Estate of A1 Katz

Lawrence T. Newman, Appellant,

Robert W. York, Appellee

Trial Court Case No. 49D13-1009-ES-040244

Date of entry of Order denying transfer:

April 12, 2019

Indiana Supreme Court

Case No. 18A-ES-01721

In re the Estate of A1 Katz, Deceased

Lawrence T. Newman, Appellant

Robert W. York, Internal Revenue Service,

and State of Indiana, Appellees

Trial Court Case No. 49D13-1009-ES-040244

Date of entry of Order denying transfer:

June 18, 2019

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page(s)

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI 1

OPINIONS BELOW

JURISDICTION

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

INVOLVED

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ...

The refusal of the trial court to ..

hear Newman’s administrative expense

Motions violates the Fourteenth

Amendment’s Due Process Clause

and other Constitutional provisions.

The Indiana Court of Appeals’ and ...

Indiana Supreme Court’s decisions, which

denied Newman a genuine bona fide

Appeal on the merits, violate the

Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process

Clause and other Constitutional provisions.

CONCLUSION

INDEX TO APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: Trial Court Order dated ....

June 12, 2018

APPENDIX B: Indiana Court of Appeals ....

Memorandum Decision dated

December 31, 2018

APPENDIX C: Indiana Court of Appeals

Order dated March 6, 2019

APPENDIX D: Indiana Supreme Court

Order dated June 18, 2019

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

U. S. SUPREME COURT CASES

Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965)....

Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. 223.......

(1 Wall. 223, 17 L.Ed. 531) (1863)

15,26

Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971)

16,17,

Boswell’s Lessee v. Otis et al., 9 How., 350 ... 15

Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978)

29,41

Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403

n.12 (2002)

Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67 (1972)

16,25

26,29

Giaccio v. State ofPennsylvania,

382 U.S. 399 (1966)

In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955)

Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath,... 29,36,

341 U.S. 123 (1951)

Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.,

455 U.S. 422 (1982)

Marshall v. Jerrico, 446 U.S. 238 (1980)

40,41

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).... 16,30,

Nations et al. v. Johnson et al., 24 How., 203 15

Oakley v. Aspinwall, 4 Comst., 514

Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Newport,

247 U.S. 464 (1918)

28,29

Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702

(1997)

Young v. U.S. exrel. Vuitton, 481 U.S. 787 ... 31

(1987).

STATE COURT CASES

Bojrab v. Bojrab, 810 N.E.2d 1008 (Ind. 2004) 34,35,

Georgos v. Jackson, 790 N.E.2d 448

(Ind. 2003)

34,35,

In re Guardianship ofStalker,..........

953 N.E.2d 1094 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)

Kindred v. Townsend, 4 N.E.3d 793

(Ind.Ct.App. 2014)

35,39

MBNA America Bank, N.A. v. Kay, .

888 N.E.2d 288 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)

MicroVote General Corp. v. Ind. ...

Election Comm’n, 924 N.E.2d 184

(Ind. Ct. App. 2010)

Warren v. Indiana Telephone Co.,......

217 Ind. 93, 26 N.E.2d 399 (Ind. 1940)

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

U.S. Const, art. IV

U.S. Const, art. VI.

2,14

U.S. Const, amend. I

2,30

U.S. Const, amend. V

2,30

U.S. Const, amend. XTV, Section 1

3,30

Ind. Const, art. 1, § 12

Ind. Const, art. VII, § 6,

32,37

COURT RULES

Indiana Trial Rule 53.1(C)

MISCELLANEOUS

Internal Revenue Service Legal Reference .. 24

Guide for Revenue Officers, Section 5.17.13.5

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner, Lawrence T. Newman, respectfully

requests that this Court issue a writ of certiorari to

review the judgments of the Indiana Court of Appeals

and of the Indiana Supreme Court in a case of

multiple deprivations of basic due process rights to a

hearing, relative to the refusal of the trial court to

ever hold any hearings on Newman’s six Motions for

reimbursements/payments to him of administrative

expenses in an estate; the subsequent denial of

Newman’s Appeal thereof by the Indiana Court of

Appeals without consideration of the merits of said

Appeal; and the denial of Transfer by the Indiana

Supreme Court, resulting in the denial of Newman’s

due process rights at all levels of the Indiana

judiciary.

OPINIONS BELOW

The order of the trial court authorizing sale of

Estate real property and distribution of proceeds,

dated June 12, 2018, is set forth in Appendix A. The

order of the Indiana Court of Appeals denying

Newman’s Appeal, dated December 31, 2018, is set

forth in Appendix B. The order of the Indiana Court

of Appeals denying Newman’s Petition for Rehearing

dated March 6, 2019, is set forth in Appendix C. The

order of the Indiana Supreme Court denying transfer

dated June 18, 2019, is set forth in Appendix D.

JURISDICTION

This cause arises from the failure of the

Indiana trial court to grant any hearing(s) to

Lawrence Newman on six (6) Motions. The Court of

Appeals denied Newman’s Appeal on December 31,

2018, and denied Newman’s Petition for Rehearing on

March 6, 2019. The Indiana Supreme Court denied

transfer on June 18, 2019.

Accordingly, the jurisdiction of this Court is

invoked under 28 U.S.C § 1257(a).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

This case involves the following Constitutional

provisions, the pertinent portions of which are set

forth below:

This Constitution... shall be the supreme Law of the

Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound

thereby....

U.S. Const, art. VI.

Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom

of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people

peaceably to assemble, and to petition the

Government for a redress of grievances.

U.S. Const, amend. I.

No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or

property, without due process of law ....

U.S. Const, amend. V.

.... No state shall make or enforce any law which shall

abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the

United States; nor shall any State deprive any person

of life, liberty, or property, without due process of

law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the

equal protection of the laws.

U.S. Const, amend. XIV, Section 1.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner Lawrence Newman ("Newman") is

the husband of Dr. Beverly Newman and the son-inlaw of Dr. Newman’s father, A1 Katz, a Holocaust

Survivor and domiciliary of Indianapolis, Indiana,

since 1947. A1 Katz also owned a condominium in

Bradenton (Manatee County), Florida, where he

normally spent the winter months.

In September 2009, A1 Katz was put into an

involuntary guardianship in Manatee County,

Florida, and the Newmans immediately thereafter

traveled from their home in Indianapolis to

Bradenton to care for him. After Beverly Newman

was appointed Guardian of the Person of A1 Katz in

November 2009, the Newmans cared for him in his

Bradenton condominium for the remaining eight

months of his life.

In July 2010, at age 90, A1 Katz passed away in

Florida, and Dr. Newman opened his Estate in the

Marion County, Indiana, Probate Court, which

appointed her as Personal Representative of the A1

Katz Estate in October 2010.

