Opposition Brief — FMC Corporation, Petitioner v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes

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No. 19-1143

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

_________

FMC CORPORATION,

Petitioner,

v.

SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES,

Respondent.

_________

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

_________

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

_________

WILLIAM F. BACON

SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES

P.O. Box 306

Fort Hall, Idaho 83203

NEAL KUMAR KATYAL

Counsel of Record

REEDY C. SWANSON

HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP

555 Thirteenth Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20004

(202) 637-5600

neal.katyal@hoganlovells.com

DOUGLAS B.L. ENDRESON

FRANK S. HOLLEMAN, IV

SONOSKY, CHAMBERS, SACHSE,

ENDRESON & PERRY, LLP

1425 K Street, N.W., Suite 600 PAUL C. ECHO HAWK

ECHO HAWK LAW OFFICE

Washington, D.C. 20005

P.O. Box 4166

Pocatello, Idaho 83205

Counsel for Respondent

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the Ninth Circuit omitted a necessary

finding from the legal framework for assessing tribal

jurisdiction.

2. Whether the Ninth Circuit correctly applied the

settled grounds for tribal jurisdiction under Montana

v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981), to the unique

facts of this case.

(i)

ii

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

To counsel’s knowledge, there are no related proceedings.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ........................................ i

RELATED PROCEEDINGS .......................................ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................ v

INTRODUCTION ........................................................ 1

STATEMENT .............................................................. 3

A.

FMC’s Polluting Activities Within

The Fort Hall Reservation ....................... 3

B.

EPA Action And Tribal Permits .............. 5

C.

Tribal Proceedings .................................... 9

D.

Federal Proceedings ............................... 15

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION .......... 18

I.

II.

THE FIRST QUESTION PRESENTED

DOES NOT WARRANT CERTIORARI ......... 18

A.

The First Question Requests An Advisory Opinion Based On A Mischaracterization Of The Decision Below ....... 19

B.

The Decision Below Does Not Split

With Any Other Circuit .......................... 22

C.

Plains Commerce Did Not Change

the Law And Impose a Threshold

Requirement On The Montana Exceptions ................................................... 23

THE SECOND QUESTION

PRESENTED DOES NOT WARRANT

CERTIORARI ................................................. 25

A.

The Court Would Have To Engage In

Splitless Error Correction Twice To

Avoid An Advisory Opinion .................... 25

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

Page

B.

The Ninth Circuit Did Not Err With

Respect to Either Exception, And

This Case Is A Poor Vehicle For Addressing Both .......................................... 26

III. PETITIONER’S POLICY CONCERNS

DO NOT WARRANT CERTIORARI.............. 32

A.

The Petition Invokes Multiple Irrelevant Issues And Exaggerates The

Consequences Of The Decision Below ... 32

B.

Petitioner’s Generalized Objections

To The Ninth Circuit And Tribal

Courts Are Unfounded ........................... 34

CONCLUSION .......................................................... 35

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

CASES:

Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley,

532 U.S. 645 (2001) ........................................ 28, 29

Belcourt Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Davis,

786 F.3d 653 (8th Cir. 2015)................................ 25

Belcourt Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Davis,

997 F. Supp. 2d 1017 (D.N.D. 2014) ................... 26

Big Horn Cty. Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Adams,

219 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. 2000)................................ 34

Black v. Cutter Labs.,

351 U.S. 292 (1956) .................................. 21, 22, 35

Buster v. Wright,

135 F. 947 (8th Cir. 1905).............................. 27, 28

Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Mississippi Band of

Choctaw Indians,

746 F.3d 167 (5th Cir. 2014).......................... 20, 24

Dollar General Corp. v. Mississippi

Band of Choctaw Indians,

136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016).......................................... 33

Evans v. Shoshone-Bannock Land Use

Policy Comm’n,

736 F.3d 1298 (9th Cir. 2013).............................. 34

Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane

Corp.,

500 U.S. 20 (1991) ................................................ 27

In re Charges of Judicial Misconduct,

769 F.3d 762 (D.C. Cir. 2014) .............................. 18

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Jackson v. Payday Financial, LLC,

764 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2014)................................ 23

Knighton v. Cedarville Rancheria of N.

Paiute Indians,

922 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 513 (2019) .................................. 21

Kodiak Oil & Gas (USA) Inc. v. Burr,

932 F.3d 1125 (8th Cir. 2019)........................ 22, 23

Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc.,

516 U.S. 479 (1996) ................................................ 6

Montana v. United States,

450 U.S. 544 (1981) ...................................... passim

Morris v. Hitchcock,

194 U.S. 384 (1904) ......................................... 27, 28

Nevada v. Hicks,

533 U.S. 353 (2001) .............................................. 24

Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family

Land & Cattle Co.,

554 U.S. 316 (2008) ...................................... passim

Rita v. United States,

551 U.S. 338 (2007) .............................................. 22

Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t,

523 U.S. 83 (1998) ................................................ 26

Stifel, Nicolaus & Co. v. Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa

Indians,

807 F.3d 184 (7th Cir. 2015)................................ 25

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

United Pub. Workers of Am. (C.I.O.) v.

Mitchell,

330 U.S. 75 (1947) ................................................ 26

United States v. FMC Corp.,

531 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2008).............................. 8, 9

United States v. FMC Corp.,

No. CV-98-0406-E-BLW, 2006 WL

544505 (D. Idaho Mar. 6, 2006) ............................. 8

United States v. Shoshone-Bannock

Tribes,

229 F.3d 1161, 2000 WL 915398 (9th

Cir. 2000).............................................................. 29

Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area,

Inc. v. LaRance,

642 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 2011)................................ 33

Window Rock Unified Sch. Dist. v.

Reeves,

861 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 648 (2018) ...................... 33, 34, 35

Zidell Expls., Inc. v. Conval Int’l Ltd.,

719 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1983).............................. 28

STATUTES:

Act of February 23, 1889, ch. 203, § 1,

¶¶ 4-5, 25 Stat. 687, 687 ........................................ 3

Fort Bridger Treaty of 1868, 15 Stat. 673 ............... 3

Idaho Code § 28-2-309(2) ........................................ 28

RULE:

Sup. Ct. R. 10 .................................................... 24, 32

viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

OTHER AUTHORITIES:

Amendments to Chapter V: Fort Hall Land

Use Operative Policy Guidelines, § V-92(B) (1998) .............................................................. 7

F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law

§ 4.02[3][c] (2005 ed.) ........................................... 30

EPA, Interim Amendment to the Record of

Decision for the EMF Superfund Site,

FMC Operable Unit, Pocatello, Idaho

(Sept. 2012) .................................................. passim

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

_________

No. 19-1143

_________

FMC CORPORATION,

Petitioner,

v.

SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES,

Respondent.

_________

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

_________

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

_________

INTRODUCTION

After generating toxic waste on the Respondent

Shoshone-Bannock Tribes’ (the “Tribes”) Reservation

for over fifty years, Petitioner FMC Corporation

reached a compromise with the Tribes. In connection

with storing over 22 million tons of its radioactive

and carcinogenic waste within the Reservation, FMC

agreed in writing to compensate the Tribes, who bear

the risks of the waste, by paying $1.5 million in fees

annually.

FMC now regrets that written agreement, and for

nearly two decades has refused to uphold its end of

the bargain, seeking instead to enlist the help of the

(1)

2

federal judiciary in nullifying it. FMC thus tries to

spin this as a case of tribal jurisdiction run amok.

