Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Ann Wilma Petersen, Petitioner v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., dba Norwegian Cruise Line
Supreme Court briefDec 21, 2018
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App. 1
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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Nos. 17-15581 & 18-10513
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:16-cv-24421-FAM
ROBERT EDWARD PETERSEN,
ANN WILMA PETERSEN, his wife,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
NCL (BAHAMAS) LTD. d.b.a.
Norwegian Cruise Line,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(September 5, 2018)
Before MARTIN, JILL PRYOR, and ANDERSON,
Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff-Appellant Robert Petersen slipped and
fell on the deck of a Norwegian Cruise Line (“NCL”)
cruise ship. He sued NCL, claiming that NCL was
App. 2
negligent in several ways. Petersen’s wife, PlaintiffAppellant Anne [sic] Wilma Petersen, brought a loss of
consortium claim. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of NCL and the Petersens appealed.
For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that the
district court prematurely granted summary judgment
regarding Mr. Petersen’s negligence claims but
properly granted summary judgment in favor of NCL
on Mrs. Petersen’s loss of consortium claim. Accordingly, we affirm with respect to the judgment of the district court regarding Mrs. Petersen’s loss of consortium
claim, but we reverse the grant of summary judgment
as to Mr. Petersen’s negligence claims and remand to
the district court for further proceedings on those
claims.1
I.
STANDARD
The Court reviews a district court’s order granting
summary judgment de novo, viewing the record, and
all its inferences, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Zaben v. Air Prod. & Chemicals, Inc., 129
F.3d 1453, 1455 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Additionally, a district court
1
The district court also entered an order taxing costs in favor
of NCL. The Petersens separately appealed from that order, and
we consolidated that appeal with this one. Because we reverse
the district court’s grant of summary judgment regarding Mr.
Petersen’s negligence claims, we also vacate the award of costs.
App. 3
may grant summary judgment to a nonmovant or on
grounds not raised by the parties only “[a]fter giving
notice and a reasonable time to respond.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(f ).
II.
BACKGROUND
A. Mr. Petersen’s Fall and Injuries
In October 2015, the Petersens took a cruise on
NCL’s cruise ship, the Breakaway. On October 22,
2015, the Breakaway docked in Bermuda. Rather than
go ashore, the Petersens stayed on the Breakaway and
planned to soak in the hot tub on deck 16. When the
Petersens arrived at deck 16, Mrs. Petersen went to the
hot tub and Mr. Petersen went to the bar to get her a
drink. According to Mr. Petersen’s deposition, he recalls feeling strong wind as he stepped onto the deck.
He testified that he remembers the wind blowing water from decorative waterfalls onto him and the deck.
Mr. Petersen testified that he does not recall it raining
but does remember seeing water on the deck. As Mr.
Petersen walked from the bar to the hot tub, both of his
feet slipped out from under him. He landed on his back
and hit his head on the deck. The ship’s closed-circuit
television system (“CCTV”) captured video footage of
Mr. Petersen’s fall from several angles.
Mr. Petersen was knocked unconscious by the fall
and taken to a hospital in Bermuda. After an examination, Mr. Petersen returned to the Breakaway and remained on board for the rest of the cruise. He sought
additional medical treatment when he returned home.
App. 4
According to Mr. Petersen’s treating physician, the fall
caused small areas of bleeding in Mr. Petersen’s brain.
Mr. Petersen still suffers from headaches, impaired vision, equilibrium problems, speech problems, and
memory problems due to the fall.
B. Deck Material and Maintenance
The deck material on which Mr. Petersen fell is
called Bolidt Bolideck Select Soft (“Bolidt Select Soft”).
The Petersens offer evidence of sixty other NCL passengers who slipped and fell on liquid on the Bolidt Select Soft decks on the Breakaway during the three
years before Mr. Petersen’s fall. The Petersens also offer evidence suggesting that NCL used too strong of a
detergent to clean the Bolidt Select Soft deck material.
Specifically, NCL’s “Deck Night Washing Policy” suggests that NCL used a detergent called “Bolidt Super
Stripper” to clean all of its decks, including the Bolidt
Select Soft. But the deck manufacturer’s instructions
recommend that cruise lines clean the Bolidt Select
Soft deck material with a “[m]ild soap cleaner for daily
use” called “Royal Soft.” The instructions recommend
the use of a “[s]trong . . . cleaning/degreasing agent,”
the “Bolidt Super Stripper,” on a different kind of Bolidt deck but do not recommend its use on the Bolidt
Select Soft. The instructions also warn: “Bolidt Super
Stripper is to be used only in the maximum concentrations specified. All traces of Super Stripper should be
removed after cleaning by washing with potable water.
Prolonged exposure to Super Stripper may permanently damage the deck surface.”
