Opposition Brief — FMC Corporation, Petitioner v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes
Supreme Court briefMay 20, 2020
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No. 19-1143
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
_________
FMC CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
v.
SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES,
Respondent.
_________
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
_________
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
_________
WILLIAM F. BACON
SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES
P.O. Box 306
Fort Hall, Idaho 83203
NEAL KUMAR KATYAL
Counsel of Record
REEDY C. SWANSON
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP
555 Thirteenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004
(202) 637-5600
neal.katyal@hoganlovells.com
DOUGLAS B.L. ENDRESON
FRANK S. HOLLEMAN, IV
SONOSKY, CHAMBERS, SACHSE,
ENDRESON & PERRY, LLP
1425 K Street, N.W., Suite 600 PAUL C. ECHO HAWK
ECHO HAWK LAW OFFICE
Washington, D.C. 20005
P.O. Box 4166
Pocatello, Idaho 83205
Counsel for Respondent
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether the Ninth Circuit omitted a necessary
finding from the legal framework for assessing tribal
jurisdiction.
2. Whether the Ninth Circuit correctly applied the
settled grounds for tribal jurisdiction under Montana
v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981), to the unique
facts of this case.
(i)
ii
RELATED PROCEEDINGS
To counsel’s knowledge, there are no related proceedings.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTIONS PRESENTED ........................................ i
RELATED PROCEEDINGS .......................................ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................ v
INTRODUCTION ........................................................ 1
STATEMENT .............................................................. 3
A.
FMC’s Polluting Activities Within
The Fort Hall Reservation ....................... 3
B.
EPA Action And Tribal Permits .............. 5
C.
Tribal Proceedings .................................... 9
D.
Federal Proceedings ............................... 15
REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION .......... 18
I.
II.
THE FIRST QUESTION PRESENTED
DOES NOT WARRANT CERTIORARI ......... 18
A.
The First Question Requests An Advisory Opinion Based On A Mischaracterization Of The Decision Below ....... 19
B.
The Decision Below Does Not Split
With Any Other Circuit .......................... 22
C.
Plains Commerce Did Not Change
the Law And Impose a Threshold
Requirement On The Montana Exceptions ................................................... 23
THE SECOND QUESTION
PRESENTED DOES NOT WARRANT
CERTIORARI ................................................. 25
A.
The Court Would Have To Engage In
Splitless Error Correction Twice To
Avoid An Advisory Opinion .................... 25
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
Page
B.
The Ninth Circuit Did Not Err With
Respect to Either Exception, And
This Case Is A Poor Vehicle For Addressing Both .......................................... 26
III. PETITIONER’S POLICY CONCERNS
DO NOT WARRANT CERTIORARI.............. 32
A.
The Petition Invokes Multiple Irrelevant Issues And Exaggerates The
Consequences Of The Decision Below ... 32
B.
Petitioner’s Generalized Objections
To The Ninth Circuit And Tribal
Courts Are Unfounded ........................... 34
CONCLUSION .......................................................... 35
v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
CASES:
Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley,
532 U.S. 645 (2001) ........................................ 28, 29
Belcourt Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Davis,
786 F.3d 653 (8th Cir. 2015)................................ 25
Belcourt Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Davis,
997 F. Supp. 2d 1017 (D.N.D. 2014) ................... 26
Big Horn Cty. Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Adams,
219 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. 2000)................................ 34
Black v. Cutter Labs.,
351 U.S. 292 (1956) .................................. 21, 22, 35
Buster v. Wright,
135 F. 947 (8th Cir. 1905).............................. 27, 28
Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Mississippi Band of
Choctaw Indians,
746 F.3d 167 (5th Cir. 2014).......................... 20, 24
Dollar General Corp. v. Mississippi
Band of Choctaw Indians,
136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016).......................................... 33
Evans v. Shoshone-Bannock Land Use
Policy Comm’n,
736 F.3d 1298 (9th Cir. 2013).............................. 34
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp.,
500 U.S. 20 (1991) ................................................ 27
In re Charges of Judicial Misconduct,
769 F.3d 762 (D.C. Cir. 2014) .............................. 18
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
Jackson v. Payday Financial, LLC,
764 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2014)................................ 23
Knighton v. Cedarville Rancheria of N.
Paiute Indians,
922 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 513 (2019) .................................. 21
Kodiak Oil & Gas (USA) Inc. v. Burr,
932 F.3d 1125 (8th Cir. 2019)........................ 22, 23
Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc.,
516 U.S. 479 (1996) ................................................ 6
Montana v. United States,
450 U.S. 544 (1981) ...................................... passim
Morris v. Hitchcock,
194 U.S. 384 (1904) ......................................... 27, 28
Nevada v. Hicks,
533 U.S. 353 (2001) .............................................. 24
Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family
Land & Cattle Co.,
554 U.S. 316 (2008) ...................................... passim
Rita v. United States,
551 U.S. 338 (2007) .............................................. 22
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t,
523 U.S. 83 (1998) ................................................ 26
Stifel, Nicolaus & Co. v. Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa
Indians,
807 F.3d 184 (7th Cir. 2015)................................ 25
vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
United Pub. Workers of Am. (C.I.O.) v.
Mitchell,
330 U.S. 75 (1947) ................................................ 26
United States v. FMC Corp.,
531 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2008).............................. 8, 9
United States v. FMC Corp.,
No. CV-98-0406-E-BLW, 2006 WL
544505 (D. Idaho Mar. 6, 2006) ............................. 8
United States v. Shoshone-Bannock
Tribes,
229 F.3d 1161, 2000 WL 915398 (9th
Cir. 2000).............................................................. 29
Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area,
Inc. v. LaRance,
642 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 2011)................................ 33
Window Rock Unified Sch. Dist. v.
Reeves,
861 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 648 (2018) ...................... 33, 34, 35
Zidell Expls., Inc. v. Conval Int’l Ltd.,
719 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1983).............................. 28
STATUTES:
Act of February 23, 1889, ch. 203, § 1,
¶¶ 4-5, 25 Stat. 687, 687 ........................................ 3
Fort Bridger Treaty of 1868, 15 Stat. 673 ............... 3
Idaho Code § 28-2-309(2) ........................................ 28
RULE:
Sup. Ct. R. 10 .................................................... 24, 32
viii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
OTHER AUTHORITIES:
Amendments to Chapter V: Fort Hall Land
Use Operative Policy Guidelines, § V-92(B) (1998) .............................................................. 7
F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law
§ 4.02[3][c] (2005 ed.) ........................................... 30
EPA, Interim Amendment to the Record of
Decision for the EMF Superfund Site,
FMC Operable Unit, Pocatello, Idaho
(Sept. 2012) .................................................. passim
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
_________
No. 19-1143
_________
FMC CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
v.
SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES,
Respondent.
_________
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
_________
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
_________
INTRODUCTION
After generating toxic waste on the Respondent
Shoshone-Bannock Tribes’ (the “Tribes”) Reservation
for over fifty years, Petitioner FMC Corporation
reached a compromise with the Tribes. In connection
with storing over 22 million tons of its radioactive
and carcinogenic waste within the Reservation, FMC
agreed in writing to compensate the Tribes, who bear
the risks of the waste, by paying $1.5 million in fees
annually.
FMC now regrets that written agreement, and for
nearly two decades has refused to uphold its end of
the bargain, seeking instead to enlist the help of the
(1)
2
federal judiciary in nullifying it. FMC thus tries to
spin this as a case of tribal jurisdiction run amok.