It is not. Having created one of the most volatile

and hazardous waste sites in the country, FMC

consented to Tribal jurisdiction over land-use permitting and negotiated with the Tribes for a reasonable annual fee that the Tribes use to manage the

risks to tribal land, health, welfare, and cultural

practices from FMC’s land use. When FMC sought

to break that arrangement unilaterally, the tribal

court enforced the agreement according to its terms,

exercising the jurisdiction to which FMC had consented. Faithfully applying this Court’s settled

framework for assessing tribal jurisdiction as set out

in Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981),

and subsequent cases, the decision below affirmed

the Tribes’ jurisdiction given FMC’s express agreement and the extraordinary threat posed by FMC’s

toxic waste. As this Court recently reaffirmed, a

“tribe may quite legitimately seek to protect its

members from noxious uses” of fee land “that threaten tribal welfare or security.” Plains Commerce

Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S.

316, 336 (2008).

It is therefore no surprise that, to make this case

seem as if it merits this Court’s attention, FMC

resorts to a battery of mischaracterizations. In the

first question presented, it imagines a holding that

does not exist in the decision below, and then conjures a split based on that imaginary holding. In the

second question presented, it asks this Court to

overturn meticulous factual findings supported by a

voluminous record. And, throughout, FMC feints

3

towards spectral issues that are not within the scope

of either question presented.

The petition should be denied.

STATEMENT

A. FMC’s Polluting Activities Within The Fort

Hall Reservation

1. The Shoshone-Bannock Tribes are a federally

recognized Indian tribe. Pet. App. 4a. Under the

terms of “the Fort Bridger Treaty of 1868, 15 Stat.

673, and related executive orders, the Tribes today

have sovereign authority over the Fort Hall Reservation.” Id. The Reservation spans 840 square miles

in southeastern Idaho, and ninety-seven percent of it

“is tribal land or land held in trust by the United

States.” Id. The Portneuf River flows through the

Reservation. Id. at 71a. The Tribes rely on the river,

and the Fort Hall Bottoms along its northern bank,

for “subsistence fishing, hunting and gathering.” Id.

The area is also vital to the Tribes’ “historical[ ] * * * cultural practices, including the Sundance.” Id.

2. For over 50 years, from 1949 until 2001, Petitioner “FMC Corporation and its predecessors owned

and operated an elemental phosphorous production

plant”—the largest in the world. Id. at 4a-5a. “Virtually all of” the plant sits on “fee land” owned by

FMC “on the Fort Hall Reservation.” Id. at 5a.1

During its operational years, “FMC obtained or

1

FMC asserts that the Reservation was allotted under the

General Allotment Act. Pet. 4. In fact, allotment occurred

under the Agreement of May 14, 1880, ratified by the Act of

February 23, 1889, ch. 203, § 1, ¶¶ 4-5, 25 Stat. 687, 688.

4

mined raw materials for its plant from tribal and

allottee lands on the Reservation.” Id. And for that

entire period, FMC used its fee lands as a dumpsite

for its phosphorus production wastes. See id.

Today, although the surface of FMC’s site may

appear tranquil in photographs, cf. Pet. 8, that is an

illusion: Over 22 million tons of hazardous waste

contaminates FMC’s site. Pet. App. 5a. “The waste

is radioactive, carcinogenic, and poisonous.” Id. at

1a. And the “rolling hills” beneath which it is stored,

Pet. 8, are perched above the Portneuf River and the

Fort Hall Bottoms, C.A. E.R. 969.

Much of the waste sits in “storage ponds” that “continue to generate lethal amounts of phosphine gas

that accumulate beneath the pond covers,” Pet. App.

5a, 43a, which is “both acutely and chronically

dangerous to people in the area,” id. at 40a (internal

quotation marks omitted). At certain quantities, “a

few breaths can render a person unable to walk or

talk, and can result in extreme harm or eventual

death.” Id. at 39a. At higher concentrations, phosphine gas has the potential to explode. Id. Over the

last fifteen years, dangerous levels have repeatedly

escaped from the ponds. Id. at 39a-43a. Some of the

ponds are lined to prevent waste from contaminating

the groundwater, but others are not. Id. at 5a.

In addition, millions of tons of “loose soil,”

“groundwater,” and rocky “slag” are contaminated

with elemental phosphorous, arsenic, and gamma

radiation. Id. at 5a, 36a. Like its gaseous cousin,

elemental phosphorous “is highly toxic by ingestion,

inhalation, and skin absorption.” Id. at 37a (internal

quotation marks omitted). It also “is likely to cause

skin burns upon contact” and “will spontaneously

5

burst into flames when exposed to the air.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at

38a (describing the statement of a witness “who

testified that he [saw] ducks spontaneously ignite as

they took off from FMC’s phosphorous containment

ponds”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Levels

of elemental phosphorous contamination on this site

exist “at a scale unprecedented anywhere in the

United States.” Id. at 36a (internal quotation marks

omitted). Elemental phosphorous and arsenic “are

continuously flowing in the groundwater from FMC’s

land through seeps and springs directly into the

Portneuf River and Fort Hall Bottoms.” Id. at 71a.

That is not all. “Somewhere between twenty one

and thirty railroad tanker cars * * * are buried on

the property.” Id. at 5a. FMC used those rail cars to

transport “hazardous [phosphorous] sludge.” Id. at

100a. Because FMC found it too dangerous for its

employees to clean the cars for reuse, FMC simply

“buried the tankers without cleaning them.” Id. No

one knows how corroded these tankers are, “and it is

possible that they either have or will corrode to the

point of leakage.” Id. “There is no lining underneath

the tanker cars * * * .” Id. at 5a.

The current management plan calls for this waste

to remain on the Reservation indefinitely. Id. at 22a.

B. EPA Action And Tribal Permits

1. In 1990, the Environmental Protection Agency

listed FMC’s site as a Superfund site, marking it as

one “of the nation’s worst hazardous waste sites.” Id.

at 5a (internal quotation marks omitted). That

designation triggered regulation under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,

and Liability Act (CERCLA). Most pertinent here, it

6

initiated EPA’s process of formulating a “Record of

Decision,” or formal documentation of the hazards on

the site and plan for mitigating the dangers posed by

the waste. See id. at 17a-18a. EPA did not finalize

its initial Record of Decision for the FMC site until

1998. See id.

In the meantime, “EPA charged FMC with violating” the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

(RCRA) by violating federal regulations concerning

“the disposal of solid and hazardous waste.” Id. at

6a.2 FMC sought to “avoid litigation,” and “began

negotiations with the EPA over the terms of a possible Consent Decree that would settle the RCRA suit.”

Id. “Though not a formal party, the Tribes participated in the negotiations.” Id. The proposed resolution “required construction of a treatment facility

and additional waste storage ponds on FMC’s fee

land on the Reservation.” Id. “As a condition to

obtaining the Consent Decree, the EPA required

FMC to obtain relevant permits from the Tribes.”

Id.; see also Consent Decree, United States v. FMC

Corp., No. 4:98-cv-00406-BLW (D. Idaho July 13,

1999). This condition “was a major factor in [FMC]

reaching an agreement with the EPA.” Pet. App.

62a.

2. The “relevant permits” were set out in the

Tribes’ Land Use Policy Ordinance, which required a

construction permit for the treatment facility and

storage ponds “and a use permit for storage of the

2

CERCLA focuses on cleaning up existing hazardous waste and

RCRA seeks to reduce or mitigate the potential for future

waste. See Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 483

(1996).

