Opposition Brief — City of Flint, Michigan, et al., Petitioners v. Shari Guertin, et al.
Supreme Court briefDec 16, 2019
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NOS. 19-205, 19-350
In the
Supreme Court of the United States
CITY OF FLINT, ET AL.,
v.
Petitioners,
SHARI GUERTIN, ET AL.,
Respondents.
______________
STEPHEN BUSCH, ET AL.,
v.
Petitioners,
SHARI GUERTIN, ET AL.,
Respondents.
______________
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO
PETITIONS FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
MYLES MCGUIRE
PAUL T. GESKE*
STEVEN HART
HART, MCLAUGHLIN & ELDRIDGE, LLC
*COUNSEL OF RECORD
MCGUIRE LAW, P.C.
55 WEST WACKER DRIVE, 9TH FL.
CHICAGO, IL 60601
(312) 893-7002
MMCGUIRE@MCGPC.COM
PGESKE@MCGPC.COM
121 W. WACKER DR.
SUITE 1050
CHICAGO, IL 60607
(312) 955-0545
SHART@HMELEGAL.COM
{ ADDITIONAL COUNSEL LISTED ON INSIDE COVER }
COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENTS
DECEMBER 16, 2019
SUPREME COURT PRESS
♦
(888) 958-5705
♦
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS
ADDITIONAL COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENTS
JOHN SAWIN
DAVID E. HART
SAWIN LAW FIRM, LTD.
MADDIN, HAUSER, ROTH &
HELLER, P.C.
55 WEST WACKER DRIVE, SUITE 900
CHICAGO, IL 60601
(312) 853-2490
JSAWIN@SAWINLAWYERS.COM
SCOTT MORGAN
MORGAN LAW FIRM, LTD.
55 WEST WACKER DR., SUITE 900
CHICAGO, IL 60601
(312) 327-3386
SMORGAN@SMORGAN-LAW.COM
SECOND FLOOR ESSEX CENTRE
28400 NORTHWESTERN HWY.
SOUTHFIELD, MI 48034
(248) 827-1884
DHART@MADDINHAUSER.COM
i
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether Respondents’ allegations plausibly
establish that Michigan and Flint officials acted with
deliberate indifference and thus violated Respondents’
constitutional right to bodily integrity by knowingly
contaminating Respondents’ drinking water with lead
and harmful bacteria, and then repeatedly lying about
evidence of the contamination, causing Respondents
and other Flint residents to unknowingly and involuntarily ingest poisonous substances over a period of
months.
2. If so, whether Respondents’ bodily integrity
rights were clearly established under the circumstances,
because a reasonable official would have been on
notice that it is not constitutionally permissible to
knowingly poison the drinking water for an entire
city’s population.
3. Whether Flint was an “arm of the state” for
Eleventh Amendment purposes merely because it
was under the control of a state-appointed emergency
manager, where Michigan law made clear that Flint,
and not the state, would be responsible for paying
any judgment.
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTIONS PRESENTED ........................................ i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................... iii
INTRODUCTION ....................................................... 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................... 5
A. The Facts .......................................................... 5
B. Proceedings Below ......................................... 11
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT .................. 16
I.
THE DENIAL OF THE INDIVIDUAL PETITIONERS’
MOTIONS TO DISMISS DOES NOT WARRANT
REVIEW ............................................................ 17
A. There Is No Conflict Among the Circuits .. 18
B. The Sixth Circuit’s Correct, Fact-Specific
Holding That the Complaint States a
Claim Does Not Merit Review .................. 22
II. THE DENIAL OF THE CITY’S MOTION TO
DISMISS ON ELEVENTH AMENDMENT GROUNDS
DOES NOT WARRANT REVIEW .......................... 33
III. THIS CASE IS A POOR VEHICLE FOR REVIEW .... 35
CONCLUSION.......................................................... 36
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Page
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662 (2009) ............................................. 5
Benzman v. Whitman,
523 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2008) ................... 20, 21, 22
Boler v. Earley,
865 F.3d 391 (6th Cir. 2017) .............................. 18
Boler v. Governor,
923 N.W.2d 287 (Mich. Ct. App. 2018) . 15, 30, 34
Carthan v. Earley, Nos. 19-1425, 19-1472,
19-1477, 19-1533 (6th Cir.) ............................. 4, 36
City of Escondido v. Emmons,
139 S.Ct. 500 (2019) .......................................... 31
Collins v. City of Harker Heights,
503 U.S. 115 (1992) ..................................... 19, 20
Concerned Citizens of Nebraska v.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n,
970 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1992) ............................. 19
Coshow v. City of Escondido,
132 Cal.App.4th 687 (2005) ................................ 20
County of Sacramento v. Lewis,
523 U.S. 833 (1998) .................................... passim
DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) ............................... 24
Ernst v. Rising,
427 F.3d 351 (6th Cir. 2005) ......................... 33, 34
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825 (1994) ........................................... 27
Foli v. Metro. Water Dist. of S. California,
592 F. App’x 634 (9th Cir. 2015) ....................... 20
Greene v. Plano Indep. Sch. Dist.,
103 F. App’x 542 (5th Cir. 2004).......................... 19
Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp.,
513 U.S. 30 (1994) .............................................. 34
Hood v. Suffolk City Sch. Bd.,
469 F. App’x 154 (4th Cir. 2012) ....................... 19
Hope v. Pelzer,
536 U.S. 730 (2002) .......................... 15, 16, 31, 32
In re Flint Water Cases,
384 F.Supp.3d 802 (E.D. Mich. 2019) ................. 4
Johnson v. Jones,
515 U.S. 304 (1995) ....................................... 3, 35
Kaucher v. County of Bucks,
455 F.3d 418 (3d Cir. 2006) .............................. 19
Lincoln County v. Luning,
133 U.S. 529 (1890) ............................................ 33
Lombardi v. Whitman,
485 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2007) ..................... 20, 21, 22
Mays v. Governor,
926 N.W.2d 803 (Mich. 2019) ........................ 4, 36
Pearson v. Callahan,
555 U.S. 223 (2009) ..................................... 3, 8, 9
v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
Regents of the Univ. of California v. Doe,
519 U.S. 425 (1997) ........................................... 34
Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding,
557 U.S. 364 (2009) ..................................... 14, 31
Salazar-Limon v. City of Houston,
137 S.Ct. 1277 (2017) ........................................ 35
United States v. Lanier,
520 U.S. 259 (1997) ......................... 14, 31, 32, 33
Washington v. Glucksberg,
501 U.S. 702 (1997) ............................................ 12
Washington v. Harper,
494 U.S. 210 (1990) ........................................... 18
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
U.S. Const. amend. IX .............................................. 19
U.S. Const. amend. XI ...................................... passim
U.S. Const. amend. XIV.......................................... 2, 11
STATUTES
42 U.S.C. § 1983 ......................................................... 11
Mich. Comp. L. § 141.1552(dd) ................................. 34
Mich. Comp. L. § 141.1560(5) ..................................... 34
Mich. Comp. L. § 141.1572 ......................................... 34
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
JUDICIAL RULES
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) .............................................. 11
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) .............................................. 11
Sup. Ct. R. 10 ............................................................. 35
REGULATIONS
40 C.F.R. § 141.82(a)................................................. 28
40 C.F.R. § 141.82(c)(1)............................................. 28
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Erica L. Green,
Flint’s Children Suffer in Class After
Years of Drinking the Lead-Poisoned
Water, N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 2019,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/06/us/
politics/flint-michigan-schools.html ................... 2
Office of Gov. Rick Snyder,
Flint Water Advisory Task Force, Final
Report 28 (Mar. 2016),
https://goo.gl/HJfmwh ....................................... 29
Sarah Childress,
We Found Dozens of Uncounted Deaths
During the Flint Water Crisis. Here’s How,
Frontline, Sept. 10, 2019,
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/
interactive/how-we-found-dozens-ofuncounted-deaths-during-flint-watercrisis/ .................................................................... 2
1
INTRODUCTION
In 2014, state and local officials in Michigan rushed
the transition of Flint’s drinking water source from
Lake Huron to the unsafe Flint River. While Flint’s
residents had previously received safe, clean, fresh
water from Lake Huron for years, the Flint River was
known to be corrosive—it was 19 times more corrosive
than the water that residents were previously receiving,
and it was replete with deadly bacteria, including E.
coli, Legionella, and other harmful substances.