App. 5
C. District Court Proceedings
The Petersons [sic] sued NCL for negligence and
loss of consortium. In their complaint, the Petersens
claim that NCL was negligent in several ways. Specifically, they allege, “[NCL] owed a duty to the passengers, and in particular to the Plaintiffs, to exercise
reasonable care to design, maintain and operate its
vessel Norwegian Breakaway in a reasonably safe condition.” They claim that NCL was negligent in fulfilling
this duty by “[f ]ailing to warn passengers of the dangerous conditions of the walking surface of the deck or
floor,” as well as by “[f ]ailing to promulgate and/or follow proper procedures for monitoring the slipperiness
and keeping the walking surface of the deck or floor
reasonably safe for passengers.”
NCL filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that (1) NCL had no duty to warn Mr. Petersen of
the dangerous condition because the dangerous condition was open and obvious; (2) NCL had no duty to
warn Mr. Petersen of the dangerous condition because
it had no notice of the dangerous condition; and (3)
maritime law does not recognize a cause of action for
loss of consortium. NCL did not address any claim that
it negligently maintained the deck in the motion for
summary judgment. In their response in opposition to
the motion for summary judgment, the Petersens
again referred to NCL’s allegedly negligent maintenance of the deck, stating, “Defendant’s operations created the unreasonably dangerous condition, by
negligent maintenance. . . .” Moreover, at the hearing
before the magistrate judge regarding the motion for
App. 6
summary judgment, the Petersens’ counsel argued extensively regarding Mr. Petersen’s claim that NCL
negligently maintained the deck.
The magistrate judge recommended that summary judgment was appropriate on all of the Petersens’ claims. Regarding Mr. Petersen’s negligence
claims, the magistrate judge concluded that NCL had
no duty to warn Mr. Petersen of the slipperiness of the
deck because the dangerous condition—the wet deck—
was open and obvious. The magistrate judge did not
address negligent maintenance at all in the report and
recommendation. The Petersens objected to the report
and recommendation, arguing again in part that NCL
negligently maintained the deck. The district court
adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. Like the magistrate judge, the district court did
not address negligent maintenance.
On appeal, the Petersens argue that: (1) the district court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of NCL on Mr. Petersen’s failure to warn claim
based on the open and obvious doctrine because the
unreasonably slippery nature of the deck was not open
and obvious; (2) the district court erred by granting
summary judgment in favor of NCL on Mr. Petersen’s
negligent maintenance claim because NCL did not
seek summary judgment regarding that claim; and (3)
the district court erred by denying Mrs. Petersen’s loss
of consortium claim.
App. 7
III.
DISCUSSION
The parties agree that, because Mr. Petersen’s injuries occurred on navigable waters, federal maritime
law controls this case. Everett v. Carnival Cruise Lines,
912 F.2d 1355, 1358 (11th Cir. 1990); see also Doe v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 394 F.3d 891, 901-02 (11th Cir.
2004) (holding that federal maritime law governed a
cruise passenger’s sexual assault case against a cruise
ship even though the assault took place while the ship
was docked in Bermuda). In analyzing a maritime tort
case, the Court applies the general principles of negligence law. Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333,
1336 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam). Under those principles, a plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant had
a duty, (2) the defendant breached that duty, (3) the
breach actually and proximately caused the plaintiff ’s
injury, and (4) the plaintiff suffered actual harm. Id. A
cruise line owes its passengers a duty of “ordinary reasonable care under the circumstances, a standard
which requires, as a prerequisite to imposing liability,
that the carrier have had actual or constructive notice
of the risk-creating condition.” Keefe v. Bahama Cruise
Line, Inc., 867 F.2d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam). The cruise line’s duty to its passengers includes
“a duty to warn of known dangers . . . in places where
passengers are invited or reasonably expected to visit”
that would not be open and obvious to a reasonable
person under the circumstances. Chaparro, 693 F.3d at
1336; Deperrodil v. Bozovic Marine, Inc., 842 F.3d 352,
357 (5th Cir. 2016) (“A vessel owner does not need to
App. 8
warn passengers or make special arrangements for
open-and-obvious risks.”).
A. Negligent Failure to Warn
The Petersens first argue that the district court
should not have applied the open and obvious doctrine
to Mr. Petersen’s negligent failure to warn claim. Specifically, they claim that, although it was obvious that
the deck on which Mr. Petersen fell was wet, it was not
open and obvious that the deck was unreasonably slippery. The Petersens offer the following evidence to support their claim that the deck on which Mr. Petersen
fell was unreasonably slippery: (1) the video footage
showing that both of Mr. Petersen’s feet slipped completely out from under him in such a manner that a
jury might find that the deck surface was unreasonably slippery; (2) the fact that sixty other NCL passengers fell on Bolidt Select Soft decking on the
Breakaway during the three year period before Mr. Petersen fell; and (3) the evidence suggesting that NCL
used the Bolidt Super Stripper detergent on the Select
Soft deck, even though that was not recommended by
the manufacturer.