7

hazardous waste.” Id. at 6a. Negotiations regarding

the permits began in July 1997. In the course of

negotiations, FMC’s Senior Vice President and

General Counsel confirmed by letter to the Tribes

that “‘[i]n connection with the land use permit, we

did agree that we would consent to tribal jurisdiction

in that area.’” Id. at 6a-7a; C.A. S.E.R. 6.

The following spring, the Tribes “considered and

then adopted amended” written guidelines regarding

the appropriate annual permit fee under the Ordinance “for storage of hazardous waste on the Reservation.” Pet. App. 7a. As amended, the guidelines

called for “an annual fee of $5.00 per ton” of waste.

Id. “Money from use permit fees was to be ‘deposited

in the Shoshone-Bannock Hazardous Waste Management Program Fund,’ and to be used ‘to pay the

reasonable and necessary costs of administrating the

Hazardous Waste Management Program.’”

Id.

(quoting Amendments to Chapter V: Fort Hall Land

Use Operative Policy Guidelines, § V-9-2(B) (1998)).

“FMC estimated that the $5 per ton storage fee

would cost over $110 million per year” given the

sheer volume of waste it had produced.

Id.

“[A]nxious to obtain the permit,” and thereby obtain

the Consent Decree, id. at 87a, “FMC sought to

negotiate a compromise with the Tribes” to avoid the

full permit amount, id. at 7a.

Those negotiations bore fruit when “FMC agreed to

a one-time fee of $1 million and an annual use permit fee of $1.5 million to cover FMC’s storage of its

hazardous waste on the Reservation.” Id. Under the

terms of the agreement, memorialized in a series of

letters between FMC and the Tribes, the $1.5 million

annual fee would continue “even if FMC capped and

8

closed the eleven hazardous waste ponds that were

subject to the RCRA Consent Decree.” Id.; see also

C.A. E.R. 1047, 1049, 1053. “FMC never attempted

to negotiate” an end date for the use fee, or to condition the fee on the operational status of FMC’s plant.

Pet. App. 87a.

3. “Within just a few months of resolving the permit issues, FMC reached agreement with the EPA on

the RCRA Consent Decree.” Id. at 62a. This “sweetheart deal” for FMC “allowed [it] to dump the toxic

mess it had created in the EPA’s lap by paying a

small fine of $11.9 million along with a few million

dollars in construction commitments.” Id. at 87a.

FMC paid the agreed-upon $1.5 million annually

without issue from 1998 until 2001. Id. at 9a. In

December 2001, FMC ceased “active phosphorous

processing operations at the site.” Id. “When the

$1.5 million use permit fee came due in 2002, FMC

refused to pay it.” Id.

The parties attempted to negotiate a resolution.

Id. After that failed, the Tribes filed a motion seeking enforcement in the RCRA Consent Decree action.

Id. The district court granted that motion, finding

that “[t]he only reasonable interpretation of” the

Consent Decree “is that it requires FMC to apply for”

the relevant permits. United States v. FMC Corp.,

No. CV-98-0406-E-BLW, 2006 WL 544505, at *4 (D.

Idaho Mar. 6, 2006). After that ruling, FMC began

contesting its obligation to pay before the Tribes’

Land Use Policy Commission. Pet. App. 10a-11a.

The Ninth Circuit reversed on procedural grounds:

It held that the Tribes lacked third-party standing to

enforce the fee through the Consent Decree action.

United States v. FMC Corp., 531 F.3d 813, 823 (9th

9

Cir. 2008). Even so, the court recognized FMC’s

obligation to continue with tribal proceedings. Id. at

823-824. Indeed, at oral argument, FMC’s counsel

“represented to the court that FMC underst[ood] that

it has the obligation to continue, and will continue,

with the current tribal proceedings to their conclusion.” Id. at 824. The Ninth Circuit “accept[ed] that

statement from counsel as binding on FMC.” Id.3

C. Tribal Proceedings

1. As it had represented to the Ninth Circuit, FMC

contested its obligation to pay the $1.5 million annual fee before tribal authorities. The Tribes’ Land Use

Policy Commission rejected its challenge, in findings

affirmed by the Tribes’ governing body, the Fort Hall

Business Council. Pet. App. 11a.4

FMC appealed the Business Council’s decision to

the Tribal Court. Id. That court exercised jurisdiction and found the permitting fee unenforceable as a

matter of tribal law. Id. at 244a. Both parties

appealed to the Tribal Court of Appeals. Id. at 12a.

The case was heard by three judges, none of whom

are members of the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes. Id.

Judge Fred Gabourie is a former California statecourt judge and former Chief Judge of the Kootenai

Tribe. Id. Judge Mary Pearson is a former Chief

3

The United States agreed that the Tribes could not enforce the

required permit through the Consent Decree action, and that

the Tribes were entitled to pursue any “remedies they have

under Tribal law.” U.S. Amicus Br., United States v. FMC

Corp., No. 06-35429 (9th Cir. May 14, 2007), 2007 WL 1899170.

4

The Council also affirmed a one-time fee for demolition

activities on the site. Pet. App. 11a.

10

Judge for the Spokane and Coeur d’Alene Tribes. Id.

And Judge Cathy Silak is a former Justice of the

Idaho Supreme Court. Id.

The Tribal Court of Appeals reversed the Tribal

Court on the tribal-law issue, finding that the permit

fee was authorized and that FMC had to pay the

agreed-upon amount. Id. at 15a-16a.

To assess tribal jurisdiction, the court looked to

the familiar Montana framework.

Id. at 153a.

Recognizing the “unique and limited character” of

tribal sovereignty, the court acknowledged the

“general rule” prohibiting “tribal authority over nonmember activity taking place” “on non-Indian fee

land” within the Reservation. Id. at 154a. And the

court recited the “two exceptions” for (1) “the activities of non-members who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members” and (2) conduct

that “threatens or has some direct effect on the

political integrity, the economic security, or the

health and welfare of the tribe.” Id. (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-566).

Applying that framework, the court held that the

Tribes had jurisdiction under the “first exception of

Montana” because “FMC’s agreement for payment * * * of the $1.5 million annual permit

fee * * * is precisely the type of commercial dealing”

covered by that exception, id. at 155a, and that FMC

had voluntarily agreed to pay the fee, id. at 184a. As

for the second exception, the court found the record

“insufficient” to “determine if” FMC’s waste “would

threaten or cause a direct impact” on the economic

security or “health and welfare” of the Tribes. Id. at

157a-158a. The court therefore ordered a hearing

regarding the site’s potential to “impact or threaten

11

the Tribes’ economic integrity, and health and welfare of Tribal members and Tribal children.” Id. at

222a.

2. FMC moved to reconsider, citing public remarks

of Judges Gabourie and Pearson at the University of

Idaho College of Law. Id. at 12a, 16a. At the conference, the judges made generalized remarks about

judging, emphasizing that “‘every court * * * should

be impartial’ and ‘a good opinion comes [from] both

sides, both parties.’” Id. at 12a-13a. Judge Gabourie

criticized this Court’s Montana line of cases, as well

as tribal courts that had deprived this Court of “vital

information about the tribes’ cultures and traditions.” Id. at 13a. “Judge Pearson discussed the

importance of * * * creating a record,” and suggested

that the court was working on “a big case * * * so

they were saying prayers, reading cases, and ‘trying

to do . . . the history.’” Id. She stressed that they

were “‘not guaranteeing anybody anything.’” Id. at

15a. FMC alleged that these comments exhibited

judicial bias. Id. at 16a.

