Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Arnold Bennett Caldwell, Petitioner v. United States

Supreme Court briefNov 19, 2018

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APPENDIX

United States Code Title 18

Crimes and Criminal Procedure

Part I. Crimes

Chapter 109B. Sex Offender and Crimes Against

Children Registry

18 U.S.C. § 2250. Failure to register

Effective: February 8, 2016

(a) In general.--Whoever-(1) is required to register under the Sex Offender

Registration and Notification Act;

(2) (A) is a sex offender as defined for the purposes

of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification

Act by reason of a conviction under Federal law

(including the Uniform Code of Military Justice),

the law of the District of Columbia, Indian tribal

law, or the law of any territory or possession of the

United States; or

(B) travels in interstate or foreign commerce, or

enters or leaves, or resides in, Indian country;

and

(3) knowingly fails to register or update a

registration as required by the Sex Offender

Registration and Notification Act;

shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more

than 10 years, or both.

(b) International

Whoever--

travel

reporting

violations.--

(1) is required to register under the Sex Offender

Registration and Notification Act (42 U.S.C. 16901

et seq.);

1a

(2) knowingly fails to provide information required

by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification

Act relating to intended travel in foreign

commerce; and

(3) engages or attempts to engage in the intended

travel in foreign commerce;

shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more

than 10 years, or both.

(c) Affirmative defense.--In a prosecution for a

violation under subsection (a) or (b), it is an

affirmative defense that-(1) uncontrollable circumstances prevented the

individual from complying;

(2) the individual did not contribute to the

creation of such circumstances in reckless

disregard of the requirement to comply; and

(3) the individual complied as soon as such

circumstances ceased to exist.

(d) Crime of violence.-(1) In general.--An individual described in

subsection (a) or (b) who commits a crime of

violence under Federal law (including the Uniform

Code of Military Justice), the law of the District of

Columbia, Indian tribal law, or the law of any

territory or possession of the United States shall

be imprisoned for not less than 5 years and not

more than 30 years.

(2) Additional punishment.--The punishment

provided in paragraph (1) shall be in addition and

consecutive to the punishment provided for the

violation described in subsection (a) or (b).

2a

Title 34. Crime Control and Law Enforcement

Subtitle II. Protection of Children and

Other Persons

Chapter 209. Child Protection and Safety

Subchapter I. Sex Offender Registration

and Notification

Effective: September 1, 2017

*

*

*

34 U.S.C. § 20901. Declaration of purpose

In order to protect the public from sex offenders and

offenders against children, and in response to the

vicious attacks by violent predators against the

victims listed below, Congress in this chapter

establishes a comprehensive national system for the

registration of those offenders . . . .

*

*

*

34 U.S.C. § 20911. Relevant definitions, including

Amie Zyla expansion of sex offender definition and

expanded inclusion of child predators

In this subchapter the following definitions apply:

(1) Sex offender:

The term “sex offender” means an individual who

was convicted of a sex offense.

(2) Tier I sex offender

The term “tier I sex offender” means a sex offender

other than a tier II or tier III sex offender.

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(3) Tier II sex offender

The term “tier II sex offender” means a sex

offender other than a tier III sex offender whose

offense is punishable by imprisonment for more

than 1 year and-(A) is comparable to or more severe than the

following offenses, when committed against a

minor, or an attempt or conspiracy to commit

such an offense against a minor:

(i) sex trafficking (as described in section

1591 of Title 18);

(ii) coercion and enticement (as described

in section 2422(b) of Title 18);

(iii) transportation with intent to engage in

criminal sexual activity (as described in

section 2423(a)) of Title 18;

(iv) abusive sexual contact (as described

in section 2244 of Title 18);

(B) involves-(i) use of a minor in a sexual performance;

(ii) solicitation of

prostitution; or

a

minor

to

(iii) production or

pornography; or

distribution

practice

of

child

(C) occurs after the offender becomes a tier I sex

offender.

