Opposition Brief — Richard Earl Shere, Jr., Petitioner v. Florida
Supreme Court briefDec 27, 2018
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DOCKET NO. 18-6877
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
RICHARD EARL SHERE, Jr.,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF
CERTIORARI TO THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT
PAMELA JO BONDI
ATTORNEY GENERAL
CAROLYN M. SNURKOWSKI*
Assistant Attorney General
Florida Bar No. 158541
*Counsel of Record
PATRICK A. BOBEK
Assistant Attorney General
Florida Bar No. 112839
Office of the Attorney General
444 Seabreeze Blvd. Suite 500
Daytona Beach, Florida 32118
Telephone: (886) 238-4990
Facsimile: (886) 226-0457
capapp@myfloridalegal.com
caroyln.snurkowski@myfloridalegal.com
patrick.bobek@myfloridalegal.com
COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
[Capital Case]
Whether certiorari review should be denied where (1) the Florida
Supreme Court’s ruling on the retroactivity of Hurst v. Florida and
Hurst v. State, which relies on state law to provide that the Hurst
cases are not retroactive to defendants whose death sentences were
final when this Court decided Ring v. Arizona, does not violate the
Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments; (2) Florida’s capital sentencing
structure does not violate this Court’s decision in Caldwell v.
Mississippi, and (3) the Florida Supreme Court’s decision does not
conflict with any decision of this Court or involve an important,
unsettled question of federal law?
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Contents
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ...........occcceecscccceeeeeeeecneeeeeteeseeeeseneeeeeeetenes i
TABLE OF CONTENTS 20... cececcceessncecessnneeessenesenneesessenesecssaneeensnseesscneesesseeeesseneeesaes i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (00... eeeccceessceeseesseeeeseeeeeseeeeeensaneeeseecaeeeseceaeeeseneeseneeeees iii
CITATION TO OPINION BELOW. ..............cccccccsssceesseeesseneeeceesenenesseaneeeeseneeeeenessaeeeeeeees 1
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ....0......ee ec eceeescccesesssaceeeceeneensenaeeeeeeeeceeeenecneeseeeeeses 1
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED ...................:006 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ..........c.cccccecccecccceeseensceeeeesecceeseseeseasaeeeesessnenceeesseaaeeeeessaaes 2
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT ...00....eeeeesseeessseceeeessneeesesneesesseesesseeeeesenees 6
Certiorari review should be denied because (1) the Florida Supreme Court’s
ruling on the retroactivity of Hurst v. Florida and Hurst v. State, which relies
on state law to provide that the Hurst cases are not retroactive to defendants
whose death sentences were final when this Court decided Ring v. Arizona,
does not violate the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments; (2) Florida’s capital
sentencing structure does not violate the legal principles of Caldwell v.
Mississippi, and (3) the Florida Supreme Court’s decision does not conflict
with any decision of this Court or involve an important, unsettled question of
federal Law..w.......ccccccccccccccccsceessssneeececcecscaseeeeeeeececcacaaseceeeceeascseeeceeeeesaausasssesseeeeesees 6
I. The Florida Court’s Ruling on Retroactivity Does Not Violate
Equal Protection or the Eighth Amendment. ....................::000seeeeeeeseeessessssseeseeees 6
II. The jury instructions in Shere’s case do not violate this Court’s