A newly constituted panel of the Tribal Court of

Appeals—excluding Judges Gabourie and Pearson—

denied FMC’s reconsideration motion in pertinent

part, id. at 16a-17a,5 reaffirming that the court had

jurisdiction under the first exception, and that FMC

“voluntarily entered into a contract in 1998 with the

Shoshone Bannock Tribes for payment of 1.5 million

per year,” C.A. E.R. 113, 115-116. The court also

5

Judges Gabourie and Pearson were replaced by Judge Peter

McDermott, a retired Idaho state judge, and Judge Vern Herzog

Jr., a practicing attorney. Pet. App. 16a.

12

“ordered

an

evidentiary

hearing

to

resolve * * * whether the Tribes had * * * jurisdiction

over FMC under the second Montana exception.”

Pet. App. 17a.

3. Before that hearing, EPA issued a new Interim

Amendment to the Record of Decision (“IRODA”)

concerning the toxic waste at FMC’s site regulated

under CERCLA. See EPA, Interim Amendment to

the Record of Decision for the EMF Superfund Site,

FMC Operable Unit, Pocatello, Idaho (Sept. 2012).

The IRODA resulted from “further investigative

work,” and concluded that there were “additional

concerns associated with elemental phosphorous and

other contaminants” on the site that required remedial action. IRODA i-ii. Those investigations revealed that “ongoing * * * releases to groundwater

and surface water are of greater significance than

was recognized” in 1998, including discharges of

“arsenic” and other contaminants “at the FMC” site.

Id. at 16. As a result, “EPA ‘no longer considered’ its

1998 measures ‘protective of human health and the

environment,’” Pet. App. 18a (quoting IRODA at v,

14, 52), and ordered that steps be taken to reduce the

threat of the “imminent and substantial endangerment to public health, welfare, or the environment”

posed by the FMC site. IRODA ii. Those steps

included placing protective caps over phosphoruscontaminated areas, covering the radioactive slag

with soil, installing “an interim groundwater extraction/treatment system,” and implementing a longterm groundwater monitoring system and a gas

monitoring program for the CERCLA ponds. Id. at

iii-iv. EPA expected the IRODA’s remedial steps to

“reduce[ ]” the risks posed by contaminants at the

13

FMC site, but it did not suggest those steps would

eliminate the risks. Id. at 73. Indeed, EPA acknowledged that capping the waste “does not reduce [the]

toxicity, mobility, or volume of contaminants.” Pet.

App. 38a (quoting IRODA 60). EPA also indicated

that several steps required future development,

including establishing a cleanup level for phosphorus, IRODA 38, 241 tbl. 8 n.d, and implementing a

gas monitoring plan, id. at 70-71. EPA also “described as ‘significant unknowns’ the ‘horizontal and

vertical gradients in the concentrations of elemental

phosphorus, the total mass of elemental phosphorus,

and the form of elemental phosphorus in the soil,’”

Pet. App. 70a (quoting IRODA 83), and acknowledged that conditions remained “highly uncertain” in

part because the interim remedy would result in

“significant[ ]” alterations to the flow of groundwater,

IRODA 18-19. EPA expected that remediation of the

contaminated groundwater “could well take more

than 100 years.” Id. at 53.

4. Following the IRODA, the Tribal Court of Appeals held an evidentiary hearing regarding Montana’s second exception that lasted approximately

two weeks. Pet. App. 17a, 21a.6 The court issued its

6

FMC suggests (at 10) it was barred from presenting certain

untimely-produced evidence at this hearing. That is misleading: FMC’s concern stems from a different, earlier hearing

concerning an issue of tribal law irrelevant to this petition,

which the court decided against FMC on terms that made the

evidence immaterial. See Tribes’ C.A. Opening & Response Br.

53 & n.37. The Ninth Circuit found this issue either “waived”

or “self-evidently meritless.” Pet. App. 52a.

14

opinion a month later. See id. at 17a.7

Based largely on the uncontested findings in the

IRODA, id. at 20a, the tribal court found that

“FMC’s activities” had resulted in “an ongoing and

extensive threat to human health,” id. at 97a. The

court also cited a 2010 letter from the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare to EPA, calling phosphine gas emissions “an urgent public health hazard

to the health of people breathing the air” in the area,

id. at 99a (internal quotation marks omitted), as well

as expert testimony showing the threats from the

contamination are “of a catastrophic nature in health

and reactions, including death,” id. at 104a. Additionally, the court found that the contaminated

groundwater threatened “subsistence fishing, hunting and gathering by tribal members” as well as

tribal “cultural practices, including the Sundance.”

Id. at 101a.

The trial also yielded extensive evidence refuting

FMC’s claims that “certain methods suggested by the

EPA” would “contain[ ]” the “risk.” Id. at 101a-102a.

Despite EPA’s involvement “at this site since 1990,”

the court found that “remedial actions chosen by

EPA have not been implemented.” Id. at 102a.

Many remained “in design phase,” and even if fully

implemented would result only in “containment.” Id.

Other testimony confirmed “that groundwater extraction systems have not been put into place at the

FMC site, and that arsenic and phosphorous” were

7

Judge John Traylor, a practicing attorney and nonmember of

the Tribes, replaced Judge Silak, who was unavailable for the

hearing. Pet. App. 17a.

15

still “actually traveling to the Portneuf River.” Id. at

101a.

Based on this extensive factual record, the court

held that “FMC’s fee land continues to present a real,

catastrophic threat to the Tribes.” Id. 107a. And the

danger was more than “a mere possibility,” id., given

the “realized and ongoing destructive effects that

contamination from the site is having on tribal

members’ cultural practices on the Portneuf River,”

id. at 104a, and the “uncontroverted testimony that

the activity of FMC has in fact interfered with the

customs and traditions of the Shoshone Bannock

Tribal Members,” id. at 107a-108a. The court therefore found the second Montana exception satisfied.

Id. at 108a-109a.

The court imposed a judgment of approximately

$20.5 million, reflecting permit fees from 2002

through 2014 and about $1 million in fees and costs.

Id. at 74a.

D. Federal Proceedings

1. FMC sued the Tribes seeking a declaration that

the Tribal Court of Appeals’ judgment is unenforceable, claiming that the Tribes lacked both regulatory

and adjudicatory jurisdiction and that FMC had been

denied due process based on the former panel members’ comments. Id. at 23a. “The Tribes counterclaimed, seeking” enforcement of the judgment. Id.

The District Court found in favor of the Tribes. Id.

at 56a. It found tribal jurisdiction appropriate under

the first Montana exception based on the “consensual

relationship” arising from the “series of letters” in

which “FMC agreed to obtain a Tribal permit to do

the work necessary to comply with the Consent

decree,” which FMC then confirmed “by signing the

16

Consent Decree” requiring those permits. Id. at 78a.

The court rejected FMC’s claim of “duress,” finding

that the Tribes had merely taken “advantage of their

bargaining leverage, a long-standing practice in the

sharp-elbowed corporate world in which FMC does

business every day.” Id. That leverage, moreover,

was not a result of the Tribes’ actions, but the federal

government’s “insisting that FMC obtain Tribal

permits.” Id. In the end, “[t]his was a simple business deal, not the product of illegal duress or coercion.” Id.

