Opposition Brief — City of Flint, Michigan, et al., Petitioners v. Shari Guertin, et al.

Supreme Court briefDec 16, 2019

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NOS. 19-205, 19-350

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

CITY OF FLINT, ET AL.,

v.

Petitioners,

SHARI GUERTIN, ET AL.,

Respondents.

______________

STEPHEN BUSCH, ET AL.,

v.

Petitioners,

SHARI GUERTIN, ET AL.,

Respondents.

______________

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO

PETITIONS FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

MYLES MCGUIRE

PAUL T. GESKE*

STEVEN HART

HART, MCLAUGHLIN & ELDRIDGE, LLC

*COUNSEL OF RECORD

MCGUIRE LAW, P.C.

55 WEST WACKER DRIVE, 9TH FL.

CHICAGO, IL 60601

(312) 893-7002

MMCGUIRE@MCGPC.COM

PGESKE@MCGPC.COM

121 W. WACKER DR.

SUITE 1050

CHICAGO, IL 60607

(312) 955-0545

SHART@HMELEGAL.COM

{ ADDITIONAL COUNSEL LISTED ON INSIDE COVER }

COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENTS

DECEMBER 16, 2019

SUPREME COURT PRESS

♦

(888) 958-5705

♦

BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

ADDITIONAL COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENTS

JOHN SAWIN

DAVID E. HART

SAWIN LAW FIRM, LTD.

MADDIN, HAUSER, ROTH &

HELLER, P.C.

55 WEST WACKER DRIVE, SUITE 900

CHICAGO, IL 60601

(312) 853-2490

JSAWIN@SAWINLAWYERS.COM

SCOTT MORGAN

MORGAN LAW FIRM, LTD.

55 WEST WACKER DR., SUITE 900

CHICAGO, IL 60601

(312) 327-3386

SMORGAN@SMORGAN-LAW.COM

SECOND FLOOR ESSEX CENTRE

28400 NORTHWESTERN HWY.

SOUTHFIELD, MI 48034

(248) 827-1884

DHART@MADDINHAUSER.COM

i

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether Respondents’ allegations plausibly

establish that Michigan and Flint officials acted with

deliberate indifference and thus violated Respondents’

constitutional right to bodily integrity by knowingly

contaminating Respondents’ drinking water with lead

and harmful bacteria, and then repeatedly lying about

evidence of the contamination, causing Respondents

and other Flint residents to unknowingly and involuntarily ingest poisonous substances over a period of

months.

2. If so, whether Respondents’ bodily integrity

rights were clearly established under the circumstances,

because a reasonable official would have been on

notice that it is not constitutionally permissible to

knowingly poison the drinking water for an entire

city’s population.

3. Whether Flint was an “arm of the state” for

Eleventh Amendment purposes merely because it

was under the control of a state-appointed emergency

manager, where Michigan law made clear that Flint,

and not the state, would be responsible for paying

any judgment.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ........................................ i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................... iii

INTRODUCTION ....................................................... 1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................... 5

A. The Facts .......................................................... 5

B. Proceedings Below ......................................... 11

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT .................. 16

I.

THE DENIAL OF THE INDIVIDUAL PETITIONERS’

MOTIONS TO DISMISS DOES NOT WARRANT

REVIEW ............................................................ 17

A. There Is No Conflict Among the Circuits .. 18

B. The Sixth Circuit’s Correct, Fact-Specific

Holding That the Complaint States a

Claim Does Not Merit Review .................. 22

II. THE DENIAL OF THE CITY’S MOTION TO

DISMISS ON ELEVENTH AMENDMENT GROUNDS

DOES NOT WARRANT REVIEW .......................... 33

III. THIS CASE IS A POOR VEHICLE FOR REVIEW .... 35

CONCLUSION.......................................................... 36

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Page

Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662 (2009) ............................................. 5

Benzman v. Whitman,

523 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2008) ................... 20, 21, 22

Boler v. Earley,

865 F.3d 391 (6th Cir. 2017) .............................. 18

Boler v. Governor,

923 N.W.2d 287 (Mich. Ct. App. 2018) . 15, 30, 34

Carthan v. Earley, Nos. 19-1425, 19-1472,

19-1477, 19-1533 (6th Cir.) ............................. 4, 36

City of Escondido v. Emmons,

139 S.Ct. 500 (2019) .......................................... 31

Collins v. City of Harker Heights,

503 U.S. 115 (1992) ..................................... 19, 20

Concerned Citizens of Nebraska v.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n,

970 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1992) ............................. 19

Coshow v. City of Escondido,

132 Cal.App.4th 687 (2005) ................................ 20

County of Sacramento v. Lewis,

523 U.S. 833 (1998) .................................... passim

DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) ............................... 24

Ernst v. Rising,

427 F.3d 351 (6th Cir. 2005) ......................... 33, 34

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Farmer v. Brennan,

511 U.S. 825 (1994) ........................................... 27

Foli v. Metro. Water Dist. of S. California,

592 F. App’x 634 (9th Cir. 2015) ....................... 20

Greene v. Plano Indep. Sch. Dist.,

103 F. App’x 542 (5th Cir. 2004).......................... 19

Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp.,

513 U.S. 30 (1994) .............................................. 34

Hood v. Suffolk City Sch. Bd.,

469 F. App’x 154 (4th Cir. 2012) ....................... 19

Hope v. Pelzer,

536 U.S. 730 (2002) .......................... 15, 16, 31, 32

In re Flint Water Cases,

384 F.Supp.3d 802 (E.D. Mich. 2019) ................. 4

Johnson v. Jones,

515 U.S. 304 (1995) ....................................... 3, 35

Kaucher v. County of Bucks,

455 F.3d 418 (3d Cir. 2006) .............................. 19

Lincoln County v. Luning,

133 U.S. 529 (1890) ............................................ 33

Lombardi v. Whitman,

485 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2007) ..................... 20, 21, 22

Mays v. Governor,

926 N.W.2d 803 (Mich. 2019) ........................ 4, 36

Pearson v. Callahan,

555 U.S. 223 (2009) ..................................... 3, 8, 9

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Regents of the Univ. of California v. Doe,

519 U.S. 425 (1997) ........................................... 34

Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding,

557 U.S. 364 (2009) ..................................... 14, 31

Salazar-Limon v. City of Houston,

137 S.Ct. 1277 (2017) ........................................ 35

United States v. Lanier,

520 U.S. 259 (1997) ......................... 14, 31, 32, 33

Washington v. Glucksberg,

501 U.S. 702 (1997) ............................................ 12

Washington v. Harper,

494 U.S. 210 (1990) ........................................... 18

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

U.S. Const. amend. IX .............................................. 19

U.S. Const. amend. XI ...................................... passim

U.S. Const. amend. XIV.......................................... 2, 11

STATUTES

42 U.S.C. § 1983 ......................................................... 11

Mich. Comp. L. § 141.1552(dd) ................................. 34

Mich. Comp. L. § 141.1560(5) ..................................... 34

Mich. Comp. L. § 141.1572 ......................................... 34

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

JUDICIAL RULES

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) .............................................. 11

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) .............................................. 11

Sup. Ct. R. 10 ............................................................. 35

REGULATIONS

40 C.F.R. § 141.82(a)................................................. 28

40 C.F.R. § 141.82(c)(1)............................................. 28

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Erica L. Green,

Flint’s Children Suffer in Class After

Years of Drinking the Lead-Poisoned

Water, N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 2019,

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/06/us/

politics/flint-michigan-schools.html ................... 2

Office of Gov. Rick Snyder,

Flint Water Advisory Task Force, Final

Report 28 (Mar. 2016),

https://goo.gl/HJfmwh ....................................... 29

Sarah Childress,

We Found Dozens of Uncounted Deaths

During the Flint Water Crisis. Here’s How,

Frontline, Sept. 10, 2019,

https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/

interactive/how-we-found-dozens-ofuncounted-deaths-during-flint-watercrisis/ .................................................................... 2

1

INTRODUCTION

In 2014, state and local officials in Michigan rushed

the transition of Flint’s drinking water source from

Lake Huron to the unsafe Flint River. While Flint’s

residents had previously received safe, clean, fresh

water from Lake Huron for years, the Flint River was

known to be corrosive—it was 19 times more corrosive

than the water that residents were previously receiving,

and it was replete with deadly bacteria, including E.

coli, Legionella, and other harmful substances.

