Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Francis A. Bottini, Jr., et al., Petitioners v. City of San Diego, California, et al.

Supreme Court briefSep 5, 2019

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APPENDIX

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APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Appendix A Order in the Supreme Court of

California

(April 10, 2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . App. 1

Appendix B Opinion in the Court of Appeal, in the

Court of Appeal of the State of

California, Fourth Appellate District,

Division One

(September 18, 2018) . . . . . . . . . . App. 3

Appendix C Judgment in the Superior Court of the

State of California for the County of

San Diego, Central Division

(December 23, 2016) . . . . . . . . . . App. 59

Appendix D U.S. Const. Amend. 5 . . . . . . . . . App. 89

Cal. Const., Art. I, § 19 . . . . . . . . App. 89

Appendix E Excerpts of Respondents’ Brief and

Cross-Appellants’ Opening Brief in the

Court of Appeal of the State of

California, Fourth Appellate District,

Division One

(November 3, 2017). . . . . . . . . . . App. 92

App. 1

APPENDIX A

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

En Banc

S252217

Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District,

Division One - No. D071670

[Filed April 10, 2019]

________________________________

FRANCIS A. BOTTINI, JR., et al., )

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

)

)

v.

)

)

CITY OF SAN DIEGO et al.,

)

Defendants and Appellants.

)

________________________________ )

Review of the above-captioned matter is dismissed

as improvidently granted. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule

8.528(b).)

Cantil-Sakauye

Chief Justice

Chin

Associate Justice

App. 2

Corrigan

Associate Justice

Liu

Associate Justice

Cuéllar

Associate Justice

Kruger

Associate Justice

Graban

Associate Justice

App. 3

APPENDIX B

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

COURT OF APPEAL,

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

D071670

(Super. Ct. No. 37-2013-00075491-CU-WM-CTL)

[Filed September 18, 2018]

________________________________

FRANCIS A. BOTTINI, JR. et al., )

)

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

)

)

v.

)

)

CITY OF SAN DIEGO et al.,

)

)

Defendants and Appellants.

)

________________________________ )

APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of

San Diego County, Katherine A. Bacal, Judge.

Affirmed.

Bottini & Bottini, Albert Y. Chang and Yury A.

Kolesnikov for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

App. 4

Office of the City Attorney, Mara W. Elliott, City

Attorney, and Carmen A. Brock, Deputy City Attorney,

for Defendants and Appellants.

Francis A. Bottini, Jr., Nina M. Bottini, and the

Bernate Ticino Trust dated March 9, 2009, Trust 3 (the

Bottinis) applied to the City of San Diego for a coastal

development permit (CDP) to construct a single-family

home on a vacant lot in La Jolla. City staff determined

that the Bottinis’ proposed construction project is

categorically exempt from environmental review under

the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA; Pub.

Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.),1 but the City Council

of San Diego (City Council; together with the City of

San Diego, the City) reversed that determination. In

reaching its decision, the City Council found that full

environmental review is necessary because the Bottinis

had removed a 19th century cottage from the lot on

which they planned to build their residence shortly

before they applied for a CDP. The City itself had

previously voted against designating that cottage as a

historical resource, declared that the cottage was a

public nuisance, and authorized the Bottinis to

demolish the cottage. Nevertheless, the City

Council—after the cottage’s demolition—declared the

cottage “historic,” concluded that the cottage’s

demolition must be considered part of the Bottinis’

project for purposes of CEQA, and found that there was

a reasonable possibility that CEQA’s “historical

resources” and “unusual circumstances” exceptions

1

All further statutory references are to the Public Resources Code,

unless otherwise noted.

App. 5

applied to the Bottinis’ construction project, thus

requiring full environmental review.

In response to the City Council’s ruling, the Bottinis

filed a petition for a writ of administrative mandamus

seeking to compel the City Council to set aside its

decision, as well as a complaint for damages against

the City, based on alleged violations of the takings, due

process, and equal protection clauses of the California

Constitution. The City moved for summary judgment

on the Bottinis’ constitutional causes of action.

The court granted the Bottinis’ petition for a writ of

administrative mandamus and ordered the City

Council to set aside its determination that the Bottinis’

proposed construction project requires environmental

review. Specifically, the court concluded that the

demolition of the cottage is not a component of the

Bottinis’ construction project and, as a result, the City

Council’s determination that the project is not

categorically exempt from CEQA review lacked

substantial evidentiary support. The court also granted

the City’s motion for summary judgment on the

Bottinis’ constitutional claims.

We conclude that the trial court properly granted

the Bottinis’ petition for a writ of administrative

mandamus because the demolition of the cottage that

previously existed on the Bottinis’ property is not a

component of the Bottinis’ residential construction

project for purposes of CEQA. Rather, the cottage was

demolished due to the City’s determination that the

cottage was a public nuisance in need of

abatement—an event that occurred before the Bottinis

applied for a CDP. We further conclude that the trial

App. 6

court properly granted the City’s motion for summary

judgment. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment in full.

I.

CEQA OVERVIEW

CEQA and its implementing regulations “embody

California’s strong public policy of protecting the

environment.” (Tomlinson v. County of Alameda (2012)

54 Cal.4th 281, 285.) “ ‘The basic purposes of CEQA are

to: [¶] (1) Inform governmental decision makers and

the public about the potential, significant

environmental effects of proposed activities.

[¶] (2) Identify ways that environmental damage can be

avoided or significantly reduced. [¶] (3) Prevent

significant, avoidable damage to the environment by

requiring changes in projects through the use of

alternatives or mitigation measures when the

governmental agency finds the changes to be feasible.

[¶] [and] (4) Disclose to the public the reasons why a

governmental agency approved the project in the

manner the agency chose if significant environmental

effects are involved.’” (Id. at pp. 285-286.)

In furtherance of these goals, CEQA establishes a

three-tier environmental review process. The first step

is jurisdictional and requires a public agency to

determine whether a proposed activity is a “project.”

Under CEQA, a project is defined as “an activity which

may cause either a direct physical change in the

environment, or a reasonably foreseeable indirect

physical change in the environment, and . . . [¶] . . . [¶]

. . . that involves the issuance to a person of a lease,

permit, license, certificate, or other entitlement for use

App. 7

by one or more public agencies.” (§ 21065.) A project

may encompass “several discretionary approvals by

governmental agencies” and does not mean “each

separate governmental approval.” (Guidelines, § 15378,

subd. (c).)2 Thus, “CEQA’s requirements [can]not [be]

avoided by chopping a proposed activity into bite-sized

pieces which, when taken individually, may have no

significant adverse effect on the environment.” (POET,

LLC v. State Air Resources Bd. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th

52, 73.) If a proposed activity is a project, the agency

proceeds to the second step of the CEQA review

process.

At the second step, the agency must “decide

whether the project is exempt from the CEQA review

process under either a statutory exemption [citation] or

a categorical exemption set forth in the CEQA

Guidelines [citations].” (California Building Industry

Assn. v. Bay Area Air Quality Management Dist. (2015)

62 Cal.4th 369, 382 (Bay Area Air).) Examples of

categorical exemptions include the operation, repair,

maintenance, permitting, leasing, licensing, or minor

alteration of existing structures (the Class 1 categorical

exemption; Guidelines, § 15301); minor alterations in

the condition of land, water, or vegetation (the Class 4

categorical exemption; id., § 15304); and—of particular

relevance to this appeal—the construction of a

single-family residence (the Class 3 categorical

exemption; id., § 15303).

2

All future references to Guidelines are to the Guidelines for

Implementation of CEQA (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15000 et seq.).

App. 8

Unlike statutory exceptions, categorical exemptions

are subject to exceptions. For instance, the Class 3

categorical exemption that is at issue in this appeal

does not apply—or, stated differently, CEQA review

may apply—if a project “may cause a substantial

adverse change in the significance of a historical

resource.” (Guidelines, § 15300.2, subd. (f); Pub.

Resources Code, § 21084, subd. (e).) For purposes of

this decision, we will refer to this as the “historical

resource” exception. The Class 3 categorical exemption

also does not apply if “there is a reasonable possibility

that the activity will have a significant effect on the

environment due to unusual circumstances.”

(Guidelines, § 15300.2, subd. (c).) This exception is

commonly referred to as the “unusual circumstances”

exception.

If a project is categorically exempt and does not fall

within an exception, “ ‘it is not subject to CEQA

requirements and “may be implemented without any

CEQA compliance whatsoever.” ’ ” (County of Amador

v. El Dorado County Water Agency (1999) 76

Cal.App.4th 931, 966.) But if a project is not exempt,

the agency must then “decide whether the project may

have a significant environmental effect.” (Bay Area Air,

supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 382.) Under CEQA, a project

that causes a substantial adverse change in the

significance of an historical resource is considered to be

a project that significantly impacts the environment.

(§ 21084.1; see § 21060.5 [defining the environment as

“the physical conditions which exist within the area

which will be affected by a proposed project,” including

“objects of historic . . . significance.”].)

App. 9

Finally, if the project may have a significant effect

on the environment, the agency must proceed to the

third step of the process and prepare an environmental

impact report (EIR). (§§ 21080, subd. (d), 21082.2,

subd. (d), 21100, subd. (a), 21151, subd. (a).)

At each stage of the CEQA review process, the

public agency must evaluate the environmental impact

of a project against a measure commonly referred to as

the baseline, i.e., the environment’s state in the

absence of the project. (North County Advocates v. City

of Carlsbad (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 94, 101 (Carlsbad);

CREED-21 v. City of San Diego (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th

488, 504 (CREED-21).) “ ‘[T]he baseline “normally”

consists of “the physical environmental conditions in

the vicinity of the project, as they exist at the time . . .

environmental analysis is commenced . . . .” ’ ”

(Carlsbad, at p. 101; see Association of Irritated

Residents v. Kern County Bd. of Supervisors (2017) 17

Cal.App.5th 708, 725 [“[T]he text of CEQA and the

Guidelines identify existing conditions as the starting

point (i.e., baseline) for determining and quantifying

the proposed project’s changes to the environment.”].)

II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Windemere and historical designation efforts

The Windemere Cottage (Windemere) was a late

Victorian-era beach bungalow in La Jolla designed by

architects Joseph Falkenhan and Irving Gill. In 1927,

the Windemere was moved from its original beachside

location to Virginia Way. The Windemere exhibited

features that were representative of early architecture

App. 10

in La Jolla, including a hipped roofline, eaves with

exposed rafters, vertical board and batten redwood

walls, and leaded, diamond-paned windows.

In 2010, the then-owner of the Windemere (the

Prior Owner) nominated the Windemere for

designation as a historical resource with the Historical

Resources Board (the Board). The Board is the

appointed body with authority over historical resources

in San Diego, including the designation of historical

sites, the establishment of historical districts, and the

review of development projects that may affect

historical resources. At the time, the Prior Owner

intended “to restore the building to its 1894 Period of

Significance.” However, in February 2011—before the

Board ruled on the Windemere’s nomination—the Prior

Owner sold the Windemere and the lot on which it was

located to the Bottinis for $1.22 million. The Prior

Owner also assigned the Bottinis her rights to the

Windemere’s historical designation application and a

property report that Legacy 106, Inc. (Legacy 106) had

prepared in support of the application.

After the sale, the Bottinis withdrew the pending

nomination and submitted a single discipline

preliminary review application to the Board to verify

whether the Windemere was eligible for historical

designation—not to pursue historical designation, but

rather, to “determine the constraints on future

development” of the property. Together with the

application, the Bottinis submitted the Legacy 106

report and an addendum that the Bottinis had solicited

to rebut the report. Based on these submissions and an

on-site visit, the Board’s staff recommended that the

App. 11

Board deny historical designation. In the staff’s view,

the Windemere had undergone too many alterations to

warrant historical designation.

In September 2011, the Board held a public hearing

to determine whether to grant the Windemere

historical status. More than a dozen speakers,

including members of the Save Our Heritage

Organization (SOHO) and the La Jolla Historical

Society (LJHS), spoke in favor of historical designation.

Nevertheless, a divided Board narrowly declined to

grant historical status to the Windemere. SOHO and

LJHS requested reconsideration of the decision, but the

Board denied the organizations’ request as untimely.

Shortly after the Board’s vote, a preservation officer

from the State Office of Historic Preservation (the

State) notified the Board that the State had received

photographs and context statements about the

Windemere and, based on these submissions, believed

that the Windemere “appear[ed] eligible” for the

California Register of Historical Resources (Register).3

The Register is “an authoritative guide in California to

be used by state and local agencies, private groups, and

citizens to identify the state’s historical resources and

to indicate what properties are to be protected, to the

extent prudent and feasible, from substantial adverse

change.” (§ 5024.1, subd. (a).) The letter did not

indicate that the State had received a nomination to

list the Windemere in the Register, nor that it had

3

The City requested judicial notice of the State’s official website,

but does not discuss the basis or purpose for its request.

Accordingly, we deny the City’s request.

App. 12

acted on any such nomination. Rather, it described the

process by which properties may be nominated and

stated that the State “encourages nominations of

properties” to the Register.

B. The demolition of the Windemere

In November 2011, the Bottinis requested that the

City’s Neighborhood Code Compliance Division (Code

Compliance) determine whether the Windemere

constituted a public nuisance. Together with their

request, the Bottinis included a report from a

structural engineering firm, which stated that the

Windemere was “uninhabitable and no persons

[should] be allowed to occupy” it. According to the

report, the Windemere’s roof, framing, and single wall

construction were incapable of supporting gravity and

seismic/wind loads, the rear porch was rotted, portions

of the residence were decayed due to age and neglect,

and the Windemere was susceptible to collapse in the

event of a minor seismic event.

The San Diego Municipal Code sets forth the

criteria by which a structure may be categorized as

“unsafe, dangerous, or substandard” and therefore,

deemed a public nuisance. (Mun. Code,

§§ 121.0402-121.0405.) If a property is found to be a

public nuisance, Code Compliance must issue a notice

of abatement to the property owner describing, among

other things, the basis of the determination and actions

that must be undertaken to abate the public nuisance.

(Id., § 121.0406.) Failure to comply with an abatement

order is punishable as a misdemeanor. (Id., §§ 12.0413,

121.0411.) The Municipal Code also establishes

procedures that apply to abatement actions involving

App. 13

designated historical resources, which require a

property owner to obtain a permit and ensure

compliance with all applicable regulations and

ordinances prior to the alteration, demolition, or

relocation of the designated historical resource. (Id.,

§ 121.0419.)

After reviewing the Bottinis’ request and conducting

an on-site visit, Code Compliance sent the Bottinis a

notice that declared the Windemere a public nuisance

for six independent reasons, including the structure’s

dilapidated state, unfitness for habitation, and

susceptibility to fire, earthquake, and wind. The notice

further stated as follows: “In order to comply with City

regulations, you are required to obtain a Demolition

Permit . . . . [¶] In order to avoid abatement action, the

Demolition Permit must be obtained and a Final

Inspection Approval secured no later than February

15, 2012.”4 The next day, the Bottinis procured a

demolition permit and promptly bulldozed the

Windemere.5 Because Code Compliance declared that

4

The parties dispute whether Code Compliance ordered the

Bottinis to obtain a demolition permit as the sole means by which

to abate the public nuisance or whether the Bottinis, in the

alternative, could have repaired the Windemere. Ultimately, we

need not resolve this factual disagreement because it is undisputed

that, at minimum, Code Compliance authorized the Bottinis to

obtain a demolition permit and the City’s Development Services

Department (Department) issued the Bottinis a demolition permit.

5

The City requested judicial notice of a video showing the

Windemere’s demolition. We deny the request, as the City appears

to be using the request as a guise to supplement the administrative

record. (Jefferson Street Ventures, LLC v. City of Indio (2015) 236

Cal.App.4th 1175, 1190.) The City also requested judicial notice of

App. 14

the Windemere was a public nuisance, the Bottinis did

not have to obtain a CDP for the demolition. (§ 30005,

subd. (b); Mun. Code § 126.0704, subd. (f).) Further, the

abatement procedures for designated historical

resources did not apply because neither the Board nor

the State had designated the Windemere a historical

resource at the time that Code Compliance rendered its

public nuisance determination.

