Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Adelmo A. Fauntleroy, Petitioner v. Virginia

rr

IN THE

FILED

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

TLIVV 08 208

ADELMO A. FAUNTLEROY

( PETITIONER )

V.

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

( RESPONDENT )

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

11

ADELMO A. FAUNTLEROY #1141800

DILLWYN CORRECTIONAL CENTER

1522 PRISON ROAD

( 6- A- 12-T)

P.O. BOX 670

DILLWYN, VIRGINIA 23936

( PROSE LITIGANT )

QUESTION(S) PRESENTED

1). Did the Court have sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt

to convict the petitioner under the Sixth Amendment by the U.S.A.

2).Was the lower court's Conviction insufficient as a matter of Law

by the standarts of Due Process of Law.

Wheather one has been currently incarcerated for long or short

term. Are his right's Constitutionally protected.

Was Counsel for the petitioner Affective under the Sixth Amendment

right to Counsel.

LIST OF PARTIES

[

All parties appear in the caption of th case on the cover page.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

OPI@IONS BELOW .....................................................

JURISDICTION ....................................................... 2.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED ................ 3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................'4

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT......................................

CONCLUSION .........................................................

INDEX TO APPENDICES

APPENDIX (A) Decision OF Court Of Appeals Of Virginia Denied Appeal,

MAR. 10 1 2005. Record No. 1366-04-02 Circuit Court No. Fo1-133 (01)

APPENDIX .(B) Decision Of Surpereme Court Of Virginia Affirmed

Conviction, Aug. 25, 2005. Record No. 050757 Court Of Appeals No.

1366-04-02.

APPENDIX (C) Dec.ision Of Supremem Court Of Virginia Dismissing

PETITION For Writ Of Habeas Corpus Mar. 28, 2018. Record No. 180164

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

Littlejohn V. Commonwealth, 482 S.E. 2d 853. 24 Va. App. 401

McGee V. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 422, 425-26, 270 S.E.

Ø, 731 ID. At 427

Dickerson V. City Of Richmond, 2 Va. App. 473, 477, 346 S.E. 2nd 335 (1986)

More V. Commonwealth, 671 S.E. 2nd 429, 53, Va. App. (2009).

Jackson V. Virginia. 99 S. Ct 2781 443. U.S. 307 (1997)

Winship, 443, U.S. 318.

Robinson V. California, 370 At 677, 82 S. Ct Wt 1420

Hwkins V. Bennet, 423 F. 2d. 948 (1970)

McLaunghin V. Royster, 346 F. Supp. 297 (E.D. Va. 1972)

Powell V. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 6953 S. Ct. 55, 64 77 L, E.D

15 (1932)

Bounds V. Smith, 52, L, E.D. 2d 72, 430 U.S.

Johnson V. Avery, 21, L, E.D. 2d. 718, 398 U.S. 483

Miller V. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 785 17 L. E.D. 2d 690 (1967)

Pile V. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 63 S. Ct 177, 87 L. E.D. 214 (1942)

Harmic V. Bailey, 386 F. 2d 395 (1967)

United States V. Boyd, 53 F. 3d 239, 243 (7Th Cir 1995)

Turner V, Commonwealth, 717, 111, 282, Va. 227

Allison V. Blackledge, 533 F. 2d 894 (1976)

Money V. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 2 55 S. Ct 340, 79 L. E.D. 791 (1935)

Napue V. Illinios, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 79 S. Ct, 1173 3 L. ED 1217 (1959)

Strickland, 466 U.S. At 687, 104 S. Ct 2052.

Outten V. Kearney, 464 F. 3d 401 (Ca. 3 Del 2006).

Rompilla V. Beard, 545 U.S. 3742 375, 125 S. Ct. 2456, 162. L. E.D.

2d 360 (2005)

Marshall V. Cathel, 428 F. 3d 452, 463, (3d Cir. 2005)

English V. Romanowski, 602 F. 3d 714, 728-31 (6Th Cir. 2010)

Strickland V. Washinton, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)

McNamara V. United States, 867 F. Supp 369, 373-374 (E.D. Va. 1994)

Weekly V. Jones, 56 F. 3d 899 8Th Cir. (1995)

STATUTES AND RULES

18.2-32

8.01-654

Due Process

Ineffective Assistance Of ounse1

IN. THE

SUPREMEM COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari iss to review the

judgment below.

