Opposition Brief — In Re Robert Sarhan, et ux., Petitioners

No. 19-1287

__________________________________________________________________

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

__________________________________________________________________

IN RE ROBERT SARHAN AND ANABELLA SOURY

Petitioners,

__________________________________________________________________

On Petition for a Writ of Mandamus and Writ of Prohibition to the

Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

__________________________________________________________________

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

__________________________________________________________________

RAUL GASTESI, JR.

Counsel of Record

GASTESI, LOPEZ & MESTRE, PLLC.

8105 NW 155th Street

Miami Lakes, Florida 33016

Tel: 305-818-9993

Fax: 305-818-9997

efiling@glmlegal.com

gastesi@glmlegal.com

Counsel for Respondent H&H Investors, Inc.

1

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

A. Questions Presented as stated by Petitioners

Should a writ of mandamus be issued to the Eleventh Circuit, requiring it

(A) to disregard matters dehors the record,

(B) to rule without regard to matters dehors the record,

(C) to reverse the order of the district court,

(1) which granted a motion to dismiss the complaint based on a matter, which was:

(i) outside the “four corners” of the complaint, and

(ii) dehors the record, and

(2) which disallowed requested relief from a state-court judgment under the Rooker

Feldman Doctrine, where the judgment was entered:

(a) without notice to Anabella Soury,

(b) without affording to her an opportunity

(i) to appeal or

(ii) to be heard on the due-process violations, and

(c) without affording to Robert Sarhan an opportunity to be heard on those

due-process arguments, and

(d) Mandating that the district court accept jurisdiction to grant relief from the

state court judgment in regard to the due-process challenges to that judgment that

the state court would not hear, notwithstanding the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine?

(e) Is mandamus available to mandate relief from orders that recite reliance on

items dehors the record and violate the ministerial duty to rule just on items within

the record?

(f) Is mandamus available to mandate relief from an order of dismissal of a

complaint that recites reliance on items dehors the “four corners” of the complaint

and violate the ministerial duty to rule just on items within those four corners?

2

(g) Is mandamus available to mandate that the court take jurisdiction where it

declined to do so because of a misinterpretation of the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine?

(h) Is a judgment of foreclosure against Anabella Soury and Robert Sarhan, as

owners of the foreclosed property, a denial of due process where that judgment was

entered without serving, and without notice to, Anabella Soury or her attorney and

without affording to Robert Sarhan an opportunity to be heard?

Should a writ of prohibition be issued to the Eleventh Circuit, prohibiting it:

(i) From considering any matters dehors the record, and

(j) Considering matters outside the “four corners” of the complaint?

(k) Is prohibition available to prohibit reliance on items outside the record?

(l) Is prohibition available to prohibit reliance on items outside the “four corners” of

the complaint in ruling on a motion to dismiss the complaint?

(m) Is a judgment of foreclosure against Anabella Soury and Robert Sarhan, as

owners of the foreclosed property, a denial of due process and void where that

judgment was entered without serving, and without notice to, Anabella Soury or her

attorney and without affording to Robert Sarhan an opportunity to be heard?

(n) Should a writ of certiorari be issued to the Eleventh Circuit determining that

the state-court judgment was entered without notice to Anabella Soury, without any

opportunity to be heard, was a denial of due process, and was void, and that the

district court should order the state court to invalidate the judgment and that the

relief hereinabove mentioned in regard to mandamus and prohibition should be

granted via certiorari?

(o) Should sanctions be permitted to be based on matters dehors the record?

3

MISSTATEMENTS IN PETITIONERS’ QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 15.2 counsel is required to address any

perceived misstatements of fact or law in the petition. Essentially every question

presented above by the Petitioners to this Court contains a misstatement and the

same are addressed below as follows:

1. All matters contained in the Eleventh Circuit’s Order of Dismissal formed

part of Petitioners’ initial Emergency Complaint and attachments to the

United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

2. In the underlying action before the Circuit Court for the Eleventh Circuit for

Miami Dade County, Anabella Soury, a.k.a. Anabella Sarhan was served,

filed a pleading that was taken as her “Answer” by the Court and a Summary

Judgment was entered against her. For the next nearly 6 years Ms. Soury

never took part in the proceedings from that moment on, even though her

attorney was served with over sixty (60) pleadings including the Trial Order.

Soury failed to attend the Trial which resulted in the ensuing Judgment.

3. Although Summary Judgment was entered against Ms. Soury on April 10,

2013, Ms. Soury was provided an opportunity to be heard on her Motion titled

“Defendants’ Emergency Motion for Relief from Judgment as Void” before

Judge Hanzman on June 20, 2019.

4. Dr. Robert Sarhan was afforded the same opportunity to be heard on his

Motion titled “Emergency Motion to Vacate Judgment of Foreclosure Due to

Fraud on the Court” three days earlier, on June 17, 2019.

4

5. At the June 20, 2019 hearing, both Mr. Sarhan and Ms. Soury appeared and

were represented by their respective counsel. Mr. Sarhan’s counsel, Mr.

Arthur Morburger, attempted to argue the Motion on Ms. Soury’s behalf

although Ms. Soury was represented by counsel, Mr. Robert Moore, who was

present at that post-judgment hearing. Mr. Morburger was allowed in open

Court an opportunity to appear as counsel for Ms. Soury and make an

argument. Mr. Morburger refused. Counsel for Ms. Soury nonetheless argued

the Motion on her behalf. Notably, there is no mention of how or what

argument would have been made that would have resulted in a different

ruling.

6. There is no denial of due process to either party. Robert Sarhan participated

in the trial court proceedings, appealed numerous times, and has removed

the matter several times to federal court, appealed each and every state court

ruling, several times. Through it all, the Final Judgment has been upheld. As

to Ms. Soury, Ms. Soury was properly served, responded and summary

judgment was entered against her on April 10, 2013. This Summary

Judgement still stands, and Ms. Soury never sought to set the same aside or

appeal.

7. Given the fact that Final Judgment was appropriately entered in the trial

court level, and the parties have had ample opportunity to appeal and be

heard, and the Final Judgment has been upheld by numerous Courts; the

Rooker Feldman Doctrine applies.

5

8. Lastly, sanctions were properly entered by the Eleventh Circuit Court of

Appeals as the Emergency Complaint filed in the District Court and the

subsequent appeal to the Eleventh Circuit was found to be frivolous. Sarhan

v. H & H Inv’rs, Inc., No. 19-12676-AA, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 767 (11th Cir.

