Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Beth Lewis Maze, Circuit Judge, Petitioner v. Kentucky Judicial Conduct Commission

Supreme Court briefSep 4, 2019

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No. 19-____

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

————

BETH LEWIS MAZE,

Petitioner,

KENTUCKY JUDICIAL CONDUCT COMMISSION,

Respondent.

————

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

Supreme Court of Kentucky

————

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

————

THEODORE H. LAVIT

224 North Spalding Avenue

P.O. Box 676

Lebanon, KY 40033

(270) 692-4471

tlavit@windstream.net

EDWARD E. DOVE

Counsel of Record

201 W. Short Street

Suite 300

Lexington, KY 40507

(859) 252-0020

eddove@windstream.net

Counsel for Petitioner

September 4, 2019

WILSON-EPES PRINTING CO., INC. – (202) 789-0096 – WASHINGTON, D. C. 20002

QUESTION PRESENTED

Petitioner, a Kentucky Circuit Judge, has been charged

by the Kentucky Judicial Conduct Commission in a

civil proceeding that could result in removal from her

elected judicial office. Petitioner also has been charged

in a state criminal indictment for the same underlying

conduct. Petitioner sought and was denied a stay of

the administrative proceedings in order to protect

her Fifth Amendment right to remain silent in the

criminal case. Did the denial of the stay in the civil

proceedings deprive Petitioner of her fundamental

Fifth Amendment right to remain silent in the state

criminal proceedings?

(i)

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioner, Beth Lewis Maze, was the movant in

lower courts. Respondent is the Kentucky Judicial

Conduct Commission.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED ..................................

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING ....................

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................

REPORTED OPINION .......................................

BASIS OF JURISDICTION ................................

PROVISIONS OF LAW INVOLVED ..................

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................

I. Procedural Background ...............................

REASONS FOR ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT .....

CONCLUSION ....................................................

APPENDIX

APPENDIX A: Opinion of the Supreme

Court of Kentucky ........................................

APPENDIX B: Order of the Judicial

Conduct Commission 11/19/18 .....................

35a

APPENDIX C: Order of the Kentucky

Supreme Court 11/30/18 ..............................

36a

APPENDIX D: Formal Charges I & II of

JCC and Answer ...........................................

38a

APPENDIX E: Formal Charges III & IV

and Answer ...................................................

45a

APPENDIX F: Indictment of 11/1/18..........

54a

APPENDIX G: Order Granting Stay of the

Supreme Court of Kentucky ........................

57a

(iii)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Page(s)

Newman v. United States,

No. 3:90-CV-7646, 1992 WL 115191

at *1 (N.D. Ohio Jan 2, 1992) (citing

In re Ivan F. Bowsky Sex. Litigation,

128 F.R.D. 47, 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1989))...........

CONSTITUTION

Fifth Amendment .........................................

REPORTED OPINION

The decision of the Supreme Court of Kentucky

in Beth Lewis Maze v. Kentucky Judicial Conduct

Commission, 2018-SC-000633-RR (Ky. 2019), is appended

to this petition.

BASIS OF JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a). The decision of the Kentucky

Supreme Court was issued on June 13, 2019. This

petition is timely filed pursuant to Supreme Court

Rule 13.1.

PROVISIONS OF LAW INVOLVED

The Fifth Amendment of the United States

Constitution provides:

No person shall . . . be compelled in any

criminal case to be a witness against himself[.]

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I. Procedural Background

Elected in 2000, Petitioner is the Chief Circuit Judge

for the 21st Judicial Circuit of Kentucky consisting of

Bath, Menifee, Montgomery and Rowan counties.

On the evening of September 18, 2017, the Bath

County jailer telephoned Petitioner from the hospital

in Mt. Sterling, Kentucky, seeking the issuance of

a drug test order which had been requested by both

the arresting officers and Petitioner’s ex-husband. The

jailer advised that all other judges in the circuit

had recused themselves with regard to any action

concerning Petitioner’s ex-husband.

Believing she was simply preserving evidence and to

comply with the jailer’s request, Petitioner located a

blank order form at her residence and completed it and

faxed it to the hospital. However, the form was

outdated and differed from the form currently in use.

In particular, the updated form contains a signature

block for parties described as “[d]istribution,” to

various parties. Appendix E 51a. In the old version of

the form this block was “seen by and order of entry

waived.”

As a result, Petitioner unknowingly signed an

outdated order form. On the lines she believed were

for distribution, Petitioner printed “Commonwealth

Att. & Bath Co. Attorney” and “Michael Campbell,”

the attorneys for the plaintiff and the defendant.

Petitioner did so believing that the order would then

be distributed to each of them. Petitioner issued

another drug test order after the jailer called a second

time. (Appendix E 51a, 52a, and 53a)

Petitioner self-reported to the Kentucky Judicial

Conduct Commission (JCC) that she had prepared

orders in a case involving her ex-husband. Petitioner

also mailed the originals to the JCC, which has constitutional oversight of the judiciary in Kentucky, as

neither order was honored; the hospital needed a

doctors order, not a court order.

On May 21, 2018, the JCC charged Petitioner with

two counts of misconduct for signing orders involving

her ex-husband (Appendix D 38a). The JCC also

charged Petitioner with two counts of misconduct for

allegedly forging the attorneys’ names to the two order

forms at issue. (Appendix E 45a)

On November 1, 2018, Petitioner was indicted by the

Bath County Grand Jury on two counts of forgery and

one count of tampering with public records for mailing

the original forms to the JCC. (Appendix F 54a)

Contrary to her Fifth Amendment right to remain

silent, the JCC now seeks to compel Petitioner to

proceed with a civil disciplinary hearing prior to her

criminal trial. At the same time, Petitioner is

scheduled for trial on November 12, 2019 in the

criminal case for the same alleged misconduct.

REASONS FOR ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT

In this case, Petitioner has an overlapping Fifth

Amendment right to remain silent in the civil administrative proceedings and in the state court criminal

case. In its opinion denying a stay in the disciplinary

matter, the Kentucky Supreme Court essentially left

Petitioner with two choices—(1) Waive her Fifth Amendment right in the civil proceeding to defend herself

against the misconduct allegations, which also would

constitute a waiver in the criminal case, or (2) invoke

her Fifth Amendment right in the civil case to protect

herself in the criminal matter, but preventing her from

defending against the misconduct allegations. The

first option also would require Petitioner to disclose

her defenses and present witness testimony in the

administrative proceeding that will be relevant to

prosecutors in the criminal case. This potential outcome

demonstrates the false choice created by the Kentucky

Supreme Court’s decision. Respondent’s interest in

resolving the civil proceedings cannot outweigh Petitioner’s fundamental right to remain silent regarding

issues material to a pending criminal case against her.

A stay should have been granted to protect Petitioner’s

constitutional rights. See Newman v. United States,

No 3:90-CV-7646, 1992 WL 115191, at *1 (N.D. Ohio

Jan. 10, 1992) (citing In re Ivan F. Bowsky Sex.

Litigation, 128 F.R.D. 47, 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1989))

CONCLUSION

This Court should grant certiorari to correct the

decision of the Kentucky Supreme Court to deny

Petitioner’s stay of the civil proceedings until the state

criminal case is resolved. Such a stay is necessary to

allow Petitioner to assert her fundamental constitutional right to remain silent.

WHEREFORE the writ of certiorari should issue.

Respectfully submitted,

THEODORE H. LAVIT

224 North Spalding Avenue

P.O. Box 676

Lebanon, KY 40033

(270) 692-4471

tlavit@windstream.net

EDWARD E. DOVE

Counsel of Record

201 W. Short Street

Suite 300

Lexington, KY 40507

(859) 252-0020

eddove@windstream.net

Counsel for Petitioner

September 4, 2019

APPENDIX

APPENDIX A

RENDERED: JUNE 13, 2019

TO BE PUBLISHED

SUPREME COURT OF KENTUCKY

————

2018-SC-000633-RR

————

BETH LEWIS MAZE, CIRCUIT JUDGE,

Movant,

KENTUCKY JUDICIAL CONDUCT COMMISSION,

Respondent.

————

OPINION AND ORDER

Acting through an attorney, Judge Beth Lewis

Maze1 sent a letter to the Judicial Conduct Commission (“JCC”) on November 12, 2017, in which she

reported her own conduct. Based upon these facts, the

JCC brought a five-count misconduct charge against

her. While those misconduct charges were pending a

final hearing before the JCC, a grand jury returned a

criminal indictment against Judge Maze on November

1, 2018. The grand jury charged Judge Maze with two

counts of second-degree forgery2 and one count of

tampering with public records.3

Beth Lewis Maze is Judge of the 21st Judicial Circuit of

Kentucky, Division No. 2.

Kentucky Revised Statutes (“KRS”) 516.030.

KRS 519.060.

Two weeks after the return of the indictment, Judge

Maze filed three motions, in her JCC proceedings, and

the JCC denied her requested relief on all of them.

The JCC’s denial of these motions is the subject of this

appeal.

Before the JCC, Judge Maze first moved for a postponement of all further JCC proceedings until resolution

of the criminal charges. Second, Judge Maze moved to

postpone the December 3, 2018, JCC hearing, claiming

insufficient time to prepare for the hearing because

the JCC produced to her a voluminous amount of materials in discovery slightly less than a month before the

scheduled JCC hearing. Third, Judge Maze asked for

an informal conference with the JCC to address additional misconduct charges that were added after the

initial charge.

After the denial of all three motions, Judge Maze

filed in this Court a Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure

(“CR”) 76.33 Motion for Intermediate Relief on November

28, 2018, asking us to stay the impending JCC hearing. And along with the CR 76.33 motion, Judge Maze

filed a Notice of Appeal, in which she asked us to review

the JCC’s denial of her three motions. We granted

Judge Maze’s CR 76.33 motion, staying all. JCC proceedings until we could address the merits of Judge

Maze’s appeal of the JCC’s denial of her motions.

