Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Gregory Stanley Roberts, Petitioner v. Inservco Insurance Services

APPENDIX-A

case: 18-3202 Document: 003113203365 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/04/2019

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

DLD-124

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT.

No. 18-3202

GREGORY STANLEY ROBERTS,

Appellant

V.

INSERVCO INSURANCE SERVICES

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civ. No. 17-cv-00476)

District Judge: Cynthia M. Rufe

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)

or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

March 7, 2019

Before: JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR. and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: April 4, 2019)

OPINION*

PER CURIAM

*

This-disposition-is notanopinionoftheful1Cowtandpiirsuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not

constitute binding precedent.

Case: 18-3202 Document: 003113203365 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/04/2019

:

Gregory Stanley Roberts appeals from an order of the District Court dismissing his

third amended complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).

For the reasons that follow, we will summarily affirm.

Roberts worked for the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare ("DPW") as a

houseparent at its Bensalem Youth Development Center for approximately 20 years. In

the course of his employment, Roberts suffered injuries in 1997 and 1998, after which he

did not return to work in any capacity. Soon after he stopped working for DPW, Roberts

applied for and received a retirement pension from DPW and a Social Security disability

pension. He was fifty-one years old at the time.

In June 2004, DPW filed a modification petition based on a labor market survey

indicating that positions were generally available to Roberts within his restrictions. DPW

also filed a suspension petition, seeking to suspend Roberts' benefits as of June 15, 1999

on the ground that he voluntarily left the labor market as of that date. After much

litigation, DPW prevailed and the Commonwealth Court ordered that Roberts' benefits be

suspended, see Dep't of Public Welfare v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Bd. (Roberts),

29 A.3d 403 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2011) ("Roberts I "). The Court held that Roberts

voluntarily 'withdrew from the workforce. Id. at 407-08. The Court then remanded for a

determination of when the suspension of benefits should begin. Id. at 408. In June 2012,

the Workers' Compensation Judge found that the effective date of suspension of benefits

should be June 5, 1999 (rather than June 15, 1999). In February 2013, the Workers'

Compensation Appeal Board affirmed and Roberts did not petition for review of that

decision to the Commonwealth Court.

2

Case 18-3202 Document 003113203365 Page 3 Date Filed 04/04/2019

In April 2013, Roberts filed a petition for penalties, alleging that DPW failed to

pay him benefits pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board February 2013

decision. The petition was denied by the Workers' Compensation Judge and the

Workers' Compensation Appeal Board affirmed in October 2014. Roberts then

petitioned for review to the Commonwealth Court. On August 14, 2015, the

Commonwealth Court affirmed, holding that no penalties were due because Roberts'

benefits were properly in a suspended status. see Roberts v. Workers' Compensation

Appeal Bd. (Dep't of Public Welfare, 2015 WL 5511171 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Aug. 14,

2015) ("Roberts II"). The Court noted that Roberts' real request was that Roberts I be

reversed and that his benefits be reinstated retroactive to the date of suspension. The

Commonwealth Court determined, however, that Roberts was barred from relitigating

that issue; he had failed to petition for review of the Workers' Compensation Appeal

Board's February 2013 decision, and he could not use a penalty petition to challenge the

determination that he voluntarily removed himself from the workforce. Id. at *2. The

Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied review on March 23, 2016 and the United States

Supreme Court denied certiorari on January 9, 2017.

On February 1, 2017, Roberts filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against

Inservco Insurance Services, Inc., alleging that Inservco was complicit in the wrongful

decision to suspend his benefits. Inservco moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to

state a plausible claim for relief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Roberts then filed an amended

complaint, adding the Pennsylvania Department of Human Services ("DHS"), formerly

3

Case: .18-3202 Document: 003113203365 Page: 4 Date Filed: 04/04/2019

known as the Department of Public Welfare, and the Bensalem Youth Development

Center ("BYDC") as defendants. He further alleged that Compservices!AmeriHealth,

Inc. might be the proper insurance company defendant. DHS/BYDC and Inservco moved

to dismiss Roberts' amended complaint. Roberts responded that he did not intend to sue

DHS and BYDC. Accordingly, in an order entered on June 19, 2017, the District Court

granted their motion and dismissed DHS and BYDC from the action. The Court then

questioned whether Roberts sought to sue Inservco or Compservices/AmeriHealth, or

both companies. The Court dismissed Roberts' amended complaint but gave him another

opportunity to amend and urged him to set forth clearly facts alleging why he was

entitled to relief and what relief was sought.