(4) Tier III sex offender

The term “tier III sex offender” means a sex

offender whose offense is punishable by

imprisonment for more than 1 year and--

4a

(A) is comparable to or more severe than the

following offenses, or an attempt or conspiracy

to commit such an offense:

(i) aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse

(as described in sections 2241 and 2242 of

Title 18); or

(ii) abusive sexual contact (as described

in section 2244 of Title 18) against a minor

who has not attained the age of 13 years;

(B) involves kidnapping of a minor (unless

committed by a parent or guardian); or

(C) occurs after the offender becomes a tier II

sex offender.

(5) Amie Zyla expansion of sex offense definition

(A) Generally

Except as limited by subparagraph (B) or (C),

the term “ sex offense” means-(i) a criminal offense that has an element

involving a sexual act or sexual contact with

another;

(ii) a criminal offense that is a specified

offense against a minor;

(iii) a Federal offense (including an offense

prosecuted under section 1152 or 1153 of

Title 18) under section 1591, or chapter 109A,

110 (other than section 2257, 2257A, or

2258), or 117, of Title 18;

(iv) a military offense specified by the

Secretary of Defense under section

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115(a)(8)(C)(i) of Public Law 105-119 (10

U.S.C. 951); or

(v) an attempt or conspiracy to commit an

offense described in clauses (i) through (iv).

(B) Foreign convictions

A foreign conviction is not a sex offense for the

purposes of this subchapter if it was not

obtained with sufficient safeguards for

fundamental fairness and due process for the

accused under guidelines or regulations

established under section 20912 of this title.

(C) Offenses

conduct

involving

consensual

sexual

An offense involving consensual sexual conduct

is not a sex offense for the purposes of this

subchapter if the victim was an adult, unless

the adult was under the custodial authority of

the offender at the time of the offense, or if the

victim was at least 13 years old and the offender

was not more than 4 years older than the victim.

(6) Criminal offense

The term “criminal offense” means a State, local,

tribal, foreign, or military offense (to the extent

specified by the Secretary of Defense under section

115(a)(8)(C)(i) of Public Law 105-119 (10 U.S.C.

951 note)) or other criminal offense.

6a

(7) Expansion of definition of “specified offense

against a minor” to include all offenses by child

predators

The term “specified offense against a minor”

means an offense against a minor that involves

any of the following:

(A) An offense (unless committed by a parent or

guardian) involving kidnapping.

(B) An offense (unless committed by a parent or

guardian) involving false imprisonment.

(C) Solicitation to engage in sexual conduct.

(D) Use in a sexual performance.

(E) Solicitation to practice prostitution.

(F) Video voyeurism as described in section

1801 of Title 18.

(G) Possession, production, or distribution of

child pornography.

(H) Criminal sexual conduct involving a minor,

or the use of the Internet to facilitate or attempt

such conduct.

(I) Any conduct that by its nature is a sex

offense against a minor.

(8) Convicted as including certain juvenile

adjudications

The term “convicted” or a variant thereof, used

with respect to a sex offense, includes adjudicated

delinquent as a juvenile for that offense, but only

if the offender is 14 years of age or older at the time

of the offense and the offense adjudicated was

comparable to or more severe than aggravated

7a

sexual abuse (as described in section 2241 of Title

18), or was an attempt or conspiracy to commit

such an offense.

(9) Sex offender registry

The term “sex offender registry” means a registry

of sex offenders, and a notification program,

maintained by a jurisdiction.

(10) Jurisdiction

The term “jurisdiction” means any of the following:

(A) A State.

(B) The District of Columbia.

(C) The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

(D) Guam.

(E) American Samoa.

(F) The Northern Mariana Islands.

(G) The United States Virgin Islands.

(H) To the extent provided and subject to the

requirements of section 20929 of this title, a

federally recognized Indian tribe.

(11) Student

The term “student” means an individual who

enrolls in or attends an educational institution,

including (whether public or private) a secondary

school, trade or professional school, and institution

of higher education.