We agree with the Petersens that this evidence is
sufficient for a reasonable juror to conclude that the
deck on which Mr. Petersen fell was unreasonably slippery. Furthermore, we agree that, although the wetness of the deck was open and obvious, the
unreasonably slippery state of the deck may not have
App. 9
been open and obvious to a reasonable person.2 Because there is evidence in the record from which a reasonable juror could conclude that the deck was
unreasonably slippery, we reverse the district court’s
grant of summary judgment on the failure to warn
claim based on its conclusion that the water on the
deck was an open and obvious risk.
We recognize that in the district court NCL raised
additional alternative arguments in its defense
against Mr. Petersen’s negligent failure to warn
claim—i.e., NCL’s alleged lack of notice of the risk-creating condition and its argument that the warnings actually given were adequate. However, Mr. Petersen’s
failure to warn claim was rejected by the magistrate
judge and the district court solely on the open and obvious ground, and neither addressed NCL’s alternative
grounds. Having vacated the district court’s judgment
with respect to the open and obvious ground, we remand Mr. Petersen’s failure to warn claim to the district court to consider in the first instance NCL’s
alternative arguments.
2
We have reached this same conclusion in another unpublished case. See Frasca v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd., 654 F. App’x
949, 953 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (reversing the district
court’s grant of summary judgment in a case in which the plaintiffs presented evidence that the deck was unreasonably slippery
because, although it may be obvious that water on a deck will
make it slicker than usual, the deck’s visible wetness may not
alert a reasonable person to the extent of the deck’s slipperiness).
App. 10
B. Negligent Maintenance
The Petersens next argue that the district court
erred by granting summary judgment with regards to
their negligent maintenance claim. Specifically, they
claim that NCL did not move for summary judgment
regarding this claim and that the district court did not
give them sufficient notice of its intent to grant summary judgment on the claim. We agree with the Petersens that the district court did not properly address
their negligent maintenance claim.
The Petersens’ complaint lists a single negligence
count against NCL. But the substance of the complaint
makes clear that the Petersens claim that NCL was
negligent in several ways, including by negligently
maintaining the deck material. Moreover, counsel for
the Petersens eliminated any uncertainty by arguing
extensively regarding Mr. Petersen’s negligent maintenance claim at the summary judgment hearing. Nevertheless, the magistrate judge, who conducted the
hearing, did not address the negligent maintenance
claim in his report and recommendation. And despite
the fact that the Petersens argued that the deck was
negligently maintained in their objections to the report
and recommendation, the district court also failed to
address that claim. Given that NCL did not move for
summary judgment regarding Mr. Petersen’s negligent
maintenance claim, the district court never addressed
that claim, and there is evidence suggesting that NCL
did not follow the manufacturer’s instructions for
cleaning the deck, we remand for the district court to
App. 11
address Mr. Petersen’s negligent maintenance claim in
the first instance.
C. Loss of Consortium
This Court has held that plaintiffs may not recover loss of consortium damages for personal injury
claims under federal maritime law. See In re Amtrak
Sunset Ltd. Train Crash in Bayou Canot, Ala. on Sept.
22, 1993, 121 F.3d 1421, 1429 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding
that the plaintiffs could not recover punitive or loss of
consortium damages for personal injuries sustained
when a commercial vessel crashed into a railway
bridge); see also Lollie v. Brown Marine Serv., Inc., 995
F.2d 1565, 1565 (11th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (“[N]either the Jones Act nor general maritime law authorizes recovery for loss of society or consortium in
personal injury cases.”). “We are bound to follow a prior
precedent or en banc holding, except where that holding has been overruled or undermined to the point of
abrogation by a subsequent en banc or Supreme Court
decision.” Tobinick v. Novella, 884 F.3d 1110, 1118
(11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Chambers v. Thompson, 150
F.3d 1324, 1326 (11th Cir. 1998)).
The Petersens recognize that this Circuit’s precedent precludes Mrs. Petersen’s loss of consortium
claim. Nevertheless, they argue that the Court should
reexamine In re Amtrak in light of the Supreme
Court’s more recent holding in Atlantic Sounding Co.
v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 129 S. Ct. 2561, 174
L. Ed. 2d 382 (2009). In Atlantic Sounding, the
App. 12
Supreme Court held that, as a matter of general maritime law, a seaman may recover punitive damages for
the willful and wanton disregard of the maintenance
and cure obligation in the appropriate case. Id. at 424,
129 S. Ct. at 2575. Nothing in that opinion undermines
our holding in In re Amtrak. See In re Amtrak, 121 F.3d
at 1429 (suggesting that punitive or loss of consortium
damages may be available under federal maritime law
“in exceptional circumstances such as willful failure to
furnish maintenance and cure to a seaman”). That is,
there are no exceptional circumstances in this case and
no allegations of intentional conduct. Accordingly, we
affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment
regarding Mrs. Petersen’s loss of consortium claim.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED with instructions.