C. The CDP process and appeals

In August 2012, the Bottinis—now the owners of a

vacant lot—applied to the Department for a CDP to

construct a single-family home on their lot. As part of

the permitting process, the La Jolla Community

Planning Association (Planning Association) reviewed

the proposed construction project. During two public

meetings, Planning Association members voiced

concerns that the Bottinis may have engaged in

improper project splitting under CEQA. Nevertheless,

the Department’s environmental staff ultimately

determined that the construction of the Bottinis’ home

was categorically exempt from CEQA review as new

residential construction on a vacant lot.

The Planning Association and LJHS appealed the

Department’s decision to the City Council, claiming

that the Department had failed to consider the “whole

of the project” and alleging that the proper project

baseline should have been set at a time before the

Bottinis demolished the Windemere. Over the course of

a video of the City Council meeting at which the demolition video

was displayed. We deny this request as unnecessary; the transcript

for that meeting is already a part of the administrative record.

App. 15

two meetings, the City Council heard testimony from

supporters and opponents of the CEQA appeals. At the

first meeting, Department staff and the deputy city

attorney informed the City Council that the Bottinis

had followed the Municipal Code “to the letter” in all

the actions that they had undertaken. Still, the City

Council deadlocked 4-4 on whether to grant the CEQA

appeals. At the second meeting, one City Council

member who had originally voted to deny the CEQA

appeals switched his vote to grant the CEQA appeals

“to get [the] item off [the City Council’s] docket and to

get the [Bottinis] out of [the] purgatory” of another tied

vote.

As a result, the City Council issued a resolution

granting the CEQA appeals and remanding the project

to the Department to reevaluate its environmental

determination with a baseline of January 2010—a date

that preceded the Bottinis’ purchase of the property. In

its resolution, the City Council concluded that the

Windemere’s “demolition should be included in the

environmental analysis” of the Bottinis’ residential

construction project. The City Council further

concluded that the project was “not categorically

exempt from environmental analysis” because two

CEQA exceptions took precedence over the categorical

exemption that governs the construction of

single-family homes. Specifically, the City Council

concluded that the redefined project (which now

included the demolition of the Windemere), with its

new baseline of January 2010 (when the Windemere

still existed), would “have a significant effect on the

environment due to unusual circumstances and may

cause a substantial adverse change in the significance

App. 16

of a historic resource” pursuant to section 15300.2,

subdivisions (c) and (f) of the CEQA Guidelines.

D. The superior court action

The Bottinis filed an action in the superior court,

requesting issuance of a peremptory writ of mandamus

directing the City to set aside its decision. In an

amended petition, the Bottinis asserted causes of

action against the City for inverse condemnation, equal

protection, and due process violations. In their inverse

condemnation cause of action, the Bottinis alleged that

the City’s CEQA determination constituted a

regulatory taking of their property because it delayed

their plans to construct a home on their property and,

as a result, required them to pay a mortgage for both

their existing home and an empty lot. In their due

process and equal protection causes of action, the

Bottinis contended that the City acted without any

rational basis and intentionally targeted the Bottinis

for disfavored treatment because they had demolished

the Windemere.

After briefing and argument, the trial court granted

the Bottinis’ petition for a peremptory writ of

mandamus. According to the court, the Bottinis’ project

is “a separate project distinct from the demolition of the

[Windemere].” The court determined that the project

baseline should be set at the point at which the

property was “an empty lot” because the “[Windemere]

had been razed pursuant to [the] demolition permit

eight months before the Bottinis submitted their

project application.” On that basis, the court found that

the City had abused its discretion in concluding that

App. 17

the project is not categorically exempt from CEQA

review.6

After further briefing and argument, the trial court

granted summary judgment for the City on the

Bottinis’ constitutional causes of action. Applying the

inverse condemnation standards that the California

Supreme Court discussed in Landgate, Inc. v.

California Coastal Com. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1006

(Landgate), the court concluded that the City was

entitled to summary judgment on the Bottinis’ inverse

condemnation cause of action because governmental

review of a project “for compliance with CEQA is

clearly a legitimate governmental purpose.” The court

further concluded that the City was entitled to

summary judgment on the Bottinis’ equal protection

cause of action because no evidence demonstrated that

the City had “intentionally discriminated” against the

Bottinis or that the City lacked a rational basis for its

decision. Finally, the court concluded that the City was

entitled to summary judgment on the Bottinis’ due

process cause of action because the Bottinis have no

protected property interest where, as here, the decision

maker (the City) has discretion to grant or deny the

benefit at issue (the CEQA categorical exemption).

The City appealed the judgment insofar as it

granted the Bottinis’ petition for a writ of mandamus

and the Bottinis cross-appealed the judgment insofar

6

The City immediately appealed the trial court’s order granting

the Bottinis’ petition for a peremptory writ of mandamus. In an

unpublished decision, we dismissed the City’s appeal for lack of

jurisdiction. (Bottini v. City of San Diego (Jan. 26, 2016, No.

D067510).)

App. 18

as the trial court granted the City’s summary judgment

motion.

III.

ANALYSIS

A. CEQA

1. Standard of review

“ ‘ “In considering a petition for a writ of mandate in

a CEQA case, ‘[o]ur task on appeal is “the same as the

trial court’s.” [Citation.]’ . . . . Accordingly, we examine

the [agency’s] decision, not the trial court’s [decision].”

[Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (World Business Academy v.

Cal. State Lands Com. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 476, 491

(World Business).)

“ ‘[O]ur inquiry extends only to whether there was

a prejudicial abuse of discretion’ by the agency.

[Citation.] ‘ “Such an abuse is established ‘if the agency

has not proceeded in a manner required by law or if the

determination or decision is not supported by

substantial evidence.’ [Citations.]” [Citation.]’

[Citation.] To the extent the question presented turns

on an interpretation of CEQA, the Guidelines, or the

scope of a particular exemption, it is one of law that we

review de novo. [Citation.]” (World Business, supra, 24

Cal.App.5th at p. 492.)

2. Application

This case turns largely on the propriety of the

parties’ dueling definitions of the project that is the

subject of this dispute. The City, on the one hand,

contends that the City Council correctly defined the

App. 19

project to include the demolition of the Windemere and

properly set a baseline of January 2010, before the

Windemere was demolished. Framed as such, the City

claims that the City Council accurately determined

that the project would result in a substantial adverse

change in the significance of an historical resource (the

Windemere) and that the project is therefore not

categorically exempt from CEQA review. The Bottinis,

on the other hand, contend that the project should be

defined to include only the construction of their

residence and claim that the baseline should be set in

August 2012, when they applied for a CDP. According

to the Bottinis, the City Council erred by considering

the Windemere’s demolition as part of the project

because the City itself had authorized the Bottinis to

demolish the Windemere as a public nuisance, which

they did several months before they submitted their

CDP application.

Based on our review of the administrative record,

we agree with the Bottinis and conclude that the City

Council abused its discretion by determining that the

project encompassed the demolition of the

Windemere—an event that took place before the

Bottinis filed their application to construct a residence.

We also conclude that the City Council abused its

discretion by setting a baseline in January 2010, a full

year before the Bottinis acquired the property on which

they planned to construct their residence. As we will

discuss post, the City’s issuance of a permit authorizing

the demolition of the Windemere served a public safety

objective untethered to the construction of the Bottinis’

residence and, in any event, fell outside of the CEQA

review process altogether because it was ministerial.

App. 20

Further, at the time the Bottinis filed their request for

a CDP, the Bottinis’ property was a vacant lot. Under

CEQA, that environmental condition accurately reflects

the baseline for the Bottinis’ construction project, not

an environmental condition that presumes the

continued existence of a cottage that, in reality, no

longer existed at the time the Bottinis filed their

application.

In short, the only project that remained for purposes

of CEQA after the City’s Code Compliance Division

authorized the Bottinis to demolish the Windemere

was the construction of a single-family residence on a

vacant lot—a categorically exempt act under CEQA.

a. Applicable project definition and baseline

As noted, the San Diego Municipal Code establishes

procedures that Code Compliance must follow to

identify unsafe, dangerous, or substandard structures,

and to order their abatement “to protect and preserve

the safety of the citizens and communities where these

structures are located.” (Mun. Code, § 121.0401, subd.

(a).) These procedures require Code Compliance to

determine whether a given structure is unsafe,

dangerous, or substandard, according to a detailed set

of criteria. (Id., §§ 121.0403-121.0405). In this case,

Code Compliance concluded that the Windemere

constituted a public nuisance for six independent

reasons under those criteria and, on that basis,

authorized the Bottinis to obtain a ministerial permit

to demolish the Windemere.

The City contends that we should treat the

Windemere’s demolition as part of the project under

App. 21

review because, in the City’s view, the public nuisance

determination that resulted in the issuance of a

demolition permit was a “faux ‘emergency’ “ that the

Bottinis “cajoled,” “pressur[ed],” and “coerc[ed] Code

Compliance” into making. We reject the City’s

characterizations of the public nuisance determination,

for a number of reasons.

As an initial matter, this CEQA action is not the

appropriate forum to launch a retroactive, collateral

attack on the validity of Code Compliance’s public

nuisance determination. That public nuisance decision

is final and is not the subject of this CEQA appeal. (A

Local & Regional Monitor v. City of Los Angeles (1993)

16 Cal.App.4th 630, 647-649 [rejecting objector’s

attempt to use an appeal arising from the certification

of an EIR as a vehicle to collaterally attack the validity

of the City’s general plan].)

Even if this were the appropriate forum to rehash

the merits of the public nuisance determination, the

City has directed us to no evidence—let alone

substantial evidence—that calls into question Code

Compliance’s conclusion that the Windemere was a

bona fide public nuisance. In fact, the City does not

even attempt to articulate why it believes the public

nuisance determination was incorrect. Instead, the City

criticizes the Bottinis for removing various

architectural features from the Windemere, which, in

the City’s words, “weaken[ed] its structural integrity.”

But the City does not accuse the Bottinis of violating

any state laws or Municipal Code provisions by

purportedly removing these architectural features. On

the contrary, the City expressly concedes that the

App. 22

Bottinis were not required to obtain a building permit

to engage in the conduct that the City alleges. Further,

in arguing that the structural integrity of the

Windemere was in fact “weaken[ed],” the City

undercuts its own unsupported claim that the

Windemere never should have been declared a public

nuisance in the first place.

The City also has not directed us to any evidence to

support its claim that the Bottinis “strong-armed” Code

Compliance into making an unfounded public nuisance

determination. On the contrary, when questioned at a

City Council meeting, the deputy city attorney agreed

with the Department’s assessment that the Bottinis

had followed the Municipal Code “to the letter” by

asking the Board to determine whether the Windemere

was historical, notifying Code Compliance that the

Board had concluded that the Windemere was not

historical, and requesting that Code Compliance make

a public nuisance determination. Under these

circumstances, we conclude that there is no substantial

evidence that undercuts Code Compliance’s public

nuisance determination or the legitimacy of the actions

that the Bottinis undertook in connection with that

determination.

We recognize, of course, that the public nuisance

determination and the Windemere’s subsequent

demolition necessarily affected the conditions of the

property on which the Bottinis later requested

permission to construct their residence. However, the

ministerial demolition permit furthered a goal

unrelated to the construction of the Bottinis’

residence—the protection and safety of the City’s

App. 23

citizens. (Mun. Code, § 121.0401, subd. (a).) Indeed, the

public nuisance determination itself states that Code

Compliance visited and analyzed the property “to

determine the condition of the structure with regards

to fire, life, health and safety regulations of the City of

San Diego.” Further, the determination did not

reference or authorize, let alone depend on, the

subsequent issuance of a building permit to the

Bottinis. (Adams Point Pres. Soc’y v. City of Oakland

(1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 203, 207 [demolition was a

separate project than the anticipated construction of a

building on the demolition site because the demolition

permit was not dependent on the issuance of a building

permit].) Thus, the public nuisance determination

confirms that the demolition permit served a purpose

distinct from, and was not a part of, the project under

review. (Banning Ranch Conservancy v. City of

Newport Beach (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1209, 1226

[ordinances were separate projects because “[t]hey

serve[d] different purposes”].)

Notwithstanding the public safety goals that the

demolition permit advanced, the City contends that we

still must treat the Windemere’s demolition and the

construction of the Bottinis’ residence as a single

cohesive project because the Bottinis purportedly knew

before the demolition that they intended to construct a

residence on the lot after the demolition. The City

argues, for instance, that the construction of the

Bottinis’ residence was not a mere “afterthought,” but

rather, the Bottinis’ goal when they purchased the

property. According to the City, we would permit the

Bottinis to violate the rule against segmentation of

projects if we were to overlook the Bottinis’ intent to

App. 24

construct a residence on the property. (Guidelines,

§ 15378, subd. (a) [project includes “the whole of an

action”].)

Assuming that the Bottinis intended to construct a

residence on the lot when they purchased it, that fact

does not change the result of this case. That is because

the demolition permit that Code Compliance

authorized the Bottinis to obtain was, as all parties

agree, ministerial. Whereas CEQA applies to certain

nonexempt discretionary acts, it specifically excludes

ministerial acts from its reach. (§ 21080, subd. (b)

[excluding “[m]inisterial projects proposed to be carried

out or approved by public agencies”].) This exclusion of

ministerial acts “recognizes that unless a public agency

can shape the project in a way that would respond to

concerns raised in an EIR, or its functional equivalent,

environmental review would be a meaningless

exercise.” (Mountain Lion Foundation v. Fish & Game

Com. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 105, 117.) Because the

demolition permit that Code Compliance authorized

the Bottinis to obtain was ministerial, it fell outside of

CEQA’s scope altogether and the demolition that

occurred as a result was not subject to environmental

review, either then or now. (Friends of Juana Briones

House v. City of Palo Alto (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 286,

292-293 [rejecting argument that CEQA required

consideration of both demolition permit and anticipated

construction because both projects were ministerial].)

Our decision in CREED-21 is particularly analogous

to the case at hand. In CREED-21, the City of San

Diego planned to replace storm drain pipes, construct

storm drain infrastructure, and revegetate the affected

App. 25

area. (CREED-21, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 495.)

The storm drain system failed before the City began its

work, so the City constructed a new storm drain system

under an emergency CEQA exemption. (Ibid.) After the

emergency repair was complete, the City concluded

that revegetation was the only act that required an

environmental assessment, given that it was the sole

component of the original project that had not been

completed. (Id. at pp. 498-499.) In an appeal arising

from a writ proceeding, we agreed. Specifically, we

concluded that the work that the City had anticipated

as part of its initially-defined project—the repair of the

storm drain pipes and the construction of

infrastructure—was “exempt from CEQA’s

environmental review provisions” due to the emergency

permit, and “therefore no environmental review of that

work was required under CEQA either before or after

it was completed.” (Id. at p. 506.)

The same is true here. The Bottinis very well may

have purchased the Windemere and the lot on which it

was located with the intention of constructing a new

residence on that lot. Indeed, the Bottinis acknowledge

that they filed a single discipline preliminary review

application with the Board shortly after purchasing the

property with the express purpose of “determin[ing] the

constraints on future development” of the property.

However, the City’s own historical designation and

nuisance abatement provisions enabled the Bottinis to

obtain a ministerial permit to demolish the existing

structure on their property and pave the way for future

construction—provisions that the Bottinis followed “to

the letter,” according to the deputy city attorney. It is

because of these Municipal Code provisions, as well as

App. 26

the City’s sanctioning of the Bottinis’ conduct at each

step of the process, that an intervening CEQA-exempt

event—the City’s issuance of a ministerial demolition

permit—occurred. As in CREED-21, this intervening

event took place “outside of CEQA’s requirements and

therefore no environmental review of that completed

work is required.”7 (CREED-21, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th

at p. 506.)