Turning to the second exception, the court found

that the contaminants at FMC’s site “pose a constant

and deadly threat to the Tribes” and “a real risk of

catastrophic consequences should containment fail.”

Id. at 81a. “This is the type of threat that falls

within Montana’s second exception.” Id. 83a. As a

matter of comity, however, the court declined to rest

on the second exception absent a more specific showing of the fee’s intended use. Id. at 86a.

The court then rejected FMC’s due process arguments, finding any bias cured when a panel excluding the judges in question “independently came to

the same conclusion.” Id. at 84a.

2. The Ninth Circuit unanimously affirmed, holding the tribal judgment enforceable under both

Montana exceptions.

Regarding the first exception, the court explained

that “consent may be established” either “expressly

or by [the nonmember’s] actions” if the nonmember

“should have reasonably anticipated that [its] interactions might trigger tribal authority.” Id. at 30a

(internal quotation marks omitted). Both of those

circumstances existed here. Id. Like the District

17

Court, the Ninth Circuit rejected FMC’s claims of

coercion, finding it was simply motivated by its

“strong interest in * * * settl[ing] the RCRA suit”

brought by EPA “on favorable terms.” Id. at 31a.

The court then turned to the second Montana exception. It agreed with the District Court’s findings

that FMC’s waste “‘threatens or has some direct

effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health and welfare’ of the Tribes to the

extent that it ‘imperil[s] the subsistence or welfare’ of

the Tribes.” Id. at 36a (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at

566).

It also rejected FMC’s contention that EPA’s actions had abated the threat. Id. at 44a-45a. Indeed,

the court determined that FMC’s brief had “misrepresent[ed] what the EPA wrote” on that subject:

Although FMC claimed that EPA had found its

remedial prescriptions “fully protective of human

health and the environment,” in fact EPA did “not

us[e] the word ‘fully’” and “specif[ied] that the remedial measures are ‘interim.’” Id. at 19a (internal

quotation marks omitted).8

Examining the nexus between the permit fee and

the threat, the court took “it as a given that there

must be some nexus between a basis for jurisdiction

under Montana and a tribal action taken in the

8

The IRODA indicates that, as a theoretical matter, containment can be “fully” effective, see IRODA 83, 107, 133, but does

not find that its interim remedies would be. The nearest it

comes is with respect to the rail cars, but even then the finding

is an “expect[ation]” grounded in assumptions, and EPA

specifies that “additional actions” may be considered if those

assumptions prove wrong. Id. at 154.

18

exercise of that jurisdiction.” Id. at 46a. Here, that

nexus was satisfied by evidence indicating “that the

Tribes have spent approximately $1.5 million annually on measures to monitor and mitigate the dangers posed by FMC’s hazardous waste.” Id. at 47a.

The court also noted that “commercial hazardous

waste disposal facilities” might charge between 10

and 50 times as much per ton as the amount prescribed by tribal guidelines—an amount itself many

times higher than the $1.5 million FMC agreed to

pay. Id.

Finally, the court rejected FMC’s due process

claim. Finding no bias, it cited “a long tradition of

lower court judges criticizing [this] Court on issues of

constitutional law [and other areas].” Id. at 51a

(quoting In re Charges of Judicial Misconduct, 769

F.3d 762, 785 (D.C. Cir. 2014)). Accepting FMC’s

argument, the court explained, would require “federal and state judges * * * to recuse themselves with

some frequency.” Id. In any event, any bias was

“eliminated” by the “differently reconstituted panel.”

Id. at 52a. The court was similarly unmoved by

FMC’s charges of systemic bias in tribal courts,

noting that empirical evidence and its own experience refuted those claims. Id. at 52a-55a.

FMC sought rehearing, which the full court denied

with no noted dissent. Id. at 90a-91a.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION

I.

THE FIRST QUESTION PRESENTED

DOES NOT WARRANT CERTIORARI.

In the first question presented, FMC asks whether “the Ninth Circuit correctly holds that tribal

jurisdiction over nonmembers is established whenev-

19

er a Montana exception is met, or whether * * * a

court must also determine that the exercise of such

jurisdiction stems from the tribe’s inherent authority

to set conditions on entry, preserve tribal selfgovernment, or control internal relations.” Pet. i-ii.

FMC’s request faces a fatal threshold obstacle:

The decision below held no such thing. On the

contrary, the Ninth Circuit carefully documented the

manifold threats to the Tribes’ environmental and

cultural resources posed by FMC’s waste, and concluded that those “constitute threats to tribal selfgovernance, health, and welfare.” Pet. App. 34a

(emphasis added). This case is therefore an inappropriate vehicle to determine whether such a finding is

necessary—at best, such an opinion would be advisory, since the Ninth Circuit actually made the finding

that Petitioner requests. And, shorn of Petitioner’s

rhetoric, the claim of a split with the Seventh and

Eighth Circuits falls away.

In any event, FMC is wrong that this Court’s

precedent requires an independent, “threshold”

finding of a direct link to tribal self-governance or

internal relations. Pet. 16. The better reading is

that those principles undergird the two canonical

Montana exceptions.

A. The First Question Requests An Advisory

Opinion Based On A Mischaracterization

Of The Decision Below.

The first question presented rests on a false premise. According to FMC, the decision below held that

“satisfying a Montana exception is enough to trigger

tribal jurisdiction—regardless of whether the regulation at issue stems from the tribe’s inherent sovereign authority to preserve tribal self-government or

20

control internal relations.” Id. at 19.

The court made no such holding. Tellingly, FMC

does not—because it cannot—quote any language

from the opinion adopting the legal principle on

which it seeks review and reversal. If anything,

FMC implicitly acknowledges that such a holding is

nowhere to be found. See id. at 16 (claiming that the

court below “disregarded” its argument rather than

issued a contrary holding).9

What FMC fails to mention is that the decision

below expressly made the finding that it seeks. The

court found that FMC’s 22 million tons of toxic waste

pose an active threat to tribal health and welfare,

water resources, and cultural practices, Pet. App.

18a-23a, 34a-45a, and concluded that such threats

“constitute threats to tribal self-governance, health

and welfare,” id. at 34a (emphasis added). Because

FMC failed to challenge that finding in the petition—

instead ignoring it—FMC has forfeited the opportunity to do so. Besides, the Ninth Circuit’s finding

is well supported by the voluminous record. Pet.

App. 18a-23a, 34a-45a; supra pp. 3-5, 12-15; cf.

Plains Commerce, 554 U.S. at 334-335 (listing “commercial development” as one example of nonmember

conduct that might “threaten tribal self-rule”).

Contaminated groundwater flows into the Portneuf

9

The Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Mississippi

Band of Choctaw Indians, 746 F.3d 167 (5th Cir. 2014), is a

useful contrast. That court held that this Court’s precedents do

not “require an additional showing that one specific relationship * * * threaten[s] self-rule.” Id. at 175 (internal quotation

marks omitted). That kind of language is missing from the

decision below.

21

River—a resource essential to the Tribes’ subsistence

and cultural practices—and phosphine gas and other

accumulated waste threatens catastrophic consequences with the potential to strain tribal resources

to the breaking point. Supra pp. 3-5, 12-15. Nor are

EPA’s actions to date sufficient to fully address the

threat, as EPA’s own findings recognize. Supra pp.

14-15; IRODA 15-18.

The Ninth Circuit’s express finding that the Tribes’

jurisdiction was linked to self-governance rules out

FMC’s argument that the court below implicitly held

that tribal jurisdiction is appropriate “regardless of”

the need “to preserve tribal self-government.” Pet.