When the officials changed the source of Flint’s
drinking water, they did not adequately treat the
water or add corrosion-control chemicals as required
under EPA regulations. They did this to save money.
Petitioners each played key roles in those decisions
and their aftermath. And they pressed forward with
the switch even when their own employees warned
them that Flint’s water treatment plant was not ready
to handle the river’s corrosive water.
In the 18 months after the switch, as evidence
mounted of serious harm caused by lead contamination,
Legionnaire’s disease, and other results of corrosion,
Petitioners rejected multiple opportunities to reconnect
Flint to Lake Huron. Further, Petitioners repeatedly
lied to the EPA and the public about the safety of Flint’s
drinking water. As a result, many Flint residents do
not have potable water to this day and continue to
experience serious harms to their health.1
1 See, e.g., Erica L. Green, Flint’s Children Suffer in Class After
Years of Drinking the Lead-Poisoned Water, N.Y. Times, Nov.
2
In this action, Flint residents seek accountability
from those who personally caused, extended, and
exacerbated Flint’s water crisis. This case, however,
is still at a very early stage of proceedings. The case
comes to this Court at the pleadings stage. The district
court denied Petitioners’ motions to dismiss, and the
Sixth Circuit affirmed on an interlocutory appeal. After
a careful analysis, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the
extensive allegations state a claim for an “executive
abuse of power” that invaded Respondents’ right to
bodily integrity in a way that “shocks the conscience”
and thus violates the Fourteenth Amendment. County
of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846-847 (1998).
See Flint Pet.App.19-43. As Judge Sutton observed
in his concurrence in the denial of rehearing en banc,
“[t]his is not a barebones complaint based on implausible allegations. It comes in at 89 pages. And it offers
plenty of details that at least plausibly allege public
acts of recklessness and intentional misbehavior.” Id.
at 213. The court determined that Petitioners’ acts of
deliberate indifference were so egregious that “[a]ny
reasonable official should have known” that their conduct would “constitute[] conscience-shocking conduct
prohibited by the substantive due process clause.” Id.
at 46.
Petitioners attempt to re-frame this case as involving mere negligence or poor judgment. Flint Pet.4, 6,
21; Busch Pet.4, 30. Although Petitioners may wish
6, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/06/us/politics/flintmichigan-schools.html; Sarah Childress, We Found Dozens of
Uncounted Deaths During the Flint Water Crisis. Here’s How,
Frontline, Sept. 10, 2019, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/
interactive/how-we-found-dozens-of-uncounted-deaths-duringflint-water-crisis/.
3
to dispute the substance of Respondents’ allegations,
they may not do so while this case is at the motion to
dismiss stage, where Respondents’ factual allegations
are accepted as true, and all reasonable inferences are
drawn in their favor. Petitioners’ arguments improperly
seek to resolve factual questions on the pleadings. As
Judge Gibbons observed in her concurrence in the
denial of rehearing en banc, “at this stage in the
proceeding, it is better to find out what facts will
eventually be before the district court.” Flint Pet.App.
203. That conclusion accords with this Court’s holding
that interlocutory appeals in qualified immunity cases
may not be used to resolve “fact-related dispute[s].”
Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 307 (1995).
Even if this Court were inclined to think that the
issues raised in the petitions might ultimately warrant
certiorari, there are compelling reasons not to intervene
at this early stage. This case was filed in 2016, when
the Flint Water Crisis was still unfolding. Since then,
numerous other cases have been filed incorporating
new information that has emerged through discovery,
FOIA requests, and investigative journalism. Respondents’ allegations, however, are still frozen in
time in 2016 when this action was filed. Accordingly,
this is a case where the ultimate “answer [to] whether
there was a [due process] violation may depend on a
kaleidoscope of facts not yet fully developed.” Pearson
v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 239 (2009) (first alteration
in original) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
Moreover, as Petitioners note, this case is just
one of several actions seeking relief against a variety
of governmental and private defendants for the Flint
4
Water Crisis. Flint Pet.5. The district court has consolidated nine of those cases in a single matter.
Earlier this year, the district court denied motions to
dismiss the due process claims in the consolidated
litigation. In re Flint Water Cases, 384 F.Supp.3d 802
(E.D. Mich. 2019). An interlocutory appeal of that
denial—filed by the Petitioners here, among others—
is pending in the Sixth Circuit. Carthan v. Earley,
Nos. 19-1425, 19-1472, 19-1477, 19-1533 (6th Cir.). The
Michigan Supreme Court has also recently granted
review of a parallel state-law Flint water class action.
See Mays v. Governor, 926 N.W.2d 803 (Mich. 2019)
(granting leave to appeal).
Petitioners are already subject to discovery on
the pending state-law claims against them and against
the private defendants. That will remain true regardless
of this Court’s ruling on these petitions. Unlike in
many qualified immunity cases, then, waiting will not
prejudice Petitioners. Waiting will give the Michigan
Supreme Court time to resolve the state-law claims
that are currently pending before it—a resolution that
may obviate key issues here. See Flint Pet.App.211213 (Sutton, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing
en banc). And waiting will give the Sixth Circuit time
to resolve the pending interlocutory appeal in the
consolidated federal case, where the complaint includes
more developed allegations.
The petitions should be denied.
5
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
As Judge Griffin wrote below, “[t]his case arises
out of the infamous government-created environmental
disaster commonly known as the Flint Water Crisis.”
Flint Pet.App.3. Petitioners insisted on the “cost-saving
measure” (id.) of switching Flint’s water supply from
Lake Huron to the Flint River, even though they knew
the river’s water was highly corrosive and their
employees warned them the City’s water treatment
plant was not prepared. On April 25, 2014, Flint made
the switch and “began dispensing drinking water to
its customers without adding chemicals to counter
the river water’s known corrosivity.” Id. at 4. During
the subsequent 18 months, as serious health harms
steadily appeared, Petitioners repeatedly rejected
opportunities to return to Lake Huron water. Instead,
they falsely assured regulators and the public that
the water drawn from the river was safe. They thus
extended and exacerbated the crisis.
A.
The Facts
1. In 2011, Michigan’s then-Governor Rick Snyder
appointed an emergency manager for the City of Flint.
In April 2013, Flint’s emergency manager decided to
cut costs by changing the City’s water source from
the Detroit Water and Sewer Department (DWSD), its
longtime provider, to the not-yet-formed Karegnondi
Water Authority (KWA). Flint Pet.App.265-266.2 To
2 Because this case comes to the Court at the motion to dismiss
stage, allegations in the complaint must be taken as true. Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
6
save money during the period before the KWA came
online, Petitioners and other state and local officials
decided to use water from the Flint River. Flint Pet.
App.266.