When the officials changed the source of Flint’s

drinking water, they did not adequately treat the

water or add corrosion-control chemicals as required

under EPA regulations. They did this to save money.

Petitioners each played key roles in those decisions

and their aftermath. And they pressed forward with

the switch even when their own employees warned

them that Flint’s water treatment plant was not ready

to handle the river’s corrosive water.

In the 18 months after the switch, as evidence

mounted of serious harm caused by lead contamination,

Legionnaire’s disease, and other results of corrosion,

Petitioners rejected multiple opportunities to reconnect

Flint to Lake Huron. Further, Petitioners repeatedly

lied to the EPA and the public about the safety of Flint’s

drinking water. As a result, many Flint residents do

not have potable water to this day and continue to

experience serious harms to their health.1

1 See, e.g., Erica L. Green, Flint’s Children Suffer in Class After

Years of Drinking the Lead-Poisoned Water, N.Y. Times, Nov.

2

In this action, Flint residents seek accountability

from those who personally caused, extended, and

exacerbated Flint’s water crisis. This case, however,

is still at a very early stage of proceedings. The case

comes to this Court at the pleadings stage. The district

court denied Petitioners’ motions to dismiss, and the

Sixth Circuit affirmed on an interlocutory appeal. After

a careful analysis, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the

extensive allegations state a claim for an “executive

abuse of power” that invaded Respondents’ right to

bodily integrity in a way that “shocks the conscience”

and thus violates the Fourteenth Amendment. County

of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846-847 (1998).

See Flint Pet.App.19-43. As Judge Sutton observed

in his concurrence in the denial of rehearing en banc,

“[t]his is not a barebones complaint based on implausible allegations. It comes in at 89 pages. And it offers

plenty of details that at least plausibly allege public

acts of recklessness and intentional misbehavior.” Id.

at 213. The court determined that Petitioners’ acts of

deliberate indifference were so egregious that “[a]ny

reasonable official should have known” that their conduct would “constitute[] conscience-shocking conduct

prohibited by the substantive due process clause.” Id.

at 46.

Petitioners attempt to re-frame this case as involving mere negligence or poor judgment. Flint Pet.4, 6,

21; Busch Pet.4, 30. Although Petitioners may wish

6, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/06/us/politics/flintmichigan-schools.html; Sarah Childress, We Found Dozens of

Uncounted Deaths During the Flint Water Crisis. Here’s How,

Frontline, Sept. 10, 2019, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/

interactive/how-we-found-dozens-of-uncounted-deaths-duringflint-water-crisis/.

3

to dispute the substance of Respondents’ allegations,

they may not do so while this case is at the motion to

dismiss stage, where Respondents’ factual allegations

are accepted as true, and all reasonable inferences are

drawn in their favor. Petitioners’ arguments improperly

seek to resolve factual questions on the pleadings. As

Judge Gibbons observed in her concurrence in the

denial of rehearing en banc, “at this stage in the

proceeding, it is better to find out what facts will

eventually be before the district court.” Flint Pet.App.

203. That conclusion accords with this Court’s holding

that interlocutory appeals in qualified immunity cases

may not be used to resolve “fact-related dispute[s].”

Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 307 (1995).

Even if this Court were inclined to think that the

issues raised in the petitions might ultimately warrant

certiorari, there are compelling reasons not to intervene

at this early stage. This case was filed in 2016, when

the Flint Water Crisis was still unfolding. Since then,

numerous other cases have been filed incorporating

new information that has emerged through discovery,

FOIA requests, and investigative journalism. Respondents’ allegations, however, are still frozen in

time in 2016 when this action was filed. Accordingly,

this is a case where the ultimate “answer [to] whether

there was a [due process] violation may depend on a

kaleidoscope of facts not yet fully developed.” Pearson

v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 239 (2009) (first alteration

in original) (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted).

Moreover, as Petitioners note, this case is just

one of several actions seeking relief against a variety

of governmental and private defendants for the Flint

4

Water Crisis. Flint Pet.5. The district court has consolidated nine of those cases in a single matter.

Earlier this year, the district court denied motions to

dismiss the due process claims in the consolidated

litigation. In re Flint Water Cases, 384 F.Supp.3d 802

(E.D. Mich. 2019). An interlocutory appeal of that

denial—filed by the Petitioners here, among others—

is pending in the Sixth Circuit. Carthan v. Earley,

Nos. 19-1425, 19-1472, 19-1477, 19-1533 (6th Cir.). The

Michigan Supreme Court has also recently granted

review of a parallel state-law Flint water class action.

See Mays v. Governor, 926 N.W.2d 803 (Mich. 2019)

(granting leave to appeal).

Petitioners are already subject to discovery on

the pending state-law claims against them and against

the private defendants. That will remain true regardless

of this Court’s ruling on these petitions. Unlike in

many qualified immunity cases, then, waiting will not

prejudice Petitioners. Waiting will give the Michigan

Supreme Court time to resolve the state-law claims

that are currently pending before it—a resolution that

may obviate key issues here. See Flint Pet.App.211213 (Sutton, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing

en banc). And waiting will give the Sixth Circuit time

to resolve the pending interlocutory appeal in the

consolidated federal case, where the complaint includes

more developed allegations.

The petitions should be denied.

5

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

As Judge Griffin wrote below, “[t]his case arises

out of the infamous government-created environmental

disaster commonly known as the Flint Water Crisis.”

Flint Pet.App.3. Petitioners insisted on the “cost-saving

measure” (id.) of switching Flint’s water supply from

Lake Huron to the Flint River, even though they knew

the river’s water was highly corrosive and their

employees warned them the City’s water treatment

plant was not prepared. On April 25, 2014, Flint made

the switch and “began dispensing drinking water to

its customers without adding chemicals to counter

the river water’s known corrosivity.” Id. at 4. During

the subsequent 18 months, as serious health harms

steadily appeared, Petitioners repeatedly rejected

opportunities to return to Lake Huron water. Instead,

they falsely assured regulators and the public that

the water drawn from the river was safe. They thus

extended and exacerbated the crisis.

A.

The Facts

1. In 2011, Michigan’s then-Governor Rick Snyder

appointed an emergency manager for the City of Flint.

In April 2013, Flint’s emergency manager decided to

cut costs by changing the City’s water source from

the Detroit Water and Sewer Department (DWSD), its

longtime provider, to the not-yet-formed Karegnondi

Water Authority (KWA). Flint Pet.App.265-266.2 To

2 Because this case comes to the Court at the motion to dismiss

stage, allegations in the complaint must be taken as true. Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

6

save money during the period before the KWA came

online, Petitioners and other state and local officials

decided to use water from the Flint River. Flint Pet.

App.266.

