Opposition Brief — Shannon Deasey, et al., Petitioners v. Daniella Slater, et al.

No. 19-1085

In the Supreme Court of the United States

SHANNON DEASEY, et al.

Petitioners,

v.

DANIELLA SLATER, et al.

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

JOHN C. FATTAHI

PAUL W. HUGHES

Law Office of John

Counsel of Record

Fattahi

MICHAEL B. KIMBERLY

21250 Hawthorne Blvd., McDermott Will & Emery LLP

Ste. 700

500 North Capitol Street NW

Torrance, CA 90503

Washington, DC 20001

(202) 756-8000

MELANIE T. PARTOW

phughes@mwe.com

Law Offices of Melanie

Partow

DALE K. GALIPO

4470 Atlantic Ave.

Law Offices of

#17433

Dale K. Galipo

Long Beach, CA 90807

21800 Burbank Blvd.,

Suite 310

Woodland Hills, CA 90367

Counsel for Respondents

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Authorities.................................................... ii

Introduction .................................................................1

Statement ....................................................................3

A. Factual background. ..........................................3

B. Proceedings below. .............................................8

Reasons for Denying Certiorari ................................10

A. There is no circuit conflict. ..............................10

B. The Court should decline petitioners’ request

for summary reversal. .....................................15

C. The petition does not present a question

regarding the burden for qualified immunity. 20

D. The Court should reverse or recalibrate the

doctrine of qualified immunity. .......................22

Conclusion .................................................................27

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Abdullahi v. City of Madison,

423 F.3d 763 (7th Cir. 2005) ................................ 19

Anderson v. Creighton,

483 U.S. 635 (1987) ........................................ 12, 22

Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,

563 U.S. 731 (2011) .............................................. 11

Baxter v. Bracey,

140 S. Ct. 1862 (2020) .................................... 22, 23

Bostock v. Clayton Cty., Georgia,

140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) .......................................... 23

Broadfield v. McGrath,

737 F. App’x 773 (7th Cir. 2018) ......................... 13

Brosseau v. Haugen,

543 U.S. 194 (2004) .............................................. 19

Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc.,

380 F.3d 893 (6th Cir. 2004) ................................ 19

Crawford-El v. Britton,

523 U.S. 574 (1998) ........................................ 21, 25

Cruz v. City of Laramie,

239 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 2001) ............................ 19

Denwiddie v. Mueller,

775 F. App’x 817 (7th Cir. 2019) ......................... 13

District of Columbia v. Wesby,

138 S. Ct. 577 (2018) ................................ 11, 18, 24

Drummond ex rel. Drummond v.

City of Anaheim,

343 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) ...................... passim

Estate of Ceballos v. Husk,

919 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 2019) ............................ 14

iii

Cases—continued

Findlay v. Lendermon,

722 F.3d 895 (7th Cir. 2013) .......................... 12, 13

Gomez v. Toledo,

446 U.S. 635 (1980) .............................................. 21

Graham v. Connor,

490 U.S. 386 (1989) ................................................ 9

Gray v. Cummings,

917 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2019) .................................... 13

Gutierrez v. City of San Antonio,

139 F.3d 441 (5th Cir. 1998) ................................ 18

Harlow v. Fitzgerald,

457 U.S. 800 (1982) ............................ 21, 22, 23, 24

Hope v. Pelzer,

536 U.S. 730 (2002) .............................................. 20

Imbler v. Pachtman,

424 U.S. 409 (1976) .............................................. 23

Kaminsky v. Schriro,

760 Fed. App’x. 69 (2d Cir. 2019) ........................ 14

Kisela v. Hughes,

138 S. Ct. 1148 (2018) .......................................... 24

L.R. v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia,

836 F.3d 235 (3d Cir. 2016) ................................. 14

Maldonado v. Rodriguez,

932 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2019) ................................ 14

Malley v. Briggs,

475 U.S. 335 (1986) .............................................. 22

Martin v. City of Broadview Heights,

712 F.3d 951 (6th Cir. 2013) ................................ 19

Mullenix v. Luna,

136 S. Ct. 305 (2015) ............................................ 11

iv

Cases—continued

Norman v. Schuetzle,

585 F.3d 1097 (8th Cir. 2009) .............................. 14

Owen v. City of Independence,

445 U.S. 622 (1980) .............................................. 23

Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,

491 U.S. 164 (1989) .............................................. 24

Pearson v. Callahan,

555 U.S. 223 (2009) .............................................. 24

Rafferty v. Trumbull County,

915 F.3d 1087 (6th Cir. 2019) .............................. 14

Reed v. Palmer,

906 F.3d 540 (7th Cir. 2018) ................................ 12

Rodriguez v. Swartz,

899 F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 2018) ................................ 25

Saucier v. Katz,

533 U.S. 194 (2001) ........................................ 11, 24

S.B. v. County of San Diego,

864 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2017) .............................. 15

Sharp v. County of Orange,

871 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 2017) ................................ 12

Thomas v. Dillard,

818 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2016) ................................ 12

Thompson v. Clark,

2018 WL 3128975 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) ..................... 26

Thompson v. Cope,

900 F.3d 414 (7th Cir. 2018) ................................ 25

Tolan v. Cotton,

572 U.S. 650(2014) ............................................... 11

Ventura v. Rutledge,

2019 WL 3219252 (E.D. Cal. 2019) ..................... 25

v

Cases—continued

Weigel v. Broad,

544 F.3d 1143 (10th Cir. 2008) ............................ 19

Weinmann v. McClone,

787 F.3d 444 (7th Cir. 2015) ................................ 13

White v. Pauly,

137 S. Ct. 548 (2017) .................................. 9, 11, 15

Wilson v. Prince George County,

893 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2018) ................................ 14

Wyatt v. Cole,

504 U.S. 158 (1992) .............................................. 25

Zadeh v. Robinson,

902 F.3d 483 (5th Cir. 2018) ................................ 25

Zadeh v. Robinson,

928 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 2019) ................................ 25

Ziglar v. Abbasi,

137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017) .................................... 22, 23

Statutes

42 U.S.C. § 1983 ........................................ 8, 21, 22, 24

Other Authorities

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 ........................... 21

Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity

Fails, 127 Yale L.J. 2 (2017) ................................ 23

Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification,

89 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 885 (2014) ............................... 23

S. Ct. Rule 14.1(a) ..................................................... 15

William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?,

106 Cal. L. Rev. 45 (2018) .................................... 25

1

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

INTRODUCTION

Joseph Slater died at age 28, while in petitioners’

custody. Evidence demonstrates that he suffocated—

he died of positional asphyxiation—while hogtied in

the rear of a police cruiser. Immediately prior, three

officers had knelt on Slater, pinning his chest to the

ground.