As the April 2014 date for the switch approached,
Petitioner Darnell Earley, then the emergency manager, knew the Flint Water Treatment Plant was not
ready but he “forced the transition through in order to
meet the aggressive deadline he had self-imposed to
cut costs.” Id. at 266-267. In the days leading up to
the switch, the water quality supervisor at the plant,
Michael Glasgow, wrote Petitioners Michael Prysby
and Stephen Busch—officials at the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ)—that “[i]f
water is distributed from this plant in the next couple
of weeks, it will be against my direction.” Id. at 267-268.
He explained that he would “reiterate this to management above me, but they seem to have their own
agenda.” Id. at 268.
Although “the proper preparations had not been
made,” Flint began using Flint River water on April
25, 2014. Id. at 269. On that day, Petitioner Howard
Croft, Flint’s Director of Public Works, announced to
the public that the “water is not only safe, but of the
high quality that Flint customers have come to expect.”
Id. He did so even though he knew of Glasgow’s
“concerns regarding the facility’s inadequate preparation and monitoring.” Id. at 270.
2. Flint did not add phosphates or other corrosioncontrol compounds to the Flint River water even though
it “was 19 times more corrosive than the water pumped
from Lake Huron by the DWSD.” Id. at 4, 294.
“[W]ithout corrosion-control treatment, lead leached
7
out of the lead-based service lines at alarming rates
and found its way to the homes of Flint’s residents.”
Id. The harms were evident immediately, and the
evidence steadily accumulated over time: “Within
days, residents complained of foul smelling and tasting
water. Within weeks, some residents’ hair began to
fall out and their skin developed rashes. And within
a year, there were positive tests for E. coli, a spike in
deaths from Legionnaires’ disease, and reports of
dangerously high blood-lead levels in Flint children.”
Id.
Petitioners were aware of the problems from the
beginning. Shortly after the April 2014 switch, Flint
residents began to complain that their water was
“odorous” and “discolored”—an indication that the
new water was corroding the pipes. Id. at 274. In
August and September, the City discovered fecal
coliform bacteria in the water; when Governor Snyder
was briefed on the discoveries, he was told that
corrosion caused the problem. Id. at 275. In October,
General Motors made a highly publicized decision to
stop using the water at its Flint manufacturing plant
due to concerns that it would corrode the machinery.
Id. Petitioner Prysby “made sure the department’s
approach was to spin this symptom as not related to
public health instead of investigating the underlying
problem.” Id. at 32-33. He urged Petitioners Busch
and Liane Shekter Smith to publicly downplay General
Motors’ decision, out of fear of “branding Flint’s water
as ‘corrosive’ from a public health standpoint.” Id. at
275.
On January 2, 2015, the City sent water customers
a notice that it was in violation of the Safe Drinking
8
Water Act “due to the presence of trihalomethanes”—
a further indication that the City’s pipes had been
corroded. Id. Also in January, the University of
Michigan-Flint “discovered lead in campus drinking
fountains,” and “the State of Michigan provided purified
water coolers at its Flint offices in response to concerns
about the drinking water.” Id. at 276. In an email to
her supervisor that month, Shekter Smith explained
her theory that Flint was experiencing “wide-spread”
corrosion throughout the “distribution system.” Id. at
276-277. Yet “State employees continued for many
months to tell the general public that the water was
safe to drink.” Id. at 276.
That same month, DWSD offered to waive the
reconnection fee and permit Flint to return to using
Lake Huron water. Id. Petitioner Gerald Ambrose,
the new emergency manager, rejected the offer. Id.
Two months later, Flint’s city council “voted 7-1 to
end Flint River service and return to DWSD.” Id. at 282.
Ambrose declared the council’s vote “incomprehensible”
and exercised his absolute power as emergency
manager to veto it. Id.
3. Petitioners did not merely refuse to reconnect
to Lake Huron water. They also made repeated false
statements to regulators and the public that exacerbated the crisis. In February 2015, the EPA asked
about high lead levels in a Flint resident’s water
sample. Id. at 278. Petitioner Busch responded “that
the Flint Water Treatment Plant had an optimized
9
corrosion control program, despite the fact that it did
not.” Id. at 277.3
Even after “the evidence confirmed that, in fact,
the lead levels in the water and in residents’ blood
were rising,” Petitioners “worked to discredit the
evidence and knowingly and proactively made false
statements to the public to persuade residents that
the water was safe to consume.” Flint Pet.App.177.
“Many residents, plaintiffs included, continued to
consume the water in reliance on defendants’ false
assurances.” Id.
In April 2015, EPA official Miguel Del Toral sent
a memorandum to the MDEQ expressing concern
that “Flint has essentially not been using any corrosion
control treatment.” Id. at 283. He explained that the
City’s monitoring results, which identified “very high
lead levels” in at least one home, were likely understating the extent of lead contamination. Id. Del
Toral was “worried that the whole town may have
much higher lead levels than the compliance results
indicated.” Id. On June 24, Del Toral shared an even
more strongly worded memorandum with Shekter
Smith, Busch, and Prysby. Id. at 285-286.
Throughout the summer and early fall of 2015,
Petitioner Wurfel, “the public face of the crisis,
announced the water was safe to drink, and demeaned,
belittled, and aggressively dampened attempts by the
scientific community to challenge the government’s
assertions that Flint did not have a problem with its
3 Busch asserts that his statement was not literally a lie. See
Busch Pet.8. That assertion improperly seeks to resolve factual
disputes.
10
drinking water.” Id. at 34. When Del Toral’s June 2015
memorandum became public and sparked an outcry,
Wurfel issued a public statement on behalf of MDEQ
that “anyone who is concerned about lead in the
drinking water in Flint can relax.” Id. at 287-288.
In August, Virginia Tech professor Marc Edwards
released an analysis that found extremely high lead
levels in Flint’s water. Id. at 291. Wurfel sought to
discredit Professor Edwards’s findings. Id. at 292-296.
Wurfel’s statements included several false assertions
designed to reassure the public that it was safe to
drink the water. Id. at 293-294, 295-296.
In September, local pediatrician Mona HannaAttisha issued her own findings that Flint’s children
had experienced an increased rate of lead poisoning
after the April 2014 switch. Id. at 302-303. Wurfel
also sought to disparage Dr. Hanna-Attisha’s findings
and reassure the public that Flint’s water was safe.
Id. at 307.
After 18 months, Governor Snyder finally directed
Flint to reconnect to the Detroit water system in
October 2015. Id. at 133. But the reconnection “did
not change the corrosion that had already occurred,
and lead has continued to leach from pipes into the
water.” Id. The harms are severe. Lead “is a powerful
neurotoxin that can have devastating, irreversible
impacts on the development of children.” Id. at 273.
Results of lead exposure in children include “decreased
IQ, behavioral problems, hearing impairment, impaired
balance and nerve function, infections, skin problems,
digestive problems, and psychological disorders.” Id.
In adults, the results of lead exposure include “digestive, cardiovascular, and reproductive problems, kidney
11
damage, dizziness, fatigue, weakness, depression and
mood disorders, diminished cognitive performance,
nervousness, irritability, and lethargy.” Id. at 273-274.
B.
Proceedings Below
1. Respondents filed this lawsuit in the District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan seeking relief
against the City of Flint, the State of Michigan, and
several state and local officials who were personally
involved in the decisions that caused and exacerbated
the crisis. Id. at 119-124.4 As relevant here, Respondents bring claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming
that Petitioners deprived them of bodily integrity, in
a manner that shocked the conscience, in violation of
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 137.