It is not. Having created one of the most volatile
and hazardous waste sites in the country, FMC
consented to Tribal jurisdiction over land-use permitting and negotiated with the Tribes for a reasonable annual fee that the Tribes use to manage the
risks to tribal land, health, welfare, and cultural
practices from FMC’s land use. When FMC sought
to break that arrangement unilaterally, the tribal
court enforced the agreement according to its terms,
exercising the jurisdiction to which FMC had consented. Faithfully applying this Court’s settled
framework for assessing tribal jurisdiction as set out
in Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981),
and subsequent cases, the decision below affirmed
the Tribes’ jurisdiction given FMC’s express agreement and the extraordinary threat posed by FMC’s
toxic waste. As this Court recently reaffirmed, a
“tribe may quite legitimately seek to protect its
members from noxious uses” of fee land “that threaten tribal welfare or security.” Plains Commerce
Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S.
316, 336 (2008).
It is therefore no surprise that, to make this case
seem as if it merits this Court’s attention, FMC
resorts to a battery of mischaracterizations. In the
first question presented, it imagines a holding that
does not exist in the decision below, and then conjures a split based on that imaginary holding. In the
second question presented, it asks this Court to
overturn meticulous factual findings supported by a
voluminous record. And, throughout, FMC feints
3
towards spectral issues that are not within the scope
of either question presented.
The petition should be denied.
STATEMENT
A. FMC’s Polluting Activities Within The Fort
Hall Reservation
1. The Shoshone-Bannock Tribes are a federally
recognized Indian tribe. Pet. App. 4a. Under the
terms of “the Fort Bridger Treaty of 1868, 15 Stat.
673, and related executive orders, the Tribes today
have sovereign authority over the Fort Hall Reservation.” Id. The Reservation spans 840 square miles
in southeastern Idaho, and ninety-seven percent of it
“is tribal land or land held in trust by the United
States.” Id. The Portneuf River flows through the
Reservation. Id. at 71a. The Tribes rely on the river,
and the Fort Hall Bottoms along its northern bank,
for “subsistence fishing, hunting and gathering.” Id.
The area is also vital to the Tribes’ “historical[ ] * * * cultural practices, including the Sundance.” Id.
2. For over 50 years, from 1949 until 2001, Petitioner “FMC Corporation and its predecessors owned
and operated an elemental phosphorous production
plant”—the largest in the world. Id. at 4a-5a. “Virtually all of” the plant sits on “fee land” owned by
FMC “on the Fort Hall Reservation.” Id. at 5a.1
During its operational years, “FMC obtained or
1
FMC asserts that the Reservation was allotted under the
General Allotment Act. Pet. 4. In fact, allotment occurred
under the Agreement of May 14, 1880, ratified by the Act of
February 23, 1889, ch. 203, § 1, ¶¶ 4-5, 25 Stat. 687, 688.
4
mined raw materials for its plant from tribal and
allottee lands on the Reservation.” Id. And for that
entire period, FMC used its fee lands as a dumpsite
for its phosphorus production wastes. See id.
Today, although the surface of FMC’s site may
appear tranquil in photographs, cf. Pet. 8, that is an
illusion: Over 22 million tons of hazardous waste
contaminates FMC’s site. Pet. App. 5a. “The waste
is radioactive, carcinogenic, and poisonous.” Id. at
1a. And the “rolling hills” beneath which it is stored,
Pet. 8, are perched above the Portneuf River and the
Fort Hall Bottoms, C.A. E.R. 969.
Much of the waste sits in “storage ponds” that “continue to generate lethal amounts of phosphine gas
that accumulate beneath the pond covers,” Pet. App.
5a, 43a, which is “both acutely and chronically
dangerous to people in the area,” id. at 40a (internal
quotation marks omitted). At certain quantities, “a
few breaths can render a person unable to walk or
talk, and can result in extreme harm or eventual
death.” Id. at 39a. At higher concentrations, phosphine gas has the potential to explode. Id. Over the
last fifteen years, dangerous levels have repeatedly
escaped from the ponds. Id. at 39a-43a. Some of the
ponds are lined to prevent waste from contaminating
the groundwater, but others are not. Id. at 5a.
In addition, millions of tons of “loose soil,”
“groundwater,” and rocky “slag” are contaminated
with elemental phosphorous, arsenic, and gamma
radiation. Id. at 5a, 36a. Like its gaseous cousin,
elemental phosphorous “is highly toxic by ingestion,
inhalation, and skin absorption.” Id. at 37a (internal
quotation marks omitted). It also “is likely to cause
skin burns upon contact” and “will spontaneously
5
burst into flames when exposed to the air.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at
38a (describing the statement of a witness “who
testified that he [saw] ducks spontaneously ignite as
they took off from FMC’s phosphorous containment
ponds”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Levels
of elemental phosphorous contamination on this site
exist “at a scale unprecedented anywhere in the
United States.” Id. at 36a (internal quotation marks
omitted). Elemental phosphorous and arsenic “are
continuously flowing in the groundwater from FMC’s
land through seeps and springs directly into the
Portneuf River and Fort Hall Bottoms.” Id. at 71a.
That is not all. “Somewhere between twenty one
and thirty railroad tanker cars * * * are buried on
the property.” Id. at 5a. FMC used those rail cars to
transport “hazardous [phosphorous] sludge.” Id. at
100a. Because FMC found it too dangerous for its
employees to clean the cars for reuse, FMC simply
“buried the tankers without cleaning them.” Id. No
one knows how corroded these tankers are, “and it is
possible that they either have or will corrode to the
point of leakage.” Id. “There is no lining underneath
the tanker cars * * * .” Id. at 5a.
The current management plan calls for this waste
to remain on the Reservation indefinitely. Id. at 22a.
B. EPA Action And Tribal Permits
1. In 1990, the Environmental Protection Agency
listed FMC’s site as a Superfund site, marking it as
one “of the nation’s worst hazardous waste sites.” Id.
at 5a (internal quotation marks omitted). That
designation triggered regulation under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act (CERCLA). Most pertinent here, it
6
initiated EPA’s process of formulating a “Record of
Decision,” or formal documentation of the hazards on
the site and plan for mitigating the dangers posed by
the waste. See id. at 17a-18a. EPA did not finalize
its initial Record of Decision for the FMC site until
1998. See id.
In the meantime, “EPA charged FMC with violating” the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA) by violating federal regulations concerning
“the disposal of solid and hazardous waste.” Id. at
6a.2 FMC sought to “avoid litigation,” and “began
negotiations with the EPA over the terms of a possible Consent Decree that would settle the RCRA suit.”
Id. “Though not a formal party, the Tribes participated in the negotiations.” Id. The proposed resolution “required construction of a treatment facility
and additional waste storage ponds on FMC’s fee
land on the Reservation.” Id. “As a condition to
obtaining the Consent Decree, the EPA required
FMC to obtain relevant permits from the Tribes.”
Id.; see also Consent Decree, United States v. FMC
Corp., No. 4:98-cv-00406-BLW (D. Idaho July 13,
1999). This condition “was a major factor in [FMC]
reaching an agreement with the EPA.” Pet. App.
62a.
2. The “relevant permits” were set out in the
Tribes’ Land Use Policy Ordinance, which required a
construction permit for the treatment facility and
storage ponds “and a use permit for storage of the
2
CERCLA focuses on cleaning up existing hazardous waste and
RCRA seeks to reduce or mitigate the potential for future
waste. See Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 483
(1996).