ruling in Caldwell v. MISSISSIPPI. ............cccccceecceeceeceeeceeecennenseessessessssssssnsenseaseees 13
CONCLUSION ..........cccccccccsscsstnessssssseseessssssvsessssesssssseusssesssseeeesececececceccauseceaaeaseneeeseeneess 16
i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Apprendi v. New Jersey,
580 U.S. 466 (2000) occ ccecccccsscccssccscssccsssccecusesssccesescsscesssesessasesesnecessueeesiesesaes 12
Asay v. State,
210 So.3d 1 (Fla. 2016) o......cceceecceccececessccseecscecenscccvsuesseseseessuseesseecsueesasessees 5, 8, 9, 10
Beck v. Washington,
B69 U.S. 541 (1962) occ ccccccccscscsecsesssscsecscsesscsesesaessssescacesesssessecsesecsesseeesseeesaees 14
Brauch v. State,
234 So.3d 548 (Fla. 2018)........cccccccscssssesssscsessesssseeesecscseessesessesesaessesessceecaesasaceess 10
Caldwell v. Mississippi,
AT2. U.S. 820 (1985) oo... ccccccccsssscsscscsssecsesscsesecsesscsesesscsesssacsessesenecsasseseesanecaceees 11, 15, 17
Cardinale v. Louisiana,
394 U.S. 487 (1969) oo. ccccccececesscccccsessessssccnsecsasessesesusecsecesesseeseesaeersesenses 10
Cole v. State,
234 So. 3d 644 (Fla. 2018).......ccccccccecsssssssescesscsessesessesesseseesecsacsassecsecsecseseeenees 11
Crawford v. Washington,
BAL U.S. 86 (2004) oo... ce cccessssscescscssesesesesseseseseeeseseseseseseeesseseseeaesesecseateccsesseseeeseas 11
Danforth v. Minnesota,
B52 U.S. 264 (2008) oo... cccccccccccscsssccsescssescsesesesessesesesesessseseeseseecaesacsesesecseaseeacseas 9
Dorsey v. United States,
BOT U.S. 260 (2012)... ccccccsccsccsscssssssecsecsesscsscssesessesesecsssaecaeseesseseseesecseceeseeneens 12,13
Dugger v. Adams,
ABO U.S. 401 (1989) 0... ccecceccecescscssesesstscsesseassscsssesseresscacsesecseceeseeseseusssceucassuseens 16
Florida v. Powell,
B59 U.S. 50 (2010)... ccceccscsscsecsessesscsscsesscsecsessessessesesucacsussecsecseesesessesscsecnsentens 10
Fox Film Corp. v. Muller,
296 U.S. 207 (1935) ....ececcscsssscsccsessescsssscsscscseseesesscssesescscsacacssesessesecaesecseessseneeaees 10
Griffith v. Kentucky,
AT9 U.S. 814 (1987) oo... ceecceccccceeceecescenescsssecsecescccseecsecseecsacecsaaeceuseesucesseesasessaeens 12
Hannon v. State,
228 So.3d 505 (Fla. 2017).....ccccccssssccssseessssessesssscsecsesecsecscseessesesaseseesscsecseseeaeeaees 10
Harris v. Alabama,
B18 U.S. 504 (1995) oo. ccccscsccsesscescsecsessessssesecsecsescesacsensesscaesseeseerseaeeneateassacees 17
Hitchcock v. State,
226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017)......c.cccccccccscscsssscsssscscescscssescscscsscsesscscsessesecssseescesceevevenss 5, 10
Hurst v. Florida,
136 S. Ct. 616 (2016) ooo. cee cccscceccscccsscccssessesseccssesesssecssecscesseseeesseceesneceeseceesece Passim
Hurst v. State,
202 So.3d 40 (Fla 2016) ........ccccccccccssessssesessesessescsesecsesesacsesacsesscaaceesecsenecneseeerens Passim
Hurst v. State,
209 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016) .....ccccccscescsssssssssssssesesesesecsesesesseeesessesesenesseseseneeseseass 5
Kaczmar v. State,
228 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 2017) oo..e..ceeccecceccccesccesccssscessecesecsesessecescecesesseeessecanecereeveceeaees 11
Lambrix v. State,
227 So. 3d 112 (Fla. 2017). ......cccccccccsccscsseecscsscssssssesseecsessnscsessesesecseeseeescerceeseeees 10
McCleskey v. Kemp,
AB1 U.S. 279 (1987) ..ccecessesscsssssssessscescsesessesesesccseseassesesceassesesseececsesesssseassteeeseeeees 13, 14
Michigan v. Long,
AGB U.S. 1082 (1988) 0... cece ccccescsscsessessesecseesesscsesseesssececsecseseessecseseeueecasansess 10