Our conclusion that the project in this case consists

solely of the construction of the Bottinis’ residence

comports with decisions from our court that have

recognized that “CEQA generally applies prospectively

to activities to be carried out in the future and not

retrospectively to work already completed.” (CREED-21,

supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at pp. 502-503, italics added;

Riverwatch v. County of San Diego (1999) 76

Cal.App.4th 1428, 1452 (Riverwatch) [“We believe that

in general preparation of an EIR is not the appropriate

forum for determining the nature and consequences of

prior conduct of a project applicant.”].) Indeed, the

baseline for purposes of CEQA normally reflects the

environmental conditions as they exist “at the time . . .

environmental analysis is commenced” precisely

7

The City tries to distinguish this case from CREED-21 on the

basis that the intervening event in CREED-21 was “a sudden,

unexpected occurrence,” whereas the nuisance determination here

purportedly was not. But in CREED-21 we did not base our

holding on the “sudden” and “unexpected” nature of the

intervening event. Rather, we based our decision on the fact that

the intervening event was exempt from CEQA. So, too, is the

ministerial permit at issue in this case. (§ 21080, subd. (b).)

Accordingly, the City’s attempt to distinguish CREED-21 is

unavailing.

App. 27

because a baseline that reflects current conditions—

rather than past conditions—enables a lead agency to

more accurately assess a project’s likely environmental

impact before the project takes place. (Carlsbad, supra,

241 Cal.App.4th at p. 101; see CREED-21, at pp.

506-507.)

California courts have applied this principle in a

variety of circumstances, even when a project

applicant’s past conduct may have violated the law or

escaped environmental review. (Riverwatch, supra, 76

Cal.App.4th at pp. 1451-1453 [measure of a project’s

environmental impact should not include the

applicant’s past unauthorized activities in the region];

Citizens for East Shore Parks v. State Lands Com.

(2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 549, 561 [baseline “must

include existing conditions, even when those conditions

have never been reviewed and are unlawful”]; Fat v.

County of Sacramento (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1270,

1279-1280 [baseline for pilots’ conditional use permit

application was the year in which application was filed,

even though the airport had expanded without CEQA

review for decades]; Bloom v. McGurk (1994) 26

Cal.App.4th 1307, 1314-1316 [applying CEQA

exemption to disposal facility’s request for a waste

permit, even though there was no record that the

facility’s prior activities had ever gone through an

environmental review].) Insofar as the City Council in

this case set a baseline in the past to measure the

environmental impacts flowing from the Bottinis’ prior

conduct, these decisions demonstrate that the City’s

decision was legally erroneous.

App. 28

Reasonable minds may differ as to whether the

Board should have granted historical designation to the

Windemere. But the Board did not do so. Reasonable

minds may also differ as to whether the Bottinis should

have attempted to repair the Windemere, rather than

asking Code Compliance to declare it a public nuisance.

But they did not. And Code Compliance did in fact

authorize the Bottinis to obtain a ministerial

demolition permit for the Windemere. While the City

may wish to turn back the clock and undo these

decisions, that goal cannot be accomplished in this case

by simply redefining the Bottinis’ project and setting a

CEQA baseline in the past, to a time when the

Windemere still existed. The fact is that the Bottinis’

project for purposes of CEQA consists solely of the

construction of a single-family residence and the proper

baseline for that project is the physical environmental

condition of the lot as it existed at the time the Bottinis

filed their request for a CDP. In concluding otherwise,

the City Council abused its discretion.

b. Class 3 categorical exemption

Because the City Council improperly defined the

project and baseline, the City Council also erred in

concluding that the project is not categorically exempt

from environmental analysis under CEQA. The CEQA

Guidelines categorically exempt the construction of a

single-family residence from review under CEQA.

(§ 15303, subd. (a); Association for Protection etc.

Values v. City of Ukiah (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 720, 727

(Ukiah) [“Guidelines section 15303 lists single-family

residences as an example of a class 3 categorical

exemption.”].) The project in this case consists of the

App. 29

construction of the Bottinis’ proposed residence, with

baseline conditions reflecting a vacant lot. Accordingly,

the Class 3 categorical exemption squarely applies,

subject to any applicable exceptions that might nullify

the categorical exemption.

From our review of the administrative record, we

discern no exception that would take precedence over

the Class 3 categorical exemption. In the proceedings

before the City Council, the Council concluded that the

historical resource exception applies. That exception

provides as follows: “A categorical exemption shall not

be used for a project which may cause a substantial

adverse change in the significance of a historical

resource.” (Guidelines, § 15300.2.) However, with a

properly defined project and baseline, substantial

evidence does not support the City Council’s conclusion.

Assuming that the Windemere did in fact constitute

a historic resource under CEQA,8 the Bottinis’

8

CEQA establishes three types of historical resources—

(1) mandatory historical resources, which include resources listed

in, or determined to be eligible for listing in, the Register;

(2) presumptive historical resources, which include resources in a

local register of historical resources or identified as significant in

surveys of historical resources; and (3) discretionary historical

resources, which include resources that lead agencies in their

discretion consider to be historical, even if the resources have been

denied listing or have not yet been listed on a local register. (Valley

Advocates v. City of Fresno (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1039,

1051-1062; § 21084.1; Guidelines, § 15064.5, subd. (a).) On appeal,

the City contends—and the Bottinis dispute—that the Windemere

constituted a discretionary historical resource. In light of our

conclusion that the properly defined project, with a proper

baseline, could not adversely affect the Windemere, it is

App. 30

construction project will not cause a substantial

adverse change in the Windemere’s significance. (San

Lorenzo Valley Community Advocates for Responsible

Education v. San Lorenzo Valley Unified School Dist.

(2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1392 [CEQA exception

did not apply because “[a] change in physical conditions

is a necessary predicate for a finding of environmental

impact.”], italics added.) Rather, as discussed ante, by

the time the Bottinis applied for a CDP in August 2012,

the Windemere had already been demolished pursuant

to Code Compliance’s December 2011 demolition

authorization.

The City Council also concluded that the “unusual

circumstances” exception applied. That exception

precludes the application of a categorical exemption

when a project will “have a significant effect on the

environment due to unusual circumstances.”

(Guidelines, § 15300.2, subd. (c).) The “unusual

circumstances” exception typically requires a showing

that: (1) the project has some feature that distinguishes

it from others in the exempt class, such as its size or

location and (2) there is a reasonable possibility of a

significant effect on the environment due to that

unusual circumstance.9 (World Business, supra, 24

unnecessary for us to resolve whether the Windemere was a

discretionary historical resource.

9

The City takes contradictory and confusing positions in its

appellate briefing regarding the City Council’s reliance on the

“unusual circumstances” exception. In its opening brief, the City

argues that the “City Council was justified in its conclusion [that

the] Bottinis’ self-serving actions present an ‘unusual

circumstances’ [sic] barring the use of a categorical exemption.”

App. 31

Cal.App.5th at p. 498.)

Neither the City Council’s resolution nor the City’s

appellate briefing has identified any distinguishing or

unusual feature presented by the Bottinis’ construction

project. The City points to the demolition of the

Windemere as a distinguishing or unusual feature

warranting application of the “unusual circumstances”

exception. However, for the reasons just discussed, the

demolition of the Windemere is not part of the project

at issue. Accordingly, the Bottinis’ project—the

construction of a single-family home—has no features

that distinguish it from others in the exempt class, and

substantial evidence does not support the City

Council’s application of the “unusual circumstances”

exception. (Ukiah, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 736 [the

“potential environmental impacts” were “normal and

common considerations in the construction of a

single-family residence” and did not constitute unusual

circumstances].)

c. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the

“historical resources” and “unusual circumstances”

exceptions do not apply to the Bottinis’ residential

construction project for purposes of CEQA. Further, the

City does not contend that any other CEQA exception

applies. Accordingly, CEQA’s Class 3 categorical

But the City claims in its reply brief that the “City Council did not

rely on the ‘unusual circumstance’ exemption to grant the

appeals.” We have reviewed the administrative record and can

confirm that the City Council did in fact conclude that the

“unusual circumstances” exception applies to the Bottinis’ project.

App. 32

exemption applies to the Bottinis’ residential

construction project and the trial court’s judgment is

affirmed insofar as it granted the Bottinis’ petition for

a peremptory writ of mandamus.

B. The Bottinis’ constitutional causes of action

Based on the City’s decision to grant the CEQA

appeals and the residential construction delays

resulting from that decision, the Bottinis also alleged

three causes of action against the City for violations of

the California Constitution’s takings, equal protection,

and due process clauses. The trial court granted

summary judgment in favor of the City on all three

causes of action. For the reasons discussed post, we

agree that no triable issue of material fact exists as to

the Bottinis’ constitutional causes of action. We

therefore affirm the trial court’s summary judgment

ruling.

1. Standard of review

Summary judgment may be granted only if there is

no triable issue of material fact and the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ.

Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) A defendant moving for

summary judgment has the burden of presenting

evidence that negates an element of plaintiff’s claim or

evidence that the plaintiff does not possess and cannot

reasonably expect to obtain evidence needed to support

an element of the claim. (Miller v. Department of

Corrections (2005) 36 Cal.4th 446, 460; Saelzler v.

Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 768.) If the

defendant meets this burden, the burden shifts to the

plaintiff to set forth “specific facts” showing that a

App. 33

triable issue of material fact exists. (Code Civ. Proc.,

§ 437c, subd. (p)(2).)

We review de novo the trial court’s grant of

summary judgment. (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th

1035, 1039.) We take the facts from the record that was

before the trial court when it ruled on the motion and

consider all the evidence set forth in the moving and

opposing papers, except those to which objections were

made and sustained. (Lonicki v. Sutter Health Central

(2008) 43 Cal.4th 201, 206; § 437c, subd. (c).) The court

does not weigh the parties’ evidence; rather, it must

consider all the evidence and “all inferences reasonably

deducible from the evidence.” (§ 437c, subd. (c); Reid v.

Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 540-541; Aguilar v.

Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 856.)

However, “any doubts as to the propriety of granting a

summary judgment motion should be resolved in favor

of the party opposing the motion.” (Reid, at p. 535;

Miller v. Bechtel Corp. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 868, 874.)

2. Inverse condemnation

a. Legal standard

Both the United States and California Constitutions

guarantee real property owners “just compensation”

when their land is taken for a public use. (Cal. Const.,

art. I, § 19; U.S. Const., 5th Amend.) These

constitutional guarantees do “not prohibit the taking of

private property, but instead place[] a condition on the

exercise of that power.” (First English Evangelical

Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles (1987) 482

U.S. 304, 314.) Stated differently, the state and federal

takings clauses are “designed not to limit the

App. 34

governmental interference with property rights per se,

but rather to secure compensation in the event of

otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking.”

(Id. at p. 315.)

“The paradigmatic taking requiring just

compensation is a direct government appropriation or

physical invasion of private property.” (Lingle v.

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (2005) 544 U.S. 528, 537 (Lingle).)

However, “government regulation of private property

may, in some instances, be so onerous that its effect is

tantamount to a direct appropriation or

ouster—and . . . such ‘regulatory takings’ may be

compensable” as a taking. (Id. at p. 537; Pennsylvania

Coal Co. v. Mahon (1922) 260 U.S. 393, 415 [“[W]hile

property may be regulated to a certain extent, if

regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a

taking.”].)

“Two categories of regulatory action are generally

‘deemed per se takings for Fifth Amendment purposes.

First, where government requires an owner to suffer a

permanent physical invasion of her property—however

minor—it must provide just compensation. [Citation.]

A second categorical rule applies to regulations that

completely deprive an owner of “ ‘all economically

beneficial us[e]’ ” of her property. ‘[Citation.]” (Dryden

Oaks, LLC v. San Diego County Regional Airport

Authority (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 383, 394-395.)

In addition to these “relatively narrow” categories of

regulatory takings, the United States Supreme Court

recognized a third “essentially ad hoc” category of

regulatory takings in Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New

York City (1978) 438 U.S. 104, 124 (Penn Central).

App. 35

(Lingle, supra, 544 U.S. at p. 538.) In Penn Central, the

Supreme Court identified three factors that are of

“particular significance” for determining whether an ad

hoc regulatory taking has occurred. The primary

considerations are “ ‘the economic impact of the

regulation on the claimant’ ” and the “ ‘extent to which

the regulation has interfered with distinct

investment-backed expectations.’ ” (Lingle, supra, 544

U.S. at pp. 538-539.) “In addition, the ‘character of the

governmental action’—for instance whether it amounts

to a physical invasion or instead merely affects

property interests through ‘some public program

adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to

promote the common good’—may be relevant in

discerning whether a taking has occurred.”10 (Id. at

p. 539.)

In this case, the trial court concluded that the City

was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the

Bottinis’ inverse condemnation cause of action, which

alleged that the delay arising from the City Council’s

order granting the CEQA appeals violated the takings

10

A special regulatory takings test also applies to land-use

exactions, i.e., demands that governments make on landowners to

dedicate a portion of their property to the public as a condition for

securing development permits. In land-use exaction cases, there

must be an “essential nexus” between a “legitimate state interest”

that the government asserts will be furthered by the condition of

a development permit and the exaction, as well as “rough

proportionality” between the development restriction and the

impact that the state-imposed development condition is intended

to mitigate. (Dolan v. City of Tigard (1994) 512 U.S. 374, 386, 391;

Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Com. (1987) 483 U.S. 825, 837.) This

standard does not apply because the Bottinis have not alleged a

land-use exaction.

App. 36

clause of the California Constitution. In granting

summary judgment for the City, the court did not apply

the Penn Central factors discussed ante. Instead, it

applied the “substantially advances” standard that the

California Supreme Court articulated in Landgate,

supra, 17 Cal.4th 1006—a standard that asks whether

the government’s conduct substantially advances a

legitimate state interest.

On appeal, the City urges us to apply the

“substantially advances” formula in evaluating the trial

court’s summary judgment ruling. The Bottinis, on the

other hand, contend that the “substantially advances”

test is no longer good law and insist that we must

apply the Penn Central test—a test that the Bottinis

claim they have satisfied. Therefore, before we rule on

the merits of the trial court’s summary judgment

ruling, we must resolve the proper legal standard that

governs when a plaintiff alleges a regulatory taking

under the California Constitution—a task that we turn

to now.

In Landgate, the California Coastal Commission

denied a landowner’s request for a coastal development

permit to build a residence on its property for several

reasons, including the landowner’s failure to obtain a

necessary lot line adjustment from the Commission.

(Landgate, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 1011-1013.) The

trial court granted the landowner’s petition for writ of

mandate compelling the Commission to set aside its

decision on the basis that the Commission lacked

jurisdiction to consider the lot line adjustment—that

authority rested with the County of Los Angeles. (Id. at

p. 1014.) The landowner also filed state and federal

App. 37

takings claims against the Commission, seeking

damages for the delay caused by the Commission’s

erroneous determination that it, rather than the

County, had jurisdiction over the setting of the

property’s lot lines. (Id. at p. 1013.) The trial court and

the Court of Appeal found that the landowner was

entitled to recover on its taking claims, but our

Supreme Court reversed. (Id. at pp. 1015-1016, 1032.)

The Supreme Court cited Penn Central and its

factors with approval, but did not in fact apply the

Penn Central factors to the case before it. Instead, the

Court—reciting language from a different United

States Supreme Court case, Agins v. City of Tiburon

(1980) 447 U.S. 255—found that a regulatory error

alone does not amount to a taking if it is “part of a

reasonable regulatory process designed to advance

legitimate government interests . . . .” (Landgate,

supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 1021.) As the Landgate Court

explained, “[t]he proper inquiry is . . . whether there is,

objectively, sufficient connection between the land use

regulation in question and a legitimate governmental

purpose so that the former may be said to substantially

advance the latter.” (Id. at p. 1022.) Under that

means-end standard, the Landgate Court concluded

that the Commission’s permit denial, though

erroneous, “appear[ed] to substantially advance

legitimate governmental interests,” and that it

therefore did not give rise to a takings claim. (Id. at p.

1023.)

However, in Lingle, the United States Supreme

Court subsequently held that the “substantially

advances” formula that it had set forth in Agins—the

App. 38

formula that the California Supreme Court had cited in

Landgate—was “regrettably imprecise” and is “not a

valid method of discerning whether private property

has been ‘taken’ for purposes of the Fifth Amendment.”

