Amicus Curiae Brief — American Bankers Association, Petitioner v. National Credit Union Administration

No. 19-1115

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

____________________

AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION,

Petitioner,

v.

NATIONAL CREDIT UNION ADMINISTRATION,

Respondent.

____________________

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to

the United States Court of Appeals

for the District of Columbia Circuit

____________________

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF PACIFIC LEGAL

FOUNDATION IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

____________________

STEVEN M. SIMPSON

Pacific Legal Foundation

3100 Clarendon Blvd.,

Suite 610

Arlington, VA 22201

GLENN E. ROPER

Counsel of Record

Pacific Legal Foundation

1745 Shea Ctr. Dr., Suite 400

Highlands Ranch, CO 80129

Telephone: (916) 419-7111

geroper@pacificlegal.org

Counsel for Amicus Curiae Pacific Legal Foundation

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................... ii

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ............................ 1

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

OF ARGUMENT ......................................................... 2

ARGUMENT ............................................................... 4

I.

This Case Presents a Critically Important

Issue that the Court Should Resolve Now. ..... 4

A. Administrative law standards set by the

D.C. Circuit warrant careful review. ............ 4

B. Congress frequently grants agencies

definitional authority. ................................... 7

C. The scope and viability of Chevron is

an important issue. ....................................... 8

II. The D.C. Circuit’s Approach Underscores the

Problems with the Chevron Doctrine. ........... 11

CONCLUSION.......................................................... 14

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Baldwin v. United States,

140 S. Ct. 690 (2020) ............................................... 9

BNSF Ry. Co. v. Loos,

139 S. Ct. 893 (2019) ............................................. 10

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def.

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) .................passim

City of Arlington, Tex. v. FCC,

569 U.S. 290 (2013) ......................................... 11–12

Coventry Health Care of Mo., Inc. v. Nevils,

137 S. Ct. 1190 (2017) ............................................. 9

Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee,

136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016) ............................................. 8

Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr.,

568 U.S. 597 (2013) ................................................. 1

Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro,

136 S. Ct. 2117 (2016) ............................................. 9

Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc.,

556 U.S. 208 (2009) ............................................... 14

Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis,

138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018) ............................................. 9

Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,

Firearms & Explosives,

920 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2019),

cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 789 (2020) .......................... 6

Gundy v. United States,

139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019) ............................................. 1

iii

Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch,

834 F.3d 1142 (10th Cir. 2016) ............................. 13

Hamilton v. Lanning,

560 U.S. 505 (2010) ............................................... 14

King v. Burwell,

135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) ............................................. 9

Kisor v. Wilkie,

139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019) ................................... 1, 8–10

La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC,

476 U.S. 355 (1986) ............................................... 12

Lucia v. SEC,

138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018) ............................................. 1

Massachusetts v. EPA,

415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005),

rev’d, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) ....................................... 6

MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co.,

512 U.S. 218 (1994) ............................................... 12

Mortg. Bankers Ass’n v. Harris,

720 F.3d 966 (D.C. Cir. 2013), rev’d sub nom.

Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n,

575 U.S. 92 (2015) ................................................... 6

Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch,

685 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ................................. 6

Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation v.

LTV Corporation,

496 U.S. 633 (1990) ................................................. 3

Pereira v. Sessions,

138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018) ................................. 9–10, 13

iv

Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n,

575 U.S. 92 (2015) ................................................. 13

Rapanos v. United States,

547 U.S. 715 (2006) ................................................. 1

Sackett v. EPA, 566 U.S. 120 (2012) .......................... 1

SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu,

138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018) ............................................. 9

Smiley v. Citibank (S. Dakota), N.A.,

517 U.S. 735 (1996) ............................................... 11

Smith v. Berryhill,

139 S. Ct. 1765 (2019) ......................................... 8–9

U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., Inc.,

136 S. Ct. 1807 (2016) ............................................. 1

Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA,

573 U.S. 302 (2014) ............................................... 11

White Stallion Energy Ctr., LLC v. EPA,

748 F.3d 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2014),

rev’d sub nom. Michigan v. EPA,

135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015) ................................. 6, 12–13