We find no error on the part of the JCC in denying

Judge Maze’s motion for a stay, and because her other

challenges are either moot or procedurally infirm at

this time, we affirm her appeal, in part, and order her

appeal dismissed, in part.

I. ANALYSIS.

Section 121 of the Kentucky Constitution creates a

commission to retire for disability, suspend without

pay, or remove for good cause members of the state’s

judiciary. And this section mandates that the “actions”

of the commission are subject to judicial review by this

Court.4 But more importantly, Section 121 gives this

Court the rulemaking power over the commission’s

proceedings. In exercise of this rulemaking power,

this Court has promulgated Kentucky Supreme Court

Rules (“SCR”) 4.000, et seq. SCR 4.010(a) designates

the name of the commission as the Kentucky Judicial

Conduct Commission.

SCR 4.290 outlines judicial review of JCC proceedings. SCR 4.290(2) provides, “A notice of appeal of the

Commission’s final order shall be filed with the Clerk

of the Supreme Court within 10 days after service

of notice of the order upon the judge.”5 Additionally,

SCR 4.290(5) provides, “The Court shall have power to

affirm, modify or set aside in whole or in part the order

of the Commission[.]”6 As such, SCR 4.290 contemplates that only after the final order of the JCC

resolving all issues does this Court exercise direct

appellate review over JCC proceedings.

The language of SCR 4.290(1), which provides that

the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (“CR”) shall

apply to this Court’s appellate review of JCC orders to

the extent they are not inconsistent with SCR 4, further buttresses the point that we review only the final

orders of the JCC. CR 54.01 provides, “A final or

appealable judgment is a final order adjudicating all

the rights of all the parties in an action or proceed-

Ky. Const. § 121.

(emphasis added).

ing[.]” This Court has long held that appeals are allowed

only from final judgments.”7

The rules governing this Court’s review of JCC

proceedings only allow us to review the propriety of

those proceedings upon submission of the JCC’s final

order resolving the proceedings.8 Here though, the

JCC proceedings are ongoing; nothing in Judge Maze’s

JCC proceedings has been finally adjudicated. And

the three JCC rulings at issue in this direct appeal—

denial of a stay, denial of a continuance, and denial of

an additional informal hearing—are all interlocutory

in nature and do not constitute immediately appealable final judgments.9

But the JCC only challenges the procedural ability

of this Court to address the propriety of Judge Maze’s

argument regarding the JCC’s denial of her motion for

an additional informal hearing. The JCC argues that

Judge Maze’s challenge to the JCC’s denial of her

Cavalier Homes of Alabama v. Coleman, 181 S.W.3d 558, 559

(Ky. 2005) (citing CR 54.01; National Gypsum Company v. Corns,

736 S.W.2d 325 (Ky. 1987)).

Indeed, a review of our case law reveals that we have only

entertained appeals of JCC proceedings after the JCC has entered

its final order disposing of the entire matter. See e.g., Gormley u.

Judicial Conduct Comm’n, 332 S.W.3d 717, 720 (Ky. 2010); Aired

v. Corn., Judicial Conduct Comm’n, 395 S.W.3d 417, 423 (Ky.

2012); Kentucky Judicial Conduct Comm’n v. Woods, 25 S.W.3d

470, 471 (Ky. 2000).

See e.g., John Bourdeau, et al., American Jurisprudence,

4 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review § 146 (Feb. 2019 update) (“[A]n

order granting or refusing a continuance, postponement, or adjournment of the trial or other proceeding involved in a state civil case

is merely interlocutory in nature and nonappealable.”) (internal

citations omitted); Warper Mfg. Co. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 606 F.

Supp. 866, 867-68 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (denial of plaintiff’s motion to

have hearing not final appealable order).

motion for an informal hearing is an impermissible

issue for interlocutory review. The JCC is correct in

this assertion, so we decline to review the propriety of

the JCC’s denial of Judge Maze’s motion for an,

informal hearing.

Additionally, the JCC argues that this Court’s grant

of Judge Maze’s CR 76.33 Motion for Intermediate

Relief, which postponed the hearing scheduled for

December 3, 2018, renders moot her challenge of the

propriety of the JCC’s denial of her motion to continue

the December 3, 2018 hearing. The JCC is also correct

in this assertion—this Court’s granting of Judge Maze’s

CR 76.33 motion did, in fact, cancel the December 3,

2018 hearing.10 So all that is left for our review is

whether the JCC correctly denied Maze’s motion for a

stay.11

“The civil and regulatory laws of [government]

frequently overlap with the criminal laws, creating the

possibility of parallel civil and criminal proceedings,

either successive or simultaneous.”12 In this case,

Judge Maze’s JCC proceedings and her criminal prose10

“A ‘moot case’ is one which seeks to get a judgment . . . upon

some matter which, when rendered, for any reason, cannot have

any practical legal effect upon a then existing controversy.” Morgan

v. Getter, 441 S.W.3d 94, 98-99 (Ky. 2014) (quoting Benton v. Clay,

233 S.W. 1041, 1042 (Ky. 1921)) (emphasis in original).

Although we have concerns about the procedural validity of

Judge Maze’s appeal of this interlocutory order, we will nonetheless address the merits of her argument because no procedural

challenge was made by the JCC on this point.

SEC v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 628 F.2d 1368, 1374

(D.C. Cir. 1980) (internal citations omitted); see also White Collar

Crime, 1 White Collar Crime § 7:1, Simultaneous or successive

civil and criminal proceedings (July 2018 update) (internal citations omitted).

cution are pending at the same time. These parallel

proceedings appear to involve the same conduct on the

part of Judge Maze. Judge Maze sought by motion to

halt the JCC proceedings until her criminal prosecution concludes, but the JCC denied the motion.

“In the absence of substantial prejudice to the rights

of the parties involved, such parallel proceedings are

unobjectionable under our jurisprudence.”13 While “[t]he

Constitution . . . does not ordinarily require a stay of

civil proceedings pending the outcome of criminal proceedings[,] [n]evertheless, a court may decide in its

discretion to stay civil proceedings, postpone civil discovery, or impose protective orders and conditions ‘when

the interests of justice seem . . . to require such action,

sometimes at the request of the prosecution, . . . sometimes at the request of the defense[.]”14 “The Court

must make such determinations in the light of the particular circumstances of the case.”15

A secondary source describes the benefits and drawbacks of parallel proceedings:

Parallel proceedings benefit the government

in several ways. . . . These proceedings allow

civil and criminal agencies to share information. Furthermore, the regulatory agency

can use the criminal conviction of the defendant to dispose of the civil action.

Parallel proceedings can also benefit a defendant. The defendant may utilize a favorable

outcome in the civil action to avoid criminal

Dresser, 628 F.2d at 1374.

Dresser, 628 F.2d at 1374 (quoting United States v. Kordel,

397 U.S. 1, 12 (1970)).

Dresser, 628 F.2d at 1374.

charges or to dismiss the criminal case. The

defendant can use the liberal discovery rules

of civil procedure to obtain information about

the criminal case. However, parallel proceedings also pose problems for a defendant, such

as invocation of his Fifth Amendment right

against self-incrimination, the financial strain

of defending two suits, and the use of evidence

from the civil case in the criminal case.16

The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in Dresser offered

a compelling analysis for when a court should defer a

noncriminal proceeding occurring simultaneously with

a defendant’s criminal proceeding:

Other than where there is specific evidence of

agency bad faith or malicious governmental

tactics, the strongest case for deferring civil

proceedings until after completion of criminal

proceedings is where a party under indictment

for a serious offense is required to defend a

civil or administrative action involving the

same matter. The noncriminal proceeding, if

not deferred, might undermine the party’s

Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination, expand rights of criminal

discovery beyond the limits of [the Rules of

Criminal Procedure], expose the basis of the

defense to the prosecution in advance of

criminal trial, or otherwise prejudice the case.

If delay of the noncriminal proceeding would

not seriously injure the public interest, a

court may be justified in deferring it.. . In

some . . . cases, however, the courts may

adequately protect the government and the

White Collar Crime, supra note 12 (citations omitted).

private party by merely deferring civil discovery or entering an appropriate protective order.17

“The burden is on the party seeking the stay to show

‘pressing need for delay’ and that neither the other

party nor the public will suffer harm from entry of the

order.’”18 If a stay is granted, “[t]he stay must only be

entered for a certain period of time and must not ‘place

[the) case in limbo for years.’”19

“While there is no precise test . . . for determining

when a stay is appropriate, . . . courts commonly

consider factors such as: (1) the extent to which the

issues in the criminal case overlap with those presented in the civil case; (2) the status of the case,

including whether the defendants have been indicted;

(3) the private interests of the plaintiffs in proceeding

expeditiously weighed against the prejudice to plaintiffs caused by the delay; (4) the private interests of

and burden on the defendants; (5) the interests of the

courts; and (6) the public interest.”20 “Moreover, the

public interest in effective criminal prosecution generally outweighs any existing civil interests.”21 “In

addition to those factors, . . . courts ‘should consider

“the extent to which the defendant’s fifth amendment

Dresser, 628 F.2d at 1376 (citations omitted).

SEC v. Abdallah, 313 F.R.D. 59, 64 (N.D. Ohio 2016)

(quoting F.T.C. v. E.M.A. Nationwide, Inc., 767 F.3d 611, 627-28

(6th Cir. 2014); Ohio Envtl. Council v. US. Dist. Ct., S. Dist. of

Ohio, E. Div., 565 F.2d 393, 396 (6th Cir. 1977)).