(Lingle, supra, 544 U.S. at p. 542.) As the unanimous

Lingle Court explained, the aim of regulatory takings

jurisprudence is to “identify regulatory actions that are

functionally equivalent to the classic taking in which

government directly appropriates private property or

ousts the owner from his domain.” (Id. at p. 539.) To do

so, courts must “focus[] directly upon the severity of the

burden that government imposes upon private property

rights.” (Ibid.) However, “the ‘substantially advances’

inquiry reveals nothing about the magnitude or

character of the burden a particular regulation imposes

upon private property rights. Nor does it provide any

information about how any regulatory burden is

distributed among property owners. In consequence,

[the “substantially advances”] test does not help to

identify those regulations whose effects are

functionally comparable to government appropriation

or invasion of private property; it is tethered neither to

the text of the Takings Clause nor to the basic

justification for allowing regulatory actions to be

challenged under the Clause.” (Id. at p. 542.)

The Lingle Court further found that the

“substantially advances” test “asks, in essence, whether

a regulation of private property is effective in achieving

some legitimate public purpose. An inquiry of this

nature has some logic in the context of a due process

challenge, for a regulation that fails to serve any

legitimate governmental objective may be so arbitrary

or irrational that it runs afoul of the Due Process

App. 39

Clause . . . . But such a test is not a valid method of

discerning whether private property has been ‘taken’

for purposes of the Fifth Amendment.” (Lingle, supra,

544 U.S. at p. 542.) Thus, the Lingle Court held “that

the ‘substantially advances’ formula is not a valid

takings test, and indeed conclude[d] that it ha[d] no

proper place in [the Supreme Court’s] takings

jurisprudence.” (Id. at p. 548.)

In the wake of Lingle, state and federal courts alike

have recognized that the “substantially advances”

formula that the United States Supreme Court

articulated in Agins and the California Supreme Court

applied in Landgate no longer constitutes a valid test

by which to determine whether there has been a

regulatory taking under the Fifth Amendment; instead,

the Penn Central factors govern. (Lockaway Storage v.

County of Alameda (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 161, 189

[“In light of Lingle, we reject the [c]ounty’s contention

that Landgate establishes an independent test for

evaluating whether government action is a regulatory

taking.”]; Allegretti & Co. v. County of Imperial (2006)

138 Cal.App.4th 1261, 1280 (Allegretti) [“Whether

County’s Action Substantially Advances a State

Interest Is No Longer A Valid Standard to Assess An

Unconstitutional Taking Under the Fifth

Amendment”]; Guggenheim v. City of Goleta (9th Cir.

2010) 638 F.3d 1111, 1117 [“Agins was overruled by

Lingle”]; Crown Point Dev. Inc. v. City of Sun Valley

(9th Cir. 2007) 506 F.3d 851, 854 [“Agins’ ‘substantially

advances’ language—i.e., that it is a ‘stand-alone

regulatory takings test’—was rejected by the Supreme

Court in Lingle.”].)

App. 40

To date, no published authority of which we are

aware has expressly analyzed whether, in light of

Lingle, the “substantially advances” formula remains

a valid test by which to determine whether a regulatory

taking has occurred under the takings clause of the

California Constitution, as opposed to the Fifth

Amendment to the United States Constitution.

(Allegretti, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1281-1284

[declining to decide whether the “substantially

advances” test is a viable regulatory takings test under

the California Constitution].) We now answer that

question in the negative and conclude that the Penn

Central test endorsed in Lingle—and not the

“substantially advances” formula—applies to ad hoc

regulatory takings claims that arise under the

California Constitution. We reach this conclusion for

the following reasons.

First, the California Supreme Court has held that

the takings clause in the California Constitution should

be construed “congruently” with the federal takings

clause, with minor differences that are not applicable

here. (San Remo Hotel v. City and County of San

Francisco (2002) 27 Cal.4th 643, 664; see also, e.g.,

Santa Monica Beach v. Superior Court (1999) 19

Cal.4th 952, 957, 962-975 [takings challenge to rent

control regulation under both clauses considered

without separate discussion of the state clause].) On

that basis, at least one member of the California

Supreme Court has explained that Lingle’s ruling—i.e.,

its clarification that the “substantially advances”

formula is a due process test—applies to challenges

arising under the California Constitution. (California

Building Industry Assn. v. City of San Jose (2015) 61

App. 41

Cal.4th 435, 485 (conc. opn. of Werdegar, J.) [“Had

Lingle already been decided, we would have considered

it in our analysis.”].)

Second, the rationale underpinning the Lingle

decision applies with equal force to the California

takings clause as to the federal takings clause. “Indeed,

it has long been recognized that the purpose of section

19 [of article I of the California Constitution], as well

as the purpose of the takings clause of the Fifth

Amendment to the United States Constitution, is to

ensure that individual property owners are not

compelled to bear burdens or incur costs that, in

fairness and justice, should be borne by the public at

large.” (Williams v. Moulton Niguel Water Dist. (2018)

22 Cal.App.5th 1198, 1210.) But, as the Lingle Court

described, the “substantially advances” formula neither

elucidates the magnitude or character of the burden

that the government regulation imposes upon private

property rights nor provides information about how the

regulatory burden is distributed among property

owners. (Lingle, supra, 544 U.S. at p. 542.)

Finally, no published California Supreme Court or

Court of Appeal decision of which we are aware has

applied the “substantially advances” formula to

regulatory takings claims—whether based on the

United States or California Constitution—since the

United States Supreme Court issued Lingle thirteen

years ago. On the contrary, it appears that California

courts have implicitly assumed that the Penn Central

formula—not the “substantially advances”

test—applies to ad hoc regulatory takings claims under

both the state and federal takings clauses. (Los Altos El

App. 42

Granada Investors v. City of Capitola (2006) 139

Cal.App.4th 629, 651 [overturning trial court’s ruling

that plaintiff’s state and federal takings claims were

meritless because the trial court applied the

“substantially advances” test, which is a “due process

test”]; see Besaro Mobile Home Park, LLC v. City of

Fremont (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 345, 359 [applying

Penn Central test to takings cause of action arising

under California Constitution]; Garcia v. Four Points

Sheraton LAX (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 364, 389-390

[same]; Small Property Owners of San Francisco v. City

& County of S.F. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1388,

1402-1409 [same].)

Accordingly, and based on our Supreme Court’s

instruction that we are to interpret the California

Constitution’s takings clause congruently with the

federal takings clause, we make explicit the conclusion

that past decisions have impliedly reached and hold

that the Penn Central test—not the “substantially

advances” formula—applies to regulatory takings

causes of action arising under the California

Constitution.

b. Application

In the following section, we apply the Penn Central

standard to the facts of the present appeal. As noted,

the Penn Central test requires us to examine three

factors to determine whether a regulatory taking has

occurred: (1) the economic impact of the regulation on

the claimant; (2) the extent to which the regulation has

interfered with the claimant’s reasonable, distinct

investment-backed expectations; and (3) the character

App. 43

of the government action. (Penn Central, supra, 438

U.S. at p. 124.)

For the first factor, “we ask whether the regulation

‘unreasonably impair[s] the value or use of [the]

property’ in view of the owners’ general use of their

property.” (Allegretti, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p.

1278.) In this case, the evidence suggests that the City

Council’s decision had an adverse economic impact on

the Bottinis. For example, the evidence shows that the

Bottinis have had to pay a mortgage for both their

existing home and an empty lot—at an additional cost

of several thousand dollars per month—as a result of

the construction delay caused by the City Council’s

erroneous resolution granting the CEQA appeals.

Further, it is doubtful that the Bottinis could have

made an alternative use of the property during the

period in which they sought to overturn the City

Council’s decision, given that the lot is zoned

exclusively for residential purposes. Thus, the economic

impact factor weighs in favor of the Bottinis.

However, the second factor—the extent to which the

City Council’s decision interferes with a reasonable

investment-backed expectation—weighs strongly

against the Bottinis. “A ‘reasonable investment-backed

expectation’ must be more than a ‘unilateral

expectation or an abstract need.’ ” (Ruckelshaus v.

Monsanto Co. (1984) 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (Ruckelshaus);

see also Allegretti, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 1279.)

Instead, it “must be objectively reasonable.” (Colony

Cove Props., LLC v. City of Carson (9th Cir. 2018) 888

F.3d 445, 452.) Additionally, “a reasonable expectation

may [depend on] whether the landowner had

App. 44

constructive knowledge of the regulation when

choosing to [acquire] the property.” (Shaw v. County of

Santa Cruz (2008) 170 Cal.App.4th 229, 273 (Shaw).)

The only evidence relevant to the second factor that

the Bottinis have submitted is a three-page declaration

from Francis Bottini, which states in pertinent part as

follows: “When we purchased the home, the [Prior

Owner] represented in the listing that the existing

residence could either be renovated or demolished and

replaced . . . . We relied on this representation in

purchasing the property for $1.22 million because the

existing residence appeared abandoned and not in good

repair.” This does not establish that the Bottinis had a

distinct investment-backed expectation.

As an initial matter, Mr. Bottini’s declaration does

not state that, at the time the Bottinis purchased the

property at issue, they intended to demolish the

Windemere and construct a residence on the lot. Thus,

the Bottinis’ expectations are not distinct and concrete,

but are instead vague and abstract. (Allegretti, supra,

138 Cal.App.4th at p. 1279 & id. fn. 9 [“[Plaintiff’s]

testimony was only that he had purchased the farm

having been given ‘lots of reassurances that it could be

a viable farming operation’ (italics added) and that his

investment had not yet reached expectation . . . .

[Plaintiff’s] expectation is too general to meet the

requisite Penn Central factor.”]; Shaw, supra, 170

Cal.App.4th at p. 274 [affirming determination that

there was no regulatory taking of property, where the

property owners’ “abstract and vague expectations

[were] not the slightest bit ‘distinct’ so as to qualify as

App. 45

a ‘ “distinct investment backed expectation[]” ’ that

would favor the finding of a taking.”].)

Even if the Bottinis had articulated that they had a

distinct expectation to demolish the Windemere and

build a residence at the time they purchased the

property, there is no basis for us to conclude that the

Bottinis had a reasonable expectation that they would

be permitted to engage in such conduct without

undertaking any form of environmental review. Indeed,

Mr. Bottinis’ declaration claims merely that the Prior

Owner stated that the Windemere could “be renovated

or demolished and replaced”—a representation that

says nothing about whether environmental review

would or would not be necessary.

Further, setting aside any representations that the

Prior Owner may have made to the Bottinis, there is no

evidence that the City informed the Bottinis before they

purchased the property that they could demolish the

Windemere and construct a residence without

undergoing environmental review. This case thus

stands in contrast to Lockaway Storage v. County of

Alameda (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 161 (Lockaway), on

which the Bottinis rely. In that case, the County of

Alameda informed a storage facility operator that it

could build and operate a self-storage facility on a

property that the operator had not yet acquired. (Id. at

p. 168.) The operator then purchased the property and,

after several years, the County reversed its stance. (Id.

at p. 186.) On these facts, the court found that the

operator had a reasonable investment-backed

expectation. (Id. at pp. 185-186.) In this case, by

contrast, there is no evidence suggesting that the

App. 46

Bottinis purchased the property in reliance on any

representation made by the City.

In fact, at the time the Bottinis purchased the

property, the Prior Owner’s nomination for the

Windemere’s designation as a historical resource was

still pending before the Board. Thus, when the Bottinis

purchased the property, it was still possible that the

Board would grant historical designation to the

Windemere—and indeed, it nearly did. If that had

happened, the Bottinis very likely would not have been

able to demolish the Windemere and construct a new

residence without satisfying the Municipal Code

nuisance abatement procedures applicable to

structures that have been designated as historical

resources (Mun. Code, § 121.0419) and/or undergoing

a full CEQA review (§§ 21060.5, 21084, subd. (e),

21084.1; Guidelines, § 15300.2, subd. (f)). In addition,

Mr. Bottini himself testified during one of the City

Council hearings that he “knew when [they] bought

[the] house . . . it would be well over a year before [they

would] be able to do anything to that house” because of

the historical review nomination that was pending at

the time. For all of these reasons, we conclude that the

Bottinis lacked a reasonable and distinct

investment-backed expectation.

Finally, the third Penn Central factor requires us to

examine the “character” of the City’s action. (Penn

Central, supra, 48 U.S. at p. 124.) The Lingle Court

explained that whether the government’s conduct

“amounts to a physical invasion or instead merely

affects property interests through ‘some public program

adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to

App. 47

promote the common good’—may be relevant in

discerning whether a taking has occurred.” (Lingle,

supra, 544 U.S. at p. 539.) In this case, the City did not

physically invade or appropriate the Bottinis’ property.

Accordingly, this factor does not support a taking.

(Shaw, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 274 [holding that

there was no regulatory taking, in part, because the

government did not physically invade the property at

issue]; Allegretti, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 1278

[same]; Rancho De Calistoga v. City of Calistoga (9th

Cir. 2015) 800 F.3d 1083, 1091 [same].)

“We may dispose of a takings claim on the basis of

one or two of [the Penn Central] factors.” (Allegretti,

supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 1277.) For the foregoing

reasons—in particular, the lack of a distinct

investment-backed expectation—we conclude that the

trial court did not err in granting summary judgment

for the City on the Bottinis’ inverse condemnation

cause of action. (Ruckelshaus, supra, 467 U.S. at p.

1005 [disposing of takings claim relating to trade

secrets solely on absence of reasonable

investment-backed expectations].)

3. Due process

Under the California Constitution, a person may not

be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due

process of law. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, subd. (a).) “The

concept of ‘due process of law’ guarantees both

procedural and substantive rights.” (Rental Housing

Owners Assn. of Southern Alameda County, Inc. v. City

of Hayward (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 81, 93 (Hayward).)

Although the Bottinis’ complaint does not state

whether they have asserted a procedural or substantive

App. 48

due process cause of action against the City, or both,

their summary judgment briefing and appellate briefs

focus on substantive due process concerns. Further, the

Bottinis have not alleged or argued that the City

denied them notice and an opportunity to be heard

before depriving them of a protected liberty or property

interest—the foundational requirements of procedural

due process.11 (Alviso v. Sonoma County Sheriff’s Dept.

(2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 198, 209.) We therefore

construe the Bottinis’ cause of action as one sounding

in substantive due process.

“Substantive due process protects against ‘arbitrary

legislative action, even though the person whom it is

sought to deprive of his right to life, liberty or property

is afforded the fairest of procedural safeguards.’

[Citation.] To satisfy substantive due process concerns,

‘the law must not be unreasonable, arbitrary or

capricious but must have a real and substantial

relation to the object sought to be attained.

[Citations.]’ ” (Hayward, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p.

93.) “ ‘[R]ejections of development projects and refusals

to issue building permits do not ordinarily implicate

substantive due process. [Citations.] Even where state

officials have allegedly violated state law or

administrative procedures, such violations do not

ordinarily rise to the level of a constitutional

11

The Bottinis briefly argue that one of the City Council members

who voted to grant the CEQA appeals formerly served as an officer

of LJHS and therefore, had “biased views” that detract from the

“legitimacy” of the City Council’s votes. However, the Bottinis

relegated this undeveloped argument to a footnote. We therefore

decline to consider it. (California School Bds. Assn. v. State of

California (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 770, 796, fn. 9.)

App. 49

deprivation.’ ” (Stubblefield Construction Co. v. City of

San Bernardino (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 687, 709.)

Rather, “[a] substantive due process violation requires

some form of outrageous or egregious conduct

constituting a ‘true abuse of power.’ ” (Las Lomas Land

Co., LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th

837, 856 (Las Lomas).)

The Bottinis contend that a reasonable jury could

conclude that the City Council’s decision to grant the

CEQA appeals and remand the Bottinis’ CDP

application to City staff for further environmental

review was unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious.

The Bottinis further argue that a reasonable jury could

find that the City Council acted as it did in order to

punish the Bottinis for demolishing the Windemere.

We have no need to analyze whether a reasonable

jury could reach these conclusions because, as the City

correctly argues, the Bottinis have not identified any

property interest or statutorily conferred benefit with

which the City has interfered. (Conejo Wellness Center,

Inc. v. City of Agoura Hills (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th

1534, 1562-1563 [affirming order dismissing due

process claim brought under California Constitution

because marijuana cooperative had no property right to

operate dispensary]; Chan v. Judicial Council of

California (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 194, 201 [affirming

order dismissing due process claim brought under

California Constitution because plaintiffs had no

property interest in remaining certified interpreters];

cf. Schultz v. Regents of University of California (1984)

160 Cal.App.3d 768, 783 [“If a [plaintiff] cannot show

a statutory interest subject to deprivation, we believe

App. 50

the [plaintiff] must still identify a property interest in

order to invoke due process rights under the state

Constitution.”].)

