Opposition Brief — Richard Earl Shere, Jr., Petitioner v. Florida

Supreme Court briefDec 27, 2018

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DOCKET NO. 18-6877

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

RICHARD EARL SHERE, Jr.,

Petitioner,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF

CERTIORARI TO THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT

PAMELA JO BONDI

ATTORNEY GENERAL

CAROLYN M. SNURKOWSKI*

Assistant Attorney General

Florida Bar No. 158541

*Counsel of Record

PATRICK A. BOBEK

Assistant Attorney General

Florida Bar No. 112839

Office of the Attorney General

444 Seabreeze Blvd. Suite 500

Daytona Beach, Florida 32118

Telephone: (886) 238-4990

Facsimile: (886) 226-0457

capapp@myfloridalegal.com

caroyln.snurkowski@myfloridalegal.com

patrick.bobek@myfloridalegal.com

COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

[Capital Case]

Whether certiorari review should be denied where (1) the Florida

Supreme Court’s ruling on the retroactivity of Hurst v. Florida and

Hurst v. State, which relies on state law to provide that the Hurst

cases are not retroactive to defendants whose death sentences were

final when this Court decided Ring v. Arizona, does not violate the

Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments; (2) Florida’s capital sentencing

structure does not violate this Court’s decision in Caldwell v.

Mississippi, and (3) the Florida Supreme Court’s decision does not

conflict with any decision of this Court or involve an important,

unsettled question of federal law?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ...........occcceecscccceeeeeeeecneeeeeteeseeeeseneeeeeeetenes i

TABLE OF CONTENTS 20... cececcceessncecessnneeessenesenneesessenesecssaneeensnseesscneesesseeeesseneeesaes i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (00... eeeccceessceeseesseeeeseeeeeseeeeeensaneeeseecaeeeseceaeeeseneeseneeeees iii

CITATION TO OPINION BELOW. ..............cccccccsssceesseeesseneeeceesenenesseaneeeeseneeeeenessaeeeeeeees 1

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ....0......ee ec eceeescccesesssaceeeceeneensenaeeeeeeeeceeeenecneeseeeeeses 1

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED ...................:006 1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ..........c.cccccecccecccceeseensceeeeesecceeseseeseasaeeeesessnenceeesseaaeeeeessaaes 2

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT ...00....eeeeesseeessseceeeessneeesesneesesseesesseeeeesenees 6

Certiorari review should be denied because (1) the Florida Supreme Court’s

ruling on the retroactivity of Hurst v. Florida and Hurst v. State, which relies

on state law to provide that the Hurst cases are not retroactive to defendants

whose death sentences were final when this Court decided Ring v. Arizona,

does not violate the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments; (2) Florida’s capital

sentencing structure does not violate the legal principles of Caldwell v.

Mississippi, and (3) the Florida Supreme Court’s decision does not conflict

with any decision of this Court or involve an important, unsettled question of

federal Law..w.......ccccccccccccccccsceessssneeececcecscaseeeeeeeececcacaaseceeeceeascseeeceeeeesaausasssesseeeeesees 6

I. The Florida Court’s Ruling on Retroactivity Does Not Violate

Equal Protection or the Eighth Amendment. ....................::000seeeeeeeseeessessssseeseeees 6

II. The jury instructions in Shere’s case do not violate this Court’s

ruling in Caldwell v. MISSISSIPPI. ............cccccceecceeceeceeeceeecennenseessessessssssssnsenseaseees 13

CONCLUSION ..........cccccccccsscsstnessssssseseessssssvsessssesssssseusssesssseeeesececececceccauseceaaeaseneeeseeneess 16

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Apprendi v. New Jersey,

580 U.S. 466 (2000) occ ccecccccsscccssccscssccsssccecusesssccesescsscesssesessasesesnecessueeesiesesaes 12

Asay v. State,

210 So.3d 1 (Fla. 2016) o......cceceecceccececessccseecscecenscccvsuesseseseessuseesseecsueesasessees 5, 8, 9, 10

Beck v. Washington,

B69 U.S. 541 (1962) occ ccccccccscscsecsesssscsecscsesscsesesaessssescacesesssessecsesecsesseeesseeesaees 14