7
hazardous waste.” Id. at 6a. Negotiations regarding
the permits began in July 1997. In the course of
negotiations, FMC’s Senior Vice President and
General Counsel confirmed by letter to the Tribes
that “‘[i]n connection with the land use permit, we
did agree that we would consent to tribal jurisdiction
in that area.’” Id. at 6a-7a; C.A. S.E.R. 6.
The following spring, the Tribes “considered and
then adopted amended” written guidelines regarding
the appropriate annual permit fee under the Ordinance “for storage of hazardous waste on the Reservation.” Pet. App. 7a. As amended, the guidelines
called for “an annual fee of $5.00 per ton” of waste.
Id. “Money from use permit fees was to be ‘deposited
in the Shoshone-Bannock Hazardous Waste Management Program Fund,’ and to be used ‘to pay the
reasonable and necessary costs of administrating the
Hazardous Waste Management Program.’”
Id.
(quoting Amendments to Chapter V: Fort Hall Land
Use Operative Policy Guidelines, § V-9-2(B) (1998)).
“FMC estimated that the $5 per ton storage fee
would cost over $110 million per year” given the
sheer volume of waste it had produced.
Id.
“[A]nxious to obtain the permit,” and thereby obtain
the Consent Decree, id. at 87a, “FMC sought to
negotiate a compromise with the Tribes” to avoid the
full permit amount, id. at 7a.
Those negotiations bore fruit when “FMC agreed to
a one-time fee of $1 million and an annual use permit fee of $1.5 million to cover FMC’s storage of its
hazardous waste on the Reservation.” Id. Under the
terms of the agreement, memorialized in a series of
letters between FMC and the Tribes, the $1.5 million
annual fee would continue “even if FMC capped and
8
closed the eleven hazardous waste ponds that were
subject to the RCRA Consent Decree.” Id.; see also
C.A. E.R. 1047, 1049, 1053. “FMC never attempted
to negotiate” an end date for the use fee, or to condition the fee on the operational status of FMC’s plant.
Pet. App. 87a.
3. “Within just a few months of resolving the permit issues, FMC reached agreement with the EPA on
the RCRA Consent Decree.” Id. at 62a. This “sweetheart deal” for FMC “allowed [it] to dump the toxic
mess it had created in the EPA’s lap by paying a
small fine of $11.9 million along with a few million
dollars in construction commitments.” Id. at 87a.
FMC paid the agreed-upon $1.5 million annually
without issue from 1998 until 2001. Id. at 9a. In
December 2001, FMC ceased “active phosphorous
processing operations at the site.” Id. “When the
$1.5 million use permit fee came due in 2002, FMC
refused to pay it.” Id.
The parties attempted to negotiate a resolution.
Id. After that failed, the Tribes filed a motion seeking enforcement in the RCRA Consent Decree action.
Id. The district court granted that motion, finding
that “[t]he only reasonable interpretation of” the
Consent Decree “is that it requires FMC to apply for”
the relevant permits. United States v. FMC Corp.,
No. CV-98-0406-E-BLW, 2006 WL 544505, at *4 (D.
Idaho Mar. 6, 2006). After that ruling, FMC began
contesting its obligation to pay before the Tribes’
Land Use Policy Commission. Pet. App. 10a-11a.
The Ninth Circuit reversed on procedural grounds:
It held that the Tribes lacked third-party standing to
enforce the fee through the Consent Decree action.
United States v. FMC Corp., 531 F.3d 813, 823 (9th
9
Cir. 2008). Even so, the court recognized FMC’s
obligation to continue with tribal proceedings. Id. at
823-824. Indeed, at oral argument, FMC’s counsel
“represented to the court that FMC underst[ood] that
it has the obligation to continue, and will continue,
with the current tribal proceedings to their conclusion.” Id. at 824. The Ninth Circuit “accept[ed] that
statement from counsel as binding on FMC.” Id.3
C. Tribal Proceedings
1. As it had represented to the Ninth Circuit, FMC
contested its obligation to pay the $1.5 million annual fee before tribal authorities. The Tribes’ Land Use
Policy Commission rejected its challenge, in findings
affirmed by the Tribes’ governing body, the Fort Hall
Business Council. Pet. App. 11a.4
FMC appealed the Business Council’s decision to
the Tribal Court. Id. That court exercised jurisdiction and found the permitting fee unenforceable as a
matter of tribal law. Id. at 244a. Both parties
appealed to the Tribal Court of Appeals. Id. at 12a.
The case was heard by three judges, none of whom
are members of the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes. Id.
Judge Fred Gabourie is a former California statecourt judge and former Chief Judge of the Kootenai
Tribe. Id. Judge Mary Pearson is a former Chief
3
The United States agreed that the Tribes could not enforce the
required permit through the Consent Decree action, and that
the Tribes were entitled to pursue any “remedies they have
under Tribal law.” U.S. Amicus Br., United States v. FMC
Corp., No. 06-35429 (9th Cir. May 14, 2007), 2007 WL 1899170.
4
The Council also affirmed a one-time fee for demolition
activities on the site. Pet. App. 11a.
10
Judge for the Spokane and Coeur d’Alene Tribes. Id.
And Judge Cathy Silak is a former Justice of the
Idaho Supreme Court. Id.
The Tribal Court of Appeals reversed the Tribal
Court on the tribal-law issue, finding that the permit
fee was authorized and that FMC had to pay the
agreed-upon amount. Id. at 15a-16a.
To assess tribal jurisdiction, the court looked to
the familiar Montana framework.
Id. at 153a.
Recognizing the “unique and limited character” of
tribal sovereignty, the court acknowledged the
“general rule” prohibiting “tribal authority over nonmember activity taking place” “on non-Indian fee
land” within the Reservation. Id. at 154a. And the
court recited the “two exceptions” for (1) “the activities of non-members who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members” and (2) conduct
that “threatens or has some direct effect on the
political integrity, the economic security, or the
health and welfare of the tribe.” Id. (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-566).
Applying that framework, the court held that the
Tribes had jurisdiction under the “first exception of
Montana” because “FMC’s agreement for payment * * * of the $1.5 million annual permit
fee * * * is precisely the type of commercial dealing”
covered by that exception, id. at 155a, and that FMC
had voluntarily agreed to pay the fee, id. at 184a. As
for the second exception, the court found the record
“insufficient” to “determine if” FMC’s waste “would
threaten or cause a direct impact” on the economic
security or “health and welfare” of the Tribes. Id. at
157a-158a. The court therefore ordered a hearing
regarding the site’s potential to “impact or threaten
11
the Tribes’ economic integrity, and health and welfare of Tribal members and Tribal children.” Id. at
222a.
2. FMC moved to reconsider, citing public remarks
of Judges Gabourie and Pearson at the University of
Idaho College of Law. Id. at 12a, 16a. At the conference, the judges made generalized remarks about
judging, emphasizing that “‘every court * * * should
be impartial’ and ‘a good opinion comes [from] both
sides, both parties.’” Id. at 12a-13a. Judge Gabourie
criticized this Court’s Montana line of cases, as well
as tribal courts that had deprived this Court of “vital
information about the tribes’ cultures and traditions.” Id. at 13a. “Judge Pearson discussed the
importance of * * * creating a record,” and suggested
that the court was working on “a big case * * * so
they were saying prayers, reading cases, and ‘trying
to do . . . the history.’” Id. She stressed that they
were “‘not guaranteeing anybody anything.’” Id. at
15a. FMC alleged that these comments exhibited
judicial bias. Id. at 16a.