In an unpublished, memorandum decision, the

court of appeals held that, taking the facts in the light

most favorable to respondents (Slater’s children and

parents), petitioners’ conduct violated his clearly established rights. In particular, nearly two decades

ago, the court had held that “squeezing the breath

from a compliant, prone, and handcuffed individual

despite his pleas for air involves a degree of force that

is greater than reasonable.” Drummond ex rel. Drummond v. City of Anaheim, 343 F.3d 1052, 1059 (9th

Cir. 2003). Here, the officers engaged in the same conduct—and they had the materially similar indications

that Slater was struggling to breathe. Respondents

state a viable constitutional claim, and the court of appeals correctly held that summary judgment is improper.

Petitioners now offer a grab bag of arguments. Not

one has merit.

The question presented asserts that, in applying

the qualified immunity standard, the panel here used

the phrase “sufficiently analogous.” And, petitioners

contend, some decisions from the Seventh Circuit

have instead used the phrase “closely analogous.” This

is not a circuit conflict warranting review. To begin

with, the unpublished decision here created no new

2

law in the Ninth Circuit, and that court has used “sufficiently analogous” and “closely analogous” interchangeably. That makes sense, of course, because the

term “sufficient” alone does not answer what constitutes sufficient. But, in the balance of the panel’s analysis, the court made clear that it followed precisely

this Court’s qualified immunity jurisprudence. What

is more, the Seventh Circuit also uses these terms interchangeably. So too does this Court. The question

presented is a game of semantics, not a serious conflict

of law warranting review.

What the petition actually appears to seek is error

correction. That claim fails on multiple scores. There

was no such request in the question presented. And,

critically, there is quite simply no error to be found.

In-circuit precedent gave officers fair warning that

their conduct was lawful. So too did a broad consensus

of authority from around the country. And, if any constitutional violation qualifies as “obvious,” it is this

one—hogtying a nonviolent, mentally unstable individual, immobilizing him with prolonged application

of body weight, and leaving him to suffocate in the

back of a police car is shockingly egregious conduct,

for which no immunity is available.

Against this backdrop, the petition attempts to

tell a vastly different factual story, painting Slater as

resisting officers in an effort to justify his death in the

backseat of a police cruiser. But, in so doing, petitioners spin a tale divorced from any factual determination of the court below. Because the petition offers

page after page of factual narrative without even a

single record cite, it is impossible to understand the

basis of the petition’s very different version of events.

The Court certainly should not engage in error correction based on a sequence of events that petitioners

have invented to suit their interests.

3

That is not all. The ambitious petition next asserts

that the unpublished panel opinion shifted the burden

to them. According to petitioners, the panel’s unpublished opinion conflicts with intra-circuit precedent. Once more, that is no basis for further review.

There is yet more reason to deny the petition.

While the court of appeals properly applied this

Court’s qualified immunity precedents, it is imperative that this Court revisit that law, reversing or

amending it, so as to substantially cut back on the

scope of the qualified immunity doctrine. A chorus of

voices—Justices on this Court, judges around the

country bound to apply qualified immunity, scholars,

and even the public at large—have taken notice of

qualified immunity. It lacks legal foundation, and it

improperly shields officers from accountability for

constitutional violations. While the court of appeals

was not free to consider a fresh qualified immunity

doctrine, this Court may. Thus, prior to any embrace

of a qualified immunity defense, the Court must first

wrestle with the sustained—and correct—criticism of

the doctrine.

For all these reasons, further review is unwarranted. The Court should deny the petition.

STATEMENT

A. Factual background.

Joseph Slater, then 28, died on April 15, 2015,

during an arrest by Sheriff’s deputies of the County of

San Bernardino. Pet. App. 2. 1 He suffocated to death,

while hogtied in the rear of a police car. Pet. App. 6.

Petitioners’ recitation of the facts, which spans 15 pages, is

remarkable insofar as it does not cite—not even once—the record

in this case. Needless to say, we disagree with substantial aspects of petitioners’ factual accounting. The specific objections we

raise here are far from the full range of misstatements in the

1

4

The deputies, petitioners here, knew that Slater

was mentally ill as a result of their prior contacts with

him. Pet. App. 2. Deputy Deasey had previously

placed Slater on a mental health hold, and officers

were aware that Slater did not have a history of violence. D. Ct. Dkt. 103, at 5; D. Ct. Dkt. 114, at 2. 2 See

also Pet. App. 21 (“Slater was known by local law enforcement in the City of Highland, and they knew that

Slater suffered from mental disorders which caused

him to act abnormal at times, that Slater had been

hospitalized for psychiatric reasons, and that Slater

had had several prior contacts with the [sheriff’s department].”). Officers responded to a call that Slater

was engaging in non-violent vandalism. Pet. App. 22.

“Deputy Deasey responded to the scene and recognized that Slater was on drugs.” Pet. App. 2-3. Slater

was “calm and cooperative” throughout this encounter, and he “willingly placed both of his hands behind

his back” to be “handcuffed.” Pet. App. 23. Deasey

agreed that he had not observed Slater “commit any

crime.” D. Ct. Dkt. 114, at 3. Deasey “placed Slater

under arrest, handcuffed him without resistance, and

attempted to place him in the back of a patrol car with

the intention of taking him to the hospital for psychiatric care.” Pet. App. 3.

petition. And, since petitioners’ statement has no citation support, respondents submit that it should be disregarded in the

whole, as it is impossible to understand the basis on which petitioners tell a materially different version of the events, much less

rebut it. Additionally, the video that petitioners reference (at 7)

does not capture the events petitioners describe, largely because

they occur out of view. By contrast, video and audio from the officers’ belt recorders supports Slater’s version of events.