As the April 2014 date for the switch approached,

Petitioner Darnell Earley, then the emergency manager, knew the Flint Water Treatment Plant was not

ready but he “forced the transition through in order to

meet the aggressive deadline he had self-imposed to

cut costs.” Id. at 266-267. In the days leading up to

the switch, the water quality supervisor at the plant,

Michael Glasgow, wrote Petitioners Michael Prysby

and Stephen Busch—officials at the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ)—that “[i]f

water is distributed from this plant in the next couple

of weeks, it will be against my direction.” Id. at 267-268.

He explained that he would “reiterate this to management above me, but they seem to have their own

agenda.” Id. at 268.

Although “the proper preparations had not been

made,” Flint began using Flint River water on April

25, 2014. Id. at 269. On that day, Petitioner Howard

Croft, Flint’s Director of Public Works, announced to

the public that the “water is not only safe, but of the

high quality that Flint customers have come to expect.”

Id. He did so even though he knew of Glasgow’s

“concerns regarding the facility’s inadequate preparation and monitoring.” Id. at 270.

2. Flint did not add phosphates or other corrosioncontrol compounds to the Flint River water even though

it “was 19 times more corrosive than the water pumped

from Lake Huron by the DWSD.” Id. at 4, 294.

“[W]ithout corrosion-control treatment, lead leached

7

out of the lead-based service lines at alarming rates

and found its way to the homes of Flint’s residents.”

Id. The harms were evident immediately, and the

evidence steadily accumulated over time: “Within

days, residents complained of foul smelling and tasting

water. Within weeks, some residents’ hair began to

fall out and their skin developed rashes. And within

a year, there were positive tests for E. coli, a spike in

deaths from Legionnaires’ disease, and reports of

dangerously high blood-lead levels in Flint children.”

Id.

Petitioners were aware of the problems from the

beginning. Shortly after the April 2014 switch, Flint

residents began to complain that their water was

“odorous” and “discolored”—an indication that the

new water was corroding the pipes. Id. at 274. In

August and September, the City discovered fecal

coliform bacteria in the water; when Governor Snyder

was briefed on the discoveries, he was told that

corrosion caused the problem. Id. at 275. In October,

General Motors made a highly publicized decision to

stop using the water at its Flint manufacturing plant

due to concerns that it would corrode the machinery.

Id. Petitioner Prysby “made sure the department’s

approach was to spin this symptom as not related to

public health instead of investigating the underlying

problem.” Id. at 32-33. He urged Petitioners Busch

and Liane Shekter Smith to publicly downplay General

Motors’ decision, out of fear of “branding Flint’s water

as ‘corrosive’ from a public health standpoint.” Id. at

275.

On January 2, 2015, the City sent water customers

a notice that it was in violation of the Safe Drinking

8

Water Act “due to the presence of trihalomethanes”—

a further indication that the City’s pipes had been

corroded. Id. Also in January, the University of

Michigan-Flint “discovered lead in campus drinking

fountains,” and “the State of Michigan provided purified

water coolers at its Flint offices in response to concerns

about the drinking water.” Id. at 276. In an email to

her supervisor that month, Shekter Smith explained

her theory that Flint was experiencing “wide-spread”

corrosion throughout the “distribution system.” Id. at

276-277. Yet “State employees continued for many

months to tell the general public that the water was

safe to drink.” Id. at 276.

That same month, DWSD offered to waive the

reconnection fee and permit Flint to return to using

Lake Huron water. Id. Petitioner Gerald Ambrose,

the new emergency manager, rejected the offer. Id.

Two months later, Flint’s city council “voted 7-1 to

end Flint River service and return to DWSD.” Id. at 282.

Ambrose declared the council’s vote “incomprehensible”

and exercised his absolute power as emergency

manager to veto it. Id.

3. Petitioners did not merely refuse to reconnect

to Lake Huron water. They also made repeated false

statements to regulators and the public that exacerbated the crisis. In February 2015, the EPA asked

about high lead levels in a Flint resident’s water

sample. Id. at 278. Petitioner Busch responded “that

the Flint Water Treatment Plant had an optimized

9

corrosion control program, despite the fact that it did

not.” Id. at 277.3

Even after “the evidence confirmed that, in fact,

the lead levels in the water and in residents’ blood

were rising,” Petitioners “worked to discredit the

evidence and knowingly and proactively made false

statements to the public to persuade residents that

the water was safe to consume.” Flint Pet.App.177.

“Many residents, plaintiffs included, continued to

consume the water in reliance on defendants’ false

assurances.” Id.

In April 2015, EPA official Miguel Del Toral sent

a memorandum to the MDEQ expressing concern

that “Flint has essentially not been using any corrosion

control treatment.” Id. at 283. He explained that the

City’s monitoring results, which identified “very high

lead levels” in at least one home, were likely understating the extent of lead contamination. Id. Del

Toral was “worried that the whole town may have

much higher lead levels than the compliance results

indicated.” Id. On June 24, Del Toral shared an even

more strongly worded memorandum with Shekter

Smith, Busch, and Prysby. Id. at 285-286.

Throughout the summer and early fall of 2015,

Petitioner Wurfel, “the public face of the crisis,

announced the water was safe to drink, and demeaned,

belittled, and aggressively dampened attempts by the

scientific community to challenge the government’s

assertions that Flint did not have a problem with its

3 Busch asserts that his statement was not literally a lie. See

Busch Pet.8. That assertion improperly seeks to resolve factual

disputes.

10

drinking water.” Id. at 34. When Del Toral’s June 2015

memorandum became public and sparked an outcry,

Wurfel issued a public statement on behalf of MDEQ

that “anyone who is concerned about lead in the

drinking water in Flint can relax.” Id. at 287-288.

In August, Virginia Tech professor Marc Edwards

released an analysis that found extremely high lead

levels in Flint’s water. Id. at 291. Wurfel sought to

discredit Professor Edwards’s findings. Id. at 292-296.

Wurfel’s statements included several false assertions

designed to reassure the public that it was safe to

drink the water. Id. at 293-294, 295-296.

In September, local pediatrician Mona HannaAttisha issued her own findings that Flint’s children

had experienced an increased rate of lead poisoning

after the April 2014 switch. Id. at 302-303. Wurfel

also sought to disparage Dr. Hanna-Attisha’s findings

and reassure the public that Flint’s water was safe.

Id. at 307.

After 18 months, Governor Snyder finally directed

Flint to reconnect to the Detroit water system in

October 2015. Id. at 133. But the reconnection “did

not change the corrosion that had already occurred,

and lead has continued to leach from pipes into the

water.” Id. The harms are severe. Lead “is a powerful

neurotoxin that can have devastating, irreversible

impacts on the development of children.” Id. at 273.

Results of lead exposure in children include “decreased

IQ, behavioral problems, hearing impairment, impaired

balance and nerve function, infections, skin problems,

digestive problems, and psychological disorders.” Id.

In adults, the results of lead exposure include “digestive, cardiovascular, and reproductive problems, kidney

11

damage, dizziness, fatigue, weakness, depression and

mood disorders, diminished cognitive performance,

nervousness, irritability, and lethargy.” Id. at 273-274.

B.

Proceedings Below

1. Respondents filed this lawsuit in the District

Court for the Eastern District of Michigan seeking relief

against the City of Flint, the State of Michigan, and

several state and local officials who were personally

involved in the decisions that caused and exacerbated

the crisis. Id. at 119-124.4 As relevant here, Respondents bring claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming

that Petitioners deprived them of bodily integrity, in

a manner that shocked the conscience, in violation of

the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Id. at 137.

