Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Joseph David Robertson, Petitioner v. United States
Supreme Court briefNov 7, 2018
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No. _________
In the
Supreme Court of the United States
JOSEPH DAVID ROBERTSON,
Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
PETITION FOR
WRIT OF CERTIORARI
MARK MILLER
Pacific Legal Foundation
4440 PGA Blvd., Ste. 307
Palm Beach Gardens, FL 33410
Telephone: (561) 691-5000
MMiller@pacificlegal.org
ANTHONY L. FRANÇOIS*
*Counsel of Record
JEFFREY W. MCCOY
TIMOTHY R. SNOWBALL
Pacific Legal Foundation
930 G Street
Sacramento, CA 95814
Telephone: (916) 419-7111
TFrancois@pacificlegal.org
ETHAN W. BLEVINS
Pacific Legal Foundation
892 Berkeley Drive
North Salt Lake, UT 84054
Telephone: (425) 576-0484
EBlevins@pacificlegal.org
Counsel for Petitioner
i
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Petitioner Joseph David Robertson is an elderly
Navy veteran who ran a fire fighting support truck
business deep in the Montana woods. He dug some
water supply ponds in and around a foot-wide, footdeep channel carrying 2 to 3 garden hoses of flow, 40plus miles from the Jefferson River, the nearest
navigable waterway.
The United States criminally prosecuted
Robertson for digging in “navigable waters” without a
Clean Water Act permit, and for damaging federal
property under 18 U.S.C. § 1361. The district court
denied Robertson’s motions for acquittal under
Criminal Rule 29(c) during a first trial that ended in
mistrial after a hung jury. On retrial, the second jury
convicted, and the court sentenced him to 18 months
in prison and $130,000 in restitution. The Ninth
Circuit affirmed, holding that proof of “navigable
waters” is governed by Justice Kennedy’s concurrence
in Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006), that
“navigable waters” is not void for vagueness, and that
denials of Rule 29(c) motions in a first trial ending in
mistrial are not appealable.
The questions presented are:
1. Is the Clean Water Act term “navigable
waters” void for vagueness, as members of this Court
have suggested? See Sackett v. EPA, 566 U.S. 120,
132-33 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring); United States
Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co., Inc., 136 S.
Ct. 1807, 1816-17 (2016) (Kennedy, Alito, Thomas,
JJ., concurring) (citing Sackett, 566 U.S. at 133 (Alito,
J., concurring)).
ii
2. Should this Court revisit its fractured
decision in Rapanos, to clearly and authoritatively
interpret “navigable waters” under the Clean Water
Act?
3. Whether a defendant who is retried and
convicted for an offense after a hung jury may appeal,
after final judgment, the erroneous denial of his
motion for judgment of acquittal during the first trial,
as recognized in United States v. Gulledge, 739 F.2d
582, 584 (11th Cir. 1984), or whether the appellate
courts may not review such denials, as the Ninth
Circuit held below?
iii
LIST OF ALL PARTIES
Petitioner Joseph David Robertson was the
defendant and appellant below. The United States of
America was the plaintiff and appellee below.
CORPORATE
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Petitioner Joseph David Robertson is a natural
person. There are no corporate parties in this case.
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI ................ 1
OPINIONS BELOW ................................................... 1
JURISDICTION.......................................................... 1
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS AT ISSUE ........................................... 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.................................... 2
Legal Background: The Confusing
Legacy of Rapanos v. United States ........................... 2
Facts: A Foot-Wide Channel, at the Top
of the Watershed, More Than 40 Miles
from an Actually Navigable River .............................. 8
Proceedings Below: Criminal Prosecution of
Petitioner Robertson for Digging Ponds in
the Foot-Wide Unnamed Channel ............................ 10
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ............... 13
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................................. 13
ARGUMENT ............................................................. 14
I.
THE COURT SHOULD GRANT
THE PETITION TO DETERMINE
WHETHER THE CLEAN WATER
ACT TERM “NAVIGABLE WATERS”
IS VOID FOR VAGUENESS .......................... 14
A.
Members of This Court,
and Lower Court Judges, Have
Expressed Concern about the
Vagueness of “Navigable Waters” ............ 15
v
B.
This Court’s Recent Decision in
Sessions v. Dimaya Suggests
That “Navigable Waters” Is
Void for Vagueness ................................... 18
C.
The Rapanos Plurality Raises
Similar Void for Vagueness Concerns ..... 21
II.
THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT
THE PETITION TO REVISIT ITS
FRACTURED RAPANOS DECISION
AND REPLACE IT WITH A CLEAR
AND AUTHORITATIVE INTERPRETATION
OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT .................... 23
A.
The Court Should Revisit Rapanos
To Give the Act a Constitutionally
Adequate Interpretation.......................... 23
B.
The Court Should Use This Case To
Cut Through the Thicket of Ongoing
Regulatory and Litigation Chaos Over
the Scope of “Navigable Waters” .............. 24
C.
The Court Should Grant the Petition
To Resolve the Circuit Splits Over
Which (If Either) Opinion in Rapanos
Provides the Controlling Rule of Law ...... 28
III. THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT
THE PETITION TO RESOLVE A
CIRCUIT SPLIT ON REVIEWABILITY
OF ORDERS DENYING MOTIONS
FOR ACQUITTAL IN A FIRST TRIAL
ENDING IN MISTRIAL, FOLLOWED BY
CONVICTION IN A SECOND TRIAL .......... 30
vi
A.
The Circuits Are Split
on This Question ...................................... 31
1. The Eleventh Circuit Allows
Post-Judgment Review of
Sufficiency Rulings................................... 31
2. Multiple Circuits Prohibit
Post-Judgment Review of
Sufficiency Rulings ................................... 33
B.
This Issue Is Both Recurring
and Important .......................................... 35
1. The Issue Arises Often ............................. 35
2. The Issue Is Important to the
Administration of Justice ........................ 36
CONCLUSION.......................................................... 37
APPENDIX
A.
Ninth Circuit Opinion,
Filed Nov. 27, 2017 .......................................A-1
B.
Ninth Circuit Order Denying Rehearing,
Filed July 10, 2018 ........................................B-1
C.
Amended Judgment,
Filed July 26, 2016 ........................................C-1
D.
Transcript of Sentencing,
Filed July 20, 2016 ...................................... D-1
E.
District Court Order Denying Motion for
Acquittal, Filed May 23, 2016 ......................E-1
vii
F.
Verdict,
Filed April 7, 2016......................................... F-1
G.
Transcript of 2016 Jury Trial ...................... G-1
H.
Opinion and Order on Motion for Acquittal,
Filed Nov. 30, 2015 ...................................... H-1
I.
Exhibit 15 ....................................................... I-1
J.
Exhibit 17 ...................................................... J-1
K.
Exhibit 23a ................................................... K-1
viii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Abney v. United States,
431 U.S. 651 (1977) ............................................... 34
Cape Fear River Watch, Inc. v. Duke Energy Progress,
Inc., 25 F. Supp. 3d 798 (E.D. N.C., 2014) ............. 6
Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984) ............................................... 27
Citizens for Peace in Space v. City of Colorado
Springs, 477 F.3d 1212 (10th Cir. 2007) ................ 9
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,
337 U.S. 541 (1949) ............................................... 32
Connally v. General Construction Co.,
269 U.S. 385 (1926) ............................................... 15
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling
Corp., 204 F.3d 149 (4th Cir. 2000) ........................ 3
Georgia v. Pruitt,
326 F. Supp. 3d 1356 (S.D. Ga. 2018)................... 25
Gibson v. American Cyanamid. Co.,
760 F.3d 600 (7th Cir. 2014) ............................. 7, 29
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay
Foundation, Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987) ...................... 3
Hawkes Co., Inc. v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers, 782 F.3d 994 (8th Cir. 2015) ............... 16
Hughes v. United States,
138 S. Ct. 1765 (2018) ........................................... 28
In re EPA,
803 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 2015) ................................. 25
ix
In re United States Department of Defense,
713 Fed. Appx. 489 (6th Cir. 2018) ....................... 25
Johnson v. United States,
135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) ..................................... 19, 21
King v. Palmer,
950 F.2d 771 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ........................... 7, 29
Liparota v. United States,
471 U.S. 419 (1985) ................................... 15, 23, 24
Marks v. United States,
430 U.S. 188 (1977) ........................................passim
National Association of Manufacturers
v. Department of Defense,
138 S. Ct. 617(2018) .................................... 7, 16, 25
North Dakota v. EPA,
127 F. Supp. 3d 1047 (D.N.D. 2015) ..................... 25
Northern California River Watch v. City of
Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2007) ............ 18
NRDC v. Calloway,
392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975) .......................... 3, 4
Ohio v. McGill,
No. 99CA25, 2000 WL 1803650,
(Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 8, 2000).................................. 35
Orchard Hill Building Company v. Army Corps,
893 F.3d 1017 (7th Cir. 2018) ......................... 17, 21
People v. Doyle,
765 N.E.2d 85 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) ........................ 35
Rapanos v. United States,
547 U.S. 715 (2006) ........................................passim
x
Richardson v. United States,
468 U.S. 317 (1984) ........................................passim
Sackett v. EPA,
566 U.S. 120 (2012) ......................................... 15, 16
Sessions v. Dimaya,
138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018) ....................................passim
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v.
United States Army Corps of Engineers,
531 U.S. 159 (2001) ....................................... 4, 6, 21
South Carolina Coastal Conservation League v.