2

Petitioners’ assertion to the contrary (at 7) lacks any factual

support and is contradicted by Deasey’s own testimony.

5

Slater soon became “fearful,” “telling Deputy

Deasey several times, ‘You’re not a cop, sir,’ and,

‘You’re going to kill me.’” Pet. App. 3. Deasey ordered

Slater to slide into the car, and then—while Slater remained handcuffed, and waiting just thirteen seconds

after his initial order—“deployed three pepper sprays

at Slater.” Ibid. 3 “Slater reacted by moving around

and yelling things like, ‘You’re blinding me.’” Ibid. He

also called out repeatedly for his mother, “Oh, my God,

Mom! Oh, Mom! Oh, Mom! Ah!”

Slater ended up on the ground with Deputy

Deasey using his body weight to pin Slater down. Pet.

App. 3. 4 Deasey also kicked Slater with his knee. Pet.

9. 5 Slater continued to yell, “Help! Help!” and began

Petitioners’ contention (at 8), without citation, that Slater was

kicking is vigorously disputed by respondents. Neither the video

nor audio evidence supports this claim. See D. Ct. Dkt. 102, at 9

(whether Slater was kicking is a disputed question of fact). Similarly, petitioners claim that Deasey deployed a second burst of

pepper spray because Slater became “more aggressive,” was

“flailing in the back seat,” and was “screaming[] and pushing his

feet and torso out of the patrol car with * * * greater force.” Pet.

8. Again, the video evidence does not support this, and respondents dispute it.

4

Petitioners are wrong to assert, without citation, that Slater

“bumped Deasey.” Pet. 9. The video does not show that. Rather,

the video indicates that Deasey pulled Slater out of the back of

the patrol unit by grabbing the back of Slater’s t-shirt. Slater

landed on the ground and rolled away from the patrol car, unable

to break his fall because his hands were handcuffed behind his

back as he called out for his “Mom.” Deasey stood and watched

as Slater hit the ground and rolled. Deasey then stepped over to

where Slater was handcuffed on the ground, placed his knee on

Slater’s neck, and radioed to dispatch, at which point Slater

again said, “You’re not a cop” and screamed for “Help!”

5

Again, petitioners are wrong to assert, without citation, that

Slater “kick[ed] his feet back toward Deasey.” Pet. 9. The video

shows that when Deasey restrained Slater on the ground,

Slater’s legs were moving away from, not toward, Deasey. And,

3

6

calling out his mother’s name and phone number, “LA

* * * Tina Slater * * * Twenty-seven * * * 76772.”

Before Deputy Gentry arrived, Deputy Deasey applied his body weight to restrain Slater on the ground

for about one minute. Once Deputy Gentry arrived,

both deputies applied their body weight to Slater.

And, finally, Sergeant Rude arrived, and also used his

body weight to restrain Slater on the ground. Slater

was restrained on the ground under the weight of one

to three deputies for nearly three minutes. While pinning him down, the deputies placed “a hobble restraint to Slater’s ankles, connecting it to his handcuffs from the back.” Pet. App. 3. Slater began to say,

“You’re going to kill me.” Ibid.

“Due to the slack in the hobble, Slater was able to

sit on his own, and he did so without further resistance.” Pet. App. 3. Paramedics “performed a medical evaluation of Slater, determined he was stable,

and released him to the deputies to transport him to

jail.” Id. at 24.

After waiting about ten minutes, the deputies attempted “to wash pepper spray off Slater,” and they

carried him back to the patrol car, and slid him onto

the back seat on his stomach. Pet. App. 3. That was

the same seat that was already contaminated by the

earlier pepper spray bursts. D. Ct. Dkt. No. 102, at 11.

Slater “thrash[ed] about” (Pet. App. 25), and he slid

“out of the open car door on the other side” (id. at 3).

In response, Deputy Gentry kicked Slater multiple times. Petitioners also “pushed him back onto the

seat and applied second and third hobbles to hogtie

Slater—the second hobble to bind his feet and hands

more tightly together, and the third hobble to secure

contrary to petitioners’ claim, Slater was never in the process of

“getting up and running off.” Ibid.

7

him to the car.” Pet. App. 3-4. See also Pet. 15 (these

hobbles further “restrict[ed] Slater’s leg movements

by bending his legs farther back, closer to the cuffs

and Slater’s backside”). Throughout this time, “Slater

remained on his chest and stomach.” Pet. App. 4.

The officers have since “admitted” that they applied “pressure on Slater’s ribs and shoulder during

the application of the second and third hobbles.” Pet.

App. 4. “Brandt put his right foot against the top of

Slater’s left shoulder, near the top of the shoulder

blade.” Id. at 25. Likewise, “Deputy Gentry testified

that he placed pressure on Slater’s left rib area with

his knee while applying the second hobble.” Id. at 6.

Indeed, Slater’s “autopsy showed extensive bruising,”

which respondents maintain “is consistent with pressure to Slater’s shoulders and back.” Id. at 4.

In all, “Slater was hogtied and placed on his stomach in the back of the police car, and the deputies applied pressure to his body during the second and third

hobbling, after pressure was already applied to his

shoulders in the prone position during the first hobbling.” Pet. App. 6. The deputies did so, even though

they have since conceded that they are trained not to

restrain subjects in prone positions because of the

danger of positional asphyxia. The deputies were also

trained that subjects, particularly those who are

handcuffed and hobbled, should be placed on their

side so that they can breathe. See D. Ct. Dkt. No. 102,

at 10-11, 17.