App. 13
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case Number: 16-24421-CIV-MORENO
ROBERT EDWARD
PETERSEN and ANN
WILMA PETERSEN
Plaintiffs,
vs.
NCL (BAHAMAS) LTD. d/b/a
NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE,
Defendant.
/
ORDER ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AND
GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
(Filed Nov. 20, 2017)
This is a slip-and-fall case brought by Robert Petersen against Norwegian Cruise Line for alleged negligence in failing to protect or warn him of a
dangerously slippery open-weather deck. Ann Petersen, Robert’s wife, also brought a loss of consortium
claim. This cause comes before the Court upon Norwegian’s motion for summary judgment, which was referred to Magistrate Judge William C. Turnoff for a
report and recommendation. Norwegian argued that:
(1) it had no duty to warn because the alleged dangerous condition was open and obvious; (2) it had no notice
of a dangerous condition; and (3) maritime law does not
App. 14
recognize loss of consortium claims. Judge Turnoff recommends granting summary judgment, specifically
finding that the alleged danger was open and obvious
as a matter of law. Plaintiffs filed objections.
First, Plaintiffs argue that Norwegian has failed
to present evidence to disprove the allegations. However, this argument misunderstands the burden of
proof. Plaintiffs have the burden to provide sufficient
evidence to demonstrate a genuine issue of material
fact. Here, the record simply does not create a genuine
dispute. And at this stage of litigation, the Court does
not consider any of Plaintiffs’ allegations that are not
supported by record evidence.
Plaintiffs also argue that the report and recommendation improperly transforms comparative negligence into a bar to recovery, However, the report and
recommendation does not address comparative negligence or any other affirmative defense. The analysis
begins and ends with Plaintiffs’ inability to prove duty,
an essential element of the negligence claim. Based on
the record evidence, the report and recommendation
correctly found that Norwegian had no duty to warn
because the alleged dangerous condition was open and
obvious as a matter of law.
Plaintiffs also argue that the report and recommendation fails to address the actual hazard—that the
deck’s non-skid properties were not working—and instead addresses only the potential hazard of a wet
deck. Here, Plaintiffs miss the mark. Indeed, the report
and recommendation states: “Plaintiff argues that
App. 15
[Norwegian] failed to warn him of the unreasonably
dangerous condition, i.e., that the deck was slippery as
ice . . . In his view, such a hazard is different from a
properly maintained non-skid walking surface that is
simply wet.” Thus, the report and recommendation
clearly addresses the proper allegations,
The Court has reviewed the entire file and record,
has made a de novo review of the issues that the objections present, and being otherwise fully advised in the
premises, it is
ADJUDGED that Plaintiffs’ objections are
OVERRULED, the Report and Recommendation is
AFFIRMED and ADOPTED, and Norwegian’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. Further, all
pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami,
Florida, this 20th of November 2017.
/s/ [Illegible]
FEDERICO A. MORENO
UNITED STATES
DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record; United States Magistrate Judge
William C. Turnoff
App. 16
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Miami Division
Case Number: 16-24421-CIV-MORENO
ROBERT EDWARD
PETERSEN and ANN
WILMA PETERSEN
Plaintiffs,
vs.
NCL (BAHAMAS) LTD. d/b/a
NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE,
Defendant.
/
FINAL JUDGMENT
(Filed Nov. 20, 2017)
Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 56
and 58, and in accordance with the reasons stated in
the Court’s Order Granting Summary Judgment on
November 20, 2017, judgment is entered in favor of the
Defendant NCL (Bahamas) Ltd. and against Plaintiffs
Robert Edward Petersen and Ann Wilma Petersen.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami,
Florida, this 20th of November 17.
App. 17
/s/ [Illegible]
FEDERICO A. MORENO
UNITED STATES
DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record
App. 18
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO: 16-24421-CIV-MORENO/TURNOFF
ROBERT PETERSEN and
ANN PETERSEN, his wife,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
NCL (BAHAMAS) LTD., d/b/a
NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE,
et al.,
Defendants.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
(Filed Oct. 13, 2017)
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendant, Norwegian Cruise Lines’ (“NCL”) Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 41). The Motion was filed
on June 23, 2017. The Response was filed on July 7,
2017 (ECF No. 49), and the Reply was filed on July
14, 2017. (ECF No. 52). The Motion was referred to
the undersigned on July 15, 2017. (ECF. No. 57). On
August 28, 2017, the undersigned entered an Order
scheduling a hearing for September 27, 2017. (ECF
No. 60). A hearing on the Motion took place as scheduled.