Jan. 9, 2020).

9. This appeal is just as frivolous.

6

CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS AND CORPORATE

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Certificate of Interested Parties and Corporate Disclosure Statement

pursuant to 11th Cir. R. 26.1 stating that the following persons and entities have a

financial interest in the outcome of this case:

1. Dr. Robert Sarhan as Petitioner.

a. Dr. Robert Sarhan is represented by the Law Office of Arthur J.

Morburger.

2. Anabella Soury, a.k.a. Anabella Sarhan, as Petitioner.

a. Anabella Soury is represented by the Law Office of Arthur J.

Morburger.

3. H & H Investors, Inc. as Respondent. H & H Investors, Inc. received a final

judgment on July 31st, 2017 and foreclosed on Plaintiff’s property.

a. H & H Investors, Inc. is represented by Gastesi, Lopez & Mestre,

PLLC.

b. H & H Investors, Inc. is owned 100% by Rafael Halim, Individually.

c. H&H Investors’ business address is: 11810 S.W. 206th St. Miami, Fl

33177.

4. Arthur Morburger, Esq.- Law Office of Arthur J. Morburger. Counsel for

Petitioners, Robert Sarhan and Anabella Soury, a.k.a. Anabella Sarhan.

a. Address: 19 W. Flagler St. Ste. 404, Miami, FL 33130

7

5. Raul Gastesi, Jr., Esq.- Gastesi, Lopez & Mestre, PLLC. Counsel for

Respondent, H & H Investors, Inc.

a. Address: 8105 N.W. 155 Street, Miami Lakes FL 33016.

8

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1

MISSTATEMENTS IN PETITIONERS’ QUESTIONS PRESENTED

3

CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS AND CORPORATE

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

6

TABLE OF CONTENTS

8

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

9

DIRECTLY RELATED CASES PURSUANT TO RULE 14.1(b)(iii)

11

OPINIONS AND ORDERS BELOW

13

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

14

INTRODUCTION

14

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

18

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITIONS

23

ATTORNEY’S FEES COSTS AND SANCTIONS

36

CONCLUSION

37

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

39

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

39

9

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Ass'n for Disabled Ams., Inc. v. Amoco Oil Co., 211 F.R.D. 457, (S.D. Fla. 2002)

…….................................................................................................................................28

BBG Design-Build, LLC v. Southern-Owners Ins. Co., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

223307 (N.D. Fla. October 11, 2019)............................................................................26

Blonder v. AGC Grp., Inc. (In re Blonder), No. 13-76658-JRS, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS

3352 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Sep. 28, 2015)..........................................................................28

Casale v. Tillman, 558 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2009)................................................29, 30

D. C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 482..................................................29, 30

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005) .......................30

Hassenflu v. Pyke, 491 F.2d 1094 (5th Cir.1974)..................................................23, 24

Lomax v. Reynolds, 119 So. 3d 562 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) ............................................35

Miami Bank & Tr. Co. v. Rademacher Co., 149 Fla. 24, 5 So. 2d 63 (1941)..............28

Powell v. Powell, 80 F.3d 464, (11th Cir. 1996) …......................................................29

Sarhan v. H & H Inv’rs, Inc., 796 F. App'x 678 (11th Cir. 2020)...............................13

Sarhan v. H & H Inv'rs, Inc., 257 So. 3d 996 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018).............................20

Sarhan v. H & H Inv’rs, Inc., No. 3D19-1322, 2019 Fla. App. LEXIS 14186 (3d DCA

Sep. 18, 2019)...........................................................................................................19, 31

Sarhan v. H & H Inv’rs, Inc., No. 19-12676-AA, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 767 (11th

Cir. Jan. 9, 2020).................................................................................................5, 13, 37

Seay v. Eagle Cleaning Serv., No. 2:18-cv-01522-LSC, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71625

(N.D. Ala. Apr. 29, 2019)...............................................................................................25

Stephens v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 749 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2014)........................26

Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, (2002) ……………………….........14

Taiyo Corp. v. Sheraton Savannah Corp., 49 F.3d 1514 (11th Cir. 1995).................37

United States v. Camejo, 929 F.2d 610 (11th Cir. Fla. April 22, 1991).........23, 24, 25

10

United States v. Napper, 887 F.2d 1528 (11th Cir. 1989).....................................32, 33

Wilson v. Gen. Tavern Corp., 469 F. Supp. 2d 1214 (S.D. Fla. 2006).........................26

Wood v. Orange Cty., 715 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1983).................................................32

Statutes

28 U.S.C.S. § 1651(a).....................................................................................................14

Fla. Stat. 26.012(g)..................................................................................................29, 31

Rules

11th Cir. R. 26.1..............................................................................................................6

Fed. R. App. P. 38..........................................................................................................37

Fla. R. Civ. Pro. 1.070...................................................................................................29

Fla. R. Civ. Pro. 1.540(b)...............................................................................................31

11

DIRECTLY RELATED CASES PURSUANT TO RULE 14.1(b)(iii)

State Trial CourtCircuit Court for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit for Miami-Dade County

● H&H Investors Inc v. Robert Sarhan, et al.

o

-2009-074988-CA-01

Reversed and Remanded 10/19/2011

● H&H Investors Inc v. Robert Sarhan, et al.

-2012-007970-CA-01

o

Final Judgment entered on 07/31/2017

o

Amended Final Judgment entered on 12/11/2018

State Appellate Court

Florida Third District Court of Appeal

● Robert Sarhan, et al., v. H & H Investors, Inc.

o

Reversed on 10/19/2011

● Robert Sarhan v. H & H Investors, Inc.

o

-3D19-1531

Stay Denied on 08/27/2019

● Robert Sarhan, et al., v. H & H Investors, Inc.

o

-3D19-1322

Per Curiam Affirmed on 09/18/2019

● Robert Sarhan v. H & H Investors, Inc.

o

-3D18-89

Per Curiam Affirmed on 09/05/2018

● Robert Sarhan, et al., v. H & H Investors, Inc.

o

-3D10-3394

-3D19-1701

Motion to Dismiss granted on 12/12/2019

Federal Trial Court

United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida

12

● Sarhan et al v. H & H Investors Inc.