Deputy Brandt acknowledges that, “[p]rior to closing the patrol car door,” he “heard Slater make a spitting noise.” Pet. App. 6. “Before long, Slater had vomited and largely stopped breathing.” Ibid. Medics were

on the scene, but they could not revive him. Id. at 4.

8

Evidence indicates that Slater “died from positional

asphyxiation.” Id. at 2. 6

B. Proceedings below.

1. Respondents, Slater’s children and parents,

filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting claims pursuant to the Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendments, as well as state law claims. Pet. App.

26-27. Petitioners filed a motion for summary judgment, which respondents opposed. Id. at 20-21.

The district court granted petitioners summary

judgment. Pet. App. 19-44. The court concluded that

“Deasey’s use of pepper spray, Deasey’s knee strike to

Slater, and the application of the first hobble (including any force that may have been used by the deputies

in applying that hobble) were reasonable and did not

violate Slater’s Fourth Amendment rights.” Pet. 29.

With respect to the imposition of the second and

third hobble restraints—and Slater’s resulting

death—the court determined that “the trier of fact

could find in [respondents’] favor with respect to [respondents’] Fourth Amendment claim.” Pet. App. 34.

But, the court found that respondents’ authorities

demonstrating that use of a “comparable amount of

force constitutes a violation of the Fourth Amendment” were “distinguishable” because of differences as

Petitioners argue (at 19-20) that Slater’s death was not caused

by the excessive force and restraints that the deputies used

against him. That issue is independent of the excessive force

claim here. Nonetheless, this issue is heavily disputed: Respondents’ expert forensic pathologist, Dr. Ronald O’Halloran, opined

that the excessive use of force and restraint was a cause of

Slater’s death, noting specifically that Mr. Slater lost consciousness, stopped breathing, and was found with vomit or sputum in

and around his mouth, while he still had a pulse. D. Ct. Dkt. No.

102, at 14-15, 18-19.

6

9

to how precisely the individuals were handcuffed or

where specifically force was applied. Pet. App. 36-37.

2. Respondents appealed, and petitioners crossappealed the district court’s finding of a constitutional

violation. Pet. App. 2 & n.1.

In an unpublished, memorandum decision, the

court of appeals agreed with the district court that

“the application” of the first hobble restraint to

Slater’s legs “did not constitute excessive force.” Pet.

App. 3. The court likewise “agree[d] with the district

court that the force used in applying the second and

third hobbles was excessive.” Pet. App. 5. The court

observed that “Fourth Amendment excessive force

claims require courts to balance ‘the nature and quality of the intrusion’ with the ‘countervailing governmental interests at stake’ to evaluate the objective

reasonableness of the force in context.” Ibid. (quoting

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)). Especially relevant here, when known to the officer, “‘a detainee’s mental illness’ is a factor bearing on the government’s interest.” Ibid.

The court of appeals reversed the district court’s

“clearly established” holding. Pet. App. 5-7. In conducting this analysis, the court took “seriously the Supreme Court’s warning that ‘clearly established law

should not be defined at a high level of generality.’”

Pet. App. 5-6 (quoting White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548,

552 (2017)). Specific precedent, Drummond ex rel.

Drummond v. City of Anaheim, 343 F.3d 1052, 1056

(9th Cir. 2003), “provide[d] ‘fair warning’ to Defendants that their alleged actions were unconstitutional.”

Pet. App. 6. That decision “clearly established that

‘squeezing the breath from a compliant, prone, and

handcuffed individual . . . involves a degree of force

that is greater than reasonable.’” Ibid. (quoting Drum-

10

mond, 343 F.3d at 1059). In addition, the Court evaluated authority from the First, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits, each of which confirmed the clarity of the legal

right at stake here. Pet. App. 7 n.3.

This petition for certiorari followed.

REASONS FOR DENYING CERTIORARI

No further review is warranted. The question presented is an issue of semantics, not a serious legal disagreement among the courts. Petitioners’ request for

error correction should also be rejected: No error occurred below, petitioners fail to take the facts in the

light most favorable to respondents, and this Court

does not address such fact-bound issues, good for this

case only. Petitioners’ undeveloped burden argument

lacks all merit. And, finally, prior to any further consideration of qualified immunity, the Court should

first revisit the doctrine wholesale, reversing or revising it.

A. There is no circuit conflict.

The petition asks the Court to review the unpublished opinion’s use, in passing, of the phrase “sufficiently analogous” (Pet. App. 6), arguing that it departs from the Seventh Circuit’s use of the phrase

“closely analogous.” Pet. i, 25-26. For multiple reasons, that contention fails.

1. The unpublished, memorandum panel opinion

plainly employed the governing legal standard for

qualified immunity. In using the passing phrase “sufficiently analogous,” the court did not cite to it as a

standard for the doctrine. Pet. App. 6-7. Nor did it incorporate some established, specific body of law.

There is no indication—none whatsoever—that the

panel’s ultimate result had anything to do with its use

of the “sufficiently analogous” phrase. Nor could “suf-

11

ficiently analogous” serve as an independent standard, as it fails to answer the question how analogous

a case must be to qualify as “sufficiently analogous.”

The court did, however, specify just what standard governed, reciting the legal standard mandated by

this Court’s precedent: To qualify as clearly established, it must be “clear to a reasonable officer that his

conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.”

Pet. App. 5. Cf. District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S.

Ct. 577, 590 (2018) (“The rule’s contours must be so

well defined that it is ‘clear to a reasonable officer that

his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.’”) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202

(2001)).

The court recognized “that ‘clearly established

law’ should not be defined ‘at a high level of generality.’” Pet. App. 6 (quoting White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct.

548, 552 (2017)). And past precedent must provide

“fair warning.” Ibid. Cf. Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650,

656 (2014) (“[T]he salient question is whether the

state of the law at the time of an incident provided

‘fair warning” to the defendants that their alleged conduct was unconstitutional.”) (quotation marks and alteration omitted).