Upon review of the Motion, the Response, the Reply, hearing argument from counsel, and being
App. 19
otherwise duly advised in the premises, the Court
makes the following findings.
Background
This action was filed on October 20, 2016. (ECF
No. 1). The Complaint alleges, among other things,
negligence in connection with a slip and fall onboard
the Norwegian Breakaway. Id. Specifically, Plaintiff
Robert Peterson [sic] (hereinafter “Plaintiff ’) claims
that he fell on water in an open-weather deck in the
“Spice H20” pool area. (ECF No. 41). He claims to have
suffered head injuries as a result [sic] the fall. (ECF
No. 1). Plaintiff alleges negligence against NCL1 for
failing to protect and/or warn him of the dangers presented by the wet deck. Id. His wife is alleging loss of
consortium. Id.
NCL’s Motion for Summary Judgment
NCL seeks summary judgment on the following
grounds: (1) it had no duty to warn Plaintiff because
the alleged dangerous condition was, or should have
been, obvious to him; (2) it had no notice of a dangerous
condition; and (3) maritime law does not recognize
claims for loss of consortium. (ECF No. 41).
In support of its Motion, NCL has submitted a
Statement of Undisputed Facts wherein it lists twenty
1
Plaintiffs initially sued both NCL and the M/S Norwegian
Breakaway. However, the Breakaway was ultimately dismissed
by stipulation. (ECF No. 16, 20).
App. 20
purportedly undisputed matters. Id. In his Response,
Plaintiff(s) concedes, that for the most part, more than
half of the listed facts (1, 2, 3, 8, 9,10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16,
17 and 18) are undisputed. (ECF No. 49). However,
some of his concessions come with explanations. Further, in his view, these facts, even if undisputed, are
immaterial to the entry of summary judgment. Nevertheless, for present purposes, the following facts are
not in dispute.
Plaintiff and his wife, Ann, (collectively “the Peterson’s [sic]”) had been on ten (10) other cruises prior to
the subject cruise. Id. On October 22, 2015, the Peterson’s [sic] were on vacation aboard NCL’s Breakaway
as non-seamen, fare paying passengers. (ECF No.
41,49). During his deposition, Plaintiff testified that
when he stepped onto the exterior of Deck 16 in the
“Spice H20 Bar,” it was obvious to him that there was
water on the deck. Id. He also testified that he felt
strong winds whipping and pelting water at him as he
stepped onto the deck. Id. Upon entering the area,
Plaintiff and his wife walked to the left towards the bar
and left their belongings in a sheltered space. Id. Plaintiff then walked barefoot from the bar toward the hot
tub with a drink in his hand. Id. He knew the deck was
wet in the path he was walking towards the hot tub.
Id. Plaintiff has no recollection of the fall, but he claims
that he slipped and fell while walking to the hot tub
from the bar. Id. Although he alleges that the source of
the water was a waterfall feature on the opposite side
of the deck, he conceded at deposition that he was actually just guessing. Id. On this particular cruise,
App. 21
Plaintiff had previously visited the deck in question,
and had used the hot tub facilities, at least once prior
to the accident. Id.
Plaintiff disputes and/or expands on the remaining facts listed by NCL. Those items are as follows:
•
Prior to Plaintiff ’s accident, he had spent
time walking around the same deck area
to observe shows and performances.
(ECF No. 41, 4).
•
Signage on the flooring in the area warns
passengers to exercise caution. Id. at 5.
•
Plaintiff walked directly over the warning signage on at least one occasion prior
to the incident. Id. 5-7.
•
While Plaintiff ordered a drink at the bar,
his wife walked towards the hot tub
through the subject area without incident. Id. at 13.
•
NCL’s CCTV video recording shows that
the deck is dry and then instantaneously
becomes soaked with a sheet of rain just
prior to the incident, evidencing little
time, if any, for NCL to take corrective action. Id. at 19.
•
There is no evidence that NCL was aware
of any alleged dangerous condition prior
to the subject incident. Id. at 20.
As noted above, Plaintiff takes issue with these
“facts,” as alleged by NCL. Specifically, Plaintiff denies
that prior to the accident he spent time walking
App. 22
around the area in question to observe shows and performances. (ECF No. 41, n.4.). While he had walked
in other areas, such as the dance floor, prior to his injuries, he had not walked close to where he fell. (ECF
No. 49). He likewise denies that the signage on the
flooring warns passengers to exercise caution. Id. In
this connection, he claims that the warning was so inadequate that it even went unnoticed by a bartender
that worked next to it for years. Id.