Abdallah, 313 F.R.D. at 64 (quoting Ohio Envtl. Council, 565

F.2d at 396).

Abdallah, 313 F.R.D. at 64.

Id.

rights are implicated.” “The most important factor is

the balance of the hardships, but ‘[t]he . . court must

also consider whether granting the stay will further

the interest in economical use of judicial time and

resources. ‘“23

This Court has recently addressed the issue of

parallel proceedings and adopted a strikingly similar

test for determining whether civil proceedings should

be stayed pending resolution of concurrent criminal

proceedings.24 In Lehmann, the defendant was alleged

to have sexually abused young children.25 About a

month after the defendant was criminally indicted, the

alleged victims filed .a civil suit against the defendant.26 In determining whether the civil proceedings

should be stayed pending resolution of the criminal

proceedings, this Court discussed the issue of parallel

proceedings and how best to address it, using the

following factors as “strong guidance: (1) the extent

to which the evidentiary material in the civil and

criminal cases overlap; (2) the status of the criminal

proceeding; (3) the interests of any parties in staying

the civil proceeding; (4) the prejudice to any parties

E.M.A. Nationwide, 767 F.3d at 627 (quoting Keating v.

Office of Thrift Supervision., 45 F.3d 322, 324 (9th Cir. 1995);

Fed. Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Molinaro, 889 F.2d 899, 902 (9th

Cir. 1989)).

E.M.A. Nationwide, 767 F.3d at 627 (internal citations

omitted).

Lehmann v. Gibson, 482 S.W.3d 375 (Ky. 2016). One of the

dissents suggests that we rely on Lehmann to support our holding. To the contrary, we only cite Lehmann for its helpful

articulation of the rule regarding the staying of a civil proceeding

occurring simultaneously with a criminal proceeding.

Id. at 379.

Id.

10a

from staying the civil proceeding; [(5)] the interests of

persons that are not parties to the litigation; [(6)] court

convenience; and [(7)] the public interest in the

pending civil and criminal actions.”27

Although we deal here with parallel JCC and

criminal prosecution whereas Lehmann dealt with

parallel civil and criminal prosecution, the distinction

is immaterial for applying the Lehmann factors as a

helpful guide in determining whether Judge Maze’s

JCC proceedings should be deferred until resolution of

her criminal prosecution as she has requested. In view

of the important constitutional function assigned to

the JCC of ensuring public trust and confidence in the

integrity of the state’s court system, we additionally

note that the JCC’s process demands a high degree of

deference.

We recognize from the outset that the burden is upon

Judge Maze to prove that her circumstances require

that the JCC proceedings against her be deferred

during her criminal prosecution. Unquestionably, the

facts underlying the criminal prosecution appear to

overlap with the facts underlying the misconduct

charges against her in the JCC proceedings. So far in

the criminal prosecution, Judge Maze has been indicted,

arraigned on all charges, and pleaded not guilty. A

pretrial conference is now set for September 17, 2019,

and a trial date for November 12, 2019.

The JCC is the prosecuting party in the case before

us. The JCC is the constitutionally created body solely

responsible under state law for “the discipline, retirement or removal of justices of the Supreme Court

and judges of the Court of Appeals, circuit court and

district court under section 121 of the Constitution of

Id. at 384 (citations omitted).

11a

Kentucky[.]” “The purpose of Section 121 of our

constitution is the regulation of the conduct of those

persons charged with the administration of justice.”29

“The aim of [JCC] proceedings . . . is to improve the

quality of justice administered within the Commonwealth

by examining specific complaints of judicial misconduct, determining their relation to a judge’s fitness for

office and correcting any deficiencies found by taking

the least severe action necessary to remedy the

situation “30

As of now, Judge Maze has been on paid suspension

from her duties as circuit judge since October 2, 2018.

The JCC’s interests in proceeding without impediment include: (1) maintaining the integrity of the

state’s judicial system by the faithful discharge of its

constitutional mandate to regulate the conduct of persons responsible for the administration of justice in

this Commonwealth; and (2) disposing expeditiously of

all pending matters before the JCC within the time

constraints imposed by SCR 4,000, et seq. The JCC’s

interests correspond with the public’s interest in the

prompt resolution of the misconduct charges against

Judge Maze. The public’s interest further demands:

(1) minimizing disruption of routine court business to

the citizens of the 21st Judicial Circuit and the Commonwealth; (2) reducing the additional expenditure of

state funds for special judges deployed to the 21st

Judicial Circuit to continue the work of the court while

Judge Maze remains suspended; and (3) reducing

length of time Judge Maze receives a full judicial

Supreme Court Rule (“SCR”) 4.000.

Nicholson v. Judicial Ret, & Removal Comm’n, 562 S.W.2d

306, 308 (Ky. 1978).

Id.

12a

salary and benefits while incapable of performing any

judicial duties.

Judge Maze argues that she will suffer increased

difficulties because of the parallel criminal charges

and disciplinary charges: (1) the quandary of asserting

her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination

and defending herself fully in both proceedings; (2) the

financial strain of defending two suits; and (3) the

overlap of evidence from the disciplinary proceeding

allowing its use in the criminal case and vice versa.

These difficulties are no greater for Judge Maze than

for any judge confronting parallel disciplinary and

criminal charges. And any financial burden on Judge

Maze does not appear to increase if the JCC proceedings proceed without further delay.

It is difficult to ascribe great weight to Judge Maze’s

Fifth-Amendment and overlapping-evidence arguments

considering the numerous voluntary and arguably incriminating statements she made in two self-reporting

letters to the JCC and the arguably incriminating

statements she made in a TV interview in August

2018. More importantly, we fail to see how Judge

Maze’s Fifth Amendment rights are even impinged

upon in this case.

“The right against self-incrimination provides two

types of protection in criminal proceedings: (1) a

defendant cannot be compelled to testify, and (2) the

factfinder cannot draw adverse inferences by the

defendant’s refusal to testify.”31 The JCC has not

compelled Judge Maze to provide testimony in her

defense that gives rise to statements that could be

used against her, and even if it did, the trial court in

Barker, 379 S.W.3d at 124 (citing Griffith v. California, 380

U.S. 609 (1965)).

13a

her ‘criminal proceeding could prevent any such

compelled testimony from being used against her. Nor

will the trial court in her criminal proceeding allow

Judge’s Maze’s silence in her JCC proceedings to be

used against her.

Understandably, Judge Maze wants to be able to

defend herself in her JCC proceedings and prevent

those statements from being used against her in any

way in her criminal proceedings. “But the Constitution

does not forbid ‘every government-imposed choice in

the criminal process that has the effect of discouraging

the exercise of constitutional rights.”‘32 “It is well

settled that the government need not make the

exercise of the Fifth Amendment privilege cost free.”33

“Although a defendant may have a right, even of

constitutional dimensions, to follow whichever course

[s]he chooses, the Constitution does not by that token

always forbid requiring h[er] to choose.”34 “It does

no violence to the privilege that a person’s choice

to testify in h[er] own behalf may open the door to

otherwise inadmissible evidence which is damaging to

h[er] case.”35

Judge Maze remains free to assert her Fifth Amendment right in both her JCC and criminal proceedings.

Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 236 (1980) (quoting

Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 30 (1973)).

McKune v. Lilfe, 536 U.S. 24, 41 (2002) (Kennedy, J.,

dissenting) (citing Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 238; Williams v. Florida,

399 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1970)).

McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 213 (1971) (vacated

on other grounds by Crampton v. Ohio, 408 U.S. 941 (1972)).

Id. (citing Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 561 n.7 (1967);

Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948)).

14a

Our decision today should not be taken to preclude her

from doing so.

One of the dissents also suggests, With the public

fully protected, the JCC cannot constitutionally justify

not awaiting the outcome of the criminal proceedings.”

If the JCC suspended Judge Maze without pay, then

Justice Lambert’s position would be strengthened. But

with this statement, the dissent ignores the fact that

the longer the JCC proceedings are stayed, the more

taxpayer dollars will be paid to a non-working judge

and the temporary judges who must fill her role.

One of the dissents additionally relies on this

Court’s decision in Cornett v. Judicial Ret. & Removal

Cornm’n36 to support its argument that a stay on

Judge Maze’s JCC proceedings is warranted. But this

Court’s disposition in that case is the exact opposite

disposition that the dissent advocates for: “The order

of the Commission is reversed, and the cause remanded

to the Commission so that it can either await the

outcome of the federal appellate process or conduct an

independent hearing and make its own findings of

culpability and enter an appropriate order based on

them.”37 In other words, faced with this exact situation

in Cornett, this Court allowed the JCC to proceed with

its investigation and disposition.

In sum, the balance of equities in this case favors

allowing the JCC to move ahead with its disciplinary

proceedings. The overarching public interest in an

expedited resolution of disciplinary proceedings against

a sitting judge furthers the goal of maintaining the

public’s trust and confidence in the judiciary while, at

625 S.W.2d 564 (Ky. 1981).

Id. at 569 (emphasis added).

15a

the same time, minimizing expense and inconvenience

to the public. These interests outweigh the burden of

parallel proceedings suffered by Judge Maze. Upon

full review of the record, we hold that the JCC did not

err in denying Maze’s motion for a stay.

Accordingly, the Court ORDERS:

1. The JCC’s denial of Judge Maze’s Motion to Stay

is AFFIRMED.

2. Judge Maze’s challenge to the JCC’s denial of

Judge Maze’s Motion for a Continuance is DISMISSED

as MOOT.

3. Judge Maze’s challenge to the JCC’s denial of

Judge Maze’s Motion for an Informal Hearing is

DISMISSED.