Miranda v. Arizona,
B84 U.S. 436 (1966) oo... .cccccccccscsscssesecsesscseessscecsesscsscnessaececaesseseesseeseersenseseasensass 2,3, 4
Mosley v. State,
209 So. 3d 1248 (Fla. 2016)..........cccccccccsssscsssscsessssesecacsesscseseescaecesecsesecseencneesenens 9
Reynolds v. State,
251 So0.3d 811 (Fla. 2018)........ccccccscescssscscscescsseecesnecassaecssenecaseneseeesseceeseeseessesanes 16
Ring v. Arizona,
536 U.S. 584 (2002) ......ecccecccceccsseseesescsssscssescssescsesseseusesceesssscseescesesssecsesseescevaesees Passim
Romano v. Oklahoma,
B12 U.S. 1 (1994) oo. cccccccescsscsseseeseesessessesecseseeseesessessesecaesessesseseeenssseseesessecensesas 15, 16
Schriro v. Summerlin,
BAZ U.S. 848 (2004) ....cccccccccccccccsccsscssssescsseacsecsecsesssecsecsesscseseesscsseetcencseseeecsesee 12
Shere v. Moore,
830 So.2d 56 (Fla. 2002) .........ccccccccscsscescssessecsecsecsessessessessessesecseessessensseseesnsencsees 4
Shere v. Secretary, Department of Correction,
587 F.8d 1804 (11th Cir. 2008) oo... ccc ccc ccccsecsssseceecssessnsessssesecsusessneeeseceesees 4
Shere v. State,
91 So.3d 133 (Table) (Fla. 2012) ........c.cccccecccceccsceseseseescsesescecsecseecsevecsecessevavsevess 4
Shere v. State,
579 So.2d 86 (Fla. 1991) voccecccccccccescessecssccsssccssccscececcessesasecseessseeesacesseseneeees 2, 3,4, 5
lv
Shere v. State,
TAZ So.2d 215 (Fla. 1999)... ccceccceeccescesccesscessesseseesseeseceseeecseassseeseeesaeeseeesceceevese 4
Shere v. State,
2016 WL 3450466 (Fla. Jume 23, 2016)..........cccccccesccssssecessseseseesecssecseesseneseseesens 4
Shere v. State,
2018 WL 4293400 (Fla. Aug. 31, 2018) 00.0... ecceececcescecesesscessessseecsserseeesneesees 4
Shere v. State,
2018 WL 4346801 (Fla. Aug. 31, 2018) .....cccc cece ccc cs ces ceeceeseenceeseeseneee 1,5
State v. Gales,
658 N.W.2d 604 (Neb. 2003) ....ccccccccscesccsscesscssessecsecsescscssscsssssecsussesceuseeassaasensess 8
State v. Mason,
___N.E.3d____, 2018 WL 1872180 (Ohio, April 18, 2018)....0....cee cece eeeeeeee 8
Street v. New York,
394 U.S. 576 (1969) cee ce ccceccccesccessccessccssecsesecsescesscssessesecesesssesesccecesseesseneeneens 10
Teague v. Lane,
A8B9 U.S. 288 (1989) oo. cecceccecceeseceesececeesceresecseeseeseesassasssesesssssatseeseseaeeaesasens 9,11, 12
United States v. Abney,
812 F.3d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 2016) oo... cccccccccccccscscsssccssccssscssscssecsssessesesseccssecesasnes 13
Whorton v. Bockting,
549 U.S. 406 (2007) oo. cecccecccscsecesececescescessenscesscsscsssessesssessessecsecsseesssesasesseeasease 11
Witt v. State,
387 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1980).....ccccccccccccccsssccssccssccsescssssssscesecstscssscesscessscssasseseceesens 9
Woodson v. North Carolina,
AZB U.S. 280 (1976) ooo. cecccccscceccesccessccsecessessccaeceeeesscsesesseaesssevsevaseneeeassenseeneeeaeess 15
Zack, Ill, v. State,
228 So. 3d 41 (Fla. 2017) ..ccceccecccccsccscccssccccccesssssccsesceesesssscessessessesesescenssecseseaees 11
Statutes
QB U.S.C. § 1257(a) ve ceccccccccccsccssvsscsssscsscssccssssscsescssecsuesessascetssassssesssseaceesesaseasenses 1
Florida State Stat. § 921.141(2)(c) (2017) ........cccceccecceeccesseceeeseseecesecsecseeeeessceanes 16
Rules
ULS. Sup. Ct. R. 10... cece ccccccccc cece nceeeeeccacaceaceeeeeeeeceaasaeceececeuseseesaacseeesssaaeseesees 7
CITATION TO OPINION BELOW
The decision of the Florida Supreme Court is not reported, but can be found
at Shere v. State, No. SC17-1703, 2018 WL 4346801, (Fla. Aug. 31, 2018).