Brauch v. State,

234 So.3d 548 (Fla. 2018)........cccccccscssssesssscsessesssseeesecscseessesessesesaessesessceecaesasaceess 10

Caldwell v. Mississippi,

AT2. U.S. 820 (1985) oo... ccccccccsssscsscscsssecsesscsesecsesscsesesscsesssacsessesenecsasseseesanecaceees 11, 15, 17

Cardinale v. Louisiana,

394 U.S. 487 (1969) oo. ccccccececesscccccsessessssccnsecsasessesesusecsecesesseeseesaeersesenses 10

Cole v. State,

234 So. 3d 644 (Fla. 2018).......ccccccccecsssssssescesscsessesessesesseseesecsacsassecsecsecseseeenees 11

Crawford v. Washington,

BAL U.S. 86 (2004) oo... ce cccessssscescscssesesesesseseseseeeseseseseseseeesseseseeaesesecseateccsesseseeeseas 11

Danforth v. Minnesota,

B52 U.S. 264 (2008) oo... cccccccccccscsssccsescssescsesesesessesesesesessseseeseseecaesacsesesecseaseeacseas 9

Dorsey v. United States,

BOT U.S. 260 (2012)... ccccccsccsccsscssssssecsecsesscsscssesessesesecsssaecaeseesseseseesecseceeseeneens 12,13

Dugger v. Adams,

ABO U.S. 401 (1989) 0... ccecceccecescscssesesstscsesseassscsssesseresscacsesecseceeseeseseusssceucassuseens 16

Florida v. Powell,

B59 U.S. 50 (2010)... ccceccscsscsecsessesscsscsesscsecsessessessesesucacsussecsecseesesessesscsecnsentens 10

Fox Film Corp. v. Muller,

296 U.S. 207 (1935) ....ececcscsssscsccsessescsssscsscscseseesesscssesescscsacacssesessesecaesecseessseneeaees 10

Griffith v. Kentucky,

AT9 U.S. 814 (1987) oo... ceecceccccceeceecescenescsssecsecescccseecsecseecsacecsaaeceuseesucesseesasessaeens 12

Hannon v. State,

228 So.3d 505 (Fla. 2017).....ccccccssssccssseessssessesssscsecsesecsecscseessesesaseseesscsecseseeaeeaees 10

Harris v. Alabama,

B18 U.S. 504 (1995) oo. ccccscsccsesscescsecsessessssesecsecsescesacsensesscaesseeseerseaeeneateassacees 17

Hitchcock v. State,

226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017)......c.cccccccccscscsssscsssscscescscssescscscsscsesscscsessesecssseescesceevevenss 5, 10

Hurst v. Florida,

136 S. Ct. 616 (2016) ooo. cee cccscceccscccsscccssessesseccssesesssecssecscesseseeesseceesneceeseceesece Passim

Hurst v. State,

202 So.3d 40 (Fla 2016) ........ccccccccccssessssesessesessescsesecsesesacsesacsesscaaceesecsenecneseeerens Passim

Hurst v. State,

209 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016) .....ccccccscescsssssssssssssesesesesecsesesesseeesessesesenesseseseneeseseass 5

Kaczmar v. State,

228 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 2017) oo..e..ceeccecceccccesccesccssscessecesecsesessecescecesesseeessecanecereeveceeaees 11

Lambrix v. State,

227 So. 3d 112 (Fla. 2017). ......cccccccccsccscsseecscsscssssssesseecsessnscsessesesecseeseeescerceeseeees 10

McCleskey v. Kemp,

AB1 U.S. 279 (1987) ..ccecessesscsssssssessscescsesessesesesccseseassesesceassesesseececsesesssseassteeeseeeees 13, 14

Michigan v. Long,

AGB U.S. 1082 (1988) 0... cece ccccescsscsessessesecseesesscsesseesssececsecseseessecseseeueecasansess 10

Miranda v. Arizona,

B84 U.S. 436 (1966) oo... .cccccccccscsscssesecsesscseessscecsesscsscnessaececaesseseesseeseersenseseasensass 2,3, 4