All sitting. Minton, C.J.; Buckingham, Hughes, and

VanMeter, JJ., concur. Keller, J. dissents by separate

opinion which Lambert and Wright, JJ. join. Lambert,

J., dissents by separate opinion, which Keller and Wright,

JJ., join. Wright, J., dissents by separate opinion

which Keller and Lambert, JJ., join.

16a

KELLER, J., DISSENTING: I strongly agree with

Justice Wright that this matter is procedurally barred;

however, in light of the majority’s analysis on the the

merits of this appeal, I feel obligated to address the

merits and, specifically, the application of the factors

in Lehmann v. Gibson, 482 S.W.3d 375 (Ky. 2016).

I agree that the Lehmann factors provide helpful

guidance on the issue at hand, namely, whether Judge

Maze’s JCC proceedings should be stayed pending

resolution of her criminal prosecution.38 I disagree,

however, on the majority’s application of those factors

to the facts of this case.

The first factor noted in Lehmann is “the extent to

which the evidentiary material in the civil and criminal cases overlap.” Lehmann, 482 S.W.3d at 384 (quoting

State v. Deal, 740 N.W.2d 755, 765 (Minn. 2007)).

Though Lehmann does not discuss this factor in detail,

one of the federal eases it relies on, Maloney v. Gordon,

328 F. Supp. 2d 508 (D. Del. 2004) provides some

insight. That Court noted that “pie similarity of the

issues underlying the civil and criminal actions is

considered the most important threshold issue in

determining whether or not to grant a stay.” Id. at 511

(citation omitted). The Maloney Court then explained,

“The strongest case for deferring civil proceedings

until after completion of criminal proceedings is where

a party under indictment for a serious offense is

required to defend a civil action involving the same

matter.” Id. (citation omitted).

I understand that Lehmann and many of the cases it cites

deal specifically with a stay of discovery in a civil proceeding,

while this case involves the stay of the entire JCC proceeding;

however, I agree with the majority that the factors it outlines are

highly relevant and worthy of consideration.

17a

In this case, the majority notes, “Unquestionably,

the facts underlying the criminal prosecution appear

to overlap with the facts underlying the misconduct

charges against her in the JCC proceedings.” Given

the factual overlap in the two matters, the evidence

will undoubtedly overlap, as well. As Maloney points

out, these circumstances weigh heavily in favor of

staying the JCC proceeding until the criminal matter

has been resolved.

Lehmann next directs us to consider the status of

the criminal proceeding. This factor should not be

overlooked, as the status of the criminal case “can have

a substantial effect on the balancing of the equities.”

Id. at 512 (citation omitted). In fact, Maloney noted

that, “[i]f criminal indictments are returned against

the civil defendants, then a court should strongly

consider staying the civil proceedings until the related

criminal proceedings are resolved.” Id. (citations omitted). This is true because “[c]ivil proceedings, if not

deferred, can undermine a defendant’s rights, including

the privilege against self-incrimination under the

Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.”

Id. (citation omitted).

Here, not only have criminal indictments been

returned against Judge Maze, but her criminal trial

has been scheduled for November of this year. A stay

would therefore delay the JCC proceeding for only a

few months. The brevity of this delay weighs in favor

of entering the stay.

The third Lehmann factor, which is discussed in

detail by the majority, is “the interests of the parties

in staying the civil proceeding.” Lehmann, 482 S.W.3d

at 384 (quoting Deal, 740 N.W.2d at 765). I strongly

agree that the JCC has an interest in maintaining

the integrity of our judicial system by regulating the

18a

conduct of our judiciary, and I agree that the JCC

has an interest in efficiently resolving those matters.

However, keeping in mind the JCC’s priorities, the

Commission functions best when presented all relevant facts and arguments. Though we cannot predict

if and when Judge Maze will invoke her Fifth Amendment right, the failure to stay the JCC proceeding

necessarily means that she may soon be called to

testify. If she does invoke her Fifth Amendment right

to remain silent, the JCC will not have the benefit of

considering Judge Maze’s entire defense. Thus, the

JCC’s interest in regulating the conduct of the bench—

not only efficiently but effectively—weighs in favor of

a stay.

More importantly, the JCC’s interests in resolving

this matter do not outweigh Judge Maze’s interest in

asserting her fundamental constitutional right against

self-incrimination. This Fifth Amendment right is so

fundamental that it was enshrined in our nation’s Bill

of Rights and in our Commonwealth’s Constitution. It

is a constitutionally guaranteed right and, undoubtedly, it should be afforded great weight. Given the

importance of this interest, I cannot find that the

JCC’s interests in an expeditious proceeding outweigh

this fundamental right. Even without considering the

other interests identified by the majority (financial

strain and overlapping of evidence), this interest alone

is so strong that it is not outweighed by JCC’s interests

in a speedy administrative proceeding.

This analysis is not altered by Judge Maze’s voluntary self-reporting letters or her television interview.

The majority finds it “difficult to ascribe great weight”

to Judge Maze’s Fifth Amendment and overlappingevidence arguments due to her earlier decision to

make these statements. Essentially, then, the majority

19a

finds that Judge Maze’s Fifth Amendment right

against self-incrimination is weakened by her decision

to self-report and be interviewed. I disagree. The

statements at issue do not provide specific details of

the alleged criminal charges of forgery and tampering

with public records, nor do they contain admissions

of guilt. Simply put, these are not self-incriminating

statements. While they might provide a basis for

impeachment during the JCC proceedings or at trial,

they do not provide a basis for denying Judge Maze her

fundamental right against self-incrimination.

Lehmann also directs us to consider any prejudice to

the parties that may result from a stay. As I noted

above, a stay would delay the JCC proceeding only

until the resolution of the criminal trial, which is

scheduled for November 12, 2019. There is no evidence

that this short delay will lead to the loss of evidence or

witnesses or will otherwise prejudice the JCC in any

way. Judge Maze, on the other hand, will be greatly

prejudiced by the absence of a stay because she will be

forced to either invoke her Fifth Amendment right,

thereby weakening her ability to tell her side of the

story in her defense, or waive her Fifth Amendment

right, in which case she risks making incriminating

statements that can later be used against her at her

criminal trial. As Maloney explained, competing civil

and criminal proceedings force upon. a defendant the

difficult choice between asserting his or her right

against self-incrimination, thereby inviting prejudice

in the civil case, or waiving those rights, thereby

courting liability in the criminal case.” 328 F. Supp. 2d

at 513 (citation omitted). This is precisely the dilemma

Judge Maze will face in the absence of a stay.

The fifth factor to consider is the interests of nonparties, which, in this particular case, overlaps with the

20a

final Lehmann factor, the public interest. Again,

Maloney provides a persuasive explanation of these

factors, particularly in cases involving the misconduct

of public officials. That Court noted that “[t]he public

has a substantial interest in the integrity or lack of

integrity of those who serve them in public office.’” 328

F. Supp. 2d at 513 (quoting United States v. Smith, 776

F.2d 1104, 1114 (3d Cir. 1985)). It clarified, however,

that “[t]he public’s interest in the integrity of the

criminal case is entitled to precedence over the civil

litigant.” Id. (quoting Javier H. v. Garcia-Botello, 218

F.R.D. 72, 75 (W.D.N.Y. 2003)). In fact, in that case, a

stay of the civil proceeding benefited the public by

allowing the criminal prosecution of the Defendants,

who are public officials, to proceed unimpeded and

unobstructed by any concerns that may arise in discovery in the civil case.” “Furthermore,” the Maloney

Court explained, “while the public has a strong interest

in this case, the related criminal proceeding serves to

advance many of those same interests, especially given

the factual overlap between the cases.” Id. at 513-14.

In the present case, the majority notes that the

public interests in this case are both pragmatic and

financial. Specifically, the public has an interest in

seeing that routine court business is not disrupted, as

well as ensuring that taxpayer dollars are not unnecessarily expended on Judge Maze’s salary and the

special judges hired to stand in her place during her

suspension. I acknowledge that Judge Maze’s suspension with pay imposes a hardship on the taxpayers

overall and citizens of her circuit; however, the interest

in protecting taxpayer dollars, while strong, does not

outweigh the fundamental constitutional right against

self-incrimination. This proposition is especially applicable here, where avenues exist to allow for Judge

Maze’s suspension without pay.

21a

Lastly, I turn to the remaining Lehmann factor:

court convenience. Essentially, this factor requires us

to consider judicial economy and, more specifically,

whether a stay will unfairly burden either the JCC or

the trial court. Federal courts have found this factor to

be “deserving of substantial weight.” Microfinancial,

Inc. v. Premier Holidays Intl, Inc., 385 F.3d 72, 79 (1st

Cir. 2004). Here, Judge Maze does not ask for an indefinite stay of the JCC proceedings; she asks that it be

stayed only until the criminal matter has resolved.

That trial is scheduled for November of this year.

Thus, while the JCC may have a heavy case load, a

stay will delay this single proceeding by only a few

months. Accordingly, I cannot find that the requested

stay would overburden the JCC, nor can I see how it

would inconvenience the trial court. This factor

therefore weighs in favor of a stay.

Having carefully considered each of the Lehmann

factors, l cannot agree with the majority’s decision.

These factors weigh in favor of a stay, and none more

so than Judge Maze’s interest in asserting a fundamental constitutional right. I have written separately

not only to emphasize that factor, but because this

issue reaches well beyond the parameters of this particular case. The Fifth Amendment belongs to all

persons found within the United States of America

and the Commonwealth of Kentucky. That right should

not and cannot be diminished for judges or any other

person that finds themselves under similar scrutiny as

Judge Maze. Therefore, I dissent.

Lambert and Wright, JJ., join.