OPINIONS BELOW

[ ] For cases from Federal Courts:

The opinion of the United States court of appeals appear at

Appendix

to the petition and is

Il I reported at

; or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but not yet reported; or,

[ ] is unpublished.

The opinion of the United States district court appears at

Appendix

to the petitin and id

[ ] reported at

; or,

[ ] has been designated for pulication but is not yet reported;

[ ] is unpublished..

] For cases from State Courts:

The opinion of the highest state court to review the merits

appears at AppendixB

to the petition and is

[ ] reported at

— or,

[ i/has been designated for publication but is not yet reported;

[Xis unpublished.

The opinion of-.the Appeals

corlit. appear.s at AppendixA to

the petition and is

[ ] reported at _Va Court Of appeals ; or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported;

is unpublished.

1.

JURISDICTION

[ ] For cases from Federal Courts:

The date on which the United States Court Of Appeals decided

my case was

[ ] No petition for rehearing was timely filed in my case.

[ ] A Timely petition for rehearing was denied by. the United

States Court of Appeals on the folling date:

and a copy of the order denying rehearing appearing at

Appendix

[] An extension of time to file the petition for writ of

certiorari was granted toand including

(date) on

(date) in Application No.

A

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.0 154(1).

[/For cases from State Courts;

The date on which the highest state court decided my ccase was

A copy of that decision appears at Appendix C

March. 28, 2018

.

[ JA timely petition for rehear.i.ng was. thereafter denied on the

following

date:

,

and a copy of-the order

denying rehearing appears at Appendi. x

] An extension, of time to file the petition for a writ of

ceriorari was. granted to and including.

(date) on

(date) in Application No.

A

-

The jurisdiction of this court in invoked under 28.U.S.0 1257(a).

2...

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

1). Right to confront under 6th amendment, decided by caseJohn Doe,

V. Mike , established presendiatial value causing Virginia

statutes 19.2-8-99 to be declared UNCONSITUTIONAL.

3,

NATURE OF THE CASE AND MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Comes now the petitioner Adelmo A. Fauntleroy, as aFProse litigant

to petition the court for a Writ of Habeas Corpus in relation to the case

listed in the above styled motion. Petitioner stood charged in The Circuit

Court of GOdhland on March.25,2002, with Aiding and Abeting Murder, Robbery,

Aiding and Abeting the use of a firearm in the commission of murder, Aiding

and Abeting the use of a firearm in the commission of robbery, and Pc'ssession

of a firearm by convicted felon. See transcript of arraignment ofiAdelmo A.

Fauntleroy taken on Fbi±uary.27,2002. Fauntleroy requested and received a

bench trial. (Tr.5)

A the conclusion of The Commonwealth's evidence, petitioner made

a motion to strike the evidence as insufficient. (Tr. 199-201). The

Commonwealth moved to amend petitioner's indictments " to add thewords

after-on the secOndline of count 2, unlawfully and feloniously Aid and

Abet- insert the words Aid and Abet and to change Rob to agree, Aid and Abet

the Robbery of, rather than feloniously Rob." (Tr.201). The court denied

the motion to strike with regard to the counts of Aiding and Abeting Murder

and Robbery, as well as the use of a firearm during the commission of those

alleged crimes. (Tr.206,216). The Commonwealth moved to dismiss the charge

of possessing a firearm after conviction of a felony, and the court granted

that motion. (Tr.204).

At close of evidence, petitoner argued that the evidence was insufficient

to convict. (Tr.282-89). The transcript suggests that the Commonwealth

proposed to amend, without objection from petitoners counsel,the charge of

Aiding and Abeting the use of a firearm while committing robbery, to the use o1

a firearm while attempting to commit robbery. See (Tr.201-05, 289-90).

Petitioner was convicted of the four remaining counts as amended. (Tr.290).

On June.18, 2002, petitioner again appeared before the Circuit

Court for Goochiand for sentencing.proceedings. (4Tr.3). The COmmonwealth

moved to "nol pros (sic) all but the Murder charge.. .to basicallyceliithinate

those, the robbery and the firearms charges from that consideration."

(4Tr.18).