Roberts then filed a second amended complaint, naming as the sole defendant

Compservices/AmeriHealth. Roberts also filed a motion for leave to amend. On

November 22, 2017, the District Court denied the motion for leave to amend without

prejudice and granted Roberts' one final opportunity to amend his complaint. Roberts

filed a third amended complaint naming Inservco Insurance Services as the only

defendant, and alleging that Inservco had assumed the responsibility of handling his

claim. Inservco moved to dismiss the third amended complaint.

In an order entered on September 26, 2018, the District Court dismissed the action

under Rule 12(b)(1) and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine for laôk of subject matter

jurisdiction. The Court determined that Roberts, in arguing a constitutional violation

See Rooker v. Fidelity TrustCo., 263 U.S. 413 (t923)andDistrict of ColumbiaCourt

of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).

4

Case: 18-3202 Document: 003113203365 Page; 5 Date Filed: 04/04/2019

regarding the deprivation of property and in seeking reinstatement of his benefits,

actually sought to challenge the Commonwealth Court's June 21, 2011 decision (Roberts

I) upholding the suspension of his workers' compensation benefits.

Roberts appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our Clerk granted

Roberts leave to appeal in forma pauperis and advised him that the appeal was subject to

summary dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or summary affirmance under Third

Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. He has submitted argument in support of his appeal,

which we have considered. He has also moved to expedite the appeal.

We will summarily affirm the order of the District Court because no substantial

question is resented by this appeal, see Third Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. We exercise

plenary review over subject matter jurisdiction dismissals. See In re: Kaiser Group

International, Inc., 399 F.3d 558, 560 (3d Cir. 2005) (Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).

"Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a district court is precluded from

entertaining an action, that is, the federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, if the

relief requested effectively would reverse a state court decision or void its ruling."

Taliaferro v. Darby Township Zoning Bd., 458 F.3d 181, 192 (3d 2006). The scope of

the doctrine is narrow and applies only to cases brought by (1) state-court losers (2)

complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments (3) rendered before the district

court proceedings commenced and (4) inviting district court review and rejection of those

judgments. j (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280,

284 (2005)). In Great Western Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d

159, 165 (3d Cir. 2010), we held that district courts must use the four-part Exxon Mobil

test to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction is lacking. In In re: Philadelphia

Entertainment & Development Partners, 879 F.3d 492, 499-500 (3d Cir. 2018), we

reaffirmed that, when a plaintiff attempts to re-litigate matters, a federal court has

jurisdiction as long as the plaintiff presents some independent claim, even if that claim

denies a legal conclusion reached by the state court.

Applying the correct standard, the District Court properly arrived at the conclusion

that Roberts' third amended complaint fits squarely within Rooker-Feldman. Here,

Roberts complained of injuries caused by the Commonwealth Court's decision upholding

the suspension of his workers' compensation benefits and sought reinstatement of those

benefits. He challenged the Commonwealth Court's decision that he voluntarily

withdrew from the workforce. Although he invoked the First and Fourteenth

Amendments and sued Inservco, he alleged only that Roberts I was wrongly decided.

The District Court correctly determined that the instant civil rights action, although it

professed to complain of injury by a third party, actually complained of injury produced

by a state-court judgment, see Great Western Mining & Mineral Co., 615 F.3d at 167.

We agree that the Commonwealth Court's decision(s) resulted in the suspension of

Roberts' benefits, and, therefore, are the source of his alleged injury. Moreover, that

state court judgment was rendered before the instant action was commenced.

For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the order of the District Court

dismissing Roberts' third amended complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Roberts' motions for appointment of counsel and to expedite the appeal are denied.

rol

--

Case 2:17-cv-00476-CMR Document 33 Filed 09/25/18 Page 1 of 5

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

GREGORY S. ROBERTS

Plaintiff,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 17476

V.

INSERVCO INSURANCE SERVICES, INC.

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Rufe, J.