LAMBERT, J., DISSENTING: Although I join

Justice Wright’s dissent regarding the necessity to file

a writ to invoke our jurisdiction to hear this case,

because the Majority has chosen to address the merits,

22a

I feel compelled to address them as well and respectfully dissent. I would hold that the Fifth Amendment

protections afforded Judge Maze in her parallel

criminal proceeding would stay the Judicial Conduct

Commission (JCC) proceedings pending the outcome

of her criminal charges, which are also part of the JCC

complaint. Because of her fundamental constitutional

rights against self-incrimination in her criminal trial,

the procedures of the JCC must face a strict scrutiny

test under Carey v. Wolnitzek.39 and Republican Party

of Minnesota v. White.40 Because the public and the

judiciary are fully protected by the temporary

measures taken by the JCC and the Chief Justice,

there is no compelling state interest, thus the stay

pending her criminal case should be granted.

I am persuaded by the analysis of Cornett v. Judicial

Ret. and Removal Comm’n.41 In Cornett, District Judge

Cornett had been convicted in the United States

District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky

of two felony offenses. Id. Judge Cornett timely filed

an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for

the Sixth Circuit. Id. After Judge Cornett had been

indicted and prior to his conviction, the Chief Justice

signed an order appointing a special presiding judge

in the place and stead of Judge Cornett.42 Id. at 565.

Meanwhile, the JCC commenced an investigation under

614 F.3d 189 (2010).

536 U.S. 765 (2002).

625 S.W.2d 564 (Ky. 1982).

The Majority states that Judge Maze is “faced with this exact

situation in Cornett”. However, that is not the case. Judge Cornett,

who had also been suspended WITH pay pending his criminal

case, had already been convicted of his charges, before the JCC

attempted to permanently remove him from office.

23a

SCR 4.170 based on his indictment. Id. Proper notice

of that investigation and an opportunity for Judge

Cornett to be informally heard was given prior to his

criminal trial. Id. Judge Cornett did not appear at the

informal conference. Id. No further action was taken

by the JCC until after he was convicted. Id. The JCC

then scheduled another opportunity for Judge Cornett

to appear informally with counsel, but the Judge did

not appear. Id. On the scheduled date, the JCC

entered an order suspending Judge Cornett based on

his conviction in the United States District Court on

two counts of conspiracy and bribery. Id. at 565-66. A

formal hearing was scheduled thereafter. Id. at 566.

Judge Cornett attended that hearing in person without counsel and implored the JCC to defer a decision

on the charges made against him until after the criminal proceedings in federal court had been fully and

completely litigated. Id. The JCC refused to do so and

issued an order removing him from office. Id. Judge

Cornett appealed to the Kentucky Supreme Court. Id.

Citing Hazelrigg v. Douglass44—where three members of the Fiscal Court of Montgomery County,

Kentucky were convicted of malfeasance in office and

fined, then their offices forfeited and declared vacant—

the Cornett court discussed the status of a public

official who had been found guilty of a serious offense:

It is suggested that when a public official has

been indicted and found guilty of a grave

offense, and judgment has been pronounced

depriving him of the office in the conduct of

which he committed the malfeasance, he ought

Kentucky Supreme Court Rule.

104 S.W. 755 (Ky. 1907).

24a

not thereafter to be allowed by suspending

the judgment to discharge the duties of the

office during an appeal; thereby defeating the

course of the law that took from him the office

he had disgraced. A sufficient answer to this

is that, in the administration of justice, under

our procedure, no judgment of an inferior

tribunal can be deemed to finally adjudge the

rights of the parties when the person against

whom it is entered prosecutes within the time

and in the manner allowed by law an appeal

to a court having jurisdiction to revise it.

Neither public policy nor the ends of justice

would be promoted by denying to a public

official the right to test the validity of a

judgment against him; and it is difficult to

understand upon what principle it can be

maintained that such officer may appeal from

so much of the judgment as imposes a trifling

fine, fully protecting his rights by the execution of a bond, and yet be denied the more

important right to save his office until the

judgment of the lower court can be reviewed.

We further said:

Again, it would be giving to the convicted

officer very inadequate relief to say that lie

might appeal from the judgment vacating his

office, and yet be deprived of the office by the

judgment of the inferior court, although that

judgment might be reversed and entirely

set aside by the judgment of the appellate

court . . . .

Cornett, 625 S.W.2d at 567. This Court went on to

reason:

25a

In the instant proceeding, Judge Cornett has

implored the Commission to await the final

outcome of the criminal proceedings against

him in the federal courts. Would granting

Judge Cornett’s request in any way interfere

with the best interest of justice to be served?

Judge Cornett has been suspended from the

practice of law as an attorney. He cannot

therefore practice law. On January 10, 1980,

the Chief Justice of this court entered an

order authorizing the regular judge of the

Harlan Circuit Court assigned temporarily as

special presiding judge of the District Court

for the 26th Judicial District, with full and

exclusive authority and responsibility to conduct all proceedings now and hereafter pending

in that court. Judge Cornett was ordered to

release to the said circuit judge all of the

records and physical, facilities of the district

court. Consequently, for all intent and purposes Judge Cornett cannot sit as the District

Judge for the 26th Judicial District. Not being

able to practice law or to hold court, it can

hardly be in the best interest of justice that

Judge Cornett’s request that the Commission

withhold the entry of an order removing him

from office be denied. Judge Cornett’s appeal

to the United States Court of Appeals is still

pending. Consequently, there is no “conviction”

which could at this time form the basis for the

entry of an order removing him from office.

Id. at 568-69. Clearly, the JCC waited until after

Judge Cornett was convicted in his criminal trial

before it acted to permanently remove him from his

seat. Judge Cornett’s criminal trial took place in 1980

and he was temporarily removed with pay. But the

26a

JCC did not proceed with its hearing against Judge

Cornett until 1981, again, after his criminal trial was

over. Judge Maze should be entitled to the same

treatment.

In the same vein, in Nicholson v. Judicial Ret, &

Removal Comm’n, we noted that:

The purpose of Section 121 of our constitution

is the regulation of the conduct of those persons charged with the administration of justice.

The aim of proceedings instituted pursuant to

this section is to improve the quality of justice

administered within the Commonwealth by

examining specific complaints of judicial misconduct, determining their relation to a judge’s

fitness for office and correcting any deficiencies found by taking the least severe action

necessary to remedy the situation. The

target is not punishment of the judge.

Consequently, the action of the Commission

does not constitute a violation of the “ex post

facto” prohibitions of the federal and state

constitutions.45

The majority seems to give much weight to the

fact that Judge Maze has made “numerous voluntary

and arguably incriminating statement? in both her

self-reporting letters to the JCC and in a television

interview. But there may be some conflation of the

concepts of forgery of signatures versus completing

an order with notation for clerical distribution, and

562 S.W,2d 306, 308 (Ky. 1978) (emphasis added) (citing

Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960); DeVeau v. Braisted,

363 U.S. 144 (1960); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333 (1866); and

Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277 (1866)).

27a

Judge Maze has not admitted any bad faith in what

transpired.

Her criminal charges, which overlap the JCC charges,

are two counts of Second-Degree Forgery and one

count of Tampering with Public Records. These charges

are the result of her signing two orders for a drug

test on her ex-husband for two different hospitals.

Specifically, that on the first order she wrote “Bath Co.

Attorney” on the “Attorney for the Plaintiff” (Form

AOC-006-3, Rev. 6-88) line, which would have indicated that the Bath Co. attorney had seen the order

and agreed to its contents. On the second order, (same

vintage) she wrote “Commonwealth Att. & Bath Co.

Attorney” on the “Attorney for the Plaintiff’ signature

line. We now know that neither the Commonwealth’s

attorney nor the Bath County attorney saw or agreed

to the orders.

However, while Judge Maze fully admits to signing

these documents and making the notations in the

lower left segment of the single page form order, she

explained in her answer to the JCC’s counts that she

inadvertently completed those orders in the same way

she had completed other orders which were on the

more recent adaptations of a different AOC form order

she typically uses. Specifically, that she thought the

form she signed (AOC-006-3) was the same as the AOC

forms she had previously used (AOC-103-1) in that

the portion to be signed was a “Distribution.” The

“Distribution” portion on the AOC-103-1 form simply

tells the Circuit Clerk who the order should be mailed

to, when entered. While the “Seen by and order of

entry waived” portion of the AOC-006-3 form which

she completed is meant to signify that whoever’s signature is on that line has seen and agreed to the

contents of the order. These sections are both in the

28a

bottom left-hand corner of the forms, and Judge Maze

asserts that she “did not realize the wording on the

bottom of the [AOC-006-3] order was different.”

Second-Degree Forgery and Tampering with Public

Records are intent crimes. A person is guilty of SecondDegree Forgery when “with intent to defraud, deceive

or injure another, he falsely makes, completes or alters

a written instrument[.]”46 The Crime of Tampering

with Public Records is committed when a person:

(1) knowingly makes a false entry in or falsely alters

any public record; or (2) knowing he or she lacks the

authority to do so, intentionally destroys, mutilates,

conceals, removes, or otherwise impairs the availability of any public records; or (3) knowing he or she lacks

the authority to retain it, intentionally refuses to

deliver up a public record in his or her possession upon

proper request of a public servant lawfully entitled to

receive such record for examination or other purposes.47

It is of course not within our province to determine

the credibility of Judge Maze’s explanation. That is the

job of a fact-finder. But if the jury empaneled for her

criminal trial credits her defense she could potentially

be acquitted of her criminal charges because she asserts

she lacked the intent required to commit those crimes.

Therefore, respectfully, the great weight that the

Majority seems to place on her allegedly incriminating

statements which might make the case indefensible is

not well founded upon closer review.