In sum, Plaintiff argues that NCL failed to warn
him of the unreasonably dangerous condition, i.e., that
the deck was as slippery as ice. Id. In his view, such a
hazard is different from a properly maintained nonskid walking surface that is simply wet. Id. Plaintiff
further argues that while his wife walked in the same
area, there is no evidence that she stepped on the exact
same slippery surface that caused him to fall. Id.
Plaintiff likewise rejects the argument that NCL was
unaware of the alleged dangerous condition. Id. Specifically, Plaintiff suggests that there were sixty (60) prior
substantially similar slips and falls on similar flooring
surfaces that were wet. In his papers, Plaintiff states
only that the same flooring existed in 60 other slip and
fall incidents. In this connection, he refers to the testimony of NCL’s corporate representative, Brett Berman, who testified that out of 600,000 guests, only 60
had ever reported slips and falls on liquid involving the
same flooring. Berman Dep. 32:1-25. It is not clear
whether these references relate to this same ship and
this particular deck, or whether this is a fleet wide reference. (ECF No. 49).
App. 23
In short, Plaintiff suggests that NCL knew of the
problem, but did nothing. Further, in his view, notice is
not even an issue, because NCL created the condition
by its own negligence.
Standard of Review
Summary judgment is proper “if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party
bears the initial responsibility to inform the court of
the basis for its motion and identifying the portions of
the pleadings, or filings, that it believes demonstrate
the absence of a genuine issue. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “[A]t the summary judgment
stage the judge’s function is not himself to weigh the
evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to
determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249
(1986). In furtherance of same, the Court should view
all evidence and make all justifiable inferences in favor
of the non-moving party. Id. However, if the evidence
proffered by the nonmovant is “merely colorable” or
“not significantly probative,” summary judgment may
still be granted. Id. at 249-250.
App. 24
Analysis
Negligence
Maritime law governs the liability of a cruise ship
for a passenger’s slip and fall.2 Everett v. Carnival
Cruise Lines, 912 F.2d 1355, 1358 (11th Cir.1990). In
this connection, a carrier by sea does not serve as an
insurer to its passengers. Kornberg v. Carnival Cruise
Lines, Inc., 741 F.2d 1332, 1334 (11th Cir.1984). Instead, it is liable only for its negligence. Id.; see also,
Weiner v. Carnival Cruise Lines, No. 11-CV-22516,
2012 WL 5199604, at *2 (S.D.Fla. Oct. 22, 2012). Stated
differently, the owner of a ship in navigable waters
owes passengers a duty of “reasonable care” under the
circumstances. Sorrels v. NCL, Ltd., 796 F. 3d 1275,
1279 (11th Cir.2015).
Here, in order to prevail on his negligence claim,
Plaintiff must show that: (1) RCL [sic] owed him a
duty; (2) that RCL [sic] breached that duty; (3) that
this duty was the proximate cause of his injury; and
that (4) that Plaintiff suffered damages. Isbell v. Carnival Corp., 462 F.Supp.2d 1232, 1236 (S.D.Fla. 2006).
The failure to show sufficient evidence of each element
is fatal to a plaintiff ’s negligence claim. Id. at 1237; see
also Taiariol v. MSC Crociere, SA, No. 5-61131, 2016
WL 1428942, at *3 (S.D.Fla. Apr. 12, 2016).
2
In the absence of applicable maritime law, the court may
apply the reasoning used by other federal circuits. Isbell v. Carnival Corp., 462 F.Supp.2d 1232 (2006) (citing Carlisle v. Ulysees
Line Ltd., S.A., 475 So.2d 248, 250 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)).
App. 25
Open and Obvious
The above-noted standard of care requires “as a
prerequisite to imposing liability, that the carrier have
had actual or constructive notice of the risk creating
condition.” Keefe v. Bahama Cruise Line, Inc., 867 F.2d
1318, 1322 (11th Cir.1989). The duty to warn passengers of dangers, however, extends only to “those dangers which are not apparent and obvious to the
passenger.” Luby v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 633
F. Supp. 40 (S.D.Fla.1986); see also, Smolnikar v. Royal
Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 787 F.Supp.2d 1308, 1323
(S.D.Fla.2011). Open and obvious dangers are dangers
that should be obvious by the ordinary use of one’s
senses. Lancaster v. Carnival Corp., 85 F.Supp.3d,
1341, 1344 (S.D.Fla.2015) (open and obvious conditions
are discernible through common sense and the ordinary use of eyesight). The question of whether a danger is ‘open and obvious’ is determined from an
objective viewpoint. John Morrell & Co. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 534 F.Supp.2d 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2008).
Stated differently, an individual’s subjective perceptions are irrelevant in determining whether a duty to
warn existed. Id. at 1351.