The court granted the motion and "previously I found that the defendant

s guil ty. -, and I find that h's not guilty. Id. Petitioner was sentenced

n the' aiarg bE Aiding and Abeting Adon' Murder .-- to Sevnty-Five years

in the Department of Corrections, with Thirty-Five years of those . - years

suspended for life. (4Tr.74).

Before closing the proceedings the court granted a joint motion to suspend

indefinitely the execution of sentenceing, tolling the Twenty-oneLday period

after the final sentencing order and retaining jurisdiction over petitioner's

case, "reserving the right for the Commonwealth to advise the court as to

such time as we believe that defendant should be remanded to the custody of

The Department of Corrections. (4Tr.75-76). By order dated July.27,2004

petitioners active sentence was reduced to Twenty-Five years in The Department

of Corrections. Petitioner timely noted his appeal to the Judgement of the

court. By opinion dated March.10,2005, the Court of Appeals of Virginia

affirmed his conviction.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On July.29,2001, at approximately 11:10 p.m., Bryan Daquan "Kiss"

Anderson (Hereinafter Anderson or Kiss) died as a result of gunshot wounds

suffered at the hands of Andrae White (Hereinafter White or Drae). See

stipulation of evidence, a copy of which is attached here to as Exhibit#1

(Tr.39). Calvin Mickey (Mickey), a resident on Mickeytown Road where the

shooting occured, peeped out of his door upon awakening to the sound of

gunshot's and saw the driver of a car running back down his road towards

the car, and also "it looked like I seen another shadow that went on the

passenger side, but I couldn't see by the way I peeping out there I could

not see nobody getting in thereon the other side or nothing like that,but

it look like it was another shadow came, you know, back on the opposite

side of the car it looked like but I couldn't-I couldn't make out what is

(sic) was another person or somebody got in the car or what, you know.

(2Tr.3-17).

On the same date at 11:49 p.m., investigator Raymond Charles Henley of

the Goochland County Sheriff's Office (Henley) repsonded to the scene and

as a result of his investigation eventully arrested White. (Tr.44-47).

2..

Henley and Special Agent Tom Kazcheck of The Virginia State Police (Kazcheck)

also arrested petitioner on September.4,2001. (Tr.47-48) The officers

advised petitioner of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, which

petitioner waved, and gave a detailed statement regarding his knowledge of

deceased, petitioner's "association" with the Bloods (Alleged to be a Gang),

and his witnessing of Anderson's death. (Tr.48,49,-60).

On October.31,2001, petitioner gave a second statement to Law Enforcement

officials. (Tr.60). Henley and Kazcheck were present again, as were Stanley

Mayo of The Goochland County Sheriff's office and The Honorable Edward K.

Carpenter, Commonwealth's Attorney for the County of Goochland; Fauntleroy

was accompanied by his counsel at the time, D.Michael Caudill, Esq. Id.

Doc" Barnes

In relevant part, petitioner revealed that his UnIe, Exondus

"

(Hereinafter) Barnes or Doc) had brought Anderson to Virginia because in

Rhode Island, "Doc" shot some people up," àaeht]y witI.Aidéis6h'

assistance; Doc

stated that Kiss, was a witness supposedly going to

testify on him to put him at the place of the shooting." (Tr.60-75).

Doc "stated that Kiss was snitching on him, that's the reason he brung

(sic) him to Richmond, because he had to get him out of the reach of the

police so that Kiss wouldn't tell the police nothing, but he was already

" "'.' (Tr.76).

talking and snitching.

Petitioner stated that Barnes

had Two Gs on: Kiss' head, meaning that Barnes

would pay Two Thousdand Dollars'for someone to kill Anderson. (Tr.77).

Petitioner ran into White, Anderson, and another individual the following

day and group went together to a friend's house. (Tr.79-80). Petitioner stated

"

"

to one Mike Caldwell, in front of White and possibly other's but definitely

to Anderson's exclusion that Barnes

got Two Gs on kiss' head," towhich

White responded "yeah I'll do it" or "I'll do it, I want it," andpetitioner

said "do what you got to do." (Tr.81). White told petitioner he wanted '-- the

"

Two Thousand dollars, but petitioner told White,:he "wanted nothing to do

with it;" White apparently then responded that he was "going to do that shit

tomorrow nigH" (Tr.84). According to petitioner, White then invited him to

come to Goochiand with White and Anderson to "see some broads." (Tr.82).