In less than one year in guardianship, A1 Katz’s

guardians had spent hundreds of thousands of dollars

of A1 Katz’s funds, leaving him destitute of liquid

assets at the time he passed away. His Estate was

opened with approximately $400.00 in its bank

account. The Estate was chronically short of liquid

assets from its inception, and Lawrence Newman, as

the son-in-law of A1 Katz, personally paid for many of

the ongoing administrative expenses of the Estate,

including, inter alia, expenses for the upkeep of A1

Katz’s domiciliary home at 4727 North Ritter Avenue,

Indianapolis, Indiana (“Ritter Property"), including,

inter alia, utilities, insurance, maintenance, and

property taxes.

At the time he paid for Estate administrative

expenses, Newman expected for the Estate to have, in

the future, sufficient funds to reimburse him for such

necessary expenses through, inter alia, the sale of the

Ritter Property as well as through four damage

lawsuits filed by the Estate in Florida relative to A1

Katz’s guardianship; however, the lawsuits were all

abandoned by the Estate in 2015 at the instance of

successor Personal Representative and Estate

attorney Robert York shortly after his appointment.

On April 27, 2013, Newman filed his "[Second]

Verified Motion for Reimbursement of Payment of A1

Katz Estate Administrative Expenses," in the amount

of $42,284.54, seeking reimbursement of Estate

administrative expenses Newman had advanced and

paid for from his personal funds on behalf of and to

support the Estate.

On August 28, 2013, Newman filed his "Third

Verified Motion for Reimbursement of Payment of A1

Katz Estate Administrative Expenses" in the amount

of $2,054.11, and in the aggregate amount of

$44,338.65.

After Judge Zore, the initial judge supervising

the A1 Katz Estate, was recused for cause, the Indiana

Supreme Court appointed Judge Rosenberg as

successor judge on August 29, 2013.

On October 9, 2013, Newman filed his "Fourth

Verified Motion for Reimbursement of Payment of A1

Katz Estate Administrative Expenses" in the amount

of $1,075.48, and in the aggregate amount of

$45,414.13.

On March 19, 2014, Newman filed his "Fifth

Verified Motion for Reimbursement of Payment of A1

Katz Estate Administrative Expenses" in the amount

of $5,422.68. Accordingly as of March 19, 2014, the

aggregate amount of administrative expenses for

which Newman sought reimbursement from the

Estate totaled $50,836.81.

Newman’s

four

administrative

expense

reimbursement Motions were set for hearing on

March 19, 2014, but not heard on said date; reset for

hearing on May 2, 2014, but not heard on said date;

and the trial court adjourned said May 2, 2014,

hearing without ever resetting said hearing and

without ever holding a subsequent hearing on said

claims, as documented by the triad court’s CCS entry

on May 5, 2014:

Administrative Event. Per jacket entry

.... L. Newman in person,

Court

adjourns without addressing 5 motions

set for 3/19/14 .... File Stamp:

05/02/2014.

Further, the "Notice of Executive Director’s

Determination Pursuant to Trial Rule 53.1(E)" dated

June 2, 2015, relative to a Rule 53.1 motion filed by

Newman against then-Judge Rosenberg (for removal

of Judge Rosenberg under Indiana’s "Lazy Judge"

rule), ruled in pertinent part as follows:

A review of the Chronological Case

Summary (CCS) shows that Lawrence

Newman filed his fourth praecipe

seeking withdrawal of the submission of

this case on May 18, 2015, alleging that

the court failed to set a hearing for or

rule on four motions filed by him.

However, the CCS also shows that the

court commenced a hearing on Mr.

Newman’s claims on May 2, 2014, but

adjourned the hearing due to the

absence of the personal representative of

the Estate, Mr. Newman’s wife. Trial

Rule 53.1 does not dictate the time in

which a court must complete a hearing

that has been adjourned.

Critically, said adjourned hearing was never

thereafter reset, and Newman’s Estate administrative

expense reimbursement Motions were never heard or

determined by the trial court.

In addition to his four administrative expense

reimbursement Motions, Newman subsequently filed

on January 25, 2016, a "Verified Petition for Payment

of Estate Attorney Fees" for administrative expenses

in the amount of $52,050.00, in payment for his

attorney fees earned while representing Estate

Personal Representative Dr. Beverly Newman in the

Estate from the opening of the Estate through his

withdrawal on February 3, 2012. Said Petition for

administrative expenses was never heard or

determined by the trial court.

Newman thereafter filed on May 9, 2016, a

"Notice to Court of Transfer of Interest of

Administrative Expense Claim and Motion for

Approval and Payment of Claim" (relative to the

"Verified Motion for Reimbursement of [Property

Tax] Payment of A1 Katz Estate Administrative

Expenses" that had been filed in the Court on or

about July 8, 2015), in the amount of $1,554.20 for

payment of Estate property taxes. Said claim for

administrative expenses was never heard or

determined by the trial court.

The aggregate amount of administrative

expenses claimed by Newman in his six

administrative expense Motions, each of which claims

was never heard or determined by the trial court,

totals $104,441.01. Dr. Newman never filed a claim

for her services as Personal Representative from

2010-2015.

In January 2015, the court appointed

Indianapolis attorney Robert York as both the

successor Personal Representative and attorney for

the AI Katz Estate and retained him in said positions

over Newman’s objections and despite its knowledge

of York’s decade-long, intense conflict of interest with

and hostility against Lawrence Newman, who had

worked for years as an associate attorney in York’s

law firm and was fired by York after refusing York’s

demand that Newman cease his public exposure of

child abuse at the Indianapolis Jewish Community

Center. Further, York has been hired for years upon

appointment by the Indiana Supreme Court as a

hearing officer for the Court, a position for which his

compensation by the Supreme Court has been scores

of thousands of dollars.

On July 13, 2016, Judge Rosenberg and his

supervising judge both recused themselves for cause,

and the Indiana Supreme Court thereupon appointed

Judge James Joven, a legal colleague of Robert York

from the small town of Lawrence, Indiana, as

successor judge on July 20, 2016.

Although Judge Rosenberg had never heard or

determined any of Newman’s six administrative

expense Motions and the court’s own written record

conclusively documented that Newman’s Motions had

never been heard or determined, Judge Joven upon

his appointment thereafter erroneously and

repeatedly held that the court had previously denied

or dismissed Newman’s Motions during Judge

Rosenberg’s tenure. In doing so, Judge Joven never

cited to any actual court order so denying or

dismissing Newman’s Motions, notwithstanding

Newman’s repeated documentation that no such

order(s) had ever been issued at any time by the

court, notwithstanding Newman’s repeated requests

that Judge Joven cite the specific alleged court orders,

and notwithstanding that Judge Joven himself had

previously listed on his November 29, 2016, Order

Setting Pretrial Conference as unheard and

undetermined Newman’s Motion for administrative

expense attorney fees filed on January 25, 2016, a

claim in and of itself for more than $50,000.00.