Here, NCL argues that it owed no such duty,3 because the conditions on Deck 16 were open and obvious
to Plaintiff. In its view, as an avid cruiser, Plaintiff
should have been aware of the fact that open weather
decks may be exposed to wet weather conditions, and
3
Notwithstanding this argument, NCL notes that it did, in
fact, provide warnings by way of signage which cautioned passengers to exercise caution while walking in the area. (ECF No. 41).
App. 26
that a wet ship deck may be slippery. (ECF No. 41).
Plaintiff, on the other hand, suggests that a jury could
view the CCTV video and conclude that the deck’ s visible wetness and the weather conditions would not
alert a reasonable observer to the extent of the deck’s
slipperiness. (ECF No. 49). In his view, this conclusion
is “bolstered by the uncontroverted fact that Defendant’s [own] employee, wearing non-skid boots, also
slipped . . . while exiting the area. Id. Based upon this
record, and after having reviewed the CCTV video
(ECF No. 61), the undersigned is not persuaded.
Plaintiff ’s own testimony reveals that he was familiar with the area in question, he understood the
deck to be wet, and was aware of the weather conditions on the day of the accident. (ECF No. 595). Specifically, Plaintiff testified as follows:
Q. Okay. Had you been to the hot tub area on
Deck 16 prior to that day?
A. Yes.
Q. How many times had you been in to the hot
tub area would you say?
A.
We were in the hot tubs, I don’t remember
what day it was, but one time prior – prior to
that day, and also they have shows and everything else up on the deck. So we didn’t really
stay at the shows, but you just go up there and
see – to see what was going on.
Peterson [sic] Dep. 55:14-25.
App. 27
Q. Ok, So you had been to the same hot tub area
at least once before to go in the hot tub?
A. Correct.
Q. And you had been in that area on another occasion to see what was going on because there
was some sort of show or performance?
A. Correct.
*
*
*
Q. Okay. When you decided to go to the hot tubs
on the day of the incident, do you recall what
the weather was like outside?
A.
That I remember?
Q. Yes.
A. I remember it was a nice day but windy, but
when we walked out one [sic] to the – I don’t
know how to explain it, but the ship is almost
like a tunnel . . .
We were just getting – the wind was just
whipping. All the chairs itself [sic] were tied
up. The wind was whipping, and you felt like
you were getting pelted by water.
Id. at 55:25; 56:1-25.
Q. And at that point, it was obvious to you it was
very windy out, correct?
A.
Very windy.
Q. Okay and your testimony was the wind was
whipping, so it was a strong wind that you felt
as soon as you got out onto the deck, correct?
App. 28
A. The wind was, yeah, whipping, gushing. The
wind was strong.
Q. Okay. Any [sic] you felt that [sic], and you observed that as soon as you stepped out onto
the exterior deck, correct?
A.
Yes.
Q. And then you said that you were also getting
pelted by water, correct?
A. Correct.
Id. at 58:1-25.
Q. So you just see in front of you from the wind
this water just pelting in front of you and coming in front of you?
A.
Yeah.
Q. Okay. I just want to make sure. So you felt it
because it was hitting you, and you could also
feel it?
A.
Yes.
Id. at 59:1-25.
Q. And you also recall stepping out onto the deck
and feeling the wind and feeling the water,
correct?
A.
I do.
Id. 60:1-12.
Q. Okay. As you felt the water pelting you and
you saw the water in front of you, did you also
see water on the deck itself ?
App. 29
A.
Yes.
Q. Okay. And that was obvious to you. You could
see the water on the deck, correct?
A.
Yes.
Q. . . . Was it obvious to you that there was water
on the deck when you stepped out onto the exterior deck?
A.
Yes.
Q. You would agree with me that you knew the
deck was wet once you were on the exterior
deck, correct?
A.
Yes.
Id. at 61:9-25; 62:1-10.
Q. And was the deck wet in the path that you
took to travel to the hot tub?
A.
Yes.
Q. Okay. And you could observe that; you could
see that, correct?
A.
Yes.
Id. at 76:5-13.
Again, Plaintiff was not new to cruising. He had
been on ten (10) other cruises before the instant cruise.
He had used the hot tub area at issue on at least one
occasion before the incident. Plaintiff himself testified
that the weather was wet and windy. One might even
classify his description as inclement weather conditions. In fact, Plaintiff testified that no one else was on
App. 30
the exterior deck at the time (Peterson [sic] Dep. 61:18) and that the furniture was tied up. Id. at 55:25; 56:125. These things, on their own, provide adequate warning that there existed the potential for the deck floor
to be slick or slippery. In addition, there was a warning
sign in the area warning passengers to exercise caution. Under these circumstances – i.e., the wind and
water described by Plaintiff – a reasonable person
could sense that water may have accumulated on the
floor. These things should have been even more obvious
to an avid cruiser like Plaintiff. In fact, his wife, also
an avid cruiser, had walked on the same path just prior
to the accident without issue.
