Amicus Curiae Brief — Larry Benzon, Warden, Petitioner v. Troy Michael Kell

No. 19-239

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

____________________________________

LARRY BENZON, WARDEN, UTAH STATE PRISON,

Petitioner,

v.

TROY MICHAEL KELL,

Respondent.

____________________________________

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United

States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

____________________________________

BRIEF OF INDIANA, ALABAMA, GEORGIA,

IDAHO, KANSAS, LOUISIANA, MONTANA,

NEBRASKA, OHIO, SOUTH CAROLINA,

AND SOUTH DAKOTA AS AMICI CURIAE

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

____________________________________

Office of the Indiana

Attorney General

IGC South, Fifth Floor

302 W. Washington St.

Indianapolis, IN 46204

(317) 232-6255

Tom.Fisher@atg.in.gov

*Counsel of Record

Counsel for Amici States

CURTIS T. HILL, JR.

Attorney General of

Indiana

THOMAS M. FISHER*

Solicitor General

KIAN J. HUDSON

Deputy Solicitor General

JULIA C. PAYNE

JESSE R. DRUM

Deputy Attorneys General

Additional counsel listed with signature block

i

CAPITAL CASE

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether a district court’s order staying and abeying a capital prisoner’s habeas corpus petition under

Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005), is immediately

appealable under the collateral-order doctrine.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED ....................................... i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................... iii

INTEREST OF THE AMICI STATES .................... 1

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ...... 2

I.

As the Court Predicted in in Rhines,

Capital Petitioners Regularly Abuse the

Stay-and-Abeyance Procedure ......................... 4

II.

Immediate Appeals Would Mitigate the

Harm from Abusive Rhines Stays and

Prevent Further Abuse .................................... 9

III. The Court Can Authorize Immediate

Appeals of Capital Rhines Stays and

Should Do So .................................................. 12

CONCLUSION ....................................................... 14

APPENDIX ............................................................. 1a

Table Listing Published Rhines Stays in

Capital Cases from March 30, 2005 to

March 30, 2010 ............................................... 1a

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

California v. Rooney,

483 U.S. 307 (1987) ..............................................10

Crump v. Filson,

No. 2:07-cv-0492-APG-CWH (D. Nev.

Mar. 23, 2017), ECF No. 86 ...................................7

Crump v. Filson,

No. 2:07-cv-0492-APG-CWH (D. Nev.

Mar. 23, 2017), ECF No. 90 ...................................7

Crump v. McDaniel,

No. 2:07-cv-0492-PMP-PAL, 2008 WL

4660137 (D. Nev. Oct. 17, 2008) ............................6

Crump v. State,

716 P.2d 1387 (Nev. 1986) .................................5, 6

Crump v. State,

No. 63346, 2016 WL 1204502 (Nev. Mar.

25, 2016) .............................................................6, 7

Crump v. State,

No. 76051, 2018 WL 5291454 (Oct. 18,

2018) .......................................................................7

Horn v. Quarterman,

508 F.3d 306 (5th Cir. 2007)..............................8, 9

iv

CASES [CONT’D]

Kell v. Crowther,

No. 2:07-cv-00359-CW, 2017 WL

5514173 (D. Utah Nov. 16, 2017) ..................11, 12

Lafferty v. Crowther,

No. 2:07-CV-322, 2015 WL 6875393 (D.

Utah Oct. 30, 2015) ..............................................12

Neville v. Dretke,

423 F.3d 474 (5th Cir. 2005)................................11

Steele v. Woodford,

No. 2:03-cv-00143-GEB-CKD (E.D. Cal.