Petitioners and other defendants filed nine motions

to dismiss, challenging the District Court’s subject

matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule 12(b)(1), arguing

that Plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed under

Federal Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, and

raising defenses of qualified immunity and 11th

Amendment sovereign immunity to Plaintiffs’ § 1983

claims. The district court granted in part and denied

in part the motions to dismiss. Id. at 199-200. The

court agreed that the claims against the state were

barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 157. But

it rejected the City’s Eleventh Amendment argument.

Id. And the district court concluded that Respondents’

allegations stated a claim for violation of due process

4 Respondents also sought relief under state law against the

private engineering companies who participated in these decisions.

Id. at 124. Those claims are not before this Court.

12

rights against all but three of the individual government defendants. Id. at 170-180.5

2. On interlocutory appeals by the individual

defendants (on qualified immunity) and the City (on

the Eleventh Amendment), the Sixth Circuit affirmed

in part and reversed in part. Id. at 64.

a. The Sixth Circuit concluded that Respondents

had stated a claim for violation of clearly established

due process rights against seven of the individual

defendants: three City officials, Petitioners Earley,

Ambrose, and Croft, id. at 30-31; and four MDEQ

officials, Petitioners Busch, Shekter Smith, Prysby

and Wurfel, id. at 31-36. But the court found the

allegations insufficient against five other defendants:

MDEQ Director Daniel Wyant, id. at 36-37; Michigan

Department of Health and Human Services (MDHHS)

Director Nicholas Lyon and Chief Medical Executive

Eden Wells, id. at 37-40; and MDHHS employees Nancy

Peeler and Robert Scott, id. at 40-43.

The Sixth Circuit observed that the Due Process

Clause has long been understood to protect “the right

to bodily integrity, and the right not to be subjected

to arbitrary and capricious government action that

‘shocks the conscience and violates the decencies of

civilized conduct.’” Id. at 10-11 (citing Washington v.

Glucksberg, 501 U.S. 702, 720 (1997); Lewis, 523 U.S.

at 846-847). By introducing poisonous water into Flint

residents’ bodies without their consent, the court

5 The court found the allegations insufficient against Governor

Snyder, Flint water quality supervisor Glasgow, and MDEQ water

treatment specialist Patrick Cook. Id. at 180.

13

concluded, the defendants’ actions threatened the right

to bodily integrity. Id. at 16-17.

But it was not enough that those actions invaded

the “constitutionally protected liberty interest” in

bodily integrity. Id. at 19. The Sixth Circuit held that

a plaintiff must also “show how the government’s

discretionary conduct that deprived that interest was

constitutionally repugnant.” Id. The plaintiff must show

that the challenged conduct “shocks the conscience.”

Id. at 20.

Where the defendant has “time to deliberate”

before acting, the Sixth Circuit concluded, deliberate

indifference will shock the conscience. Id. at 23-25.

Conduct that evinces deliberate indifference necessarily shocks the conscience, because when “‘extended

opportunities to do better are teamed with protracted

failure even to care, indifference is truly shocking.’”

Id. at 27 (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 853).

The court concluded that Petitioners had “[e]xtensive time to deliberate” when they made the decisions

at issue, which “took place over a series of days, weeks,

months, and years, and did not arise out of time-is-ofthe-essence necessity.” Id. And it found the allegations against each of the Petitioners sufficient to

demonstrate deliberate indifference. Petitioners Earley

and Croft “were among the chief architects of Flint’s

decision to switch water sources and then use a plant

they knew was not ready to safely process the water,

especially in light of the Flint River’s known environmental issues and the problems associated with lead

exposure.” Id. at 30. Petitioner Ambrose’s “decisions

to twice turn down opportunities to reconnect to the

DWSD after he knew of the significant problems with

14

the water,” the court thought, “were especially egregious.” Id.

Petitioners Busch and Prysby “played a pivotal

role in authorizing Flint to use its ill-prepared water

treatment plant to distribute drinking water from a

river they knew was rife with public-health-compromising complications.” Id. at 32. And “when faced

with the consequences of their actions,” Petitioners

Busch, Prysby, Shekter Smith, and Wurfel “falsely

assured the public that the water was safe and

attempted to refute assertions to the contrary.” Id. The

allegations demonstrated that “these MDEQ defendants created the Flint Water environmental disaster

and then intentionally attempted to cover-up their

grievous decision. Their actions shock our conscience.”

Id. at 33.

Turning to qualified immunity, the Sixth Circuit

concluded that the “lack of a comparable governmentcreated public health disaster precedent does not

grant defendants a qualified immunity shield. Rather,

it showcases the grievousness of [Petitioners’] alleged

conduct.” Id. at 45. It pointed to this Court’s statements

that “‘[t]he easiest cases don’t even arise,’” and “‘there

is no need that the very action in question [have] previously been held unlawful’ because . . . ‘outrageous

conduct obviously will be unconstitutional.’” Id. (quoting

United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997);

Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S.

364, 377 (2009)). It held that “taking affirmative steps

to systematically contaminate a community through

its public water supply with deliberate indifference is

a government invasion of the highest magnitude”—

one that “[a]ny reasonable official should have known”

15

was “conscience-shocking conduct.” Id. at 46. Relying

on this Court’s decision in Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730

(2002), the Sixth Circuit concluded that “‘t[he] obvious

cruelty inherent’ in defendants’ conduct should have

been enough to forewarn defendants.” Flint Pet.App.45

(quoting Hope, 536 U.S. at 745).

b. The Sixth Circuit also held that the City of

Flint was not an arm of the state entitled to Eleventh

Amendment immunity. Id. at 51-64. Under Michigan

law, even if a city is under emergency management,

any judgment against the city will be satisfied out of

municipal funds. Id. at 55-56. The Sixth Circuit pointed

to the Michigan Court of Appeals’ decision in Boler v.

Governor, 923 N.W.2d 287, 293-296 (Mich. Ct. App.

2018), appeal denied, 924 N.W.2d 250 (Mich. 2019),

which specifically held that the City of Flint was not

acting as an arm of the state under Michigan law while

under emergency management—and that the state

thus cannot be liable for actions the City’s emergency

managers took during the water crisis. See Flint Pet.

App.57-61.

c. Judge McKeague dissented in part. He agreed

with the majority’s ruling that the City was not entitled

to Eleventh Amendment immunity, as well as with

its ruling that defendants Wyant, Lyon, Wells, Peeler,

and Scott were entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at

67. But he would have granted qualified immunity to

the other individual defendants as well. Id.

3. The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for rehearing en banc. Judge Kethledge, joined by four other

judges, dissented. Id. at 215.

Four judges joined separate concurrences in the

denial of rehearing. Judge Gibbons, joined by Judge

16

Stranch, emphasized that the case remains at the

pleading stage. Id. at 203-204. Judge Sutton, joined

by Judge Bush, similarly emphasized that “[a]t this

early stage of the case, we must give the benefit of

the doubt to the plaintiffs’ preferred theory of the

case and allow the discovery process to determine

whether plausible allegations in their complaint mature

into fact-supported allegations.” Id. Judge Sutton read

this Court’s decision in Hope as holding that “the

egregiousness of the state officials’ state of mind” can

overcome qualified immunity. Id. at 214. Based on

that precedent, “it would seem that allegations like

these—intentional or reckless poisoning of citizens—

plausibly clear the clearly established hurdle and

warrant discovery.” Id.