Statutes

7 U.S.C. § 2.................................................................. 5

7 U.S.C. § 1307 ............................................................ 7

12 U.S.C. § 84(d)(1) ..................................................... 7

12 U.S.C. § 1817(a)(7) ................................................. 7

12 U.S.C. § 1831i(f) ..................................................... 7

15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(1)(B) .............................................. 7

15 U.S.C. § 1681a(q)(3) ............................................... 7

v

15 U.S.C. § 2604(h)(3) ............................................. 7–8

15 U.S.C. § 2618 .......................................................... 5

16 U.S.C. § 1536 .......................................................... 5

18 U.S.C. § 844(g)(2) ................................................... 8

21 U.S.C. § 457 ............................................................ 5

26 U.S.C. § 415(j) ........................................................ 8

30 U.S.C. § 1276 .......................................................... 5

33 U.S.C. § 1365 .......................................................... 5

42 U.S.C. § 300j-7 ....................................................... 5

42 U.S.C. § 6292(b)(2)(C) ............................................ 7

42 U.S.C. § 6976(a) ..................................................... 5

42 U.S.C. § 7411 .......................................................... 5

42 U.S.C. § 7412 .......................................................... 5

42 U.S.C. § 7413 .......................................................... 5

42 U.S.C. § 7419 .......................................................... 5

42 U.S.C. § 7420 .......................................................... 5

42 U.S.C. § 7521 .......................................................... 5

42 U.S.C. § 7545 .......................................................... 5

42 U.S.C. § 7571 .......................................................... 5

42 U.S.C. § 7607 .......................................................... 5

42 U.S.C. § 9613 .......................................................... 5

47 U.S.C. § 522(4) ....................................................... 7

Rule

Sup. Ct. R. 37.2(a) ....................................................... 1

vi

Other Authorities

Bamzai, Aditya,

The Origins of Judicial Deference

to Executive Interpretation,

126 Yale L.J. 908 (2017)........................................ 10

Bednar, Nicholas R. & Hickman, Kristin E.,

Chevron’s Inevitability,

85 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1392 (2017) ....................... 10

Beerman, Jack M., End the Failed Chevron

Experiment Now: How Chevron Has Failed

and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled,

42 Conn. L. Rev. 779 (2010) .................................. 10

Fraser, Eric M., et al.,

The Jurisdiction of the D.C. Circuit,

23 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 131 (2013) ............. 5–6

Hamburger, Philip, Chevron Bias,

84 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1187 (2016) ....................... 10

Lawson, Gary & Kam, Stephen,

Making Law Out of Nothing At All:

The Origins of the Chevron Doctrine,

65 Admin. L. Rev. 1 (2013).................................... 10

Morrison, Alan B.,

Chevron Deference: Mend It, Don’t End It,

32 J.L. & Pol. 293 (2017) ....................................... 10

vii

Murphy, Richard W.,

Abandon Chevron and Modernize

Stare Decisis for the Administrative State,

69 Ala. L. Rev. 1 (2017) ......................................... 10

Nou, Jennifer & Stiglitz, Edward H.,

Regulatory Bundling,

128 Yale L.J. 1174 (2019)........................................ 6

Roberts, Jr., John G., Lecture, What Makes

the D.C. Circuit Different? A Historical View,

92 Va. L. Rev. 375 (2006) .................................... 4–6

Scalia, Antonin & Garner, Bryan A.,

Reading Law: The Interpretation

of Legal Texts (2012) ............................................. 12

Siegel, Jonathan R.,

The Constitutional Case for Chevron Deference,

71 Vand. L. Rev. 937 (2018) .................................. 10

Stephenson, Matthew C. & Vermeule, Adrian,

Chevron Has Only One Step,

95 Va. L. Rev. 597 (2009) ........................................ 2

Sunstein, Cass R., Beyond Marbury:

The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is,

115 Yale L.J. 2580 (2006)...................................... 10

Sunstein, Cass R., Chevron as Law,

107 Geo. L.J. 1613 (2019)...................................... 10

1

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 1

Founded in 1973, Pacific Legal Foundation (PLF)

is a nonprofit legal foundation established for the

purpose of litigating matters affecting the public

interest. PLF provides a voice in the courts for

Americans who believe in limited constitutional

government, private property rights, and individual

freedom. It is the most experienced public-interest

legal organization defending the constitutional

principle of separation of powers in the arena of

administrative law. In pursuing its mission, PLF’s

attorneys have frequently represented litigants or

participated as amicus in cases before this Court,

including cases involving the separation of powers.