In 2017, York attempted to consummate a sale

of the Ritter Property without consideration of

Newman’s six unheard administrative expense

Motions, thereby excluding Newman from sharing in

the proceeds of the sale of the Ritter Property, which

was the last asset of substantial value held by the

Estate. On August 4, 2017, the trial court issued its

“Order Directing Sale of Ritter Avenue Property and

Distribution of Proceeds.”

Newman thereafter filed an interlocutory

Appeal on October 22, 2017 (the "2017 Appeal"),

challenging the trial court’s order which authorized

the distribution of the proceeds of the sale of the

Ritter Property without consideration of Newman’s

six administrative expense Motions that still had

never been heard or determined by the trial court.

Said 2017 Appeal was challenged as late and untimely

by York and was thereafter dismissed with prejudice

by the Court of Appeals, before any briefs were filed,

by order of January 4, 2018, on the basis that

Newman had filed an untimely interlocutory Appeal.

Because no briefs were filed in the

interlocutory 2017 Appeal before it was dismissed for

untimeliness, the appellate court never considered or

issued any determinations on the merits of Newman’s

position that his Constitutional due process rights

had been violated by the trial court through its

refusal to hear Newman’s six administrative expense

Motions before ordering the distribution of the

proceeds from the sale of the Ritter Property, thereby

precluding Newman from sharing in the proceeds of

said sale.

After said 2017 Appeal was dismissed, the

Ritter Property sale was not consummated, and York

subsequently sold the property to a different buyer

under a new purchase agreement. On May 17, 2018,

York filed his Petition for Instructions Regarding Sale

of Ritter Avenue Property, informing the trial court

that a new buyer had been found for the Ritter

Property. According to York, “the sale is expected to

result in net sales proceeds to the Estate in the

approximate amount of $54,191.00.” York intended

to distribute the bulk of said proceeds to the United

States of America for unpaid federal income taxes of

A1 Katz and to the State of Indiana for unpaid state

income taxes of A1 Katz (which taxes were unpaid

because A1 Katz’s Florida guardian of the property

had refused to pay), while making no distributions to

Newman.

On May 31, 2018, Newman filed his “Verified

Response to Petition for Instructions Regarding

Ritter Avenue Property and Verified Petition for

Payment of Administrative Expenses,” in which he

stated in pertinent part:

Lawrence Newman submits to this

Court that any distributions to the

United States of America and to the

State of Indiana for their respective tax

claims without payment of Lawrence

Newman’s

administrative

expense

claims will be a violation of probate law

and of Lawrence Newman’s due process

rights under the United States

Constitution

and

the

Indiana

Constitution, as well as a violation of

Lawrence Newman’s rights of access to

the courts guaranteed by the Indiana

Constitution....

Lawrence

Newman

further

repeatedly notified this Court and as he

does so herein, it is necessary that this

Court hear and determine Lawrence

Newman’s six (6) administrative expense

claims prior to any distribution of the

sale proceeds of the Ritter Property in

order to facilitate the compromise of the

IRS’s tax lien on the Ritter Property in

accordance with the IRS policy

referenced above and to subordinate the

State of Indiana’s tax lien to his

administrative expense claims.

Lawrence Newman submits to this

Court that his federal and state

Constitutional due process rights and his

rights to access to the courts guaranteed

by the Indiana Constitution compel:

(1) that Lawrence Newman’s six

administrative expense claims be heard

by this Court and paid to Lawrence

Newman in the distribution of the

anticipated proceeds of the sale of the

Estate’s Ritter Property; and (2) that

Lawrence Newman be given the

reasonable opportunity to obtain a

compromise from the Internal Revenue

Service of its tax claim in accordance

with the Internal Revenue Service’s

written policy to compromise tax claims

in an Estate in favor of administrative

expense claims.

On June 12, 2018, the trial court issued its

Agreed Order of Instructions as to Sale of Ritter

Avenue Property, in which order the trial court set

forth the distributions to be made from the proceeds

of the sale of the Ritter Property to the United States

of America and to the State of Indiana relative to

their tax claims, with any remaining amount of said

proceeds to be paid to the Estate. Said order did not

mention Newman or provide for any payment to

Newman from the Ritter Property sales proceeds for

his administrative expense claims.

Newman appealed said order to the Indiana

Court of Appeals on July 12, 2018, but the court

denied Newman’s Appeal on the basis that its order

dismissing "with prejudice" Newman’s 2017 Appeal

for untimeliness, prior to the filing of any briefs or

arguments on the merits, was nonetheless a judgment

on the merits of the prior Appeal and thus was res

judicata as to Newman’s subsequent 2018 Appeal,

ruling:.

As we dismissed Newman’s [prior 2017]

appeal with prejudice, we do not disturb

the trial court’s finding that it had

for

claims

denied

Newman’s

administrative expenses, and this issue

is foreclosed for our review.

In addition to denying his Appeal, the Court of

Appeals assessed appellate attorney fees against

Newman "[i]n light of Newman’s appellate briefs and

arguments," thus further penalizing Newman for

seeking his basic Constitutional rights to due process

by having his administrative expense Motions heard

by the Indiana court.

On January 29, 2019, Newman filed a Motion

for Rehearing that was denied on March 6, 2019. He

filed a Petition To Transfer to the Indiana Supreme

Court on April 5, 2019, challenging the actions of both

the trial court and of the Court of Appeals in denying

Newman Constitutional due process of law, which

Petition To Transfer was also denied on June 18,

2019.

As a result of the trial court’s aforesaid orders

and the appellate court’s decision not to consider the

issue on the merits, Newman did not receive any

payment from the proceeds of the sale of the Estate’s

Ritter Property, and his six administrative expense

Motions remain unheard, undecided, and unpaid.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

The refusal of the trial court to hear

Newman’s administrative expense Motions violates

the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause

and other Constitutional provisions.

This case concerns a first impression issue of

total deprivation of due process by the refusal of a

trial court to ever hold a hearing on issues of

substantial property rights, thus depriving the

litigant, Lawrence Newman, of both his due process

rights and his property rights guaranteed to him

under the United States Constitution.

While this Court has considered many cases of

due process considerations dealing with issues of

insufficiency of notice, timing of hearings, and

substance of hearings, this case presents the unique

circumstance where no hearing whatsoever was

granted to Newman on any of his six administrative

expense Motions, thus denying him any opportunity

to present his case on the merits in a court of law, an

egregious

deprivation

the

fundamental

Constitutional right to due process right enacted in

the Bill of Rights over two centuries ago.

In this respect, the United States Constitution

is applicable to the courts of the several states,

including the state courts of Indiana:

This Constitution, and the Laws of the

United States which shall be made in

Pursuance thereof; ... shall be the

supreme Law of the Land; and the

Judges in every State shall be bound

thereby, any Thing in the Constitution

or Laws of any State to the Contrary

notwithstanding.