Pruitt, 318 F. Supp. 3d 959 (D.S.C. 2018) ............ 26
Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action,
480 U.S. 370 (1987) ............................................... 33
Texas v. EPA,
No. 3:15-CV-00162, 2018 WL 4518230,
(S.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2018) ...................................... 25
The Daniel Ball,
77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870) .................................. 3
United States Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes
Co., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1807 (2016)................ 15, 16, 21
United States v. Achobe,
560 F.3d 259 (5th Cir. 2008) ........................... 30, 33
United States v. Bailey,
571 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2009) ................................. 28
United States v. Bodey,
607 F.2d 265 (9th Cir. 1979) ................................. 35
United States v. Coleman,
862 F.2d 455 (3d Cir. 1988)............................. 30, 33
United States v. Cooper,
733 F.2d 91 (11th Cir. 1984) ................................. 32
xi
United States v. Cundiff,
555 F.3d 200 (6th Cir. 2009) ................................. 28
United States v. Donovan,
661 F.3d 174 (3rd Cir. 2011) ................................. 29
United States v. Gavin,
No. 09-15518, 2010 WL 3373973
(11th Cir. Aug. 27, 2010) ....................................... 32
United States v. Gulledge,
739 F.2d 582 (11th Cir. 1984) ......................... 30, 31
United States v. Johnson,
467 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2006)................................ 6, 28
United States v. Julien,
318 F.3d 316 (1st Cir. 2003)............................ 30, 33
United States v. Lanier,
520 U.S. 259 (1997) ............................. 14, 15, 23, 24
United States v. Lucero,
No. 16-cr-00107-HSG-1, 2017 WL 9534005
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2017) ...................................... 17
United States v. Martinez,
No. 11-12131, 2013 WL 563158
(11th Cir. Feb. 15, 2013) ................................. 30, 32
United States v. Perea-Rey,
680 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2012) ................................. 9
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,
474 U.S. 121 (1985) ........................................... 4, 21
United States v. Robertson,
875 F.3d 1281 (9th Cir. 2017) ........................passim
United States v. Robison,
505 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2007) ......................... 6, 28
xii
United States v. Rodriguez,
No. 1:CR 09-279-BLW, 2011 WL 1458231
(D. Idaho Apr. 15, 2011) ........................................ 17
United States v. Taylor,
176 F.3d 331 (6th Cir. 1999) ................................. 32
United States v. Willis,
02 F.3d 1078 (10th Cir. 1996) ......................... 30, 33
Yeager v. United States,
557 U.S. 110 (2009) ............................................... 34
Statutes
18 U.S.C. § 1361 ........................................................ 10
18 U.S.C. § 16(b) ............................................ 18, 20-21
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) ..................................................... 1
28 U.S.C. § 1291 ........................................................ 32
33 U.S.C. § 1251, et seq. .............................................. 2
33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) ..................................................... 2
33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2)(A) .......................................... 10
33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) ................................................... 2
33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) ..................................................... 2
Constitution
U.S. Const., amend. V................................................. 2
Federal Regulations
33 C.F.R. §328.3(a)(1) (2004) ...................................... 4
33 C.F.R. §328.3(a)(3) (2004) ...................................... 4
33 C.F.R. §328.3(a)(5) (2004) ...................................... 4
xiii
33 C.F.R. §328.3(a)(7) (2004) ...................................... 4
33 C.F.R. §328.3(c) (2004)........................................... 4
Federal Register
39 Fed. Reg. 12115 (Apr. 3, 1974) .............................. 3
42 Fed. Reg. 37122 (July 19, 1977) ............................ 4
51 Fed. Reg. 41206 (Nov. 13, 1986) ............................ 4
65 Fed. Reg. 12818 (Mar. 9, 2000).............................. 4
Rules
Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 29............................................... 11
Other Authorities
EPA,
Classification and Types of Wetlands,
https://www.epa.gov/wetlands/classification
-and-types-wetlands #marshes
(last updated July 5, 2018) ................................... 20
Hannaford-Agor, Paula L., et al.,
Are Hung Juries a Problem?
National Center for State Courts
(Sept. 30, 2002) ...................................................... 35
Sierra Club,
Trump & Pruitt Repeal the
2015 Clean Water Rule, (June 28, 2017),
https://www.sierraclub.org/ohio/blog/
2017/06/trump-pruitt-repeal-2015-clean-waterrule. ........................................................................ 26
Websters New Int’l Dictionary,
2d ed. 1954 ......................................................... 5, 22
1
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Joseph David Robertson respectfully petitions
this Court for a writ of certiorari to review the
judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit.
OPINIONS BELOW
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion is published at
United States v. Robertson, 875 F.3d 1281 (9th Cir.
2017), and reproduced in the Appendix at A-1. The
Ninth Circuit’s unpublished order denying rehearing
and rehearing en banc is reproduced in the Appendix
at B-1. The district court’s unpublished Amended
Judgment is reproduced in the Appendix at C-1.
JURISDICTION
The district court entered the Amended
Judgment on July 26, 2016. Petitioner timely
appealed to the Ninth Circuit, whose opinion was
entered on November 27, 2017. Petitioner timely
sought rehearing and rehearing en banc, which the
Ninth Circuit denied on July 10, 2018. On
July 30, 2018, Associate Justice Kennedy granted
Petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file this
petition for writ of certiorari to and including
November 7, 2018. This Court has jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
2
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS AT ISSUE
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States provides that “[n]o person shall . . .
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law;” U.S. Const. amend. V.
The Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251, et seq.,
provides as follows:
“Except in compliance with . . . section . . . 1344
of this title, the discharge of any pollutant by any
person shall be unlawful.” 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
“The term “discharge of a pollutant” . . . means
. . . any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters
from any point source,” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12).
“The term “navigable waters” means the waters
of the United States, including the territorial seas.”
33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Legal Background: The Confusing
Legacy of Rapanos v. United States
The Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251, et seq.,
regulates discharges of pollutants from point sources
to “navigable waters.” 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a), § 1362(12).
The Act defines “navigable waters” as “waters of the
United States, including the territorial seas.”
33 U.S.C. § 1362(7). Nonexempt discharges require a
permit from either the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) or U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Army
Corps). The permitting regime is time-consuming,
3
expensive, and can require significant changes to the
applicant’s intended operations. See Rapanos v.
United States, 547 U.S. 715, 721 (2006).
A person engaged in unpermitted, nonexempt
discharges or permit violations faces administrative
cease-and-desist
and
compliance
orders,
administrative penalties, civil actions for monetary
civil penalties and injunctive relief, and criminal
prosecution. See generally, Gwaltney of Smithfield,
Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 484 U.S. 49,
52-53 (1987). Liability for violation of the Act is strict,
without regard to the responsible party’s intent or
knowledge. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper
Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 151 (4th Cir. 2000). The
burdens of the permitting regime, and the significance
of the criminal penalties for violating it, make it
critically important that the regulated public know
what is meant by “navigable waters.”
In 1974, EPA and the Army Corps adopted
regulations defining “waters of the United States”
consistently with this Court’s long-standing definition
of the term “navigable waters of the United States,”
appearing in predecessor statutes, as interstate
waters that are navigable in fact or readily susceptible
of being rendered so. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 723 (citing
The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870),
and 39 Fed. Reg. 12115, 12119 (Apr. 3, 1974)). In 1975,
the District Court for the District of Columbia
enjoined this definition as too narrow. Rather than
appealing that decision, the agencies rewrote their
regulations more broadly. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 724
(citing NRDC v. Calloway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686
(D.D.C. 1975)). The new regulations purported to
extend the scope of “navigable waters” to the outer
4
limits of Congress’ commerce power. Id. (citing 42 Fed.
Reg. 37122, 37144 n.2 (July 19,1977)).
By 1986, the agencies had stretched the term
“navigable waters” to include interstate waters,
intrastate waters with various relationships to
interstate or foreign commerce, tributaries of such
waters, and wetlands adjacent to (defined as
bordering, contiguous, or neighboring) such
tributaries and other waters. Id. at 724 (citing
33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(1), (a)(3), (a)(5), (a)(7), and
§328.3(c) (2004)). The agencies also added isolated
waters used by migratory birds. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at
724 (citing 51 Fed. Reg. 41206, 41217 (Nov. 13, 1986).
By 2000, the agencies had swept “ephemeral streams”
and “drainage ditches” with an ordinary high water
mark within the ambit of “tributaries.” Id. at 725
(citing 65 Fed. Reg. 12818, 12823 (Mar. 9, 2000)).
In United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes,
Inc., this Court upheld the regulation of nonnavigable
wetlands as “navigable waters” as long as the
wetlands “actually abut on” traditional navigable
waters so closely that it is difficult to tell where one
ends and the other begins. 474 U.S. 121, 135 (1985),
cited in Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 724-25. Then in Solid
Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United
States Army Corps of Engineers (SWANNC), this
Court struck down the Migratory Bird Rule, holding
that the Act did not extend to “nonnavigable, isolated,
intrastate waters.” 531 U.S. 159, 171 (2001), cited in
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 726.
In Rapanos, this Court considered the agency
regulations defining tributaries and adjacent
wetlands as “navigable waters” and invalidated them
for exceeding the scope of the Act. 547 U.S. at 728, id.
5
at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Despite five Justices
agreeing that the regulations exceeded the agencies’
authority, they did not agree why.
A plurality of four Justices would have held
that nonnavigable tributaries are only “navigable
waters” if they are “relatively permanent, standing or
continuously flowing bodies of water “forming
geographic features” that are described in ordinary
parlance as “streams[,] . . . oceans, rivers, [and] lakes.”
547 U.S. at 739 (citing Webster’s New Int’l Dictionary
2882 (2d ed. 1954). The plurality based this view on a
textual analysis of the Act informed by its federalism
purpose and relied on the Clear Statement Rule, both
as to federal usurpation of local land use authority
and Congress’ exercise of its Commerce Clause power
to its furthest limit. 547 U.S. at 738. As to wetlands,
the plurality wrote that “navigable waters” includes
only those wetlands abutting actually navigable
waters or covered tributaries to the degree that, as in
Riverside Bayview, it was doubtful where the wetland
ends and the abutted waterway begins. Id. at 742.
Writing only for himself, Justice Kennedy
concurred in the judgment and that the agency
regulations including all tributaries and adjacent
wetlands were overbroad. Id. at 759 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). But he read “navigable waters” much
more broadly than did the plurality, concluding that
the term also encompassed intermittent tributaries,
id. at 770, and wetlands that do not abut covered
tributaries but which nonetheless have a significant
nexus, determined alone or in combination with
others “in the region,” with actually navigable waters,
determined on a case-by-case basis according to
6
physical, chemical, and biological factors, id. at 77375.