The three men departed, but stopped at White's house so that White could

"Change his clothes and call the whores and let them know that we was on the

way." Id. White left petitioner and Anderson in the car, but eventually

summoned petitioner into his home to assist in loaded a revolver. (Tr.82-83).

3

Petitioner did not assist with preparing the firearm, and the two men

were quickly interrupted by Anderson's knock on the bedroom door. (Tr-83

-97). At White's direction, Anderson and Fauntleroy returned to the car

to wait for White. Id.Three men then drove to Goochiand County where

White shot and killed Anderson. (Tr.84-94).

Raymond Cruz (Cruz) and Gamin r. mack (Mack), both inmate's at the

Pamunkey Regional Jail with Fauntleroy as he awaited trial, testified

for the Commonwealth. (Tr.119-173,173-199). The inmate's testified that

Fauntleroy had made certain statement's in the jail describing his

involvement with Anderson's death. E.G. (Tr.124-127). In pertinent part

the inmate's offered detail's corroborating petitioner's account of the

murder, but also suggested that petitioneradmitted to orchestrating

Anderson's murder at Barnes's behest, and was White's superior officer

in the Blood's. (Tr.130-132,137-139,170-180,182-185,187).

Cruz and Mack, also stated that petitioner joined White in pursuit of

Anderson, as he fled after being shot but prior to dying. (Tr.133-184).

Petitioner, according to Cruz, admitted saying "oh shit, get him", when

Anderson fled White after being shot for the first time. (Tr.139.

Fauntleroy took the stand in his own defense. (3Tr.3-45).

The defense called Kazcheck, who testified with regard to statement's

made by both Cruz and Mack. (Tr.217-28). The defense also called several

other inmate's from the Pamunkey Regional Jail to rebut the assertions

made by Cruz and Mack, and the defendant's mother took the stand briefly

to deny that her son Fauntleroy was present in one of the photographs

offered into evidence. (Tr.229-74).

LEGAL ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY

The star witness for the Commonwealth both Gamin R. Mack, and Raymond Cruz,

consistantly gave vague testimony to prove that the accused either knew,

or had reason to know of principles criminal intention. And that the

accused intended to encourage, incite, or Aid the principle's commission

of the crime. Citing Mcgee V. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 422,425-26,270 S.E.

729,731 Id. at 427. Although the Commonwealth may meet it's burden of

proof through circumstantial evidence, See Dickenson V. City. of Richmond,

2vVa. App. 473, 477, 346 S.E. 2nd 335 (1986).

Under familar principle's, such proof is insufficient if it creates merely

a suspicion of guilt. The evidence must be consistant with guilt, and

exclude every reasonable hypothesis that the accused is innocent of the

charge offense. See Monique LittleJohn V. Commonwealth of Va, 482, S.E.

2d 853 24 V.a. App. 401.

In the current motion before the court, the petitioner's court records

will reflect the witness conflicting statement's, and therefore spoke

falsely on more than occassion. The recantation is sufficient to justify

"Post Conviction Relief", because it does not, standing alone establish

that the testimony was false, and that the statement's in the susequent

recantation were true. The trUthfU.lnes of a recantation Is a question

to be resolved by the tril court citing MoreV. Commonwealth, 671 S.E.

2d 429, 53, Va. App. (2009).

The petitioner concedes the ends of justice and ask the court to review

the facts, and inferences in credibitty determinations. The petitioner

supports his arguments from the case of Jackson V. Virginia, 99 S.Ct

2781 443, U.S. 307 (1997). Which proves the "No evidence" doctrine,

which secures to an accused the most elemental of Due process right's,

freedom from a whole arbitrary deprivation of liberty. The "No evidence

doctrine apply's to the petitioner which his conviction were based upon

the prosecution had no evidence to convict. The petitioner's conviction

stripped him of his liberty as provided by the United States Consititution

and thus this court has jurisdiction.