U.S. Const, art. 6.

Over 150 years ago, even prior to the

enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, in Baldwin

v. Hale, 68 U.S. 223 (1 Wall. 223, 17 L.Ed. 531)

(1863), this Court clearly recognized the right of a

litigant in American courts to have his case actually

heard, as established in cases dating back to 1850:

Parties whose rights are to be affected

are entitled to be heard; and in order

that they may enjoy that right they must

first be notified. Common justice

requires that no man shall be

condemned in his person or property

without notice and an opportunity to

make his defence. Nations et al. v.

Johnson et al., 24 How., 203; Boswell’s

Lessee v. Otis et al., 9 How., 350; Oakley

v. Aspinwall, 4 Comst., 514

With the amounts at issue totaling over

$104,000.00

relative

to Newman’s

unheard

administrative

expense

reimbursement/payment

Motions, Newman has substantial property rights in

his claims against the assets of the Al Katz Estate,

which property rights were disregarded by the trial

court; without being afforded any hearings on his

Motions, Newman was unable to assert his property

rights for reimbursement and/or payment from Estate

assets.

The Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of

"property" has never been interpreted to safeguard

only the rights of undisputed ownership. Rather, it

has been read broadly to extend protection to "any

property

interest."

significant

Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,379 (1971).

Boddie

"It is enough to invoke the procedural

safeguards of the Fourteenth Amendment that a

significant property interest is at stake, whatever the

ultimate outcome of a hearing. ..." Fuentes v.

Shevin, 407 U. S. 67,87 (1972).

Procedural due process imposes constraints on

governmental decisions which deprive individuals of

"liberty" or "property" interests within the meaning of

the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth

Amendment. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319

(1976). “[S]ome form of hearing is required before an

individual is finally deprived of a property [or liberty]

interest.” Id., 424 U.S. at 333.

Newman has been deprived by the state of

significant property interests without any form of

hearing, in violation of Constitutional law.

"Both liberty and property are specifically

protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against any

state deprivation which does not meet the standards

of due process ...." Giaccio v. State of Pennsylvania,

382 U.S. 399 (1966).

Mindful of his Constitutional rights to a

hearing, for a period of over five years, Newman

actively asserted his due process rights to a hearing,

taking repeated unsuccessful actions in both the trial

and appellate courts to obtain a hearing on his

administrative expense Motions.

In this respect, "Due process has been

interpreted by this Court as preventing the states

from denying litigants use of established adjudicatory

procedures, when such an action would be the

equivalent of denying them an opportunity to be

heard upon their claimed right[s].” Boddie v.

Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,380 (1971).

On April 27, 2013, Newman filed his (Second)

Motion for Reimbursement of Payment of A1 Katz

Estate Administrative Expenses, requesting an

immediate hearing thereon and advising the court

that "time is of the essence." On June 5, 2013,

Newman filed a Lazy Judge motion seeking removal

of the initial trial court judge, Judge Zore, for failure

to timely hear Newman’s April 27, 2013, Motion for

reimbursement of Estate administrative expenses.

Judge Zore was removed, and Judge Louis Rosenberg

was appointed as Special Judge on August 29, 2013.

On August 28, 2013, Newman filed his Third

Verified Motion for Reimbursement of Payment of A1

Katz Estate Administrative Expenses, requesting an

immediate hearing thereon and advising the court

that "time is of the essence," and on October 9, 2013,

Newman filed his Fourth Verified Motion for

Reimbursement of Payment of A1 Katz Estate

Administrative Expenses, again requesting an

immediate hearing thereon and again advising the

court that "time is of the essence."

On October 10, 2013, Judge Rosenberg held a

status hearing at which he was informed that

Newman’s Motions for administrative expense

reimbursements needed to be heard by the court.

On March 19, 2014, Newman filed his "Fifth

Verified Motion for Reimbursement of Payment of A1

Katz Estate Administrative Expenses," once again

requesting an immediate hearing thereon and again

advising the court that "time is of the essence."

Also on March 19, 2014, Judge Rosenberg held

a hearing at which he had scheduled Newman’s

Although

reimbursement Motions to be heard.

Newman requested to participate telephonically,

Judge Rosenberg compelled Newman to be personally

present at said hearing, requiring Newman to fly from

Florida to Indianapolis for the hearing, at significant

personal expense of time and money. At hearing,

despite Newman’s mandated presence, Judge

Rosenberg declined to hear Newman’s administrative

expense Motions.

Judge Rosenberg thereafter set a hearing on

Newman’s administrative expense reimbursement

Motions on May 2, 2014, again compelling Newman to

be personally present. Again Newman flew from

Florida to Indianapolis at significant personal expense

of time and money, and again Judge Rosenberg

declined to hear Newman’s Motions, instead

adjourning the hearing, and stating:

... I’m going to delay ruling on your — on

your five (5) (sic) requests for

reimbursement.

On February 10, 2015, Newman filed a "Lazy

Judge" Motion against Judge Rosenberg, stating in

pertinent part:

As of February 10, 2015, 654 days since

the filing of his Second Motion for

Reimbursement, and 328 days since the

filing of his Fifth Motion for

Reimbursement, the Judge herein has

failed to set Lawrence T. Newman’s four

Motions for Reimbursement for hearing.

nor has Judge Rosenberg ruled on said

four Motions for Reimbursement.

On May 6, 2015, Newman filed his "Response

to Personal Representative’s Report Regarding

Claims Filed by Beverly and Lawrence Newman" in

which Newman stated to the trial court in pertinent

part:

Further, as Lawrence Newman has

advised this Court multiple times in

filing his successive subject Motions,

inter alia:

Time is of the essence with respect to

the granting of the Order sought herein

since A1 Katz’s Indiana house is in the

process of being sold and the award of

Administrative Expenses to Lawrence

Newman is needed for purposes of

compromising the federal income tax

debt secured bv a tax lien placed upon A1

Katz’s Indiana house by the Internal

Revenue Service for A1 Katz’s unpaid

federal income taxes for the years 2007.

2008. 2009. and 2010. in order to

conclude the sale of said house. Said

debt was not paid by A1 Katz’s Guardian

of his Florida property ....

Accordingly,

this

Court

should

immediately and expeditiously grant

Lawrence Newman’s Verified Motions

for Reimbursement in full without

hearing.

On May 25, 2015, Newman filed another "Lazy

Judge" motion against Judge Rosenberg, stating in

pertinent part:

It has now been over two years that the

Court has failed to hear Lawrence

Newman’s (Second) Verified Motion for

Reimbursement of Payment of A1 Katz

Estate Administrative Expenses and well

over one year that the Court has failed

to hear Lawrence Newman’s Fifth

Verified Motion for Reimbursement of

Payment

Katz

Estate

Administrative Expenses, all in violation

of Rule 53.1, denying Lawrence Newman

his due process rights as a creditor of the

Estate of A1 Katz.