o

Case Dismissed on 06/24/2019

● Sarhan v. H & H lnvestors

o

-1:18-cv-20088-JEM

Case Remanded to State Court on 05/18/2018

● Sarhan et al v. H & H Investors et al

o

-1:19-cv-22588-DPG

-1:19-cv-20368-RNS

Case Dismissed on 02/26/2019

Federal Appellate Courts

United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

● Robert Sarhan v. H & H Investors

o

Appeal of 18-cv-20088

o

Dismissal entered on 07/06/2018

● Robert Sarhan v. H & H Investors, et al

o

Appeal of 19-cv-20368

o

Dismissal entered on 12/20/2019

● Robert Sarhan, et al v. H & H Investors, Inc.

o

Appeal of 19-cv-22588

o

Per Curiam Affirmed on 01/09/2020

-18-12422

-19-11177

-19-12676

Supreme Court of the United States

● Robert Sarhan, et ux., Petitioners v. H & H Investors, Inc.

o

Appeal of 3D19-1322

o

Petition Denied on 06/01/2020

-19-8142

13

OPINIONS AND ORDERS BELOW

The following are the Opinions and Orders from which the Petitioners seek

relief:

Per Curiam Affirmed Order entered on January 9, 2020 in Robert Sarhan

and Anabella Soury v. H&H Investors, Inc. by the United States Court of Appeals

for the Eleventh Circuit. See Sarhan v. H & H Inv’rs, Inc., 796 F. App'x 678 (11th

Cir. 2020).

Order on Sanctions entered on January 9, 2020 in Robert Sarhan and

Anabella Soury v. H&H Investors, Inc. by the United States Court of Appeals for

the Eleventh Circuit. See Sarhan v. H & H Inv’rs, Inc., No. 19-12676-AA, 2020 U.S.

App. LEXIS 767 (11th Cir. Jan. 9, 2020).

14

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The U.S. Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction in this matter. This Court

lacks discretionary jurisdiction to consider this case. Petitioners allege that this

Court's jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C.S. § 1651(a). It is well established that:

Where a statute specifically addresses the particular issue at

hand, it is that authority, and not the All Writs Act, that is

controlling. The right of removal is entirely a creature of statute and

a suit commenced in a state court must remain there until cause is

shown for its transfer under some act of Congress. Syngenta Crop

Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32, 123 S. Ct. 366, 369 (2002).

INTRODUCTION

The Petitioners, unhappy with their results in state court, attempted to elicit

a different, more favorable result from Federal Court. The District Court properly

found that it does not have jurisdiction over the Petitioners’ Emergency Complaint

pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

Furthermore, the State Court acted within its jurisdictional authority at all

times throughout the proceeding, as Florida law grants Florida circuit courts

jurisdiction over mortgage foreclosures. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precluded the

Petitioners from raising claims in federal court that are inextricably intertwined

with their unsuccessful state court claims.

The underlying case is a 2012 case, where Final Judgment was finally

entered in 2017. Just recently the Petitioners began to claim that since the Final

Judgment was not served on Ms. Soury that the Final Judgment and Amended

Final Judgment are void. What Petitioners fail to mention is that Anabella Soury

15

was properly served (App. 5) when the State Court proceedings commenced and had

a reasonable opportunity to raise all of her federal and state court claims, as well as

any defenses she may have had. In fact, Ms. Soury litigated against a Motion for

Summary Judgment (App. 8) that was granted against her in 2013, finding she did

not have an interest in the property (App.9). After that ruling, Ms. Soury

abandoned the case. Neither Ms. Soury nor her counsel made any filings on her own

behalf for nearly six (6) years and she otherwise failed to participate in any of the

court’s proceedings. Nevertheless, she was served with several documents providing

notice of a looming trial and pending appeal, among others. Ms. Soury, at any point

throughout the nearly eight years of litigation, could have brought up any claims

that she wished, but chose not to. As a result, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

precludes her from making new arguments in federal court because she was

unsuccessful in state court.

Another frivolous argument made by the Petitioners stems from Ms. Soury’s

participation, or lack thereof, in a different improper removal case initiated by the

Petitioner Robert Sarhan before the filing of the Emergency Complaint in the

District Court. This argument is irrelevant to the Court’s Rooker-Feldman analysis.

Regardless

of

Ms.

Soury’s

participation

in

that

improper

removal,

the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes Ms. Soury and Dr. Sarhan from bringing a new

action in federal court that is inextricably intertwined with their state court claims

for the sole purpose that they lost in State Court.

16

The Emergency Complaint filed by the Petitioners in District Court was in an

attempt to appeal an Order (App. 12) entered by Judge Hanzman in the State Court

on June 20, 2019. From this Order and hearing stem a range of other frivolous

issues raised by the Petitioners. First, Judge Hanzman’s ruling that Dr. Sarhan

lacked standing and Mr. Morburger could not argue on behalf of a party that he did

not represent was proper. In fact, Judge Hanzman gave Mr. Morburger every

reasonable opportunity to elect to appear on behalf of Ms. Soury at the hearing in

order to make whatever arguments he deemed necessary. (App. 10 at page 6 of

trascript) However, Mr. Morburger’s refusal to appear on behalf of Ms. Soury and

make arguments on her behalf does not amount to an action restricting the

Petitioners from raising any claims at that hearing. Anabella Soury was

represented by counsel, Robert Moore, Esq. In fact, the arguments on her behalf

were made by Robert Moore, Esq. There is no mention of any arguments that were

not made by Robert Moore, Esq. that Mr. Morburger would have made that would

have resulted in a different outcome.

Furthermore, Judge Hanzman’s ruling that Dr. Sarhan could not make any

further pro se filings and must obtain counsel to make new filings as a result of his

abuse of the judicial system is a recognized sanction in Florida courts. Once again,

what filing or argument would Dr. Sarhan have made that the attorneys did not

make that would have resulted in a different outcome?

As a result, Judge Hanzman’s ruling (just as Florida’s Third District Court of

Appeal determined) was proper, and should not otherwise be set aside.

17

Furthermore, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precluded the federal district court from

entertaining the Petitioners’ action because it lacked jurisdiction.

18

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Dr. Sarhan and his attorneys, now together with Ms. Soury and her attorney,

for nearly eight years have made baseless, improper, and frivolous filings with the

sole purpose of delaying the underlying foreclosure action for as long as possible.

