Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Ronald R. Myles, Petitioner v. United States

(A'

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

No. 17-3817

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

FILED

Feb 21, 2019

DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR

THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF

OHIO

V.

RONALD R. MYLES, JR.,

- -

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER

Before: KEITH, KETHLEDGE, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges.

Ronald R. Myles, Jr., a pro se federal prisoner, appeals the district court's denial of his

motion to suppress evidence and to return property in his criminal case. This case has been referred

to a panel of the court that, upon examination, unanimously agrees that oral argument is not

needed. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a).

After Myles robbed a bank on June 4; 2016, in Marion, Ohio, the Marion Municipal Court

issüéd a warrant (the "June 6th

fàii?'fOTh

rest. UaW'fffdëeiiint, however, wws'iiffable

to apprehend Myles before he robbed a second bank in Marion on June 17, 2016. Through cellphone tracking data, Myles was located later that day at a hotel in Montgomery County, Ohio, and

was arrested. Law enforcement immediately obtained a search warrant (the "June 17th warrant")

for Myles's hotel room and car from the Vandalia Municipal Court in Montgomery County and

seized over $137,000 in cash, a Mercedes, marijuana, two cell phones, and other personal property.

No. 17-3817

-2A Marion County grand jury subsequently indicted Myles on charges of aggravated

robbery, but the State dismissed the charges upon the issuance of a federal indictment against

Myles for one count of bank robbery.

Myles soon filed a pro se motion to dismiss the federal indictment, to suppress the evidence

seized at the hotel, and for the return of his seized property, all on the ground that the search and

seizure at the hotel occurred without an active, lawful warrant. He challenged the validity of both

warrants and asserted, among other things, that the, June 17th warrant, had not yet been issued at

the time of the search, aspurportedly shownby a file-stamp date of June 24, 2016, and by a state

—judge's comment atapie-trial heating on- July

At a hearing, the district court orally denied Myles's combined motions and, began by

rejecting his motion to dismiss the indictment. The district court determined that Myles's

challenge to the June 6th arrest warrant was based on a misunderstanding of the Ohio Rules of

Criminal Procedure and that the warrant provided sufficient grounds to arrest Myles on June 17.

As to the June 17th search warrant, the district court concluded that law enforcement did obtain it

on that date, shortly after Myles's arrest, but simply had not filed it in court until June 24.

Additionally, the affidavit supported the probable cause determination because it detailed the

events of June 17 and included witness statements, cell phone location data, hotel records, and

surveillance information. While the affidavit contained a few misstatements, the misstatements

were connections drawn by a police officer and were not "deliberately or recklessly false as

opposed to perhaps inadvertently or negligently inaccurate." In any event, the remainder of the

affidavit was sufficient to support a finding of probable cause

The district court next rejected Myles's motion to suppress the evidence seized, noting that

the June 6th and June 17th warrants, were not invalid for the aforementioned reasons.

Alternatively, the court concluded that even if a deficiency existed in either warrant,the good-faith

exception to the warrant requirement applied because law enforcement had not acted unreasonably

or in bad faith. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 142, 144-45 (2009). Finally, the

No. 17-3817

district court

court denied Myles's motion for the return of property because the marijuana was

contraband and the remainder of the property was evidence in the ongoing criminal proceeding.

Myles thereafter was charged by superseding indictment on two counts of armed bank

robbery. See 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d). Ajury convicted him of both counts, and the district court

sentenced him to 222 months in prison and three years of supervised release, and ordered him to

pay $145,468 in restitution.

On appeal, Myles argues that the district court should have granted his motion to suppress

and for the return of property ursuant to the Rooker-Feldman' and res judicata doctrines.,

With respect to th dvniai-ü!a ñiO'tiUñt

ippiss,

court's finding

of fact for clear error, (ts legal conclusions de novo)and the evidence in the light most favorable

to the government. United States v. Jackson, 682 F.3d 448, 452 (6th Cir. 2012).

In support of his argument that the Rooker-Feldman and res judicata doctrines required the

district court to grant his motion to suppress and return his property, Myles relies on the state

judge's purported "ruling" on July 21, 2016, thathe June 6th warrant was the sole warrant.He

further argues that the state court's "ruling" precluded application of the good-faith exception4 and

that there should have been a federal warrant.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine "bars attempts by a federal plaintiff to receive appellate

review of a(statc-court decisionin a federal district court." Howard v. Whitbeck, 382 F.3d 633,

638 (6th Cir. 2004). "To determine whether a state court action is a 'decision,' we evaluate

whether.1, state court addressed the claim 'on the merits." Berry v. Schmitt, 688 F.3d 290, 299

(6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Feldman, 460 U.S. at 478). The doctrine is limited to "cases brought by

state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the

district court proceedings commenced." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S.

280, 284 (2005).

'See D. C. Court ofAppeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263

U.S. 413 (1923).

No. 17-3817

-4Under the (doctrine of res judioatali federal courts must give the same preclusive effect to

(state court judgments as those judgments would receive in the courts of the rendering state. See

Migray. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. ofEduc., 465 U.S. 75, 80-85 (1984). In Ohio, res judicata has

four elements:

a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction;

a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a

second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first

action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was

the subject matter of the previous action.

)

:'•;

United States ex rel. Sheldon v. Kettering Health Network, 816 F.3d 399, 415 (6th Cir. 2016)

(quoting Hápgoodv. City of Warren, 127 F.3d 490, 493 (6th Cir. 1997)).

At the state preliminary hearing in Marion County Common Pleas Court on July 21, 2016,

Myles asked the judge if the June 6th warrant was the latest warrant and argued that it permitted

only his arrest and not the seizure of his property. He then requested that the state charges be

dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Although the state judge stated that the June 6th warrant "was

-

the latest one that was filed," the judge directed Myles to submit a written motion to dismiss.

Myles did so, but the judge did not rule on the motion because the State dismissed the case due to

the initiation of federal prosecution.

We conclude that the district court did not err by failing to grant Myles's motion to suppress

and return his property. The Rooker-Feldman and res judicata doctrines do not apply because the

state court did not address Myles's argument on the merits and issue a decision "See Kettering

Health Network, 81.6 F.3.dat415; Berry,.688 •F.3d at 299..Furthermorc, the government was not

................................................

a party to the state action. See Kettering Health Network, 816 F.3d at 415.

We further conclude that no federal search warrant was necessary. Evidence seized by

state officers pursuant toastate search warrant generally may be used in a federal prosecution,

provided that the warrant passes constitutional muster. See United States v. Bennett, 170 F.3d 632,

----....-

--.-

..

636 n.1 (6th Cir. 1999). For the reasons stated by the district court, the search warrant for Myles's

hotel room and car was supported by probable cause as required by the Fourth Amendment. See

United States v. Rose, 714 F.3d 362, 366 (6th Cir. 2013).

No. 17-3817

-5To the extent that Myles attempts to raise an independent argument regarding the denial of

his motion for the return of his property, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its

discretion because criminal proceedings had not terminated, and Myles had not shown that he was

lawfully entitled to the property. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g); Savoy v. United States, 604 F.3d 929,

932 (6th Cir. 2010).

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court's judgment.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

Deborah S. Hunt, Clerk