June 30, 2015), ECF No. 253 .................................8

People v. Steele,

47 P.3d 225 (Cal. 2002) ..........................................8

Picard v. Connor,

404 U.S. 270 (1971) ..............................................10

Rhines v. Weber,

346 F.3d 799 (8th Cir. 2003)................................12

Rhines v. Weber,

544 U.S. 269 (2005) ...................................... passim

Riner v. Crawford,

415 F. Supp. 2d 1207 (D. Nev. 2006)...................11

Roper v. Simmons,

543 U.S. 551 (2005) ................................................9

v

CASES [CONT’D]

Steele v. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab.,

No. S147651 (Cal. Jan. 24, 2007) ..........................8

Steele v. Ornoski,

No. 2:03-cv-0143-GEB-KJM, 2006 WL

2844123 (E.D. Cal. 2006) .......................................8

Thompson v. Frank,

599 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2010)................................7

Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 420 (2000) ................................................2

STATUTES

28 U.S.C. § 2254 ..........................................................2

1

INTEREST OF THE AMICI STATES1

The States of Indiana, Alabama, Georgia, Idaho,

Kansas, Louisiana, Montana, Nebraska, Ohio, South

Carolina, and South Dakota respectfully submit this

brief as amici curiae in support of the petitioner.

In Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005), this Court

held that federal district courts may stay “mixed” habeas petitions—that is, petitions with exhausted and

unexhausted claims—to allow habeas petitioners to

present their unexhausted claims in state court before

returning to federal court. The Court held, however,

that such stays are appropriate only in in “limited circumstances,” cautioning in particular that capital petitioners “might deliberately engage in dilatory tactics to prolong their incarceration and avoid execution

of the sentence of death.” Id. at 277–78. The Amici

States have a strong interest in preventing and correcting abusive Rhines stays, which they can do only

through immediate appeals. In its decision below,

however, the Tenth Circuit held that States cannot

immediately appeal Rhines stays—even in capital

cases, where the risk and cost of abusive stays are

greatest. The Amici States submit this brief to explain

why the Court should grant Utah’s petition and hold

that Rhines stays in capital cases are immediately appealable.

1 Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.2(a), counsel of record for

all parties received notice of Amici States’ intention to file this

brief at least 10 days prior to the due date of this brief.

2

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

This Court has long “been careful to limit the scope

of federal intrusion into state criminal adjudications”

in light of “the principles of comity, finality, and federalism.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000).

And in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Congress advanced these principles by circumscribing when federal courts may

grant habeas relief from state criminal judgments. Id.

Specifically, Congress sought to reserve to state

courts the opportunity to adjudicate constitutional

claims in the first instance and sought “to ‘reduce delays in the execution of state and federal criminal sentences, particularly in capital cases.’” Rhines v. Weber,

544 U.S. 269, 276 (2005) (quoting Woodford v.

Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206 (2003)). To these ends,

AEDPA requires habeas petitioners to exhaust claims

in state court before raising them in federal court and

imposes a one-year statute of limitations on petitions.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (d); Rhines, 544 U.S. at 274–

75. As a result, when habeas petitioners file “mixed”

petitions combining exhausted and unexhausted

claims they “run the risk of forever losing their opportunity for any federal review of their unexhausted

claims.” Id. at 275.

In Rhines, the Court considered whether district

courts can relieve petitioners of this risk by staying

and abeying the federal habeas proceeding to allow

the petitioner to present the unexhausted claims in

state court before returning to federal court. The

Court noted that the stay-and-abeyance procedure facilitates federal review of constitutional claims, but,

3

“if employed too frequently, has the potential to undermine the[] twin purposes” of AEDPA: It “frustrates

AEDPA’s objective of encouraging finality by allowing

a petitioner to delay the resolution of the federal proceedings . . . [and] undermines AEDPA’s goal of

streamlining federal habeas proceedings by decreasing a petitioner’s incentive to exhaust all his claims

. . . .” Id. at 277. Balancing these considerations, the

Court held that stay-and-abeyance is appropriate

only in “limited circumstances”: where “the petitioner

had good cause for his failure to exhaust, his unexhausted claims are potentially meritorious, and there

is no indication that the petitioner engaged in intentionally dilatory litigation tactics.” Id. at 277–78. The

Court emphasized that capital cases require special

care because “capital petitioners might deliberately

engage in dilatory tactics to prolong their incarceration and avoid execution of the sentence of death.” Id.

The Court’s prediction that capital petitioners

would abuse Rhines stays to delay their executions

has proven correct. District courts have delayed numerous executions by issuing stays based on plainly

meritless claims. Making things worse, many circuit

courts—including the Tenth Circuit below—have held

that Rhines stays are not immediately appealable,

even in capital cases like Rhines.