The Petitioners’ (and their Counsel’s) irresponsible behavior has resulted in a

convoluted procedural history and confusing underlying facts. In addition, their

frivolous actions and pleadings have led to sanctions being entered against the

Petitioners and their attorneys by the Circuit Court for the Eleventh Judicial

Circuit for Miami-Dade County, by the Florida Third District Court of Appeals and

by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. This specific appeal stems

from a per curiam affirmation by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

of a dismissal of a case in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of

Florida.

On June 21, 2019, Petitioners filed an Emergency Complaint in the United

States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. Said Complaint was

promptly dismissed by Judge Darrin P. Gayles because, as stated by Judge Gayles,

“Plaintiffs were recently denied the same sought relief on the same substantive

issues presented here.” Furthermore, Judge Gayles explained that the District

Court lacked jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, because the

claims were inextricably intertwined with the State Court claims. A Notice of

Appeal for this Dismissal was filed on July 7, 2019. On that same day, the

Petitioners also appealed the same subject Order from their Emergency Complaint

19

to the Florida Third District Court of Appeal under case number 3D19-1322. The

Florida Third District Court of Appeal per curiam affirmed the Circuit Court Order

on September 18, 2019. Sarhan v. H & H Inv’rs, Inc., No. 3D19-1322, 2019 Fla. App.

LEXIS 14186 (3d DCA Sep. 18, 2019). Petitioners recently also sought a writ of

certiorari from this Court regarding appeal 3D19-1322 that was denied on June 1,

2020. Not surprisingly, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit also per

curiam affirmed the U.S. District Court's dismissal and entered sanctions against

the Petitioners and their counsel due to the fact that they found the appeal

frivolous. Petitioners are seeking relief from said affirmation and sanctions.

The matter before this Court began as a simple and straightforward state

foreclosure case involving Dr. Sarhan’s admitted and repeated breaches of loan

obligations and a subsequent settlement agreement.

Not long after the parties entered into the Settlement Agreement, Dr. Sarhan

defaulted once again. This default served as the catalyst for what would turn into

more than seven (7) years of litigation. Dr. Sarhan and his attorneys unduly

delayed the litigation for 5 ½ years before trial and for more than two years

post-judgement. This baseless appeal is just one of many examples of how the

Petitioners and their attorneys have been successful in delaying the conclusion of

this case for almost eight years.

The Final Judgment was entered for Respondent on July 31, 2017. See

Petitioners’ Exhibit C. Petitioner Sarhan then filed motions for reconsideration and

rehearing, all of which were denied. Ultimately, the matter was appealed to the

20

Third District Court of Appeal of Florida under case No. 3D18-89 and the rulings of

the trial court were per curiam affirmed. Sarhan v. H & H Inv'rs, Inc., 257 So. 3d

996 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018). Further motions for rehearing and for the issuance of a

written opinion were denied. An Amended Final Judgment was entered on

December 11, 2018 that only amended the amounts due regarding attorney’s fees

and costs. See Petitioners’ Exhibit D.

Even though the matter was fully briefed and the decisions of the trial court

were upheld on appeal, the Petitioners' insistence on improperly delaying the

conclusion of this case has led to approximately thirty (30) post-final judgment

filings at the trial court level.

Unfortunately, the Petitioners antics do not end there. Since the entry of the

Final Judgment, the Petitioner Sarhan, now together with Petitioner Soury, have

filed three (3) separate lawsuits in federal court (two of which were improper

removals from state court) that were summarily dismissed, three (3) appeals before

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit on this matter, two (2) actions

before this Court, one of which was denied on June 1, 2020. This is all in addition to

all the post judgment appeals before the Third District Court of Appeals for Florida.

All of these appeals involve post-trial issues the Petitioners raised in an effort

to continue to prolong the conclusion of the underlying case. In addition, as a result

of the trial court and appellate court proceedings, the Petitioners have filed lawsuits

against two (2) trial court judges, three (3) appellate court judges, the Governor of

21

Florida, the director of the FBI, two FBI agents, undersigned counsel, and even a

court reporter. All to no avail.

When none of the previously mentioned removals, appeals, or six (6)

bankruptcies worked, the Petitioners conveniently reverted back to the false claim

that Anabella Soury still had an interest in the property. The Petitioners make

these false claims even though Ms. Soury was left with no interest in the subject

property, pursuant to their Marital Settlement Agreement entered into during their

divorce over eleven years ago. App. 4. The Marital Settlement Agreement remains

in full force and effect until this day. As a result, an order granting summary

judgment was entered against Ms. Soury on April 10, 2013 finding that Ms. Soury

did not have an interest in the property. That order has never been appealed, and is

otherwise still in effect.

Ms. Soury and her attorney, Mr. Robert Moore, Esq., seemingly abandoned

the case for six (6) years after the Order granting the Motion for Summary

Judgment (App. 9) was entered against her. Even so, Mr. Robert Moore, Esq. was

served with numerous documents (64 pleadings) concerning this case, including the

Trial Order and Dr. Sarhan’s first Notice of Appeal. Mr. Robert Moore, Esq. has also

represented Dr. Sarhan in the past.

Despite being served with those documents, Mr. Moore did not attend

mediation or a single deposition, did not file any pleadings, or otherwise participate

in the case. Mr. Moore also did not file so much as a witness list, exhibit list, or

other pretrial motion. Mr. Moore failed and/or refused to appear at what would

22

otherwise have been the calendar call. He made no effort to appear at trial, nor any

of the post-judgment hearings prior to the first appeal.

Anabella Soury now files this meritless case without ever claiming that she

had a meritorious defense nor claiming that she had the ability to cure the breach of

the mortgage, either by having the funds to pay-off the mortgage or that she had a

willing buyer to purchase the property, and pay-off the mortgage with the closing

proceeds. Anabella Soury does not claim that the amount of the Judgment was

calculated incorrectly. In fact Anabella Soury does not even appeal the order

granting the Summary Judgment against her setting forth that any interest that

she may have is inferior to the Respondent’s interest. Ms. Soury simply states that

the Judgment is void as she was never served with the actual Final Judgment or

was ever provided an opportunity to raise all of her claims. This statement is simply

false.

23

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITIONS

Given that the following three subdivisions by the Petitioners are highly

related, they will be discussed together in the following paragraphs.

I.