A newly constituted panel of the Tribal Court of
Appeals—excluding Judges Gabourie and Pearson—
denied FMC’s reconsideration motion in pertinent
part, id. at 16a-17a,5 reaffirming that the court had
jurisdiction under the first exception, and that FMC
“voluntarily entered into a contract in 1998 with the
Shoshone Bannock Tribes for payment of 1.5 million
per year,” C.A. E.R. 113, 115-116. The court also
5
Judges Gabourie and Pearson were replaced by Judge Peter
McDermott, a retired Idaho state judge, and Judge Vern Herzog
Jr., a practicing attorney. Pet. App. 16a.
12
“ordered
an
evidentiary
hearing
to
resolve * * * whether the Tribes had * * * jurisdiction
over FMC under the second Montana exception.”
Pet. App. 17a.
3. Before that hearing, EPA issued a new Interim
Amendment to the Record of Decision (“IRODA”)
concerning the toxic waste at FMC’s site regulated
under CERCLA. See EPA, Interim Amendment to
the Record of Decision for the EMF Superfund Site,
FMC Operable Unit, Pocatello, Idaho (Sept. 2012).
The IRODA resulted from “further investigative
work,” and concluded that there were “additional
concerns associated with elemental phosphorous and
other contaminants” on the site that required remedial action. IRODA i-ii. Those investigations revealed that “ongoing * * * releases to groundwater
and surface water are of greater significance than
was recognized” in 1998, including discharges of
“arsenic” and other contaminants “at the FMC” site.
Id. at 16. As a result, “EPA ‘no longer considered’ its
1998 measures ‘protective of human health and the
environment,’” Pet. App. 18a (quoting IRODA at v,
14, 52), and ordered that steps be taken to reduce the
threat of the “imminent and substantial endangerment to public health, welfare, or the environment”
posed by the FMC site. IRODA ii. Those steps
included placing protective caps over phosphoruscontaminated areas, covering the radioactive slag
with soil, installing “an interim groundwater extraction/treatment system,” and implementing a longterm groundwater monitoring system and a gas
monitoring program for the CERCLA ponds. Id. at
iii-iv. EPA expected the IRODA’s remedial steps to
“reduce[ ]” the risks posed by contaminants at the
13
FMC site, but it did not suggest those steps would
eliminate the risks. Id. at 73. Indeed, EPA acknowledged that capping the waste “does not reduce [the]
toxicity, mobility, or volume of contaminants.” Pet.
App. 38a (quoting IRODA 60). EPA also indicated
that several steps required future development,
including establishing a cleanup level for phosphorus, IRODA 38, 241 tbl. 8 n.d, and implementing a
gas monitoring plan, id. at 70-71. EPA also “described as ‘significant unknowns’ the ‘horizontal and
vertical gradients in the concentrations of elemental
phosphorus, the total mass of elemental phosphorus,
and the form of elemental phosphorus in the soil,’”
Pet. App. 70a (quoting IRODA 83), and acknowledged that conditions remained “highly uncertain” in
part because the interim remedy would result in
“significant[ ]” alterations to the flow of groundwater,
IRODA 18-19. EPA expected that remediation of the
contaminated groundwater “could well take more
than 100 years.” Id. at 53.
4. Following the IRODA, the Tribal Court of Appeals held an evidentiary hearing regarding Montana’s second exception that lasted approximately
two weeks. Pet. App. 17a, 21a.6 The court issued its
6
FMC suggests (at 10) it was barred from presenting certain
untimely-produced evidence at this hearing. That is misleading: FMC’s concern stems from a different, earlier hearing
concerning an issue of tribal law irrelevant to this petition,
which the court decided against FMC on terms that made the
evidence immaterial. See Tribes’ C.A. Opening & Response Br.
53 & n.37. The Ninth Circuit found this issue either “waived”
or “self-evidently meritless.” Pet. App. 52a.
14
opinion a month later. See id. at 17a.7
Based largely on the uncontested findings in the
IRODA, id. at 20a, the tribal court found that
“FMC’s activities” had resulted in “an ongoing and
extensive threat to human health,” id. at 97a. The
court also cited a 2010 letter from the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare to EPA, calling phosphine gas emissions “an urgent public health hazard
to the health of people breathing the air” in the area,
id. at 99a (internal quotation marks omitted), as well
as expert testimony showing the threats from the
contamination are “of a catastrophic nature in health
and reactions, including death,” id. at 104a. Additionally, the court found that the contaminated
groundwater threatened “subsistence fishing, hunting and gathering by tribal members” as well as
tribal “cultural practices, including the Sundance.”
Id. at 101a.
The trial also yielded extensive evidence refuting
FMC’s claims that “certain methods suggested by the
EPA” would “contain[ ]” the “risk.” Id. at 101a-102a.
Despite EPA’s involvement “at this site since 1990,”
the court found that “remedial actions chosen by
EPA have not been implemented.” Id. at 102a.
Many remained “in design phase,” and even if fully
implemented would result only in “containment.” Id.
Other testimony confirmed “that groundwater extraction systems have not been put into place at the
FMC site, and that arsenic and phosphorous” were
7
Judge John Traylor, a practicing attorney and nonmember of
the Tribes, replaced Judge Silak, who was unavailable for the
hearing. Pet. App. 17a.
15
still “actually traveling to the Portneuf River.” Id. at
101a.
Based on this extensive factual record, the court
held that “FMC’s fee land continues to present a real,
catastrophic threat to the Tribes.” Id. 107a. And the
danger was more than “a mere possibility,” id., given
the “realized and ongoing destructive effects that
contamination from the site is having on tribal
members’ cultural practices on the Portneuf River,”
id. at 104a, and the “uncontroverted testimony that
the activity of FMC has in fact interfered with the
customs and traditions of the Shoshone Bannock
Tribal Members,” id. at 107a-108a. The court therefore found the second Montana exception satisfied.
Id. at 108a-109a.
The court imposed a judgment of approximately
$20.5 million, reflecting permit fees from 2002
through 2014 and about $1 million in fees and costs.
Id. at 74a.
D. Federal Proceedings
1. FMC sued the Tribes seeking a declaration that
the Tribal Court of Appeals’ judgment is unenforceable, claiming that the Tribes lacked both regulatory
and adjudicatory jurisdiction and that FMC had been
denied due process based on the former panel members’ comments. Id. at 23a. “The Tribes counterclaimed, seeking” enforcement of the judgment. Id.
The District Court found in favor of the Tribes. Id.
at 56a. It found tribal jurisdiction appropriate under
the first Montana exception based on the “consensual
relationship” arising from the “series of letters” in
which “FMC agreed to obtain a Tribal permit to do
the work necessary to comply with the Consent
decree,” which FMC then confirmed “by signing the
16
Consent Decree” requiring those permits. Id. at 78a.
The court rejected FMC’s claim of “duress,” finding
that the Tribes had merely taken “advantage of their
bargaining leverage, a long-standing practice in the
sharp-elbowed corporate world in which FMC does
business every day.” Id. That leverage, moreover,
was not a result of the Tribes’ actions, but the federal
government’s “insisting that FMC obtain Tribal
permits.” Id. In the end, “[t]his was a simple business deal, not the product of illegal duress or coercion.” Id.