The Chief Justice joined the plurality, but also
concurred to lament the agencies’ failure to issue valid
new regulations after the SWANCC decision, and that
due to the lack of a majority opinion in the case, “lower
courts and regulated entities will now have to feel
their way on a case-by-case basis.” 547 U.S. at 758
(Roberts, C.J., concurring) (citing Marks v. United
States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977)).
Congress took the same action to clarify
“navigable waters” after Rapanos as it did following
SWANCC: nothing. The agencies adopted informal
guidance in 2008, which used the reasoning of both
the plurality and the concurrence as parallel bases for
identifying “navigable waters.” See Cape Fear River
Watch, Inc. v. Duke Energy Progress, Inc., 25 F. Supp.
3d 798, 808 (E.D.N.C. 2014) (discussing Rapanos
Guidance).
The circuit courts are split on the application of
Rapanos. Some hold under Marks that only the
concurrence is binding. Others hold that jurisdiction
may be proven under either the plurality or the
concurrence. Compare United States v. Johnson, 467
F.3d 56, 66 (1st Cir. 2006) (jurisdiction under plurality
and concurrence), with United States v. Robison, 505
F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2007) (jurisdiction under
concurrence only).
Further, the decision below directly splits with
the Seventh and DC Circuits on the question of
whether a circuit court may consider a dissent in a
fractured decision of this Court in applying Marks.
Compare United States v. Robertson, 875 F.3d 1281,
7
1291 (9th Cir. 2017) (dissent in Rapanos combined
with concurrence to conclude that concurrence
controls), with King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 783 (D.C.
Cir. 1991) (no use of dissent in Marks analysis); accord
Gibson v. American Cyanamid. Co., 760 F.3d 600, 622
(7th Cir. 2014) (Marks bars use of dissents in applying
Rapanos).
As the district court stated during Robertson’s
sentencing below, “there are significant legal
questions in the Supreme Court itself about how to
define ‘waters of the United States.’” Appendix D-3.
In 2015, the agencies finalized a new
regulation, once again broadly defining “navigable
waters,” based principally on Justice Kennedy’s
concurring Rapanos opinion. This rulemaking was
met with multiple lawsuits in both the federal district
and circuit courts. See generally, National Association
of Manufacturers v. Department of Defense, 138 S. Ct.
617, 625-27 (2018) (NAM). In NAM, this Court held
that the district rather than circuit courts have
jurisdiction over these lawsuits. Id. at 624.
Meanwhile, the current administration has
announced its intent to repeal the 2015 Rule and
adopt a new regulatory definition of “navigable
waters,” this time based on the Rapanos plurality
instead of the concurrence. See www.epa.gov/wotusrule/rulemaking-process. It remains unclear how soon
this new regulation will be finalized.
One thing does appear clearly. As long as the
fractured Rapanos decision stands, the agencies will
continue to assert jurisdiction under either or both
opinions, based on political and other considerations,
with the now real prospect that succeeding
8
administrations will toggle the regulatory definition
from plurality to concurrence and back to suit each
other’s electoral constituency.
In all of this, “regulated entities” (including
Petitioner Robertson) remain left to feel their way on
a case-by-case basis, under a statute that is
“hopelessly indeterminate,” interpreted disparately
by the members of this Court and the lower courts,
and administered by agencies that continue to assert
their jurisdiction to the very outward boundaries of
watersheds, over minute channels across which many
“regulated entities” would step without noticing.
This case is about one of these waters.
Facts: A Foot-Wide Channel, at the Top
of the Watershed, More Than 40 Miles
from an Actually Navigable River
The “navigable water” at issue in this case is an
unnamed channel, a foot or so wide and a foot or so
deep, running through a clearing in the woods in
Montana (the Pond Site), carrying two or three garden
hoses worth of flow. Appendix G-2; G-5; G-7-8; K-1.
The Pond Site is more than 40 miles distant from the
nearest actually navigable water body, the Jefferson
River. The unnamed channel flows downhill
discontinuously about half a mile to drain into
Cataract Creek, Appendix I-1, which then flows a
further two miles to meet the Boulder River near
Basin, Montana. From Basin, the Boulder River flows
roughly 40 miles, first east alongside Interstate 15 to
Boulder, Montana, and thence south alongside state
9
highway 69 to meet the Jefferson River near Cardwell,
Montana. Appendix J-1. 1
Forty-plus miles upstream from the Jefferson
River is almost as far as one can follow the Boulder
River, Cataract Creek, and then the unnamed channel
uphill into the woods before running out of water
entirely. There is almost no regular channel
associated with flow uphill of the Pond Site, which
itself is a mere 2,100 feet from the very top of the
watershed. Appendix G-12-15.
The unnamed channel forms on or just below a
patented mining claim called the White Pine Lode. It
then crosses an unpatented mining claim called the
Mohawk Lode, before entering another patented
mining claim called the Manhattan Lode and then
finding its way to Cataract Creek. The White Pine,
Mohawk, and Manhattan Lodes sit just inside the
boundary of the Beaverhead-Deerlodge National
Forest. Appendix D-3-4; I-1 (Exhibit 15 showing
patented claims in dark shading, with the Pond Site
indicated by blue dot, and Forest boundary in dark
red).
Petitioner Joe Robertson is an elderly Navy
veteran. He owns the White Pine Lode and has lived
there with his wife Carri for many years. They also
1 This Court can
take judicial notice of the distance from the
confluence of Cataract Creek with the Boulder River to its
confluence with the Jefferson River as reflected in online
mapping websites and the admitted exhibits in this case. United
States v. Perea-Rey, 680 F.3d 1179, 1182 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012)
(taking judicial notice of Google map distance determination)
(citing Citizens for Peace in Space v. City of Colorado Springs,
477 F.3d 1212, 1218 n.2 (10th Cir. 2007) (same, using different
mapping website)).
10
owned the Manhattan Lode, but lost it in a tax sale in
2013. Robertson has also, at various times, owned the
mineral rights associated with the Mohawk
unpatented mining claim that sits between the White
Pine and Manhattan Lodes. Appendix D-3-5.
The Robertsons ran a fire fighting support
truck business until recently. Living deep in the
woods in an increasingly fire-prone landscape, they
were concerned about their safety and the
vulnerability of their property. Appendix G-15-16. In
2013 and 2014, Joe Robertson dug a series of small
water supply ponds in and about the unnamed
channel at the Pond Site, with a view to being well
prepared should fire strike near his home. Some of the
ponds sit on the Manhattan Lode, and the government
charges that others sit on the Mohawk. Appendix G15-17.
Robertson dug the ponds without approval from
the Forest Service to disturb the surface estate of the
Mohawk Lode, and without permission from the Army
Corps under the Clean Water Act.
Proceedings Below: Criminal Prosecution of
Petitioner Robertson for Digging Ponds
in the Foot-Wide Unnamed Channel
On May 22, 2015, the government indicted
Robertson charging him with two counts of violating
the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2)(A)
(Counts I and III) and one count alleging willful
destruction of government property under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1361 (Count II). Appendix A-4-5. The district court
denied several pretrial motions to dismiss or clarify
the indictment, and the trial commenced on October
5, 2015. Appendix A-5. On October 6, Robertson once
11
again moved to dismiss Counts I and III, arguing that
the current law defining “waters of the United States”
violates due process on vagueness grounds because it
is impossible to determine with any accuracy what
constitutes a violation of the Clean Water Act.
Robertson, 875 F.3d at 1292. The district court
ultimately denied the motion. Appendix A-5, H-2.
Robertson’s trial lasted four days. As to Counts
I and III, the government offered no flow studies for
the unnamed channel, and instead focused on an
alleged ordinary high water mark of the channel.
Appendix H-7. For Count II, the government relied
primarily on cadastral maps to prove that
Mr. Robertson’s work occurred on the unpatented
Mohawk Lode rather than the privately owned White
Pine or Manhattan Lodes. Appendix H-11. The jury
hung on all three counts. Appendix A-5, H-2.
Robertson moved for a judgment of acquittal
under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, during
trial and before the case was submitted to the jury, for
insufficiency of evidence that the unnamed channel is
“navigable waters” and that any of the ponds were
located on the unpatented White Pine Lode. Appendix
A-5, H-2. After the jury failed to return a verdict and
the judge declared mistrial, Robertson once again
moved for judgment of acquittal. Appendix A-5, H-2.
The district court judge denied all motions and reset
the trial. Appendix H-12.
The second trial began on April 4, 2016.
Appendix A-5, E-1. At the second trial, the
government significantly bolstered its evidence and
changed its litigation strategy. For Counts I and III,
the government introduced evidence from a new site
investigation made after the first trial, in November
12
of 2015, Appendix E-4, and provided previously
undeveloped evidence of the flow of the channel,
Appendix E-4. For Count II, the government primarily
relied on Forest Service boundary surveys to prove
that Robertson’s work occurred on the White Pine
Lode, rather than the cadastral maps used in the first
trial. Appendix E-2. On April 7, the jury found
Robertson guilty on all counts. Appendix E-1, F-1-2.
At the second trial, Robertson renewed his
motion to dismiss and made new motions for a
judgment of acquittal. Appendix E-1. After the jury
returned its verdict but before sentencing, Robertson
filed a second motion to dismiss Counts I and III.
Appendix A-5, D-2. Based on an intervening en banc
decision from the Ninth Circuit, the second motion to
dismiss argued that Justice Kennedy’s opinion was
not the controlling opinion of Rapanos. Appendix A-13,
A-24, D-2. While the district court recognized the
seriousness of the legal question of which Rapanos
opinion controls, the court ultimately denied the
second motion to dismiss. Appendix A-5, D-2-3. The
judge sentenced Mr. Robertson to 18 months in prison
for each of the three counts, one year of supervised
release for each of Counts I and III, and three years of
supervised release for Count II. In addition, the judge
sentenced Robertson to pay $129,933.50 in restitution
to the government. Appendix C-4, 10. All sentences
were to run concurrently. Id. 2
Robertson timely appealed his conviction to the
Ninth Circuit. He argued that (1) the Rapanos
concurrence is not the controlling opinion in that
Robertson completed his term of imprisonment on or about
December 5, 2017, and is presently under supervised release and
making payments on his restitution obligation.