Mosley v. State,

209 So. 3d 1248 (Fla. 2016)..........cccccccccsssscsssscsessssesecacsesscseseescaecesecsesecseencneesenens 9

Reynolds v. State,

251 So0.3d 811 (Fla. 2018)........ccccccscescssscscscescsseecesnecassaecssenecaseneseeesseceeseeseessesanes 16

Ring v. Arizona,

536 U.S. 584 (2002) ......ecccecccceccsseseesescsssscssescssescsesseseusesceesssscseescesesssecsesseescevaesees Passim

Romano v. Oklahoma,

B12 U.S. 1 (1994) oo. cccccccescsscsseseeseesessessesecseseeseesessessesecaesessesseseeenssseseesessecensesas 15, 16

Schriro v. Summerlin,

BAZ U.S. 848 (2004) ....cccccccccccccccsccsscssssescsseacsecsecsesssecsecsesscseseesscsseetcencseseeecsesee 12

Shere v. Moore,

830 So.2d 56 (Fla. 2002) .........ccccccccscsscescssessecsecsecsessessessessessesecseessessensseseesnsencsees 4

Shere v. Secretary, Department of Correction,

587 F.8d 1804 (11th Cir. 2008) oo... ccc ccc ccccsecsssseceecssessnsessssesecsusessneeeseceesees 4

Shere v. State,

91 So.3d 133 (Table) (Fla. 2012) ........c.cccccecccceccsceseseseescsesescecsecseecsevecsecessevavsevess 4

Shere v. State,

579 So.2d 86 (Fla. 1991) voccecccccccccescessecssccsssccssccscececcessesasecseessseeesacesseseneeees 2, 3,4, 5

lv

Shere v. State,

TAZ So.2d 215 (Fla. 1999)... ccceccceeccescesccesscessesseseesseeseceseeecseassseeseeesaeeseeesceceevese 4

Shere v. State,

2016 WL 3450466 (Fla. Jume 23, 2016)..........cccccccesccssssecessseseseesecssecseesseneseseesens 4

Shere v. State,

2018 WL 4293400 (Fla. Aug. 31, 2018) 00.0... ecceececcescecesesscessessseecsserseeesneesees 4

Shere v. State,

2018 WL 4346801 (Fla. Aug. 31, 2018) .....cccc cece ccc cs ces ceeceeseenceeseeseneee 1,5

State v. Gales,

658 N.W.2d 604 (Neb. 2003) ....ccccccccscesccsscesscssessecsecsescscssscsssssecsussesceuseeassaasensess 8

State v. Mason,

___N.E.3d____, 2018 WL 1872180 (Ohio, April 18, 2018)....0....cee cece eeeeeeee 8

Street v. New York,

394 U.S. 576 (1969) cee ce ccceccccesccessccessccssecsesecsescesscssessesecesesssesesccecesseesseneeneens 10

Teague v. Lane,

A8B9 U.S. 288 (1989) oo. cecceccecceeseceesececeesceresecseeseeseesassasssesesssssatseeseseaeeaesasens 9,11, 12

United States v. Abney,

812 F.3d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 2016) oo... cccccccccccccscscsssccssccssscssscssecsssessesesseccssecesasnes 13

Whorton v. Bockting,

549 U.S. 406 (2007) oo. cecccecccscsecesececescescessenscesscsscsssessesssessessecsecsseesssesasesseeasease 11

Witt v. State,

387 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1980).....ccccccccccccccsssccssccssccsescssssssscesecstscssscesscessscssasseseceesens 9

Woodson v. North Carolina,

AZB U.S. 280 (1976) ooo. cecccccscceccesccessccsecessessccaeceeeesscsesesseaesssevsevaseneeeassenseeneeeaeess 15

Zack, Ill, v. State,

228 So. 3d 41 (Fla. 2017) ..ccceccecccccsccscccssccccccesssssccsesceesesssscessessessesesescenssecseseaees 11

Statutes

QB U.S.C. § 1257(a) ve ceccccccccccsccssvsscsssscsscssccssssscsescssecsuesessascetssassssesssseaceesesaseasenses 1

Florida State Stat. § 921.141(2)(c) (2017) ........cccceccecceeccesseceeeseseecesecsecseeeeessceanes 16

Rules

ULS. Sup. Ct. R. 10... cece ccccccccc cece nceeeeeccacaceaceeeeeeeeceaasaeceececeuseseesaacseeesssaaeseesees 7

CITATION TO OPINION BELOW

The decision of the Florida Supreme Court is not reported, but can be found

at Shere v. State, No. SC17-1703, 2018 WL 4346801, (Fla. Aug. 31, 2018).