PANEL OPINION CONSISTS OF MATTERS DEHORS THE

RECORD AND OUTSIDE THE “FOUR CORNERS” OF THE

COMPLAINT

II.

THE ANSWER BRIEF AND APPELLEE'S APPENDIX ARE

DEHORS THE RECORD, STRAY OUTSIDE THE FOUR

CORNERS OF THE COMPLAINT, AND DO NOT DISPUTE THE

COMPLAINT'S ALLEGATIONS

III.

THE ANSWER BRIEF'S ARGUMENTS ARE MISDIRECTED

AWAY FROM APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS AND THEIR

SUPPORTING CITATIONS AND THEREFORE NO REPLY IS

DUE

The Petitioners cite various cases in an attempt to support their contention

that it is inappropriate to base an opinion on assertions that do not form part of the

record. Among their citations, both Hassenflu v. Pyke, 491 F.2d 1094 (5th Cir.1974)

and United States v. Camejo, 929 F.2d 610, 616 (11th Cir. Fla. April 22, 1991) deal

with appellants seeking relief from trial court adjudications where there was little

or no record. In Camejo, the appellant is seeking relief from certain statements

made to the jury in trial. The appellant in Camejo seeks relief by attempting to rely

on certain documents that the appellant himself never propounded into evidence

and for said reason they do not form part of the record. These cases do not apply to

the matters at hand. For example:

The defendant did not offer the letter in evidence. It is

not a part of the record before us. We are in no position to pass

upon its authenticity or contents as corroborating evidence of the

24

defendant. ...The government cannot be faulted for the failure of the

defendant to make a record, nor can it be censored for arguing the

evidence established by it without reference to a document that was

not offered in evidence.

The government also offered evidence of unexplained wealth by

introducing a wire transfer of $ 4,000 to the defendant by his wife

while he was vacationing in Europe where he spent $8,000 in charges.

The defendant contends that the prosecutor should not have argued in

summation that the defendant's wife wired him the money from Miami

to Rome because their passports showed that she accompanied him on

the trip and the passports were shown to the government. The

passports were not offered in evidence and no proffer was

made. They are not a part of the record and are not before us.

We decline to consider matters dehors the record. Hassenflu v. Pyke,

491 F.2d 1094 (5th Cir.1974) (per curiam). In any event, whether or

not the defendant's wife went to Europe with him is of no moment

since the fact remains that he spent $8,000 on a European vacation.

The prosecutor's argument did not affect the substantial rights of the

defendant. Emphasis added. United States v. Camejo, 929 F.2d 610,

616 (11th Cir. Fla. April 22, 1991)

The matter before this Court stems from an Emergency Complaint filed by

the Petitioners in the United States District Court for the Southern District of

Florida. In said Emergency Complaint the Petitioners formed a record which

contained an Order entered by Judge Hanzman on June 20, 2019. (App. 12) The

purpose of the lawsuit was precisely to appeal this Order. The Order by Judge

Hanzman laid out a summarized history of the case and of the frivolous acts

performed by the Petitioners in an attempt to delay the matter further. In addition,

the Order explains how Ms. Soury is not entitled to the relief sought as she was

properly served, filed what was adopted as her “Answer” and summary judgment

was entered against her in 2013. Petitioners now complain that the Court appears

to have considered the Order that they themselves submitted into the record. A copy

25

of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the pleading

for all purposes. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c); Seay v. Eagle Cleaning Serv., No.

2:18-cv-01522-LSC, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71625, at *4 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 29, 2019).

Even though this Order was submitted by the Petitioners to the District Court

when they filed the “new” lawsuit and to the Eleventh Circuit when they appealed

the dismissal, they have now conveniently omitted the Order from their Appendix.

See Petitioners’ Exhibit C1 on page 2 where it shows that the Hanzman Order

should be attached to said document in subsection G.

The petitioners now claim that they have been prejudiced by the Court

having reviewed and seemingly adopted said Order, yet they fail to plead how the

result would have been any different if they had not.

The short answer to this argument is that it amounts to no more

than speculation and conjecture and has no support in the record. ... In

fact, the sole ground stated in the district court in support of this

motion for a mistrial was that the juror was in no state of mind to

fairly and impartially consider the defendants' guilt or innocence. The

recitation in this court of what the defendants might have elicited from

questioning the juror was neither submitted to nor argued to the trial

judge. Emphasis added. United States v. Camejo, 929 F.2d 610, 615

(11th Cir. 1991)

Furthermore, Petitioners claim that all matters presented by the Respondent

are matters “dehors” of record and should not be admitted. They further state that

Respondent did not file any answer or response to the Emergency Complaint filed in

the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. Again,

Petitioners fail to point out that said Emergency Complaint was dismissed sua

26

sponte on June 24, 2019 via Paperless Order entered by Judge Darrin P. Gayles

within three (3) days of the Emergency Complaint being filed. The Order of

dismissal clearly states that the Petitioners are seeking review from a Florida state

court order denying them relief. The Order further states the Court lacks

jurisdiction and states the grounds upon which the Court relied to dismiss the case.

Among the reasons listed was the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Petitioners’

Exhibit C1 at page 4 (D.E. [5]).

Nonetheless, it can be argued that where the underlying complaint omitted a

crucial, undisputed fact in an attempt to, for example, acquire jurisdiction, the court

may consider extrinsic facts.

In most cases, a court deciding whether a duty to defend existed

looks only to the four corners of the underlying complaint and the four

corners of the insurance policy. Id. However, the Eleventh Circuit has

recognized "a limited exception to the eight corners rule, in which a

court may consider extrinsic facts 'if those facts are undisputed, and,

had they been pled in the complaint, they clearly would have placed

the claims outside the scope of coverage.'" Id. (quoting Stephens v.

Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 749 F.3d 1318, 1323 (11th Cir. 2014)). The

Court explained that the exception "is limited to 'exceptional cases in

which courts have crafted an equitable remedy when it is manifestly

obvious to all involved that the actual facts placed the claims outside

the scope of coverage.'" Id. (quoting Stephens); see also Wilson v. Gen.

Tavern Corp., 469 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1220 (S.D. Fla. 2006) ("[T]he

[underlying] complaint omitted [a] crucial, undisputed fact in a patent

attempt to 'plead into coverage.'"). BBG Design-Build, LLC v.

Southern-Owners Ins. Co., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 223307, *5 (N.D.