2
13
decision, (2) the term “waters of the United States” is
void for vagueness, and (3) the trial court should have
granted his motions for judgment of acquittal from the
first trial. Appendix A-6. Applying Marks, the Ninth
Circuit held that Justice Kennedy’s Rapanos
concurrence is the controlling opinion and rejected
Robertson’s due process vagueness argument, holding
that at the time of conviction a prior Ninth Circuit
decision gave reasonable warning that the Clean
Water Act applied. Appendix A-17-19. Finally, the
court below, citing Richardson v. United States, 468
U.S. 317 (1984), determined that it could not review
Robertson’s motions for acquittal from his first trial.
Appendix A-22.
On July 30, 2018, Justice Kennedy granted
Mr. Robertson’s application to extend the time to file
this petition. See Supreme Court docket # 18A108. He
now submits this petition, requesting that this Court
grant certiorari to review the decision of the Ninth
Circuit.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The meaning of “navigable waters” under the
Clean Water Act is unfinished business; this case
offers an ideal vehicle to rectify that situation. Recent
decisions holding other criminal statutes void for
vagueness suggest that any interpretation of the Act
as covering substantially more than traditionally
navigable waters is void for vagueness. Revisiting
Rapanos would give this Court an immediate
opportunity to clearly and authoritatively interpret
14
the Act, if it can be interpreted constitutionally, in a
way that will provide fair notice to the public and
proper direction to the agencies in their ongoing (and
seemingly perpetual) rulemaking efforts. At the very
least, the Court should direct the lower courts on the
question of which, if either, of the opinions supporting
the judgment in Rapanos is controlling.
The Court should also grant the petition to
resolve a circuit split on whether a defendant may
appeal the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal
at a first trial that ends in mistrial and is followed by
conviction at a second trial. This is a significant
question of criminal procedure that divides the lower
federal and state courts. In those circuits and states
following the decision below, the government is given
an unjust advantage that vitiates the presumption of
innocence and the beyond reasonable doubt standard
of proof: it may retry a defendant after failing to meet
its burden of proof at an initial trial, with no appellate
review of its failure to meet the burden in the first
trial.
ARGUMENT
I
THE COURT SHOULD GRANT THE
PETITION TO DETERMINE WHETHER
THE CLEAN WATER ACT TERM “NAVIGABLE
WATERS” IS VOID FOR VAGUENESS
The Due Process Clause requires that criminal
statutes afford adequate notice of what they proscribe
to those who must comply. United States v. Lanier,
520 U.S. 259, 265-67 (1997) (discussing doctrine,
reciting elements, and citing sources). The three
related considerations of constitutionally fair notice
15
for criminal statutes include: (1) adequate specificity,
such that people “of common intelligence” need not
“guess at its meaning” and will not “differ as to its
application”; (2) application of the rule of lenity to
limit the interpretation of criminal statutes to activity
clearly covered; and (3) exclusion of criminal liability
where a judicial “gloss” that clarifies the law is applied
for the first time. Lanier, 520 U.S. at 266 (quoting
Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385,
391 (1926), and Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S.
419, 427 (1985)).
A.
Members of This Court, and Lower Court
Judges, Have Expressed Concern about
the Vagueness of “Navigable Waters”
Justice Alito has described the phrases
“navigable waters” and “waters of the United States”
in terms that clearly call into question whether they
are void for vagueness under the Due Process Clause:
“The reach of the Clean Water Act is notoriously
unclear.” Sackett v. EPA, 566 U.S. 120, 132 (2012)
(Alito, J., concurring). Further, “[r]eal relief requires
Congress to do what it should have done in the first
place, provide a reasonably clear rule regarding the
reach of the Clean Water Act.” Id. at 133. “Congress
did not define what it meant by “the waters of the
United States”; the phrase was not a term of art with
a known meaning; and the words themselves are
hopelessly indeterminate.” Id. (emphasis added).
Other members of this Court appear to have
taken up the same concern. Hawkes, 136 S. Ct. at 1816
(Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., concurring) (citing
Sackett, 566 U.S. at 130-131 (Alito, J., concurring)); id.
at 1812 (“It is often difficult to determine whether a
particular piece of property contains waters of the
16
United States.”); id. at 1816-17 (Kennedy, Alito,
Thomas, JJ., concurring) (“[T]he reach and systemic
consequences of the Clean Water Act remain a cause
for concern.”); id. at 1816 (citing Sackett, 566 U.S. at
132 (Alito, J., concurring)); see NAM, 138 S. Ct. at 625
(“In decades past, the EPA and the Corps . . . have
struggled to define and apply that statutory term.”).
During oral argument in Army Corps of
Engineers v. Hawkes, Justice Kennedy went so far as
to pose the following question:
Well, I think—I think underlying Justice
Kagan’s question is that the Clean Water
Act is unique in both being quite vague
in its reach, arguably unconstitutionally
vague, and certainly harsh in the civil
and criminal sanctions it puts into
practice. What’s the closest analogous
statute that give the affected party so
little guidance at the front end? 3
Circuit court judges have also expressed
concern about the difficulty of determining whether a
given property contains “navigable waters.” See
Hawkes Co., Inc. v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers, 782 F.3d 994, 1003 (8th Cir. 2015) (Kelly,
J., concurring) (“[T]he Court in Sackett was concerned
with just how difficult and confusing it can be for a
landowner to predict whether or not his or her land
falls within CWA jurisdiction . . . . This is a unique
aspect of the CWA; most laws do not require the hiring
of expert consultants to determine if they even apply
3 Transcript of Oral Argument at 18:11-19, Hawkes, 136 S. Ct.
1807, available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_argument
s/argument_transcripts/2015/15-290_j5fl.pdf.
17
to your property.”); Orchard Hill Building Company
v. Army Corps, 893 F.3d 1017, 1025 (7th Cir. 2018)
(“Justice Kennedy did not define ‘similarly situated’—
a broad and ambiguous term . . . .”).
By contrast, only a handful of district courts
have addressed this question and concluded that the
Act affords constitutionally adequate notice under the
Due Process Clause. United States v. Lucero, No. 16cr-00107-HSG-1, 2017 WL 9534005 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 14, 2017); United States v. Rodriguez, No. 1:CR09-279-BLW, 2011 WL 1458231 (D. Idaho Apr. 15,
2011).
Even the judges of the Ninth Circuit below
appeared concerned about this difficulty. During oral
argument, Judge McKeown asked:
It kind of goes back to the basic question
of notice. If you can’t even figure out
which parts of the Venn Diagram fit
together amongst all these lawyers and
judges, how does a regular citizen figure
it out?
Judge Gould followed with:
I just have the problem in a criminal case
as to whether with that sort of
convoluted analysis under the Marks
theory and sufficiently complex [sic] that
our court took an en banc in Davis to
have another run at it, whether a citizen
18
is supposed to know that, and go to
prison if they don’t know that. 4
And yet the Ninth Circuit concluded in its
decision below that “navigable waters” is not void for
vagueness based on the non sequitur that it had
previously held in Northern California River Watch v.
City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2007), that
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion was the holding
of Rapanos under Marks. Appendix A-20. City of
Healdsburg may have established the law of the
circuit on how to apply to Rapanos, but deciding which
opinion is the holding under Marks is not directly
germane to whether the Act itself (as interpreted by a
single Justice of this Court or otherwise) is void for
vagueness. Put another way, Justice Kennedy’s
interpretation of the Act may, for the sake of
argument, be the controlling opinion of this Court, but
that does not answer whether that (or any other)
interpretation of the Act is void for vagueness.
B.
This Court’s Recent Decision in Sessions
v. Dimaya Suggests That “Navigable
Waters” Is Void for Vagueness
Sessions v. Dimaya held that 18 U.S.C. § 16(b),
defining “crime of violence” for purposes of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, is void for
vagueness. 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1210 (2018). The Court’s
analysis rested on the statute’s use of two terms: “by
its nature” (as applied to the noun “felony”) and
“substantial risk” (that physical force would be used
in committing the crime). Both terms require an
4 Available at https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_video.
php?pk_vid=0000012065, at 23:55-24:12 (McKeown, J.) and
27:13-42 (Gould, J.).
19
interpreting court to decide, without any standards,
what crimes fall within the definition. Id. at 1213-14.
Relying heavily on its prior decision in Johnson v.
United States, the Court noted that applying the “by
its nature” provision requires a court to determine the
“idealized ordinary case” of a given offense. 138 S. Ct.
1204, 1214 (2018) (quoting Johnson v. United States,
135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557 (2015)). That exercise yields no
clear answer; it depends entirely on a given judge’s
opinion of what the essential nature—or platonic
form—of a given crime involves. 138 S. Ct. at 1214; id.
at 1231-32 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). Secondly, this
indeterminacy is compounded by the requirement
that the judge then determine whether the platonic
form of a crime poses some threshold level of risk—a
“substantial risk”—of violence. Id. at 1214. The
combination of the need to posit an idealized version
of a crime with the question whether the idealized
form poses a threshold risk level crosses the line into
unconstitutional vagueness. Id. (quoting Johnson, 135
S. Ct. at 2561).
The same analytical approach is applicable to
the Rapanos concurrence. As with the statute struck
down in Dimaya, the Rapanos concurrence interprets
“navigable waters” to require two interacting
determinations, one involving an idealized or
otherwise undefinable condition (“wetlands . . . in
combination with similarly situated lands in the
region”), and the second overlaying a threshold
relationship (“significantly affects” traditionally
navigable waters).” 547 U.S. at 780 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
The “similarly situated within the region”
provision requires a judge to make two idealized
20
determinations: what two or more wetlands are
“similarly situated” to each other, and what is “the
region” within which those wetlands’ situation must
be similar? As interpreted by Justice Kennedy,
“navigable waters” offers no guidance to answer either
of these questions. Id. (“wetlands, either alone or in
combination with similarly situated lands in the
region”). Wetlands can be similar in any number of
ways: location, size, plant communities, length of
inundation, type of connection to other features,
animal communities that use or rely on them, soil
types, etc. 5 They may, at the same time, be similar in
some of these aspects and dissimilar in others. How is
a judge (or regulated party, agency staff,
administrative law judge, or citizen suit plaintiff or
defendant) to determine whether any two or more
wetlands are similarly situated to the requisite
degree? Nor is the platonic form of “the region” any
more determinate. How large is a region? And how are
its borders defined? If by watershed, how large a part
of the watershed? The portion in which the similarly
situated wetlands appear, or the entire watershed of
the applicable traditionally navigable water? The
larger the region (whether defined by a watershed or
some other geographic concept), the more
indeterminate “similarly situated” becomes.