Turning to the second exception, the court found
that the contaminants at FMC’s site “pose a constant
and deadly threat to the Tribes” and “a real risk of
catastrophic consequences should containment fail.”
Id. at 81a. “This is the type of threat that falls
within Montana’s second exception.” Id. 83a. As a
matter of comity, however, the court declined to rest
on the second exception absent a more specific showing of the fee’s intended use. Id. at 86a.
The court then rejected FMC’s due process arguments, finding any bias cured when a panel excluding the judges in question “independently came to
the same conclusion.” Id. at 84a.
2. The Ninth Circuit unanimously affirmed, holding the tribal judgment enforceable under both
Montana exceptions.
Regarding the first exception, the court explained
that “consent may be established” either “expressly
or by [the nonmember’s] actions” if the nonmember
“should have reasonably anticipated that [its] interactions might trigger tribal authority.” Id. at 30a
(internal quotation marks omitted). Both of those
circumstances existed here. Id. Like the District
17
Court, the Ninth Circuit rejected FMC’s claims of
coercion, finding it was simply motivated by its
“strong interest in * * * settl[ing] the RCRA suit”
brought by EPA “on favorable terms.” Id. at 31a.
The court then turned to the second Montana exception. It agreed with the District Court’s findings
that FMC’s waste “‘threatens or has some direct
effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health and welfare’ of the Tribes to the
extent that it ‘imperil[s] the subsistence or welfare’ of
the Tribes.” Id. at 36a (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at
566).
It also rejected FMC’s contention that EPA’s actions had abated the threat. Id. at 44a-45a. Indeed,
the court determined that FMC’s brief had “misrepresent[ed] what the EPA wrote” on that subject:
Although FMC claimed that EPA had found its
remedial prescriptions “fully protective of human
health and the environment,” in fact EPA did “not
us[e] the word ‘fully’” and “specif[ied] that the remedial measures are ‘interim.’” Id. at 19a (internal
quotation marks omitted).8
Examining the nexus between the permit fee and
the threat, the court took “it as a given that there
must be some nexus between a basis for jurisdiction
under Montana and a tribal action taken in the
8
The IRODA indicates that, as a theoretical matter, containment can be “fully” effective, see IRODA 83, 107, 133, but does
not find that its interim remedies would be. The nearest it
comes is with respect to the rail cars, but even then the finding
is an “expect[ation]” grounded in assumptions, and EPA
specifies that “additional actions” may be considered if those
assumptions prove wrong. Id. at 154.
18
exercise of that jurisdiction.” Id. at 46a. Here, that
nexus was satisfied by evidence indicating “that the
Tribes have spent approximately $1.5 million annually on measures to monitor and mitigate the dangers posed by FMC’s hazardous waste.” Id. at 47a.
The court also noted that “commercial hazardous
waste disposal facilities” might charge between 10
and 50 times as much per ton as the amount prescribed by tribal guidelines—an amount itself many
times higher than the $1.5 million FMC agreed to
pay. Id.
Finally, the court rejected FMC’s due process
claim. Finding no bias, it cited “a long tradition of
lower court judges criticizing [this] Court on issues of
constitutional law [and other areas].” Id. at 51a
(quoting In re Charges of Judicial Misconduct, 769
F.3d 762, 785 (D.C. Cir. 2014)). Accepting FMC’s
argument, the court explained, would require “federal and state judges * * * to recuse themselves with
some frequency.” Id. In any event, any bias was
“eliminated” by the “differently reconstituted panel.”
Id. at 52a. The court was similarly unmoved by
FMC’s charges of systemic bias in tribal courts,
noting that empirical evidence and its own experience refuted those claims. Id. at 52a-55a.
FMC sought rehearing, which the full court denied
with no noted dissent. Id. at 90a-91a.
REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION
I.
THE FIRST QUESTION PRESENTED
DOES NOT WARRANT CERTIORARI.
In the first question presented, FMC asks whether “the Ninth Circuit correctly holds that tribal
jurisdiction over nonmembers is established whenev-
19
er a Montana exception is met, or whether * * * a
court must also determine that the exercise of such
jurisdiction stems from the tribe’s inherent authority
to set conditions on entry, preserve tribal selfgovernment, or control internal relations.” Pet. i-ii.
FMC’s request faces a fatal threshold obstacle:
The decision below held no such thing. On the
contrary, the Ninth Circuit carefully documented the
manifold threats to the Tribes’ environmental and
cultural resources posed by FMC’s waste, and concluded that those “constitute threats to tribal selfgovernance, health, and welfare.” Pet. App. 34a
(emphasis added). This case is therefore an inappropriate vehicle to determine whether such a finding is
necessary—at best, such an opinion would be advisory, since the Ninth Circuit actually made the finding
that Petitioner requests. And, shorn of Petitioner’s
rhetoric, the claim of a split with the Seventh and
Eighth Circuits falls away.
In any event, FMC is wrong that this Court’s
precedent requires an independent, “threshold”
finding of a direct link to tribal self-governance or
internal relations. Pet. 16. The better reading is
that those principles undergird the two canonical
Montana exceptions.
A. The First Question Requests An Advisory
Opinion Based On A Mischaracterization
Of The Decision Below.
The first question presented rests on a false premise. According to FMC, the decision below held that
“satisfying a Montana exception is enough to trigger
tribal jurisdiction—regardless of whether the regulation at issue stems from the tribe’s inherent sovereign authority to preserve tribal self-government or
20
control internal relations.” Id. at 19.
The court made no such holding. Tellingly, FMC
does not—because it cannot—quote any language
from the opinion adopting the legal principle on
which it seeks review and reversal. If anything,
FMC implicitly acknowledges that such a holding is
nowhere to be found. See id. at 16 (claiming that the
court below “disregarded” its argument rather than
issued a contrary holding).9
What FMC fails to mention is that the decision
below expressly made the finding that it seeks. The
court found that FMC’s 22 million tons of toxic waste
pose an active threat to tribal health and welfare,
water resources, and cultural practices, Pet. App.
18a-23a, 34a-45a, and concluded that such threats
“constitute threats to tribal self-governance, health
and welfare,” id. at 34a (emphasis added). Because
FMC failed to challenge that finding in the petition—
instead ignoring it—FMC has forfeited the opportunity to do so. Besides, the Ninth Circuit’s finding
is well supported by the voluminous record. Pet.
App. 18a-23a, 34a-45a; supra pp. 3-5, 12-15; cf.
Plains Commerce, 554 U.S. at 334-335 (listing “commercial development” as one example of nonmember
conduct that might “threaten tribal self-rule”).
Contaminated groundwater flows into the Portneuf
9
The Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Mississippi
Band of Choctaw Indians, 746 F.3d 167 (5th Cir. 2014), is a
useful contrast. That court held that this Court’s precedents do
not “require an additional showing that one specific relationship * * * threaten[s] self-rule.” Id. at 175 (internal quotation
marks omitted). That kind of language is missing from the
decision below.
21
River—a resource essential to the Tribes’ subsistence
and cultural practices—and phosphine gas and other
accumulated waste threatens catastrophic consequences with the potential to strain tribal resources
to the breaking point. Supra pp. 3-5, 12-15. Nor are
EPA’s actions to date sufficient to fully address the
threat, as EPA’s own findings recognize. Supra pp.
14-15; IRODA 15-18.
The Ninth Circuit’s express finding that the Tribes’
jurisdiction was linked to self-governance rules out
FMC’s argument that the court below implicitly held
that tribal jurisdiction is appropriate “regardless of”
the need “to preserve tribal self-government.” Pet.