Not only did the panel faithfully apply this Court’s

precedent, but this Court likewise refers, in passing,

to the concept of “sufficient” when describing the

clearly established test. Thus, this Court holds that a

“clearly established right is one that is sufficiently

clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (emphasis

added). See also Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018) (“To

be clearly established, a legal principle must have a

sufficiently clear foundation in then-existing precedent.”) (emphasis added); Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563

12

U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (“A Government official’s conduct

violates clearly established law when, at the time of

the challenged conduct, ‘the contours of a right are

sufficiently clear’ that every ‘reasonable official would

have understood that what he is doing violates that

right.’”) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,

640 (1987)) (emphasis added).

2. In fact, precedent from the court of appeals confirms that it has not established a “sufficiently analogous” test as distinct from “closely analogous.” In

Sharp v. County of Orange, 871 F.3d 901 (9th Cir.

2017), the court once invoked “sufficiently analogous”

and then elsewhere, with no distinction, referenced

“closely analogous.” Id. at 912, 920.

What is more, the Ninth Circuit itself uses the formulation “closely analogous” to describe the second

prong of the qualified immunity inquiry. In Thomas v.

Dillard, 818 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2016), for example, the

Court denied qualified immunity because “the facts of

the cases existing at the time are not so closely analogous to this case such that [the officer’s] mistaken

view of the law was unreasonable.” Id. at 891. The essential premise that undergirds the petition—that

there is a “conflict” among the circuits “as to whether

the existence of a merely ‘sufficiently analogous’ case

is enough” (Pet. 25)—is transparently incorrect.

3. On the other side of the ledger, the Seventh Circuit too uses the “sufficiently analogous” phrasing

with some frequency, confirming that there is simply

no conflict.

Petitioners rest their claim on Reed v. Palmer, 906

F.3d 540 (7th Cir. 2018), which used the term “closely

analogous.” In so doing, Reed quoted Findlay v.

Lendermon, 722 F.3d 895 (7th Cir. 2013). Critical for

present purposes, Findlay used the phrase “suffi-

13

ciently analogous” interchangeably with “closely analogous.” 722 F.3d at 900 (“Because he has neither identified a sufficiently analogous case nor adequately explained how Lendermon’s actions were so plainly excessive that any reasonable officer would know it violated the constitution, he cannot defeat Lendermon’s

qualified immunity defense.”) (emphasis added).

Indeed, the Seventh Circuit routinely uses the

phrase “sufficiently analogous” in describing the

“clearly established” prong of qualified immunity. See,

e.g., Denwiddie v. Mueller, 775 F. App’x 817, 820 (7th

Cir. 2019) (“The rights must be described with adequate specificity, but there need not be a case directly

on point so long as existing precedent is sufficiently

analogous as to place the officers on notice that their

conduct was unlawful.”); Broadfield v. McGrath, 737

F. App’x 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2018) (“In making this determination, we do not require a case be directly on

point, but existing precedent must be sufficiently

analogous to place the officers on notice that their conduct was unlawful.”); Weinmann v. McClone, 787 F.3d

444, 450-451 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding that, even if

there had been no “sufficiently analogous” decisions,

qualified immunity would still be inappropriate under

the Seventh Circuit’s alternative test of “plainly excessive conduct”).

As the Seventh Circuit precedent proves, there is

no material divergence between these formulations,

which are used by the courts interchangeably. There

surely is no conflict between these circuits regarding

the applicable standard.

4. To gild the lily, examination of other circuits

confirms that reference to “sufficiently analogous”

precedent is not some innovation of the court below.

That language is as ubiquitous as it is unobjectionable. See e.g., Gray v. Cummings, 917 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.

14

2019) (considering whether use of a taser was “sufficiently analogous” to past precedent); Kaminsky v.

Schriro, 760 Fed. App’x. 69, 73 (2d Cir. 2019) (emphasis added) (“sufficiently analogous”); L.R. v. Sch. Dist.

of Philadelphia, 836 F.3d 235, 249 (3d Cir. 2016) (“Although there is no case that directly mirrors the facts

here * * * there are sufficiently analogous cases that

should have placed a reasonable official in Littlejohn’s

position on notice that his actions were unlawful.”)

(emphasis added); Wilson v. Prince George County,

893 F.3d 213, 222 (4th Cir. 2018) (“The cases we have

examined are not sufficiently analogous to the present

case to have placed [the officer] on such notice.”) (emphasis added); Maldonado v. Rodriguez, 932 F.3d 388,

393 (5th Cir. 2019) (“the right * * * was not clearly

established * * * because neither the Fifth Circuit nor

the Supreme Court had addressed the issue * * * and

neither had addressed an issue sufficiently analogous

that a reasonable official would understand [the conduct at issue was unconstitutional].”) (emphasis

added); Rafferty v. Trumbull County, 915 F.3d 1087,

1097 (6th Cir. 2019) (“sufficiently analogous”); Norman v. Schuetzle, 585 F.3d 1097, 1110 (8th Cir. 2009)

(finding an officer was entitled to qualified immunity

because his conduct was not “sufficiently analogous”

to prior cases that thus did not put him on notice that

his actions were unconstitutional); Estate of Ceballos

v. Husk, 919 F.3d 1204, 1216-1217 (10th Cir. 2019)

(using both “sufficiently” and “closely” analogous interchangeably).

*

*

*

In all, there is no circuit conflict: The Seventh and

Ninth Circuits—the only two courts addressed in the

petition—both alternately use the phrases “sufficiently analogous” and “closely analogous.” This Court

uses the concept of “sufficient.” And that language is

15

reflected across all circuits. The issue that headlines

the petition is all semantics and no substance.

B. The Court should decline petitioners’

request for summary reversal.

In fact, the claimed circuit conflict is little more

than window dressing for what the petition actually

seeks—review of the fact-bound, case-specific question whether, in the court of appeals, this particular

right was clearly established at the relevant time. See

Pet. 35 (requesting summary reversal). Given that the

holding below was unpublished, that issue, as resolved here, is truly good for this case only. There is

no basis—none whatsoever—to engage such claims of

error correction.