Fla. October 11, 2019)

A review in detail of the Hanzman Order, which was the Order from which

Petitioners were seeking relief in their Emergency Complaint, the Paperless Order

dismissing their Emergency Complaint at the District Court level, and finally the

27

Order entered by the Eleventh Circuit which is being appealed to this Court, they

all align to conclude the same reasoning. Ms. Soury had her day in court and the

federal system has no jurisdiction to relitigate this matter.

IV.

THE JUDGMENT, AMENDED JUDGMENT, AND APPEAL

WERE ALL PROSECUTED WITHOUT ANY NOTICE TO

ANABELLA OR HER ATTORNEY ROBERT L. MOORE,

THEREBY

DEPRIVING

THE

STATE

COURT

OF

JURISDICTION OVER HER PERSON AND RENDERING THE

ROOKER-FELDMAN DOCTRINE INAPPLICABLE TO HER.

As mentioned before, Petitioners fail to mention that Anabella Soury was

properly served (App. 5) when the State Court proceedings commenced and had a

reasonable opportunity to raise all of her federal and state court claims, as well as

any defenses she may have had. Ms. Soury filed a pleading (App. 6) that was

accepted as her “Answer” (App. 7) In fact, Ms. Soury litigated against a Motion for

Summary Judgment (App. 8) that was granted against her in 2013, finding she did

not have an interest in the property (App. 9). After that ruling, Ms. Soury

abandoned the case. Neither Ms. Soury nor her counsel made any filings on her own

behalf for nearly six (6) years and she otherwise failed to participate in any of the

court’s proceedings. Nevertheless, she was served with several documents providing

notice of a looming trial and pending appeal, among others. Ms. Soury, at any point

throughout the nearly eight years of litigation, could have brought up any claims

that she wished, but chose not to. As a result, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

precludes her from making new arguments in federal court because she was

unsuccessful in state court.

28

The Petitioners attempt to mislead this Court by claiming that Ms. Soury did

not have an opportunity to raise her federal claims in State Court and therefore the

Final Judgment and Amended Final Judgment were entered without jurisdiction

over Ms. Soury. As support to their contention they cite Ass'n for Disabled Ams.,

Inc. v. Amoco Oil Co., 211 F.R.D. 457, 472 (S.D. Fla. 2002), Miami Bank & Tr. Co. v.

Rademacher Co., 149 Fla. 24, 5 So. 2d 63, 64 (1941), and Blonder v. AGC Grp., Inc.

(In re Blonder), No. 13-76658-JRS, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 3352 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Sep.

28, 2015). The cited cases consist of matters where reference is made to either

“nonparties”, or that "a notice of an appeal was insufficient to make someone a

party", or that "a person should not be bound by a judgment or verdict to which he

was not a party". What Petitioners fail to clarify is that Ms. Soury was a party, Mr.

Soury was served and there was a summary judgment entered against her.

Anabella Soury now files this meritless case without ever claiming that she

had a meritorious defense nor claiming that she had the ability to cure the breach of

the mortgage, either by having the funds to pay-off the mortgage or that she had a

willing buyer to purchase the property, and pay-off the mortgage with the closing

proceeds. Anabella Soury does not claim that the amount of the Judgment was

calculated incorrectly. In fact Anabella Soury does not even appeal the order

granting the Summary Judgment against her setting forth that any interest that

she may have is inferior to the Respondent’s interest.

The State Court acted under its jurisdictional authority at all times

throughout the course of the proceedings. Florida state courts, by statute, are

29

granted exclusive original jurisdiction over “all actions involving the title and

boundaries of real property.” See Fla. Stat. 26.012(g). The underlying action in this

case is a simple mortgage foreclosure case involving title to property in Miami-Dade

County, Florida. There is not, and never has been, any dispute, as to the state

court’s jurisdictional authority in this case. On the contrary, the Petitioners’ use of

this nonsensical jurisdictional argument is a product of their lack of success in state

court proceedings. In the event that this Court finds that the state court lacked

jurisdiction, this Court has never recognized an exception to the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine on that basis. Casale v. Tillman, 558 F.3d 1258, 1261 (11th Cir. 2009).

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not permit federal district courts to

review state court judgments because that authority rests with state appellate

courts, and as a last resort, the United States Supreme Court. See D. C. Court of

Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 482. The doctrine applies to both federal claims

raised in state court and claims that are “inextricably intertwined” with the state

court’s judgment. Id. Claims are inextricably intertwined if they would "effectively

nullify" the state court judgment, Powell v. Powell, 80 F.3d 464, 467 (11th Cir.

1996), or they "succeed only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the

issues." Tillman, 558 F.3d at 1260.

In Florida, circuit court’s by statute, have jurisdictional authority to hear all

mortgage foreclosure cases. Fla. Stat. 26.012(g). Fla. R. Civ. Pro. 1.070 controls

service of process after the commencement of each action. Lastly, this Court does

not recognize an exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine when the state court’s

30

judgment was void because the state court lacked jurisdiction. Tillman, 558 F.3d at

1261.

The instant appeal is more of the same from the Petitioners. Incoherent

arguments that are difficult to follow and respond to. Nevertheless, this appeal, like

the majority of the others filed in this, and related matters, is frivolous and lacks

any and all merit.

Commencing litigation as a result of a parties lack of success in the state

court system is precisely the kind of litigation the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

disallows. D. C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482; see also Exxon Mobil

Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (stating that the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine continues to apply with full force to "cases brought by

state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered

before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review

and rejection of those judgments”). The Petitioners’ complaint is the perfect example

of why the Rooker-Feldman doctrine exists. They have attempted to seek relief from

the Final Judgment and Judge Hanzman’s order in every way, shape, or form, and

have finally gone too far.

The reason the Petitioners insist on seeking relief from Judge Hanzman’s

Order is because they improperly delayed the underlying simple foreclosure case for

over seven (7) years. As a result, when Judge Hanzman attempted to put a stop to

their irresponsible behavior and waste of judicial resources, the Petitioners were

left with no other option but to start filing meritless pleadings in another court.

31

They continue to improperly file pleadings in different courts, including this Court,

because whenever they attempt to litigate the matter on its merits, they are

unsuccessful. In fact, when seeking review of Judge Hanzman’s Order using proper

process, in an appeal No. 3D19-1322 to Florida’s Third District Court of Appeal, the

state appellate court per curiam affirmed Judge Hanzman’s Order. Sarhan v. H & H

Inv’rs, Inc., No. 3D19-1322, 2019 Fla. App. LEXIS 14186 (3d DCA Sep. 18, 2019).