The Bottinis raised this argument both in the trial

court and on appeal; however, the Bottinis have not

attempted to identify any interest or benefit of which

the City has deprived them. Instead, relying on

Galland v. City of Clovis (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1003

(Galland), the Bottinis suggest that they need not

identify any right or statutorily conferred interest to

prove a due process violation, as long as they can show

that the City engaged in a “deliberate flouting of the

law.” (Id. at p. 1035.) The Bottinis are mistaken.

Under Galland, a government entity may be found

liable for a due process violation for conduct that

deliberately flouts the law, but such conduct still must

“obstruct the [plaintiff’s] constitutionally based

property rights.” (Galland, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1040,

italics added; id. at p. 1033 [the “deliberate flouting”

test is the “appropriate substantive due process

standard for determining when an administrative body

charged with implementing a law acts erroneously in

such a way as to injure an individual’s economic and

property interests.”], italics added; id. at p. 1034 [“[A]

deliberate flouting of the law that trammels significant

personal or property rights” qualifies as a due process

violation], italics altered; id. at p. 1040

[“[A]dministrative expenses can be charged directly to

[the government] . . . only when the city imposes them

in deliberate contravention of the law to obstruct the

[plaintiffs’] constitutionally based property

rights . . . .”], italics added.) Thus, the Bottinis can

App. 51

prevail only if they show that the City’s allegedly

deliberate flouting of the law interfered with a property

right or statutorily conferred interest. They have

identified no such right or interest.

Nor is it apparent that the Bottinis could identify

such a right or interest. The Bottinis have no right or

statutorily conferred interest that entitles them to

bypass CEQA review. (Las Lomas, supra, 177

Cal.App.4th at pp. 848-852 [project applicant had no

due process right to force lead agency to complete and

consider EIR under CEQA]; Sagaser v. McCarthy

(1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 288, 308 [“The procedural rights

created by CEQA . . . do not operate as constitutional

safeguards nor create fundamental, substantive

rights.”].) Indeed, even if a lead agency declares a

project categorically exempt under CEQA (for example,

under a Class 3 categorical exemption), the agency has

discretion to apply an exception that overrides the

categorical exemption. Nor do the Bottinis have a

property right or statutorily conferred interest in a

discretionary CDP that has not yet been issued.

(Reddell v. California Coastal Com. (2009) 180

Cal.App.4th 956, 970-971 [“The Coastal Act sets only

minimum standards and policies and creates no

mandatory duty to issue development permits.”].)

On these facts, we conclude that the trial court

properly granted the City’s motion for summary

judgment on the Bottinis’ substantive due process

cause of action.12

12

We note that the Bottinis’ prayer for relief requests only

monetary damages for the due process cause of action, coupled

App. 52

4. Equal Protection

The California Constitution, like its federal

counterpart, guarantees the right to equal protection of

the laws. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, subd. (a).) “Equal

protection of the laws means that similarly situated

persons shall be treated similarly unless there is a

sufficiently good reason to treat them differently.”

(People v. Castel (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1321, 1326.)

The Bottinis alleged a “class of one” violation,

claiming that the City treated them differently from

every other person seeking to build a single-family

home insofar as the City required a full environmental

review of a CEQA-exempt residential construction

project. “To succeed on a class of one claim, a plaintiff

must establish that ‘(1) the plaintiff was treated

differently from other similarly situated persons,

(2) the difference in treatment was intentional, and

(3) there was no rational basis for the difference in

treatment.’ ” (Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Agricultural

Labor Relations Bd. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1118, 1144.) The

third element is essentially the same rational basis test

that courts typically apply in equal protection cases

involving economic regulations. (Las Lomas, supra, 177

with a general request for attorney fees and costs. However, “[i]t

is beyond question that a plaintiff is not entitled to damages for a

violation of the due process clause or the equal protection clause of

the state Constitution.” (Javor v. Taggart (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th

795, 807 (Javor).) Because we resolve this appeal based on the

Bottinis’ lack of a property interest or statutorily conferred benefit,

we need not and do not address whether the Bottinis’ inability to

recover damages constitutes an independent basis on which to

affirm the summary judgment order.

App. 53

Cal.App.4th at p. 858.) For purposes of this decision,

we presume that the first two elements are satisfied

and focus our attention on the third element.

Where the defendant is “the party moving for

summary judgment[,] it has the burden of negating a

necessary element of the plaintiff’s case or establishing

an affirmative defense. [Citation.] In the area of

economic regulation, a legislative classification does not

deny equal protection if the ‘distinctions drawn by a

challenged [act] bear some rational relationship to a

conceivable legitimate state purpose.’ [Citation.] Thus,

in a case where the state moves for summary

judgment, the state meets its burden by demonstrating

some conceivably rational basis for its classification. ‘A

distinction . . . is not arbitrary if any set of facts

reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it.’

[Citation.] The state need not prove such facts exist;

the existence of facts supporting the . . . [classification]

is presumed. [Citations.] Once the state posits a

rational basis for its classification, the burden shifts to

the plaintiff to demonstrate the classification bears no

rational relationship to any conceivable legitimate

state interest as a matter of law [citation] or to

demonstrate there are triable issues of fact which, if

resolved in favor of the plaintiff, would negate any

rational basis for the classification.” (Wachs v. Curry

(1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 616, 622, revd. on other grounds

Marathon Entertainment, Inc. v. Blasi (2008) 42

Cal.4th 974 (Wachs).)

In its motion for summary judgment and its

appellate briefing, the City articulated just one basis

for the City Council’s conduct, i.e., that the City

App. 54

Council rationally could have granted the CEQA

appeals and required the Bottinis’ project to undergo

environmental review because the City purportedly

believed that “a potential statewide historic resource

had been destroyed and the loss of a 100 year old beach

cottage had evaded environmental review.”

There can be no dispute that the state has a

legitimate interest in protecting California’s

environmental resources and ensuring that statutorily

mandated environmental reviews are conducted.

(§ 21000 [“It is the intent of the Legislature that all

agencies of the state government which regulate

activities of private individuals, corporations, and

public agencies which are found to affect the quality of

the environment, shall regulate such activities so that

major consideration is given to preventing

environmental damage . . . .”].) The Bottinis do not

contend otherwise.

However, the parties dispute whether the City’s

decision was rationally related to achieving that

interest. We conclude that it was. Although the

Windemere no longer existed at the time the City

Council issued its decision, thereby precluding any

possibility that the Windemere could be preserved or

relocated, the City could have reasonably believed that

an “environmental review” of the Bottinis’ project

would result in other forms of mitigation. (Napa Valley

Wine Train, Inc. v. Public Utilities Com. (1990) 50

Cal.3d 370, 376, fn. 7, revd. on another point by Pub.

Resources Code, § 21080.04, subd. (b) [“full

environmental review” under CEQA includes

“consideration of available measures to mitigate any

App. 55

environmental effects”].) In fact, before the City

Council granted the CEQA appeals and ordered a

CEQA review of the project, the Bottinis themselves

proposed mitigation measures that did not involve the

preservation or relocation of the Windemere, including

the creation of a plaque commemorating the

Windemere and the donation of the Windemere’s

architectural drawings to a historical society.13

Because the City satisfied its burden of articulating

a rational basis for its decision, the burden shifted to

the Bottinis to show that the City’s decision bore no

rational relationship to a conceivable legitimate state

interest as a matter of law, or to demonstrate that

there were triable issues of fact which, if resolved in

favor of the Bottinis, would negate any rational basis

13

In relating the mitigation measures proposed by the Bottinis, we

are not suggesting that these measures would constitute sufficient

mitigation if a lead agency were to conclude that a project may

cause a substantial adverse change in the significance of an

historical resource. On the contrary, “preservation in place” is the

preferred method of addressing environmental impacts affecting

historical resources, unless the lead agency “determines that

another form of mitigation is available and provides superior

mitigation of the impacts.” (Madera Oversight Coalition, Inc. v.

County of Madera (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 48, 87; see League for

Protection of Oakland’s etc. & Historic Resources v. City of Oakland

(1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 896, 909 [proposed measures to mitigate the

demolition of an historical building, including a plaque and

documentation of the building’s historical features, did not “begin

to alleviate the impacts of [the building’s] destruction”].) Rather,

we simply conclude that, under the deferential rational basis test,

the City Council could have reasonably concluded that mitigation

measures other than preservation or relocation of the Windemere

would be sufficient here, where preservation and relocation were

no longer viable options.

App. 56

for the classification. (Wachs, supra, Cal.App.4th at p.

622.) The Bottinis argue that they satisfied that burden

for two reasons.

First, the Bottinis contend that a triable issue of

fact exists because the City patently misapplied CEQA,

namely, by requiring an environmental assessment of

a CEQA-exempt project. As discussed ante, we agree

that the City misconstrued CEQA and, on that basis,

we have affirmed the trial court’s order granting their

petition for a peremptory writ of mandamus. However,

we disagree that the City Council’s mere

misinterpretation of CEQA establishes a triable issue

of fact as to whether the City Council violated the

Bottinis’ equal protection rights. The City Council

articulated a rational basis for its decision, even though

we have concluded that the expressed basis is

erroneous. (Clark v. City of Hermosa Beach (1996) 48

Cal.App.4th 1152, 1186 [“Plainly, the [c]ouncil erred in

considering and deciding issues raised for the first time

after the public hearing was over. Further, it may have

misconstrued or misapplied the provisions of the zoning

ordinance concerning lot coverage and usable open

space. Nonetheless, the [c]ouncil’s ultimate decision to

deny the permits did not lack a rational basis.”]; Shaw,

supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 278 [“[T]he [c]ounty’s legal

position, though later found to be erroneous, was

nevertheless plausible” and therefore constitutional.].)

Second, the Bottinis argue that a reasonable jury

could conclude that the City Council required an

environmental assessment in order to punish the

Bottinis for demolishing the Windemere. However, in

making this argument, the Bottinis rely entirely on

App. 57

inference and have produced no evidence that the City

Council ordered an environmental review in order to

punish them. The Bottinis contend that an intent to

punish can be inferred from one City Council member’s

statement that an environmental assessment was

needed to “do the right thing.” We disagree. A City

Council member’s request that the City Council “do the

right thing” in no way implies that the City Council

member, let alone the entire City Council, sought to

punish the Bottinis.

For all of these reasons, we conclude that the trial

court did not err in granting summary judgment for the

City on the Bottinis’ equal protection cause of action.14

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. The parties are to bear

their own costs on appeal.

AARON, J.

WE CONCUR:

HALLER, Acting P. J.

GUERRERO, J.

14

As with their due process cause of action, the Bottinis seek only

monetary damages, which cannot be recovered for alleged

violations of the equal protection clause of the California

Constitution. (Javor, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 807.) Our

conclusion that the City had a rational basis for its decision

obviates the need for us to determine whether the summary

judgment ruling should be affirmed on this basis.

App. 58

KEVIN J. LANE, Clerk of the Court of Appeal, Fourth

Appellate District, State of California, does hereby

Certify that the preceding is a true and correct copy of

the Original of this document/order/opinion filed in this

Court as shown by the records of my office.

WITNESS, my hand and the Seal of this Court.

09/18/2018

[SEAL]

KEVIN J. LANE, CLERK

By A Galvez

Deputy Clerk

App. 59

APPENDIX C

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF

SAN DIEGO, CENTRAL DIVISION

Case No. 37-2013-00075491-CU-TM-CTL

Judge Katherine A. Bácal

Dept. 69

[Filed December 23, 2016]

___________________________________

BERNATE TICINO TRUST

)

DATED MARCH 2, 2009,

)

TRUST “3”; NINA M. BOTTINI;

)

and FRANCIS A. BOTTINI, JR.,

)

)

Petitioners and Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

CITY OF SAN DIEGO, a municipal

)

corporation; CITY COUNCIL OF

)

THE CITY OF SAN DIEGO;

)

and DOES 1 – 10, inclusive,

)

)

Respondents and Defendants. )

___________________________________ )

App. 60

JUDGMENT

This is a case alleging writ of mandate, inverse

condemnation, violation of due process and violation of

equal protection. The Court bifurcated the writ hearing

from the remaining causes of action.

The Court heard argument on the writ of mandate

on December 15, 2014. It found in favor of plaintiffs

and issued a Peremptory Writ of Mandate on January

26, 2015. The Court’s December ruling is attached

hereto as Exhibit A. The Peremptory Writ of Mandate

is attached hereto as Exhibit B.

On June 7, 2016, plaintiffs filed a first amended

petition (FAP) pursuant to the parties’ agreement.

On October 21, 2016, the Court heard argument on

defendants’ motion for summary judgment. It found in

favor of defendants on the three remaining causes of

action. At the hearing, the Court confirmed its

tentative with one modification. The Court declined to

rule on the City’s foundation and authentication

objections to Exhibits 9 through 11, and 17 through 19,

finding that the Exhibits were not material to the

disposition. The Court’s minute order, reflecting the

modification is attached hereto as Exhibit C.

All matters now being fully resolved, the Court

orders that judgment be entered as follows:

1. In favor of plaintiffs on their first cause of action

for writ of mandamus for Failure to Comply with

the California Environmental Quality Act;

App. 61

2. In favor of defendants on the second cause of

action (Inverse Condemnation), third cause of

action (Due Process Violations) and fourth cause

of action (Equal Protection Violation);

3. Costs to be awarded pursuant to memoranda of

costs.

Dated: December 23, 2016

/s/Katherine A. Bacal

KATHERINE A. BACAL

Judge of the Superior Court

App. 62

EXHIBIT A

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

CENTRAL

MINUTE ORDER

DATE: 12/15/2014 TIME: 02:38:00 PM

Dept: C-69

JUDICIAL OFFICER PRESIDING: Katherine Bacal

CLERK: Jay Browder

REPORTER/ERM: Not Reported

BAILIFF/COURT ATTENDANT: C. Rice

CASE NO: 37-2013-00075491-CU-TT-CTL

CASE INIT.DATE: 11/13/2013

CASE TITLE: Bernate TicinoTrust Dated March 2,

2009 Trust ‘3’ vs. City Of San Diego [E-File]

CASE CATEGORY: Civil - Unlimited

CASE TYPE: Toxic Tort/Environmental

APPEARANCES

There are no appearances by any party.

The Court, having taken the above-entitled matter

under submission on 12/11/2014 and having fully

considered the arguments of all parties, both written

and oral, as well as the evidence presented, now rules

as follows:

The petition for administrative writ of mandamus, filed

by Bernate Ticino Trust dated March 2, 2009, Trust

“3,” Nina Bottini, and Francis Bottini, Jr. (collectively,

“the Bottinis”) is granted.

App. 63

Preliminary Matters

The parties’ requests for judicial notice are granted,

except for the City’s additional request for judicial

notice stated in its Response. This request does not

comply with the California Rules of Court, is of

questionable relevance and is denied.

Factual and Procedural Background

The Bottinis challenge the City of San Diego’s

determination that their application to construct a

single family residence is not categorically exempt from

review under the California Environmental Quality Act

(CEQA).

The Bottinis purchased the subject property in January

2011. Administrative Record (AR) Vol. 2, Tab 97. At

that time, the property included a structure known as

the Windemere Cottage (the “Cottage”). The Cottage

was constructed in 1895 and moved ½ mile to the

present site in 1927. AR 3:132, p. 1106. The Cottage’s

prior owners nominated the Cottage for historical

designation by the City. The Bottinis withdrew the

nomination in May 2011. Ibid.

In August 2011, the Bottinis asked the City to

determine whether the Cottage was eligible for

historical designation under the Municipal Code. Ibid.

On September 22, 2011, the City’s Historical Resources

Board (HRB) determined not to designate the property

as a historical resource. AR 1: 3; AR 3:174.

That same day, the Bottinis requested that the City’s

Neighborhood Code Compliance Division (NCCD)

determine whether the building was structurally safe.