Noting that “[d]oubt clouds several aspects of

the claims that remain in the case,” id. at 210, Judge

Sutton explained that the opportunity for discovery

“should help us all in resolving this case fairly,” id. at

213. He thought that the pending proceedings in the

Michigan Supreme Court would also assist the district

court’s resolution. If the plaintiffs win there, “there

will be less, perhaps nothing at all, for the federal

courts to remedy” under the Constitution, and even if

the plaintiffs lose, “the state courts’ explanation may

inform the federal claims.” Id.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

Respondents’ 89-page complaint “offers plenty of

details that at least plausibly allege public acts of

recklessness and intentional misbehavior.” Flint Pet.

17

App.213 (Sutton, J., concurring in denial of rehearing

en banc). Further, nothing in the Sixth Circuit’s decision breaks new ground or conflicts with the decisions

of another circuit court or of this Court. Rather, it

reaffirms this Court’s longstanding commitment to

safeguarding the right to bodily integrity as a fundamental constitutional right.

Petitioners’ arguments largely rest on an alternate

narrative, a defendant-friendly reading of the facts that

is out of place at the pleading stage. They wish to

challenge the lower courts’ application of established

legal principles to a set of facts that have yet to be

fully developed, and that in any event focus on

Petitioners' uniquely egregious actions in causing the

Flint Water Crisis.

There is no need for this Court to grant review

of this “one-off” case. Id. at 209. And if this Court

were inclined to believe that the fact-specific issues

addressed below might warrant review, the pending

Sixth Circuit appeal in the consolidated Flint Water

Crisis action would provide a better vehicle for doing

so.

I.

THE DENIAL OF THE INDIVIDUAL PETITIONERS’

MOTIONS TO DISMISS DOES NOT WARRANT REVIEW.

The Sixth Circuit concluded that Respondents

had cleared the “particularly high hurdle” of alleging

deliberate indifference against each of the seven individual Petitioners. Flint Pet.App.29. That holding does

not conflict with the holdings of any other circuit. It is

also correct.

18

A. There Is No Conflict Among the Circuits.

1. The Sixth Circuit’s Decision Does Not

Conflict with Cases Rejecting a Constitutional Right to a Clean Environment.

Petitioners assert that the Sixth Circuit’s decision

conflicts with numerous decisions rejecting the proposition that there is a constitutional right to a clean

environment. Flint Pet.15-17; Busch Pet.21-25. But

Respondents’ claims are not based on a right to safe

drinking water or a right to a healthful environment.

Rather, the right Respondents invoke in their complaint

—and the right the Sixth Circuit recognized—is the

right to bodily integrity, which numerous courts have

held protects against government actors knowingly

introducing harmful substances into a person’s body

without their consent.

Petitioners’ actions shock the conscience and thus

violate the Constitution because Petitioners intentionally—and over many months—acted with deliberate indifference to the serious health risks they knew

they were imposing on Flint residents. A mere failure

to keep the environment clean, without these culpable

actions, would not violate the Constitution. Conversely,

poisoning an individual’s drinking water with deliberate indifference to serious, known health risks does.

See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990).

This is true even if the vector of harm were not

environmental pollution. As the Sixth Circuit explained

in an earlier Flint Water Crisis case, there is no

“constitutional significance to the means by which

the harm occurs.” Boler v. Earley, 865 F.3d 391, 408

n.4 (6th Cir. 2017) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 138

S.Ct. 1281, 1285, 1294 (2018).

19

Only two of the right-to-clean-environment cases

Petitioners cite were published opinions by federal

courts of appeals. Neither involved deliberate indifference. One, Concerned Citizens of Nebraska v. U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 970 F.2d 421, 426–27

(8th Cir. 1992), concluded that the mere release of

low-level radiation into the surrounding environment,

without any showing of deliberate indifference or

harm, did not violate the Ninth Amendment. The

other, Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 42829 (3d Cir. 2006), involved unsanitary conditions at

a jail. The court explicitly noted that “defendants’

conduct does not exhibit deliberate indifference.” Id.

at 428. Here, the allegations show multiple acts of

deliberate indifference causing serious harm to Flint

residents. Concerned Citizens and Kaucher are therefore inapposite.

Nor do any of the unpublished court of appeals

cases cited by Petitioners involve facts approaching

the egregiousness of the misconduct alleged here.

The decisions in Hood v. Suffolk City Sch. Bd., 469 F.

App’x 154, 159 (4th Cir. 2012) and Greene v. Plano

Indep. Sch. Dist., 103 F. App’x 542, 544-45 (5th Cir.

2004) involved mold in schools—not poisoning the water

system of an entire city. Crucially, Hood and Greene

were brought by school employees. This Court’s decision in Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S.

115 (1992) held that the Due Process Clause does not

afford public employees a remedy for unsafe working

conditions. As the Sixth Circuit explained, deliberately

indifferent actions that contaminated a city’s water

system—and thus poisoned the general public, who

made no choice to work for the City or assume the

risk—are very different from providing unsafe working

20

conditions. Flint Pet.App.26 n.6 (concluding that a

deliberate-indifference analysis deriving from Lewis,

rather than Collins ’s rule of nonliability for workplace

injuries, applies when harm to the general public is

at issue).

Petitioners also point to cases rejecting constitutional challenges to the fluoridation of public drinking

water systems. As the Sixth Circuit explained, Flint

Pet.App.19, those cases are factually distinguishable.

Their holdings that water fluoridation is “a reasonable

and proper exercise of the police power in the interest

of public health,” Coshow v. City of Escondido, 132 Cal.

App.4th 687 (2005)—one that is “rationally related to

the state’s interest in promoting public health,” Foli

v. Metro. Water Dist. of S. California, 592 F. App’x 634,

635 (9th Cir. 2015)—say nothing about the constitutionality of knowingly introducing toxic substances into

individuals' drinking water. Unlike in the fluoridation cases, “defendants make no contention that

causing lead to enter Flint’s drinking water was for

the public good or that they provided notice to Flint

residents about the lead-laced water.” Flint Pet.App.19.

2. The Sixth Circuit’s Decision Does Not

Conflict with the Second Circuit’s Decisions

in Post-9/11 Cases.

The Petitioner MDEQ officials assert that the

Sixth Circuit’s decision conflicts with the Second

Circuit’s decisions in Lombardi v. Whitman, 485 F.3d

73 (2d Cir. 2007), and Benzman v. Whitman, 523

F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2008). Busch Pet.23, 31, 34-35. The

Sixth Circuit appropriately found those cases inapposite. Flint Pet.App.35-36.

21

In Lombardi, the Second Circuit rejected due process claims brought by paramedics and law-enforcement

officers who “performed search, rescue and clean-up

work” at Ground Zero immediately after the 9/11

terrorist attacks. Lombardi, 485 F.3d at 74. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant officials reassured them

with false statements about the healthfulness of the

air in the area. See id. The court emphasized that the

defendants did not in any way cause the terrorist

attack. See id. at 80. They “were required to make

decisions using rapidly changing information” and to

do so “without all of the data that decision-makers

would normally desire.” Id. at 82, 83 (internal quotation marks omitted). Relying on Lombardi, the Second

Circuit in Benzman rejected similar claims brought by

individuals who lived and worked in Lower Manhattan.

See Benzman, 523 F.3d at 127-129.

The informational chaos in the aftermath of 9/11—

an unprecedented terrorist attack—has nothing in

common with the evidence of harm that steadily

accumulated over the course of months during the Flint

Water Crisis. In contrast to the 9/11 terrorist attacks,

the Flint Water Crisis resulted entirely from decisions

made by the Petitioners and others with whom they

worked. Petitioners had ample opportunities to avoid

the crisis before switching to the Flint River, and

they had ample opportunities to reverse and mitigate

the effects of their prior decisions over the 18 months

after the switch. As the Sixth Circuit observed, the

“crisis was predictable, and preventable.” Flint Pet.