In this respect, Justice Kennedy’s “similarly
situated within the region” interpretation of
“navigable waters” is even less knowable for the
regulated citizen or enforcement personnel than the
“ordinary case” of any given crime under 18 U.S.C.
See, e.g., EPA, Classification and Types of Wetlands,
https://www.epa.gov/wetlands/classification-and-types-wetlands
#marshes (last updated July 5, 2018).
5
21
§ 16(b). Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” requires
two abstract determinations (“similarly situated” and
“the region”) that entirely depend upon the subjective
judgment of the reviewing court or enforcing agency
staff, whereas the “ordinary case” of a crime only
requires one such imaginative abstraction. See
Orchard Hill Building Company, 893 F.3d at 1025
(“Justice Kennedy did not define ‘similarly situated’—
a broad and ambiguous term . . . .”).
And exactly as in Dimaya and Johnson, this
abstracted concept of similarly situated wetlands in a
region is overlaid by an equally problematic
significance threshold: a significant nexus with
downstream traditionally navigable waters. See
Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1215-16. The combination of the
idealized “similarly situated within the region”
wetland combination that also “significantly affects”
downstream, boat-floating, commerce-supporting
rivers and lakes renders the concurrence’s reading of
“navigable waters” hopelessly vague and far short of
constitutional muster, as Justice Kennedy indeed
intimated during the Hawkes oral argument.
C.
The Rapanos Plurality Raises
Similar Void for Vagueness Concerns
Riverside Bayview holds that non navigable
wetlands which abut navigable waters, such that the
end of one and the beginning of the other are not easy
to distinguish, may be regulated under the Act. 474
U.S. at 132. SWANCC holds that isolated ponds
exceed the scope of the Act and may not be regulated
under it. 531 U.S. at 167. Somewhere between these
two poles, regulated parties must be able to determine
which waters are regulated and which are not. The
Rapanos
plurality
expressly
disclaimed
a
22
comprehensive answer to this question. Rapanos, 547
U.S. at 731 (“We need not decide the precise extent to
which the qualifiers ‘navigable’ and ‘of the United
States’ restrict the coverage of the Act.”).
The Rapanos plurality defines covered
tributaries based on the dictionary definition of
“waters” in Webster’s New International Dictionary.
547 U.S. at 732. Among the features the plurality
found to be included as “waters” are “streams.” Id. at
733. The plurality stated the rule of law based on this
analysis as limiting “navigable waters” to, inter alia,
“relatively permanent, . . . continuously flowing bodies
of water forming geographic features [] described in
ordinary parlance as streams . . . .” Id. at 739 (citing
Webster’s Second) (internal quotation marks omitted
and emphasis added). The plurality establishes no
lower bound on the size of “stream” included within its
definition, unless the expression “geographic features
described in ordinary parlance” provides that
boundary. Id.
The Rapanos plurality also rejects an
interpretation of the Act that would extend its
coverage in a way that tests the limits of Congress’
authority under the Commerce Clause or interferes
with local matters like land use, under the Clear
Statement Rule. 547 U.S. at 737-38.
The clear application of this analysis is that
while the plurality considers certain nonnavigable
tributaries to be covered by the Act, this
interpretation does not encompass every last “stream”
no matter how small or far from an actually navigable
river or lake. A line clearly sits somewhere, but cannot
be discerned from the plurality’s interpretation of the
Act.
23
As with the concurrence, the plurality’s
interpretation of “navigable waters” relies on two
interacting vague standards: whether a tributary is a
“geographic feature described in ordinary parlance as
a stream” and whether its size, location, or other
characteristics would test the limits of the Commerce
Power. The plurality, as much as the concurrence, is
likely void for vagueness under Dimaya.
The Court should grant the petition to answer
the question whether “navigable waters” under the
Act is void for vagueness, either standing on its own
or as interpreted by the plurality and/or concurrence
in Rapanos.
II
THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT
THE PETITION TO REVISIT ITS
FRACTURED RAPANOS DECISION
AND REPLACE IT WITH A CLEAR AND
AUTHORITATIVE INTERPRETATION OF
THE CLEAN WATER ACT
A.
The Court Should Revisit Rapanos
To Give the Act a Constitutionally
Adequate Interpretation
If the Court concludes that an interpretation of
“navigable waters” and “waters of the United States”
is possible that does not run afoul of the void for
vagueness doctrine, then it should grant the Petition
in order to adopt such an interpretation of the Act.
The Due Process Clause requires application of
the rule of lenity to limit the interpretation of criminal
statutes to activity clearly covered. Lanier, 520 U.S.
at 266 (citing Liparota and others).
24
Petitioner argues above that the Court should
grant the petition to decide whether “navigable
waters” is void for vagueness. As shown, the Rapanos
concurrence, which the circuit courts have so far
endorsed as either the holding of Rapanos or an
alternate basis for jurisdiction, appears certainly to be
void for vagueness under this Court’s recent decision
in Dimaya. Likewise, the Rapanos plurality presents
serious void for vagueness problems. However, the
Court should take this case to also consider whether
the Act is susceptible of a constitutional
interpretation. As Liparota and Lanier hold, when the
courts find that an act of Congress is susceptible of
both a constitutional and an unconstitutional
interpretation, the rule of lenity compels the adoption
of the constitutional alternative. Lanier, 520 U.S. at
266; Liparota, 471 U.S. at 427.
This Court should grant the petition, to replace
the
currently
prevailing
unconstitutional
interpretation of the Act set forth in the Rapanos
concurrence with an interpretation that affords the
regulated public with constitutionally adequate
notice.
B.
The Court Should Use This Case
To Cut Through the Thicket of Ongoing
Regulatory and Litigation Chaos Over
the Scope of “Navigable Waters”
Rapanos’ fractured outcome amplified the
confusion engendered by the Clean Water Act rather
than resolving any of it. Instead of the one ambiguous
and excessive regulatory standard for tributaries and
adjacent wetlands (adopted through notice and
comment rulemaking) which Rapanos struck down,
the agencies spent nine years after 2006 using a non
25
binding guidance that asserted they could use either
of the Rapanos interpretations of the statute to
determine jurisdiction. As set forth above, some
circuit courts have agreed with this view, while others
have said only the concurrence may be used.
In 2015 EPA and the Corps adopted a new
regulation that is generally “inspired” by the Kennedy
test, although it has most of the same features that
this Court determined to be illegal about the
regulations invalidated in Rapanos. See In re EPA,
(6th Cir. 2015) (staying 2015 Rule and explaining
challengers’ probability of success on the merits),
vacated for lack of jurisdiction per NAM, see In re
United States Department of Defense, 713 Fed. Appx.
489 (6th Cir. 2018).
Many lawsuits were filed over the 2015
regulation in the federal district courts and in the
federal circuit courts. It took until January of 2018 to
resolve which set of lawsuits the courts had
jurisdiction over, and which were to be dismissed.
NAM, 138 S. Ct. at 627. Those lawsuits continue now
in the district courts, three of which have enjoined the
2015 Rule in a total of 28 states. See Georgia v. Pruitt,
326 F. Supp. 3d 1356 (S.D. Ga. 2018); North Dakota v.
EPA, 127 F. Supp. 3d 1047 (D.N.D. 2015); Texas v.
EPA, No. 3:15-CV-00162, 2018 WL 4518230 (S.D. Tex.
Sept. 12, 2018).
Meanwhile, in 2017, the White House ordered
a change of direction at the agencies from the Rapanos
concurrence to the plurality as the basis for a
regulatory definition. See generally, www.epa.gov/
wotus-rule/rulemaking-process. This process has
lumbered along for almost two years, involving three
separate notice and comment rulemakings. Id. Only
26
one is actually complete, and it was promptly enjoined
nationwide. South Carolina Coastal Conservation
League v. Pruitt, 318 F. Supp. 3d 959 (D.S.C. 2018).
Another pending rulemaking (the Repeal Rule) is
intended to revoke the 2015 regulation and informally
re-adopt the prior (illegal, as per Rapanos)
regulations, and yet another pending rulemaking (the
Replacement Rule) is intended to adopt a new
regulation based on the plurality opinion.
www.epa.gov/wotusrule/rulemaking-process.
Supporters of the 2015 Rule have vowed to sue over
both the Repeal Rule and the Replacement Rule, 6
while the opponents of the 2015 Rule continue to slog
their way through the district courts.
As a result, roughly half of the nation is subject
to the illegal 2015 Rule, while the other half is subject
to a regime in which the illegal pre-2015 regulations
and guidance are used to enforce the Act.
It is impossible to say when (if ever) the
resulting thicket of litigation will be sufficiently
resolved to arrive in this Court. The pending
rulemakings may render the litigation against the
2015 Rule moot, unless litigation over the pending
Repeal or Replacement Rules results in injunctions
against either or both of them.
Again, it is precisely the fractured nature of the
Rapanos decision that stokes this chaos.
The framework is well established under
Rapanos
for
each
successive
presidential
administration to launch a new rulemaking to reset
6See Sierra Club, Trump & Pruitt Repeal the 2015 Clean Water
Rule (June 28, 2017), https://www.sierraclub.org/ohio/blog/
2017/06/trump-pruitt-repeal-2015-clean-water-rule.
27
the regulation to the Rapanos opinion preferred by
that administration’s political coalition, ad infinitem.