These decisions are directly contrary to Rhines,

which assumed that appellate courts would have jurisdiction to review stay-and-abeyance orders; Rhines

itself was an interlocutory appeal from a stay, and the

Court remanded to the Court of Appeals to apply the

new test. Id. at 279. And these decisions are not only

4

wrong; they also seriously and uniquely harm States,

because Rhines stays, which are often based on meritless claims, irreparably delay executions; if States

cannot appeal such stays, circuit courts cannot correct

district courts’ misinterpretations of Rhines. The

Court should grant Utah’s petition for a writ of certiorari to vindicate AEDPA’s purposes and restore the

careful balance the Court struck in Rhines.

I.

As the Court Predicted in Rhines, Capital

Petitioners Regularly Abuse the Stay-andAbeyance Procedure

In Rhines the Court recognized that “not all petitioners have an incentive to obtain federal relief as

quickly as possible. In particular, capital petitioners

might deliberately engage in dilatory tactics to prolong their incarceration and avoid execution of the

sentence of death.” Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269,

277–78 (2005). The Court’s prediction was accurate.

Capital petitioners routinely abuse the stay-andabeyance procedure, delaying and sometimes entirely

foreclosing States from executing lawful sentences.

For example, in the first five years following

Rhines, federal district courts granted stays in at

least twenty-six capital cases.2 Even though Rhines

2 This total includes the orders available on Westlaw; district

courts may have granted more stays in unpublished orders. To

capture how state courts evaluated the claims underlying the

Rhines stays, this analysis focuses on orders issued within the

first five years after Rhines, which ensures that most of the poststay state-court proceedings have been completed.

5

requires federal district courts to deny stays if the unexhausted claims are “plainly meritless,” id. at 277,

state courts denied relief in more than two-thirds of

these cases: eighteen out of twenty-six. These claims

were rejected by state courts in eight states that span

five federal circuits. (Out of the remaining eight cases,

State courts granted relief in six, and two are still

pending in state court). See Appended Table. That

such a high percentage of these stays were premised

on claims that state courts later rejected suggests

that federal district courts are misapplying Rhines. It

also underscores the widespread, unnecessary harms

that unappealable stays impose on States: Rhines

stays prevented the execution of final judgments in

some of these States’ most heinous criminal cases

without furthering any purpose but delay, and this

outcome could easily have been avoided if the States

had been able to immediately appeal the stays.

Take, for example, the case of Thomas Crump.

When Crump was serving a life sentence in New Mexico for murdering his wife, he confessed to murdering

and robbing an escort in Las Vegas in 1980. See

Crump v. State (“Crump I”), 716 P.2d 1387, 1388

(Nev. 1986). The police had found the victim’s naked

body in a motel bathtub, her arms and legs bound

with pantyhose and a ligature made from knotted

strips of pillowcase around her neck. Id. In Crump’s

confession, he said, “No crime of murder, of violence

is justifiable, but in my estimation it was. . . . She deserved what she got, and I don’t feel no remorse over

it. . . . I could have obtained my money without killing

her. I just wanted to kill her. . . . It[’]s an eye for an

eye. . . . I premeditated. I knew I was going to kill her

6

and I did.” Id. He later confessed to committing “(1)

seven murders, (2) seven attempted murders, and (3)

innumerable robberies, assaults, and kidnappings.

Crump additionally confessed that he had participated in a prison uprising in which a prison guard

was taken hostage and killed. He had also escaped

from a New Mexico jail.” Id. He admitted that he

would escape again if he could, that prison time did

not affect him, and that he would hurt someone else.

Id. He said, “I would like the death penalty because I

deserve it. . . . I don’t want to hurt nobody else.” Id.

Crump was sentenced to death in 1984, and his judgment became final in 1986. Crump v. McDaniel

(“Crump II”), No. 2:07-cv-0492-PMP-PAL, 2008 WL

4660137, at *1 (D. Nev. Oct. 17, 2008). From 1987 to

2007, he pursued state post-conviction relief. Id.