September 25, 2018

Defendant lnservco Insurance Services, Inc. has filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff

Gregory Roberts's Third Amended Complaint for failure to state a plausible claim to relief. For

the following reasons, the motion will be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff; proceeding pro Se, has filed this suit, which appears to relate to a complex and

long-running workers' compensation case in Pennsylvania state court. Plaintiff was injured

during his employment with the Youth Development Center ("Employer"), retired, and began

receiving workers' compensation benefits.' Eventually, Employer sought to suspend those

benefits and the dispute was brought before the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court.' The

Commonwealth Court held that Plaintiff voluntarily withdrew from the workforce and granted

Employer's suspension petition.3

Dept of Pub. Welfare/Norristown State Hosp. v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd. (Roberts), 29 A.3d 403, 404

(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2011) ("Roberts 1").

2 1d. at 406.

3 1d. at 407.

Case 2:17-cv-00476-CMR Document 33 Filed 09/25/18 Page 2 of 5

Plaintiff's case was remanded to determine the exact date that his benefits should have

been suspended.4 The Workers' Compensation Judge ("WCJ") found that date to be June 5, 1999

and the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board ("Board") affirmed.5 Plaintiff did not appeal this

decision but later filed a penalty petition alleging Employer's failure to pay him his benefits.6

The case again went before the Commonwealth Court which found that Plaintiff was attempting

to use the penalty petition to challenge the ruling in Roberts j7 The Commonwealth Court ruled

that Plaintiff was barred from re-litigating this issue because he had failed to appeal the Board's

affirmation that his benefits should have been suspended on June 5, 1999.8

Plaintiff has now filed this action against lnservco, alleging that Defendant has "assumed

the handling" and "accepted responsibility" of his claim. Although the Third Amended

Complaint is difficult to parse, Plaintiff states facts relating to the previous litigation and alleges

that the appeal in Roberts I was improper. Plaintiff alleges that his First and Fourteenth

Amendment rights were violated, and seeks relief in the form of monetary damages including

compensatory damages for his suspended benefits, interest, penalties, and punitive damages.

II.

LEGAL STANDARDS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) allows a party to move for dismissal of any

claim where the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.9 When considering a 12(b)(1)

motion, the court "review[s] only whether the allegations on the fact of the complaint, taken as

4 1d. at 408.

5 Roberts v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd. (Dep 't of Public Welfare), No. 2159 C.D. 2014, 2015 WL

5511171, *1 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Aug. 14, 2015) ("Roberts Ii").

6 1d. at *2

7 1d. at

*3

8

9 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).

2

Case 2:17-cv-00476-CMR Document 33 Filed 09/25/18 Page 3 of 5

true, allege facts sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the district court."10 When subject matter

jurisdiction is challenged under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion.'1

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), dismissal of a complaint for failure

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is appropriate where a plaintiffs "plain

statement" 2 lacks enough substance to show that he is entitled to relief '3 In determining

whether a motion to dismiss should be granted, the Court must consider only those facts alleged

in the complaint, accepting all allegations as true and drawing from reasonable inferences in

favor of the plaintiff. 14 Courts are not, however, bound to accept as true legal conclusions

couched as factual allegations. 15 Something more than a mere possibility of a claim must be

alleged; a plaintiff must allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face." 6 "A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." 7 The

complaint must set forth "direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements

necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory," 8 but a "formulaic recitation 1919 of

'0 Licata v. U.S. Postal Serv., 33 F.3d 259,260 (3d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).

"Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991) (citation omitted).

12

13

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

Bell Ail. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007).

14 ALA, Inc. v. CCAIR, Inc., 29 F.3d 855, 859 (3d Cir. 1994); Fay v. Muhlenberg Coll., No. 07-4516, 2008

WL 205227, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 24, 2008).

'

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 564.

16 Id. at 570; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

17 1qba1 556 U.S. at 678.

18

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562 (emphasis in original) (quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d

1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984)).

'9 Id. at 545, 555.