8a

(12) Employee

The term “employee” includes an individual who is

self-employed or works for any other entity,

whether compensated or not.

(13) Resides

The term “resides” means, with respect to an

individual, the location of the individual's home or

other place where the individual habitually lives.

(14) Minor

The term “minor” means an individual who has not

attained the age of 18 years.

*

*

*

34 U.S.C. § 20913. Registry requirements for sex

offenders

(a) In general

A sex offender shall register, and keep the registration

current, in each jurisdiction where the offender

resides, where the offender is an employee, and where

the offender is a student. For initial registration

purposes only, a sex offender shall also register in the

jurisdiction in which convicted if such jurisdiction is

different from the jurisdiction of residence.

(b) Initial registration

The sex offender shall initially register-(1) before completing a sentence of imprisonment

with respect to the offense giving rise to the

registration requirement; or

9a

(2) not later than 3 business days after being

sentenced for that offense, if the sex offender is not

sentenced to a term of imprisonment.

(c) Keeping the registration current

A sex offender shall, not later than 3 business days

after each change of name, residence, employment, or

student status, appear in person in at least 1

jurisdiction involved pursuant to subsection (a) and

inform that jurisdiction of all changes in the

information required for that offender in the sex

offender registry. That jurisdiction shall immediately

provide that information to all other jurisdictions in

which the offender is required to register.

(d) Initial registration of sex offenders unable to

comply with subsection (b)

The Attorney General shall have the authority to

specify the applicability of the requirements of this

subchapter to sex offenders convicted before the

enactment of this chapter or its implementation in a

particular jurisdiction, and to prescribe rules for the

registration of any such sex offenders and for other

categories of sex offenders who are unable to comply

with subsection (b).

(e) State penalty for failure to comply

Each jurisdiction, other than a Federally recognized

Indian tribe, shall provide a criminal penalty that

includes a maximum term of imprisonment that is

greater than 1 year for the failure of a sex offender to

comply with the requirements of this subchapter.

*

*

*

10a

34 U.S.C. § 20914. Information required

in registration

(a) Provided by the offender

The sex offender shall provide the following

information to the appropriate official for inclusion in

the sex offender registry:

(1) The name of the sex offender (including any

alias used by the individual).

(2) The Social Security number of the sex offender.

(3) The address of each residence at which the sex

offender resides or will reside.

(4) The name and address of any place where the

sex offender is an employee or will be an employee.

(5) The name and address of any place where the

sex offender is a student or will be a student.

(6) The license plate number and a description of

any vehicle owned or operated by the sex offender.

(7) Information relating to intended travel of the

sex offender outside the United States, including

any anticipated dates and places of departure,

arrival, or return, carrier and flight numbers for

air travel, destination country and address or

other contact information therein, means and

purpose of travel, and any other itinerary or other

travel-related information required by the

Attorney General.

(8) Any other information required by the Attorney

General.

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(b) Provided by the jurisdiction

The jurisdiction in which the sex offender registers

shall ensure that the following information is included

in the registry for that sex offender:

(1) A physical description of the sex offender.

(2) The text of the provision of law defining the

criminal offense for which the sex offender is

registered.

(3) The criminal history of the sex offender,

including the date of all arrests and convictions;

the status of parole, probation, or supervised

release; registration status; and the existence of

any outstanding arrest warrants for the sex

offender.

(4) A current photograph of the sex offender.

(5) A set of fingerprints and palm prints of the sex

offender.

(6) A DNA sample of the sex offender.

(7) A photocopy of a valid driver's license or

identification card issued to the sex offender by a

jurisdiction.

(8) Any other information required by the Attorney

General.

(c) Time and manner

A sex offender shall provide and update information

required under subsection (a), including information

relating to intended travel outside the United States

required under paragraph (7) of that subsection, in

conformity with any time and manner requirements

prescribed by the Attorney General.