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The judgment of the Florida Supreme Court was entered on August 31, 2018.
(Pet. App. A). Petitioner asserts that this Court’s jurisdiction is based upon 28
U.S.C. § 1257(a). Respondent agrees that this statutory provision sets out the scope
of this Court’s certiorari jurisdiction, but submits that this case is inappropriate for
the exercise of this Court’s discretionary jurisdiction.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Respondent accepts Petitioner’s statement regarding the applicable
constitutional and statutory provisions involved.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Richard Shere was charged with the 1987 murder of Drew Snyder. Snyder
had been reported missing, and the police investigation quickly led them to Shere.
Shere v. State, 579 So.2d 86, 88 (Fla. 1991). Shere waived his Miranda’ rights, gave
several statements, and led detectives to various scenes involving the murder. /d.
According to Shere, on December 24, 1987, Shere’s later codefendant, Bruce
“Brewster” Demo, told Shere that the victim, Snyder, was going to inform the police
about Shere’s and Demo’s theft of air conditioners. /d. The next day, Demo called
Shere and said he was thinking about killing Snyder, and threatened to kill Shere if
he didn’t help. Jd. Shere went to Demo’s house where Demo loaded a shovel into
Shere’s car, and the two drank beers and smoke marijuana into the early hours
before convincing Snyder to go rabbit hunting. /d.
Shere told police that at some point in the hunt he placed his rifle on the roof
of the car so he could relieve himself. Jd. While he was doing that, Demo grabbed
the weapon and Shere heard a gunshot. /d. Shere dropped to the ground, hearing
Snyder say, “Oh, my God, Brewster,” followed by several more shots. Jd. When he
got up, he saw Snyder still breathing in the back of the car, and said they should
take Snyder to the hospital. /d. Instead, Demo took out a pistol and shot Snyder in
the forehead, and then pulled Snyder out of the car to also shoot him in the chest.
Id. Shere said they drove Snyder's body a short distance and Demo forced him to dig
a hole and bury the body. /d. Shere then returned home, when he cleaned up and
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2
burned his bloodied backseat /d. Later, at Demo’s suggestion, Shere and his
girlfriend Heidi Greulich went to Snyder’s house, gathered some of his belongings,
and dumped them in another city hoping to leave the impression that Snyder had
left town. Jd.
Demo gave a different account to the detectives. In his version, Demo, not
Shere, was the one who had turned his back to relieve himself, when he heard
Shere fire the first shots. /d. at 89. Demo turned and saw Shere fire through the
rear car window five or six times. Jd. Shere then pointed the gun at Demo and
ordered him to finish off Snyder. Jd. Demo shot Snyder twice in the head and once
in the heart. /d. He said he made Shere dig the grave because he was upset by what
Shere had done. Jd. Greulich also gave a statement to police wherein she revealed
that Shere had told her that he alone had killed Snyder. /d. A friend of Shere’s, Ray
Pruden, testified that one night after Christmas, Shere told Pruden that he had
shot Snyder to death ten or fifteen times while rabbit hunting. /d. Medical
testimony showed that Snyder had been shot ten times. /d.
The jury found Shere guilty and recommended a death sentence by a vote of
seven to five. Jd. The judge found three aggravating factors: 1) the murder was
committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of a governmental function or the
enforcement of laws by eliminating a witness; 2) the murder was especially evil,
wicked, atrocious, or cruel; and 3) the murder was committed in a cold, calculated,
and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification. Jd. In
mitigation, the court said “that it considered numerous possible mitigating
circumstances, rejected some, and found that ‘the aggravating circumstances far
outweighed the mitigating circumstances.” Jd. The judge followed the jury's
recommendation and sentenced Shere to death. /d.
Although the Florida Supreme Court struck especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel aggravator, they upheld his convictions and sentence. Jd. at 97. Shere’s
sentence became final in 1991. He has spent the past nearly three decades
unsuccessfully challenging his conviction and sentence. See, Shere v. State, 742
So.2d 215 (Fla. 1999) (affirming denial of postconviction relief); Shere v. Moore, 830
So.2d 56 (Fla. 2002) (denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus); Shere v.