16, 19, 24. Nor is there anything to FMC’s charge
that the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly ignored the
connection between tribal jurisdiction and selfgovernance. In an opinion decided just a few months
before this one, the Ninth Circuit quoted—
verbatim—the language FMC invokes. See Knighton
v. Cedarville Rancheria of N. Paiute Indians, 922
F.3d 892, 903 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Plains Commerce, 554 U.S. at 337), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 513
(2019) (mem.).
Because the Ninth Circuit found that FMC’s conduct threatens tribal self-governance, FMC is also
wrong to claim this issue is “outcome determinative.”
Pet. 16. On the contrary, any opinion would be
advisory: If this Court granted certiorari and answered the first question in the affirmative, nothing
would change because the necessary finding is already in the opinion below.
At bottom, FMC is frustrated that the Ninth Circuit did not respond more directly to an argument it
made. Id. at 15-16 & n.3. But this Court “reviews
22
judgments, not statements in opinions.” Black v.
Cutter Labs., 351 U.S. 292, 297 (1956). FMC’s frustration is no basis for this Court to render an advisory opinion about how the Ninth Circuit should have
phrased its finding concerning tribal selfgovernment. Cf. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338,
356 (2007) (“Sometimes a judicial opinion responds
to every argument; sometimes it does not * * * .”).
B. The Decision Below Does Not Split With
Any Other Circuit.
FMC claims a split with two other circuits, the
Seventh and the Eighth. Pet. 17-18. But there is no
conflict: The claim of a split depends on the misreading of the Ninth Circuit’s decision described above.
See id. at 18-19. Because the court below found that
FMC’s conduct threatens the Tribes’ self-governance,
it did not split with any decision requiring such a
finding.
If FMC claims that the Seventh and Eighth Circuits would have disagreed with the Ninth Circuit’s
finding of the requisite connection on this record,
even a cursory review of the cited cases shows that
does not follow. First, the entire discussion of the
Montana exceptions in Kodiak Oil & Gas (USA) Inc.
v. Burr, 932 F.3d 1125 (8th Cir. 2019), is dictum,
because the court had already found tribal jurisdiction lacking for a different reason. Id. at 1136-1137.
Setting that aside, however, the facts were very
different. Kodiak involved disputed oil royalties
allegedly owed to individual members of a tribe;
there was no evidence, as there is here, that the
tribe’s health, welfare, or cultural practices were
threatened. Id. at 1130. Indeed, Kodiak recognized
that “[t]ribal court[s]” may have a role in “enforce-
23
ment of tribal laws relating to public health and
safety and environmental protection.” Id. at 1138.
And although the Eighth Circuit found that the
“complete federal control of oil and gas leases on
allotted lands” rendered tribal jurisdiction unnecessary, id., that determination rested on more extensive federal control than EPA exercised here. There,
“the entire relationship [was] mediated by the federal government,” id.—in fact, the United States had
“issued” the relevant lease, which “required approval
by the” Bureau of Indian Affairs, id. at 1130, and
collected and disbursed the disputed royalties, id. at
1136. Here, EPA has consistently recognized a role
for tribal regulation, supra pp. 6-9 & n.3, and noted
that its own measures to date are “interim” and do
not completely address the threats posed by FMC’s
waste, supra pp. 12-13.
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Jackson v. Payday Financial, LLC, 764 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2014), is
even further afield. That case did not involve “any
activities inside the reservation,” which made it
unnecessary to consider the extent of a tribe’s inherent authority within a reservation. Id. at 782 (citing
Plains Commerce, 554 U.S. at 332). Instead, the case
concerned a suit by non-Indians against a payday
lending operation. Id. at 768. The Seventh Circuit
declined to determine whether the payday lending
operation constituted a member of the tribe. Id. at
782 n.42. Jackson is nothing like this case.
C. Plains Commerce Did Not Change the Law
And Impose a Threshold Requirement On
The Montana Exceptions.
FMC’s mischaracterization of the opinion below
and the lack of any split are reason enough for the
24
Court to deny certiorari. See Sup. Ct. R. 10. But
FMC is also wrong on the merits.
FMC derives its “threshold” requirement, Pet. 16,
from a single sentence in Plains Commerce. See 554
U.S. at 337.10 Read in context, that sentence did not
require a formal finding of a threat to tribal selfgovernment or internal relations anytime the Montana exceptions are invoked. See Dolgencorp, 746
F.3d at 175. The better reading is that the Court
was explaining the theoretical foundations of the
Montana exceptions. That reading draws support
from Montana itself, which is the origin of the language FMC invokes from Plains Commerce. Montana, 450 U.S. at 564. In Montana, the Court explained that “exercise of tribal power beyond what is
necessary to protect tribal self-government or to
control internal relations is inconsistent with the
dependent status of the tribes.” Id. And it then
articulated the two exceptions to that rule that have
governed tribal jurisdiction for the last forty years.
See id. at 565-566. Any remaining doubt is dispelled
by Nevada v. Hicks, which confirmed “that what is
necessary to protect tribal self-government and
control internal relations can be understood by
looking at the examples of tribal power to which
Montana referred” in the two exceptions. 533 U.S.
353, 360-361 (2001). Nowhere did Plains Commerce
purport to alter this settled law.
10
Elsewhere, FMC criticizes the Ninth Circuit for looking to a
different “passing observation” in the same case. Pet. 14. FMC
offers no explanation for resting its case on this “passing
observation” in Plains Commerce, while discounting another.
25
Ultimately, however, these are questions for another day. Here, the Ninth Circuit made the finding
that FMC seeks. That disposes of the first question
presented.
II.
THE SECOND QUESTION PRESENTED
DOES NOT WARRANT CERTIORARI.
The second question presented is really two questions lumped in one: whether the Ninth Circuit erred
in applying both the first and second Montana exceptions to the highly particularized facts of this case.
Because either exception is sufficient to sustain the
judgment, the Court would need to address both, and
reverse on both, to avoid rendering an advisory
opinion. In other words, this second question presented asks this Court to engage in splitless error
correction twice-over. The Court should follow its
usual practice and decline that invitation.
A. The Court Would Have To Engage In Splitless Error Correction Twice To Avoid An
Advisory Opinion.
The lack of a split with respect to either Montana
exception exposes FMC’s request for error correction
for what it is. Petitioner does not claim a split with
respect to the first exception. See Pet. 20-23. And its
half-hearted claim (at 27) on the second is easily
dismissed. As the petition suggests, Stifel, Nicolaus
& Co. v. Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior
Chippewa Indians involved only the “financial consequences” of intangible bonds—there was no evidence of a physical threat to the tribes or their
essential natural resources. 807 F.3d 184, 209 (7th
Cir. 2015). And Belcourt Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Davis,
786 F.3d 653 (8th Cir. 2015), involved discrete
wrongdoing alleged by a handful of employees of a
26
school district, Belcourt Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Davis, 997
F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1019 (D.N.D. 2014). Neither of
those cases remotely resembles the environmental
and cultural threats posed by 22 million tons of
highly toxic waste.