16, 19, 24. Nor is there anything to FMC’s charge

that the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly ignored the

connection between tribal jurisdiction and selfgovernance. In an opinion decided just a few months

before this one, the Ninth Circuit quoted—

verbatim—the language FMC invokes. See Knighton

v. Cedarville Rancheria of N. Paiute Indians, 922

F.3d 892, 903 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Plains Commerce, 554 U.S. at 337), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 513

(2019) (mem.).

Because the Ninth Circuit found that FMC’s conduct threatens tribal self-governance, FMC is also

wrong to claim this issue is “outcome determinative.”

Pet. 16. On the contrary, any opinion would be

advisory: If this Court granted certiorari and answered the first question in the affirmative, nothing

would change because the necessary finding is already in the opinion below.

At bottom, FMC is frustrated that the Ninth Circuit did not respond more directly to an argument it

made. Id. at 15-16 & n.3. But this Court “reviews

22

judgments, not statements in opinions.” Black v.

Cutter Labs., 351 U.S. 292, 297 (1956). FMC’s frustration is no basis for this Court to render an advisory opinion about how the Ninth Circuit should have

phrased its finding concerning tribal selfgovernment. Cf. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338,

356 (2007) (“Sometimes a judicial opinion responds

to every argument; sometimes it does not * * * .”).

B. The Decision Below Does Not Split With

Any Other Circuit.

FMC claims a split with two other circuits, the

Seventh and the Eighth. Pet. 17-18. But there is no

conflict: The claim of a split depends on the misreading of the Ninth Circuit’s decision described above.

See id. at 18-19. Because the court below found that

FMC’s conduct threatens the Tribes’ self-governance,

it did not split with any decision requiring such a

finding.

If FMC claims that the Seventh and Eighth Circuits would have disagreed with the Ninth Circuit’s

finding of the requisite connection on this record,

even a cursory review of the cited cases shows that

does not follow. First, the entire discussion of the

Montana exceptions in Kodiak Oil & Gas (USA) Inc.

v. Burr, 932 F.3d 1125 (8th Cir. 2019), is dictum,

because the court had already found tribal jurisdiction lacking for a different reason. Id. at 1136-1137.

Setting that aside, however, the facts were very

different. Kodiak involved disputed oil royalties

allegedly owed to individual members of a tribe;

there was no evidence, as there is here, that the

tribe’s health, welfare, or cultural practices were

threatened. Id. at 1130. Indeed, Kodiak recognized

that “[t]ribal court[s]” may have a role in “enforce-

23

ment of tribal laws relating to public health and

safety and environmental protection.” Id. at 1138.

And although the Eighth Circuit found that the

“complete federal control of oil and gas leases on

allotted lands” rendered tribal jurisdiction unnecessary, id., that determination rested on more extensive federal control than EPA exercised here. There,

“the entire relationship [was] mediated by the federal government,” id.—in fact, the United States had

“issued” the relevant lease, which “required approval

by the” Bureau of Indian Affairs, id. at 1130, and

collected and disbursed the disputed royalties, id. at

1136. Here, EPA has consistently recognized a role

for tribal regulation, supra pp. 6-9 & n.3, and noted

that its own measures to date are “interim” and do

not completely address the threats posed by FMC’s

waste, supra pp. 12-13.

The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Jackson v. Payday Financial, LLC, 764 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2014), is

even further afield. That case did not involve “any

activities inside the reservation,” which made it

unnecessary to consider the extent of a tribe’s inherent authority within a reservation. Id. at 782 (citing

Plains Commerce, 554 U.S. at 332). Instead, the case

concerned a suit by non-Indians against a payday

lending operation. Id. at 768. The Seventh Circuit

declined to determine whether the payday lending

operation constituted a member of the tribe. Id. at

782 n.42. Jackson is nothing like this case.

C. Plains Commerce Did Not Change the Law

And Impose a Threshold Requirement On

The Montana Exceptions.

FMC’s mischaracterization of the opinion below

and the lack of any split are reason enough for the

24

Court to deny certiorari. See Sup. Ct. R. 10. But

FMC is also wrong on the merits.

FMC derives its “threshold” requirement, Pet. 16,

from a single sentence in Plains Commerce. See 554

U.S. at 337.10 Read in context, that sentence did not

require a formal finding of a threat to tribal selfgovernment or internal relations anytime the Montana exceptions are invoked. See Dolgencorp, 746

F.3d at 175. The better reading is that the Court

was explaining the theoretical foundations of the

Montana exceptions. That reading draws support

from Montana itself, which is the origin of the language FMC invokes from Plains Commerce. Montana, 450 U.S. at 564. In Montana, the Court explained that “exercise of tribal power beyond what is

necessary to protect tribal self-government or to

control internal relations is inconsistent with the

dependent status of the tribes.” Id. And it then

articulated the two exceptions to that rule that have

governed tribal jurisdiction for the last forty years.

See id. at 565-566. Any remaining doubt is dispelled

by Nevada v. Hicks, which confirmed “that what is

necessary to protect tribal self-government and

control internal relations can be understood by

looking at the examples of tribal power to which

Montana referred” in the two exceptions. 533 U.S.

353, 360-361 (2001). Nowhere did Plains Commerce

purport to alter this settled law.

10

Elsewhere, FMC criticizes the Ninth Circuit for looking to a

different “passing observation” in the same case. Pet. 14. FMC

offers no explanation for resting its case on this “passing

observation” in Plains Commerce, while discounting another.

25

Ultimately, however, these are questions for another day. Here, the Ninth Circuit made the finding

that FMC seeks. That disposes of the first question

presented.

II.

THE SECOND QUESTION PRESENTED

DOES NOT WARRANT CERTIORARI.

The second question presented is really two questions lumped in one: whether the Ninth Circuit erred

in applying both the first and second Montana exceptions to the highly particularized facts of this case.

Because either exception is sufficient to sustain the

judgment, the Court would need to address both, and

reverse on both, to avoid rendering an advisory

opinion. In other words, this second question presented asks this Court to engage in splitless error

correction twice-over. The Court should follow its

usual practice and decline that invitation.

A. The Court Would Have To Engage In Splitless Error Correction Twice To Avoid An

Advisory Opinion.

The lack of a split with respect to either Montana

exception exposes FMC’s request for error correction

for what it is. Petitioner does not claim a split with

respect to the first exception. See Pet. 20-23. And its

half-hearted claim (at 27) on the second is easily

dismissed. As the petition suggests, Stifel, Nicolaus

& Co. v. Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior

Chippewa Indians involved only the “financial consequences” of intangible bonds—there was no evidence of a physical threat to the tribes or their

essential natural resources. 807 F.3d 184, 209 (7th

Cir. 2015). And Belcourt Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Davis,

786 F.3d 653 (8th Cir. 2015), involved discrete

wrongdoing alleged by a handful of employees of a

26

school district, Belcourt Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Davis, 997

F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1019 (D.N.D. 2014). Neither of

those cases remotely resembles the environmental

and cultural threats posed by 22 million tons of

highly toxic waste.