App.4.

Further, as the Sixth Circuit noted, Lombardi

and Benzman “involved the balancing of competing

22

governmental interests—restoring public services

and protecting public health—during a time-sensitive

environmental emergency.” Flint Pet.App.36. Here, by

contrast, there were no “push-and-pulls of competing

policy decisions” because “defendants make no contention that causing lead to enter Flint’s drinking water

was for the public good.” Id. at 19. Because there was

no countervailing exigency, the Sixth Circuit’s decision does not conflict with Lombardi and Benzman.

B. The Sixth Circuit’s Correct, Fact-Specific

Holding That the Complaint States a Claim

Does Not Merit Review.

At least since this Court’s decision in Lewis, the

standard for determining if an official’s actions

violate the due process right to bodily integrity is

whether they “shock the conscience” and therefore

constitute an “abuse of power.” Lewis, 523 U.S. at

846. See also id. at 847 n.8 (describing the shocksthe-conscience test as the “threshold question” in any

“case challenging executive action on substantive due

process grounds”). Where government actors have “time

to make unhurried judgments” and “the chance for

repeated reflection,” actions taken with deliberate

indifference necessarily shock the conscience. Id. at

853. As this Court explained in Lewis, “[w]hen such

extended opportunities to do better are teamed with

protracted failure even to care, indifference is truly

shocking.” Id.

The Sixth Circuit carefully analyzed the allegations in the complaint and concluded that they stated

a claim for violation of that settled due process

standard against each of the individual Petitioners.

There is no basis for disturbing the Sixth Circuit’s

23

holding, particularly at this early stage of the case

before discovery.

1. Petitioners Rely on Factual Arguments

Inappropriate for a Motion to Dismiss.

a. Petitioners’ Conduct Reflected Deliberate

Indifference, Not Mere “Bad Decisions.”

Petitioners attempt to recharacterize the facts as

merely involving “bad decisions,” Flint Pet.4, 21, or a

series of unfortunate events, Busch Pet.25-26. But

this case is at the pleading stage. As the Sixth Circuit

emphasized, “[o]ne can place a benign construction

on the factual allegations and draw inferences so

that the facts amount to a negligent mismanagement

of priorities and risks.” Flint Pet.App.31. At this

stage, however, a court must draw all reasonable

inferences in the plaintiffs’ favor. The Sixth Circuit

panel, id. at 31, 34-35, as well as the judges concurring

in the denial of en banc review, id. at 203-204 (Gibbons,

J.), 213 (Sutton, J.), correctly determined that the

complaint properly pleaded a constitutional violation.

The voluminous facts pled in the complaint, fairly

construed, plausibly allege that Petitioners’ actions

go well beyond bad decisions or negligence. Petitioners

forced the switch to the Flint River in April 2014 even

though they knew Flint’s water treatment plant was

not ready; they did not add corrosion control to the

water even though they knew it was 19 times more

corrosive than the water the City had been using

before; they continued to use the Flint River without

corrosion control in the face of mounting evidence of

serious health risks, rejecting multiple opportunities

to switch back to Lake Huron water; and they extended

24

the crisis by repeatedly lying to the EPA and the

general public in an effort to falsely reassure them that

the water was safe. The consequence was widespread

corrosion and lead contamination, and the delivery of

poisonous water directly into Flint residents’ homes.

See Flint Pet.App.6. These actions bespeak deliberate

indifference, not mere negligence.

For the same reasons, Petitioners are incorrect

to say that the complaint challenges mere omissions,

Busch Pet.29, or a “fail[ure] to protect” the public, Flint

Pet.6; Busch Pet.4. The Petitioners did not simply

fail to protect Flint residents against harm caused by

others. Cf. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197 (1989). They affirmatively

acted to cause serious harm to Flint residents.

b. Petitioners’ Asserted Reliance on the

Advice of Others Does Not Undermine

the Allegations of Deliberate Indifference.

Petitioners argue that they were acting in reliance

on the advice of others and thus cannot be held liable.

The petitioner City officials argue that they relied on

the MDEQ as well as the engineering-company

defendants. Flint Pet.11-12, 17-21. The petitioner

MDEQ officials, in turn, argue that they relied on the

City’s reliance on the engineering-company defendants.

Busch Pet.2-3. Once again, though, these arguments

ask this Court to engage in impermissible factfinding.

The Petitioner City officials note that “the MDEQ

approved the use of the River without requiring corrosion control or water quality parameters, and thereafter

continued to assure the City and others that the

water was safe and complied with ‘all current state

25

and federal requirements.’” Flint Pet.11. Those are

among the facts that demonstrate that the MDEQ

officials were deliberately indifferent. But they by no

means undermine the claim that Earley, Ambrose,

and Croft were deliberately indifferent as well.

At the time of the April 2014 switch, Petitioners

Earley and Croft knew more than just that the MDEQ

had approved the use of the river. They also knew

that Glasgow—the City’s water quality supervisor—

was urgently telling them that the Flint Water Treatment Plant was not ready to handle the changeover.

Yet they forced the switch anyway. See p. 3, supra.

After the switch, Petitioners received mounting

evidence that the water was corroding the pipes,

causing lead contamination, and resulting in serious

health harms. Almost immediately, Flint residents

complained about the color and smell of the new

water. Over the summer, the City discovered fecal

coliform bacteria in the water—a sign of corrosion.

That October, General Motors announced that it would

no longer use Flint water out of fear that it would

corrode the company’s machinery. By January 2015,

the City knew that the water system had a high level

of trihalomethanes—another sign of corrosion. That

same month saw the University of Michigan-Flint and

state office buildings in the City take steps to move

away from using the local drinking water. See p.4,

supra.

In the face of this accumulating evidence of harm,

Earley and Ambrose refused to reconnect to Lake Huron

water. Ambrose twice refused even after the DWSD

offered to waive any reconnection fee. He went so far

26

as to veto a 7-1 city council vote to reconnect. See p. 4,

supra.

Whatever inferences Earley, Ambrose, and Croft

might have drawn from the MDEQ’s approval of

using Flint River water, there was nothing in that

approval that should have led them to disregard the

evidence of corrosion that was accumulating in front

of them. The complaint’s allegations plausibly allege

that they were deliberately indifferent in disregarding

that evidence.

Petitioners’ purported reliance on the engineeringcompany defendants is similarly misplaced. Petitioners note that, at the time of the April 2014 switch,

defendant Lockwood Andrews Newnam, Inc. (LAN) did

not advise the City to use corrosion control. Busch

Pet.2; Flint Pet.12. And they note that in February

2015 defendant Veolia “assured the City that the water

was in compliance with drinking water standards.”

Flint Pet.12 (internal quotation marks omitted). See

also Busch Pet.3. These allegations tend to demonstrate

that LAN and Veolia violated their duties under state

law—an issue that is currently being litigated in the

district court. But they do not undermine the claim

that the Petitioners were deliberately indifferent as

well.

At the time they made the switch, Petitioners

“knew that the important limitation was that the

treatment plant be ready to treat Flint River water.”

Flint Pet.App.267. In fact, “[t]he treatment plant was

not ready”—as Glasgow informed his superiors—but

they “forced the transition through” anyway. Id. Notwithstanding LAN’s own wrongdoing, these allegations

27

are sufficient at the pleading stage to demonstrate

deliberate indifference.

And as the evidence of corrosion and associated

harms accumulated following the switch, Petitioners

had more than LAN’s predictive judgment to go on in

making their decisions. They had actual experience

that the failure to use corrosion control had been a

grievous error. Yet, rather than heed that experience

as a reasonable official would, Petitioners disregarded

it. That is plainly deliberate indifference—“know[ing]

of and disregard[ing] an excessive risk” to bodily

integrity and health. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

837 (1994).