Even if the Ninth Circuit’s analysis with respect
to one exception warranted review, it would make
little sense to do so in this case. It only takes one
Montana exception to sustain jurisdiction. Thus,
unless this Court addresses both exceptions and
reverses as to each, any opinion on a single exception
would be purely advisory. See Pet. 23 (agreeing that
only one exception is necessary). Constitutional and
prudential considerations counsel against that
course. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523
U.S. 83, 101 (1998) (noting “an advisory opinion” has
been “disapproved by this Court from the beginning”); United Pub. Workers of Am. (C.I.O.) v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89 (1947) (“federal courts * * * do not
render advisory opinions”). This is not gamesmanship on the part of the Tribes or the Ninth Circuit—
that both exceptions apply merely reflects that this is
not a close case.
B. The Ninth Circuit Did Not Err With Respect to Either Exception, And This Case Is
A Poor Vehicle For Addressing Both.
On top of everything else, the Ninth Circuit did
not err with respect to the Montana exceptions. And
the idiosyncratic facts of this case would hamper this
Court’s review of either.
1. The first exception authorizes tribes to “regulate * * * the activities of nonmembers who enter
consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases,
27
or other arrangements.” Montana, 450 U.S. at 565.
The agreement may be “express[ ]” or evident from
the nonmember’s “actions.” Plains Commerce, 554
U.S. at 337.
In 1998, FMC entered into an express, commercial agreement to pay $1.5 million annually to the
Tribes as long as FMC’s waste remained within the
Reservation. Pet. App. 30a. In the course of negotiations, FMC expressly agreed to tribal jurisdiction in
connection with that permitting fee. Id. at 6a-7a. As
both courts below found, that agreement was consensual. Id. at 31a-32a, 78a-79a. Although EPA’s
actions gave the Tribes a bargaining advantage, see
id., bargaining power need not be equal for an
agreement to be valid and consensual. On the contrary, commercial contracts between parties with
unequal power are enforced every day. See, e.g.,
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S.
20, 32-33 (1991) (agreements to arbitrate valid
despite frequently “unequal bargaining power”
between parties).
FMC protests that this case does not resemble the
example cases listed by this Court after it articulated
the first exception in Montana. That is wrong:
Morris v. Hitchcock “uph[e]ld[ ] tribal taxes on nonmembers grazing cattle on Indian-owned fee land
within tribal territory,” and Buster v. Wright involved “a permit tax on nonmembers for the privilege
of doing business within the reservation.” Plains
Commerce, 554 U.S. at 332-333 (describing Morris,
194 U.S. 384, 393 (1904), and Buster, 135 F. 947, 950
(8th Cir. 1905)). This regulation is in the same vein:
FMC conducted business within the Reservation, and
the resulting waste has impacted Indian land.
28
Indeed, the permit fee here is much more limited
than the regulations in Morris and Buster. It does
not apply for merely “doing business” and addresses
impacts far more significant than grazing cattle.11
FMC also complains that the agreement cannot
be terminated, but that is an incomplete description:
The agreement cannot be unilaterally terminated.
That is generally true of contractual arrangements.12
The critical question is whether the nonmember
could avoid tribal regulation by adjusting its conduct
ex ante, not whether it can unilaterally withdraw
after the fact. This is not, as FMC fears (at 21), the
“Hotel California”: It is an ordinary hotel, at which
you must pay the rate you agreed to for the stay you
booked. Here, FMC agreed to continue payments
“beginning on June 1, 1999, and for every year
thereafter.” C.A. E.R. 1046; see id. at 1049, 1053;
11
Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 653 n.4 (2001),
reaffirmed that Buster provides “guidance * * * as to the type of
consensual relationship contemplated by the first exception,”
even as it questioned a different aspect of Buster.
12
FMC claims that Idaho law permits a party to unilaterally
terminate a contract that “does not specify its duration.” Pet.
22 n.6. Not so: The case FMC cites discusses Oregon law, and
refers only to contracts that do not specify a minimum duration.
See Zidell Expls., Inc. v. Conval Int’l Ltd., 719 F.2d 1465, 147374 (9th Cir. 1983). Idaho law provides that a contract of
unspecified duration is “valid for a reasonable time” and may
not be terminated unilaterally if “otherwise agreed.” Idaho
Code § 28-2-309(2). Here, the Tribes sought clarification that
FMC would not unilaterally discontinue payments “in the next
several years,” and FMC agreed. C.A. E.R. 1049, 1053. In any
event, this Court has never suggested that the “agreement”
necessary to support tribal jurisdiction is subject to the formal
requirements of state contract law.
29
Pet. App. 86a-87a.
Nor did the Ninth Circuit endorse an “in for a
penny, in for a pound” regime. Pet. 22 (alteration
and internal quotation marks omitted). By the
express terms of the agreement, FMC was “in for” a
$1.5 million annual fee. The tribal court did not rely
on the agreement to find jurisdiction over an unrelated “area,” as the Court contemplated when it
coined that phrase. Atkinson, 532 U.S. at 656.
Although FMC suggests (at 22) the Ninth Circuit
was wrong to consider whether it should have “reasonably anticipated” tribal jurisdiction, that consideration was not dispositive. The “express[ ]” agreement with the Tribes was sufficient to support the
judgment, regardless of the course of dealing. Pet.
App. 30a. In any event, reasonable expectations are
an appropriate consideration: As FMC recognizes (at
14), this Court said so in Plains Commerce. 554 U.S.
at 338.
Finally, this is a poor vehicle to take up the first
Montana exception given the federal government’s
involvement in this case. As FMC admits, the RCRA
Consent Decree is “a reasonable settlement reached
at arm’s length between the [federal] government
and FMC.” FMC C.A. Opening Br. 10 (quoting
United States v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 229 F.3d
1161, 2000 WL 915398, at *1 (9th Cir. 2000)). That
Decree contemplated FMC obtaining applicable
tribal permits, which FMC did after consenting to
tribal jurisdiction. Supra pp. 6-8. These unusual
facts counsel against certiorari.
2. The second Montana exception applies when
“the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within [a]
reservation * * * threatens or has some direct effect
30
on the political integrity, the economic security, or
the health or welfare of the tribe.” 450 U.S. at 566.
“The conduct must * * * ‘imperil the subsistence’ of
the tribal community,” Plains Commerce, 554 U.S. at
341 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 566), or “be
necessary to avert catastrophic consequences,” id.
(quoting F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law
§ 4.02[3][c], at 232, n.220 (2005 ed.)).
The decision below found such a threat based on
the factual findings of the Tribal Court of Appeals
and EPA, expert testimony, and the record as a
whole. Pet. App. 36a. Every judge to have examined
this record agrees. Id. at 36a, 80a-83a, 104a-109a.
The threat is not “speculative.” There is ongoing
damage to the Portneuf River and the Fort Hall
Bottoms, which are necessary for “subsistence fishing” and cultural and religious practices. Supra p. 3;
IRODA 4. And, although that is significant enough,
there is also a very real possibility of sudden and
unpredictable calamity as a result of so much toxic
waste, supra pp. 16-18, which includes “lethal
amounts of phosphine gas that accumulate beneath
the pond covers,” Pet. App. 43a. Monitoring is key to
averting such a catastrophe, but it is “‘completely
inadequate’” at the FMC site, id. (quoting expert
testimony), and there is no early warning system in
place, id. The Tribes are entitled to take reasonable
steps to prepare before disaster strikes. Id. at 107a;
see also Plains Commerce, 554 U.S. at 341.
EPA’s actions have not eliminated the threat.