After Crump exhausted his state-court remedies,

he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court in April 2007. Id. One year later, he

moved for a Rhines stay to raise three additional unexhausted claims: that he was mentally incompetent

to be executed, that one of the aggravating circumstances for the death penalty was improper, and that

a jury instruction given at his trial was erroneous. Id.

at *3–4. The district court granted his motion over Nevada’s objection. Id. at *4.

Back in state court, Crump pursued a second

round of post-conviction proceedings from 2008 until

2016. Crump v. State (“Crump III”), No. 63346, 2016

WL 1204502, at *1 (Nev. Mar. 25, 2016), cert. denied,

137 S. Ct. 596. When the case finally arrived in the

Supreme Court of Nevada, the court concluded that

7

“Crump’s postconviction petition for a writ of habeas

corpus is subject to several procedural bars.” Id. It

“was untimely.” Id. (citing Nev. Rev. Stat. §

34.726(1)). It was “successive.” Id. (citing Nev. Rev.

Stat. § 34.810(2)). It “constituted an abuse of the

writ.” Id. (citing Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.810(1)(b)). And

“the State pleaded laches.” Id. Because Crump could

not demonstrate cause and prejudice to excuse his

procedural default, the court affirmed the denial of

his petition. Id. at *2–5. Under any interpretation of

Rhines, that should have been Crump’s last trip to

state court.

On March 23, 2017, however, the district court

continued Crump’s Rhines stay, again over Nevada’s

objection, so that he could exhaust yet another claim

in state court. Order Granting Mot. to Lift Stay,

Crump v. Filson, No. 2:07-cv-0492-APG-CWH (D.

Nev. Mar. 23, 2017), ECF No. 86. Nevada could not

appeal because the Ninth Circuit has held that the

collateral-order doctrine does not apply to Rhines

stays. See Thompson v. Frank, 599 F.3d 1088, 1090

(9th Cir. 2010).

Crump’s state-court proceedings were still pending on June 15, 2018, more than three decades after

his judgment became final, when he died of natural

causes at the age of seventy-eight. See Order Dismissing Case, Crump v. Filson, No. 2:07-cv-0492-APGCWH (D. Nev. July 18, 2018), ECF No. 90; Crump v.

State, No. 76051, 2018 WL 5291454 (Oct. 18, 2018). A

Rhines stay had prevented Nevada from executing a

sentence that no court had ever found to be unlawful.

8

Nevada is not the only State that was stymied

from executing a lawful capital sentence by a Rhines

stay. In California, Raymond Steele was sentenced to

death for his second murder: in 1971 he stabbed to

death a fifteen-year-old babysitter, and in 1988 he

stabbed and strangled to death a developmentally disabled woman, who “had the skills of . . . maybe a 10

year old,” after paying her for sex. People v. Steele, 47

P.3d 225, 230–31 (Cal. 2002) (internal quotation

marks omitted), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1115 (2003). He

received a stay on September 29, 2006 to exhaust

thirty-seven claims in state court. Steele v. Ornoski,

No. 2:03-cv-0143-GEB-KJM, 2006 WL 2844123, at

*12 (E.D. Cal. 2006). On January 24, 2007, the Supreme Court of California concluded that all of the

claims were meritless and that most of them were procedurally defaulted. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus

Denied, Steele v. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., No. S147651

(Cal. Jan. 24, 2007).3 On April 22, 2015, while Steele’s

federal proceedings were still pending, he died in

prison. Order, Steele v. Woodford, No. 2:03-cv-00143GEB-CKD (E.D. Cal. June 30, 2015), ECF No. 253.

To be sure, not all Rhines stays are abusive. Patrick Horn’s case is a good example. He was sentenced

to death for a murder that he committed when he was

seventeen years old. Horn v. Quarterman, 508 F.3d

306, 307–08 (5th Cir. 2007). He filed his petition for a

writ of habeas corpus before this Court ruled that a

Available at https://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/

case/dockets.cfm?dist=0&doc_id=1879329&doc_no=

S147651&request_token=NiIwLSIkTkw2WyBFSCI9UEtIQEQ0UDxfJyMuXz9TICAgCg%3D%3D.

3

9

death sentence for a juvenile offender is unconstitutional in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).