Petitioners and other defendants filed nine motions
to dismiss, challenging the District Court’s subject
matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule 12(b)(1), arguing
that Plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed under
Federal Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, and
raising defenses of qualified immunity and 11th
Amendment sovereign immunity to Plaintiffs’ § 1983
claims. The district court granted in part and denied
in part the motions to dismiss. Id. at 199-200. The
court agreed that the claims against the state were
barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 157. But
it rejected the City’s Eleventh Amendment argument.
Id. And the district court concluded that Respondents’
allegations stated a claim for violation of due process
4 Respondents also sought relief under state law against the
private engineering companies who participated in these decisions.
Id. at 124. Those claims are not before this Court.
12
rights against all but three of the individual government defendants. Id. at 170-180.5
2. On interlocutory appeals by the individual
defendants (on qualified immunity) and the City (on
the Eleventh Amendment), the Sixth Circuit affirmed
in part and reversed in part. Id. at 64.
a. The Sixth Circuit concluded that Respondents
had stated a claim for violation of clearly established
due process rights against seven of the individual
defendants: three City officials, Petitioners Earley,
Ambrose, and Croft, id. at 30-31; and four MDEQ
officials, Petitioners Busch, Shekter Smith, Prysby
and Wurfel, id. at 31-36. But the court found the
allegations insufficient against five other defendants:
MDEQ Director Daniel Wyant, id. at 36-37; Michigan
Department of Health and Human Services (MDHHS)
Director Nicholas Lyon and Chief Medical Executive
Eden Wells, id. at 37-40; and MDHHS employees Nancy
Peeler and Robert Scott, id. at 40-43.
The Sixth Circuit observed that the Due Process
Clause has long been understood to protect “the right
to bodily integrity, and the right not to be subjected
to arbitrary and capricious government action that
‘shocks the conscience and violates the decencies of
civilized conduct.’” Id. at 10-11 (citing Washington v.
Glucksberg, 501 U.S. 702, 720 (1997); Lewis, 523 U.S.
at 846-847). By introducing poisonous water into Flint
residents’ bodies without their consent, the court
5 The court found the allegations insufficient against Governor
Snyder, Flint water quality supervisor Glasgow, and MDEQ water
treatment specialist Patrick Cook. Id. at 180.
13
concluded, the defendants’ actions threatened the right
to bodily integrity. Id. at 16-17.
But it was not enough that those actions invaded
the “constitutionally protected liberty interest” in
bodily integrity. Id. at 19. The Sixth Circuit held that
a plaintiff must also “show how the government’s
discretionary conduct that deprived that interest was
constitutionally repugnant.” Id. The plaintiff must show
that the challenged conduct “shocks the conscience.”
Id. at 20.
Where the defendant has “time to deliberate”
before acting, the Sixth Circuit concluded, deliberate
indifference will shock the conscience. Id. at 23-25.
Conduct that evinces deliberate indifference necessarily shocks the conscience, because when “‘extended
opportunities to do better are teamed with protracted
failure even to care, indifference is truly shocking.’”
Id. at 27 (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 853).
The court concluded that Petitioners had “[e]xtensive time to deliberate” when they made the decisions
at issue, which “took place over a series of days, weeks,
months, and years, and did not arise out of time-is-ofthe-essence necessity.” Id. And it found the allegations against each of the Petitioners sufficient to
demonstrate deliberate indifference. Petitioners Earley
and Croft “were among the chief architects of Flint’s
decision to switch water sources and then use a plant
they knew was not ready to safely process the water,
especially in light of the Flint River’s known environmental issues and the problems associated with lead
exposure.” Id. at 30. Petitioner Ambrose’s “decisions
to twice turn down opportunities to reconnect to the
DWSD after he knew of the significant problems with
14
the water,” the court thought, “were especially egregious.” Id.
Petitioners Busch and Prysby “played a pivotal
role in authorizing Flint to use its ill-prepared water
treatment plant to distribute drinking water from a
river they knew was rife with public-health-compromising complications.” Id. at 32. And “when faced
with the consequences of their actions,” Petitioners
Busch, Prysby, Shekter Smith, and Wurfel “falsely
assured the public that the water was safe and
attempted to refute assertions to the contrary.” Id. The
allegations demonstrated that “these MDEQ defendants created the Flint Water environmental disaster
and then intentionally attempted to cover-up their
grievous decision. Their actions shock our conscience.”
Id. at 33.
Turning to qualified immunity, the Sixth Circuit
concluded that the “lack of a comparable governmentcreated public health disaster precedent does not
grant defendants a qualified immunity shield. Rather,
it showcases the grievousness of [Petitioners’] alleged
conduct.” Id. at 45. It pointed to this Court’s statements
that “‘[t]he easiest cases don’t even arise,’” and “‘there
is no need that the very action in question [have] previously been held unlawful’ because . . . ‘outrageous
conduct obviously will be unconstitutional.’” Id. (quoting
United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997);
Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S.
364, 377 (2009)). It held that “taking affirmative steps
to systematically contaminate a community through
its public water supply with deliberate indifference is
a government invasion of the highest magnitude”—
one that “[a]ny reasonable official should have known”
15
was “conscience-shocking conduct.” Id. at 46. Relying
on this Court’s decision in Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730
(2002), the Sixth Circuit concluded that “‘t[he] obvious
cruelty inherent’ in defendants’ conduct should have
been enough to forewarn defendants.” Flint Pet.App.45
(quoting Hope, 536 U.S. at 745).
b. The Sixth Circuit also held that the City of
Flint was not an arm of the state entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity. Id. at 51-64. Under Michigan
law, even if a city is under emergency management,
any judgment against the city will be satisfied out of
municipal funds. Id. at 55-56. The Sixth Circuit pointed
to the Michigan Court of Appeals’ decision in Boler v.
Governor, 923 N.W.2d 287, 293-296 (Mich. Ct. App.
2018), appeal denied, 924 N.W.2d 250 (Mich. 2019),
which specifically held that the City of Flint was not
acting as an arm of the state under Michigan law while
under emergency management—and that the state
thus cannot be liable for actions the City’s emergency
managers took during the water crisis. See Flint Pet.
App.57-61.
c. Judge McKeague dissented in part. He agreed
with the majority’s ruling that the City was not entitled
to Eleventh Amendment immunity, as well as with
its ruling that defendants Wyant, Lyon, Wells, Peeler,
and Scott were entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at
67. But he would have granted qualified immunity to
the other individual defendants as well. Id.
3. The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for rehearing en banc. Judge Kethledge, joined by four other
judges, dissented. Id. at 215.
Four judges joined separate concurrences in the
denial of rehearing. Judge Gibbons, joined by Judge
16
Stranch, emphasized that the case remains at the
pleading stage. Id. at 203-204. Judge Sutton, joined
by Judge Bush, similarly emphasized that “[a]t this
early stage of the case, we must give the benefit of
the doubt to the plaintiffs’ preferred theory of the
case and allow the discovery process to determine
whether plausible allegations in their complaint mature
into fact-supported allegations.” Id. Judge Sutton read
this Court’s decision in Hope as holding that “the
egregiousness of the state officials’ state of mind” can
overcome qualified immunity. Id. at 214. Based on
that precedent, “it would seem that allegations like
these—intentional or reckless poisoning of citizens—
plausibly clear the clearly established hurdle and
warrant discovery.” Id.
Noting that “[d]oubt clouds several aspects of
the claims that remain in the case,” id. at 210, Judge
Sutton explained that the opportunity for discovery
“should help us all in resolving this case fairly,” id. at
213. He thought that the pending proceedings in the
Michigan Supreme Court would also assist the district
court’s resolution. If the plaintiffs win there, “there
will be less, perhaps nothing at all, for the federal
courts to remedy” under the Constitution, and even if
the plaintiffs lose, “the state courts’ explanation may
inform the federal claims.” Id.