I also respectfully disagree with the weight given to

the public interest in “reducing the length of additional time Judge Maze receives her full judicial salary

Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 616.030 (emphasis added).

KRS 519.060 (emphasis added).

29a

while incapable of performing her judicial duties.”

The interests of the public are fully protected during

this time through her temporary suspension and

with coverage of her duties by special judges. As the

Nicholson48 court noted, “The target is not the punishment of the Judge.”

Should Judge Maze be found guilty of misconduct

under the JCC proceedings, she is subject to discipline

which could potentially remove her from the office to

which she was elected. Her office would be declared

vacant and a special election would be held to fill the

remainder of her term which ends January 9, 2023.

The right to choose or pursue an occupation has

been held to be a substantial right and is protected by

the due process and equal protection clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment and subject to a rational basis

test. In Bruner v. Zawaki49, the Federal District Court

said:

Under the due process clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment, the state may not deprive a

citizen of life, liberty, or property without due

process of law. See U.S. Coast. Amend. XIV

§ 1. “The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action

of the government.” Cnty. of Sacramento v.

Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140

L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998). The Fourteenth Amendment “prohibits the government from imposing

impermissible substantive restrictions on individual liberty,” including the liberty interest

to pursue a chosen occupation. Craigmiles v.

Nicholson, 562 S.W.2d at 308.

997 F. Supp. 2d 691, 697-98 (E.D. Ky. 2014).

30a

Giles, 110 F.Supp.2d 658, 661 (2000), citing

Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 72021, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (1997);

Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 291-92, 119

S.Ct. 1292, 143 L.Ed.2d 399 (1999). Such a

liberty interest is subject to reasonable regulation by the state, and the “burden is on the

challenger to show that there is no rational

connection between the enactment and a legitimate government interest? Am. Express Travel

Related Servs. Co. v. Ky., 641 F.3d 685, 689

(6th Cir.201I) (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted).

Thus, the procedures of the JCC must at least meet

the rational basis test. With the public fully protected,

the JCC cannot constitutionally justify not awaiting

the outcome of the criminal proceedings. Judge Maze

has also asserted that there have been failures in the

JCC process which include the refusal for informal

conferences and the issuance of a subpoena for grand

jury transcripts without the required notice under the

applicable Supreme Court and criminal and civil rules.

Here, as in Cornett, both the JCC and the Chief

Justice protected the public interest and the integrity

of the judicial process by the temporary safeguards

i.e., temporary suspension and the appointment of

special judges to handle the judicial responsibilities.

Therefore, there is no prejudice to the JCC or the

public in staying the civil proceeding.

In weighing the individual constitutional rights of

Judge Maze against the JCC process, particularly

with her temporary suspension and the appropriate

actions of the Chief Justice in providing coverage of

her assigned cases, I cannot agree that the JCC pro-

31a

cess should outweigh Judge Maze’s Fifth Amendment

and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

And while the majority cites Lehmann v. Gibson,

482 S.W.3d 375 (Ky. 2016) as if it supports its holding,

through examination of its non-precise test,50 this

court in Lehmann actually upheld the lower court’s

deference to having the criminal prosecution case tried

first. The Lehmann. court emphasized the importance

of the criminal process and its heightened importance

in simultaneous civil and criminal proceedings:

The Commonwealth and public share a particularly weighty interest in protecting the

integrity of the criminal prosecution. The

degree to which the issues in the civil and

criminal proceedings overlap, then, is particularly important. The more overlap, “the

more likely that allowing civil discovery will

jeopardize the integrity of the criminal proceeding” as using that discovery may become

an “irresistible temptation” to gain an advantage

in the criminal proceeding.

Id. at 384 (internal footnotes omitted).

Here, the JCC can show no prejudice to its case

against Judge Maze by giving deference to the weightier

criminal prosecution at hand. No citizens are at risk of

We find it unnecessary to provide an exhaustive list of

factors for a trial court’s consideration, but we find these to be

strong guidance: (1) the extent to which the evidentiary material

in the civil and criminal cases overlap; (2) the status of the

criminal proceeding; (3) the interests of any parties in staying the

civil proceeding; (4) the prejudice to any parties from staying the

civil proceeding; [(5)] the interests of persons that are not parties

to the litigation; [(6)] court convenience; and [(7)] the public

interest in the pending civil and criminal actions.

32a

harm as the safeguards of temporary removal and

special judges are in place. Judge Maze has even been

banned from the courthouses except to appear in her

criminal cases. In fact, should Judge Maze be convicted, then the JCC case is greatly simplified. Yet

Judge Maze’s constitutional rights are on the line

here, in both the JCC and criminal cases. Should she

be improperly removed from office, there is no way to

adequately restore her to her position to which she has

been elected. Additionally, should the JCC remove her

permanently prior to her criminal trial, that fact could

be admitted against her in the criminal trial. At the

very least, should she testify at the JCC hearing, those

statements could be used against her in the criminal

trial. Therefore, I cannot join the majority.

Keller and Wright, JJ., join.

WRIGHT, J., DISSENTING: As the majority points

out, “[t]he rules governing this Court’s review of JCC

proceedings only allow us to review the propriety of

those proceedings upon submission of the JCC’s final

order resolving the proceedings.” (Emphasis added.)

However, since the JCC did not challenge this Court’s

procedural ability to address Judge Maze’s argument

concerning her motion for an additional informal hearing, the majority opinion addresses the merits of her

“appeal.” I dissent as this is in direct contradiction of

our rules and we lack appellate jurisdiction in this

matter.

Kentucky Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 4.290 addresses

the judicial review of decisions of the Judicial Conduct

Commission. Specifically, SCR 4.290(2) specifies that

“A notice of appeal of the Commission’s final order

shall be filed . . .” (Emphasis added.) Furthermore,

SCR 4.290(1) states that “To the extent applicable

and not inconsistent with SCR 4, the Rules of Civil

33a

Procedure (CR) applicable to other types of proceedings shall apply to the judicial review of Commission

orders by the Supreme Court.” Pursuant to CR 54.02,

“A final or appealable judgment is a final order adjudicating all the rights of all the parties in an action or

proceeding, or a judgment made final under Rule

54.02.”

As the majority admits, the order Judge Maze

requests this Court to appeal was not final. Therefore,

we should not review it as an appeal. Rather, this case

could have properly come to this Court as a writ action

pursuant to CR 76.36 which reads, in pertinent part:

“Original proceedings in an appellate court may be

prosecuted only against a judge or agency whose

decisions may be reviewed as a matter of right by that

appellate court.”

This is not a mere matter of splitting hairs; rather,

it is a jurisdictional dilemma that must be dealt with.

“Although the question is not raised by the parties or

referred to in the briefs, the appellate court should

determine for itself whether it is authorized to review

the order appealed from.” Hook v. Hook, 563 S.W.2d

716, 717 (Ky.1978). More recently, we have stated: “As

a preliminary matter, this Court’s jurisdiction to hear

this matter as a direct appeal must be addressed . . . .

Though neither party has raised or addressed the

issue, this Court must determine for itself that jurisdiction is proper.” Leonard v. Commonwealth 279 S.W.3d

151, 155 (Ky. 2009), citing Hubbard v. Hubbard, 303

Ky. 411, 412, 197 S.W.2d 923, 923 (1946) (“This question is not raised by the record, nor is it referred to in

the briefs, but jurisdiction may not be waived, and it

can not be conferred by consent of the parties. This

court must determine for itself whether it has jurisdiction.”). Here, the order in question is “plainly an

34a

interlocutory determination. . . It [is] not reviewable

by direct appeal.” Hook, 563 S.W.2d at 717.

This Court makes the rules—both SCR and CR—for

the orderly administration of justice. We should not

turn a blind eye to those rules in this case and allow

an appeal from a nonfinal order, lest we risk facing an

onslaught of such improper “appeals.” If we disregard

our rules, they become meaningless. Here, we lack

appellate jurisdiction and should not entertain this

case. For these reasons, I dissent and would dismiss

Judge Maze’s appeal as improper.

Keller and Lambert, JJ., join.

ENTERED: June 13, 2019.

/s/ [Illegible]

Chief Justice

35a

APPENDIX B

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

JUDICIAL CONDUCT COMMISSION

————

IN RE THE MATTER OF:

BETH LEWIS MAZE, CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE

21ST JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

————

ORDER

Upon due consideration of Judge Maze's Motion to

Stay Proceedings Pending Resolution of the Criminal

Prosecution and the Response filed by Counsel for

the Commission; Judge Maze's Motion to Continue

Hearing; and, Judge Maze's Motion for Opportunity to

Appear Informally, and the Commission being fully

advised and informed, it is hereby ordered that the

Motions be and are hereby DENIED.

Date: November 19th, 2018

/s/ Stephen D. Wolnitzek

STEPHEN D. WOLNITZEK, CHAIR

36a

APPENDIX C

SUPREME COURT OF KENTUCKY

————

2018-SC-000633-RR

————

BETH LEWIS MAZE, CIRCUIT JUDGE,

Appellant,

KENTUCKY JUDICIAL CONDUCT COMMISSION,

Appellee.

————

ORDER GRANTING MOTION

FOR IMMEDIATE RELIEF

After consideration of appellant Beth Maze’s motion

for Intermediate Relief pursuant to CR 76.33, and

the Kentucky Judicial Conduct Commission’s (“JCC”)

response thereto, it is hereby ORDERED:

1) Appellant’s motion is hereby GRANTED;

2) The JCC hearing scheduled for December 3, 2018

in Maze’s judicial conduct disciplinary proceeding is

STAYED pending a decision by this Court on the

merits of the above styled appeal;

3) Pursuant to SCR 4.290, appellant and the JCC

shall confer and file an abbreviated record with the

Court within 10 days of the date of this Order. Appellant’s brief shall be due 20 days from the date of the

filing of the abbreviated record with the Court. The

JCC’s brief shall be due 20 days from the date of the

filing of appellant’s brief. No reply brief shall be filed;

37a

4) After the filing of the briefs, the above-styled

appeal will stand submitted without oral argument.