App. 64

AR 1:12, p. 445. After inspecting the building, on

December 21, 2011 the NCCD declared the structure

unsafe and ordered the Bottinis to obtain a demolition

permit by February 15, 2012. AR 6:492. The Bottinis

obtained a demolition permit the next day. Demolition

was completed by December 30, 2011. AR 5: 365, 366.

In August 2012, the Bottinis applied for a Coastal

Development Permit (CDP) to construct a single family

residence on the property. AR 4:241. In January 2013,

City staff determined the project was exempt under

section 15303 of the CEQA Guidelines (California Code

of Regulations, title 14) pertaining to new construction

of single family residences. AR 4:292. Appeals were

filed by the La Jolla Community Planning Group and

the La Jolla Historical Society. AR 4:297. The City’s

Development Services Department (DSD) prepared a

memorandum addressing the objections and

recommended the City Council deny the appeals. AR 5:

318. Among other things, the DSD stated the

demolition permit was exempt from CEQA because it

was a ministerial act in accordance with the nuisance

determination, the Cottage is not part of the current

project, and the proper baseline for conducting an

environmental review is the condition of the property

at the time of the application, i.e., as a vacant lot. Ibid.

On September 23, 2013 the City Council granted the

appeals. AR 1:1. The City Council determined the

project was not categorically exempt from an

environmental analysis, and it directed City staff to reevaluate the environmental determination with the

baseline for the project set with the Cottage on the site.

The City Council further found that the demolition

App. 65

permit was unlawfully issued while the Cottage was

being considered for listing on the California Register

of Historical Resources.

At issue here is the Bottinis 1st cause of action for

failure to comply with CEQA, the Court having abated

the 2nd cause of action for inverse condemnation

pending the outcome of the CEQA claim. ROA # 56.

Discussion

A. Jurisdiction

The City argues mandamus relief is premature because

there has not been a final administrative decision and

judicial review is not permissible until after the City

conducts a CEQA study. The Court rejected this

argument when it overruled the City’s demurrer. For

the reasons stated in that ruling, the Court has

jurisdiction to decide this petition. See also Association

for a Cleaner Environment v. Yosemite Community

College Dist. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 629, 636 (agency’s

preliminary review to determine whether a proposed

activity falls within CEQA is subject to judicial review).

B. Abuse of Discretion

The Bottinis contend that the City Council abused its

discretion in decreeing that the project was not

categorically exempt from CEQA. The issue before the

trial court is whether the agency abused its discretion.

“Abuse of discretion is shown if (1) the agency has not

proceeded in a manner required by law, or (2) the

determination is not supported by substantial

evidence.” Gentry v. City of Murrieta (1995) 36

Cal.App.4th 1359, 1375.

App. 66

Under CEQA, an agency must first determine whether

the project is covered by CEQA. “If the project is

exempt, the process does not need to proceed any

farther.” Guidelines, § 15002, subd. (k)(1). The crux of

this dispute is largely definitional: what is the project?

The Bottinis argue that the project is the new

construction of single family residence on a vacant lot.

Such a project would be categorically exempt. See

Guidelines, § 15303, subd. (a). The City does not

dispute that the Bottinis seek to construct a new single

family residence. It contends, however, that the “whole

of the project” includes the prior removal of the

Cottage, because the lot was created as a result of a

demolition permit that was wrongfully issued.

CEQA defines a “project” as “the whole of an action,

which has a potential for resulting in either a direct

physical change in the environment, or a reasonably

foreseeable indirect physical change in the

environment. . . . ” Guidelines, § 15378; see also Pub.

Resources Code, § 21065. “Whether a particular

activity constitutes a project in the first instance is a

question of law.” Black Property Owners Assn. v. City

of Berkeley (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 974, 984; see also

California Clean Energy Committee v. City of Woodland

(2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 173, 193 (“The question of

which acts constitute the ‘whole of an action’ for

purposes of CEQA is one of law, which we review de

novo based on the undisputed facts in the record.”)

The City argues that the project baseline was with the

Cottage in place and in the condition as reflected in the

2010 May Historical Report. The record does not

support this assertion. The baseline for a CEQA

App. 67

analysis must be the “existing physical conditions in

the affected area” and reflect the “real conditions on the

ground.” Communities For A Better Environment v.

South Coast Air Quality Management Dist. (2010) 48

Cal.4th 310, 321. The Cottage had been razed pursuant

to a demolition permit eight months before the Bottinis

submitted their project application. Thus, the existing

condition in this case is an empty lot. The fact that the

City now believes the demolition permit should never

have been issued is immaterial because the baseline

does not consider the level of development “that could

or should have been present according to a plan or

regulation.” Id.

An analogous issue was addressed in Citizens for East

Shore Parks v. California State Lands Com. (2011) 202

Cal.App.4th 549. In that case, the plaintiffs asserted

that the baseline should exclude current conditions

because otherwise the project would be exempt CEQA

review. The Court disagreed, explaining that “neither

the statute, nor any CEQA case, supports plaintiffs’

revisionist approach to the baseline.” Id.at 561.

Instead, “the baseline must include existing conditions,

even when those conditions have never been reviewed

and are unlawful.”

At oral argument, the City argued that this case is less

like Citizens and more like Riverwatch v. County of San

Diego (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1428. Riverwatch dealt

with a challenge to an environmental impact review

(“EIR”). It is not analogous to a case like this, where

there is a categorical exemption. However, the

Riverwatch Court did note “the generally accepted

principle that environmental impacts should be

App. 68

examined in light of the environment as it exists when

a project is approved.” Id. at 1453.

The City correctly states that CEQA forbids

segmenting a project to evade CEQA review. See

California Clean Energy Committee v. City of Woodland

(2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 173, 193. At oral argument, the

City asked the Court to focus on the Bottinis’ intent

when they purchased the property. According to this

argument, because the Bottinis intended to either build

a new house or remodel the Cottage at the time they

acquired the property, the baseline must include the

Cottage. The City conceded that notwithstanding the

Bottinis’ intent at time of purchase, there would have

to be some temporal limitations to this baseline. Here,

the Cottage was demolished pursuant to a permit

issued by the City after the City declared the building

to be a nuisance and ordered its removal. It is

undisputed that the time to challenge that permit has

expired. See, San Diego Municipal Code, § 121.0102.

This is the point in time that the baseline no longer

includes the Cottage. Moreover, where, as here, a

demolition permit is not dependent upon the issuance

of a building permit “the demolition of the existing

dwelling constitutes a ‘project’ separate from the

alleged anticipated construction of another building”

and the building permit should be reviewed

independently to determine whether CEQA applies.

Adams Point Preservation Society v. City of Oakland

(1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 203, 207-208; see also Friends of

Juana Briones House v. City of Palo Alto (2010) 190

Cal.App.4th 286, 312 (a “ministerial demolition permit,

arguably followed by a ministerial building permit”

does not “render the approval a discretionary one.”)

App. 69

Consequently, the fact that the Cottage had been

removed was irrelevant to the project under

consideration by the City. The CDP is a separate

project distinct from the demolition of the Cottage.

For the foregoing reasons, the City’s determination

that the project was not categorically exempt is not

supported by substantial evidence. As a result, the

determination was an abuse of discretion. The petition

for writ of mandate is granted. The City is directed to

set aside its decision and re-consider the appeals in

conformance with the views expressed herein.

/s/Katherine Bacal

Judge Katherine Bacal

DATE: 12/15/2014

DEPT: C-69

MINUTE ORDER

Page 4

Calendar No.

App. 70

EXHIBIT B

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

CASE NO. 37-2013-00075491-CU-WM-CTL

[Filed January 26, 2015]

___________________________________

BERNATE TICINO TRUST

)

DATED MARCH 2, 2009,

)

TRUST “3”; NINA M. BOTTINI;

)

and FRANCIS A. BOTTINI, JR.,

)

)

Petitioners/Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

CITY OF SAN DIEGO, a municipal

)

corporation; CITY COUNCIL OF

)

THE CITY OF SAN DIEGO;

)

and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

)

)

Respondents/Defendants.

)

___________________________________ )

[PROPOSED] PEREMPTORY WRIT

OF MANDAMUS

TO:

RESPONDENTS CITY OF SAN DIEGO AND

CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF SAN DIEGO

The Court having issued a final order granting the

petition for writ of administrative mandamus (“Order”),

App. 71

a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as

Exhibit “A”.

NOW

THEREFORE

IT

IS

HERERBY

COMMANDED that upon service of this Peremptory

Writ of Mandamus (“Peremptory Writ”):

1. Respondent City Council of the City of San Diego

(“City Council”) shall set aside its adoption of

Resolution Number R-308449, which granted the

Environmental Appeals filed by the La Jolla.

Community Planning Group and La Jolla Historical

Society (“Appeals”), and reconsider the Appeals in

conformance with the views expressed in the attached

Order.

2. Nothing in this Peremptory Writ shall direct the

City Council to exercise its discretion in any particular

way.

3. The Court shall retain jurisdiction over

Respondents’ proceedings by way of a return to the

Peremptory Writ, and this Peremptory Writ shall

remain in effect until the Court determines that

Respondents have complied with CEQA as to the

matters set forth herein.

4. Respondents shall file a return to this

Peremptory Writ no later than 90 days upon service of

this Peremptory Writ.

Dated: _________

__________________, Clerk

By: _____________, Deputy Clerk

App. 72

Dated: 1/26/15

/s/Katherine A. Bacal

THE HONORABLE KATHERINE A. BACAL

JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT

App. 73

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

CENTRAL

MINUTE ORDER

DATE: 12/15/2014 TIME: 02:38:00 PM

Dept: C-69

JUDICIAL OFFICER PRESIDING: Katherine Bacal

CLERK: Jay Browder

REPORTER/ERM: Not Reported

BAILIFF/COURT ATTENDANT: C. Rice

CASE NO: 37-2013-00075491-CU-TT-CTL

CASE INIT.DATE: 11/13/2013

CASE TITLE: Bernate TicinoTrust Dated March 2,

2009 Trust ‘3’ vs. City Of San Diego [E-File]

CASE CATEGORY: Civil - Unlimited

CASE TYPE: Toxic Tort/Environmental

APPEARANCES

There are no appearances by any party.

The Court, having taken the above-entitled matter

under submission on 12/11/2014 and having fully

considered the arguments of all parties, both written

and oral, as well as the evidence presented, now rules

as follows:

The petition for administrative writ of mandamus, filed

by Bernate Ticino Trust dated March 2, 2009, Trust

“3,” Nina Bottini, and Francis Bottini, Jr. (collectively,

“the Bottinis”) is granted.

App. 74

Preliminary Matters

The parties’ requests for judicial notice are granted,

except for the City’s additional request for judicial

notice stated in its Response. This request does not

comply with the California Rules of Court, is of

questionable relevance and is denied.

Factual and Procedural Background

The Bottinis challenge the City of San Diego’s

determination that their application to construct a

single family residence is not categorically exempt from

review under the California Environmental Quality Act

(CEQA).

The Bottinis purchased the subject property in January

2011. Administrative Record (AR) Vol. 2, Tab 97. At

that time, the property included a structure known as

the Windemere Cottage (the “Cottage”). The Cottage

was constructed in 1895 and moved ½ mile to the

present site in 1927. AR 3:132, p. 1106. The Cottage’s

prior owners nominated the Cottage for historical

designation by the City. The Bottinis withdrew the

nomination in May 2011. Ibid.

In August 2011, the Bottinis asked the City to

determine whether the Cottage was eligible for

historical designation under the Municipal Code. Ibid.

On September 22, 2011, the City’s Historical Resources

Board (HRB) determined not to designate the property

as a historical resource. AR 1: 3; AR 3:174.

That same day, the Bottinis requested that the City’s

Neighborhood Code Compliance Division (NCCD)

determine whether the building was structurally safe.

App. 75

AR 1:12, p. 445. After inspecting the building, on

December 21, 2011 the NCCD declared the structure

unsafe and ordered the Bottinis to obtain a demolition

permit by February 15, 2012. AR 6:492. The Bottinis

obtained a demolition permit the next day. Demolition

was completed by December 30, 2011. AR 5: 365, 366.

In August 2012, the Bottinis applied for a Coastal

Development Permit (CDP) to construct a single family

residence on the property. AR 4:241. In January 2013,

City staff determined the project was exempt under

section 15303 of the CEQA Guidelines (California Code

of Regulations, title 14) pertaining to new construction

of single family residences. AR 4:292. Appeals were

filed by the La Jolla Community Planning Group and

the La Jolla Historical Society. AR 4:297. The City’s

Development Services Department (DSD) prepared a

memorandum addressing the objections and

recommended the City Council deny the appeals. AR 5:

318. Among other things, the DSD stated the

demolition permit was exempt from CEQA because it

was a ministerial act in accordance with the nuisance

determination, the Cottage is not part of the current

project, and the proper baseline for conducting an

environmental review is the condition of the property

at the time of the application, i.e., as a vacant lot. Ibid.

On September 23, 2013 the City Council granted the

appeals. AR 1:1. The City Council determined the

project was not categorically exempt from an

environmental analysis, and it directed City staff to reevaluate the environmental determination with the

baseline for the project set with the Cottage on the site.

The City Council further found that the demolition

App. 76

permit was unlawfully issued while the Cottage was

being considered for listing on the California Register

of Historical Resources.

At issue here is the Bottinis 1st cause of action for

failure to comply with CEQA, the Court having abated

the 2nd cause of action for inverse condemnation

pending the outcome of the CEQA claim. ROA # 56.

Discussion

A. Jurisdiction

The City argues mandamus relief is premature because

there has not been a final administrative decision and

judicial review is not permissible until after the City

conducts a CEQA study. The Court rejected this

argument when it overruled the City’s demurrer. For

the reasons stated in that ruling, the Court has

jurisdiction to decide this petition. See also Association

for a Cleaner Environment v. Yosemite Community

College Dist. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 629, 636 (agency’s

preliminary review to determine whether a proposed

activity falls within CEQA is subject to judicial review).

B. Abuse of Discretion

The Bottinis contend that the City Council abused its

discretion in decreeing that the project was not

categorically exempt from CEQA. The issue before the

trial court is whether the agency abused its discretion.

“Abuse of discretion is shown if (1) the agency has not

proceeded in a manner required by law, or (2) the

determination is not supported by substantial

evidence.” Gentry v. City of Murrieta (1995) 36

Cal.App.4th 1359, 1375.

App. 77

Under CEQA, an agency must first determine whether

the project is covered by CEQA. “If the project is

exempt, the process does not need to proceed any

farther.” Guidelines, § 15002, subd. (k)(1). The crux of

this dispute is largely definitional: what is the project?

The Bottinis argue that the project is the new

construction of single family residence on a vacant lot.

Such a project would be categorically exempt. See

Guidelines, § 15303, subd, (a). The City does not

dispute that the Bottinis seek to construct a new single

family residence. It contends, however, that the “whole

of the project” includes the prior removal of the

Cottage, because the lot was created as a result of a

demolition permit that was wrongfully issued.

CEQA defines a “project” as “the whole of an action,

which has a potential for resulting in either a direct

physical change in the environment, or a reasonably

foreseeable indirect physical change in the

environment. . . . ” Guidelines, § 15378; see also Pub.

Resources Code, § 21065. “Whether a particular

activity constitutes a project in the first instance is a

question of law.” Black Property Owners Assn. v. City

of Berkeley (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 974, 984; see also

California Clean Energy Committee v. City of Woodland

(2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 173, 193 (“The question of

which acts constitute the ‘whole of an action’ for

purposes of CEQA is one of law, which we review de

novo based on the undisputed facts in the record.”)

The City argues that the project baseline was with the

Cottage in place and in the condition as reflected in the

2010 May Historical Report. The record does not

support this assertion. The baseline for a CEQA

App. 78

analysis must be the “existing physical conditions in

the affected area” and reflect the “real conditions on the

ground.” Communities For A Better Environment v.

South Coast Air Quality Management Dist. (2010) 48

Cal.4th 310, 321. The Cottage had been razed pursuant

to a demolition permit eight, months before the

Bottinis submitted their project application. Thus, the

existing condition in this case is an empty lot. The fact

that the City now believes the demolition permit

should never have been issued is immaterial because

the baseline does not consider the level of development

“that could or should have been present according to a

plan or regulation.” Id.