The source of this mess is this Court’s split
decision in Rapanos, yielding two very different rules
of decision, both of which the government claims the
authority to enforce either through new regulations or
informal and putatively non binding guidance. The
answer to this ongoing pendulum of regulation and
litigation is for this Court to revisit Rapanos now, in
this case, and adopt a clear majority interpretation of
“navigable waters” that provides the public, the
agencies, and the lower courts with a rule of decision
that makes sense of the statute and affords the due
process minimum of constitutional notice. Indeed, as
the district court below recognized, this case is the
ideal case for resolving the confusion over the
interpretation of “navigable waters.” Appendix D-2-3.
An important aspect of this case that makes it
the ideal vehicle to revisit Rapanos is that since it does
not involve a regulatory interpretation of the Act; the
Court can dispense with any and all issues related to
Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984) and directly interpret the
statutory text. Waiting until some or all of the ongoing
litigation over the 2015 regulation reaches the Court
will necessitate wading through the Chevron
questions in order to address the central Clean Water
Act question that this case presents cleanly.
28
C.
The Court Should Grant the Petition
To Resolve the Circuit Splits Over
Which (If Either) Opinion in Rapanos
Provides the Controlling Rule of Law
Last term in Hughes v. United States, 138 S. Ct.
1765 (2018), this Court granted certiorari on
questions involving the proper application of Marks v.
United States to this Court’s fractured decisions. Id.
at 1771-72. Ultimately, the Court was able to resolve
the underlying issue of criminal procedure in Hughes,
and did not need to address the Marks questions in
that case. Id. This petition provides a sound vehicle
for the Court to address two discrete questions arising
under Marks, in the event it is not possible to arrive
at a majority opinion to replace Rapanos.
As stated above, the circuit courts’ disparate
efforts to apply the various Rapanos opinions has
resulted in at least two circuit splits, one on whether
Marks applies to Rapanos, and one on whether
dissents may be used in applying Marks.
First, the Ninth Circuit in the decision below
joins the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits in holding
that under Marks, the concurrence is the holding of
Rapanos. See Robertson, 875 F.3d at 1291; Gibson, 760
F.3d at 621; Robison, 505 F.3d at 1221-22. By
contrast, the First, Third, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits
hold that Marks does not apply to Rapanos, and allow
the government to follow both the plurality and the
concurrence. See Johnson, 467 F.3d at 66; United
States v. Cundiff, 555 F.3d 200, 210 (6th Cir. 2009);
United States v. Bailey, 571 F.3d 791, 799 (8th Cir.
2009); United States v. Donovan, 661 F.3d 174, 181 (3d
Cir. 2011).
29
This circuit split is not merely academic. The
results are that in four federal circuits regulated
entities are subject to jurisdiction under both the
Rapanos plurality and concurrence, while in three
others the government is limited to proving
jurisdiction under the concurrence. The Clean Water
Act should be enforced uniformly nationwide. The
Court should grant the petition to eliminate the
existing geographically based double standard.
The application of Marks to Rapanos has also
yielded an important express split between the
Seventh and Ninth and D.C. Circuits over whether
Marks allows the use of dissents in determining the
holding of a fractured decision of this Court. Compare
United States v. Robertson, 875 F.3d at 1291 (dissent
in Rapanos combined with concurrence to conclude
that concurrence is holding under Marks), with
Gibson v. American Cyanamid. Co., 760 F.3d at 622
(Marks bars use of dissents in applying Rapanos);
King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d at 783 (no use of dissent in
Marks analysis).
Whether or not a dissent may be used to
determine the holding of a fractured decision is an
important question of law with wide ranging
consequences, which the Court should resolve. This
petition provides a sound vehicle for resolving that
question, since it involves a complete disagreement
between the Seventh and Ninth Circuits on the use of
dissents in applying Marks to the same case.
30
III
THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT
THE PETITION TO RESOLVE A
CIRCUIT SPLIT ON REVIEWABILITY
OF ORDERS DENYING MOTIONS FOR
ACQUITTAL IN A FIRST TRIAL ENDING
IN MISTRIAL, FOLLOWED BY CONVICTION
IN A SECOND TRIAL
In Richardson v. United States, this Court
addressed whether criminal defendants may seek
interlocutory review of orders denying judgments of
acquittal following a mistrial to prevent their retrial,
on the ground that retrial would violate double
jeopardy. The answer is no. But this Court did not
address whether a district court ruling on a motion for
acquittal based on insufficient evidence can, like any
other interlocutory ruling, be reviewed following final
judgment after retrial.
In the decision below, the Ninth Circuit joined
four other circuits in holding that Richardson
prohibits such review. See United States v. Achobe,
560 F.3d 259, 265-68 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v.
Julien, 318 F.3d 316, 321 (1st Cir. 2003); United
States v. Willis, 102 F.3d 1078, 1081 (10th Cir. 1996);
United States v. Coleman, 862 F.2d 455, 460 (3d Cir.
1988). In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit says that
Richardson does not preclude post-judgment review.
United States v. Gulledge, 739 F.2d 582, 584 (11th Cir.
1984). In the Eleventh Circuit, denial of a motion for
judgment of acquittal in a first trial ending in a hung
jury is assumed to be reviewable despite an
individual’s subsequent conviction in a second trial.
See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, No. 11-12131,
2013 WL 563158, at *1 (11th Cir. Feb. 15, 2013).
31
A criminal defendant’s ability to challenge on
appeal the legal sufficiency of the evidence presented
at their first trial should not rise or fall based on
where their prosecution takes place. Yet the circuit
split here has allowed this very circumstance to
prevail for 30-plus years. This Court should grant
certiorari to resolve this express circuit split on a
recurring and important issue.
A.
The Circuits Are Split on This Question
Richardson holds that a retrial following the
erroneous denial of a motion to acquit does not violate
double jeopardy. But this Court did not address in
Richardson whether a defendant can seek review of a
sufficiency ruling in its own right on appeal from final
judgment following a second trial. In the wake of
Richardson, lower courts have split over this question.
1.
The Eleventh Circuit Allows
Post-Judgment Review of
Sufficiency Rulings
In United States v. Gulledge, the district court
denied the defendant’s motion for acquittal at a trial
that ended in a mistrial. 739 F.2d at 583-84. The
defendant sought interlocutory review, challenging
the sufficiency ruling and claiming that his retrial
would violate double jeopardy. Id. at 584. A panel of
the Eleventh Circuit rejected the double-jeopardy
claim in light of the holding in Richardson. Id. at 58485. But it matter-of-factly noted in dicta that a ruling
on the sufficiency of evidence at the first trial, like any
other interlocutory ruling, is reviewable after a final
judgment is rendered. Id. at 584 (“[T]he purported
insufficiency of the evidence in the first trial is
reviewable by this court only on appeal from a
32
conviction after a second trial . . . . ”) (emphasis added).
In the Eleventh Circuit this has been the view, see
United States v. Cooper, 733 F.2d 91, 92 (11th Cir.
1984), and continues to be the view, see Martinez, 2013
WL 563158, at *1 (affirming denial of defendant’s
motion for judgment of acquittal based on sufficiency
of evidence in the first trial that resulted in a hung
jury); United States v. Gavin, No. 09-15518, 2010 WL
3373973, at *1 (11th Cir. Aug. 27, 2010) (same).
This interpretation comports with the common
understanding of the reviewability of interlocutory
rulings after a final judgment. See, e.g., United States
v. Taylor, 176 F.3d 331, 335 (6th Cir. 1999) (“It is
elementary, however, that even though a party may
not file an appeal from [an interlocutory ruling], that
does not mean he may never obtain review of the
decision, once a final order has been entered.”)
(emphasis added). The purpose of the final judgment
rule contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1291 is not to preclude
review of interlocutory rulings altogether, but “to
combine in one review all stages of the proceeding.”
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541,
546 (1949).
As a consequence, parties can seek review of
allegedly prejudicial interlocutory rulings following
final judgment. “The prohibition against immediate
appeal . . . is offset by the rule that once appeal is
taken from a truly final judgment that ends the
litigation, earlier rulings generally can be reviewed.”
15A C. Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 3905.1, at 249 (2d ed. 1991) (footnote omitted). The
“appeal from final judgment opens the record and
permits review of all rulings that led up to the
judgment.” Id. at 250-52 n.3 (collecting cases).
33
Consistent with this principle, this Court has
repeatedly noted the availability of post-judgment
review before disallowing interlocutory review of non
final orders that fail the collateral order doctrine. See,
e.g., Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action,
480 U.S. 370, 375-76 (1987).
2.
Multiple Circuits Prohibit PostJudgment Review of Sufficiency
Rulings
The holding of the Ninth Circuit below, like the
rulings of the four circuits on which it relies, 7 is
directly at odds with the more logical position of the
Eleventh Circuit. While it is true that “double
jeopardy protections do not bar a second trial” after a
jury deadlocks, Robertson, 875 F.3d at 1293, it does
not logically follow that this principle prohibits the
reviewability of a denied sufficiency motion after a
final judgment is entered. Robertson did not argue on
appeal after his conviction that his retrial violated
double jeopardy. The attempted double jeopardy
arguments made in Richardson were simply not
present in the appeal before this Court. Robertson
contended only that the district court erred by denying
his motion to acquit at his first trial. Double jeopardy
is “not implicated simply because the Government
presented insufficient evidence at a previous trial.”
Robertson, 875 F.3d at 1294. But the Ninth Circuit
found that Robertson’s ability to challenge the
sufficiency of the evidence at his first trial, unlike any
other interlocutory ruling, was precluded based on
Richardson anyway.
7 See Achobe, 560 F.3d at 265-68; Julien, 318 F.3d at 321; Willis,
102 F.3d at 1081; Coleman, 862 F.2d at 460.
34
But nothing in Richardson disturbs the wellsettled rule that parties may seek review of
interlocutory rulings after a final judgment. See
Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110, 123-24 (2009)
(discussing Richardson’s applicability to double
jeopardy arguments related to mistrial, not the
reviewability of interlocutory rulings). Richardson
addressed only whether a retrial following the
erroneous denial of a motion to acquit would violate
double jeopardy. This Court held retrial would not
violate double jeopardy because the mistrial did not
terminate jeopardy. Richardson, 468 U.S. at 325-26.