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT
Respondents’ 89-page complaint “offers plenty of
details that at least plausibly allege public acts of
recklessness and intentional misbehavior.” Flint Pet.
17
App.213 (Sutton, J., concurring in denial of rehearing
en banc). Further, nothing in the Sixth Circuit’s decision breaks new ground or conflicts with the decisions
of another circuit court or of this Court. Rather, it
reaffirms this Court’s longstanding commitment to
safeguarding the right to bodily integrity as a fundamental constitutional right.
Petitioners’ arguments largely rest on an alternate
narrative, a defendant-friendly reading of the facts that
is out of place at the pleading stage. They wish to
challenge the lower courts’ application of established
legal principles to a set of facts that have yet to be
fully developed, and that in any event focus on
Petitioners' uniquely egregious actions in causing the
Flint Water Crisis.
There is no need for this Court to grant review
of this “one-off” case. Id. at 209. And if this Court
were inclined to believe that the fact-specific issues
addressed below might warrant review, the pending
Sixth Circuit appeal in the consolidated Flint Water
Crisis action would provide a better vehicle for doing
so.
I.
THE DENIAL OF THE INDIVIDUAL PETITIONERS’
MOTIONS TO DISMISS DOES NOT WARRANT REVIEW.
The Sixth Circuit concluded that Respondents
had cleared the “particularly high hurdle” of alleging
deliberate indifference against each of the seven individual Petitioners. Flint Pet.App.29. That holding does
not conflict with the holdings of any other circuit. It is
also correct.
18
A. There Is No Conflict Among the Circuits.
1. The Sixth Circuit’s Decision Does Not
Conflict with Cases Rejecting a Constitutional Right to a Clean Environment.
Petitioners assert that the Sixth Circuit’s decision
conflicts with numerous decisions rejecting the proposition that there is a constitutional right to a clean
environment. Flint Pet.15-17; Busch Pet.21-25. But
Respondents’ claims are not based on a right to safe
drinking water or a right to a healthful environment.
Rather, the right Respondents invoke in their complaint
—and the right the Sixth Circuit recognized—is the
right to bodily integrity, which numerous courts have
held protects against government actors knowingly
introducing harmful substances into a person’s body
without their consent.
Petitioners’ actions shock the conscience and thus
violate the Constitution because Petitioners intentionally—and over many months—acted with deliberate indifference to the serious health risks they knew
they were imposing on Flint residents. A mere failure
to keep the environment clean, without these culpable
actions, would not violate the Constitution. Conversely,
poisoning an individual’s drinking water with deliberate indifference to serious, known health risks does.
See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990).
This is true even if the vector of harm were not
environmental pollution. As the Sixth Circuit explained
in an earlier Flint Water Crisis case, there is no
“constitutional significance to the means by which
the harm occurs.” Boler v. Earley, 865 F.3d 391, 408
n.4 (6th Cir. 2017) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 138
S.Ct. 1281, 1285, 1294 (2018).
19
Only two of the right-to-clean-environment cases
Petitioners cite were published opinions by federal
courts of appeals. Neither involved deliberate indifference. One, Concerned Citizens of Nebraska v. U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 970 F.2d 421, 426–27
(8th Cir. 1992), concluded that the mere release of
low-level radiation into the surrounding environment,
without any showing of deliberate indifference or
harm, did not violate the Ninth Amendment. The
other, Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 42829 (3d Cir. 2006), involved unsanitary conditions at
a jail. The court explicitly noted that “defendants’
conduct does not exhibit deliberate indifference.” Id.
at 428. Here, the allegations show multiple acts of
deliberate indifference causing serious harm to Flint
residents. Concerned Citizens and Kaucher are therefore inapposite.
Nor do any of the unpublished court of appeals
cases cited by Petitioners involve facts approaching
the egregiousness of the misconduct alleged here.
The decisions in Hood v. Suffolk City Sch. Bd., 469 F.
App’x 154, 159 (4th Cir. 2012) and Greene v. Plano
Indep. Sch. Dist., 103 F. App’x 542, 544-45 (5th Cir.
2004) involved mold in schools—not poisoning the water
system of an entire city. Crucially, Hood and Greene
were brought by school employees. This Court’s decision in Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S.
115 (1992) held that the Due Process Clause does not
afford public employees a remedy for unsafe working
conditions. As the Sixth Circuit explained, deliberately
indifferent actions that contaminated a city’s water
system—and thus poisoned the general public, who
made no choice to work for the City or assume the
risk—are very different from providing unsafe working
20
conditions. Flint Pet.App.26 n.6 (concluding that a
deliberate-indifference analysis deriving from Lewis,
rather than Collins ’s rule of nonliability for workplace
injuries, applies when harm to the general public is
at issue).
Petitioners also point to cases rejecting constitutional challenges to the fluoridation of public drinking
water systems. As the Sixth Circuit explained, Flint
Pet.App.19, those cases are factually distinguishable.
Their holdings that water fluoridation is “a reasonable
and proper exercise of the police power in the interest
of public health,” Coshow v. City of Escondido, 132 Cal.
App.4th 687 (2005)—one that is “rationally related to
the state’s interest in promoting public health,” Foli
v. Metro. Water Dist. of S. California, 592 F. App’x 634,
635 (9th Cir. 2015)—say nothing about the constitutionality of knowingly introducing toxic substances into
individuals' drinking water. Unlike in the fluoridation cases, “defendants make no contention that
causing lead to enter Flint’s drinking water was for
the public good or that they provided notice to Flint
residents about the lead-laced water.” Flint Pet.App.19.
2. The Sixth Circuit’s Decision Does Not
Conflict with the Second Circuit’s Decisions
in Post-9/11 Cases.
The Petitioner MDEQ officials assert that the
Sixth Circuit’s decision conflicts with the Second
Circuit’s decisions in Lombardi v. Whitman, 485 F.3d
73 (2d Cir. 2007), and Benzman v. Whitman, 523
F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2008). Busch Pet.23, 31, 34-35. The
Sixth Circuit appropriately found those cases inapposite. Flint Pet.App.35-36.
21
In Lombardi, the Second Circuit rejected due process claims brought by paramedics and law-enforcement
officers who “performed search, rescue and clean-up
work” at Ground Zero immediately after the 9/11
terrorist attacks. Lombardi, 485 F.3d at 74. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant officials reassured them
with false statements about the healthfulness of the
air in the area. See id. The court emphasized that the
defendants did not in any way cause the terrorist
attack. See id. at 80. They “were required to make
decisions using rapidly changing information” and to
do so “without all of the data that decision-makers
would normally desire.” Id. at 82, 83 (internal quotation marks omitted). Relying on Lombardi, the Second
Circuit in Benzman rejected similar claims brought by
individuals who lived and worked in Lower Manhattan.
See Benzman, 523 F.3d at 127-129.
The informational chaos in the aftermath of 9/11—
an unprecedented terrorist attack—has nothing in
common with the evidence of harm that steadily
accumulated over the course of months during the Flint
Water Crisis. In contrast to the 9/11 terrorist attacks,
the Flint Water Crisis resulted entirely from decisions
made by the Petitioners and others with whom they
worked. Petitioners had ample opportunities to avoid
the crisis before switching to the Flint River, and
they had ample opportunities to reverse and mitigate
the effects of their prior decisions over the 18 months
after the switch. As the Sixth Circuit observed, the
“crisis was predictable, and preventable.” Flint Pet.