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Florida Supreme Court was entered on August 31, 2018.

(Pet. App. A). Petitioner asserts that this Court’s jurisdiction is based upon 28

U.S.C. § 1257(a). Respondent agrees that this statutory provision sets out the scope

of this Court’s certiorari jurisdiction, but submits that this case is inappropriate for

the exercise of this Court’s discretionary jurisdiction.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Respondent accepts Petitioner’s statement regarding the applicable

constitutional and statutory provisions involved.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Richard Shere was charged with the 1987 murder of Drew Snyder. Snyder

had been reported missing, and the police investigation quickly led them to Shere.

Shere v. State, 579 So.2d 86, 88 (Fla. 1991). Shere waived his Miranda’ rights, gave

several statements, and led detectives to various scenes involving the murder. /d.

According to Shere, on December 24, 1987, Shere’s later codefendant, Bruce

“Brewster” Demo, told Shere that the victim, Snyder, was going to inform the police

about Shere’s and Demo’s theft of air conditioners. /d. The next day, Demo called

Shere and said he was thinking about killing Snyder, and threatened to kill Shere if

he didn’t help. Jd. Shere went to Demo’s house where Demo loaded a shovel into

Shere’s car, and the two drank beers and smoke marijuana into the early hours

before convincing Snyder to go rabbit hunting. /d.

Shere told police that at some point in the hunt he placed his rifle on the roof

of the car so he could relieve himself. Jd. While he was doing that, Demo grabbed

the weapon and Shere heard a gunshot. /d. Shere dropped to the ground, hearing

Snyder say, “Oh, my God, Brewster,” followed by several more shots. Jd. When he

got up, he saw Snyder still breathing in the back of the car, and said they should

take Snyder to the hospital. /d. Instead, Demo took out a pistol and shot Snyder in

the forehead, and then pulled Snyder out of the car to also shoot him in the chest.

Id. Shere said they drove Snyder's body a short distance and Demo forced him to dig

a hole and bury the body. /d. Shere then returned home, when he cleaned up and

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

2

burned his bloodied backseat /d. Later, at Demo’s suggestion, Shere and his

girlfriend Heidi Greulich went to Snyder’s house, gathered some of his belongings,

and dumped them in another city hoping to leave the impression that Snyder had

left town. Jd.

Demo gave a different account to the detectives. In his version, Demo, not

Shere, was the one who had turned his back to relieve himself, when he heard

Shere fire the first shots. /d. at 89. Demo turned and saw Shere fire through the

rear car window five or six times. Jd. Shere then pointed the gun at Demo and

ordered him to finish off Snyder. Jd. Demo shot Snyder twice in the head and once

in the heart. /d. He said he made Shere dig the grave because he was upset by what

Shere had done. Jd. Greulich also gave a statement to police wherein she revealed

that Shere had told her that he alone had killed Snyder. /d. A friend of Shere’s, Ray

Pruden, testified that one night after Christmas, Shere told Pruden that he had

shot Snyder to death ten or fifteen times while rabbit hunting. /d. Medical

testimony showed that Snyder had been shot ten times. /d.

The jury found Shere guilty and recommended a death sentence by a vote of

seven to five. Jd. The judge found three aggravating factors: 1) the murder was

committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of a governmental function or the

enforcement of laws by eliminating a witness; 2) the murder was especially evil,

wicked, atrocious, or cruel; and 3) the murder was committed in a cold, calculated,

and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification. Jd. In

mitigation, the court said “that it considered numerous possible mitigating

circumstances, rejected some, and found that ‘the aggravating circumstances far

outweighed the mitigating circumstances.” Jd. The judge followed the jury's

recommendation and sentenced Shere to death. /d.

Although the Florida Supreme Court struck especially heinous, atrocious, or

cruel aggravator, they upheld his convictions and sentence. Jd. at 97. Shere’s

sentence became final in 1991. He has spent the past nearly three decades

unsuccessfully challenging his conviction and sentence. See, Shere v. State, 742

So.2d 215 (Fla. 1999) (affirming denial of postconviction relief); Shere v. Moore, 830

So.2d 56 (Fla. 2002) (denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus); Shere v.