ENTERED: November 30, 2018.

/s/ [Illegible]

Chief Justice

38a

APPENDIX D

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

JUDICIAL CONDUCT COMMISSION

————

IN RE THE MATTER OF:

BETH LEWIS MAZE, CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE

21ST JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

————

NOTICE OF FORMAL PROCEEDINGS

AND CHARGES

Notice is hereby given of the initiation of formal

proceedings under Rule 4.180 of Rules of the Supreme

Court. At the times set out in this Notice, you were

Circuit Court Judge for Kentucky’s 21st Judicial Circuit

consisting of Bath, Menifee, Montgomery, and Rowan

counties. The charges are as follows:

Count I

On September 18, 2017, you received information

that your ex-husband had been arrested on several

criminal charges including possession of a controlled

substance. You immediately made several attempts to

contact the Bath County Jailer, Earl Willis, to obtain

information on his arrest. After making contact with

Mr. Willis, you contacted pretrial services in an attempt

to secure a pretrial officer from outside of your judicial

circuit to conduct your ex-husband’s pretrial interview.

You then contacted District Judge William Roberts to

discuss the matter, only to be advised that neither he

nor Judge Donald Blair would preside and that the

matter would be referred to the Chief Regional Judge

for the appointment of a special judge.

39a

You then made contact with Jailer Willis again who

informed you that he was assisting your ex-husband in

obtaining a drug test from St. Joseph Hospital in

Mount Sterling, Kentucky. Jailer Willis informed you

that the hospital would not give your ex-husband a

drug test without a court order. In response, you issued

an Order to St. Joseph Hospital to perform the drug

screen. When St. Joseph refused to perform the drug

screen, you issued a second Order to Clark County

Medical Center in a second attempt to allow your exhusband to obtain the drug screen he desired.

Your actions violate SCR 4.020(1)(b)(i) and constitute misconduct in office. Furthermore, your actions

violate SCR 4.300 and the relevant portions of the

following Canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct, as

they existed at the time of the violation:1

• Canon 1 which requires judges to maintain high

standards of conduct and uphold the integrity

and independence of the judiciary.

• Canon 2A which requires judges to respect and

comply with the law and act at all times in a

manner that promotes public confidence in the

integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.

• Canon 2D which prohibits judges from lending

the prestige of judicial office to advance the

private interests of others.

• Canon 3B(7) which prohibits judges from initiating or considering ex parte communications

with parties.

The Canons cited by the Commission herein were the versions

in effect at the time of the violation. The provisions within the

cited Canons are now contained in Rules 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 2.9, and

2.11.

40a

• Canon 3E(1) which requires a judge to disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which

the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be

questioned.

Count II

On September 18, 2017, you issued two separate

Orders for a drug screen to St. Joseph Hospital and

Clark County Medical Center for the benefit of your exhusband. Neither of these Orders were included in the

official record or sent to the Bath County Attorney.

Your actions violate SCR 4.020(1)(b)(i) and constitute misconduct in office. Furthermore, your actions

violate SCR 4.300 and the relevant portions of the

following Canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct, as

they existed at the time of the violation:2

• Canon 1 which requires judges to maintain high

standards of conduct and uphold the integrity

and independence of the judiciary.

• Canon 2A which requires judges to respect and

comply with the law and act at all times in a

manner that promotes public confidence in the

integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.

• Canon 3E(1) which requires a judge to disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in

which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably

be questioned.

The jurisdiction of the Judicial Conduct Commission

in this matter is under SCR 4.020(1)(b)(i) and (v), and

(1)(c) which read in pertinent part as follows:

(1) Commission shall have authority:

(b) To impose the sanctions, separately

or collectively of (1) admonition, private

41a

reprimand, public reprimand or censure;

(2) suspension without pay or removal or

retirement from judicial office, upon any

judge of the Court of Justice or lawyer while

a candidate for judicial office, who after

notice and hearing the Commission finds

guilty of any one or more of the following:

(i) Misconduct in office.

(v) Violation of the code of Judicial

Conduct, Rule 4.300.

judge whom it finds to lack the constitutional statutory qualifications for the

judgeship in question.

For your information, the Commission wishes to call

your attention to the following Supreme Court Rule:

RULE 4.180 FORMAL PROCEEDINGS

If the Commission concludes that formal

proceedings should be initiated, it shall notify

the judge. He may file an answer within 15

days after service of the notice. Upon the filing

of his answer, or the expiration of time for so

filing, the Commission shall set a time and

place for the hearing and shall give reasonable notice thereof to the judge.

Please mail your answer to: Ms. Jimmy Shaffer,

Executive Secretary, Kentucky Judicial Conduct

Commission, P.O. Box 4266, Frankfort, Kentucky

40604-4266.

May 21st, 2018.

/s/ Stephen D. Wolnitzek

STEPHEN D. WOLNIRZEK, CHAIR

42a

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

JUDICIAL CONDUCT COMMISSION

————

IN RE THE MATTER OF:

BETH LEWIS MAZE, CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE

21ST JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

————

ANSWER

* * *

Comes Beth Lewis Maze, by counsel, and for her

Answer to the Notice of Formal Proceedings and

Charges, states as follows:

1. Judge Maze admits she contacted and received

information from Bath County Jailer, Earl Willis. Mr.

Willis was unsure whether Judge Maze’s ex-husband

was going to be arrested or issued a citation.

2. Judge Maze admits she contacted pre-trial services for the purpose of alerting pretrial services that

the local pretrial worker might have to seek outside

assistance from a worker in a different judicial circuit

to avoid a conflict.

3. Judge Maze admits she contacted Judge Roberts

to alert him what was going on about a potential

conflict.

4. Judge Maze called the Jailer to determine whether

her ex-husband was being arrested or cited. Mr. Willis

responded that he believed the ex-husband was being

cited.

5. Jailer Willis contacted and requested Judge Maze

to issue an order for St. Joseph Hospital to perform a

43a

drug test on her ex-husband. Judge Maze initially

refused.

6. Jailer Willis advised Judge Maze that St. Joseph

Hospital had refused to perform the test.

7. Jailer Willis then proceeded to take the exhusband to Clark Regional Medical Center at the

request of the ex-husband.

8. While in route to the Clark County Jail, Jailer

Willis drove by both hospitals.

9. Jailer Willis then called Judge Maze and advised

her that he would need another order to have a drug

test performed,

10. Judge Maze issued a second order which Jailer

Willis told Judge Maze was thrown in the trash by

Clark Regional Medical Center, as the hospital advised

Jail Willis that a doctor’s order was needed, not a court

order.

11. Judge Maze states that she never intended to

bestow any benefit upon her ex-husband by ordering

these drug tests.

12. Judge Maze believes any person under similar

circumstance as her ex-husband has a right to have a

drug test performed, regardless of what the test results

might produce, in order to preserve evidence because

evidence can be dissipated if not preserved timely.

13. Judge Maze believed that the exigent circumstances presented to her qualifies as an exception to

the Canons she is charged with violating, specifically

Rule 2.11, comment 3.

[3] The rule of necessity may override the

rule of disqualification. For example, a judge

might be required to participate in judicial

44a

review of a judicial salary statute, or might be

the only judge available in a matter requiring

immediate judicial action, such as a hearing

on probable cause or a temporary restraining

order. In matters that require immediate

action, the judge must disclose on the record

the basis for possible disqualification and make

reasonable efforts to transfer the matter to

another judge as soon as practicable,

14. Judge Maze’s purpose as Chief Judge for the

21st. Judicial Circuit in contacting pretrial and Judge

Roberts was to minimize the burden on other court

personnel by alerting them to the conflict to avoid late

hour inconvenience.

15. Judge Maze never requested that Judge Roberts,

Pretrial, or the Jailer take any action on behalf of her

ex-husband,

Respectfully,

/s/ Thomas E. Clay

THOMAS E. CLAY

CLAY DANIEL WINNER, LLC

917 Lily Creek Road

Louisville, KY 40243

(502) 561-2005

tclay@tclaylaw.com

45a

APPENDIX E

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

JUDICIAL CONDUCT COMMISSION

————

IN RE THE MATTER OF:

BETH LEWIS MAZE, CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE 21ST

JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

————

AMENDED NOTICE OF FORMAL

PROCEEDINGS AND CHARGES

Notice is hereby given of the initiation of formal

proceedings under Rule 4.180 of Rules of the Supreme

Court. At the times set out in this Notice, you were

Circuit Court Judge for Kentucky’s 21st Judicial Circuit

consisting of Bath, Menifee, Montgomery, and Rowan

counties. The charges are as follows:

Counts I and II in the May 21, 2018 Notice of Formal

Proceedings and Charges are incorporated by reference and reaffirmed as if fully set forth herein.

Count III

On September 18, 2017, you issued two separate

Orders for a drug screen to St. Joseph Hospital and

Clark County Medical Center, respectively. On the

first Order, you wrote “Bath Co. Attorney” on the

“Attorney for the Plaintiff” signature line, indicating

that the Bath County Attorney had seen and agreed to

the Order and its contents. On the second Order, you

wrote “Commonwealth Att. & Bath Co. Attorney” on

the “Attorney for the Plaintiff’ signature line, indicating that both attorneys had seen and agreed to the

Order and its contents. You additionally signed Michael

46a

Campbell’s name on the “Attorney for Defendant”

signature line.