See, e.g., Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019); Gundy

v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019); Lucia v. SEC,

138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018); U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v.

Hawkes Co., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1807 (2016); Decker v. Nw.

Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597 (2013); Sackett v. EPA,

566 U.S. 120 (2012); Rapanos v. United States, 547

U.S. 715 (2006).

PLF’s adherence to constitutional principle and

broad litigation experience offer the Court an

important perspective that will assist in reviewing

this case. The decision below raises questions related

to judicial review of administrative agency decisions,

1

Pursuant to this Court’s Rule 37.2(a), all parties have

consented to the filing of this brief, and counsel of record for all

parties received timely notice of the intention to file the brief.

Pursuant to Rule 37.6, Amicus Curiae affirms that no counsel for

any party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no counsel

or party made a monetary contribution intended to fund the

preparation or submission of this brief. No person other than

Amicus Curiae, its members, or its counsel made a monetary

contribution to the brief’s preparation or submission.

2

and PLF supports Petitioner’s request for a writ of

certiorari.

INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Petition asks this Court to review the D.C.

Circuit’s interpretation and application of Chevron,

U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.

837 (1984), a case whose continuing viability has been

called into question by members of both this Court and

the legal academy. Chevron generally requires courts

to consider two “steps” when evaluating agencies’

statutory interpretations: (1) whether Congress has

“directly addressed the precise question at issue,” and

(2) if not, “whether the agency’s answer is based on a

permissible construction of the statute.” Id. at 843. 2

This case involves the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation of

Chevron step two.

Specifically, the D.C. Circuit below held that

under Chevron step two, when Congress has directed

an agency to define a statutory term, the agency must

be granted an unusually high degree of deference that

accords the agency “vast discretion” in formulating a

definition. Pet. App. 19a. Under the D.C. Circuit’s

approach, an agency’s unreasonable interpretation of

the statutory text could become a reasonable

interpretation, simply because Congress asked the

agency to promulgate a rule defining the term. That

goes well beyond the usual view of Chevron’s scope.

2 But see Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron

Has Only One Step, 95 Va. L. Rev. 597, 599 (2009) (arguing that

Chevron asks a “single question”; namely, “whether the agency’s

construction is permissible as a matter of statutory

interpretation”).

3

But the D.C. Circuit didn’t stop at pressing a

thumb on the deference scale. It further concluded

that when Congress has directed an agency to define

terms, that “suggests that Congress did not intend the

[terms] to be applied in [their] plain meaning sense.”

Pet. App. 17a (quotation omitted). In other words, in

the D.C. Circuit’s view, it is not only acceptable, but

expected that the agency’s definition will depart from

the plain meaning of the text enacted by Congress.

Given the importance of the D.C. Circuit in

establishing administrative law standards, its

decision to adopt such an expansive standard merits

this Court’s review. Congress has granted the D.C.

Circuit exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction over many

challenges to agency rulemaking, including

rulemaking based on the authority to define statutory

terms. See infra Part. I.A. And it is not at all unusual

for Congress to authorize agencies to promulgate such

definitions. See infra Part I.B. This Court should

therefore grant certiorari to determine whether the

grant of definitional authority carries with it

enhanced deference under Chevron step two.

On the merits, the Court should hold that the D.C.

Circuit’s overly deferential approach stretches

Chevron too far. It turns cautious respect for “practical

agency expertise,” Pension Benefit Guaranty

Corporation v. LTV Corporation, 496 U.S. 633, 651

(1990), into uncritical acceptance that hollows out

judicial oversight. And if the Court concludes that the

D.C. Circuit has accurately interpreted Chevron’s

scope, then it should take this opportunity to revisit

that case. Allowing agencies to mold and revise

definitions to suit their policy preferences creates

extraordinary risk for regulated parties, including

4

businesses and ordinary citizens who are no longer

able to rely on the words that Congress enacted into

law.

ARGUMENT

The D.C. Circuit’s expansion of Chevron deference

establishes an important administrative law

precedent that will have wide ramifications if not

checked. It sets up a legal standard that goes well

beyond this Court’s precedents and highlights flaws in

Chevron itself. It therefore merits review by this

Court.