App.4.
Further, as the Sixth Circuit noted, Lombardi
and Benzman “involved the balancing of competing
22
governmental interests—restoring public services
and protecting public health—during a time-sensitive
environmental emergency.” Flint Pet.App.36. Here, by
contrast, there were no “push-and-pulls of competing
policy decisions” because “defendants make no contention that causing lead to enter Flint’s drinking water
was for the public good.” Id. at 19. Because there was
no countervailing exigency, the Sixth Circuit’s decision does not conflict with Lombardi and Benzman.
B. The Sixth Circuit’s Correct, Fact-Specific
Holding That the Complaint States a Claim
Does Not Merit Review.
At least since this Court’s decision in Lewis, the
standard for determining if an official’s actions
violate the due process right to bodily integrity is
whether they “shock the conscience” and therefore
constitute an “abuse of power.” Lewis, 523 U.S. at
846. See also id. at 847 n.8 (describing the shocksthe-conscience test as the “threshold question” in any
“case challenging executive action on substantive due
process grounds”). Where government actors have “time
to make unhurried judgments” and “the chance for
repeated reflection,” actions taken with deliberate
indifference necessarily shock the conscience. Id. at
853. As this Court explained in Lewis, “[w]hen such
extended opportunities to do better are teamed with
protracted failure even to care, indifference is truly
shocking.” Id.
The Sixth Circuit carefully analyzed the allegations in the complaint and concluded that they stated
a claim for violation of that settled due process
standard against each of the individual Petitioners.
There is no basis for disturbing the Sixth Circuit’s
23
holding, particularly at this early stage of the case
before discovery.
1. Petitioners Rely on Factual Arguments
Inappropriate for a Motion to Dismiss.
a. Petitioners’ Conduct Reflected Deliberate
Indifference, Not Mere “Bad Decisions.”
Petitioners attempt to recharacterize the facts as
merely involving “bad decisions,” Flint Pet.4, 21, or a
series of unfortunate events, Busch Pet.25-26. But
this case is at the pleading stage. As the Sixth Circuit
emphasized, “[o]ne can place a benign construction
on the factual allegations and draw inferences so
that the facts amount to a negligent mismanagement
of priorities and risks.” Flint Pet.App.31. At this
stage, however, a court must draw all reasonable
inferences in the plaintiffs’ favor. The Sixth Circuit
panel, id. at 31, 34-35, as well as the judges concurring
in the denial of en banc review, id. at 203-204 (Gibbons,
J.), 213 (Sutton, J.), correctly determined that the
complaint properly pleaded a constitutional violation.
The voluminous facts pled in the complaint, fairly
construed, plausibly allege that Petitioners’ actions
go well beyond bad decisions or negligence. Petitioners
forced the switch to the Flint River in April 2014 even
though they knew Flint’s water treatment plant was
not ready; they did not add corrosion control to the
water even though they knew it was 19 times more
corrosive than the water the City had been using
before; they continued to use the Flint River without
corrosion control in the face of mounting evidence of
serious health risks, rejecting multiple opportunities
to switch back to Lake Huron water; and they extended
24
the crisis by repeatedly lying to the EPA and the
general public in an effort to falsely reassure them that
the water was safe. The consequence was widespread
corrosion and lead contamination, and the delivery of
poisonous water directly into Flint residents’ homes.
See Flint Pet.App.6. These actions bespeak deliberate
indifference, not mere negligence.
For the same reasons, Petitioners are incorrect
to say that the complaint challenges mere omissions,
Busch Pet.29, or a “fail[ure] to protect” the public, Flint
Pet.6; Busch Pet.4. The Petitioners did not simply
fail to protect Flint residents against harm caused by
others. Cf. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197 (1989). They affirmatively
acted to cause serious harm to Flint residents.
b. Petitioners’ Asserted Reliance on the
Advice of Others Does Not Undermine
the Allegations of Deliberate Indifference.
Petitioners argue that they were acting in reliance
on the advice of others and thus cannot be held liable.
The petitioner City officials argue that they relied on
the MDEQ as well as the engineering-company
defendants. Flint Pet.11-12, 17-21. The petitioner
MDEQ officials, in turn, argue that they relied on the
City’s reliance on the engineering-company defendants.
Busch Pet.2-3. Once again, though, these arguments
ask this Court to engage in impermissible factfinding.
The Petitioner City officials note that “the MDEQ
approved the use of the River without requiring corrosion control or water quality parameters, and thereafter
continued to assure the City and others that the
water was safe and complied with ‘all current state
25
and federal requirements.’” Flint Pet.11. Those are
among the facts that demonstrate that the MDEQ
officials were deliberately indifferent. But they by no
means undermine the claim that Earley, Ambrose,
and Croft were deliberately indifferent as well.
At the time of the April 2014 switch, Petitioners
Earley and Croft knew more than just that the MDEQ
had approved the use of the river. They also knew
that Glasgow—the City’s water quality supervisor—
was urgently telling them that the Flint Water Treatment Plant was not ready to handle the changeover.
Yet they forced the switch anyway. See p. 3, supra.
After the switch, Petitioners received mounting
evidence that the water was corroding the pipes,
causing lead contamination, and resulting in serious
health harms. Almost immediately, Flint residents
complained about the color and smell of the new
water. Over the summer, the City discovered fecal
coliform bacteria in the water—a sign of corrosion.
That October, General Motors announced that it would
no longer use Flint water out of fear that it would
corrode the company’s machinery. By January 2015,
the City knew that the water system had a high level
of trihalomethanes—another sign of corrosion. That
same month saw the University of Michigan-Flint and
state office buildings in the City take steps to move
away from using the local drinking water. See p.4,
supra.
In the face of this accumulating evidence of harm,
Earley and Ambrose refused to reconnect to Lake Huron
water. Ambrose twice refused even after the DWSD
offered to waive any reconnection fee. He went so far
26
as to veto a 7-1 city council vote to reconnect. See p. 4,
supra.
Whatever inferences Earley, Ambrose, and Croft
might have drawn from the MDEQ’s approval of
using Flint River water, there was nothing in that
approval that should have led them to disregard the
evidence of corrosion that was accumulating in front
of them. The complaint’s allegations plausibly allege
that they were deliberately indifferent in disregarding
that evidence.
Petitioners’ purported reliance on the engineeringcompany defendants is similarly misplaced. Petitioners note that, at the time of the April 2014 switch,
defendant Lockwood Andrews Newnam, Inc. (LAN) did
not advise the City to use corrosion control. Busch
Pet.2; Flint Pet.12. And they note that in February
2015 defendant Veolia “assured the City that the water
was in compliance with drinking water standards.”
Flint Pet.12 (internal quotation marks omitted). See
also Busch Pet.3. These allegations tend to demonstrate
that LAN and Veolia violated their duties under state
law—an issue that is currently being litigated in the
district court. But they do not undermine the claim
that the Petitioners were deliberately indifferent as
well.
At the time they made the switch, Petitioners
“knew that the important limitation was that the
treatment plant be ready to treat Flint River water.”
Flint Pet.App.267. In fact, “[t]he treatment plant was
not ready”—as Glasgow informed his superiors—but
they “forced the transition through” anyway. Id. Notwithstanding LAN’s own wrongdoing, these allegations
27
are sufficient at the pleading stage to demonstrate
deliberate indifference.
And as the evidence of corrosion and associated
harms accumulated following the switch, Petitioners
had more than LAN’s predictive judgment to go on in
making their decisions. They had actual experience
that the failure to use corrosion control had been a
grievous error. Yet, rather than heed that experience
as a reasonable official would, Petitioners disregarded
it. That is plainly deliberate indifference—“know[ing]
of and disregard[ing] an excessive risk” to bodily
integrity and health. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
837 (1994).