The petitioner ak thC é.ôurt' to 6onduct a " Evidentuary Hearing," or

wahtever the court's deem appropriate in relation to the "entire case

file of the record's". The trial transcript's reflect from the Commonwealth's

star witness, that there was off the record interview's, and the arresting

investigator's, nor the witness, made it clear the amount of time they

excluded from the record, which amount's to gleam of Due process.

The jackson case cites from Winship, which the Winship court, held for

the first time that the Due process clause of the (14th) amendment protets

a defendant in a criminal case against conviction, except upon proof

beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime

which he is charged. In the petitioner's case the prosecution did not

prove one element of any crime he stood charged with.

5

The petitioner was stripped of his right to Due process as provided by

the 14th amendment. The constitutional standard reognized in the Winship

case, expressly phrased as one that protect's an accused against a

conviction except proof beyond a reasonal doubt. Under Winship, 443,

U.S. 318.Established proof beyond a reasonable doubt as a essential

of 14th amendment Due process. It follows that whensuch a conviction

", it can not constitutionally stand.

in a state occurs in a "state tria l

The petitioner is aware the filing of a WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, is beyond

the prescribe filing deadline. But shall be given consideration when it

pertains to constitutional violations. The court's noted in

Robinson V. California,370 At 677,82 S.Ct At 14202 A single day in prison

may be unconstitutional in some circumstances, and in the petitioner's

case, he has been incarcerated after being wrongfully convicted without

any evidence. Therefore regardless of the passage of time, the court

has the authrity and obligation to end a mis-carriage of Justice.

The petitioner supports his arguement from Hawkins V Bennet, 423 F.2d.

948 (1970),in which the court held that "A passage of 44 years since

state prisoner was allegedly denied his constitutional rights, did not

bar him from proceeding with post conviction efforts. And concluded

that the passage of time does not serve to cure the wrong. The petitioner

has contiued to seek Justice and get legal representation, and his

exzibits of record will show dilligence from a prose person unable to

afford counsel, citing Mclaunghin V. Royster, 346 F. supp 297 (E.D.Va. 1972).

Stating that "The Supreme Court, has recognized thefeven an intelligent,

and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of

law. Indeed he frequently lacks both the skill, and knowledge adequate

to prepare a defense even though he may have a perfect one. He requires

the guiding hand of counsel at every step of the proceeding against him.

See Powell V. Alabama, 287, U.S. 45, 6953 S.ct. 55, 64, 77 L, E.D. 158

(1-932).

The petitoner has sought counsel to reprsent him whom was his current

counsel of record at the time of his convictions. The petitioners counsel

of record, responded to him that he would place any information within

his file after stating (the file) was destroyed. Petitioner sought out

information and legal help from Jailhouse lawyers who have some

understanding of the Judicial system as provide in Bounds V. Smith, 52,

Ir

L. E.D. 2d 72, 430 U.S.-and Johnson V. Avery, 21 L E.D. 2d. 718, 398

U.S. 483, in order to grasp the Justice system. Yet none, nor the

petitioner have been a practitioner of Law, and is one of limitted

education citing priorly, Mclaughin V. Royster. The Supreme Court has

recognized that even an intelligent, and educated layman has small,

and even sometimes no skill, nor knowledge adequate to prepare a defense

even though he may one.

The petitioners counsel of record received a "Sworn Affidavit" from

one of the Commonwealth's "Star Witnessess". A Sworn Affidavit, of

recantation to very the vague, and leading questions, that the court

records reflect from Mr. Gamin R. Mack. Willingly admitting to falsely

testifying against the petitioner, and doing so in aligned co-herence

with the-Commonwealth ' s Attorney for Goochland County, and the Arresting

Officers in the case. The Affidavit also reflects the motive of a

Sentence Reduction, from the Commonwealth's Attorney. The Affidavit also

reflects that the Commonwealth's other star witness, Raymond CruzIV,

made the intial introduction to conspire with the Police, and the

Commonwealth's Attorney, in hopes of a Sentence Reduction.(See.Exzibit #1).

The petitioner cites Monique LittleJohn, is a mirror reflection of his

case. The police lies, deception, and no motive to prove the intent to

murder. Calvin Mickey, testified as a star witnessfor the Commonwealth,

but could only give what he thought, or had probability appeared to be,

but not nothing iron clad to prove accessory, or that petitioner knew,

or had reason to know of Principals Criminal intentions. Nor that petitioner

Aided Principles, commission of crime. The Affidavit also reflects

Clandestine Meetings, with all three Arresting Officers, on and off record.