I.

This Case Presents a Critically Important

Issue that the Court Should Resolve Now.

The D.C. Circuit’s expanded version of Chevron

deference raises important questions that only this

Court can resolve. There is no reason to await further

percolation among the lower courts, especially given

the importance of the D.C. Circuit in setting

administrative law standards. And because Congress

often asks agencies to define statutory terms, the D.C.

Circuit’s standard will have broad repercussions.

Furthermore, the decision below implicates the

question of Chevron’s continuing viability, a question

that is both important and timely, as several members

of this Court have recently reaffirmed.

A. Administrative law standards set by the

D.C. Circuit warrant careful review.

The D.C. Circuit plays an outsized role in shaping

the contours of administrative law. This is due in no

small part to Congress’s frequent grant of exclusive or

concurrent review of agency decisions to that court, in

a wide variety of statutes. See John G. Roberts, Jr.,

Lecture, What Makes the D.C. Circuit Different? A

5

Historical View, 92 Va. L. Rev. 375, 376 (2006)

(“Whatever combination of letters you can put

together [in an agency acronym], it is likely that

jurisdiction to review that agency’s decision is vested

in the D.C. Circuit.”); see also, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2

(granting the D.C. Circuit appellate jurisdiction over

certain decisions made by the Commodities Futures

Trading Commission); 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (granting

concurrent jurisdiction to review Endangered Species

Act cases); 21 U.S.C. § 457 (granting appellate

jurisdiction over decisions made by the Food & Drug

Administration); 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (granting

concurrent jurisdiction over Clean Water Act cases);

42 U.S.C. §§ 7411, 7412, 7413, 7419, 7420, 7521, 7545,

7571, 7607 (granting exclusive jurisdiction to hear

certain Clean Air Act petitions); Eric M. Fraser, et al.,

The Jurisdiction of the D.C. Circuit, 23 Cornell J.L. &

Pub. Pol’y 131, 154–55 (2013) (listing more than 100

statutory provisions specifically relating to D.C.

Circuit jurisdiction). 3 Such agency decisions, and the

D.C. Circuit’s review of them, affect the lives of

millions of Americans. And given the D.C. Circuit’s

dominant role in reviewing administrative agency

decisions, “there is a far more extensive body of

3 See also, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2618 (granting concurrent jurisdiction

over rules relating to control of toxic substances); 30 U.S.C.

§ 1276 (granting exclusive jurisdiction over Surface Mining

Control and Reclamation Act standards); 42 U.S.C. § 300j-7

(establishing the D.C. Circuit as the sole venue for appeal of

national primary drinking water regulations); 42 U.S.C.

§ 6976(a) (granting exclusive jurisdiction to review Resource

Conservation and Recovery Act regulations); 42 U.S.C. § 9613

(granting exclusive jurisdiction over regulations promulgated

under

the

Comprehensive

Environmental

Response,

Compensation, and Liability Act).

6

administrative law developed there than in other

circuits.” Roberts, supra, at 376.

In fact, the D.C. Circuit consistently hears about

a third of all administrative reviews nationwide

(excluding Social Security and immigration cases)—

far more than any other circuit. See Fraser, supra, at

142 (“[T]he share of total administrative reviews in

the country conducted by the D.C. Circuit has been

growing steadily over time, from 28% of the national

total in 1986 to 36% in 2010.”). Its docket includes

many of the most challenging and significant

administrative law cases. See, e.g., Nat. Res. Def.

Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1982),

rev’d sub nom Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def.

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 4 Put simply, absent

examination by this Court, “the D.C. Circuit is in all

likelihood the final resting place for administrative

controversies.” Jennifer Nou & Edward H. Stiglitz,

Regulatory Bundling, 128 Yale L.J. 1174, 1214 (2019).

4 See also, e.g., Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms &

Explosives, 920 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (applying Chevron

deference to uphold agency rule regarding bump stocks), cert.

denied, 140 S. Ct. 789 (2020); White Stallion Energy Ctr., LLC v.

EPA, 748 F.3d 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2014), rev’d sub nom. Michigan v.

EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015) (reversing the D.C. Circuit’s use of

Chevron to approve an agency’s disregard of compliance costs

when regulating power plants); Mortg. Bankers Ass’n v. Harris,

720 F.3d 966 (D.C. Cir. 2013), rev’d sub nom. Perez v. Mortg.

Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92 (2015) (reversing a D.C. Circuit rule

regarding use of notice-and-comment procedures under the

APA); Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev’d,

549 U.S. 497 (2007) (reversing the D.C. Circuit’s decision on

whether the EPA can decline to regulate the emissions of

greenhouse gases from automobiles).

7

Given the D.C. Circuit’s well-recognized role in

controlling the direction and application of

administrative law principles, a decision from the

D.C. Circuit governing the scope and applicability of

Chevron deserves close review.

B. Congress frequently grants agencies

definitional authority.

Judicial review of agency definitions—including

the determination of whether and how Chevron

applies—is particularly important because numerous

statutes authorize or direct administrative agencies to

define statutory terms. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 1307 (“The

Secretary [of Agriculture] shall issue regulations

defining the term ‘person’ . . . .”); 15 U.S.C.

§ 57a(a)(1)(B) (authorizing the Federal Trade

Commission to define “acts or practices which are

unfair or deceptive”); 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(q)(3)

(authorizing the Consumer Financial Protection

Bureau to define the term “identity theft”); 42 U.S.C.

§ 6292(b)(2)(C) (directing the Secretary of Energy to

define the term “household”); 47 U.S.C. § 522(4)

(directing the Federal Communications Commission

to define the term “television channel”). 5

5 See also, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 84(d)(1) (authorizing the Office of the

Comptroller of the Currency to prescribe “regulations to define

or further define terms” governing national banks’ lending

limits); 12 U.S.C. § 1817(a)(7) (authorizing the Federal Deposit

Insurance Corporation to “by regulation define the terms ‘cash

items’ and ‘process of collection’”); 12 U.S.C. § 1831i(f)

(authorizing “[e]ach appropriate Federal banking agency” to

“prescribe by regulation a definition for the terms ‘troubled

condition’ and ‘senior executive officer’”); 15 U.S.C. § 2604(h)(3)

(authorizing the Environmental Protection Agency to define the

8

If challenged in the D.C. Circuit, definitions

promulgated under these and other similar statutes

would be subject to a highly deferential Chevron step

two standard. Rather than a standard evaluation of

the definition’s reasonableness, tied to the plain

meaning of the statutory text, a reviewing court would

grant the agency “vast discretion” to depart from the

plain meaning. Given the numerous statutes

potentially subject to this standard, the validity of the

D.C. Circuit’s rule is an important question worthy of

this Court’s review.

C. The scope and viability of Chevron is an

important issue.

In addition to the question of whether the D.C.

Circuit properly interpreted and applied Chevron, this

case implicates Chevron’s continuing viability. See

Pet. 19 (“To the extent that Chevron can be

understood to authorize agency interpretations that

go beyond the reasonable range of ambiguity of a

statutory

term,

that

decision

should

be

reconsidered.”). That provides yet another reason for

this Court to review the decision below.

In recent years, this Court has at times cited

Chevron deference with apparent approval. See, e.g.,

Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415; Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v.

Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016). But in other cases,

it has avoided Chevron deference under various

justifications. See, e.g., Smith v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct.

term “small quantities” with regard to toxic chemical

substances); 18 U.S.C. § 844(g)(2) (authorizing the Federal

Aviation Administration to define the term “ammunition”); 26

U.S.C. § 415(j) (directing the Secretary of Labor to define the

term “year” with respect to pension plans).

9

1765, 1778 (2019) (declining to grant deference “for an

interpretation that the Government’s briefing

rejects”); Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2113

(2018) (declining Chevron deference because statute

was unambiguous); Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S.

Ct. 1612, 1629 (2018) (declining to apply Chevron

deference because one of its “essential premises is

simply missing”); Coventry Health Care of Mo., Inc. v.