12a

34 U.S.C. § 20915. Duration of registration

requirement

(a) Full registration period

A sex offender shall keep the registration current for

the full registration period (excluding any time the sex

offender is in custody or civilly committed) unless the

offender is allowed a reduction under subsection (b).

The full registration period is-(1) 15 years, if the offender is a tier I sex offender;

(2) 25 years, if the offender is a tier II sex offender;

and

(3) the life of the offender, if the offender is a tier

III sex offender.

(b) Reduced period for clean record

(1) Clean record

The full registration period shall be reduced as

described in paragraph (3) for a sex offender who

maintains a clean record for the period described

in paragraph (2) by-(A) not being convicted of any offense for which

imprisonment for more than 1 year may be

imposed;

(B) not being convicted of any sex offense;

(C) successfully completing any periods of

supervised release, probation, and parole; and

(D) successfully completing of an appropriate

sex offender treatment program certified by a

jurisdiction or by the Attorney General.

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(2) Period

In the case of-(A) a tier I sex offender, the period during which

the clean record shall be maintained is 10 years;

and

(B) a tier III sex offender adjudicated delinquent

for the offense which required registration in a

sex registry under this subchapter, the period

during which the clean record shall be

maintained is 25 years.

(3) Reduction

In the case of-(A) a tier I sex offender, the reduction is 5 years;

(B) a tier III sex offender adjudicated

delinquent, the reduction is from life to that

period for which the clean record under

paragraph (2) is maintained.

*

*

*

34 U.S.C. § 20916. Direction to the Attorney

General

(a) Requirement that sex offenders provide certain

Internet related information to sex offender

registries

The Attorney General, using the authority provided in

section 114(a)(7) of the Sex Offender Registration and

Notification Act, shall require that each sex offender

provide to the sex offender registry those Internet

identifiers the sex offender uses or will use of any type

that the Attorney General determines to be

appropriate under that Act. These records of Internet

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identifiers shall be subject to the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C.

552a) to the same extent as the other records in the

National Sex Offender Registry.

(b) Timeliness of reporting of information

The Attorney General, using the authority provided in

section 112(b) of the Sex Offender Registration and

Notification Act, shall specify the time and manner for

keeping current information required to be provided

under this section.

(c) Nondisclosure to general public

The Attorney General, using the authority provided in

section 118(b)(4) of the Sex Offender Registration and

Notification Act, shall exempt from disclosure all

information provided by a sex offender under

subsection (a).

(d) Notice to sex offenders of new requirements

The Attorney General shall ensure that procedures are

in place to notify each sex offender of changes in

requirements that apply to that sex offender as a

result of the implementation of this section.

(e) Definitions

(1) Of “social networking website”

As used in this Act, the term “social networking

website”-(A) means an Internet website-(i) that allows users, through the creation of

web pages or profiles or by other means, to

provide information about themselves that is

available to the public or to other users; and

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(ii)

that

offers

a

mechanism

for

communication with other users where such

users are likely to include a substantial

number of minors; and

(iii) whose primary purpose is to facilitate

online social interactions; and

(B) includes any contractors or agents used by

the website to act on behalf of the website in

carrying out the purposes of this Act.

(2) Of “Internet identifiers”

As used in this Act, the term “Internet identifiers”

means electronic mail addresses and other

designations used for self-identification or routing

in Internet communication or posting.

(3) Other terms

A term defined for the purposes of the Sex

Offender Registration and Notification Act has the

same meaning in this Act.

*

*

*

34 U.S.C. § 20918. Periodic in person verification

A sex offender shall appear in person, allow the

jurisdiction to take a current photograph, and

verify the information in each registry in which

that offender is required to be registered not less

frequently than-(1) each year, if the offender is a tier I sex offender;

(2) every 6 months, if the offender is a tier II sex

offender; and

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(3) every 3 months, if the offender is a tier III sex

offender.

*

*

*

34 U.S.C. § 20921. National Sex Offender Registry

(a) Internet

The Attorney General shall maintain a national

database at the Federal Bureau of Investigation for

each sex offender and any other person required to

register in a jurisdiction's sex offender registry. The

database shall be known as the National Sex Offender

Registry.