Secretary, Department of Correction, 537 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2008) (affirming the
district court’s denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus); Shere v. State, 91
So.3d 133 (Table) (Fla. 2012) (affirming denial of postconviction relief); Shere v.
State, 2016 WL 3450466 (Fla. 2016) (affirming denial of postconviction relief); Shere
v. State, 2018 WL 4293400 (Fla. 2018) (affirming denial of postconviction relief).
On January 6, 2017, Shere filed a successive motion to vacate death sentence,
and argued that his death sentence violates Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016)
and Hurst v. State, 209 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016). Shere also raised retroactivity and
Eighth Amendment Issues. On August 22, 2017, the trial court entered an order
denying Shere’s successive motion to vacate his death sentence. Sheer appealed to
the Florida Supreme Court, and on October 13, 2017, that court issued an order to
show cause why the trial court’s order should not be affirmed in light of the court’s
decision in Hitchcock v. State, 226 So. 3d 216 (Fla. 2017).
In Aitchcock, the Florida Supreme Court reaffirmed its previous holding in
Asay v. State, 210 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 41 (2017), in which it
held that Hurst v. Florida as interpreted by Hurst v. State is not retroactive to
defendants whose death sentences were final when this Court decided Ring v.
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). Following briefing in Shere’s case, the Florida
Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the lower court’s denial of relief, finding:
After reviewing Shere’s response to the order to show cause and the
State’s arguments in reply, we conclude that Shere is not entitled to
relief. Shere was sentenced to death following a jury’s recommendation
of death by a vote of seven to five. Shere v. State, 579 So. 2d 86, 89
(Fla. 1991), reh’g denied (Fla. April 4, 1991). His sentence became final
in 1991. /d. Therefore, Hurst does not apply retroactively to Shere’s
death sentence. See Hitchcock, 226 So. 3d at 217. Accordingly, we
affirm the denial of Shere’s motion. No rehearing will be entertained.
Shere v. State, No. SC17-1703, 2018 WL 4346801, 1* (Fla. Aug. 31, 2018). Shere
now seeks certiorari review of the Florida Supreme Court’s decision.
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT
Certiorari review should be denied because (1) the Florida Supreme
Court’s ruling on the retroactivity of Hurst v. Florida and Hurst v.
State, which relies on state law to provide that the Hurst cases are not
retroactive to defendants whose death sentences were final when this
Court decided Ring v. Arizona, does not violate the Eighth or
Fourteenth Amendments; (2) Florida’s capital sentencing structure
does not violate the legal principles of Caldwell v. Mississippi, and (3)
the Florida Supreme Court’s decision does not conflict with any
decision of this Court or involve an important, unsettled question of
federal law.
Shere requests this Court review the Florida Supreme Court’s decision
affirming the denial of his successive postconviction motion, arguing that the state
court’s holding with respect to retroactivity violates the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. He also argues that the jury being instructed that their verdict was a
recommendation violates the Eighth Amendment.
As will be shown, nothing about the Florida Supreme Court’s retroactivity
decision is inconsistent with the United States Constitution. Shere does not provide
any “compelling” reason for this Court to review his case. U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 10.
Indeed, Shere cannot cite to any decision from this or any appellate court that
conflicts with the Florida Supreme Court’s decision below, in which the court
determined that Shere was not entitled to relief because Hurst v. State was not
retroactive to his death sentence. Nothing presented in the petition justifies the
exercise of this Court’s certiorari jurisdiction.
I. The Florida Court’s Ruling on Retroactivity Does Not Violate
Equal Protection or the Eighth Amendment.
The Florida Supreme Court’s holding in Hurst v. State followed this Court’s
ruling in Hurst v. Florida in requiring that aggravating circumstances be found by a
jury beyond a reasonable doubt before a death sentence may be imposed. The
Florida court then expanded this Court’s ruling, requiring in addition that “before
the trial judge may consider imposing a sentence of death, the jury in a capital case
must unanimously and expressly find all the aggravating factors that were proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, unanimously find that the aggravating factors are
sufficient to impose death, unanimously find that the aggravating factors outweigh
the mitigating circumstances, and unanimously recommend a sentence of
death.”2 Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d at 57. In Asay v. State, 210 So. 3d 1, 22 (Fla.