On January 25, 2016, Newman filed his

Verified Petition for Payment of Estate Attorney

Fees, stating in pertinent part:

Petitioner [Newman] has personally

appeared before this Court on March 19,

2014, and May 2, 2014, relative to its

approval of Petitioner’s four Verified

Motions for Reimbursement of Payment

of AI Katz Estate Administrative

Expenses; but none of said Petitions has

ever been heard.

Pursuant to I.C. 29-1-10-13, Petitioner

requests that this Court immediately

approve the within Petition for attorney

fees and approve the Petitioner’s aforereferenced

Verified

Motions

for

Reimbursement.

On April 7, 2016, Newman filed his Verified

Motion for Disqualification of Judge Rosenberg for

Cause, stating in pertinent part:

[T]he essential pivotal question of the

removal of Judge Rosenberg is whether

an “average person on the street” would

question the impartiality of Judge

Rosenberg if he refuses to remove

himself in a case in which he, inter alia:

has refused to hear any of Lawrence

Newman’s four outstanding Motions for

reimbursement of Estate expenses for

two to three years;....

On July 1, 2016, Newman filed his Motion To

Appear at July 19, 2016, Hearing by Telephone, in

which he stated in pertinent part:

Lawrence Newman has twice flown from

Florida to Indianapolis for hearings on

March 19, 2014, and May 2, 2014, in this

cause on his own motions for

reimbursement of Estate administrative

expenses at great personal expense in

terms of time expended, worktime lost,

and significant money spent for travel,

which motions were specifically set by

this Court for hearing on said dates.

Notwithstanding this Court’s setting of

Lawrence Newman’s motions and his

personal appearance at said hearings,

this Court decided during said hearings

not to hear Lawrence Newman’s

motions, and, over two years later, said

motions have never been heard by this

Court .... Lawrence Newman’s motions

for

reimbursement

Estate

administrative expenses are not amongst

the motions specifically listed on this

Court’s subject Order Setting Hearing

on All Pending Matters

On July 11, 2016, Newman filed his Verified

Motion for Disqualification of Judge Rosenberg for

Cause, in which he stated in pertinent part:

In his Order Setting Hearing on All

Pending Matters issued on May 27,

2016, Judge Rosenberg enumerated

certain pending motions he intends to

hear at the hearing scheduled on July

Lawrence Newman’s four

19, 2016.

unheard Motions for Reimbursement of

Estate Administrative Expenses are not

Order,

enumerated

said

notwithstanding the fact that Lawrence

Newman has made numerous filings

over the past two years seeking to have

said Motions heard by Judge Rosenberg.

Consequent to Newman’s Motion for

Disqualification, Judge Rosenberg and his supervising

judge recused themselves on July 13, 2016, and Judge

Joven shortly thereafter was appointed.

In his March 17, 2017, Verified Motion for

Disqualification of Judge Joven for Cause, Newman

stated in pertinent part:

...for the third time in this cause,

Lawrence Newman was required by this

Court to travel from Florida to

Indianapolis at great personal expense in

time, lost work, and costs to appear in

person at a hearing for which his open

and unheard Motions had been

specifically set by this Court to be heard

and/or scheduled for future hearing, but

his subject Motions were, in fact, not

heard and/or scheduled....

On July 10, 2017, Newman filed his Motion To

Vacate Hearing on Sale of Ritter Property, in which

he stated in pertinent part (emphasis added):

Lawrence T. Newman’s due process

rights will be violated by a sale of the

Ritter property at this time because

Lawrence T. Newman has statutory

priority

rights

his

multiple

administrative expense claims over the

tax claims of the Internal Revenue

Service and of the State of Indiana,

which priorities Lawrence T. Newman

has been prevented and precluded from

asserting because this Court has

intentionally failed and refused to hear

and determine Lawrence T. Newman’s

multiple outstanding administrative

expense claims....

[F]ederal law regarding federal income

tax claims also recognizes the priority of

administrative expense claims over

federal income tax claims as follows from

the Internal Revenue Service Legal

Reference Guide for Revenue Officers,

Section 5.17.13.5: "... courts have held

that certain classes of claim can be paid

before the tax debt. These excepted

classes include administrative expenses.”

Additionally, years ago Lawrence T.

Newman was advised that the Internal

Revenue Service would recognize the

priority of administrative expense claims

over the IRS’s tax claims in the Estate.

On July 14, 2017, Newman filed his Motion for

Certification of Interlocutory Order for Immediate

Appeal, in which he stated:

The issues to be addressed in the

interlocutory appeal are this Court’s

Order Setting Hearing on Petition for

Hearing Regarding Sale of Ritter

Property dated June 27, 2017, without

this Court having first scheduled, heard,

and determined Lawrence T. Newman’s

six (6) Motions for payment of

administrative expenses, one Motion

being unheard for well over four years....

The court denied Newman’s Motion; held the

scheduled hearing on the sale of the Ritter Property;

the Ritter Property was thereafter sold by the Estate;

and most of the proceeds therefrom were distributed

by the Estate to the Internal Revenue Service and to

the Indiana taxing authorities. None of the proceeds

from the Ritter Property sale was distributed to

Newman.

Newman thereafter appealed the order of sale,

but the Court of Appeals denied his Appeal without

consideration on the merits of the issue of the refusal

of the trial court to hold a hearing on Newman’s

administrative expense Motions, instead sanctioning

Newman for having brought the Appeal with an order

to pay York appellate attorney fees, without stating

the required factual and legal grounds for imposing

its appellate attorney fee sanction.

To date, the trial court has never heard or

determined any of Newman’s subject expense

Motions, and the Estate has never made any

payments to Newman on said claims. The trial

court’s actions produce a chilling effect on probate

attorneys and devastating effects on public trust and

confidence in the American judiciaiy.

In Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), this

Court held (emphasis added):

For more than a century, the central

meaning of procedural due process has

been clear: "Parties whose rights are to

be affected are entitled to be

heard." Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223,233.

....the

prohibition

against

the

deprivation of property without due

process of law reflects the high value,

embedded in our constitutional and

political history, that we place on a

person’s right to enjoy what is his, free

of governmental interference.

....For when a person has an opportunity

to speak up in his own defense, and

when the State must listen to what he

has to say, substantively unfair and

simply

mistaken

deprivations

property interests can be prevented.....

Indiana’s judicial system from bottom to top

has forfeited Newman’s "right to enjoy what is his,

free of governmental interference" because the State

has refused to give him "an opportunity to speak up in

his own defense...[and to] listen to what he has to say"

order

prevent

"substantively

unfair....deprivations of

[Newman’s]

property

interests...."