Horn, 508 F.3d at 307, 311. After Roper, he sought a

Rhines stay, which the district court appropriately

granted so that Horn could raise his Roper claim in

state court—which ultimately commuted his sentence

to life. Id. at 307–08, 311. But Horn is an exceptional

case; as the Table appended to this brief shows,

Rhines stays are much more often based on claims

that state courts go on to reject.

Abusive Rhines stays can prevent States from carrying out lawful sentences—sometimes for years and

sometimes forever. This is precisely contrary to this

Court’s reasoning in Rhines, where the Court was

careful to ensure that the stay-and-abeyance procedure does not undercut one of the principal purposes

of AEDPA: “to ‘reduce delays in the execution of state

and federal criminal sentences, particularly in capital

cases.’” Rhines, 544 U.S. at 276 (quoting Woodford v.

Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206 (2003)). To reaffirm that

Rhines stays should not be used to delay lawful executions, and to restore the balance between petitioners’ interests and States’ interests, the Court should

grant certiorari and hold that stay-and-abeyance orders are immediately appealable.

II.

Immediate Appeals Would Mitigate the

Harm from Abusive Rhines Stays and

Prevent Further Abuse

An immediate appeal is a State’s only opportunity

to redress abusive Rhines stays. If the Rhines stay is

not immediately appealable, the State will be unable

10

to challenge the propriety of the stay regardless of the

ultimate disposition of the habeas petition: If the district court ultimately denies habeas relief, the State

cannot appeal at all, see, e.g., California v. Rooney,

483 U.S. 307, 311 (1987) (per curium), and if the district court grants relief, the decision to grant a stay

will be moot because once a petitioner has exhausted

his state-court remedies, they remain exhausted,

even if the Rhines stay was improper, see Picard v.

Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971) (citations omitted)

(“[O]nce the federal claim has been fairly presented to

the state courts, the exhaustion requirement is satisfied.”). And in any event, a delayed appeal cannot cure

the harms imposed by the stay. The only way to secure the State’s ability to correct and remedy improper Rhines stays is immediate appeal, which protects the State’s interest in finality and helps prevent

future abuses of the stay-and-abeyance procedure.

Immediate appeals are essential to vindicating the

States’ interest in finality. Of course, the appeal of a

Rhines stay will take some time, but it will invariably

take longer for a petitioner to exhaust new claims

through the entire state-court system than it will take

a State to convince a federal circuit court that the district court abused its discretion in ordering a stay. See

Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 279 (2005) (remanding

to determine “whether the District Court’s grant of a

stay . . . constituted an abuse of discretion”). At the

very least, States should be given the opportunity to

weigh their prospects on interlocutory appeal against

the potential delay in state court in each case.

11

In addition, immediate appeals will prevent further Rhines abuse by permitting appellate courts to

provide further explication of when such stays are appropriate; without immediate appeals the development of doctrine under Rhines is currently stunted in

the majority of circuits. For example, district courts

are split on the standard for “good cause.” Id. at 277.

Some courts have held that the standard is the same

as the standard for procedural default; some courts

have held that it is lower; and at least one court has

held that it lands somewhere in between. Riner v.

Crawford, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1209–10 (D. Nev.

2006) (collecting cases). Courts also disagree about

whether ineffective assistance of post-conviction

counsel is good cause. Id. at 1210–11 (collecting

cases).

In addition to confusion about the “good cause”

standard, federal courts inconsistently apply the

“plainly meritless” standard. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 278.

In Rhines, the Court held that “the district court

would abuse its discretion if it were to grant [the petitioner] a stay when his unexhausted claims are

plainly meritless.” Id. at 277. The delay caused by

Rhines stays is equally pointless when the claim underlying the stay is barred by state procedural rules—

as they often are, as the cases of Thomas Crump and

Raymond Steele illustrate. The Fifth Circuit recognized this in Neville v. Dretke, 423 F.3d 474, 480 (5th

Cir. 2005), when it held that the petitioner’s “unexhausted claims are ‘plainly meritless’ because he is

now procedurally barred from raising those claims in

state court.” Yet the district court in this case would

“not address possible state court time and procedural

12

bars” to determine whether the claims purportedly

justifying the Rhines were plainly meritless. Kell v.