With then Commonwealth's Attorney for Goochiand County, Mr. Edward K.

Carpenter.In whom was named the sole 'Proprietor", for the false testimony

after threating, and promising a deal of a Sentence Reduction. But when

refferred to Trial Court Transcript Record: tried to Ommit himself from

the record, and fraud committed. (TR.176-177).

Mr. Mack, made it known that it took him 1O .- years to be definitive about

the inial act that stripped the petitioner of his Libery after being coached,

what would be needed of them to obtain a illegal conviction. In Miller V.

Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 87 S. ct. 785 17 L. E.D. 2d 690 (1967). It was held that

-1

the Fourteenth Amendment, can not tolerate a state criminal conviction

obtained by the knowing use of false evidence. Citing Pile V Kansas,

317

U.S. 213, 63 S. ct 177, 87 L. E.D. 214 (1942).' In Miller, the court

unanimously held that "Prosecution deliberately missrepresented the

truth" and this act constitutionally invalidadated the conviction. In

the case Harmic V. Bailey, 386 F. 2d 395 (1967),'The Forth Circuit held

evidence may be false either because it is perjured, or not itself factually

inaccurate, because it creates a false impression of facts which are

known not to be true. In Harmic, they agreed with the Supreme::Cout, and

the position of the petitioner in that case to claim when it stated,

We do not suggest that the testimony of the witness in the instant case

was perjured. Their mistake may well have been due : 0their lack of

perception, rather than to a lack of veracity. The court recognized that

many of the cases which have found a violation of due process, where

false eivdence has been knowingly used by the Prosecution involved

perjured testimony. The supreme Court held that due process is violated

not only where the prosecution used Perjured testimony to support it's

case, but also where it used evidence which it knows creates a false

impression of a material fact.

That mirrors Harmic, 386 F. 2d at 394. The prosecutorial misconduct

violated the petitioner's due process rights as so in the defendants

current petition before the court. The dueprocess in Harmic, was

equally violated by the use of perjured testimony. As it is by the use

which the Goverment knows creates a false impression of material fact.

It is enough that the Judge was likely to understand the witness to have

said something that the prosecution knew was false, citing United States

V. Boyd, 53 F. 3d 239, 243 (7th Cir 1995).

The record reflects fraud upon the court, and the Constitutional :maginitude

that substantially prejudical the Constitutionally guarantee to a fair

trial that is reversable error.

The petitoner's looks to the courts decision citing Turner V. Commonwealth,

717, 111, 282, Va. 227, -,. and Allison V. Black.led.ge , 533 F. 2d 894 (1976).

12

Turner, cites "there is no mandatory formula for a Circuit Court's

Consideration of credibility for a witness. As the trier of fact, the

Circuit Court is charged with the responsibility of considering various

factors. Including the demeanor, his opportunity for knowing things

about what he testified, his bias, and any prior inconsistantstatemenL's

relating to the subject of his present testimony. In addition, the

circumstances of a particular case may raise other factor's that the

Circuit Court deems relevant in assessing a witnesses.. credibility. In

this case, the witness of the Commonwealth, has a track record of

testimony to reduce his Legal out comes. And the petitioner point's out

the trial court record's, will also reflect.

8.01-654 C), In a Habeas Corpus in which the Supreme Court of Virginia

has original Jurisdiction. Can refer factual issues to the Circuit Court

for an Evidentary Hearing, citing from the Allison V. Blackledge, which

provides where an indigent prisoner proceeding Prose, alleges a cause of

action if proved, would entitle him to post conviction. It is improper

to document that claim, or support it by Affidavit's of his witnessess

before affording him the Evidentary Hearing. He is other wised entitled,

and a Prose petitioner is not to be put to a greater burden to obtain an

Evidentary Hearing. Any other type of cause if proved, would entitle

him to relief in any other type of action.