Indeed, as documented above, the initial judge

(Judge Zore) was removed because he would not

timely hear Newman’s first subject administrative

expense reimbursement Motion; therefore, it is

indisputable that Judge Zore did not hear any of

Newman’s subject Motions. Newman’s successive five

additional administrative expense Motions were all

filed while Judge Rosenberg was in charge of the A1

Katz Estate proceeding, but verifiably never heard by

Judge Rosenberg; yet, Judge Joven erroneously

had

predecessor

judge

insisted

that

denied/dismissed Newman’s administrative expense

Motions without ever citing to any actual court

order(s) so denying/dismissing Newman’s Motions.

Newman repeatedly requested that Judge Joven

identify any such alleged court orders, hearing dates,

transcripts, or statutorily-required recordings, but

Judge Joven refused to do so.

In this respect, Indiana Trial Rule 53.1(C)

provides that “a court is deemed to have set a motion

for hearing on the date the setting is noted in the

Chronological Case Summary, and to have ruled on

the date the ruling is noted in the Chronological Case

Summary.” The Katz Estate CCS establishes that no

hearing on Newman’s administrative expense

Motions was ever conducted by the trial court: but

Judge Joven repeatedly erroneously ruled otherwise,

consequently repeatedly denying Newman his

Constitutional due process rights.

The trial court repeatedly erroneously stated in

various orders that Newman’s administrative expense

claims have either been denied or dismissed; however,

in none of said statements did the trial court ever

identify any alleged: (1) hearing date(s), (2) date(s) of

order(s), (3) specific order(s) of the court upon which

its erroneous statement rests, or (4) transcript

excerpts from any alleged hearings on the matters of

administrative expense payments.

For example, in its Order Directing Sale of

Ritter Avenue Property and Distribution of Proceeds

issued on August 4, 2017, the trial court stated:

Lawrence [Newman] had also previously

asserted (and continues to assert) claims

against the Estate totaling more than

$50,000 purportedly expended on behalf

of the Estate ....

The Court has repeatedly denied

Lawrence’s claims for administrative

expenses. Time and again, Lawrence

has (unsuccessfully) attempted to have

the

Court

recognize

that

his

administrative claims were still in

existence. During the July 21, 2017,

hearing, the Court restated from the

bench that the Court had long ago

denied Lawrence’s purported claims

against the Estate.

The trial court’s repeated erroneous rulings,

made contrary to the record, have served to deprive

Newman of his most basic Constitutional rights to

due process in the form of a hearing on his legal

grievances involving substantial property rights. This

Court has repeatedly and consistently ruled that the

right to a meaningful hearing is amongst the most

basic of Constitutional due process rights.

“It is a violation of due process for a state to

enforce a judgment against a party to a proceeding

without having given him an opportunity to be heard

sometime before final judgment is entered." Postal

Telegraph Cable Co. v. Newport, 247 U.S. 464,476

(1918).

“,..[T]he opportunity to be heard must be

granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful

manner.” Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545,552

(1965).

“[A] purpose of procedural due process is to

convey to the individual a feeling that the government

has dealt with him fairly, as well as to minimize the

risk of mistaken deprivations of protected interests.”

Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).

“Because the right to procedural due process is

’absolute’ in the sense that it does not depend upon

the merits of a claimant’s substantive assertions, and

because of the importance to organized society that

procedural due process be observed, see Boddie v.

Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371 (1971); Anti-Fascist

Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. at 171-172

(Frankfurter, J., concurring), we believe that the

denied of procedural due process should be actionable

for nominal damages without proof of actual injury.”

Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).

“This right is a basic aspect of the duty of

government to follow a fair process of decision making

when it acts to deprive a person of his possessions.

The purpose of this requirement is not only to ensure

abstract fair play to the individual. Its purpose, more

particularly, is to protect his use and possession of

property from arbitrary encroachment . . . .” Puentes

v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67,80-81 (1972).

Indeed, Newman’s property deprivations are

"arbitrary encroachment[s]" by Indiana’s judicial

system from bottom to top, reflecting bias against

Newman for his outspoken public opposition to child

abuse at the Indianapolis Jewish Community Center,

which has long-time ties to the appellate courts and to

Robert York, hearing officer for the Indiana Supreme

Court.

Accordingly, the failure of the trial court to

afford Newman the most rudimentary aspects of due

process is a direct affront to the basic characteristics

of due process long established by this Court. "Due

process guarantees a “fair hearing in a fair tribunal.”

In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133,136 (1955). Due

Process requires “the opportunity to be heard at a

meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,333 (1976). The

"Due Process Clause grants the aggrieved party the

opportunity to present his case and have its merits

fairly judged”. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455

U.S. 422, 433 (1982).

Due process rights are considered as so

fundamental that they are guaranteed in multiple

See

clauses in the United States Constitution.

Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403,415 n.12 (2002)

(holding the right to be “grounded in the Article IV

Privileges and Immunities Clause, the First

Amendment Petition Clause, the First Amendment

Petition Clause, the Fifth Amendment Due Process

Clause, and the Fourteenth Amendment Equal

Protection and Due Process Clauses.”). See also id. at

415 (access to the courts is a “fundamental right”

that is a “separate and distinct right to seek judicial

relief for some wrong.”).

Due process rights are the type of

“fundamental rights” that are both “deeply rooted in

this Nation’s history and tradition” and “implicit in

the concept of ordered liberty.”

Washington v.

Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,720-21 (1997).

This Court has stated that “some errors are so

fundamental and pervasive that they require reversal

without regard to the facts and circumstances of the

case.” Young v. U.S. ex rel. Vuitton, 481 U.S. 787,810

(1987). An error is fundamental if it undermines

confidence in the proceeding. Id., at 812-813.

In sum, the failure of the trial court to even

hold any hearing(s) on Newman’s administrative

expense Motions and the consequent unconstitutional

deprivation of Newman’s property rights are such

fundamental errors that this Court should grant

certiorari and reverse the decision of the trial court.

The "fundamental and pervasive" errors in this case

undermine [public] confidence in the proceeding" and

in Indiana’s judicial credibility with adverse

ramifications to public trust in American

jurisprudence.

The Indiana Court of Appeals’ and Indiana

Supreme Court’s decisions, which denied Newman a

genuine bona fide Appeal on the merits, violate the

Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and

other Constitutional provisions.

In addition to the trial court’s violations of

Newman’s due process rights, as discussed above, the

Indiana Court of Appeals also violated Newman’s

Constitutional due process rights by denying Newman

his right to a substantive Appeal on the merits

regarding the issue of the trial court’s refusal to ever

hold a hearing on any of Newman’s six administrative

expense Motions. Subsequently, upon Newman’s

Petition To Transfer to the Indiana Supreme Court,

the Indiana Supreme Court further violated

Newman’s Constitutional due process rights by

refusing to grant transfer, thus denying Newman his

right to a substantive Appeal on the merits of the

issue of the trial court’s refusal to ever hold a hearing

for years on Newman’s administrative expense

Motions.