Here, viewing the above facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, and applying the law, the undersigned finds that Defendant is entitled to summary
judgment. Simply put, the conditions on the deck on
the day of the incident were open and obvious. The
Court is sympathetic, as it does appear that Plaintiff
was injured. However, liability cannot rest on sympathy alone. Weiner v. Carnival Cruise Lines, No. 11-CV22516, 2012 WL 5199604, at *6 (S.D.Fla. Oct. 22, 2012).
As noted supra, cruise lines do not serve as insurers of
the safety of their passengers. Cohen v. Carnival Corp.,
945 F.Supp.2d 1351, 1356 (S.D.Fla.2013). In other
words, liability cannot be imposed merely because an
accident occurs. Thomas v. NCL,(Bahamas), Ltd., No.
13-24682-CIV. 2014 WL 3919914, at *5 (S.D.Fla. Aug.
11, 2014).
Having determined that the condition was open
and obvious, and that there existed no duty to warn,
App. 31
the Court need not conduct a further analysis as to notice. See e.g., Lugo v. Carnival Corp., 154 F.Supp.3d
1341 (S.D.Fla.2015); Isbell v. Carnival Corp., 462
F.Supp.2d (S.D.Fla.2006). Consistent with the above, it
is hereby RESPECTFULLY RECOMMENDED that
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No.
41) be GRANTED as to Plaintiffs negligence claim.
Loss of Consortium
Having determined that Plaintiffs claim fails, it
logically follows that his wife’s loss of consortium claim
likewise fails. Indeed, the wife’s claim fails even if
Plaintiffs claim is allowed to proceed. Specifically
since, general maritime law does not allow for loss of
support or loss of services in passenger injury cases.
(ECF No. 41).
As explained by the Eleventh Circuit, “Neither the
Jones Act nor general maritime law authorizes recovery for loss of society or consortium in personal injury
cases.” Lollie v. Brown Marine Service, Inc., 995 F.2d
1565 (11th Cir.1993). Following this same principle,
the Court instructs:
Unless or until the United States Supreme
Court should decide to add state remedies to
the admiralty remedies for personal injury,
personal injury claimants have no claim for
nonpecuniary damages such as loss of society,
loss of consortium or punitive damages, except in exceptional circumstances such as
willful failure to furnish maintenance and
cure to a seaman, intentional denial of a
App. 32
vessel owner to furnish a seaworthy vessel to
a seaman and in those very rare situations of
intentional wrongdoing.
In re Amtrak “Sunset, Ltd.” Train Crash, 121 F.3d 1421
(11th Cir.1997).
Florida courts, state and federal, have cited to this
line of cases in denying loss of consortium claims in
cruise line passenger cases. See e.g., Ridley v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., 824 F. Supp.2d 1355, 1363 (S.D.Fla.2010)
(there is no doubt that, under Eleventh Circuit precedent, loss of consortium is not permitted under general
maritime law); Frango v. Royal Caribbean Cruises,
Ltd., 891 So. 2d 1208 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (affirming
summary judgment against husband of injured cruise
passenger because allowing same would conflict with
federal maritime law); see also, NCL, Ltd. v. Zareno,
712 So. 2d 791, 793 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). Accordingly, it
is RESPECTFULLY RECOMMENDED that NCL’s
Motion (ECF No. 41) be likewise GRANTED as to the
loss of consortium claim.
Pursuant to S.D. Fla. Magistrate Rule 4(b), the
parties may serve and file written objections to this
Recommendation with the Honorable Federico A.
Moreno within fourteen (14) days after being served
with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. Failure to timely file objections shall bar the parties from
attacking on appeal any factual findings contained
herein. RTC v. Hallmark Builders, Inc., 996 F.2d 1144
(11th Cir. 1993); LoConte v. Dugger, 847 F.2d 745 (11th
Cir. 1988).
App. 33
RESPECTFULLY RECOMMENDED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this 13th day of October 2017.
/s/ William C. Turnoff
WILLIAM C. TURNOFF
UNITED STATES
MAGISTRATE JUDGE
cc: Hon. Federico A. Moreno
Counsel of Record
App. 34
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Nos. 17-15581 & 18-10513-FF
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
ROBERT EDWARD PETERSEN,
ANN WILMA PETERSEN, his wife,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
versus
NCL (BAHAMAS) LTD,
d.b.a. Norwegian Cruise Line,
Defendant - Appellee.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
(Filed Oct. 18, 2018)
BEFORE: MARTIN, JILL PRYOR and ANDERSON,
Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
The petition(s) for panel rehearing filed by the Appellee is DENIED.
App. 35
ENTERED FOR THE COURT:
/s/ R. Lanier Anderson
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE
ORD-41
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