Secretary, Department of Correction, 537 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2008) (affirming the

district court’s denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus); Shere v. State, 91

So.3d 133 (Table) (Fla. 2012) (affirming denial of postconviction relief); Shere v.

State, 2016 WL 3450466 (Fla. 2016) (affirming denial of postconviction relief); Shere

v. State, 2018 WL 4293400 (Fla. 2018) (affirming denial of postconviction relief).

On January 6, 2017, Shere filed a successive motion to vacate death sentence,

and argued that his death sentence violates Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016)

and Hurst v. State, 209 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016). Shere also raised retroactivity and

Eighth Amendment Issues. On August 22, 2017, the trial court entered an order

denying Shere’s successive motion to vacate his death sentence. Sheer appealed to

the Florida Supreme Court, and on October 13, 2017, that court issued an order to

show cause why the trial court’s order should not be affirmed in light of the court’s

decision in Hitchcock v. State, 226 So. 3d 216 (Fla. 2017).

In Aitchcock, the Florida Supreme Court reaffirmed its previous holding in

Asay v. State, 210 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 41 (2017), in which it

held that Hurst v. Florida as interpreted by Hurst v. State is not retroactive to

defendants whose death sentences were final when this Court decided Ring v.

Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). Following briefing in Shere’s case, the Florida

Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the lower court’s denial of relief, finding:

After reviewing Shere’s response to the order to show cause and the

State’s arguments in reply, we conclude that Shere is not entitled to

relief. Shere was sentenced to death following a jury’s recommendation

of death by a vote of seven to five. Shere v. State, 579 So. 2d 86, 89

(Fla. 1991), reh’g denied (Fla. April 4, 1991). His sentence became final

in 1991. /d. Therefore, Hurst does not apply retroactively to Shere’s

death sentence. See Hitchcock, 226 So. 3d at 217. Accordingly, we

affirm the denial of Shere’s motion. No rehearing will be entertained.

Shere v. State, No. SC17-1703, 2018 WL 4346801, 1* (Fla. Aug. 31, 2018). Shere

now seeks certiorari review of the Florida Supreme Court’s decision.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

Certiorari review should be denied because (1) the Florida Supreme

Court’s ruling on the retroactivity of Hurst v. Florida and Hurst v.

State, which relies on state law to provide that the Hurst cases are not

retroactive to defendants whose death sentences were final when this

Court decided Ring v. Arizona, does not violate the Eighth or

Fourteenth Amendments; (2) Florida’s capital sentencing structure

does not violate the legal principles of Caldwell v. Mississippi, and (3)

the Florida Supreme Court’s decision does not conflict with any

decision of this Court or involve an important, unsettled question of

federal law.

Shere requests this Court review the Florida Supreme Court’s decision

affirming the denial of his successive postconviction motion, arguing that the state

court’s holding with respect to retroactivity violates the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments. He also argues that the jury being instructed that their verdict was a

recommendation violates the Eighth Amendment.

As will be shown, nothing about the Florida Supreme Court’s retroactivity

decision is inconsistent with the United States Constitution. Shere does not provide

any “compelling” reason for this Court to review his case. U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 10.

Indeed, Shere cannot cite to any decision from this or any appellate court that

conflicts with the Florida Supreme Court’s decision below, in which the court

determined that Shere was not entitled to relief because Hurst v. State was not

retroactive to his death sentence. Nothing presented in the petition justifies the

exercise of this Court’s certiorari jurisdiction.

I. The Florida Court’s Ruling on Retroactivity Does Not Violate

Equal Protection or the Eighth Amendment.

The Florida Supreme Court’s holding in Hurst v. State followed this Court’s

ruling in Hurst v. Florida in requiring that aggravating circumstances be found by a

jury beyond a reasonable doubt before a death sentence may be imposed. The

Florida court then expanded this Court’s ruling, requiring in addition that “before

the trial judge may consider imposing a sentence of death, the jury in a capital case

must unanimously and expressly find all the aggravating factors that were proven

beyond a reasonable doubt, unanimously find that the aggravating factors are

sufficient to impose death, unanimously find that the aggravating factors outweigh

the mitigating circumstances, and unanimously recommend a sentence of

death.”2 Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d at 57. In Asay v. State, 210 So. 3d 1, 22 (Fla.

2016), cert. dented, 138 S. Ct. 41 (2017), the Florida Supreme Court ruled that, as a

matter of state law, Hurst v. State is not retroactive to any case in which the death

sentence was final prior to the June 24, 2002, decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S.