Newman was never provided a substantive

Appeal by the Court of Appeals; rather, by its various

orders, the Court of Appeals denied Newman his right

to appeal (a Constitutional right under the Indiana

Constitution, Ind. Const, art. VII, § 6, under which

there is an "absolute right to one appeal") by way of

tortuous legal reasoning intended to give the illusion

of appellate rights met, while piggybacking one

wrongful appellate decision - namely dismissal with

prejudice - upon another.

In its subject December 31, 2018, order denying

Newman’s instant Appeal, the Indiana Court of

Appeals ruled in toto relative to the issue of the trial

court’s violations of Newman’s due process rights:

With respect to Newman’s argument

that the trial court erred in determining

that his administrative claims were

dismissed or denied, Newman cites the

court’s August 4, 2017, order in which

the trial court stated that it had

repeatedly denied Newman’s claims for

administrative expenses. Newman also

cites the trial court’s August 28, 2017,

order in which the court mentioned it

had previously dismissed his claims.

However, Newman already sought an

interlocutory appeal of these orders

under Cause No. 2475 and the appeal

was dismissed with prejudice. “It is

generally recognized that a dismissal

with prejudice is a dismissal on the

merits.” In re Guardianship of Stalker,

953 N.E.2d 1094, 1102 (Ind. Ct. App.

2011) (citing MBNA America Bank, N.A.

v. Kay, 888 N.E.2d 288, 292 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2008)). As such it is conclusive of

the rights of the parties and res judicata

as to the questions which might have

been litigated. Id. As we dismissed

Newman’s appeal with prejudice, we do

not disturb the trial court’s finding that

it had denied Newman’s claims for

administrative expenses, and this issue

is foreclosed for our review.

The Court of Appeals’ dismissal of Newman’s

interlocutory 2017 Appeal "with prejudice" based upon

a belated interlocutory filing, did not comply with law,

because, as an interlocutory Appeal in a probate

proceeding, it could have been timely appealed by

Newman at the conclusion of the probate proceeding,

as determined by the Indiana Supreme Court, "A

claimed error in an interlocutory order is not waived

for failure to take an interlocutory appeal but may be

raised on appeal from the final judgment." Bojrab v.

Bojrab, 810 N.E.2d 1008 (Ind. 2004), citing Georgos v.

Jackson, 790 N.E.2d 448 (Ind. 2003)

Although the Court of Appeals characterized its

dismissal of Newman’s 2017 Appeal as “a dismissal on

the merits” by invoking a “generally recognized” rule

that “a dismissal with prejudice is a dismissal on the

merits,” the record clearly establishes that this

characterization is erroneous because: (1) the merits

of said 2017 Appeal were never even considered by the

Court of Appeals, because it was dismissed as

untimely before Newman had even filed his initial

brief; and (2) under Indiana law, even if Newman had

the legal right to an immediate interlocutory Appeal,

he was not required to take an interlocutory Appeal,

but could wait until the conclusion of the case to file

his Appeal. Accordingly, any "untimely" interlocutory

Appeal would not affect Newman’s alternate right to

Appeal the matter at the conclusion of the case.

Clearly, any "general rule" could not apply to

Newman’s case because the merits of his 2017 Appeal

had unquestionably never actually been determined

at any time, and the appellate court’s designation of

its dismissal "with prejudice" cannot change this fact.

Under Indiana law, even though Newman’s

2017 Appeal may have been filed too late to perfect an

interlocutory Appeal, Newman still retained the right

to file an Appeal at the conclusion of the case; thus,

the Court of Appeals’ dismissal of the time-barred

interlocutory Appeal was not only in error, it served

to deny Newman his due process rights, and it was

used to piggyback denial of Newman’s 2018 Appeal.

In Kindred v. Townsend, 4 N.E.3d 793

(Ind.Ct.App. 2014), the factual situation mirrored

that of Newman’s prior Appeal. In Kindred, the

appellant filed a late interlocutory appeal, and the

Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal on the basis

that it was untimely, ruling in pertinent part as

follows (emphasis added):

Because the Kindreds did not perfect an

interlocutory appeal within thirty days

of the trial court’s order entering the

preliminary injunction, their right to

appeal this order has been forfeited ....

[Footnote 3]: Our holding should not be

taken to mean that the Kindreds have

forever waived any issue with regard to

the trial court’s interlocutory order(s).

To the contrary, our supreme court has

held that “[a] claimed error in an

interlocutory order is not waived for

failure to take an interlocutory appeal

but may be raised on appeal from the

final judgment.” Bojrab v. Bojrab, 810

N.E.2d 1008,1014 (Ind. 2004) (citing

Georgos v. Jackson, 790 N.E.2d 448,452

(Ind. 2003)). Thus, the Kindreds may

attack the trial court’s interlocutory

orders on appeal from the final

judgment. See id. But we hold that they

have forfeited their right to an

interlocutory appeal by failing to timely

appeal the trial court’s entry of the

preliminary injunction.

Thus, denial of an interlocutory Appeal for

untimeliness does not establish res judicata upon

which to piggyback denial of a subsequent Appeal.

Unlike the court in Kindred, which dismissed

the untimely interlocutory appeal but properly

recognized the due process right of the appellant to

nonetheless litigate the appeal of the interlocutory

order at a later point in time via an appeal of the final

judgment, the Court of Appeals in Newman’s case

dismissed Newman’s untimely interlocutory prior

Appeal, wrongfully dismissing it "with prejudice," thus

unconstitutionally depriving Newman of his right to

appeal the interlocutory order in an Appeal of the

final judgment and piggybacking the wrongful

dismissal with prejudice to deny Newman’s

subsequent Appeal.

The Court of Appeals’ unconstitutional

deprivations of Newman’s due process rights through

its dismissal "with prejudice" of his 2017 Appeal was

exacerbated by its failure to state any purported legal

grounds for said dismissal "with prejudice."

"[Fjairness can rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided

determination of facts decisive of rights. Joint AntiFascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123,170

(1951)."

By denying Newman his instant Appeal

because his interlocutory 2017 Appeal had been

dismissed with prejudice, when the merits of the 2017

Appeal had never been considered, the Court of

Appeals and the Indiana Supreme Court acted to deny

Newman the due process owed to him by both the

Indiana Constitution and the U.S. Constitution.

The Indiana Constitution guarantees Newman

the “absolute right to one appeal.” Ind. Const, art.

VII, §6.

By dismissing Newman’s prior time-barred

interlocutory Appeal “with prejudice” and then

subsequently piggybacking said dismissal "with

prejudice" as the predicate for denying Newman an

Appeal on the merits in his subsequent Appeal, the

Court of Appeals violated Newman’s Constitutional

“absolute right to one appeal” under the Indiana

Constitution and Newman’s due process rights under

the Indiana and federal Constitutions.