What is more, while the petition gesticulates at a

summary reversal request (Pet. 27-33, 35), that issue

is not set forth in the question presented. Nor is it

fairly encompassed within the question presented,

which raised the supposed distinction between “sufficiently” and “closely” analogous precedent. Having

failed to raise this as a question presented, it is not

properly before the Court. See S. Ct. Rule 14.1(a).

1. In all events, there is certainly no error to correct. The panel faithfully applied this Court’s qualified immunity precedents. It took care not to define

clearly established law at the proscribed “high level of

generality.” Pet. App. 6 (citing White v. Pauly, 137 S.

Ct. 548, 552 (2017); S.B. v. County of San Diego, 864

F.3d 1010, 1015 (9th Cir. 2017) (“We hear the Supreme Court loud and clear.”)). Rather, the panel below “t[oo]k seriously the Supreme Court’s warning,”

and instead considered “whether the right was clearly

established in the light of the specific context of the

case.” Pet. App. 5-6.

16

The panel correctly concluded that Drummond

sufficed to clearly establish the right at issue. Pet.

App. 5-6. The parallels are clear: Slater and Drummond were unarmed. Drummond, 343 F.3d at 1054.

In both cases, the involved officers knew that the decedent was mentally ill. Ibid. In both cases, the decedent was paranoid and hallucinating. Ibid. Both cases

concern an encounter in a convenience store parking

lot and in both cases, officers intended to transport the

decedent to a hospital to get them help. Ibid. In both

cases, the decedent was handcuffed behind his back,

after which time officers used their body weight to

hold the decedent down. As was the case in Drummond (ibid.), and based on the disputed facts as construed favorably to Slater, Slater did not resist or attempt to kick any of the deputies after he was handcuffed and on the ground. See page 5 n.3, supra. In

both cases, the officers were warned of the dangers of

positional asphyxia and of the risk of death. Drummond, 343 F.3d at 1059. In both cases, some minutes

passed between the moment when officers initially

handcuffed the decedent and when officers decided to

hobble the decedent at his ankles. Id. at 1054. In both

cases, the decedent went limp shortly after supplemental restraints were applied. In both cases, the officers had received training about the potentially fatal

risks of positional asphyxia caused by kneeling on a

subject’s back or neck to restrain them. Id. at 1056,

1060 n.6. In Drummond, the plaintiff fell into a coma

from which he never recovered, whereas here, Slater

could not be revived.

This was a specific and granular rule—and it provides the requisite clarity demanded by the Court’s

precedent. Indeed, the setting and circumstances are

nearly identical.

17

Petitioners’ efforts to create meaningful daylight

from Drummond each fail. Petitioners first argue that

Drummond repeatedly told the officers that he could

not breathe, whereas Slater did not use those words.

Pet. 27, 29. But no reasonable officer could have concluded that Drummond’s constitutional holding

turned on whether Slater said the magic words, “I

can’t breathe,” rather than whether the circumstances

were such that the officers knew or had reason to

know that Slater, after being pepper sprayed, restrained, hobbled, subjected to the application of the

body weight of multiple officers, and was heard spitting while in a hogtied position, was at substantial

risk for respiratory distress.

If anything, petitioners appear to concede that,

while hogtied, Slater was arching his back like a bow,

and trying to lift his head and chest off of the back

seat. This was yet more clear, objective evidence that

Slater was in respiratory distress.

What is more, in attempting to distinguish Drummond, petitioners rest on a factual narrative quite different than the one most favorable to respondents. Petitioners claim that, unlike Drummond, Slater resisted the officers. Pet. 31. But that assertion—again,

made without a hint of citation to the record—is little

more than factual dispute. As respondents see it,

Slater never kicked the deputies, never threatened

the deputies, was respectful to the deputies, called

Deputy Deasey “sir,” and was so paranoid that he repeatedly pled with Deputy Deasey that he was not an

actual police officer. And he begged for his mother

throughout the encounter. Taking the facts in the

light favorable to respondents, no conduct by Slater

meaningfully distinguishes this case from Drummond.

18

Petitioners also try to distinguish the precise nature of the force applied. Pet. 31. However, according

to respondents’ version of events, which is supported

by video evidence, multiple officers applied their body

weight to Slater while he was chest-down, handcuffed,

and hobbled, in order to further restrain him and stop

him from positioning himself so that he could breathe.

The fact that Slater was restrained in a prone position, while handcuffed, hobbled, and hogtied under

the weight of officers in a patrol unit, while Drummond was restrained in a prone position, while handcuffed and hobbled, under the weight of officers on the

ground is not a distinction that should provide petitioners in this case any less notice that their conduct

was unconstitutional. Were it otherwise, qualified immunity would lose sight of any practical mooring—

turning on technicalities rather than an honest appraisal as to whether past precedent supplied “fair

warning.”

2. What is more, a consensus of authority from

courts of appeals from around the country have similarly found this conduct to violate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on excessive force. That is, other

circuits have similarly held that petitioners’ conduct,

in applying body weight to further restrain Slater so

as to apply the second and third hogtie connections,

after he was handcuffed, hobbled, and restrained in

the prone position, constitutes excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The court of appeals

thus properly referenced (Pet. App. 7 n.3) the “robust

‘consensus of cases of persuasive authority,’” which

further renders this right a clearly established one.

Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 589-590.

The law is clear and well-understood. See

Gutierrez v. City of San Antonio, 139 F.3d 441, 446447 (5th Cir. 1998) (sufficient evidence existed about

19

the dangers of hogtying that its use “would have violated law clearly established prior to November

1994”); Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc., 380 F.3d

893, 903 (6th Cir. 2004) (clearly established “that putting substantial or significant pressure on a suspect’s

back while that suspect is in a face-down prone position after being subdued and/or incapacitated constitutes excessive force); Martin v. City of Broadview

Heights, 712 F.3d 951, 961 (6th Cir. 2013) (“The prohibition against placing weight on [the subject’s] body

after he was handcuffed was clearly established in the

Sixth Circuit as of August 2007”); Abdullahi v. City of

Madison, 423 F.3d 763, 771 (7th Cir. 2005) (unreasonable force where an officer knelt on the plaintiff’s

shoulder and held the plaintiff down with his body

weight while another officer handcuffed the plaintiff);

Cruz v. City of Laramie, 239 F.3d 1183, 1188 (10th

Cir. 2001) (while hogtying alone does not violate

clearly established law, “officers may not apply this

technique when an individual’s diminished capacity is

apparent); Weigel v. Broad, 544 F.3d 1143, 1155 (10th

Cir. 2008) (“[T]he law was clearly established that applying pressure to [plaintiff’s] upper back, once he was

handcuffed and his legs restrained, was constitutionally unreasonable” due to the significant risk of positional asphyxia [].”).