The defendant in that case asserted only a doublejeopardy claim, because that was the only sort of claim
that could be reviewed on an interlocutory basis under
Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977). See
Richardson, 468 U.S. at 320. Richardson simply did
not address, and had no reason to address, whether
the erroneous denial of the motion to acquit could be
reviewed in its own right following final judgment just
like any other interlocutory order.
The lack of double jeopardy below had no effect
upon the reviewability of Mr. Robertson’s denied
motion for acquittal based on allegedly deficient
evidence in his first trial after final judgment was
entered in his second trial. Holding that “a criminal
defendant cannot challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence presented at a previous trial following a
conviction at a subsequent trial” is not a “necessary
extension” of the principle that double jeopardy does
not bar that retrial. The two propositions are simply
not related or analogous. It does no violence to the
holding of Richardson to recognize that a defendant
can challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence
presented by the government in the first trial at the
35
conclusion of the second trial. Simply put, the decision
of the Ninth Circuit, like most of the circuit cases on
which it relies, conflates a challenge to a sufficiency
ruling with a double-jeopardy claim.
B.
This Issue Is Both Recurring
and Important
1.
The Issue Arises Often
Even before the present circuit split over
Richardson, this issue repeatedly arose in both federal
and state courts, with lower courts almost uniformly
allowing post-judgment review of denied motions for
acquittal based on insufficient evidence. See, e.g.,
United States v. Bodey, 607 F.2d 265, 267-68 (9th Cir.
1979) (defendant entitled to reversal “if the evidence
at his first trial was insufficient”). Of the
approximately 3,000 federal criminal trials each year,
more than 130 are retrials following mistrials. See
Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Business of
the United States Courts 257 tbl.D-7, 279 tbl.D-13
(2008).
Mistrial rates in state courts, which hear more
than 50,000 criminal trials each year, are even higher
than federal courts. See Paula L. Hannaford-Agor, et
al., Are Hung Juries a Problem? 19-27, National
Center for State Courts (Sept. 30, 2002). Some state
courts currently allow post-judgment review of priortrial sufficiency rulings, see, e.g., Ohio v. McGill,
No. 99CA25, 2000 WL 1803650, at *6-9 (Ohio Ct. App.
Dec. 8, 2000), while others expressly relying on
Richardson reject such claims, see, e.g., People v.
Doyle, 765 N.E.2d 85, 91 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002). These
courts, like their federal counterparts, would benefit
greatly from this Court’s guidance on this question.
36
2.
The Issue is Important to the
Administration of Justice
The reviewability of prior sufficiency rulings at
subsequent trials is a matter of grave importance to
the administration of justice. Rather than the narrow
question addressed in Richardson involving when
defendants can seek review, this case presents the
much broader question of whether such rulings are
reviewable at all. The consequences of the rule applied
below and in the four other circuits denying review is
harsh. Defendants are forever barred from obtaining
review, however patently erroneous the district
court’s ruling may have been.
The decision below thus leaves defendants not
convicted at their first trial worse off than those who
actually are convicted. If a jury convicts a defendant
and the district court erroneously denies his motion to
acquit, that individual can receive review of that
denial on appeal. But under the Ninth Circuit’s
interpretation of Richardson, if a jury is unable to
reach a verdict and there is a retrial, the error is
unreviewable forevermore. This result is patently
unjust.
37
CONCLUSION
The petition for writ of certiorari should be
granted.
DATED: November, 2018.
Respectfully submitted,
MARK MILLER
Pacific Legal Foundation
4440 PGA Blvd., Ste. 307
Palm Beach Gardens, FL 33410
Telephone: (561) 691-5000
MMiller@pacificlegal.org
ANTHONY L. FRANÇOIS*
*Counsel of Record
JEFFREY W. MCCOY
TIMOTHY R. SNOWBALL
Pacific Legal Foundation
930 G Street
Sacramento, CA 95814
Telephone: (916) 419-7111
TFrancois@pacificlegal.org
ETHAN W. BLEVINS
Pacific Legal Foundation
892 Berkeley Drive
North Salt Lake, UT 84054
Telephone: (425) 576-0484
EBlevins@pacificlegal.org
Counsel for Petitioner
Appendix A-1
FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JOSEPH DAVID ROBERTSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
No.
16-30178
D,C. No.
6:15-cr-00007-DWM-1
District of Montana,
Helena
OPINION
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Donald W. Molloy, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted August 29, 2017
Seattle, Washington
Filed November 27, 2017
Before: M. Margaret McKeown and Ronald M. Gould,
Circuit Judges, and Barbara Jacobs Rothstein,*
District Judge.
Opinion by Judge Gould
The Honorable Barbara Jacobs Rothstein, United States
District Judge for the Western District of Washington, sitting by
designation.
*
Appendix A-2
UNITED STATES V. ROBERTSON
SUMMARY**
Criminal Law
The panel affirmed convictions for violating the
Clean Water Act (CWA) by knowingly discharging
dredged or fill material from a point source into a
water of the United States without a permit; willfully
injuring and committing depredation of property of
the United States, causing more than $1,000 worth of
damage to the property; and knowingly discharging
dredged or fill material from a point source into a
water of the United States on private property
without a permit.
The defendant’s first trial ended with a hung
jury, and the defendant was convicted after a second
trial.
The panel rejected the defendant’s contention
that the Government did not establish that there was
jurisdiction under the CWA. The panel held that
Northern California River Watch v. City of
Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993 (2007) (holding that Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence in Rapanos v. United States,
547 U.S. 715 (2006), is the controlling test for
determining CWA jurisdiction), is not clearly
irreconcilable with United States v. Davis, 825 F.3d
1014 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc), and remains binding
precedent. The panel held that the district court did
not err in determining that CWA jurisdiction existed
under the “significant nexus” test set forth in Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence in Rapanos.
** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court.
It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the
reader.
Appendix A-3
The panel rejected the defendant’s contentions
that the statutory term “waters of the United States”
is unconstitutionally vague and that he did not have
fair warning of the meaning of that term.
The panel held that a criminal defendant
cannot challenge the sufficiency of the evidence at a
previous trial following conviction at a subsequent
trial. The panel therefore deemed foreclosed the
defendant’s argument that the district court should
have granted his motion to acquit after the jury
deadlocked at his first trial.
The panel held that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in allowing the Montana State
Program Manager for the Army Corps of Engineers
and Supervisory Civil Engineer to testify as an expert
witness. The panel held that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in excluding an Army Corps of
Engineers guidance manual or a crystal mine study.
COUNSEL
Michael Donahoe (argued), Deputy Federal Public
Defender; Anthony R. Gallagher, Federal Defender;
Federal Defenders of Montana, Helena, Montana; for
Defendant-Appellant.
John David Gunter II (argued) and Robert Stockman,
Attorneys; John C. Cruden, Assistant Attorney
General; Environment & Natural Resources Division,
United States Department of Justice, Washington,
D.C.; Bryan R. Whittaker and Eric E. Nelson, Office of
the United States Attorney, Helena, Montana; for
Plaintiff-Appellee.
Appendix A-4
Roger I. Roots, Livingston, Montana, for Amici Curiae
The Constitution Society and Founder and President
Jon Roland.
Anthony L. François, Pacific Legal Foundation,
Sacramento, California, for Amici Curiae Chantell
and Michael Sackett, John Duarte, and Duarte
Nursery Inc.
OPINION
GOULD, Circuit Judge:
Between October 2013 and October 2014,
Joseph David Robertson excavated and constructed a
series of ponds on National Forest System Lands and
on the privately owned Manhattan Lode mining claim.
In the process of creating these ponds, Robertson
discharged dredged and fill material into the
surrounding wetlands and an adjacent tributary,
which flows to Cataract Creek. Cataract Creek is a
tributary of the Boulder River, which in turn is a
tributary of the Jefferson River—a traditionally
navigable water of the United States. Robertson was
warned by an EPA Special Agent that his activities
“very likely” required permits. Yet, he did not get
permits to build the ponds or to discharge dredged or
fill material into waters of the United States.
The Forest Service soon learned of Robertson’s
activities. And on May 22, 2015, a grand jury charged
Robertson with three criminal counts. Count I charged
Robertson with knowingly discharging dredged or fill
material from a point source into a water of the United
States without a permit in violation of the Clean
Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. § 1251–1388. Count II
Appendix A-5
charged Robertson with willfully injuring and
committing depredation of property of the United
States, namely National Forest Service Land, causing
more than $1,000 worth of damage to the property, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1361. Count III charged
Robertson with another CWA violation for knowingly
discharging dredged or fill material from a point
source into a water of the United States on private
property without a permit.
Robertson’s initial jury trial was held from
October 5 to October 8, 2015. At the close of the
Government’s case and at the close of the presentation
of evidence, Robertson unsuccessfully moved for a
judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 29. That first jury trial ended with a hung
jury, and the judge declared a mistrial. Robertson
again moved for acquittal on all three counts, arguing
that the Government’s evidence was insufficient to
sustain a conviction. The district court denied this
motion.
Robertson’s second jury trial was held from
April 4 to April 7, 2016. Robertson again moved for
acquittal on all three counts after the close of the
Government’s case and at the close of evidence. And
the district court again denied both motions. On
April 7, 2016, the jury returned guilty verdicts on all
three counts. On April 21, 2016, Robertson renewed
his motions for acquittal and moved for a new trial.
The district court denied those motions, concluding
that the verdict was supported by sufficient evidence.
Robertson timely filed this appeal, over which
we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Appendix A-6
I
Robertson argues (1) that the Government did
not establish that there was CWA jurisdiction, and
(2) that he lacked fair warning of the scope of CWA
jurisdiction. He also (3) challenges the sufficiency of
evidence at an earlier trial that ended in a mistrial;
(4) appeals some evidence rulings; and (5) contests the
calculation of restitution. 1
We review the district court’s interpretation of
the jurisdictional bounds of the CWA de novo. See
United States v. Lewis, 67 F.3d 225, 228 (9th Cir.
1995). We also review whether a statute is
unconstitutionally vague de novo. See United States v.
Cooper, 173 F.3d 1192, 1202 (9th Cir. 1999). We
review the challenged evidence rulings and a
challenge to the district court permitting an expert to
testify for abuse of discretion. See United States v.