(b) Electronic forwarding

The Attorney General shall ensure (through the

National Sex Offender Registry or otherwise) that

updated information about a sex offender is

immediately transmitted by electronic forwarding to

all relevant jurisdictions.

*

*

*

34 U.S.C. § 20925. Development and availability of

registry management and website software

(a) Duty to develop and support

The Attorney General shall, in consultation with the

jurisdictions, develop and support software to enable

jurisdictions to establish and operate uniform sex

offender registries and Internet sites.

(b) Criteria

The software should facilitate--

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(1) immediate exchange of information among

jurisdictions;

(2) public access over the Internet to appropriate

information, including the number of registered

sex offenders in each jurisdiction on a current

basis;

(3) full compliance with the requirements of this

subchapter; and

(4) communication of information to community

notification program participants as required

under section 20923 of this title.

(c) Deadline

The Attorney General shall make the first complete

edition of this software available to jurisdictions

within 2 years of July 27, 2006.

*

*

*

34 U.S.C. § 20926. Period for implementation by

jurisdictions

(a) Deadline

Each jurisdiction shall implement this subchapter

before the later of-(1) 3 years after July 27, 2006; and

(2) 1 year after the date on which the software

described in section 20925 of this title is available.

(b) Extensions

The Attorney General may authorize up to two 1-year

extensions of the deadline.

*

*

*

18a

34 U.S.C. § 20927. Failure of jurisdiction to

comply

(a) In general

For any fiscal year after the end of the period for

implementation, a jurisdiction that fails, as

determined by the Attorney General, to substantially

implement this subchapter shall not receive 10 percent

of the funds that would otherwise be allocated for that

fiscal year to the jurisdiction under subpart 1 of part E

of title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe

Streets Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 3750 et seq.).

*

*

*

34 U.S.C. § 20941. Federal assistance with respect

to violations of registration requirements

(a) In general

The Attorney General shall use the resources of

Federal law enforcement, including the United States

Marshals Service, to assist jurisdictions in locating

and apprehending sex offenders who violate sex

offender registration requirements. For the purposes

of section 566(e)(1)(B) of Title 28, a sex offender who

violates a sex offender registration requirement shall

be deemed a fugitive.

(b) Authorization of appropriations

There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as

may be necessary for fiscal years 2007 through 2009 to

implement this section.

*

*

*

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Case: 17-2062

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NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

File Name: 18a0430n.06

CASE NO. 17-2062

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES of AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ARNOLD BENNETT CALDWELL,

Defendant-Appellant.

)

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FILED

Aug 21, 2018

DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk

ON APPEAL FROM THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT

COURT FOR THE WESTERN

DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

Before: BATCHELDER, MOORE, and LARSEN, Circuit Judges.

ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge. The defendant appeals the judgment entered

following his guilty plea to failure to register as a sex offender. We AFFIRM.

According to the PSR, back in the 1990’s, defendant Arnold Caldwell was living in

Tacoma, Washington, with his “common law wife,” Kitt Henderson. Henderson had a young niece

who frequently stayed with them at the residence. When the girl was six or seven years old,

Caldwell molested her; shortly thereafter, Caldwell entered her bedroom at night and raped her.

Caldwell continued to rape her every time she spent the night at the residence, which was “about

every other week” from January 1994 until August 1998. In 2001, when she was 14, the girl

reported the molestation and rapes to a school counselor and eventually the police.

In March 2004, the State of Washington convicted Caldwell, via guilty plea, of “assault in

the second degree with sexual motivation,” which required Caldwell to register as a sex offender.

The State court sentenced Caldwell to eight months in jail, but released him based on time served.