584 (2002). See also Mosley v. State, 209 So. 3d 1248, 1272-78 (Fla. 2016) (holding

that, as a matter of state law, Hurst v. State does apply retroactively to defendants

whose sentences were not yet final when this Court issued Ring). Florida’s partial

2Lower courts have almost uniformly held that a judge may perform the “weighing”

of factors to arrive at an appropriate sentence without violating the Sixth

Amendment. See e.g. State v. Mason, _N.E.3d __, 2018 WL 1872180, *5-6

(Ohio, April 18, 2018) (“Nearly every court that has considered the issue has held

that the Sixth Amendment is applicable to only the fact-bound eligibility decision

concerning an offender’s guilt of the principle offense and any aggravating

circumstances” and that “weighing is not a factfinding process subject to the Sixth

Amendment.”) (string citation omitted); State v. Gales, 658 N.W.2d 604, 628-29

(Neb. 2003) (““[Wle do not read either Apprendi or Ring to require that the

determination of mitigating circumstances, the balancing function, or

proportionality review to be undertaken by a jury”).

retroactive application of Hurst v. State is not constitutionally unsound and does

not otherwise present a matter that merits the exercise of this Court’s certiorari

jurisdiction.

This Court has held that, in general, a state court’s retroactivity

determinations are a matter of state law, not federal constitutional law. Danforth v.

Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264 (2008). State courts may fashion their own retroactivity

tests, including partial retroactivity tests. A state supreme court is free to employ a

partial retroactivity approach without violating the federal constitution under

Danforth. The state retroactivity doctrine employed by the Florida Supreme Court

did not violate federal retroactivity standards. The court’s expansion of Hurst v.

Florida in Hurst v. State is applicable only to defendants in Florida, and,

consequently, subject to retroactivity analysis under state law as set forth in Witt v.

State, 387 So. 2d 922 (Fla.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1067 (1980). See Asay, 210 So. 3d

at 15 (noting that Florida’s Witt analysis for retroactivity provides “more expansive

retroactivity standards” than the federal standards articulated in Teague v. Lane,

489 U.S. 288 (1989) (emphasis in original; citation omitted).

This Court has repeatedly recognized that where a state court judgment rests

on non-federal grounds, where the non-federal grounds are an adequate basis for

the ruling independent of the federal grounds, “our jurisdiction fails.” Fox Film

Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1038

(1983). See also Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 437, 438 (1969) (reaffirming that

this Court has no jurisdiction to review a state court decision on certiorari review

unless a federal question was raised and decided in the state court below); Street v.

New York, 394 U.S. 576, 581-82 (1969) (same). If a state court’s decision is based on

separate state law, this Court “of course, will not undertake to review the decision.”

Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50, 57 (2010).

Florida’s retroactivity analysis is a matter of state law. This fact alone

militates against the grant of certiorari in this case. It should also be noted that this

Court has repeatedly denied certiorari to review the Florida Supreme Court’s

retroactivity decisions following the issuance of Hurst v. State. See, e.g., Asay v.

State, 210 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 41 (2017); Hitchcock v. State,

226 So. 3d 216 (Fla.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 513 (2017); Lambrix v. State, 227 So.

8d 112, 118 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, Lambrix v. Florida, 138 S. Ct. 312 (2017);

Hannon v. State, 228 So. 3d 505, 513 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, Hannon v. Florida,

138 S. Ct. 441 (2017); Branch v. State, 234 So. 3d 548, 549 (Fla. 2018), cert. denied,

Branch v. Florida, 138 S. Ct. 1164 (2018); Cole v. State, 234 So. 3d 644 (Fla.), cert.

denied, Cole v. Florida, 138 S. Ct. 2657 (2018); Kaczmar v. State, 228 So. 3d 1 (Fla.

2017), cert. denied, Kaczmar v. Florida, 138 S. Ct. 1973 (2018); Zack, IIL, v. State,

228 So. 3d 41 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, Zack, III, v. Florida, 138 8. Ct. 2653 (2018).

Shere argues that the Florida Supreme Court’s partial retroactive application of

Hurst v. Florida as interpreted in Hurst v. State violates the Eighth Amendment

and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. He also claims that

the sentencing procedure used in his case violates this Court’s ruling in Caldwell v.

Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985), because the jury was instructed that its death

recommendation was advisory. The Florida Supreme Court’s retroactivity ruling is

not contrary to federal law. It does not conflict with precedent from this Court or

from any appellate court. Caldwell does not provide an avenue for relief. Certiorari

review is unnecessary.

New rules of law such as the rule announced in Hurst v. Florida do not

usually apply to cases that are final. See Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416

(2007) (explaining the normal rule of nonretroactivity and holding the decision in

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), was not retroactive). Additionally, the

general rule is one of nonretroactivity for cases on collateral review, with narrow

exceptions. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307 (1989) (observing that there were

only two narrow exceptions to the general rule of nonretroactivity for cases on

collateral review). Furthermore, certain matters are not retroactive at all. Hurst v.

Florida was based on this Court’s holding in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002),

which in turn was based on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). This

Court has held that “Aing announced a new procedural rule that does not apply

retroactively to cases already final on direct review.” Schriro v. Summerlin, 542

U.S. 348, 352 (2004) (emphasis added).

In Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987), this Court held “that a new

rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all

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cases, state or federal, pending direct review or not yet final, with no exception for

cases in which the new rule constitutes a ‘clear break’ with the past.” Under this

“pipeline” concept, only those cases still pending direct review or not yet final-would

receive the benefit from alleged Hurst error. Retroactivity under Griffith depends

on the date of the finality of the direct appeal. Under Teague, if a case is final on

direct review, the defendant will not receive the benefit of the new rule unless one of

the narrow exceptions announced in Jeague applies. Again, finality is the critical

date-based test under 7Jeague. There is nothing about Florida’s decision providing

partial retroactivity to Hurst v. Florida and Hurst v. State that is contrary to this

Court’s retroactivity jurisprudence.

Moreover, if partial retroactivity violated the United States Constitution or

this Court’s retroactivity jurisprudence, this Court would not have given partial

retroactive effect to a change in the penal law in Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S.

260 (2012). In Dorsey, this Court held that the Fair Sentencing Act was partially

retroactive in that it would apply to those offenders who committed applicable

offenses prior to the effective date of the act, but who were sentenced after that

date. Id. at 273. See United States v. Abney, 812 F.3d 1079, 1097-98 (D.C. Cir.

2016) (noting that prior to the decision in Dorsey, this Court had not held a change

in a criminal penalty to be partially retroactive).

Any retroactive application of a new development in the law under any

analysis will mean that some cases will get the benefit of a new development, while

11

other cases will not, depending on a date. Drawing a line between newer cases that

will receive benefit of a new development in the law and older final cases that will

not receive the benefit is part and parcel of the landscape of any retroactivity

analysis. It is simply part of the retroactivity paradigm that some cases will be

treated differently than other cases based on the age of the case. This is not

arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Eighth Amendment; it is simply a fact

inherent in any retroactivity analysis.

Shere’s argument for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause fares no

better than his Eighth Amendment argument. A criminal defendant challenging the

State’s application of capital punishment must show intentional discrimination to

prove an equal protection violation. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987). A

“[d]iscriminatory purpose’ . . . implies more than intent as violation or intent as

awareness of consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker . . . selected or

reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in

spite of, its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” /d. at 298.

The Florida court’s retroactivity ruling was based on the date of the Aing

decision, not based on a purposeful intent to deprive pre-Aing death sentenced

defendants in general, and Shere in particular, relief under Hurst v. State. The

Florida Supreme Court has been entirely consistent in denying Hurst relief to those

defendants whose convictions and sentences were final when Aing was issued in

2002. Shere is being treated exactly the same as similarly situated murderers.

12

Consequently, Shere’s equal protection argument is plainly meritless.

Additionally, in Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541 (1962), this Court refused

to find constitutional error in the alleged misapplication of Washington law by

Washington courts: “We have said time and again that the Fourteenth Amendment

does not ‘assure uniformity of judicial decisions . . . [or] immunity from judicial

error. . .. Were it otherwise, every alleged misapplication of state law would

constitute a federal constitutional question.” Jd. at 554-55 (citation omitted).