An analogous issue was addressed in Citizens for East

Shore Parks v. California State Lands Com. (2011) 202

Cal.App.4th 549. In that case, the plaintiffs asserted

that the baseline should exclude current conditions

because otherwise the project would be exempt CEQA

review. The Court disagreed, explaining that “neither

the statute, nor any CEQA case, supports plaintiffs’

revisionist approach to the baseline.” Id.at 561.

Instead, “the baseline must include existing conditions,

even when those conditions have never been reviewed

and are unlawful.”

At oral argument, the City argued that this case is less

like Citizens and more like Riverwatch v. County of San

Diego (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1428. Riverwatch dealt

with a challenge to an environmental impact review

(“EIR”). It is not analogous to a case like this, where

there is a categorical exemption. However, the

Riverwatch Court did note “the generally accepted

principle that environmental impacts should be

App. 79

examined in light of the environment as it exists when

a project is approved.” Id. at 1453.

The City correctly states that CEQA forbids

segmenting a project to evade CEQA review. See

California Clean Energy Committee v. City of Woodland

(2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 173, 193. At oral argument, the

City asked the Court to focus on the Bottinis’ intent

when they purchased the property. According to this

argument, because the Bottinis intended to either build

a new house or remodel the Cottage at the time they

acquired the property, the baseline must include the

Cottage. The City conceded that notwithstanding the

Bottinis’ intent at time of purchase, there would have

to be some temporal limitations to this baseline. Here,

the Cottage was demolished pursuant to a permit

issued by the City after the City declared the building

to be a nuisance and ordered its removal. It is

undisputed that the time to challenge that permit has

expired. See, San Diego Municipal Code, § 121.0102.

This is the point in time that the baseline no longer

includes the Cottage. Moreover, where, as here, a

demolition permit is not dependent upon the issuance

of a building permit “the demolition of the existing

dwelling constitutes a ‘project’ separate from the

alleged anticipated construction of another building”

and the building permit should be reviewed

independently to determine whether CEQA applies.

Adams Point Preservation Society v. City of Oakland

(1987) 192 Cal.App. 3d 203, 207-208; see also Friends

of Juana Briones House v. City of Palo Alto (2010) 190

Cal.App.4th 286, 312 (a “ministerial demolition permit,

arguably followed by a ministerial building permit”

does not “render the approval a discretionary one.”)

App. 80

Consequently, the fact that the Cottage had been

removed was irrelevant to the project under

consideration by the City. The CDP is a separate

project distinct from the demolition of the Cottage.

For the foregoing reasons, the City’s determination

that the project was not categorically exempt is not

supported by substantial evidence. As a result, the

determination was an abuse of discretion. The petition

for writ of mandate is granted. The City is directed to

set aside its decision and re-consider the appeals in

conformance with the views expressed herein.

/s/Katherine Bacal

Judge Katherine Bacal

DATE: 12/15/2014

DEPT: C-69

MINUTE ORDER

Page 4

Calendar No.

App. 81

EXHIBIT C

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

CENTRAL

MINUTE ORDER

DATE: 10/21/2016 TIME: 01:30:00 PM

Dept: C-69

JUDICIAL OFFICER PRESIDING: Katherine Bacal

CLERK: Jay Browder

REPORTER/ERM: Johnell Gallivan CSR#10505

BAILIFF/COURT ATTENDANT: Bryan Bagnas

CASE NO: 37-2013-00075491-CU-TT-CTL

CASE INIT.DATE: 11/13/2013

CASE TITLE: Bernate TicinoTrust Dated March 2,

2009 Trust ‘3’ vs. City Of San Diego [E-File]

CASE CATEGORY: Civil - Unlimited

CASE TYPE: Toxic Tort/Environmental

EVENT TYPE: Summary Judgment / Summary

Adjudication (Civil)

MOVING PARTY: City Council Of The City Of San

Diego

CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED: Motion for

Summary Judgment and/or Adjudication City of San

Diego’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Or In The

Alternative, Motion for Adjudication of Issues; and All

Supporting Documents, 08/03/2016

APPEARANCES

Carmen A Brock, counsel,

Respondent,Appellant(s).

present

for

App. 82

Neal A Markowitz and Karen R. Frostrom, counsel, are

present on behalf of Plaintiff.

Now being the time previously set for hearing

Defendant City of San Diego’s Motion for Summary

Judgment, counsel appear as noted above and the

hearing commences.

Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore is signed

and filed.

MISCELLANEOUS MINUTES:

In light of the Court’s ruling on the MSJ below, all

future dates are vacated.

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT:

The Court hears argument.

The Court confirms as modified the tentative ruling as

follows:

The motion for summary judgment, filed by defendant

City of San Diego, is granted.

Preliminary Matters

Plaintiffs’ and City’s requests for judicial notice are

granted.

The Court declines to rule on plaintiffs’ evidentiary

objections and the City’s objections to Karen Frostrom’s

declaration and Exhibits 3-7, 9-11, and 17-19. The

Court need rule only on those objections to evidence

that it deems material to its disposition of the motion.

Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (q).

App. 83

The City’s foundation and authentication objections to

Exhibits 9-11 and 17-19 ar8 sustained.

Background

This action arises from plaintiffs Nina Bottini and

Francis Bottini’s attempt to construct a home on their

property. The relevant facts giving rise to this action

are set out in the Court’s ruling on the petition for writ

of mandamus (ROA# 79) and the appellate decision in

Bottini v. City of San Diego (Jan. 26, 2016, No.

D067510) 2016 WL 304682.

At issue here are the 2nd cause of action for inverse

condemnation, 3rd cause of action for due process

violations, and 4th cause of action for equal protection

violations. Ex. J [Amended Petition].

Discussion

Inverse Condemnation

The second cause of action alleges that the City

Council’s finding that the issuance of the demolition

permit was a “failure to proceed in a manner required

by law” means the City’s order to obtain the permit and

the finding that the Cottage was a public nuisance are

unlawful. Plaintiffs contend they are entitled to

damages for the delay caused by the City Council

flouting the law and forcing plaintiffs to seek judicial

assistance to correct their unlawful conduct.

The California Supreme Court decision of Landgate,

Inc. v. California Coastal Com. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1006

is controlling. A legally erroneous decision of a

government agency during the development approval

App. 84

process resulting in delay does not, by itself, amount to

a taking of property. Id. at 1018. Plaintiffs contend that

there was more than simply a government mistake.

They argue the project was categorically exempt from

CEQA review and the City deliberately flouted the law

to achieve the result it wanted.

The subjective motive of the government agency is not

relevant. Id. at 1198. The proper inquiry is whether

“there is, objectively, sufficient connection between the

land use regulation in question and a legitimate

governmental purpose so that the former may be said

to substantially advance the latter.” Id. Reviewing a

project for compliance with CEQA is clearly a

legitimate governmental purpose. Id. at 1028-1029 (the

government’s wrongful application of CEQA

regulations is not a taking; a writ of mandate is the

sole remedy for an agency’s noncompliance with

CEQA). Plaintiffs are not entitled to damages for the

temporary delay in building their house. Accordingly,

the City is entitled to summary adjudication of the 2nd

cause of action.

Due Process

Plaintiffs argue the City violated their right to due

process under California Const. Art. I, § 7 (a) by

refusing to recognize a categorical exemption under

CEQA for single-family residences. See CEQA

Guidelines, § 15303.

The California due process clause “protects only those

property interests or benefits that are conferred by

statute.” Las Lomas Land Co., LLC v. City of Los

Angeles (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 837, 855. “A benefit is

App. 85

not a protected property interest under the due process

clause if the decision maker has the discretion to grant

or deny the benefit.” Id. at 853; see also Town of Castle

Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales (2005) 545 U.S. 748, 756 (“[A]

benefit is not a protected entitlement if government

officials may grant or deny it in their discretion.”)

Under CEQA, the public agency must conduct a

preliminary review to determine whether a project is

exempt from further review. Banker’s Hill, Hillcrest,

Park West Community Preservation Group v. City of

San Diego (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 249, 258. Because

the City has discretion to determine whether the

project is categorically exempt, plaintiffs do not have a

property interest conferred by statute. Thus, the City

is entitled to summary adjudication of the 3rd cause of

action.

Equal Protection

California’s due process clause provide that persons

who are similarly situated with respect to the

legitimate purpose of a law must be treated alike under

the law. Las Lomas, supra, at 857. Plaintiffs bring a

“class of one” equal protection claim. To prevail on a

class of one claim, plaintiffs must demonstrate that

(1) they were treated differently from other similarly

situated persons, (2) the difference in treatment was

intentional, and (3) there was no rational basis for the

difference in treatment. Id. at 858.

“A court must reject an equal protection challenge to

government action ‘if there is any reasonably

conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational

basis for the [difference in treatment]’.” Id. (citation

omitted).

App. 86

Plaintiffs argue the City Council was given the CEQA

statute that entitled plaintiffs to an exemption but the

Council intentionally flouted the law when it ordered

the City’s Development Services Department to

conduct a CEQA review, setting the baseline for the

project at when the Cottage was still in existence. As

noted, the City was required to conduct a preliminary

review of the project to determine whether it was

exempt. Plaintiffs obtained a demolition permit and

removed the Cottage while the project was under

review for historic designation. These circumstances

complicated the decision as to the proper baseline for

evaluating the project under CEQA. Plaintiffs’

disagreement with the decision does not demonstrate

a violation of equal protection. “The rational basis test

is extremely deferential and does not allow inquiry into

the wisdom of government action.” Las Lomas, supra,

at 858. Plaintiffs present no evidence that the City

Council intentionally discriminated against them or

that there was no rational basis for the City Council’s

decision. Accordingly, the City is entitled to summary

adjudication of the 4th cause of action.

Because there is no triable issue of fact on any cause of

action, and the Court decided the administrative

mandamus claim, the City is entitled to summary

judgment.

The City is directed to serve notice on all parties within

2 court days of this ruling and to submit a proposed

judgment.

/s/Katherine Bacal

Judge Katherine Bacal

App. 87

DATE: 10/21/2016

DEPT: C-69

MINUTE ORDER

Page 3

Calendar No. 59

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

Central

330 West Broadway

San Diego, CA 92101

SHORT TITLE: Bernate TicinoTrust Dated March

2, 2009 Trust ‘3’ vs. City Of San Diego [E-File]

CLERK’S

CERTIFICATE OF

SERVICE BY MAIL

CASE NUMBER:

37-2013-00075491-CUTT -CTL

I certify that I am not a party to this cause. I certify

that a true copy of the JUDGMENT was mailed

following standard court practices in a sealed envelope

with postage fully prepaid, addressed as indicated

below. The mailing and this certification occurred at

San Diego, California, on 12/23/2016.

Clerk of the Court, by: /s/Jay W. Browder, Deputy

ALBERT Y CHANG

7817 IVANHOE AVENUE # 102

LA JOLLA, CA 92037

ANDREA M CONTRERAS

445 EASTGATE MALL, STE. 400

SAN DIEGO, CA 92121

App. 88

VINCENT J BARTOLOTTA

THORSNES BARTOLOTTA MCGUIRE

2550 FIFTH AVE 11TH FL

SAN DIEGO, CA 92103

CARMEN A BROCK

OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY

1200 THIRD AVENUE # 1100

SAN DIEGO, CA 92101-4100

DONALD W BRECHTEL

462 STEVENS AVE #102

SOLANA BEACH, CA 92075

G Additional names and address attached.

CLERK’S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL

Page: 1

App. 89

APPENDIX D

U.S. Const. Amend. 5. Criminal actions—

Provisions concerning—Due process of law and

just compensation clauses.

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or

otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or

indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in

the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in

actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall

any person be subject for the same offence to be twice

put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in

any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor

be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due

process of law; nor shall private property be taken for

public use, without just compensation.

Cal. Const., Art. I § 19. Eminent Domain;

Restrictions; Definitions

(a) Private property may be taken or damaged for a

public use and only when just compensation,

ascertained by a jury unless waived, has first been paid

to, or into court for, the owner. The Legislature may

provide for possession by the condemnor following

commencement of eminent domain proceedings upon

deposit in court and prompt release to the owner of

money determined by the court to be the probable

amount of just compensation.

App. 90

(b) The State and local governments are prohibited

from acquiring by eminent domain an owneroccupied

residence for the purpose of conveying it to a private

person.

(c) Subdivision (b) of this section does not apply when

State or local government exercises the power of

eminent domain for the purpose of protecting public

health and safety; preventing serious, repeated

criminal activity; responding to an emergency; or

remedying environmental contamination that poses a

threat to public health and safety.

(d) Subdivision (b) of this section does not apply when

State or local government exercises the power of

eminent domain for the purpose of acquiring private

property for a public work or improvement.

(e) For the purpose of this section:

1. “Conveyance” means a transfer of real property

whether by sale, lease, gift, franchise, or otherwise.

2. “Local government” means any city, including a

charter city, county, city and county, school district,

special district, authority, regional entity,

redevelopment agency, or any other political

subdivision within the State.

3. “Owner-occupied residence” means real property

that is improved with a single-family residence such

as a detached home, condominium, or townhouse

and that is the owner or owners’ principal place of

residence for at least one year prior to the State or

local government’s initial written offer to purchase

the property. Owner-occupied residence also

App. 91

includes a residential dwelling unit attached to or

detached from such a single-family residence which

provides complete independent living facilities for

one or more persons.

4. “Person” means any individual or association, or

any business entity, including, but not limited to, a

partnership, corporation, or limited liability

company.

5. “Public work or improvement” means facilities or

infrastructure for the delivery of public services

such as education, police, fire protection, parks,

recreation, emergency medical, public health,

libraries, flood protection, streets or highways,

public transit, railroad, airports and seaports;

utility, common carrier or other similar projects

such as energy-related, communication-related,

water-related and wastewater-related facilities or

infrastructure; projects identified by a State or local

government for recovery from natural disasters; and

private uses incidental to, or necessary for, the

public work or improvement.

6. “State” means the State of California and any of

its agencies or departments.

App. 92

APPENDIX E

IN THE

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

Civil No. D071670

[Filed November 3, 2017]

___________________________________

NINA M. BOTTINI, FRANCIS

)

A. BOTTINI, JR., and BERNATE

)

TICINO TRUST DATED March 2,

)

2009, TRUST “3”,

)

)

Plaintiffs-Respondents

)

and Cross-Appellants,

)

)

vs.

)

)

CITY OF SAN DIEGO, a municipal

)

corporation, and CITY COUNCIL

)

OF THE CITY OF SAN DIEGO,

)

)

Defendants-Appellants

)

and Cross-Respondents.

)

___________________________________ )

On Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of

California County of San Diego

The Honorable Katherine A. Bacal

App. 93

Superior Court Case No. 37-2013-00075491-CU-TT-CTL

__________________________________

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF AND

CROSS-APPELLANTS’ OPENING BRIEF

__________________________________

BOTTINI & BOTTINI, INC.

Albert Y. Chang (SBN 296065)

Yury A. Kolesnikov (SBN 271173)

7817 Ivanhoe Avenue, Suite 102

La Jolla, California 92037

Telephone: (858) 914-2001

Facsimile: (858) 914-2002

E-mail:

achang@bottinilaw.com

ykolesnikov@bottinilaw.com

Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Respondents

and Cross-Appellants

App. 94

***

Third, the trial court erred in granting summary

judgment as to the equal protection claim. A reasonable

jury could find that the City Council treated

Respondents differently than any other property owner

applying for a CEQA-exempt construction of a new

single-family residence and by setting an arbitrary

baseline. There is sufficient evidence in the record that

the City’s conduct was intentional and geared to

“punish” Respondents for following the process that the

City itself set forth and mandated.

I. The Trial Court Erred in Granting Summary

Judgment as to Respondents’ Inverse

Condemnation Claim

The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution

prohibits the government from taking private property

for public use without just compensation. U.S. CONST.

amend. V. The federal takings clause applies to the

States via the Fourteenth Amendment. Lockaway, 216

Cal. App. 4th at 183. “Moreover, the takings clause in

the California Constitution is construed congruently

with the federal clause.” Id. The Fifth Amendment “is

designed not to limit the governmental interference

with property rights per se, but rather to secure

compensation in the event of otherwise proper

interference amounting to a taking.” Lingle, 544 U.S. at

536–37.