Nevils, 137 S. Ct. 1190, 1198 n.3 (2017) (“Because the

statute alone resolves this dispute, we need not

consider whether Chevron deference attaches . . . .”);

Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117,

2126 (2016) (declining to grant Chevron deference

because the regulation lacked a “reasoned

explanation”); King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488–

89 (2015) (declining to grant Chevron deference to IRS

interpretation of Affordable Care Act because the

Act’s tax credits present “a question of deep economic

and political significance that is central to this

statutory scheme”); see also Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2121

(Alito, J., dissenting) (“I can only conclude that the

Court, for whatever reason, is simply ignoring

Chevron.”). This ambivalence creates substantial

uncertainty about Chevron’s applicability, if not its

ongoing vitality. See also SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138

S. Ct. 1348, 1358 (2018) (“[W]hether Chevron should

remain is a question we may leave for another day.”).

Moreover, multiple members of the Court have

recently expressed concern over the ongoing viability

and foundations of Chevron. See, e.g., Baldwin v.

United States, 140 S. Ct. 690, 691 (2020) (Thomas, J.,

dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (“Chevron is

in serious tension with the Constitution, the APA, and

over 100 years of judicial decisions.”); Kisor, 139 S. Ct.

at 2446 n.114 (Gorsuch, J., joined by Justices Thomas

10

& Kavanaugh, concurring in the judgment) (asserting

that “there are serious questions” about whether

Chevron “comports with the APA and the

Constitution”); BNSF Ry. Co. v. Loos, 139 S. Ct. 893,

908 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., joined by Justice Thomas,

dissenting) (noting “the mounting criticism of Chevron

deference”); Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2120 (Kennedy, J.,

concurring) (expressing “concern” over how Chevron

“has come to be understood and applied”); id. at 2129

(Alito, J., dissenting) (noting that “[i]n recent years,

several Members of this Court have questioned

Chevron’s foundations”). Those concerns reflect the

importance of the issues presented in this case. 6

In sum, the decision below raises important

questions regarding the scope and limits of Chevron—

one of the foundational cases in modern American

6 Chevron has also been a subject of growing and robust scholarly

interest and debate, illustrating the importance of the issues

presented by the Petition. Compare Aditya Bamzai, The Origins

of Judicial Deference to Executive Interpretation, 126 Yale L.J.

908 (2017); Richard W. Murphy, Abandon Chevron and

Modernize Stare Decisis for the Administrative State, 69 Ala. L.

Rev. 1 (2017); Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 Geo. Wash.

L. Rev. 1187 (2016); Gary Lawson & Stephen Kam, Making Law

Out of Nothing At All: The Origins of the Chevron Doctrine, 65

Admin. L. Rev. 1 (2013); and Jack M. Beerman, End the Failed

Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has Failed and Why It

Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 Conn. L. Rev. 779 (2010), with

Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron as Law, 107 Geo. L.J. 1613 (2019);

Jonathan R. Siegel, The Constitutional Case for Chevron

Deference, 71 Vand. L. Rev. 937 (2018); Nicholas R. Bednar &

Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Inevitability, 85 Geo. Wash. L.

Rev. 1392 (2017); Alan B. Morrison, Chevron Deference: Mend It,

Don’t End It, 32 J.L. & Pol. 293 (2017); and Cass R. Sunstein,

Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is,

115 Yale L.J. 2580, 2590 (2006).

11

administrative law. These are questions of undeniable

importance that merit this Court’s review.

II. The D.C. Circuit’s Approach Underscores

the Problems with the Chevron Doctrine.

The D.C. Circuit’s approach to Chevron in this

case illustrates its infirmities. There is no support in

this Court’s precedents for the notion that an express

delegation of definitional authority grants an agency

“vast discretion” to define the relevant terms counter

to their plain meaning, as the D.C. Circuit held below.

See Pet. App. 19a; cf. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA,

573 U.S. 302, 326 (2014) (“Agencies exercise discretion

only in the interstices created by statutory silence or

ambiguity . . . .”) (quotation omitted); Smiley v.

Citibank (S. Dakota), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740–41

(1996) (under Chevron, when Congress “left ambiguity

in a statute,” it only intended the agency to have the

“degree of discretion the ambiguity allows”).

At most, an express delegation of authority to

define terms in a statute resolves step one of Chevron.