3. Finally, this same conclusion is appropriate

based on the “obvious case” doctrine. See Brosseau v.

Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004) (“Of course, in an

obvious case, these standards can ‘clearly establish’

the answer, even without a body of relevant case

law.”).

Here, the constitutional violation is patently obvious: Petitioners hogtied a subdued, non-threatening,

mentally disturbed individual, they applied pressure

to his back while he was stomach down, and they left

20

him alone despite knowing that he was making spitting noises. Especially in light of training not to bind

hobble a person’s hands or handcuffs because of the

risk of positional asphyxia (D. Ct. Dkt. No. 102, at 10;

D. Ct. Dkt. No. 114, at 6), any reasonable officer would

be aware that this dehumanizing conduct is as unlawful as it is immoral.

Indeed, in Drummond, the court of appeals recognized that, as early as 2003, “any reasonable person”

(let alone a peace officer) should have known that the

petitioners’ conduct in the case involved a degree of

force that is obviously unreasonable. 343 F.3d at 1059.

Indeed, “it is even more striking that the officers had

been specifically warned of the extreme danger of this

sort of force,” in part because there was “ample publicity in Southern California regarding similar instances of asphyxiation as a result of the use of similar

force.” Ibid.

A holding that these facts do not satisfy the “obvious case” doctrine would be tantamount to writing

that law off the books—effectively overruling Hope v.

Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738, 741 (2002) (“a general constitutional rule already identified in the decisional

law may apply with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question, even though ‘the very action in question has [not] previously been held unlawful.’”). Indeed, it would be an indictment of the qualified immunity doctrine as a whole. In all, qualified immunity

supplies no basis, on these facts at this juncture, to

render judgment as a matter of law in petitioners’ favor.

C. The petition does not present a question

regarding the burden for qualified

immunity.

Adding to its scattershot request for error correction, petitioners tack on an undeveloped argument (at

21

34) that the court below somehow erred by noting that

“defendants bear the burden of proving that they are

entitled to qualified immunity.” Pet. App. 5. This assertion is insubstantial.

First, petitioners failed to identify this as a question presented by the petition. Because this issue was

not set out as a question expressly raised here, it is

not properly before the Court.

Second, petitioners affirmatively argue that this

unpublished, memorandum opinion conflicts with

published precedent from the same court. Pet. 34.

Such an asserted intra-circuit conflict, between published and memorandum dispositions, is not the making of a petition for certiorari.

Third, there is no indication whatever that the allocation of burden did any work in this case—and petitioners certainly do not argue otherwise. Absent

clear evidence that this formed the rule of decision,

the issue is not squarely before the Court.

Fourth, in any event, because qualified immunity

is an affirmative defense, there is every reason to conclude that the burden does rest on defendants to prove

entitlement to it. As the Court has explained, “qualified immunity is an affirmative defense and * * * ‘the

burden of pleading it rests with the defendant.’” Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 587 (1998) (quoting

Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980)). See also

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982) (“Qualified or ‘good faith’ immunity is an affirmative defense

that must be pleaded by a defendant official.”). A Section 1983 claim requires allegations that the defendant has violated a constitutional right; the Court “has

never indicated that qualified immunity is relevant to

the existence of the plaintiff’s cause of action.” Gomez,

446 U.S. at 640.

22

And that is especially true in this context, because, at the summary judgment stage, Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 56 places on the moving party the

burden of showing that there is no genuine dispute as

to any material fact.

D. The Court should reverse or recalibrate the

doctrine of qualified immunity.

The Court should deny certiorari for a more fundamental reason: qualified immunity lacks legal foundation, and, in an appropriate case, the Court should

reverse or recalibrate the doctrine. Until such time, it

should not expand upon it. While precedent foreclosed

respondents from raising this argument below, it is an

appropriate alternative basis to reach the judgment

below—and thus serves as a question prior to all of

the arguments contained in the petition for certiorari.

1. As Justice Thomas put it, “[t]here is likely no

basis for the objective inquiry into clearly established

law that our modern cases prescribe.” Baxter v.

Bracey, 140 S. Ct. 1862 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting

from denial of certiorari). To the contrary, “the Court

adopted the test not because of ‘general principles of

tort immunities and defenses,’ but because of a ‘balancing of competing values’ about litigation costs and

efficiency.” Ibid. (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S.

335, 339 (1986), and Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816).

Because the Court’s “analysis is no longer

grounded in the common-law backdrop against which

Congress” drafted Section 1983, the Court has

stopped “interpreting the intent of Congress in enacting the Act.” Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1871

(2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring

in the judgment) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483

U.S. 635, 645 (1987)) (quotation marks and alteration

omitted). Indeed, the Court has acknowledged this

23

point time and again—Section 1983 “on its face admits of no immunities” (Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.

409, 417 (1976)), and “[Section 1983’s] language is absolute and unqualified; no mention is made of any

privileges, immunities, or defenses that may be asserted” (Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622,

635 (1980)).

Rather than emanating from text or history, qualified immunity was informed by judge-made policy determinations. In particular, the Court was concerned

with the imposition of personal liability on public officials and the burden of litigation, an admitted policy

judgment designed “to balance competing values.” See

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813-814 (1982)

(addressing perceived social costs of claims against

government officials). But, as Justice Thomas observed, these “qualified immunity precedents * * *

represent precisely the sort of freewheeling policy

choices that [the Court has] previously disclaimed the

power to make.” Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1871 (Thomas,

J., concurring) (quotation and alteration omitted); See

also Baxter, 140 S. Ct. 1862. See, e.g., Bostock v. Clayton Cty., Georgia, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (Gorsuch, J.)