The petitioner-- has a valid Swbiti Affidavit of Recantation, and ask's

the Court's to conduct a Evidentary Hearing, and to cure the wrong with

supporting arguement from Hawkins V. Bennet.- Weather one has been currently

incarcerated for long term, his right's are constitutionally protected,

and must be corrected. The proecution was aware of their star witness

having prior record's of material testimony, that could create a false

impression, in regard's to reduce their sentences of Felony Prosecution

they faced. The trial court transcript record's, would also mirror that

a numerous of inmates from the Pamunkey Regional Jail came fourth, to

testify for the defense's behalf toillistrate, or rebut the false testimony

given by both Cruz, and Mack. Citing that it was an Continuous, and

reputicious Scheme of the two inmate's. The petitioner ask's, that the

Court's review the record's of all the fact's to be reviewed in light of

the mis-carrage of Justice. The petitioner also ask's the Honorable

Courttoconjunct the Court record's, and will protect his Constitutionally

guaranteed right's by the state, and the U.S. Constitution. No matter

the lapse of time as priorly cited in Hawkins, 423 F. 2d 948 (ca8 (Iwoa

1970). He just as the man convicted, must be afforded a meanful opportunity

to prove his claims.

The petitioner has gleamed the fact's, and record's will reflect from

every aspect procured within the current motion. The testimony. and false

evidence given it has been well established by the United States Supreme

Court, since the case of Money V. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 55 S. ct 340, 79

L. E-d. 791 (1935). That "it is a rquirement that can not be deemed to be

satified by mere notice, and hearing, if a state has contrived a conviction

through the pretense of a trial which in truth, is used as a means of

depriving a defendant of Lihert'through a deliberate deception. Such as a

contrivance by a state to procure the conviction, and imprisonment of a

defendant. It is inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of Justice, as

is obtaing a liked result, by intimidation. As Mr. Gamin R. Mack,-,one of

the prosecution's star witnesses stated, he was given a threat to receive

a harsher sentence, if he didn't cooperate. Willing solicitating false

evidence. Citing Napue V. Illinios, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 79 S. ct, 1173

3 L. Ed 1217 (1959). The petitioner has painted all the recorded fact's,

and ask's the Honorable Court to grant the motion, and appoint him counsel.

According to the Surpreme Court in Mclaughin V. Royster, "even an intelligent

and educated layman, has small skill, and lacks both the skill, and

knowledge to prepare a defense though•hemay have a perfect one". "He

requires the guiding hand of counsel every step of the way". 346 F. Supp.

297 (E. Dua 1972).

The petitioner has shown by exzibits, he has tried to obtain counsel

dilligently, and ethicly. The infitutional:attorney's duties are outside

the litigation for post conviction remedies, to help seek Justice for a

wrongful conviction. Petitioner cites ineffective assistance of counsel

under the sixth Amendment. Under the first prong of Strickland, a petitioner

must show that the trial counsel's performance was deficient, Strickland

466 U.S. At. 687, 104 S. ct 2052. The proper standard for attorney

performance is that of reasonably effective assistance, as defined by

prevailing professional norms"I.d. at 687-88, 104 S. 6 t 2052. The defendant

must establish that counsel's representation fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness. The counsel's reasonableness must be asse s sed

on the fact's of the particular case, viewed as of the time counsel's

us

conduct. I.d at 689, 104 S. ct. 2052. Strickland's, second prong requires

a petitioner to show that "the defii.ent performance prejudiced the

defense •ld-:ai687, 104 S. ct 2052. The prejudice cmpert requires the

petitioner to demonstrate that ther.is a reasonable probability that,

without his counsel's unprofessional error's, the result's of the

proceeding's would have been different. The SUpreme COurt has explained

the difference owed to strategic decision's of counsel, by reference to

the scope of the investigations supporting those decision's. Stratgic

choices made after, a thorough investigation of Law and fact's, relevant

to plausable option's. Are virtually unchailengable, and strategic

choices made after, less than a complete investigation, are precisely to

the extent that reasonable professional judgement's support the limitations,

or investigation. The counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations,

or to make a'reasonabie decision that make's particular investigations

unnecessary.

in any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must

be directly assessed for reasonableness, in all the circumstances applying

a heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgement. See Outten V Kearney,