As for Petitioners’ purported reliance on Veolia,

two points are crucial: First, what Veolia said was that

the water complied with state and federal regulatory

standards. Flint Pet.App.280. There was no reason for

Petitioners to take Veolia’s statement as authorizing

them to disregard the mounting evidence of serious

health risks. It is axiomatic that conduct can violate

the Constitution even if it complies with statutes and

regulations. Second, Veolia did not issue its interim

report until February 18, 2015. Id. at 279-280. Petitioners could not have relied on its statements before

that time.

Reliance on Veolia thus cannot justify Petitioners’

refusal to add corrosion control or reconnect to Lake

Huron water as the evidence of harm accumulated

throughout the summer and fall of 2014. It cannot

justify the efforts of Petitioners Prysby, Busch, and

Shekter Smith to publicly downplay the risks during

that time. And it cannot justify Petitioner Ambrose’s

rejection of the DWSD’s offer to reconnect—a rejec-

28

tion that came in January 2015, before Veolia’s interim

report.

Nor can the Veolia report justify the multiple

actions described in the complaint that were taken

by the Petitioner MDEQ officials to mislead the EPA

and the public throughout 2015. In its February 2015

interim report, Veolia explicitly acknowledged that

the City was not using corrosion control. Flint Pet.

App.280. Less than two weeks later, Petitioner Busch

“told the EPA on behalf of MDEQ that the Flint Water

Treatment Plant had an optimized corrosion control

program, despite the fact that it did not.” Id. at 277.

Busch asserts that he did not tell the EPA that

Flint was using “corrosion control” but instead that

the City “had a corrosion control ‘program’ in place.”

Busch Pet.8 (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted). That statement was literally true, he says,

because Flint’s “program” consisted of waiting to

decide whether to add corrosion control to the water.

Id. That is precisely the sort of factual dispute that

cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss.

In any event, Busch’s post hoc interpretation of

his statement to the EPA is implausible. EPA regulations use the phrase “optimal corrosion control” to

refer to the treatment of water to prevent corrosion—

not to mere watching and waiting. See 40 C.F.R.

§ 141.82(a), (c)(1). As soon as EPA official Del Toral

learned in April that Flint was not using corrosion

control, he expressed surprise and alarm—something

he would not have done if Busch’s February statement

had been understood as suggesting that the City was

simply waiting to decide whether to use corrosion

control. See p. 5, supra. And then-Governor Snyder’s

29

office publicly acknowledged that “MDEQ inaccurately

reported information about Flint’s corrosion control to

EPA, stating that Flint had an optimized corrosion

control program when, in fact, it was not employing

corrosion control treatment.” Office of Gov. Rick Snyder,

Flint Water Advisory Task Force, Final Report 28 (Mar.

2016), https://goo.gl/HJfmwh.

Similarly, nothing in Veolia’s report supported

Petitioner Wurfel’s efforts to publicly discredit Del

Toral’s June 2015 memorandum and the findings of

lead contamination and lead poisoning that Drs.

Edwards and Hanna-Attisha issued during the summer

of 2015. See p. 5, supra. The Veolia report was prepared

before Edwards and Hanna-Attisha released their

findings and thus could not have taken them into

account. Wurfel’s efforts to convince the public to

disregard those findings were his own responsibility.

c. The MDEQ Petitioners’ Asserted Misinterpretation of Federal Statutes and

Regulations Does Not Undermine the

Allegations of Deliberate Indifference.

The Petitioner MDEQ officials insist that their

conduct reflected an honest, if mistaken, interpretation

of the SDWA’s Lead and Copper Rule. Busch Pet.3-4,

28, 30. But the question is not whether Petitioners

violated any statute or regulation. It is whether they

took actions that were deliberately indifferent to the

serious health risks they were causing. As the Sixth

Circuit explained in an earlier Flint Water Crisis

case, the SDWA does not occupy the field in this area.

A government official can engage in deliberate

indifference that violates the Constitution even if

30

there is no violation of the statute. See Boler, 865 F.3d

at 408

In any event, a supposed misinterpretation of

the Lead and Copper Rule cannot explain much of

the MDEQ Petitioners' conduct. If Busch honestly

thought that the City was complying with the Rule,

for example, there would have been no need for him

to lie to the EPA about whether Flint maintained

corrosion control. And an honest but erroneous interpretation of federal regulations would not explain why

Prysby, Busch, and Shekter Smith sought to publicly

downplay the import of General Motors’ decision to stop

using Flint water. Nor would it explain why Wurfel

worked so aggressively to publicly undermine the

factual findings of Drs. Edwards and Hanna-Attisha

—as well as of the EPA’s own official Del Toral. There

is no basis for resolving these questions against the

Respondent-Plaintiffs on a motion to dismiss.

2. This Court Need Not Review the Sixth

Circuit’s Correct Application of Qualified

Immunity Principles to the Extraordinarily

Egregious Facts Alleged Here.

The individual Petitioners argue that the Sixth

Circuit was required to grant them qualified immunity

unless it could point to “a case with a similar fact

pattern” that found liability. Busch Pet.21; accord

Flint Pet.23 (arguing that plaintiffs must “‘identify[ ]

a factually similar case’” to overcome immunity)

(quoting Flint Pet.App.103). Petitioners are incorrect.

This Court has repeatedly emphasized that the

crucial question is not whether there is a “a case

directly on point” but whether “existing precedent”

31

has “place[d] the lawfulness of the particular [action]

beyond debate.” City of Escondido v. Emmons, 139 S.Ct.

500, 504 (2019) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Court has “expressly rejected” any “requirement

that previous cases be ‘fundamentally similar’” or

“‘materially similar.’” Hope, 536 U.S. at 741. The crucial

question is whether the law at the time gave the

defendants “fair warning” that their actions were

unconstitutional. Id.

Where an action is marked by “obvious cruelty,”

that fact itself can provide notice that the action is

unconstitutional. Id. at 745; Safford Unified Sch. Dist.

No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 377 (2009) (“outrageous

conduct obviously will be unconstitutional”). In the

most obvious cases of unconstitutionality, there may

be no precedents addressing identical facts because

“[t]he easiest cases don’t even arise.” Lanier, 520 U.S.

at 271 (internal quotation marks omitted). But “it does

not follow that if such a case arose, the officials would

be immune.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Court’s statements in Hope and Lanier

precisely describe this case. Here, “[t]he lack of a

comparable government-created public health disaster

precedent does not grant defendants a qualified immunity shield. Rather, it showcases the grievousness of

their alleged conduct.” Flint Pet.App.45. Indeed, the

“‘obvious cruelty inherent’ in defendants’ conduct should

have been enough to forewarn defendants” that their

conduct would violate Plaintiffs’ constitutionally protected bodily integrity rights. Id. at 46.

Petitioner Flint officials argue that the HopeLanier analysis should apply only in “rare[]” instances.

Flint Pet.24. True enough, but the “government-created

32

public health disaster” at issue here is much rarer

than the prisoner abuse and sexual assault that were

held to violate clearly established law in Hope and

Lanier, respectively. “[T]aking affirmative steps to

systematically contaminate a community through its

public water supply with deliberate indifference is a

government invasion of the highest magnitude.” Flint

Pet.App.46. Given the magnitude of the risk to

Plaintiffs’ lives, and their prolonged consumption of

toxic drinking water, Defendants’ “protracted failure

even to care” is “truly shocking.” Id. at 27. Petitioners

thus had fair warning that they were violating the

Constitution.