Even if the Ninth Circuit’s analysis with respect

to one exception warranted review, it would make

little sense to do so in this case. It only takes one

Montana exception to sustain jurisdiction. Thus,

unless this Court addresses both exceptions and

reverses as to each, any opinion on a single exception

would be purely advisory. See Pet. 23 (agreeing that

only one exception is necessary). Constitutional and

prudential considerations counsel against that

course. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523

U.S. 83, 101 (1998) (noting “an advisory opinion” has

been “disapproved by this Court from the beginning”); United Pub. Workers of Am. (C.I.O.) v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89 (1947) (“federal courts * * * do not

render advisory opinions”). This is not gamesmanship on the part of the Tribes or the Ninth Circuit—

that both exceptions apply merely reflects that this is

not a close case.

B. The Ninth Circuit Did Not Err With Respect to Either Exception, And This Case Is

A Poor Vehicle For Addressing Both.

On top of everything else, the Ninth Circuit did

not err with respect to the Montana exceptions. And

the idiosyncratic facts of this case would hamper this

Court’s review of either.

1. The first exception authorizes tribes to “regulate * * * the activities of nonmembers who enter

consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases,

27

or other arrangements.” Montana, 450 U.S. at 565.

The agreement may be “express[ ]” or evident from

the nonmember’s “actions.” Plains Commerce, 554

U.S. at 337.

In 1998, FMC entered into an express, commercial agreement to pay $1.5 million annually to the

Tribes as long as FMC’s waste remained within the

Reservation. Pet. App. 30a. In the course of negotiations, FMC expressly agreed to tribal jurisdiction in

connection with that permitting fee. Id. at 6a-7a. As

both courts below found, that agreement was consensual. Id. at 31a-32a, 78a-79a. Although EPA’s

actions gave the Tribes a bargaining advantage, see

id., bargaining power need not be equal for an

agreement to be valid and consensual. On the contrary, commercial contracts between parties with

unequal power are enforced every day. See, e.g.,

Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S.

20, 32-33 (1991) (agreements to arbitrate valid

despite frequently “unequal bargaining power”

between parties).

FMC protests that this case does not resemble the

example cases listed by this Court after it articulated

the first exception in Montana. That is wrong:

Morris v. Hitchcock “uph[e]ld[ ] tribal taxes on nonmembers grazing cattle on Indian-owned fee land

within tribal territory,” and Buster v. Wright involved “a permit tax on nonmembers for the privilege

of doing business within the reservation.” Plains

Commerce, 554 U.S. at 332-333 (describing Morris,

194 U.S. 384, 393 (1904), and Buster, 135 F. 947, 950

(8th Cir. 1905)). This regulation is in the same vein:

FMC conducted business within the Reservation, and

the resulting waste has impacted Indian land.

28

Indeed, the permit fee here is much more limited

than the regulations in Morris and Buster. It does

not apply for merely “doing business” and addresses

impacts far more significant than grazing cattle.11

FMC also complains that the agreement cannot

be terminated, but that is an incomplete description:

The agreement cannot be unilaterally terminated.

That is generally true of contractual arrangements.12

The critical question is whether the nonmember

could avoid tribal regulation by adjusting its conduct

ex ante, not whether it can unilaterally withdraw

after the fact. This is not, as FMC fears (at 21), the

“Hotel California”: It is an ordinary hotel, at which

you must pay the rate you agreed to for the stay you

booked. Here, FMC agreed to continue payments

“beginning on June 1, 1999, and for every year

thereafter.” C.A. E.R. 1046; see id. at 1049, 1053;

11

Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 653 n.4 (2001),

reaffirmed that Buster provides “guidance * * * as to the type of

consensual relationship contemplated by the first exception,”

even as it questioned a different aspect of Buster.

12

FMC claims that Idaho law permits a party to unilaterally

terminate a contract that “does not specify its duration.” Pet.

22 n.6. Not so: The case FMC cites discusses Oregon law, and

refers only to contracts that do not specify a minimum duration.

See Zidell Expls., Inc. v. Conval Int’l Ltd., 719 F.2d 1465, 147374 (9th Cir. 1983). Idaho law provides that a contract of

unspecified duration is “valid for a reasonable time” and may

not be terminated unilaterally if “otherwise agreed.” Idaho

Code § 28-2-309(2). Here, the Tribes sought clarification that

FMC would not unilaterally discontinue payments “in the next

several years,” and FMC agreed. C.A. E.R. 1049, 1053. In any

event, this Court has never suggested that the “agreement”

necessary to support tribal jurisdiction is subject to the formal

requirements of state contract law.

29

Pet. App. 86a-87a.

Nor did the Ninth Circuit endorse an “in for a

penny, in for a pound” regime. Pet. 22 (alteration

and internal quotation marks omitted). By the

express terms of the agreement, FMC was “in for” a

$1.5 million annual fee. The tribal court did not rely

on the agreement to find jurisdiction over an unrelated “area,” as the Court contemplated when it

coined that phrase. Atkinson, 532 U.S. at 656.

Although FMC suggests (at 22) the Ninth Circuit

was wrong to consider whether it should have “reasonably anticipated” tribal jurisdiction, that consideration was not dispositive. The “express[ ]” agreement with the Tribes was sufficient to support the

judgment, regardless of the course of dealing. Pet.

App. 30a. In any event, reasonable expectations are

an appropriate consideration: As FMC recognizes (at

14), this Court said so in Plains Commerce. 554 U.S.

at 338.

Finally, this is a poor vehicle to take up the first

Montana exception given the federal government’s

involvement in this case. As FMC admits, the RCRA

Consent Decree is “a reasonable settlement reached

at arm’s length between the [federal] government

and FMC.” FMC C.A. Opening Br. 10 (quoting

United States v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 229 F.3d

1161, 2000 WL 915398, at *1 (9th Cir. 2000)). That

Decree contemplated FMC obtaining applicable

tribal permits, which FMC did after consenting to

tribal jurisdiction. Supra pp. 6-8. These unusual

facts counsel against certiorari.

2. The second Montana exception applies when

“the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within [a]

reservation * * * threatens or has some direct effect

30

on the political integrity, the economic security, or

the health or welfare of the tribe.” 450 U.S. at 566.

“The conduct must * * * ‘imperil the subsistence’ of

the tribal community,” Plains Commerce, 554 U.S. at

341 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 566), or “be

necessary to avert catastrophic consequences,” id.

(quoting F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law

§ 4.02[3][c], at 232, n.220 (2005 ed.)).

The decision below found such a threat based on

the factual findings of the Tribal Court of Appeals

and EPA, expert testimony, and the record as a

whole. Pet. App. 36a. Every judge to have examined

this record agrees. Id. at 36a, 80a-83a, 104a-109a.

The threat is not “speculative.” There is ongoing

damage to the Portneuf River and the Fort Hall

Bottoms, which are necessary for “subsistence fishing” and cultural and religious practices. Supra p. 3;

IRODA 4. And, although that is significant enough,

there is also a very real possibility of sudden and

unpredictable calamity as a result of so much toxic

waste, supra pp. 16-18, which includes “lethal

amounts of phosphine gas that accumulate beneath

the pond covers,” Pet. App. 43a. Monitoring is key to

averting such a catastrophe, but it is “‘completely

inadequate’” at the FMC site, id. (quoting expert

testimony), and there is no early warning system in

place, id. The Tribes are entitled to take reasonable

steps to prepare before disaster strikes. Id. at 107a;

see also Plains Commerce, 554 U.S. at 341.

EPA’s actions have not eliminated the threat.