As for Petitioners’ purported reliance on Veolia,
two points are crucial: First, what Veolia said was that
the water complied with state and federal regulatory
standards. Flint Pet.App.280. There was no reason for
Petitioners to take Veolia’s statement as authorizing
them to disregard the mounting evidence of serious
health risks. It is axiomatic that conduct can violate
the Constitution even if it complies with statutes and
regulations. Second, Veolia did not issue its interim
report until February 18, 2015. Id. at 279-280. Petitioners could not have relied on its statements before
that time.
Reliance on Veolia thus cannot justify Petitioners’
refusal to add corrosion control or reconnect to Lake
Huron water as the evidence of harm accumulated
throughout the summer and fall of 2014. It cannot
justify the efforts of Petitioners Prysby, Busch, and
Shekter Smith to publicly downplay the risks during
that time. And it cannot justify Petitioner Ambrose’s
rejection of the DWSD’s offer to reconnect—a rejec-
28
tion that came in January 2015, before Veolia’s interim
report.
Nor can the Veolia report justify the multiple
actions described in the complaint that were taken
by the Petitioner MDEQ officials to mislead the EPA
and the public throughout 2015. In its February 2015
interim report, Veolia explicitly acknowledged that
the City was not using corrosion control. Flint Pet.
App.280. Less than two weeks later, Petitioner Busch
“told the EPA on behalf of MDEQ that the Flint Water
Treatment Plant had an optimized corrosion control
program, despite the fact that it did not.” Id. at 277.
Busch asserts that he did not tell the EPA that
Flint was using “corrosion control” but instead that
the City “had a corrosion control ‘program’ in place.”
Busch Pet.8 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). That statement was literally true, he says,
because Flint’s “program” consisted of waiting to
decide whether to add corrosion control to the water.
Id. That is precisely the sort of factual dispute that
cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss.
In any event, Busch’s post hoc interpretation of
his statement to the EPA is implausible. EPA regulations use the phrase “optimal corrosion control” to
refer to the treatment of water to prevent corrosion—
not to mere watching and waiting. See 40 C.F.R.
§ 141.82(a), (c)(1). As soon as EPA official Del Toral
learned in April that Flint was not using corrosion
control, he expressed surprise and alarm—something
he would not have done if Busch’s February statement
had been understood as suggesting that the City was
simply waiting to decide whether to use corrosion
control. See p. 5, supra. And then-Governor Snyder’s
29
office publicly acknowledged that “MDEQ inaccurately
reported information about Flint’s corrosion control to
EPA, stating that Flint had an optimized corrosion
control program when, in fact, it was not employing
corrosion control treatment.” Office of Gov. Rick Snyder,
Flint Water Advisory Task Force, Final Report 28 (Mar.
2016), https://goo.gl/HJfmwh.
Similarly, nothing in Veolia’s report supported
Petitioner Wurfel’s efforts to publicly discredit Del
Toral’s June 2015 memorandum and the findings of
lead contamination and lead poisoning that Drs.
Edwards and Hanna-Attisha issued during the summer
of 2015. See p. 5, supra. The Veolia report was prepared
before Edwards and Hanna-Attisha released their
findings and thus could not have taken them into
account. Wurfel’s efforts to convince the public to
disregard those findings were his own responsibility.
c. The MDEQ Petitioners’ Asserted Misinterpretation of Federal Statutes and
Regulations Does Not Undermine the
Allegations of Deliberate Indifference.
The Petitioner MDEQ officials insist that their
conduct reflected an honest, if mistaken, interpretation
of the SDWA’s Lead and Copper Rule. Busch Pet.3-4,
28, 30. But the question is not whether Petitioners
violated any statute or regulation. It is whether they
took actions that were deliberately indifferent to the
serious health risks they were causing. As the Sixth
Circuit explained in an earlier Flint Water Crisis
case, the SDWA does not occupy the field in this area.
A government official can engage in deliberate
indifference that violates the Constitution even if
30
there is no violation of the statute. See Boler, 865 F.3d
at 408
In any event, a supposed misinterpretation of
the Lead and Copper Rule cannot explain much of
the MDEQ Petitioners' conduct. If Busch honestly
thought that the City was complying with the Rule,
for example, there would have been no need for him
to lie to the EPA about whether Flint maintained
corrosion control. And an honest but erroneous interpretation of federal regulations would not explain why
Prysby, Busch, and Shekter Smith sought to publicly
downplay the import of General Motors’ decision to stop
using Flint water. Nor would it explain why Wurfel
worked so aggressively to publicly undermine the
factual findings of Drs. Edwards and Hanna-Attisha
—as well as of the EPA’s own official Del Toral. There
is no basis for resolving these questions against the
Respondent-Plaintiffs on a motion to dismiss.
2. This Court Need Not Review the Sixth
Circuit’s Correct Application of Qualified
Immunity Principles to the Extraordinarily
Egregious Facts Alleged Here.
The individual Petitioners argue that the Sixth
Circuit was required to grant them qualified immunity
unless it could point to “a case with a similar fact
pattern” that found liability. Busch Pet.21; accord
Flint Pet.23 (arguing that plaintiffs must “‘identify[ ]
a factually similar case’” to overcome immunity)
(quoting Flint Pet.App.103). Petitioners are incorrect.
This Court has repeatedly emphasized that the
crucial question is not whether there is a “a case
directly on point” but whether “existing precedent”
31
has “place[d] the lawfulness of the particular [action]
beyond debate.” City of Escondido v. Emmons, 139 S.Ct.
500, 504 (2019) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Court has “expressly rejected” any “requirement
that previous cases be ‘fundamentally similar’” or
“‘materially similar.’” Hope, 536 U.S. at 741. The crucial
question is whether the law at the time gave the
defendants “fair warning” that their actions were
unconstitutional. Id.
Where an action is marked by “obvious cruelty,”
that fact itself can provide notice that the action is
unconstitutional. Id. at 745; Safford Unified Sch. Dist.
No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 377 (2009) (“outrageous
conduct obviously will be unconstitutional”). In the
most obvious cases of unconstitutionality, there may
be no precedents addressing identical facts because
“[t]he easiest cases don’t even arise.” Lanier, 520 U.S.
at 271 (internal quotation marks omitted). But “it does
not follow that if such a case arose, the officials would
be immune.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Court’s statements in Hope and Lanier
precisely describe this case. Here, “[t]he lack of a
comparable government-created public health disaster
precedent does not grant defendants a qualified immunity shield. Rather, it showcases the grievousness of
their alleged conduct.” Flint Pet.App.45. Indeed, the
“‘obvious cruelty inherent’ in defendants’ conduct should
have been enough to forewarn defendants” that their
conduct would violate Plaintiffs’ constitutionally protected bodily integrity rights. Id. at 46.
Petitioner Flint officials argue that the HopeLanier analysis should apply only in “rare[]” instances.
Flint Pet.24. True enough, but the “government-created
32
public health disaster” at issue here is much rarer
than the prisoner abuse and sexual assault that were
held to violate clearly established law in Hope and
Lanier, respectively. “[T]aking affirmative steps to
systematically contaminate a community through its
public water supply with deliberate indifference is a
government invasion of the highest magnitude.” Flint
Pet.App.46. Given the magnitude of the risk to
Plaintiffs’ lives, and their prolonged consumption of
toxic drinking water, Defendants’ “protracted failure
even to care” is “truly shocking.” Id. at 27. Petitioners
thus had fair warning that they were violating the
Constitution.