(“[N]o court should ever” dispense with a statutory

text “to do as we think best.”).

Beyond that, qualified immunity has proven not

to accomplish the goals it seeks. As for officer liability,

indemnification is the norm. One study found that officers in a sample of settlements for police misconduct

only paid 0.02% of the damages paid to plaintiffs,

demonstrating the strong protection already afforded

by indemnification. Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 885, 890 (2014). And

there is evidence that qualified immunity plays no

meaningful role in alleviating litigation burdens. See

Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails,

24

127 Yale L.J. 2, 48-51 (2017). While justified solely by

judicially identified policy aims, decades of experience

have proven that those goals are not meaningfully advanced by the doctrine. 7

2. Prior to further endorsing—and expanding

upon—qualified immunity, it is essential for the Court

to address these substantial concerns.

Indeed, Justice Sotomayor has identified the baleful impacts of the doctrine, especially when used by

this Court in summary fashion. See Kisela v. Hughes,

138 S. Ct. 1148, 1162 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Because “[n]early all of the Supreme Court’s

qualified immunity cases come out the same way—by

finding immunity for the officials,” Justice Sotomayor

cautioned that the current “one-sided approach to

qualified immunity transforms the doctrine into an

absolute shield for law enforcement officers.” Ibid. In

the Fourth Amendment context, the result is to “gut[]”

its “deterrent effect.” Ibid. More broadly, this “sends

an alarming signal to law enforcement officers and the

public”—“[i]t tells officers that they can shoot first and

think later, and it tells the public that palpably unreasonable conduct will go unpunished.” Ibid.

There is thus a dire need to revisit qualified immunity jurisprudence. Judge Willett, for example, recently added his “voice to a growing, cross-ideological

No factors counsel in favor of retaining qualified immunity in

its current fashion. The Court has previously altered its judgemade rules regarding Section 1983, without serious hesitation.

See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 233-234 (2009)

(overruling Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001)); Harlow, 457

U.S. at 816-818. Having been “tested by experience” (Patterson

v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173-174 (1989)), existing

doctrine has proven not just ineffective at accomplishing its

stated ends, but affirmatively detrimental to litigants and the

law alike.

7

25

chorus of jurists and scholars urging recalibration of

contemporary immunity jurisprudence.” Zadeh v.

Robinson, 902 F.3d 483, 499-500 (5th Cir. 2018) (Willett, J., concurring dubitante) (footnotes omitted).

Judge Willett continued:

To some observers, qualified immunity

smacks of unqualified impunity, letting public

officials duck consequences for bad behavior—

no matter how palpably unreasonable—as

long as they were the first to behave badly.

Merely proving a constitutional deprivation

doesn’t cut it; plaintiffs must cite functionally

identical precedent that places the legal question “beyond debate” to “every” reasonable officer.

Zadeh v. Robinson, 928 F.3d 457, 479 (5th Cir. 2019)

(Willett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

These criticisms of qualified immunity are broadbased. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 170 (1992)

(Kennedy, J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring) (in qualified immunity cases, “we have diverged to a substantial degree from the historical standards”); CrawfordEl v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 611 (1998) (Scalia, J.,

joined by Thomas, J., dissenting) (the Court has not

even “purported to be faithful to the common-law immunities that existed when § 1983 was enacted.”);

William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?,

106 Cal. L. Rev. 45 (2018). 8

See also Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719, 732 n.40 (9th Cir.

2018) (Kleinfeld, J.) (“Some argue that the ‘clearly established’

prong of the analysis lacks a solid legal foundation.”); Thompson

v. Cope, 900 F.3d 414, 421 n.1 (7th Cir. 2018) (Hamilton, J.)

(“Scholars have criticized [the qualified immunity] standard.”);

Ventura v. Rutledge, 2019 WL 3219252, at *10 n.6 (E.D. Cal.

2019) (“[T]his judge joins with those who have endorsed a com8

26

3. Ultimately, in this case, police officers hogtied

and applied sustained body weight to a subdued, mentally-ill individual, leaving him in the rear of a police

car, all contrary to their clear training. They left him

in a position such that he could not breathe. Slater

then died. Qualified immunity does not shield such official conduct from review. If, contrary to fact and law,

the qualified immunity doctrine actually provided for

summary judgment in these circumstances, that

would be confirmatory evidence that qualified immunity must be revisited and, at a minimum, pared back

substantially. Otherwise, qualified immunity would

eviscerate fundamental constitutional rights.

Prior to any consideration of the application of

qualified immunity to this case, the Court should revisit that doctrine entirely—reversing or substantially narrowing it.

plete re-examination of the doctrine which, as it is currently applied, mandates illogical, unjust, and puzzling results in many

cases.”); Thompson v. Clark, 2018 WL 3128975, at *10 (E.D.N.Y.

2018) (Weinstein, J.) (“The legal precedent for qualified immunity, or its lack, is the subject of intense scrutiny.”).

27

CONCLUSION

The Court should deny the petition for a writ of

certiorari.

Respectfully submitted.

JOHN C. FATTAHI

PAUL W. HUGHES

Law Office of John

Counsel of Record

Fattahi

MICHAEL B. KIMBERLY

21250 Hawthorne Blvd., McDermott Will & Emery LLP

Ste. 700

500 North Capitol Street NW

Torrance, CA 90503

Washington, DC 20001

(202) 756-8000

MELANIE T. PARTOW

phughes@mwe.com

Law Offices of Melanie

Partow

DALE K. GALIPO

4470 Atlantic Ave.

Law Offices of

#17433

Dale K. Galipo

Long Beach, CA 90807

21800 Burbank Blvd.,

Suite 310

Woodland Hills, CA 90367

Counsel for Respondents