Petitioners thereafter sought a writ of certiorari from this Court in case number

19-8142 that was denied. As a result, the Petitioners continue to attempt to

circumvent the judicial system in any way they can, regardless of merit and ethical

considerations.

Therefore, this Court should affirm the lower court’s decision that it lacks

jurisdiction to adjudicate the Petitioners’ Emergency Complaint pursuant to the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and find that the state court acted within the

jurisdictional authority prescribed to it by Fla. Stat. 26.012(g) at all times

throughout the state court proceedings.

V.

ROOKER-FELDMAN DOCTRINE HAS NO APPLICATION TO A

STATE COURT PROCEEDING WHERE ANABELLA HAD NO

REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO RAISE HER FEDERAL

CLAIMS OR TO APPEAL, AND HAS NO APPLICATION TO

FLORIDA RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 1.540(B)(4)

MOTION PROCEEDINGS

The Petitioners as they often do, attempt to mischaracterize the events that

have transpired and the law at issue. Here, the Petitioners seem to conflate their

Fla. R. Civ. Pro. 1.540(b) motions in state court with the action they commenced in

32

the lower court. The proper forum for the Rule 1.540(b) motion they filed was the

State Court in which it was litigated. Those motions were summarily denied.

The commencement of an action that, at its core, seeks a review of Judge

Hanzman’s Order (App. 12) and automatically triggers the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine and as a result does not grant the District Court jurisdiction to litigate the

matter. However, the Petitioners continue to engage in classic “shotgun litigation”

and assert any and every issue they can think of and hoping something sticks.

In their petition, the Petitioners claim that as discussed in Wood v. Orange

Cty., 715 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1983) and United States v. Napper, 887 F.2d 1528

(11th Cir. 1989) the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine does not apply to the case at bar.

Both cases are highly distinguishable from the case at bar as explained below. First,

Wood clearly concludes that:

Since plaintiffs did not have a reasonable opportunity to raise

their claims in the state trial court where judgment was entered or on

appeal of that judgment, the district court will not usurp the role of

state appellate courts or the Supreme Court by accepting jurisdiction.

The plaintiffs' allegations were not "inextricably intertwined" with the

state court judgment. Emphasis added. Wood v. Orange Cty., 715 F.2d

1543, 1548 (11th Cir. 1983)

This is simply not the case for Ms. Soury. As explained numerous times

throughout this Brief, Ms. Soury had ample opportunity to raise her claims in State

Court and chose not to. Napper as well is distinguishable as the party upon which

the Rooker- Feldman Doctrine does not apply was never a party to the proceedings.

The party sought to intervene in the State Court proceeding and later sought relief

33

from the District Court. The party never had an opportunity to raise the issues

involved in the State Court, therefore Rooker did not apply.

It is clear that this case does not fall within the confines of the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine as thus formulated. The government brought

a new action in the district court to recover its documents from the

City. The government was not a party to the state proceeding; it

[**19] cannot and does not appeal that decision. Nor does the

government appeal the state court's denial of its motion to intervene.

Emphasis added. United States v. Napper, 887 F.2d 1528, 1534 (11th

Cir. Ga. November 13, 1989)

Anabella Soury had a reasonable opportunity in State Court to raise any

federal claims, appeal the judgment entered against her, and assert any defenses

she deemed proper, but failed to. She was properly served on July 30, 2012 (App. 5);

and filed an “Objection to Foreclosure” (App. 6) on September 17, 2012. That

pleading was adopted by the court as her “Answer to Complaint” via Order dated

October 31, 2012. App. 7. Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (App. 8)

against Anabella Sarhan on December 31, 2012 that was later granted by Order

entered on April 10, 2013, finding that she had no interest in the property. App. 9.

Logically, she thereafter seemingly abandoned the litigation and Ms. Soury nor her

counsel made any filings on her behalf for nearly six (6) years. Furthermore, Ms.

Soury, otherwise failed to participate in any of the court’s proceedings.

Nevertheless, Ms. Soury’s attorney Robert Moore was served with sixty-four (64)

different documents, and did not respond to a single one. Among these documents

was a Trial Order and Dr. Sarhan’s first Notice of Appeal. The state appellate court

found that these documents served as sufficient notice of the looming trial and

34

impending appeal. Despite having been served with these documents, Ms. Soury

and her counsel refused or otherwise chose not to participate in the litigation.

However, Ms. Soury and her counsel’s affirmative decision not to participate in the

litigation does not equate to a lack of a reasonable opportunity to assert her federal

claims in state court. As a result, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does apply and the

district court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the Petitioners’ complaint.

VI.

THE COURT'S RELIANCE ON JUDGE SCOLA'S REMARKS IN

REGARD TO THE REMOVAL OVERLOOKS THE FACT THAT

ANABELLA WAS NOT A PARTY TO THE REMOVAL AND WAS

NOT A PARTY TO THE APPEAL TO WHICH JUDGE SCOLA

REFERRED

As mentioned previously, Dr. Sarhan has attempted to delay these

proceedings in countless ways. After breaching the stipulated agreement Dr.

Sarhan concocted numerous delay tactics to prevent the inevitable from happening:

a foreclosure judgement. When bankruptcy was no longer an option due to abusive

and continuous bankruptcies filed by the Petitioners, Dr. Sarhan found new

alternatives to delay. Final Judgement was eventually entered after approximately

five years of delays and litigation. Three years have elapsed since the Final

Judgement was entered, and Dr. Sarhan continues to frivolously file pleadings in

this matter. When Dr. Sarhan and his attorney ran out of options, they decided to

bring Mrs. Soury back into the equation falsely as a last ditch attempt to continue

to delay the proceedings. The truth is, Dr. Sarhan and his attorney’s irresponsible

behavior has led to a convoluted and nearly incomprehensible procedural history

35

regarding this case. Nevertheless, Ms. Soury’s participation, or lack thereof, in an

improper removal case does not change the fact that the Petitioners are simply

wasting judicial resources while they attempt to use the federal courts to review a

State Court judgment they disagree with. For this, the Defendants and their

Counsel have been sanctioned, and should once again be sanctioned and an award

of attorney's fees and double costs should be made.

VII.