About two months later, in May 2004, the State convicted Caldwell of failing to register as a sex

offender and he spent another 26 days in jail. In February 2006, the State again convicted Caldwell

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No. 17-2062, United States v. Caldwell

of failing to register as a sex offender after he provided a false address (he had registered using the

address of a bowling alley) and he spent another four months in jail. In June 2007, the State of

Washington yet again convicted Caldwell of failing to register as a sex offender after he again

provided a false address, and this time he spent 17 months in prison (charges regarding a second

false address were dismissed as already incorporated). Following his release in 2008, he was

returned to custody several times for various other offenses.

In October 2011, Caldwell decided to move to Chicago.

He notified the State of

Washington before departing and, upon arrival, registered with the Illinois Sex Offender Registry

at the Chicago Police Department. But Caldwell did not comply with the annual registration

requirements or ever update his registration. By 2013, Chicago police were looking for him.

Eventually, police discovered that he had moved to Michigan without registering as a sex offender

in Michigan, in violation of both the Federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act

(SORNA) and Michigan law. When the police arrested Caldwell in February 2017, he admitted

that he knew the registration requirements and knew that he was in violation, but complained that

he was “tired” and had struggled to get the necessary documentation, particularly a birth certificate.

He also admitted that he had not applied for Michigan identification or for welfare assistance

because that would have given him away.

In March 2017, the federal grand jury indicted Caldwell on a charge of failing to register

as a sex offender, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) and 42 U.S.C. § 16901, et seq.1 Caldwell

pled guilty without a plea agreement. Prior to sentencing, the PSR tabulated Caldwell’s criminal

history score at 13, which corresponds to a criminal history category of VI. Coupled with a base

offense level of 10, the PSR’s advisory guideline range was 24 to 30 months in prison.

1

On September 1, 2017, 42 U.S.C. § 16901 was re-classified as 34 U.S.C. § 20901.

2

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Caldwell objected to the criminal-history-score tabulation’s adding three points from the

two convictions in 2004 (i.e., the “assault in the second degree with sexual motivation” and the

first failure to register). Specifically, he argued that because the present offense occurred when he

moved to Michigan in 2015, the tabulation should not have included the 2004 convictions because

they had occurred over ten years earlier and were sentences of less than 13 months. See U.S.S.G.

§ 4A1.2(e)(1) & (2). The PSR responded that the offense actually began in Chicago in December

2013, on “the date law enforcement discovered [that he] was in violation of SORNA,” and

continued until his apprehension in Michigan in 2017, as “an ongoing offense that involved the

same course of conduct,” which put the 2004 convictions within ten years.

The PSR also explained that if Caldwell were correct, the new criminal history score would

be ten, the new criminal history category would be V, and—coupled with the base offense level of

ten—the new PSR advisory guideline range would be 21 to 27 months in prison.

At sentencing, Caldwell argued that the present offense, under SORNA, was based on

interstate travel from Illinois to Michigan in 2015 and was not the same course of conduct as his

failure to register in Illinois in 2013, under Illinois law, which involved no interstate travel. The

district court disagreed, finding that Caldwell’s failures to register on the states’ sex-offender

registries was a continuing course of conduct for which SORNA provides federal jurisdiction;

SORNA does not create a national registry or a separate interstate-travel offense.

The court adopted the PSR’s advisory guidelines range of 24 to 30 months, opined that a

sentence “within the guideline range” would be appropriate, and sentenced Caldwell to 24 months.

The court’s stated reasons were Caldwell’s repeated convictions for failing to register and the need

for incremental punishment to ensure that he did not receive a lighter sentence for repeating the

same violations. Specifically, the court expressed a need to sentence Caldwell to more than the

17 months in prison that he had received the last time he was sentenced for failing to register.