Crowther, No. 2:07-cv-00359-CW, 2017 WL 5514173,

at *3 (D. Utah Nov. 16, 2017); see also Lafferty v.

Crowther, No. 2:07-CV-322, 2015 WL 6875393, at *5

(D. Utah Oct. 30, 2015) (refusing to consider state procedural bars as part of the “potentially meritorious”

analysis). Litigants and lower courts are much more

likely to find clarity on these important issues if

States can immediately appeal.

III.

The Court Can Authorize Immediate

Appeals of Capital Rhines Stays and

Should Do So

As Utah argues in its petition, the collateral-order

doctrine applies to Rhines stays. The Court implicitly

acknowledged this in Rhines when it decided the case

after the Eighth Circuit exercised jurisdiction under

the collateral-order doctrine. See Rhines v. Weber, 346

F.3d 799 (8th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (“We have jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine to review

an interlocutory order holding a habeas petition in

abeyance pending exhaustion of state court remedies.” (citing Carmichael v. White, 163 F.3d 1044,

1045 (8th Cir. 1998)). If the Eighth Circuit had been

wrong about the collateral-order doctrine, then this

Court would not have had jurisdiction to decide the

case, and the Eighth Circuit would not have had jurisdiction to apply the new test on remand. See Rhines

v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 279 (2005) (remanding to determine “whether the District Court’s grant of a stay

. . . constituted an abuse of discretion”).

13

The availability of immediate appeals is also implicit in the Court’s reasoning. First, the Court held

that “the district court would abuse its discretion if it

were to grant [the petitioner] a stay when his unexhausted claims are plainly meritless,” id. at 277, and

abuse of discretion is an appellate standard of review.

Second, the Court explicitly recognized that the stayand-abeyance procedure needed to balance two competing interests: Petitioners want the federal courts

to review all of their claims without missing AEDPA’s

statute of limitations. Id. at 275. And States want finality in their judgments. Id. at 276. For a petitioner

to protect his interests, he can request a Rhines stay.

Id. at 277. For a State to protect its interests, it can

appeal. To hold otherwise would upset the careful balance that the Court struck in Rhines.

The Tenth Circuit’s holding would also lead to too

many Rhines stays in capital cases, which this Court

warned would “undermine the[] twin purposes” of

AEDPA. Id. After all, if a capital petitioner has every

reason to “deliberately engage in dilatory tactics,” id.

at 277, and the State has no defense, why would the

petitioner exhaust all of his claims in state court before filing his habeas petition? Perversely, the petitioners with the least meritorious claims would have

the most incentive to abuse Rhines stays. Even in the

first five years after Rhines, before capital petitioners

knew how lower courts would dismantle its reasoning,

they employed this strategy. See Appended Table.

Reaffirming that the collateral-order doctrine applies to Rhines stays will fully align Rhines with

AEDPA. To prevent capital petitioners from abusing

14

the stay-and-abeyance procedure, States need authority to immediately appeal. The Court should grant

Utah’s petition to authorize States to immediately appeal Rhines stays.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Office of the Indiana

Attorney General

IGC South, Fifth Floor

302 W. Washington St.

Indianapolis, IN 46204

(317) 232-6255

Tom.Fisher@atg.in.gov

CURTIS T. HILL, JR.

Attorney General

THOMAS M. FISHER*

Solicitor General

KIAN J. HUDSON

Deputy Solicitor General

JULIA C. PAYNE

JESSE R. DRUM

Deputy Attorneys

General

Counsel for Amici States

*Counsel of Record

Dated: September 23, 2019

15

ADDITIONAL COUNSEL

Counsel for Amici States

STEVE MARSHALL

Attorney General

State of Alabama

TIMOTHY C. FOX

Attorney General

State of Montana

CHRISTOPHER M. CARR

Attorney General

State of Georgia

DOUGLAS J. PETERSON

Attorney General

State of Nebraska

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN

Attorney General

State of Idaho

DAVE YOST

Attorney General

State of Ohio

DEREK SCHMIDT

Attorney General

State of Kansas

ALAN WILSON

Attorney General

State of South Carolina

JEFF LANDRY

Attorney General

State of Louisiana

JASON R. RAVNSBORG

Attorney General

State of South Dakota

APPENDIX

1a

Appendix

Published Rhines Stays in Capital Cases from

March 30, 2005 to March 30, 2010

Petitioner

Citation

1. Patrick

Horn

Horn v. Dretke, 2005

WL 3003504 (E.D.