ROOKER-FELDMAN DOCTRINE HAS NO APPLICATION TO

ANY RULE l.540(B) PROCEEDING OR TO ANY OTHER

CRIMINALLY SANCTIONED PROCEEDING IN WHICH

ROBERT SARHAN OR ANABELLA DID NOT AND WILL NOT

HAVE A REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO RAISE THEIR

FEDERAL CLAIMS IN THE STATE COURT

The Petitioners use this section of their brief to, once again, mischaracterize

the events that transpired at the state court level and the relevant case law. Judge

Hanzman’s order that Dr. Sarhan be unable to access the courts on this issue

without the assistance of counsel is a recognized sanction in Florida. See Lomax v.

Reynolds, 119 So. 3d 562, 565 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (holding that a pro se litigant’s

abuse of the judiciary required him to obtain counsel for all future filings).

Furthermore, Judge Hanzman did not instruct the Petitioners’ attorneys to refrain

from making any filings, Judge Hanzman simply reminded Mr. Moore and Mr.

Morburger that any frivolous filings could result in sanctions.

Furthermore, two distinct hearings took place before Judge Hanzman.

Neither Dr. Sarhan nor his attorney were allowed to make arguments at the second

hearing, since Judge Hanzman found Dr. Sarhan lacked standing on the issue at

36

hand and Mr. Morburger was not appearing on behalf of Ms. Soury. However, in

order to grant Mr. Morburger an opportunity to make said arguments, Judge

Hanzman gave Mr. Morburger several opportunities to file an appearance on behalf

of Ms. Soury at that very hearing. Mr. Morburger, however, refused to do so. Ms.

Soury’s attorney who was also present, Mr. Robert Moore, Esq., then proceeded to

make the argument on her behalf. See App. 10.

As previously stated, the Petitioners have not demonstrated what argument

would have been made that would have somehow resulted in a different outcome, or

even what prejudice was suffered. As a result, the lower court’s refusal to allow Mr.

Morburger to argue on behalf of Ms. Soury is not improper, and this Court should

find that Judge Hanzman’s ruling did not deprive the Petitioners of their

opportunity to raise their Federal claims.

ATTORNEY’S FEES COSTS AND SANCTIONS

In the case which the Petitioners are currently appealing to this Court, the

Respondent filed a motion for appellate sanctions, attorney’s fees and costs, against

the Petitioners for filing a frivolous, bad faith appeal. The motion was filed

pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 38. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals granted this

motion. See Sarhan v. H & H Inv’rs, Inc., No. 19-12676-AA, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS

767 (11th Cir. Jan. 9, 2020). The State Court and Florida Third District Court of

Appeal have granted sanctions against the Petitioners as well.

37

Petitioners are continuing the same appeal of the State Court’s decision to

this Court, which is a continuation of their frivolous and bad faith litigation

practices. As such, Respondent requests that sanctions, attorney’s fees and costs be

awarded to Respondent, against Petitioners, pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 38 and the

inherent authority of the Supreme Court. See Taiyo Corp. v. Sheraton Savannah

Corp., 49 F.3d 1514 (11th Cir. 1995). Respondent expects to file a separate motion

in accordance with the above and requests the Supreme Court reserve jurisdiction

for the sole purpose of making such an award against Petitioners, or in the

alternative, remand the case to determine the amount of sanctions, fees and costs to

be awarded.

CONCLUSION

This is a simple mortgage foreclosure case involving the breach of a

Stipulation for an admitted lack of payment on a loan that has by this time

matured. For more than seven (7) years, the Petitioners have raised every issue

imaginable. There are simply no issues left that have not already been litigated.

This appeal is simply a ruse conjured by Dr. Sarhan to create more issues, through

his former wife, because all other issues have been exhausted.

Ms. Soury relinquished her interest in the subject property pursuant to divorce

decree prior to the institution of this foreclosure action. The Judgment is otherwise

valid because Ms. Soury was given adequate service of process. Ms. Soury was given

sufficient notice that the case had been initiated against her, she was properly

38

named as a Defendant, and she was given every opportunity possible to be heard.

Ms. Soury was also served with several documents, despite having a Motion for

Summary Judgment entered against her, including the Trial Order. Ms. Soury

simply chose not to participate in the proceedings. Ms. Soury has not demonstrated

how the outcome would otherwise have been different.

Furthermore, The court’s alleged failure to serve a copy of the Final Judgment

onto Ms. Soury does not affect the validity or finality of the judgment in any way.

Even so, there is no mention that Ms. Soury was unaware of the Final Judgment’s

existence nor that Dr. Sarhan did not tell her of the Final Judgment in this matter.

The parties allegedly both resided on the subject property together. Mr. Moore is

also Dr. Sarhan’s attorney in other matters.

Lastly, it should be indisputable that this case has met its end. A writ of

possession has been served and the Respondent is in possession of the property. Dr.

Sarhan, Ms. Soury, and their legal team have done everything they can to delay this

foreclosure case for as long as possible. The Petitioners have time and time again

shown an utter disregard for the judicial process and seemingly believe that they

are above the law. However, the time has come for Dr. Sarhan and his legal team to

come to terms with the findings of the judicial system. The litigation at hand must

come to an end to allow the Respondent, undersigned counsel, and everyone else

involved in this baseless case to move on with their lives.

39

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

This Brief in Opposition is filed in accordance with Rule 33 of the Rules of the

Supreme Court and in accordance with the Order List: 589 U.S. dated April 15,

2020. The word count for this Brief, excluding the allowed sections, is 7,556.

/s/ Raul Gastesi, Jr.

RAUL GASTESI, JR.

Counsel for Respondent H&H Investors, Inc

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I CERTIFY that the foregoing document has been furnished by e-mail and

mail this 12th day of June, 2020 to:

ARTHUR J. MORBURGER

Attorney for Petitioners

19 W. Flagler St. Ste. 404

Miami, FL 33130

Tel. No. 305-374-3373

Amorburger@bellsouth.net

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Raul Gastesi, Jr.

RAUL GASTESI, JR.

Counsel of Record

GASTESI, LOPEZ & MESTRE, PLLC.

8105 NW 155th Street

Miami Lakes, Florida 33016

Tel: 305-818-9993

Fax: 305-818-9997

efiling@glmlegal.com

gastesi@glmlegal.com

Counsel for Respondent H&H Investors, Inc.