Petitioners nonetheless protest that the Sixth
Circuit described clearly established law at too high
a level of generality, Flint Pet.24, and that cases
involving government officials targeting particular
individuals for invasions of bodily integrity are too
far removed from this case to provide fair warning.
Busch Pet.32-33. But knowingly causing individuals
to involuntarily consume a poisonous substance
undoubtedly invades their bodily integrity, whether
they are targeted or not. In any event, the question of
whether Petitioners’ conduct shocks the conscience
turns on the Petitioners’ subjective mental state—
whether they acted with deliberate indifference.
Once the Sixth Circuit found a triable issue of
deliberate indifference, then, it correctly concluded
that Petitioners were not entitled to immunity. See
Flint Pet.App.214 (Sutton, J., concurring in denial of
rehearing en banc). There was no need for the court to
identify a prior case finding deliberate indifference in
an identical fact setting. Here, the Petitioners’ culpable
33
mental state is enough to “alert a reasonable person to
the likelihood of personal liability.” Id. at 46 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
II.
THE DENIAL OF THE CITY’S MOTION TO DISMISS ON
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT GROUNDS DOES NOT
WARRANT REVIEW.
The Sixth Circuit correctly rejected Flint’s claim
to sovereign immunity. The court of appeals applied
well established standards to an unusual set of facts
and concluded that the City was not acting as an arm
of the state. The City’s challenge to the correctness of
that ruling presents no issue meriting review by this
Court.
Although municipalities generally are not entitled
to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, Lincoln
County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890), the City argues
that this case was different because of the power that
the state-appointed emergency managers had over
municipal affairs. See Flint Pet.25. The City candidly
acknowledges that this is a case of first impression
and that “Michigan’s Emergency Management Statute
is truly extraordinary.” Flint Pet.25. The City does not
even attempt to show a conflict among the circuits.
Rather, it argues that the court of appeals improperly
failed to distinguish its prior holding in Ernst v.
Rising, 427 F.3d 351 (6th Cir. 2005) (en banc), which
set forth the Sixth Circuit’s analysis for determining
when an entity is an “arm of the state” for Eleventh
Amendment purposes. Flint Pet.27. But this Court
generally does not grant certiorari to resolve an intracircuit conflict, let alone to tell a lower court that it
should have distinguished one of its own prior cases.
34
In any event, the Sixth Circuit was correct. The
court applied the analysis from Ernst, Flint Pet.App.
53-54, which itself applied this Court’s key “arm of
the state” precedents. See Ernst, 427 F.3d at 359
(relying on, inter alia, Regents of the Univ. of California
v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425 (1997), and Hess v. Port Auth.
Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30 (1994)). As the Sixth
Circuit explained, “the state’s potential liability for a
judgment against the entity” is the “foremost” factor
in determining whether that entity is an arm of the
state. Flint Pet.App.54 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Hess, 513 U.S. at 51 (“Eleventh Amendment’s
core concern is not implicated” unless the state is “in
fact obligated to bear and pay the resulting indebtedness of the enterprise”).
Under Michigan law, it is the municipality—not
the state—that must pay any judgment incurred while
the entity is under emergency management. See Mich.
Comp. L. §§ 141.1560(5), 141.1572. The Michigan Court
of Appeals has specifically held that Flint was not
acting as an arm of the state under Michigan law
while under emergency management—and thus the
state cannot be liable for the actions its emergency
managers took during the water crisis. See Boler,
923 N.W.2d at 293-296. The court explained that the
emergency manager exercised a local power, not a state
power: “The emergency manager, in place of the chief
administrative officer and governing body, acts for
and on behalf of the local government only.” Id. at 295.
See Mich. Comp. L. § 141.1552(dd). The Sixth Circuit
thus correctly concluded that Flint was not an arm of
the state under the Eleventh Amendment. The court’s
application of settled law to a unique set of facts does
not warrant review.
35
III. THIS CASE IS A POOR VEHICLE FOR REVIEW.
This Court “rarely grant[s] review where the thrust
of the claim is that a lower court simply erred in
applying a settled rule of law to the facts of a particular
case.” Salazar-Limon v. City of Houston, 137 S.Ct.
1277, 1278 (2017) (Alito, J., concurring in the denial
of certiorari). See S.Ct. R. 10. As Judge Sutton emphasized, that concern is especially acute here, where the
egregious facts alleged in the pleadings have yet to
be developed through discovery. Flint Pet.App.213. As
explained above, Petitioners’ constitutional arguments
turn centrally on disputed interpretations of the
allegations in the complaint. This Court ought not to
rule on those arguments absent factual development.
In Johnson, supra, this Court held that the resolution of factual issues is inappropriate in qualifiedimmunity interlocutory appeals. Resolving factual
issues is the daily work of trial judges, but “appellate
judges enjoy no comparative expertise in such matters.”
Johnson, 515 U.S. at 316. Fact questions—particularly when, as here, they involve the determination
of defendants’ mental state—“can consume inordinate
amounts of appellate time.” Id. Even if the Court
were to believe that the questions presented might at
some point warrant review, it ought not to decide
them now, “in the context of a less developed record,”
rather than after discovery or trial, “on a record that
will permit a better decision.” Id. at 317.
Waiting will not prejudice Petitioners’ interests.
Petitioners are already responding to third-party discovery requests in the district court on the state-law
claims against the engineering-company defendants.
Unlike in other qualified immunity cases, then, a grant
36
of certiorari at this stage cannot be justified as
protecting against the burdens of discovery.
Even if the Court were to believe that the questions
presented might warrant intervention at the motionto-dismiss stage, it should wait to make any such
determination until the Sixth Circuit decides the
pending Carthan appeal. If the Sixth Circuit sustains
the complaint in that case, it is likely that the
defendants will again petition and provide the Court
the opportunity to decide whether review is merited
with the full set of factual allegations in view. It will
also offer the chance to avoid deciding questions
unnecessarily in the event that the state-court Mays
litigation, pending in the Michigan Supreme Court,
obviates any of the issues here. There is, in any event,
no basis for review now.
CONCLUSION
The petitions for writ of certiorari should be
denied.
37
Respectfully submitted by Respondents Counsel,
MYLES MCGUIRE
PAUL T. GESKE (COUNSEL OF RECORD )
MCGUIRE LAW, P.C.
55 WEST WACKER DRIVE, 9TH FLOOR
CHICAGO, IL 60601
(312) 893-7002
MMCGUIRE@MCGPC.COM
PGESKE@MCGPC.COM
JOHN SAWIN
SAWIN LAW FIRM, LTD.
55 WEST WACKER DRIVE, SUITE 900
CHICAGO, IL 60601
(312) 853-2490
JSAWIN@SAWINLAWYERS.COM
SCOTT MORGAN
MORGAN LAW FIRM, LTD.
55 WEST WACKER DR., SUITE 900
CHICAGO, IL 60601
(312) 327-3386
SMORGAN@SMORGAN-LAW.COM
STEVEN HART
HART, MCLAUGHLIN & ELDRIDGE, LLC
121 W. WACKER DR., SUITE 1050
CHICAGO, IL 60607
(312) 955-0545
SHART@HMELEGAL.COM
DAVID E. HART
MADDIN, HAUSER, ROTH & HELLER, P.C.
SECOND FLOOR ESSEX CENTRE
28400 NORTHWESTERN HWY.
SOUTHFIELD, MI 48034
(248) 827-1884
DHART@MADDINHAUSER.COM
DECEMBER 16, 2019
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.