3

Case 2:17-cv-00476-CMR Document 33 Filed 09/25/18 Page 4 of 5

the elements is insufficient. The Court has no duty to "conjure up unpleaded facts that might turn

a frivolous.. .action into a substantial one."20

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as the Complaint is in

essence an attempt to re-litigate his workers' compensation case. Under the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine, federal district courts lack jurisdiction over suits that are essentially appeals from statecourt judgments .2' There are four requirements that must be met for the doctrine to apply: "(1)

the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff complains of injuries caused by the state

court judgment; (3) those judgments were rendered before the federal suit was filed; and (4) the

plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and reject the state judgments. ,22 In determining

whether the alleged injuries were caused by the state court judgment the critical task is "to

identify those federal suits that profess to complain of injury by a third party, but actually

complain of injury 'produced by a state-court judgment and not simply ratified, acquiesced in, or

left unpunished by it. `23

The Commonwealth Court ruled against Plaintiff in Roberts 1 and Roberts II and those

judgments were rendered before Plaintiff filed this action in federal court. 24 Plaintiff has invited

the Court to review the Roberts I decision by arguing that he is entitled to relief from the

20

Id. at 562 (quoting McGregor v. Indus. Excess Landfill, Inc., 856 F.2d 39, 42-43 (6th Cir. 1988)).

21

Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 2010).

22 1d at 166 (quotation marks omitted) (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S.

280, 284 (2005)).

23

Id. at 167 (quoting Hoblock v. Albany Cty. Bd. of Elections, 442 F.3d 77, 88 (2d Cir. 2005)).

24

See generally Roberts 1, 29 A.3d 403; Roberts II, 2015 WL 5511171. Roberts Iwas decided on June 21,

2011, Roberts If was decided on August 14, 2015, and Plaintiff filed his First Complaint with the Court on February

1,2017.

4

Case 2:17-cv-00476-CMR Document 33 Filed 09/25/18 Page 5 of 5

Commonwealth Court's judgment. 25 Plaintiff asserts that his injuries were caused by the

26

suspension of his benefits resulting from the Roberts I decision. It was the Commonwealth

Court decisions that resulted in the suspension of Plaintiff's benefits, and therefore, are the

source of Plaintiff's alleged injury. There are no allegations that Defendant has taken any actions

not mandated by the Commonwealth Court decisions. The four requirements of the RookerFeldman doctrine are therefore satisfied and Plaintiff's claims will be dismissed.

IV. CONCLUSION

The motion to dismiss will be granted. In civil rights cases, "district courts must offer

amendment

irrespective of whether it was requested

-

-

when dismissing a case for failure to

state a claim unless doing so would be inequitable or futile."27 Plaintiff already has had several

opportunities to amend, and further amendment would be futile because he has not alleged a

claim that this Court may adjudicate. Therefore, the Third Amended Complaint will be dismissed

with prejudice. An appropriate order will be entered.

25

26

27

Pl.'s Am. Compl. 3, Dec. 7, 2017, ECF No. 23.

1d at 4 ("My suspension caused me to lose 290 weeks of Workers Compensation Benefits.").

Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007).

Case 2:17-cv-00476-CMR Document 34 Filed 09/25/18 Page 1 of 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

GREGORY S. ROBERTS

Plaintiff,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 17476

V.

INSERVCO INSURANCE SERVICES, INC.

Defendant.

ORDER

AND NOW, this 25th day of September 2018, upon consideration of Defendant's Motion

to Dismiss [Doc. No. 26], and the responses thereto, and for the reasons explained in the

Memorandum Opinion issued on this date, it is hereby ORDERED that the Motion is

GRANTED. Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

The Clerk is directed to CLOSE the case.

It is so ORDERED.

BY THE COURT:

Is! Cynthia M. Rufe

CYNTHIA M. RUFE, J.

Case: 18-3202 Document: 003113225724 Page: 1

Date Filed: 04/30/2019

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 18-3202

GREGORY STANLEY ROBERTS,

Appellant

I,,

INSERVCO INSURANCE SERVICES

(E.D. Pa. No. 2-17-cv-00476)

SUR PETITION FOR REHEARING

Present: JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.

The petition for rehearing filed by Appellant in the above-entitled case having

been submitted to the judges who participated in the decision of this Court, and no judge

who concurred in the decision having asked for rehearing, the petition for rehearing by

the panel is denied.

BY THE COURT,

s/Joseph A. Greenaway, Jr.

Circuit Judge

Dated: April 30, 2019

PDB/cc: Gregory Stanley Roberts

Louis C. Long, Esq.