2016), cert. dented, 138 S. Ct. 41 (2017), the Florida Supreme Court ruled that, as a
matter of state law, Hurst v. State is not retroactive to any case in which the death
sentence was final prior to the June 24, 2002, decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S.
584 (2002). See also Mosley v. State, 209 So. 3d 1248, 1272-78 (Fla. 2016) (holding
that, as a matter of state law, Hurst v. State does apply retroactively to defendants
whose sentences were not yet final when this Court issued Ring). Florida’s partial
2Lower courts have almost uniformly held that a judge may perform the “weighing”
of factors to arrive at an appropriate sentence without violating the Sixth
Amendment. See e.g. State v. Mason, _N.E.3d __, 2018 WL 1872180, *5-6
(Ohio, April 18, 2018) (“Nearly every court that has considered the issue has held
that the Sixth Amendment is applicable to only the fact-bound eligibility decision
concerning an offender’s guilt of the principle offense and any aggravating
circumstances” and that “weighing is not a factfinding process subject to the Sixth
Amendment.”) (string citation omitted); State v. Gales, 658 N.W.2d 604, 628-29
(Neb. 2003) (““[Wle do not read either Apprendi or Ring to require that the
determination of mitigating circumstances, the balancing function, or
proportionality review to be undertaken by a jury”).
retroactive application of Hurst v. State is not constitutionally unsound and does
not otherwise present a matter that merits the exercise of this Court’s certiorari
jurisdiction.
This Court has held that, in general, a state court’s retroactivity
determinations are a matter of state law, not federal constitutional law. Danforth v.
Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264 (2008). State courts may fashion their own retroactivity
tests, including partial retroactivity tests. A state supreme court is free to employ a
partial retroactivity approach without violating the federal constitution under
Danforth. The state retroactivity doctrine employed by the Florida Supreme Court
did not violate federal retroactivity standards. The court’s expansion of Hurst v.
Florida in Hurst v. State is applicable only to defendants in Florida, and,
consequently, subject to retroactivity analysis under state law as set forth in Witt v.
State, 387 So. 2d 922 (Fla.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1067 (1980). See Asay, 210 So. 3d
at 15 (noting that Florida’s Witt analysis for retroactivity provides “more expansive
retroactivity standards” than the federal standards articulated in Teague v. Lane,
489 U.S. 288 (1989) (emphasis in original; citation omitted).
This Court has repeatedly recognized that where a state court judgment rests
on non-federal grounds, where the non-federal grounds are an adequate basis for
the ruling independent of the federal grounds, “our jurisdiction fails.” Fox Film
Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1038
(1983). See also Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 437, 438 (1969) (reaffirming that
this Court has no jurisdiction to review a state court decision on certiorari review
unless a federal question was raised and decided in the state court below); Street v.
New York, 394 U.S. 576, 581-82 (1969) (same). If a state court’s decision is based on
separate state law, this Court “of course, will not undertake to review the decision.”
Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50, 57 (2010).
Florida’s retroactivity analysis is a matter of state law. This fact alone
militates against the grant of certiorari in this case. It should also be noted that this
Court has repeatedly denied certiorari to review the Florida Supreme Court’s
retroactivity decisions following the issuance of Hurst v. State. See, e.g., Asay v.
State, 210 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 41 (2017); Hitchcock v. State,
226 So. 3d 216 (Fla.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 513 (2017); Lambrix v. State, 227 So.
8d 112, 118 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, Lambrix v. Florida, 138 S. Ct. 312 (2017);
Hannon v. State, 228 So. 3d 505, 513 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, Hannon v. Florida,
138 S. Ct. 441 (2017); Branch v. State, 234 So. 3d 548, 549 (Fla. 2018), cert. denied,
Branch v. Florida, 138 S. Ct. 1164 (2018); Cole v. State, 234 So. 3d 644 (Fla.), cert.
denied, Cole v. Florida, 138 S. Ct. 2657 (2018); Kaczmar v. State, 228 So. 3d 1 (Fla.
2017), cert. denied, Kaczmar v. Florida, 138 S. Ct. 1973 (2018); Zack, IIL, v. State,
228 So. 3d 41 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, Zack, III, v. Florida, 138 8. Ct. 2653 (2018).
Shere argues that the Florida Supreme Court’s partial retroactive application of
Hurst v. Florida as interpreted in Hurst v. State violates the Eighth Amendment
and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. He also claims that
the sentencing procedure used in his case violates this Court’s ruling in Caldwell v.
Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985), because the jury was instructed that its death
recommendation was advisory. The Florida Supreme Court’s retroactivity ruling is
not contrary to federal law. It does not conflict with precedent from this Court or
from any appellate court. Caldwell does not provide an avenue for relief. Certiorari
review is unnecessary.
New rules of law such as the rule announced in Hurst v. Florida do not
usually apply to cases that are final. See Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416
(2007) (explaining the normal rule of nonretroactivity and holding the decision in
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), was not retroactive). Additionally, the
general rule is one of nonretroactivity for cases on collateral review, with narrow
exceptions. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307 (1989) (observing that there were
only two narrow exceptions to the general rule of nonretroactivity for cases on
collateral review). Furthermore, certain matters are not retroactive at all. Hurst v.
Florida was based on this Court’s holding in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002),
which in turn was based on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). This
Court has held that “Aing announced a new procedural rule that does not apply
retroactively to cases already final on direct review.” Schriro v. Summerlin, 542
U.S. 348, 352 (2004) (emphasis added).
In Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987), this Court held “that a new
rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all
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cases, state or federal, pending direct review or not yet final, with no exception for
cases in which the new rule constitutes a ‘clear break’ with the past.” Under this
“pipeline” concept, only those cases still pending direct review or not yet final-would
receive the benefit from alleged Hurst error. Retroactivity under Griffith depends
on the date of the finality of the direct appeal. Under Teague, if a case is final on
direct review, the defendant will not receive the benefit of the new rule unless one of
the narrow exceptions announced in Jeague applies. Again, finality is the critical
date-based test under 7Jeague. There is nothing about Florida’s decision providing
partial retroactivity to Hurst v. Florida and Hurst v. State that is contrary to this
Court’s retroactivity jurisprudence.
Moreover, if partial retroactivity violated the United States Constitution or
this Court’s retroactivity jurisprudence, this Court would not have given partial
retroactive effect to a change in the penal law in Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S.
260 (2012). In Dorsey, this Court held that the Fair Sentencing Act was partially
retroactive in that it would apply to those offenders who committed applicable
offenses prior to the effective date of the act, but who were sentenced after that
date. Id. at 273. See United States v. Abney, 812 F.3d 1079, 1097-98 (D.C. Cir.
2016) (noting that prior to the decision in Dorsey, this Court had not held a change
in a criminal penalty to be partially retroactive).
Any retroactive application of a new development in the law under any
analysis will mean that some cases will get the benefit of a new development, while
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other cases will not, depending on a date. Drawing a line between newer cases that
will receive benefit of a new development in the law and older final cases that will
not receive the benefit is part and parcel of the landscape of any retroactivity
analysis. It is simply part of the retroactivity paradigm that some cases will be
treated differently than other cases based on the age of the case. This is not
arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Eighth Amendment; it is simply a fact
inherent in any retroactivity analysis.
Shere’s argument for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause fares no
better than his Eighth Amendment argument. A criminal defendant challenging the
State’s application of capital punishment must show intentional discrimination to
prove an equal protection violation. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987). A
“[d]iscriminatory purpose’ . . . implies more than intent as violation or intent as
awareness of consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker . . . selected or
reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in
spite of, its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” /d. at 298.
The Florida court’s retroactivity ruling was based on the date of the Aing
decision, not based on a purposeful intent to deprive pre-Aing death sentenced
defendants in general, and Shere in particular, relief under Hurst v. State. The
Florida Supreme Court has been entirely consistent in denying Hurst relief to those
defendants whose convictions and sentences were final when Aing was issued in
2002. Shere is being treated exactly the same as similarly situated murderers.
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Consequently, Shere’s equal protection argument is plainly meritless.
Additionally, in Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541 (1962), this Court refused
to find constitutional error in the alleged misapplication of Washington law by
Washington courts: “We have said time and again that the Fourteenth Amendment
does not ‘assure uniformity of judicial decisions . . . [or] immunity from judicial
error. . .. Were it otherwise, every alleged misapplication of state law would
constitute a federal constitutional question.” Jd. at 554-55 (citation omitted).