The Supreme Court has identified three distinct

categories of regulatory takings. Id. at 538. The first

category is government action which requires a

property owner to “suffer a permanent physical

App. 95

invasion” of his or her property. Id. The second

category includes regulatory conduct that deprives the

owner of “all economically beneficial use” of the

property. Id. These two categories are deemed per se

takings for Fifth Amendment purposes. Id. The third

category encompasses all regulatory takings challenges

that fall “[o]utside these two relatively narrow

categories.” Id.

Courts have long recognized that “government

regulation of private property may, in some instances,

be so onerous that its effect is tantamount to a direct

appropriation or ouster — and that such ‘regulatory

takings’ may be compensable under the Fifth

Amendment.” Id. at 537; see also Kavanau v. Santa

Monica Rent Control Bd., 16 Cal. 4th 761, 773 (1997).

“In Justice Holmes’ storied but cryptic formulation,

‘while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if

regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a

taking.” Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537 (quoting Penn. Coal

Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)).

A. The Trial Court Erred in Concluding that a

Writ of Mandate Is the Sole Remedy for a

Regulatory Taking that Deprives the

Owner of Some, but Not All, Economic

Value of the Property

In Lockaway, the court held that “a temporary

regulatory taking may require payment of just

compensation for the period the taking was in effect.”

Lockaway, 216 Cal. App. 4th at 184 (citing First

English Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles Cnty., 482

U.S. 304, 321 (1987)). “Thus, if a property owner

prevails in an inverse condemnation action, and the

App. 96

regulatory agency elects to withdraw the regulation

that effected the taking, the property owner may

have a right to just compensation for the period

that the regulation was in effect.” Id.; see also

Kavanau, 16 Cal. 4th at 773 (“Even if the agency

withdraws the regulation, the property owner may

have a right to just compensation for the temporary

taking while the regulation was in effect.”); Ali v. City

of Los Angeles, 77 Cal. App. 4th 246, 251 (1999).

Accordingly, the trial court erred as a matter of law

in relying on Landgate to hold that “a writ of mandate

is the sole remedy for an agency’s noncompliance with

CEQA.” See AA03636. Indeed, even Landgate does not

support this blanket assertion. See 17 Cal. 4th at 1017

(observing that the California Supreme Court’s prior

holding that “the sole remedy for government

regulation that effects a taking of property is an

administrative mandamus overturning the regulation

rather than an award of damages” “was repudiated” by

the U.S. Supreme Court in First English, 482 U.S.

304).

B. A Regulatory Takings Challenge in This

Case Must Be Evaluated Under the Penn

Central Standard

In Lockaway, the First District engaged in an

exhaustive analysis of the applicable U.S. Supreme

Court precedent and concluded that “a regulatory

takings challenge that does not fall into [the] two

narrow categories [identified in Lingle] is evaluated

under a set of standards first articulated by the

Supreme Court in Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104.”

Lockaway, 216 Cal. App. 4th at 184; see also Lingle,

App. 97

544 U.S. at 538 (“Outside these two relatively narrow

categories … , regulatory takings challenges are

governed by the standards set forth in Penn Central[,

438 U.S. 104].”).

“The Penn Central inquiry is not a formula but an

ad hoc factual inquiry that weighs several factors for

evaluating a regulatory takings claim.” Lockaway, 216

Cal. App. 4th at 185 (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at

124, and Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538). Under Penn Central,

the court looks to three primary factors in conducting

the inquiry: (1) the “economic impact” of the regulation

on the claimant; (2) the extent to which the regulation

interfered with “distinct investment-backed

expectations”; and (3) the “character of the

governmental action.” 438 U.S. at 124; accord

Lockaway, 216 Cal. App. 4th at 185. These Penn

Central factors are “the principal guidelines” for

resolving regulatory takings claims that do not fall

within the two per se categories. Lingle, 544 U.S. at

539.

Notably, under Penn Central, “the question is not

‘whether a regulation of private property is effective in

achieving some legitimate public purpose.’” Lockaway,

216 Cal. App. 4th at 185 (quoting Lingle, 544 U.S. at

542). Instead, “the goal is to assess the magnitude or

character of the burden a particular regulation

imposes upon private property rights in order to

determine whether its effects are functionally

comparable to government appropriation or invasion of

private property.” Id. (quoting Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542).

App. 98

C. The Trial Court Erred in Applying

Landgate Instead of the Test Set Forth in

Penn Central and Lockaway

Landgate was decided before the U.S. Supreme

Court announced its decision in Lingle, 544 U.S. 528,

that held regulatory takings cases that do not fall into

one of two narrow categories are governed by the Penn

Central test. See Lockaway, 216 Cal. App. 4th at 189

(rejecting the county’s reliance on Landgate). In

Landgate, the California Supreme Court acknowledged

the Penn Central factors, but relied on a different test

evolved from language in Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S.

255, 260 (1980). In Agins, the U.S. Supreme Court

stated that “[t]he application of a general zoning law to

particular property effects a taking if the ordinance

does not substantially advance legitimate state

interests or denies an owner economically viable use of

his land.” 447 U.S. at 260. Through development of the

case law, the Agins rule evolved into a “stand-alone

regulatory takings test” that focused exclusively on

whether the challenged government action

substantially advanced a legitimate state interest. See

Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542; Lockaway, 216 Cal. App. 4th at

189.

In Lingle, the U.S. Supreme Court expressly held

that “the ‘substantially advances’ formula announced

in Agins is not a valid method of identifying regulatory

takings for which the Fifth Amendment requires just

compensation.” 544 U.S. at 545. As the Court

explained, the “substantially advances” formula is a

due process test which, when used as a takings test, is

“doctrinally untenable” and poses “serious practical

App. 99

difficulties.” Id. at 544. Among other things, that

formula is not a useful tool for identifying a taking

because it “reveals nothing about the magnitude or

character of the burden a particular regulation imposes

upon private property rights.” Id. at 542. Moreover, as

a practical matter, the formula would require courts to

engage in a “means-ends” analysis of government

regulations affecting private property, which is “a task

for which courts are not well suited.” Id. at 544.

Here, the trial court relied exclusively on Landgate

in concluding that Respondents did not have a viable

inverse condemnation claim. See AA03635–03636.

Indeed, the trial court even quoted the “substantially

advances” formula (see AA03636), which (as noted

above) was subsequently rejected by the U.S. Supreme

Court in Lingle. See Lockaway, 216 Cal. App. 4th at

188–89.

In Lockaway, the First District held that “in light of

Lingle, we reject the [c]ounty’s contention that

Landgate establishes an independent test for

evaluating whether government action is a regulatory

taking.” 216 Cal. App. 4th at 189 (noting that since

Lingle was decided, several other courts of appeal

“have questioned whether the Landgate rule remains

viable” (collecting cases)). Similarly, this Court should

reject the City’s and the trial court’s reliance on

Landgate as the exclusive test for evaluating whether

a governmental action amounts to a regulatory taking.

Instead, the proper analysis to be applied in this case

is the Penn Central test. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538;

Lockaway, 216 Cal. App. 4th at 184, 189.

App. 100

In any event, even assuming Landgate remains

good law, the rule it sets forth is subject to an

important caveat: “a government agency may not evade

the takings clause by fabricating a dispute . . . or by

otherwise arbitrarily imposing conditions on

development in order to delay or discourage that

development.” 17 Cal. 4th at 1029. Thus, for example,

even when a regulation substantially advances a

legitimate government purpose, if the agency’s

“position was so unreasonable from a legal standpoint

as to lead to the conclusion that it was taken for no

purpose other than to delay the development project

before it,” the action could amount to a taking. Id. at

1024. As the court in Landgate observed, “[s]uch a

delaying tactic would not advance any valid

government objective.” Id.

D. A Reasonable Jury Could Find that All

Three of the Penn Central Factors Are

Satisfied

1. Economic Impact

Under Penn Central, the Court must first consider

the “economic impact” of the Resolution on

Respondents. See 438 U.S. at 124; Lockaway, 216 Cal.

App. 4th at 185. Although not all land use regulations

that adversely impact property interests amount to

regulatory takings, “a government action that

unreasonably impairs the value or use of the property

may be an indication that a taking occurred.”

Lockaway, 216 Cal. App. 4th at 185.

Here, the City Council’s Resolution prevented

Respondents from building any residence on the

App. 101

Property until the conclusion of an expensive and timeconsuming EIR. See AR:1:00001–00005. As a result of

the inability to develop the Property, Respondents have

had to pay a mortgage on a second home in addition to

paying the mortgage on the Property. See AA03484 at

¶ 7. They have also had to incur significant attorneys’

fees and costs. Id. The drain on Respondents’ financial

resources will continue for as long as the City refuses

to comply with the Court’s writ of mandate. Id. Because

Respondents’ Property is in a residential zone, they can

make no use of the Property other than by building a

house on the vacant lot.

In Lockaway, the court found the first factor

satisfied under even less compelling circumstances.

There, the court noted that the county’s action “did not

render the property worthless” and, in fact, left open

“some alternative uses” that “had calculable

commercial value.” 216 Cal. App. 4th at 185.

Nonetheless, the court found the first factor satisfied

because the owner “was fully committed to developing

the storage facility and had already spent significant

resources committing its property to that specific use”

and because the owner “would have incurred

substantial costs to convert the property to another use

after the County had shut it down and would have

suffered a material decrease in its value.” Id.

Here, the City Council’s Resolution did not leave

open “some alternative uses” for the Property that “had

calculable commercial value.” See id. As noted above,

because the Property is in a residential zone,

Respondents can make no use of the Property other

than by building a house on the vacant lot.

App. 102

In any event, just like in Lockaway, Respondents

paid a premium for the Property because they were

assured by the prior owner that they could build a

house of their choosing on the Property. See

AA03482–03483 at ¶ 3; AA03470 (prior owner

advertised that the buyers could “build [their] own

dream home”). Just like in Lockaway, Respondents

have “already spent significant resources” on the

Property. Thus, a reasonable jury could find that the

Resolution had an “economic impact” on Respondents.

See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124; Lockaway, 216 Cal.

App. 4th at 185.

2. D i s t i n c t

Investment-Backed

Expectations

The second Penn Central factor requires the Court

to consider the extent to which the Resolution

interfered with Respondents’ “distinct investmentbacked expectations.” 438 U.S. at 124. “A reasonable

investment-backed expectation must be more than a

unilateral expectation or an abstract need.”

Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005

(1984). Here, as noted above, when Respondents

purchased the Property, they were told that the

Property was suitable for removal of the old structure

and construction of a new home. AA03482–03483 at

¶ 3; AA03470. In reliance on those representations,

even though the old structure on the Property was

uninhabitable and unsafe, Respondents agreed to pay

$1.22 million for the property. AA03482–03483 at ¶ 3.

That is a sizable investment for a property where one

cannot live.

App. 103

In Lockaway, the court found the second factor

satisfied under similar circumstances. There, the

owner “purchased the property only after the County

expressly confirmed that [the owner] could rely on the

[previously-issued conditional use permit] to develop a

storage facility.” 216 Cal. App. 4th at 185–86. After the

expiration date of the prior permit had passed, the

County changed its position and used another

regulation to shut the project down. Id. at 186. The

court concluded that, “[o]n these facts, there is no

denying that [the owner] had a reasonable investmentbacked expectation its project could proceed from the

time it purchased the property in 2000, until the

County changed its position in 2002.” Id.

Similarly, here, not only did Respondents rely on

the prior owner’s statements that they can develop the

Property to “build [their] own dream home” (see

AA03470), but they also relied on the City’s own

process and regulations, which assured them that they

can proceed with the construction of a single-family

residence on the Property. Specifically, as required by

the City, Respondents sought a determination from the

HRB as to whether the Cottage was an historical

resource. AR132:0116; AR318:01997. After holding a

public hearing and personally inspecting the Property,

the HRB did not designate the Cottage as historical.

AR174:01595. Subsequently, Respondents cooperated

with the City’s NCCD in having the Cottage evaluated

to determine whether it was a dangerous and unsafe

structure. See AR12:00445; AR318:01998;

AR107:01062–01063. Following a personal inspection

of the Cottage, the City’s Senior Civil Engineer

declared the Cottage unsafe and a public nuisance and

App. 104

issued a letter to Respondents ordering them to obtain

a demolition permit. AR492:02381–02382. Respondents

complied and submitted an application for a demolition

permit. AR216:01663–01668. Once again, the City

acted by having the City Building Official issue the

demolition permit. AR365:02070; AR366:02071.

A year later, the City’s DSD approved Respondents’

building application and advised Respondents that

their application was categorically exempt from CEQA

review. AR292:01994–01945. When two administrative

appeals were filed, the DSD reviewed all of the grounds

raised in the appeals and advised the City Council that

(1) the Project was properly found to be exempt from

CEQA pursuant to CEQA Guidelines § 15303; (2) the

proper baseline for an environmental review was the

condition that existed on August 22, 2012, when the

application was submitted; and (3) as such, the proper

baseline was a vacant lot. AR318:01995–01999.

All told, just like in Lockaway, Respondents have

followed and complied with each and every demand

imposed by the City. Moreover, on every turn, the City

approved all of the actions, not once indicating that the

demolition permit was improperly issued or that

Respondents cannot develop their property in the way

that they intended. Rather, it was only after the two

administrative appeals were filed that the City Council

— at the urging of Councilmember Lightner (who is a

former officer of LJHS, one of the two appellants before

the City Council) — changed its position and held, ex

post facto, that the issuance of the demolition permit by

the City itself was a failure to proceed in a manner

required by law and that Respondents cannot construct

App. 105

their intended family home without first completing an

expensive and time-consuming EIR. Thus, just like in

Lockaway, a reasonable jury could find that

Respondents had reasonable investment-backed

expectations that they could build their family home on

the Property when they purchased the Property, when

the City issued the demolition permit, and when the

City approved their building application, until the City

suddenly changed its position in 2013. See 216 Cal.

App. 4th at 186.

3. Character of the Governmental Action

The third Penn Central factor requires the Court to

consider the “character” of the City Council’s action.

438 U.S. at 124; Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542. Here, as the

trial court correctly ruled, and as argued in the

Respondents’ Brief with regard to the writ of mandate,

“the City’s determination that the project was not

categorically exempt . . . was an abuse of discretion.”

AA01540.

The law is clear that the Project, which is the

construction of a new single-family residence on a

vacant lot, is categorically exempt from CEQA. The

issuance of a demolition permit a year earlier, which is

a ministerial act, does not change the fact that the

Project is CEQA-exempt. The City’s own staff reached

this correct conclusion in recommending that the City

Council deny the appeals. AR318:01995–01999. Despite

the City’s staff’s recommendation and CEQA’s plain

and unambiguous language, the City Council — at the

urging of Councilmember Lightner — deliberately

flouted the law by setting the baseline a year before

Respondents even acquired the Property and by

App. 106

requiring Respondents to complete an expensive and

time-consuming EIR before they can develop the

property.

In Lockaway, the court found the third factor

satisfied under similar circumstances. The court

focused on what it called the county’s “showstopping Uturn,” by which the county reversed its position and

“took the eleventh-hour position” that plaintiffs’ project

was doomed from the commencement. 216 Cal. App.

4th at 186. “When this trap door closed on [p]laintiffs,

the ‘character’ of the government’s conduct revealed

itself.” Id. Similarly, here, when the City Council

followed Councilmember Lightner’s urging “[t]o do the

right thing” (AR8:00390) by punishing Respondents

with the requirement to conduct an expensive and

time-consuming, but utterly irrelevant and

unnecessary, EIR, the true “character” of the City’s

conduct revealed itself. See Lockaway, 216 Cal. App.

4th at 186.

***

In sum, there is sufficient evidence in the record

from which a reasonable jury could find that the

Resolution had an economic impact on Respondents

and interfered with their reasonable investmentbacked expectations. A reasonable jury could also find

that the City Council did not act pursuant to some

legitimate or bona fide concern, but instead

deliberately flouted the law. Thus, under the Penn

Central inquiry, a reasonable jury could find that the

City Council’s Resolution was a temporary regulatory

taking that required the payment of just compensation.

App. 107

The trial court erred in granting summary judgment on

the inverse condemnation claim.

***

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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