Tex. Nov. 8, 2005)

(stay granted June 27,

2005)

Rhines v. Weber, 408

F. Supp. 2d 844

(D.S.D. 2005)

King v. Dretke, 2006

WL 887488 (E.D. Tex.

Mar. 29, 2006)

Prystash v. Quarterman, 2006 WL

2479094 (S.D. Tex.

Aug. 25, 2006)

Steele v. Ornoski, 2006

WL 2844123 (E.D. Cal.

Sept. 29, 2006)

Alvarez v. Ayers, 2006

WL 3531750 (E.D. Cal.

Dec. 7, 2006)

Vieira v. Ayers, 2007

WL 38028 (E.D. Cal.

Jan. 4, 2007)

2. Charles

Rhines

3. John

King

4. Joseph

Prystash

5. Raymond

Steele

6. Manuel

Alvarez

7. Richard

Vieira

Statecourt

relief?

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

2a

Petitioner

8. Victor

Taylor

Citation

Taylor v. Simpson,

2007 WL 141052 (E.D.

Ky. Jan. 17, 2007)

9. Anibal

Canales v. QuarterCanales

man, 2007 WL 922150

(E.D. Tex. Mar. 23,

2007)

10. Zane

Floyd v. McDaniel,

Floyd

2007 WL 1231734 (D.

Nev. Apr. 25, 2007)

11. Gerald

Hand v. Houk, 2007

Hand

WL 2852360 (S.D. Oh.

Oct. 1, 2007)

12. Karl

Roberts v. Norris, 526

Roberts

F. Supp. 2d 926 (E.D.

Ark. 2007)

13. NathaJackson v. Houk, 2008

nial Jackson WL 1805800 (N.D. Oh.

Apr. 18, 2008)

14. William Speer v. Dretke, 2008

Speer

WL 2065798 (E.D.

Tex. May 13, 2008)

15. Kelly

Rhyne v. McDaniel,

Rhyne

2008 WL 2165955 (D.

Nev. May 21, 2008)

16. Colin

Dickey v. Ayers, 2008

Dickey

WL 2131564 (E.D. Cal.

May 21, 2008)

Statecourt

relief?

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

Pending

No

3a

Petitioner

17. Seifullah AbdulSalaam

Citation

Abdul-Salaam v.

Beard, 2008 WL

2704605 (M.D. Penn.

Jul. 7, 2008)

18. Zane

Fields v. Klauser, 2008

Fields

WL 3992255 (D. Idaho

Aug. 27, 2008)

19. Thomas Crump v. McDaniel,

Crump

2008 WL 4660137 (D.

Nev. Oct. 17, 2008)

20. Edward Beets v. McDaniel,

Beets

2009 WL 212424 (D.

Nev. Jan. 23, 2009)

21. Rickey

Newman v. Norris, 597

Newman

F. Supp. 2d 890 (W.D.

Ark. 2009)

22. Travers Greene v. McDaniel,

Greene

2009 WL 311168 (D.

Nev. Feb. 6, 2009)

23. Steven

Catlin v. Wong, 2009

Catlin

WL 1026057 (E.D. Cal.

Apr. 15, 2009)

24. Roderick Rankin v. Norris, 2009

Rankin

WL 1973475 (E.D.

Ark. Jul. 8, 2009)

25. Glen

Cornwell v. Ayers,

Cornwell,

2009 WL 2171089

Jr.

(E.D. Cal. Jul. 17,

2009)

Statecourt

relief?

No

No

No

Yes

(agreed

resolution)

Yes

No

No

Pending

No

4a

Petitioner

26. Paul

Johnson

Citation

Johnson v. Sec’y, Dep’t

of Corr., No. 8:09-cv2065-T-27TGW, 2009

WL 3486024 (M.D.

Fla. Oct. 28, 2009)

Statecourt

relief?

Yes