Finally, Shere suggests that Hurst should be applied retroactively to pre-
Ring defendants because they have suffered on death row for a long period of time,
changes in technology and litigation practices could provide them more robust
mitigation presentations, and they were “unfortunate” enough to receive a
constitutionally sound trial the first time around. He points to no legal precedent to
support these arguments, and relies largely on speculation on how the outcome of
crimes that were tried decades ago would be tried now. It defies logic that the same
exhaustive appeals process that has allowed Shere to remain on death row for so
long without being executed should also be the mechanism that permits him a new
penalty phase hearing twenty-seven years after the original one.
II. The jury instructions in Shere’s case do not violate this Court’s
ruling in Caldwell v. Mississippi
Shere’s attempt to tie his Equal Protection argument to Caldwell v.
Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985), fails. First, the decision in Caldwell did not
interpret the Equal Protection Clause. There, this Court found that a prosecutor’s
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comments diminishing the jury’s sense of responsibility for determining the
appropriateness of a death sentence was “inconsistent with the Eighth
Amendment's ‘need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate
punishment in a specific case.” Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 323 (citing Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976)). Second, there was no Caldwell error in this
case. To establish constitutional error under Ca/dwel/, a defendant must show that
the comments or instructions to the jury “improperly described the role assigned to
the jury by local law.” Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 9 (1994). Shere’s jury was
properly instructed on its role based on the state law existing at the time of his
trial. See Reynolds v. State, 251 So.38d 811, (Fla. 2018) (explaining that under
Romano, the Florida standard jury instruction at issue “cannot be invalidated
retroactively prior to Hing simply because a trial court failed to employ its divining
rod successfully to guess at completely unforeseen changes in the law by later
appellate courts”).
Shere’s jury was properly informed that it needed to determine whether
sufficient aggravating factors existed and, if so, whether the aggravation
outweighed the mitigation before the death penalty could be imposed. His jury was
also informed that its recommendation would be given “great weight” by the trial
court. (Resp. App. A). A Florida jury’s decision regarding a death sentence was, and
still remains, an advisory recommendation. See Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401
(1989). See also § 921.141(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2017) (providing that “[i]f a unanimous
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jury determines that the defendant should be sentenced to death, the jury’s
recommendation to the court shall be a sentence of death”) (emphasis added). Thus,
there was no violation of Caldwell because there were no comments or instructions
to the jury that “improperly described the role assigned to the jury by local law.”
Romano, 512 U.S. at 9. Shere’s jury was accurately advised that its decision was an
advisory recommendation that would be accorded “great weight.” This case would be
a uniquely inappropriate vehicle for certiorari because this is a postconviction case
and this Court would have to address retroactivity before even reaching the
underlying jury instruction issue.
To the extent Shere suggests that jury sentencing is now required under
federal law, this is not the case. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 612 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(“[T]oday’s judgment has nothing to do with jury sentencing. What today’s decision
says is that the jury must find the existence of the fact that an aggravating factor
existed.”) (emphasis in original); Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 515 (1995)
(holding that the Constitution does not prohibit the trial judge from “imposling] a
capital sentence”). No case from this Court has mandated jury sentencing in a
capital case, and such a holding would require reading a mandate into the
Constitution that is simply not there. The Constitution provides a right to trial by
jury, not to sentencing by jury.
In sum, there is no conflict between the Florida Supreme Court’s decision and
this Court’s Sixth Amendment, Eighth Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment
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jurisprudence. Nor is there any conflict between the Florida Supreme Court’s
decision and this Court’s decision in Caldwell v. Mississippi. Certiorari review
should be denied.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Respondents respectfully request that this Court
deny the petition for writ of certiorari.
Respectfully submitted,
PAMELA JO BONDI
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Tallabsesee, Florida
/ VA ( / , 5
Cz S—- 7 1A ae eee
CAROLYN M. SNURKOWSKI*
Assistant Attorney General
Florida Bar No. 158541
*Counsel of Record
PATRICK A. BOBEK
Assistant Attorney General
Florida Bar No. 112839
Office of the Attorney General
444 Seabreeze Blvd. Suite 500
Daytona Beach, Florida 32118
Telephone: (886) 238-4990
Facsimile: (386) 226-0457
capapp@myfloridalegal.com
carolyn.snurkowski@myfloridalegal.com
patrick. bobek@myfloridalegal.com
COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENTS
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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.