Petitioners nonetheless protest that the Sixth

Circuit described clearly established law at too high

a level of generality, Flint Pet.24, and that cases

involving government officials targeting particular

individuals for invasions of bodily integrity are too

far removed from this case to provide fair warning.

Busch Pet.32-33. But knowingly causing individuals

to involuntarily consume a poisonous substance

undoubtedly invades their bodily integrity, whether

they are targeted or not. In any event, the question of

whether Petitioners’ conduct shocks the conscience

turns on the Petitioners’ subjective mental state—

whether they acted with deliberate indifference.

Once the Sixth Circuit found a triable issue of

deliberate indifference, then, it correctly concluded

that Petitioners were not entitled to immunity. See

Flint Pet.App.214 (Sutton, J., concurring in denial of

rehearing en banc). There was no need for the court to

identify a prior case finding deliberate indifference in

an identical fact setting. Here, the Petitioners’ culpable

33

mental state is enough to “alert a reasonable person to

the likelihood of personal liability.” Id. at 46 (internal

quotation marks omitted).

II.

THE DENIAL OF THE CITY’S MOTION TO DISMISS ON

ELEVENTH AMENDMENT GROUNDS DOES NOT

WARRANT REVIEW.

The Sixth Circuit correctly rejected Flint’s claim

to sovereign immunity. The court of appeals applied

well established standards to an unusual set of facts

and concluded that the City was not acting as an arm

of the state. The City’s challenge to the correctness of

that ruling presents no issue meriting review by this

Court.

Although municipalities generally are not entitled

to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, Lincoln

County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890), the City argues

that this case was different because of the power that

the state-appointed emergency managers had over

municipal affairs. See Flint Pet.25. The City candidly

acknowledges that this is a case of first impression

and that “Michigan’s Emergency Management Statute

is truly extraordinary.” Flint Pet.25. The City does not

even attempt to show a conflict among the circuits.

Rather, it argues that the court of appeals improperly

failed to distinguish its prior holding in Ernst v.

Rising, 427 F.3d 351 (6th Cir. 2005) (en banc), which

set forth the Sixth Circuit’s analysis for determining

when an entity is an “arm of the state” for Eleventh

Amendment purposes. Flint Pet.27. But this Court

generally does not grant certiorari to resolve an intracircuit conflict, let alone to tell a lower court that it

should have distinguished one of its own prior cases.

34

In any event, the Sixth Circuit was correct. The

court applied the analysis from Ernst, Flint Pet.App.

53-54, which itself applied this Court’s key “arm of

the state” precedents. See Ernst, 427 F.3d at 359

(relying on, inter alia, Regents of the Univ. of California

v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425 (1997), and Hess v. Port Auth.

Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30 (1994)). As the Sixth

Circuit explained, “the state’s potential liability for a

judgment against the entity” is the “foremost” factor

in determining whether that entity is an arm of the

state. Flint Pet.App.54 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Hess, 513 U.S. at 51 (“Eleventh Amendment’s

core concern is not implicated” unless the state is “in

fact obligated to bear and pay the resulting indebtedness of the enterprise”).

Under Michigan law, it is the municipality—not

the state—that must pay any judgment incurred while

the entity is under emergency management. See Mich.

Comp. L. §§ 141.1560(5), 141.1572. The Michigan Court

of Appeals has specifically held that Flint was not

acting as an arm of the state under Michigan law

while under emergency management—and thus the

state cannot be liable for the actions its emergency

managers took during the water crisis. See Boler,

923 N.W.2d at 293-296. The court explained that the

emergency manager exercised a local power, not a state

power: “The emergency manager, in place of the chief

administrative officer and governing body, acts for

and on behalf of the local government only.” Id. at 295.

See Mich. Comp. L. § 141.1552(dd). The Sixth Circuit

thus correctly concluded that Flint was not an arm of

the state under the Eleventh Amendment. The court’s

application of settled law to a unique set of facts does

not warrant review.

35

III. THIS CASE IS A POOR VEHICLE FOR REVIEW.

This Court “rarely grant[s] review where the thrust

of the claim is that a lower court simply erred in

applying a settled rule of law to the facts of a particular

case.” Salazar-Limon v. City of Houston, 137 S.Ct.

1277, 1278 (2017) (Alito, J., concurring in the denial

of certiorari). See S.Ct. R. 10. As Judge Sutton emphasized, that concern is especially acute here, where the

egregious facts alleged in the pleadings have yet to

be developed through discovery. Flint Pet.App.213. As

explained above, Petitioners’ constitutional arguments

turn centrally on disputed interpretations of the

allegations in the complaint. This Court ought not to

rule on those arguments absent factual development.

In Johnson, supra, this Court held that the resolution of factual issues is inappropriate in qualifiedimmunity interlocutory appeals. Resolving factual

issues is the daily work of trial judges, but “appellate

judges enjoy no comparative expertise in such matters.”

Johnson, 515 U.S. at 316. Fact questions—particularly when, as here, they involve the determination

of defendants’ mental state—“can consume inordinate

amounts of appellate time.” Id. Even if the Court

were to believe that the questions presented might at

some point warrant review, it ought not to decide

them now, “in the context of a less developed record,”

rather than after discovery or trial, “on a record that

will permit a better decision.” Id. at 317.

Waiting will not prejudice Petitioners’ interests.

Petitioners are already responding to third-party discovery requests in the district court on the state-law

claims against the engineering-company defendants.

Unlike in other qualified immunity cases, then, a grant

36

of certiorari at this stage cannot be justified as

protecting against the burdens of discovery.

Even if the Court were to believe that the questions

presented might warrant intervention at the motionto-dismiss stage, it should wait to make any such

determination until the Sixth Circuit decides the

pending Carthan appeal. If the Sixth Circuit sustains

the complaint in that case, it is likely that the

defendants will again petition and provide the Court

the opportunity to decide whether review is merited

with the full set of factual allegations in view. It will

also offer the chance to avoid deciding questions

unnecessarily in the event that the state-court Mays

litigation, pending in the Michigan Supreme Court,

obviates any of the issues here. There is, in any event,

no basis for review now.

CONCLUSION

The petitions for writ of certiorari should be

denied.

37

Respectfully submitted by Respondents Counsel,

MYLES MCGUIRE

PAUL T. GESKE (COUNSEL OF RECORD )

MCGUIRE LAW, P.C.

55 WEST WACKER DRIVE, 9TH FLOOR

CHICAGO, IL 60601

(312) 893-7002

MMCGUIRE@MCGPC.COM

PGESKE@MCGPC.COM

JOHN SAWIN

SAWIN LAW FIRM, LTD.

55 WEST WACKER DRIVE, SUITE 900

CHICAGO, IL 60601

(312) 853-2490

JSAWIN@SAWINLAWYERS.COM

SCOTT MORGAN

MORGAN LAW FIRM, LTD.

55 WEST WACKER DR., SUITE 900

CHICAGO, IL 60601

(312) 327-3386

SMORGAN@SMORGAN-LAW.COM

STEVEN HART

HART, MCLAUGHLIN & ELDRIDGE, LLC

121 W. WACKER DR., SUITE 1050

CHICAGO, IL 60607

(312) 955-0545

SHART@HMELEGAL.COM

DAVID E. HART

MADDIN, HAUSER, ROTH & HELLER, P.C.

SECOND FLOOR ESSEX CENTRE

28400 NORTHWESTERN HWY.

SOUTHFIELD, MI 48034

(248) 827-1884

DHART@MADDINHAUSER.COM

DECEMBER 16, 2019

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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