464 F. 3d 401 (Ca. 3 Del 2006). and Rompilla V. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 375,

125 S. Ct. 2456, 162. L. E.d. 2d 360 (2005). Explaining that the Court

has long referred to ABA standards for criminal justice as guides to

determine what is reasonable, stating in highlighting counsel's duty

to investigate. Also citing Marshall V. Ccathel, 428 F. 3d 452 463

(3d Cir. 2005). " An attorney's duty to investigate,'- is itself judged

under a reasonableness standard based on prevailing norm's, such as those

found in the ABA standards for criminal justice. The petitionerwasdenied

ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner's counsel's failure to

investigate Forensics of Shooting, was ineffective assistance because

it deprived defendant of substantial arguement. English V. Romanowski,

602 F. 3d 714, 728-31 (6th Cir. 2010). Petitioner's current case, his

counsel failed to investigate any Forensics, and was deficient, and

prejudiced as a result. The first Cort Appointed counsel, nor the last

counsel, of record made any request to test evidence, nor investigated

pertinent evidence to the criminal case. Petitioner cites Strickland V.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). and has met the first prong of deficient,

nd.prjudiced as a result. The last counsel of record, and the first

counsel of record, merely focused on the credibility of Commonwealth's

witnesses. The defendant was facing a Capital offense, and the attorney's

deficient performance, prejurdiced the defendant, that counsel's error

dprived him of a fair trial. The alleged victim's Clothing was not

tested for any DNA, that would corroborate the Commonwealth's star

witnesses testimony that the petitioner searched the victim' pant's

pocket's. The Cout Record's will reflect this testimony, after the

alleged victim was shot. See (Tr. Transcript).

This type of investigation is pertinent to the trial, and reasonable

investigation of applicable Law, and facts adequately to perform Legal

research, Mcnamara V. United States, 867 F. Supp 369, 373-374 (E.d. Va.

1994). is ineffective assistance of Counsel. Petitioner also cites,

Strickland, 466 U.S. At 694, 104 S. Ct 2068 " that the defendant must

show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's

unprofessional error's. The result of the proceeding would have been

different. A reasonable probability, is a probability. Sufficient enough

to undermine confidence in the outcome.

The defendant need not to establish that the attorney's deficient

performance, more likely than not, altered the outcome in order to

establish perjudice under Strickland. and the probability standard is

not the sufficiency of the evidence test. Weékly V. Jones, 56 F. 3d 899

8th Cir. (1995). quoting Strickland,104 S. ct, at 2068. The Court also

held that the result of a proceeding can be rendered unreliable, and

hence the prodeeding itself unfair, even if the error's of counsel can

not be shown by a preponderance of the evidence to have determined the

outcome.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The petitioner continues to support his argument based upon the citing

of Hawkins V. Bennett, 423 F. 2d 948 (1970). The court held that the

passage of 44 years since the state prisoner was allegedly denied his

constitutional rights, did not bar him from proceeding with post

conviction efforts, and concluded that the passage of time does not cure

the wrong. The petitioner has presented a.Affidavit to sustain his

argument which the highest court in the state denied due to the passage

of time.

Allison V. Blackledge, 533 F. 2d 894 (1976). whichpprovides, " where arri

indigent prisoner proceeding (prose), alleges a cause of action which

if proved would entitle him to post conviction relief. It is improper to

require him to document that claim, or support it by Affidavits of his

witnesses before affording him the evidentiary he is other wise entitled

and a prose petitioner is not to be put to a greater burden to obtain a

evidentiary hearing when he has alleged a cause which if proved, would

entitle him to relief then any other type of action.

The petitioner argues that the question of jurisdiction, and filing

deadlines without question, and that due to multiple constitutional

violations surrondimg his conviction, The court does have the authority,

and jurisdiction to act upon this petition and grant the petitioners

motion before the court. To infact cure the substantial constitutional

error.

The supreme court in McLaughlin V. Royster, 346 F. Supp. 297 (E.D. Va 1972)

recognized that even an intelligent, and educated laymean, has small

and sometimes no skill in the science of the law. Indeed frequently

lacks both the skill and knowledge to prepare a defense even though he

may have a perfect one. The defendant requires the guiding hand of

counsel at every step of the proceedings against him.

The defendant in this case has a perfect defense, and the record will

reflect it. And this court should grant the petition premised upon all

the petitioner has presented before the court.

5.

106

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

ADELMO A. FAUNTLEROY # 114180(

Date:

JUNE. 5, 2018