That is, it makes explicit what Chevron held is

implicit from statutory ambiguity: Congress intended

the agency to answer a particular question about the

meaning of a statutory term. But once the step one

question is resolved, the question at step two of

Chevron remains the same: whether the agency’s

definition is “a permissible construction of the

statute.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. As this Court has

made clear, “[n]o matter how it is framed, the question

a court faces when confronted with an agency’s

interpretation of a statute it administers is always,

simply, whether the agency has stayed within the

bounds of its statutory authority.” City of Arlington,

12

Tex. v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 297 (2013) (emphasis

omitted).

This is so whether an agency is interpreting an

ambiguous statute under an implied delegation or

exercising definitional authority granted explicitly by

Congress. In either scenario, the agency possesses

only the authority that Congress has given it, for “an

agency literally has no power to act . . . unless and

until Congress confers power upon it.” La. Pub. Serv.

Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986). That

authority is necessarily tied to the language of the

statute, whether that language is ambiguous or a

term the agency is directed to define, as the agency

may “go no further than the ambiguity”—or, in this

case, the term to be defined—permits. City of

Arlington, 569 U.S. at 307; see also Michigan, 135 S.

Ct. at 2707 (stating that even under the deferential

Chevron standard, “agencies must operate within the

bounds of reasonable interpretation”);

MCI

Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218,

229 (1994) (stating that an agency interpretation

receives no Chevron deference if it “goes beyond the

meaning that the statute can bear”); Antonin Scalia &

Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of

Legal Texts 232 (2012) (“[T]here is a presumption

against” definitions that stray far from the meaning of

the word being defined because “the word being

defined is the most significant element of the

definition’s context.”).

The D.C. Circuit’s approach, however, suggests

that the agency has authority that goes beyond what

the statutory language would permit—that the

agency possesses “vast discretion” or is somehow

entitled to extra deference—when Congress confers

13

upon it the authority to define a statutory term or

provision. But that supposed standard is incoherent.

Either an agency’s interpretation is a reasonable

interpretation of the statutory language or the agency

is acting beyond the statutory language and

establishing policy.

This highlights several problems with Chevron

that members of this Court have identified. First,

deference is often a subterfuge for ignoring vast

delegations of law-making authority from Congress to

the executive branch. See, e.g., Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at

2713 (Thomas, J., concurring) (highlighting “the scope

of the potentially unconstitutional delegations we

have come to countenance in the name of Chevron

deference”); Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d

1142, 1153 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).

Second, when courts defer, they abdicate their

independent duty to assess not only whether an

agency is in fact operating within the bounds of its

lawful authority, but also whether Congress is

operating within the bounds of its constitutional

authority. See, e.g., Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n,

575 U.S. 92, 115–19 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in

judgment); Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2712–14 (Thomas,

J., concurring); Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1153

(Gorsuch, J., concurring). Third, Chevron provides a

significant and perverse incentive for courts to ignore

the difficult task of statutory interpretation and,

instead, defer to agency interpretations. See Pereira,

138 S. Ct. at 2120 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting

the “cursory analysis” many courts applied to a BIA

interpretation of an immigration statute and

expressing concern about the “reflexive deference”

courts often give to agency interpretations under

14

Chevron). Those concerns apply equally, if not even

more strongly, to the D.C. Circuit’s decision below.

Under this Court’s precedents, Chevron

sometimes requires courts to put aside what they

deem the “most reasonable” interpretation of a statute

in favor of an agency’s differing interpretation. See

Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 218

(2009). In this case, the D.C. Circuit’s standard goes

even further, requiring Chevron deference to agency

definitions that depart from the plain meaning of the

text. That standard is contrary to the principle that

where Congress intends for a term “to carry a

specialized—and indeed, unusual—meaning,” it

“would have said so expressly.” Hamilton v. Lanning,

560 U.S. 505, 517 (2010). Asking an agency to define

a term is not the same thing as asking it to rewrite the

statute, and the D.C. Circuit erred in concluding

otherwise.

CONCLUSION

The Petition should be granted.

DATED: April 2020.

Respectfully submitted,

STEVEN M. SIMPSON

Pacific Legal Foundation

3100 Clarendon Blvd.,

Suite 610

Arlington, VA 22201

GLENN E. ROPER

Counsel of Record

Pacific Legal Foundation

1745 Shea Ctr. Dr., Suite 400

Highlands Ranch, CO 80129

Telephone: (916) 419-7111

geroper@pacificlegal.org

Counsel for Amicus Curiae Pacific Legal Foundation