FMC misstated EPA’s own conclusions on that front
to the Court below, Pet. App. 19a-20a, and it continues to obscure the facts before this Court. As the
IRODA makes clear, existing monitoring systems are
31
inadequate.13 Even if the IRODA measures are fully
implemented, additional risks and uncertainty
remain. Supra pp. 12-15; IRODA 18-19, 73.14
Contrary to FMC’s representation (at 26), the
Ninth Circuit did require the Tribes to show a nexus
between the threat and the exercise of jurisdiction,
and found a nexus on the facts of this case. Pet. App.
46a-48a. The money was earmarked for the Tribes’
hazardous waste management program. Supra p. 7.
And there is record evidence that the Tribes spent at
least this much monitoring and addressing the
threat. Pet. App. 47a; see also C.A. S.E.R. 8-14. The
court below also properly looked to the cost of commercial waste disposal as a benchmark: Although
the Tribes are not taking the waste for disposal, they
are hosting the waste on the Reservation indefinitely, meaning they are subject to some of the same
effects as a storage facility. Moreover, the Tribes are
not charging a similar fee; they are charging much
13
To the extent FMC relies on any measures taken since 2014,
see Pet. 8, 24-25, it has not explained any legal basis for why
those developments are relevant to the 2014 tribal judgment.
14
The United States’ brief in the RCRA case, which FMC cites
(at 6 n.1) for the proposition that EPA’s action “fully” addressed
the threat, was penned in 2000, long before the “additional
investigations” discussed in the IRODA and expert testimony
revealed the shortcomings of EPA’s actions in the late 1990s.
The same brief recognized that “the Tribes need not rely
exclusively on the United States,” suggesting regulation would
be appropriate under the second Montana exception. U.S. Br.
at 40, United States v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, No. 99-35821
(9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2000), 2000 WL 33996529 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
32
less. Pet. App. 47a.
Because the threat posed by FMC’s waste is so
extreme, this case would also be a poor vehicle for
addressing the second Montana exception. See id. at
5a (“FMC’s plant was the largest elemental phosphorous plant in the world.”); IRODA 83 (“phosphorous
contamination” at FMC site is “unprecedented anywhere in the United States”). FMC’s continued
resistance to the factual findings below exacerbates
the problem. Although it claims those disputes are
“irrelevant to the legal issues,” Pet. 24 n.7, that is
wrong: The legal question is whether the threat to
the Tribes suffices for jurisdiction. See Plains Commerce, 554 U.S. at 341. That is intimately related to
the lower courts’ assessments of danger that FMC
tries to sweep under the rug. Granting certiorari in
this case would entail collateral fact-finding and
relitigating whether FMC or the courts below correctly report the facts. That is not this Court’s role.
III. PETITIONER’S POLICY CONCERNS DO
NOT WARRANT CERTIORARI.
A. The Petition Invokes Multiple Irrelevant
Issues And Exaggerates The Consequences
Of The Decision Below.
1. Perhaps because the petition falls short of the
traditional Rule 10 criteria, FMC raises a host of
other issues. None would be properly before the
Court if it granted certiorari.
First, FMC dedicates extensive space to its due
process arguments, even though it has not presented
those issues to this Court. That is for good reason:
In the main, the supposedly “stunning” comments of
Judges Gabourie and Pearson are routine. The
33
Judges discussed the importance of building a record, reading case law, and researching history.
Supra p. 11. And although they offered a generalized critique of this Court’s precedent, the Ninth
Circuit correctly observed that there is a “long tradition” of state and federal judges doing the same. Pet.
App. 51a (internal quotation marks omitted). Judges
also often write separately to express concern about
a particular precedent. That does not require recusal
whenever a case relating to that precedent arises.
Second, FMC alludes to the question of “adjudicatory jurisdiction” that divided the Court in Dollar
General Corp. v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016) (mem.) (per curiam). But
FMC’s petition does not posit any delta between
regulatory and adjudicatory jurisdiction, meaning
that issue is not presented here.
Third, FMC cites several Ninth Circuit cases involving regulatory jurisdiction on tribally-owned
land. See Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, Inc.
v. LaRance, 642 F.3d 802, 810 (9th Cir. 2011) (per
curiam); Window Rock Unified Sch. Dist. v. Reeves,
861 F.3d 894, 898 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S.
Ct. 648 (2018) (mem.). But the court’s approach to
jurisdiction on tribal land is not implicated in this
petition concerning fee land.
Fourth, FMC raises concerns about the requirement to exhaust tribal remedies. Pet. 31. That
issue, too, is beyond the scope of the questions presented, since FMC exhausted its tribal remedies
here, as its binding representations to the Ninth
Circuit obliged it to. Supra p. 9.
2. FMC also claims that the decision below will
have dire consequences. Those fears derive from
34
FMC’s refusal to acknowledge that the Montana
analysis is fact-driven, and the reach of the decision
below is limited by its extraordinary facts. For
example, FMC claims that the decision below ushers
in a regime of “unfettered regulatory and adjudicatory jurisdiction,” even if an “agreement * * * seeks to
limit tribal jurisdiction.” Pet. 28. But the judgment
was limited to the terms of FMC’s agreement with
the Tribes, which involved no jurisdictional limitation. Likewise, the decision below does not foreshadow jurisdiction for any activity fully contained on fee
land. The court’s holding rested in large measure on
the threat to the surrounding tribal land and the
Indians residing there. Supra pp. 16-17; cf. Evans v.
Shoshone-Bannock Land Use Policy Comm’n, 736
F.3d 1298, 1301, 1307 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that
there was not even plausible tribal jurisdiction over
construction of “a single-family residence” on fee
land). As for FMC’s own situation, it has other
remedies—including renegotiating its business deal
with the Tribes, or taking its concerns to Congress.
B. Petitioner’s Generalized Objections To The
Ninth Circuit And Tribal Courts Are Unfounded.
As FMC’s futile efforts to create a split prove, the
Ninth Circuit’s approach to Montana is not aberrant.
See, e.g., Big Horn Cty. Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Adams,
219 F.3d 944, 951 (9th Cir. 2000) (giving the second
exception a “narrow construction” for fear it “would
effectively swallow Montana’s main rule”). The
leading quotation that FMC relies on to paint a
contrary picture, from Judge Christen, concerns a
different legal context: tribal jurisdiction over tribal
land. Window Rock, 861 F.3d at 916 (Christen, J.,
35
dissenting). It has no relevance to this case. More
generally, this Court does not sit to review the general “atmosphere in which an opinion is written.”
Black, 351 U.S. at 298.
Nor is there any basis for FMC’s contention that
tribal courts are systematically biased against nonmembers. The Ninth Circuit rejected that argument,
citing empirical evidence and its “own experience.”
Pet. App. 54a-55a. More to the point, if there is any
truth to FMC’s concerns, there will be a more suitable vehicle to address the questions presented here.
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
WILLIAM F. BACON
SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES
P.O. Box 306
Fort Hall, Idaho 83203
NEAL KUMAR KATYAL
Counsel of Record
REEDY C. SWANSON
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP
555 Thirteenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004
(202) 637-5600
neal.katyal@hoganlovells.com
DOUGLAS B.L. ENDRESON
FRANK S. HOLLEMAN, IV
SONOSKY, CHAMBERS, SACHSE,
ENDRESON & PERRY, LLP
1425 K Street, N.W., Suite 600 PAUL C. ECHO HAWK
ECHO HAWK LAW OFFICE
Washington, D.C. 20005
P.O. Box 4166
Pocatello, Idaho 83205
Counsel for Respondent
May 2020
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.