FMC misstated EPA’s own conclusions on that front

to the Court below, Pet. App. 19a-20a, and it continues to obscure the facts before this Court. As the

IRODA makes clear, existing monitoring systems are

31

inadequate.13 Even if the IRODA measures are fully

implemented, additional risks and uncertainty

remain. Supra pp. 12-15; IRODA 18-19, 73.14

Contrary to FMC’s representation (at 26), the

Ninth Circuit did require the Tribes to show a nexus

between the threat and the exercise of jurisdiction,

and found a nexus on the facts of this case. Pet. App.

46a-48a. The money was earmarked for the Tribes’

hazardous waste management program. Supra p. 7.

And there is record evidence that the Tribes spent at

least this much monitoring and addressing the

threat. Pet. App. 47a; see also C.A. S.E.R. 8-14. The

court below also properly looked to the cost of commercial waste disposal as a benchmark: Although

the Tribes are not taking the waste for disposal, they

are hosting the waste on the Reservation indefinitely, meaning they are subject to some of the same

effects as a storage facility. Moreover, the Tribes are

not charging a similar fee; they are charging much

13

To the extent FMC relies on any measures taken since 2014,

see Pet. 8, 24-25, it has not explained any legal basis for why

those developments are relevant to the 2014 tribal judgment.

14

The United States’ brief in the RCRA case, which FMC cites

(at 6 n.1) for the proposition that EPA’s action “fully” addressed

the threat, was penned in 2000, long before the “additional

investigations” discussed in the IRODA and expert testimony

revealed the shortcomings of EPA’s actions in the late 1990s.

The same brief recognized that “the Tribes need not rely

exclusively on the United States,” suggesting regulation would

be appropriate under the second Montana exception. U.S. Br.

at 40, United States v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, No. 99-35821

(9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2000), 2000 WL 33996529 (internal quotation

marks omitted).

32

less. Pet. App. 47a.

Because the threat posed by FMC’s waste is so

extreme, this case would also be a poor vehicle for

addressing the second Montana exception. See id. at

5a (“FMC’s plant was the largest elemental phosphorous plant in the world.”); IRODA 83 (“phosphorous

contamination” at FMC site is “unprecedented anywhere in the United States”). FMC’s continued

resistance to the factual findings below exacerbates

the problem. Although it claims those disputes are

“irrelevant to the legal issues,” Pet. 24 n.7, that is

wrong: The legal question is whether the threat to

the Tribes suffices for jurisdiction. See Plains Commerce, 554 U.S. at 341. That is intimately related to

the lower courts’ assessments of danger that FMC

tries to sweep under the rug. Granting certiorari in

this case would entail collateral fact-finding and

relitigating whether FMC or the courts below correctly report the facts. That is not this Court’s role.

III. PETITIONER’S POLICY CONCERNS DO

NOT WARRANT CERTIORARI.

A. The Petition Invokes Multiple Irrelevant

Issues And Exaggerates The Consequences

Of The Decision Below.

1. Perhaps because the petition falls short of the

traditional Rule 10 criteria, FMC raises a host of

other issues. None would be properly before the

Court if it granted certiorari.

First, FMC dedicates extensive space to its due

process arguments, even though it has not presented

those issues to this Court. That is for good reason:

In the main, the supposedly “stunning” comments of

Judges Gabourie and Pearson are routine. The

33

Judges discussed the importance of building a record, reading case law, and researching history.

Supra p. 11. And although they offered a generalized critique of this Court’s precedent, the Ninth

Circuit correctly observed that there is a “long tradition” of state and federal judges doing the same. Pet.

App. 51a (internal quotation marks omitted). Judges

also often write separately to express concern about

a particular precedent. That does not require recusal

whenever a case relating to that precedent arises.

Second, FMC alludes to the question of “adjudicatory jurisdiction” that divided the Court in Dollar

General Corp. v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016) (mem.) (per curiam). But

FMC’s petition does not posit any delta between

regulatory and adjudicatory jurisdiction, meaning

that issue is not presented here.

Third, FMC cites several Ninth Circuit cases involving regulatory jurisdiction on tribally-owned

land. See Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, Inc.

v. LaRance, 642 F.3d 802, 810 (9th Cir. 2011) (per

curiam); Window Rock Unified Sch. Dist. v. Reeves,

861 F.3d 894, 898 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S.

Ct. 648 (2018) (mem.). But the court’s approach to

jurisdiction on tribal land is not implicated in this

petition concerning fee land.

Fourth, FMC raises concerns about the requirement to exhaust tribal remedies. Pet. 31. That

issue, too, is beyond the scope of the questions presented, since FMC exhausted its tribal remedies

here, as its binding representations to the Ninth

Circuit obliged it to. Supra p. 9.

2. FMC also claims that the decision below will

have dire consequences. Those fears derive from

34

FMC’s refusal to acknowledge that the Montana

analysis is fact-driven, and the reach of the decision

below is limited by its extraordinary facts. For

example, FMC claims that the decision below ushers

in a regime of “unfettered regulatory and adjudicatory jurisdiction,” even if an “agreement * * * seeks to

limit tribal jurisdiction.” Pet. 28. But the judgment

was limited to the terms of FMC’s agreement with

the Tribes, which involved no jurisdictional limitation. Likewise, the decision below does not foreshadow jurisdiction for any activity fully contained on fee

land. The court’s holding rested in large measure on

the threat to the surrounding tribal land and the

Indians residing there. Supra pp. 16-17; cf. Evans v.

Shoshone-Bannock Land Use Policy Comm’n, 736

F.3d 1298, 1301, 1307 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that

there was not even plausible tribal jurisdiction over

construction of “a single-family residence” on fee

land). As for FMC’s own situation, it has other

remedies—including renegotiating its business deal

with the Tribes, or taking its concerns to Congress.

B. Petitioner’s Generalized Objections To The

Ninth Circuit And Tribal Courts Are Unfounded.

As FMC’s futile efforts to create a split prove, the

Ninth Circuit’s approach to Montana is not aberrant.

See, e.g., Big Horn Cty. Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Adams,

219 F.3d 944, 951 (9th Cir. 2000) (giving the second

exception a “narrow construction” for fear it “would

effectively swallow Montana’s main rule”). The

leading quotation that FMC relies on to paint a

contrary picture, from Judge Christen, concerns a

different legal context: tribal jurisdiction over tribal

land. Window Rock, 861 F.3d at 916 (Christen, J.,

35

dissenting). It has no relevance to this case. More

generally, this Court does not sit to review the general “atmosphere in which an opinion is written.”

Black, 351 U.S. at 298.

Nor is there any basis for FMC’s contention that

tribal courts are systematically biased against nonmembers. The Ninth Circuit rejected that argument,

citing empirical evidence and its “own experience.”

Pet. App. 54a-55a. More to the point, if there is any

truth to FMC’s concerns, there will be a more suitable vehicle to address the questions presented here.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM F. BACON

SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES

P.O. Box 306

Fort Hall, Idaho 83203

NEAL KUMAR KATYAL

Counsel of Record

REEDY C. SWANSON

HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP

555 Thirteenth Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20004

(202) 637-5600

neal.katyal@hoganlovells.com

DOUGLAS B.L. ENDRESON

FRANK S. HOLLEMAN, IV

SONOSKY, CHAMBERS, SACHSE,

ENDRESON & PERRY, LLP

1425 K Street, N.W., Suite 600 PAUL C. ECHO HAWK

ECHO HAWK LAW OFFICE

Washington, D.C. 20005

P.O. Box 4166

Pocatello, Idaho 83205

Counsel for Respondent

May 2020

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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