Both the Commonwealth and County Attorneys have

denied ever seeing or agreeing to the above-referenced

Orders and there is no indication that you had authorization to sign either their names or that of Michael

Campbell to the September 18, 2017 Orders.

Your actions violate SCR 4.020(1)(b)(1) and constitute misconduct in office. Furthermore, your actions

violate SCR 4.300 and the relevant portions of the

following Canons of the Code of judicial Conduct, as

they existed at the time of the violation:1

• Canon 1 which requires judges to maintain high

standards of conduct and uphold the integrity

and independence of the judiciary.

• Canon 2A which requires judges to respect and

comply with the law and act at all times in a

manner that promotes public confidence in the

integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.

• Canon 3B(2) which requires judges to be

faithful to the law and maintain professional

competence in it.

Count IV

Throughout the preliminary investigation of this

matter, up to and including your most recent correspondence with the Commission, you failed to disclose

your actions as described in Count Ill to the Commission.

Your actions violate SCR 4.020(1)(b)(1) and constitute misconduct in office. Furthermore, your actions

The Canons herein were the versions in effect at the time of

the violation. The provisions within the cited Canons are now

contained in Rules 1.1, 1.2, and 2.5.

47a

violate SCR 4.300 and the relevant portions of the

following Canons of the Code of judicial Conduct, as

they existed at the time of the violations:2

• Rule 2.16 which requires judges to cooperate

with the Commission, which includes acting

candidly and honestly.

The jurisdiction of the judicial Conduct Commission

in this matter is under SCR 4.020(1)(h)(i) and (v), and

(1)(c) which read in pertinent part as follows:

(1) Commission shall have authority:

(b) To impose the sanctions, separately

or collectively of (1) admonition, private

reprimand, public reprimand or censure;

(2) suspension without pay or removal or

retirement from judicial office, upon any

judge of the Court of Justice or lawyer while

a candidate for judicial office, who after

notice and hearing the Commission finds

guilty of any one or more of the following;

(i) Misconduct in office.

(v) Violation of the code of Judicial

Conduct, Rule 4.300.

judge whom it finds to lack the constitutional statutory qualifications for the

judgeship in question.

For your information, the Commission wishes to call

your attention to the following Supreme Court Rule:

The Rules herein were the versions in effect at the time of the

violation, having become effective on January 1, 2010.

48a

RULE 4.180 FORMAL PROCEEDINGS

If the Commission concludes that formal

proceedings should be initiated, it shall notify

the judge. He may file an answer within 15

days after service of the notice. Upon the

tiling of his answer, or the expiration of time

for so filing, the Commission shall set a time

and place for the hearing and shall give

reasonable notice thereof to the judge.

Please mail your answer to: Ms. Jimmy Shaffer,

Executive Secretary, Kentucky Judicial Conduct

Commission, P.O. Box 4266, Frankfort, Kentucky

40604-4266.

September 10th, 2018

/s/ Stephen D.Wolnitzek

STEPHEN D. WOLNITZEK, CHAIR

49a

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

JUDICIAL CONDUCT COMMISSION

————

IN RE THE MATTER OF:

BETH LEWIS MAZE, CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE

21ST JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

————

ANSWER

* * *

Comes Judge Beth Lewis Maze and for her answer

to Charges III and IV and states as follows:

1. Judge Maze signed her name on the orders referenced in Counts I and II.

2. Judge Maze inadvertently completed these two

orders in the same manner she had completed other

orders which were on a different AOC form Order. (See

Ex, 1 attached hereto.)

3. Judge Maze did not complete either order with

any intent to deceive or mislead anyone.

4. Judge Maze was not aware of the issue charged

in Counts III and IV until she saw the report on WLEX

television at 11:00 p.m. on August 6, 2018.

5. The two AOC forms differ on the information

contained in the lower left corner, AOC Form 103-1

(Rev. 8-97) contains “Distribution:” The purpose of

distribution is to tell the Circuit Clerk who to mail the

orders to if entered. AOC Form 006-3 (Rev, 6-88) states

“Seen by and order of entry waiver.” (Ex, 2 and 3)

6. Judge Maze took the old orders to her residence

when she was cleaning out the circuit judge’s office in

50a

Rowan County in June, 2011, in preparation of the

move to the new judicial center and did not realize the

wording on the bottom of the older order was different.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS 24th DAY OF

SEPTEMBER, 2018,

/s/ Thomas E. Clay

THOMAS E. CLAY, P.S.C.

CLAY DANIEL WINNER, LLC

917 Lily Creek Road

Louisville, KY 40243

(502) 561-2005

tclay@tclaylaw.com

* Please note new mailing address*

51a

EXHIBIT 1

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

TWENTY-FIRST JUDICIAL

COURT

County

Case No.

PLAINTIFF

vs.

DEFENDANT(S)

ORDER

This matter coming on to be heard

and the Court being advised, IT IS HEREBY

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED, AS FOLLOWS, TOWIT:

this

day of

, 19

Judge

Distribution:

Attorney for Plaintiff

Attorney for Defendant(s)

52a

EXHIBIT 3

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

Court of Justice

————

Case No.

Court District

County Bath

————

Commonwealth of Ky

Plaintiff,

vs.

Donald Maze

Defendant(s).

————

ORDER

This matter coming on to be heard by the Bath Circuit

Court

and the Court being advised, IT IS HEREBY

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED, AS FOLLOWS, TOWIT:

A drug test shall be conducted by the hospital at St.

Joseph in Mt. Sterling Kentucky.

This 18 day of September, 2017.

/s/ Beth Lewis Maze

Judge

Seen by and order of entry waived:

Commonwealth Att. & Bath Co. Attorney

Attorney for Plaintiff

Michael Cambell

Attorney for Defendant(s)

53a

EXHIBIT 2

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

Court of Justice

————

Case No.

Court District

County Bath

————

Commonwealth of Ky

Plaintiff,

vs.

Donald Maze

Defendant(s).

————

ORDER

This matter coming on to be heard

and the Court being advised, IT IS HEREBY

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED, AS FOLLOWS, TOWIT:

A drug test shall be conducted by a hospital facility.

This 18 day of Sept., 2017.

/s/ Beth Lewis Maze

Judge

Seen by and order of entry waived:

Bath Co Attorney

Attorney for Plaintiff

Attorney for Defendant(s)

54a

APPENDIX F

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

BATH CIRCUIT COURT

CRIMINAL DIVISION

————

CASE NO. 18-CR-00059

————

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

vs.

LAURA LEWIS MAZE, AKA: BETH LEWIS MAZE,

Defendant.

————

INDICTMENT

Date of Birth: 02/28/1963

License #:

KY M95-078-455

LKA:

860 Wyoming Rd., Owingsville, KY 40360

Height:

Weight:

Hair:

Eyes:

Race:

Sex:

District Court File Number:

THE GRAND JURY OF BATH COUNTY CHARGES

that on or about September 18, 2018, in Bath County,

Kentucky, the above-named defendant, while acting

alone or in complicity with another, unlawfully committed the offenses of

COUNT I: FORGERY SECOND DEGREE, in violation of KRS 516.030, a Class D Felony, violation code

25212, by falsely making, completing, or altering, a

55a

public record or instrument filed or required or authorized by law to be filed in or with a public office or public

employee; or a written instrument officially issued or

created by a public office, public employee or governmental agency;

COUNT II: FORGERY SECOND DEGREE, in violation of KRS 516.030, a Class D Felony, violation code

25212, by falsely making, completing, or altering, a

public record or instrument filed or required or authorized by law to be filed in or with a public office or public

employee; or a written instrument officially issued or

created by a public office, public employee or governmental agency;

COUNT III: TAMPERING WITH PUBLIC RECORDS,

in violation of KRS 519.060; a Class D Felony, violation code 01012, by knowingly making a false entry

in or falsely altering a public record; or knowingly

lacking the authority to do so, intentionally destroys,

mutilates, conceals, removes, or otherwise impairs the

availability of any public records;

ALL AGAINST THE PEACE AND DIGNITY OF THE

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY.

A TRUE BILL.

/s/ [Illegible]

FOREPERSON

All other charges, if any, bound over with this case

and not indicted herein are a No True Bill.

Presented by the foreperson, in the preset e of the

Grand Jury, to the Court and filed in open Court by

me this, the 1 day of November, 2018.

CIRCUIT COURT CLERK

BY: [Illegible]

56a

GRAND JURY WITNESS: Det. Chad Bowling,

KSP DESI East

Earl Willis,

Bath County Jailer

Hon. Michael Campbell

57a

APPENDIX G

SUPREME COURT OF KENTUCKY

————

2018-SC-000633-RR

————

BETH LEWIS MAZE. CIRCUIT JUDGE,

Appellant,

KENTUCKY JUDICIAL CONDUCT COMMISSION,

Appellee.

————

ORDER GRANTING STAY PENDING REVIEW BY

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

On motion of the appellant, Beth Lewis Maze.

pursuant to CR 76 44(b), a stay of execution and

enforcement of this Court’s Opinion and Order entered

June 13, 2019. which became final on June 25, 2019,

is granted for a period of ninety (90) days to and

including September 23, 2019. in order that Beth

Lewis Maze may make application to the Supreme

Court of the United States for a Writ of Certiorari.

Additional stays should be obtained from the United

States Supreme Court.

Further action before the Judicial Conduct Commission in Maze’s judicial conduct disciplinary proceeding

is similarly stayed pending the filing of a Petition for

Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court of the

United States

ENTERED: August 30th, 2019

/s/ Michelle M. Keller

JUSTICE MICHELLE M. KELLER

/s/ Debra Hembree Lambert

JUSTICE DEBRA HEMBREE LAMBERT

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.