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No. 17-2062, United States v. Caldwell

In this appeal, Caldwell contests the relevant-conduct determination that underlies his

sentence. “Because a district court’s relevant-conduct determination involves the application of

law to facts, we review [it] de novo.” United States v. Amerson, 886 F.3d 568, 573 (6th Cir. 2018)

(citation omitted). “The government bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the

evidence, that another offense constituted relevant conduct.” Id. (citation omitted). For our

purposes, “relevant conduct” means that the “acts and omissions . . . were part of the same course

of conduct.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2). The Guidelines’ commentary elaborates:

Same course of conduct. Offenses that do not qualify as part of a common scheme

or plan may nonetheless qualify as part of the same course of conduct if they are

sufficiently connected or related to each other as to warrant the conclusion that they

are part of a[n] . . . ongoing series of offenses. Factors that are appropriate to the

determination of whether offenses are sufficiently connected or related to each

other to be considered as part of the same course of conduct include the degree of

similarity of the offenses, the regularity (repetitions) of the offenses, and the time

interval between the offenses. . . . The nature of the offenses may also be a relevant

consideration (e.g., a defendant’s failure to file tax returns in three consecutive

years appropriately would be considered as part of the same course of conduct

because such returns are only required at yearly intervals).

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, com. n. 5(B)(ii).

Caldwell contends that his failure to register as a sex offender in Michigan in 2015 was not

a continuous course of conduct with his failure to maintain his registration as a sex offender in

Illinois in 2013 (after he had originally registered in 2011). He argues that the 2013 and 2015

offenses are not similar, inasmuch as the latter involved interstate travel whereas the former did

not; the former was a failure to update his registration while the latter was a failure to register at

all; the two offenses occurred in different states; and the two offenses occurred two years apart.

The district court was unpersuaded by these same arguments, finding the interstate travel aspect

irrelevant to the substance of the offense and characterizing Caldwell’s conduct as a longstanding

refusal to register as required under the law, which was demonstrated by his repeated and

continuous failures to register in multiple states (i.e., Washington, Illinois, and Michigan) as well

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No. 17-2062, United States v. Caldwell

as his efforts to avoid detection in Michigan by choosing not to acquire Michigan identification or

apply for state welfare assistance.

Caldwell’s arguments fare no better here. SORNA itself disposes of Caldwell’s contention

that his 2013 Illinois offense and his 2015 Michigan offense are necessarily unconnected or

unrelated because the former involved no interstate travel. While SORNA did not require Caldwell

to inform the sex-offender registry in Chicago that he was departing Illinois, see Nichols v. United

States, 578 U.S. --, 136 S. Ct. 1113 (2016), it nonetheless has two requirements that apply to

Caldwell here: (1) that he maintain his registration while living in Chicago, see 42 U.S.C. §

16913(a) (eff. July 27, 2006 to Aug. 31, 2017) (the “sex offender shall register, and keep the

registration current, in each jurisdiction where the offender resides”); and (2) that he register in

Michigan within three days of his relocation, such that Michigan could inform the Illinois registry

of the change, see § 16913(c) (eff. July 27, 2006 to Aug. 31, 2017). Consequently, the 2013 Illinois

offense and the 2015 Michigan offense are equally violations of SORNA and, given that one led

directly into the other, they are inherently related.

This same analysis applies to Caldwell’s frivolous argument that the offenses are unrelated

because one was a failure to maintain or update his registration while the other was a failure to

register at all. That distinction is not material. Finally, the fact that the offenses occurred in

different states and, in Caldwell’s view, two years apart, does not necessarily render them

unconnected or unrelated. As the district court recognized, the “2013” offense actually spanned

the time from when Caldwell first failed to update his Illinois registration—at least as early as

October 2012 when his annual update was due—until he left Illinois for Michigan in 2015, at

which point these offenses were separated by only the time it took to make the trip.

The district court was correct that the 2013 and 2015 offenses were a continuing course of

conduct, i.e., “related conduct,” which put the 2004 convictions within ten years of those offenses,

5

24a

Case: 17-2062

Document: 30-2

Filed: 08/21/2018

Page: 6

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No. 17-2062, United States v. Caldwell

so as to include those points in the criminal history tabulation. The court’s advisory guidelines

calculation was, therefore, correct and the within-guidelines sentence was reasonable.

We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

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25a

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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