In this respect, the Court of Appeals failed to

follow Indiana law with respect to the doctrine of res

judicata-, since there could not be the possibility of

"repetitive litigation of the same dispute" because

there has never been any litigation with respect to the

approved of his estate administrative expense

reimbursement/payment

claims,

pursuant

MicroVote General Corp. v. Ind. Election Comm’n,

924 N.E.2d 184,191 (Ind.Ct.App.2010):

The doctrine of res judicata bars

litigation of a claim after a final

judgment has been rendered in a prior

action involving the same claim between

the same parties or their privies. The

principle behind this doctrine, as well as

the doctrine of collateral estoppel, is the

prevention of repetitive litigation of the

same dispute.

In its order in Warren v. Indiana Telephone

Co., 217 Ind. 93, 26 N.E.2d 399 (Ind. 1940), the

Indiana Supreme Court recognized the fundamental

Constitutional dimensions of due process and the

need for uniformity in the applications of law as "the

keystone of our system of jurisprudence."

The Constitution of Indiana provides

that: ... "All courts shall be open; and

every man, for injury done to him in his

person, property, or reputation, shall

have remedy by due course of law.

Justice shall be administered freely, and

without purchase; completely, and

without denial; speedily, and without

delay" (Article 1, § 12); .... These

provisions of the Constitution are a part

of the fundamental law of the state,

declared by the people themselves acting

in their sovereign capacity.... As such

they are entitled to strict construction....

It has been said that the language of

each provision of the Constitution is to

be considered as though every word had

been hammered into place.

Uniformity in the interpretation and

application of the law is the keystone of our system of

jurisprudence.... Id., 217 Ind. 93 at 107-112, 26 N.E.2d

399 (Ind. 1940).

By failing to follow established law, as

determined in Bojrab v. Bojrab, 810 N.E.2d 1008,1014

(Ind. 2004), Georgos v. Jackson, 790 N.E.2d 448,452

(Ind. 2003), and Kindred v. Townsend, 4 N.E.3d 793

(Ind.Ct.App. 2014), and thereby denying Newman his

opportunity to be heard at the appellate level, both

the Indiana Court of Appeals and Supreme Court

violated Newman’s Constitutional due process rights

both to an Appeal and to a hearing on his

administrative expense motions.

Dismissal with prejudice is amongst the most

extreme consequences a court can impose. In the

instant matter, Newman, simply seeking his due

process rights to be heard, equal treatment under the

law, and equal access to the courts for redress of

grievances, reaped the extreme consequence of

dismissal of his case with prejudice, without legal

justification.

In truth, the extreme consequence imposed by

the Indiana Court of Appeals is a result of Lawrence

Newman’s

long-time

public

and

vociferous

whistleblowing about child abuse linked to the

Indianapolis Jewish Community Center ("JCC"),

where a number of convicted child molesters have

frequented for years and where the Indiana Court of

Appeals has repeatedly chosen, above thousands of

other venues in Indianapolis, to hold actual highlypublicized oral arguments during the time period

when Newman’s first Appeal was before the Court of

Appeals and also during the time period when

Newman’s second Appeal was before the Indiana

Supreme Court, which denied transfer from the Court

of Appeals less than one week after an appellate oral

argument was held on-site at the Indianapolis JCC.

Amongst the convicted child molesters

frequenting the Indianapolis JCC is Jared Fogle, the

prolific global predator who was spokesman for

Subway, as well as a violent predator who mutilated

the genital areas of a young victim’s dolls and then

set them on fire. The trial court judge in a civil case

involving said predator fined Newman’s wife

$60,000.00 for attempting to take the deposition of

the predator’s mother relative to other victims of her

son whom she had refused to report to authorities.

Said trial court judge, Steve David, was thereafter

appointed as an Indiana Supreme Court Justice,

where he currently serves and has twice ruled against

Newman in his Petitions To Transfer his Appeals in

the A1 Katz Estate proceeding. Likewise, in keeping

with the Indiana Court of Appeals imposition of

extreme consequences, the Indiana Supreme Court

ruled, without any of the required stated legal and

factual grounds, to assess Newman additional

appellate attorney fees in favor of its hearing officer,

Robert York, who had fired Newman when Newman

refused York’s ultimatum to be silent about child

abuse at the Indianapolis JCC or be fired. For years,

York has served as a hearing officer for the Indiana

Supreme Court on lawyer disciplinary cases and has

been paid scores of thousands of dollars of taxpayer

funds in said position.

In this respect, in Marshall v. Jerrico, 446 U.S.

238 (1980), this Court held that a disinterested

tribunal is a requisite of due process of law:

The Due Process Clause entitles a

person to an impartial and disinterested

tribunal in both civil and criminal cases.

This requirement of neutrality in

adjudicative proceedings safeguards the

two central concerns of procedural due

process, the prevention of unjustified or

mistaken

deprivations

and

the

promotion of participation and dialogue

affected

individuals

the

decisionmaking process. See Carey v.

Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259-262, 266-267

(1978). The neutrality requirement

helps to guarantee that life, liberty, or

property will not be taken on the basis of

an erroneous or distorted conception of

the facts or the law. See Mathews v.

Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,344 (1976). At the

same time, it preserves both the

appearance and reality of fairness,

"generating the feeling, so important to a

popular government, that justice has

been

done,"

Joint

Anti-Fascist

Committee

McGrath, 341 U.S.

(1951) (Frankfurter,

J.,

123,172,

concurring), by ensuring that no person

will be deprived of his interests in the

absence of a proceeding in which he may

present his case with assurance that the

arbiter is not predisposed to find against

him ....

In sum, Indiana’s appellate courts do not

appear to the "average person on the street" as

"disinterested tribunals" with their strong links to the

Indianapolis JCC and to Robert York, vocal opponents

against Newman for decades, thus raising issues

regarding the neutrality of Indiana’s appellate

tribunals toward Newman, particularly given the

nature of their repeated unconstitutional decisions

against him in the instant Appeal.

CONCLUSION

Lawrence Newman has been denied his basic

rights to due process in this case at all three levels of

the Indiana courts - trial court, Court of Appeals, and

Supreme Court. Due process of law has been a

bedrock Constitutional right of citizens since the Bill

of Rights was enacted well over 200 years ago, and

justice requires that this Court reverse the Indiana

courts, giving Newman his day in court in Indiana.

The Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be

granted to correct the grave deprivations of due

process of law Lawrence Newman has suffered at all

levels of the Indiana courts and their consequent

inhibitions of public trust in America’s judiciary.

Respectfully submitted,

Lawrence T. Newman

4102 66th Street Circle West

Bradenton, FL 34209

(317) 397-5258

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.