Finally, Shere suggests that Hurst should be applied retroactively to pre-

Ring defendants because they have suffered on death row for a long period of time,

changes in technology and litigation practices could provide them more robust

mitigation presentations, and they were “unfortunate” enough to receive a

constitutionally sound trial the first time around. He points to no legal precedent to

support these arguments, and relies largely on speculation on how the outcome of

crimes that were tried decades ago would be tried now. It defies logic that the same

exhaustive appeals process that has allowed Shere to remain on death row for so

long without being executed should also be the mechanism that permits him a new

penalty phase hearing twenty-seven years after the original one.

II. The jury instructions in Shere’s case do not violate this Court’s

ruling in Caldwell v. Mississippi

Shere’s attempt to tie his Equal Protection argument to Caldwell v.

Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985), fails. First, the decision in Caldwell did not

interpret the Equal Protection Clause. There, this Court found that a prosecutor’s

13

comments diminishing the jury’s sense of responsibility for determining the

appropriateness of a death sentence was “inconsistent with the Eighth

Amendment's ‘need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate

punishment in a specific case.” Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 323 (citing Woodson v. North

Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976)). Second, there was no Caldwell error in this

case. To establish constitutional error under Ca/dwel/, a defendant must show that

the comments or instructions to the jury “improperly described the role assigned to

the jury by local law.” Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 9 (1994). Shere’s jury was

properly instructed on its role based on the state law existing at the time of his

trial. See Reynolds v. State, 251 So.38d 811, (Fla. 2018) (explaining that under

Romano, the Florida standard jury instruction at issue “cannot be invalidated

retroactively prior to Hing simply because a trial court failed to employ its divining

rod successfully to guess at completely unforeseen changes in the law by later

appellate courts”).

Shere’s jury was properly informed that it needed to determine whether

sufficient aggravating factors existed and, if so, whether the aggravation

outweighed the mitigation before the death penalty could be imposed. His jury was

also informed that its recommendation would be given “great weight” by the trial

court. (Resp. App. A). A Florida jury’s decision regarding a death sentence was, and

still remains, an advisory recommendation. See Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401

(1989). See also § 921.141(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2017) (providing that “[i]f a unanimous

14

jury determines that the defendant should be sentenced to death, the jury’s

recommendation to the court shall be a sentence of death”) (emphasis added). Thus,

there was no violation of Caldwell because there were no comments or instructions

to the jury that “improperly described the role assigned to the jury by local law.”

Romano, 512 U.S. at 9. Shere’s jury was accurately advised that its decision was an

advisory recommendation that would be accorded “great weight.” This case would be

a uniquely inappropriate vehicle for certiorari because this is a postconviction case

and this Court would have to address retroactivity before even reaching the

underlying jury instruction issue.

To the extent Shere suggests that jury sentencing is now required under

federal law, this is not the case. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 612 (Scalia, J., concurring)

(“[T]oday’s judgment has nothing to do with jury sentencing. What today’s decision

says is that the jury must find the existence of the fact that an aggravating factor

existed.”) (emphasis in original); Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 515 (1995)

(holding that the Constitution does not prohibit the trial judge from “imposling] a

capital sentence”). No case from this Court has mandated jury sentencing in a

capital case, and such a holding would require reading a mandate into the

Constitution that is simply not there. The Constitution provides a right to trial by

jury, not to sentencing by jury.

In sum, there is no conflict between the Florida Supreme Court’s decision and

this Court’s Sixth Amendment, Eighth Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment

15

jurisprudence. Nor is there any conflict between the Florida Supreme Court’s

decision and this Court’s decision in Caldwell v. Mississippi. Certiorari review

should be denied.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Respondents respectfully request that this Court

deny the petition for writ of certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

PAMELA JO BONDI

ATTORNEY GENERAL

Tallabsesee, Florida

/ VA ( / , 5

Cz S—- 7 1A ae eee

CAROLYN M. SNURKOWSKI*

Assistant Attorney General

Florida Bar No. 158541

*Counsel of Record

PATRICK A. BOBEK

Assistant Attorney General

Florida Bar No. 112839

Office of the Attorney General

444 Seabreeze Blvd. Suite 500

Daytona Beach, Florida 32118

Telephone: (886) 238-4990

Facsimile: (386) 226-0457

capapp@myfloridalegal.com

carolyn.snurkowski@myfloridalegal.com

patrick. bobek@myfloridalegal.com

COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENTS

16

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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