W.R. Grace, 504 F.3d 745, 759 (9th Cir. 2007); United
States v. Layton, 767 F.2d 549, 553 (9th Cir. 1985).
II
We look first at the CWA jurisdiction issue. To
assess Robertson’s arguments on these points, some
background on the CWA and the cases that have
interpreted it is necessary. Congress enacted the CWA
“to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a). To meet this goal, the CWA prohibits the
discharge of dredge or fill material into “navigable
waters” unless authorized by a permit from the
Secretary of the Army through the Army Corps of
We address and reject Robertson’s challenge to the district
court’s ruling compelling Robertson to bear a part of the costs of
his defense in the concurrently filed memorandum disposition.
1
Appendix A-7
Engineers (“the Corps”). Id. §§ 1311(a), 1311(d),
1344(a). Any person who knowingly violates § 1311 by
discharging a pollutant without a permit “shall be
punished” by a fine, imprisonment, or both. Id.
§ 1319(c)(2).
At issue on jurisdiction is the meaning of
“navigable waters,” and the reach of the CWA.
“Navigable waters” is defined as “the waters of the
United States, including the territorial seas.” Id.
§ 1362(7). For there to be CWA jurisdiction here then,
the creek and wetlands that Robertson polluted had to
be “waters of the United States.”
The reach of the Corps’ jurisdiction over
“navigable waters” is controversial and has been the
subject of many Supreme Court cases. See, e.g., United
States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121
(1985) (upholding a Corps’ regulation that extended
the Corps’ authority under § 1344 to wetlands
“adjacent to navigable or interstate waters and their
tributaries”); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v.
U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001)
(invalidating the Corps’ “Migratory Bird Rule”
because the Corps does not have CWA jurisdiction
over non-navigable, isolated, intrastate waters that
are not adjacent to open water).
Central to this appeal is the Supreme Court’s
fractured 4-1-4 decision, Rapanos v. United States,
547 U.S. 715 (2006). In that case, the Court confronted
the issue of whether wetlands, which did not contain
or directly abut traditionally navigable waterways,
were “waters of the United States” subject to the
Corps’ jurisdiction under the CWA. See id. at 729–30
(plurality); id. at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment). In answering this question, the Court had
Appendix A-8
to address whether the Corps’ regulations were a
permissible interpretation of the CWA. The
regulations had interpreted “waters of the United
States” very broadly, including not just traditionally
navigable interstate waters, but also
“[a]ll
interstate
waters
including
interstate
wetlands,”
[33
C.F.R.]
§ 328.3(a)(2); “[a]ll other waters such as
intrastate
lakes,
rivers,
streams
(including
intermittent
streams),
mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs,
prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa
lakes, or natural ponds, the use,
degradation or destruction of which
could affect interstate or foreign
commerce,”
[id.]
§
328.3(a)(3);
“[t]ributaries of [such] waters,” [id.]
§ 328.3(a)(5); and “[w]etlands adjacent to
[such] waters [and tributaries] (other
than waters that are themselves
wetlands),” [id.] § 328.3(a)(7). The
regulation defines “adjacent” wetlands
as those “bordering, contiguous [to], or
neighboring” waters of the United
States. [Id.] § 328.3(c). It specifically
provides that “[w]etlands separated from
other waters of the United States by
manmade dikes or barriers, natural river
berms, beach dunes and the like are
‘adjacent wetlands.’” [Id.]
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 724 (plurality).
The plurality opinion, authored by Justice
Scalia, and joined by Chief Justice Roberts, and
Justices Thomas and Alito, concluded that the Corps’
Appendix A-9
regulations were not “based on a permissible
construction of the statute.” Id. at 739 (quoting
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S.
837, 843 (1984)). The plurality held that “the phrase
‘the waters of the United States’ includes only those
relatively permanent, standing or continuously
flowing bodies of water ‘forming geographic features’
that are described in ordinary parlance as ‘streams[,]
. . . oceans, rivers, [and] lakes.’” Id. (quoting Webster’s
Second 2882) (alterations in original). The term,
according to Justice Scalia’s opinion, “does not include
channels through which water flows intermittently or
ephemerally, or channels that periodically provide
drainage for rainfall.” Id. The plurality went on to
conclude that wetlands are covered by the CWA only
if two conditions are met: first, “the adjacent channel
contains a ‘wate[r] of the United States,’ (i.e., a
relatively permanent body of water connected to
traditional interstate navigable waters);” and second,
“the wetland has a continuous surface connection with
that water, making it difficult to determine where the
‘water’ ends and the ‘wetland’ begins.” Id. at 742
(alteration in original). The plurality ultimately
remanded the case to the lower court so that it could
determine, in the first instance, whether the wetlands
at issue were subject to the CWA under the new
standard.
Justice Kennedy, providing the fifth vote
supporting the judgment concurred in the judgment
but rejected the plurality’s test and outlined his own
test to determine whether a wetland that is not
adjacent to and does not contain a navigable-in-fact
water is subject to the CWA. See id. at 758–59, 768–78
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice
Kennedy concluded that the Corps could reasonably
Appendix A-10
interpret the CWA to cover “impermanent streams,”
id. at 770, and he concluded that the “Corps’ definition
of adjacency is a reasonable one,” id. at 775. Justice
Kennedy held that the Corps could exercise CWA
jurisdiction over a wetland only if there was “a
significant nexus between the wetlands in question
and navigable waters in the traditional sense.” Id. at
779; see also id. at 767. He explained, “wetlands
possess the requisite nexus, and come within the
statutory phrase ‘navigable waters,’ if the wetlands,
either alone or in combination with similarly situated
lands in the region, significantly affect the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of other covered
waters more readily understood as ‘navigable.’” Id. at
780. When “wetlands’ effects on water quality are
speculative or insubstantial, they fall outside the zone
fairly encompassed by the statutory term ‘navigable
waters.’” Id.
Four members of the Court joined in a dissent
authored by Justice Stevens. His dissent concluded
that Riverside Bayview controlled the cases, that the
Corps’ regulations were a reasonable interpretation of
the CWA, and that any wetland that is adjacent to
navigable waters or their tributaries is subject to the
CWA. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 787, 792 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). He disagreed with both the plurality and
with Justice Kennedy. He noted that “Justice
Kennedy’s approach had far fewer faults,” and
concluded that both decisions “fail[ed] to give proper
deference to the agencies entrusted by Congress to
implement the Clean Water Act.” Id. at 810. The
dissenting Justices would have upheld the Corps’
jurisdiction in the cases at issue in Rapanos “and in
all other cases in which either the plurality’s or
Justice Kennedy’s test is satisfied.” Id. at 810. Indeed,
Appendix A-11
although the dissent “assume[d] that Justice
Kennedy’s approach will be controlling in most cases
because it treats more of the nation’s waters as within
the Corps’ jurisdiction,” the dissent would uphold
jurisdiction when either test was met—even “in the
unlikely event that the plurality’s test is met but
Justice Kennedy’s is not.” Id. at 810 n.14; see also id.
at 810. The dissent also stated that “in these and
future cases the United States may elect to prove
jurisdiction under either test.” Id. at 810 n.14.
All this paints a rather complex picture, and
one where without more it might not be fair to expect
a layman of normal intelligence to discern what was
the proper standard to determine what are waters of
the United States. But the substance of that picture
was clarified by later decisional law within the Ninth
Circuit.
Specifically, in Northern California River
Watch v. City of Healdsburg, a precedent that is
critical to our decision today, we held that Justice
Kennedy’s opinion was the controlling opinion from
Rapanos. 496 F.3d 993, 995 (2007). We explained that
because it is “the narrowest ground to which a
majority of the Justices would assent if forced to
choose in almost all cases, . . . Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence provides the controlling rule of law for
our case.” Id. at 999–1000; see also United States v.
Moses, 496 F.3d 984, 990 (9th Cir. 2007) (recognizing
Justice Kennedy’s “opinion as the controlling rule of
law”); San Francisco Baykeeper v. Cargill Salt Div.,
481 F.3d 700, 707 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Justice Kennedy’s
controlling concurrence explained that only wetlands
with a significant nexus to a navigable-in-fact
waterway are covered by the Act” (emphasis added)).
Appendix A-12
In reaching this conclusion, we relied upon United
States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723 (7th Cir.
2006). See City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d at 999–1000.
In Gerke, the Seventh Circuit had explained that
Justice Kennedy’s test—which it also found to be
controlling—was “narrower (so far as reining in
federal authority is concerned) than the plurality’s in
most cases.” 464 F.3d at 724–25. The Eleventh Circuit
has also concluded that Justice Kennedy’s test is
controlling. See United States v. Robison, 505 F.3d
1208, 1221 (11th Cir. 2007) (concluding that under the
facts of Rapanos, Justice Kennedy’s opinion is the
narrowest and controlling).
Other circuits have adopted different
approaches. The First, Third, and Eighth Circuits
have explicitly concluded that the federal Government
can establish CWA jurisdiction if it can meet either
the plurality’s or Justice Kennedy’s standard. United
States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 64–66 (1st Cir. 2006);
United States v. Donovan, 661 F.3d 174, 176, 182
(3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Bailey, 571 F.3d 791,
799 (8th Cir. 2009). The Fourth Circuit has used
Justice Kennedy’s test, without deciding whether the
plurality’s test could provide an alternate ground for
establishing CWA jurisdiction. See Precon Dev. Corp.,
Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 633 F.3d 288 (4th
Cir. 2011). The Sixth Circuit has expressly not yet
decided which test is controlling. See United States v.
Cundiff, 555 F.3d 200, 210 (6th Cir. 2009). It appears
that the Fifth Circuit has also not yet decided which
test controls, see United States v. Lucas, 516 F.3d 316,
324–28 (5th Cir. 2008), although it has indicated—
albeit in an unpublished decision—that jurisdiction
could be established under either test, see United
States v. Lipar, 665 F. App’x 322, 325 (5th Cir. 2016).
Appendix A-13
In view of these competing precedents
interpreting Rapanos, and further uncertainty
engendered by our later en banc decision in United
States v. Davis, 825 F.3d 1014 (9th Cir. 2016),
Robertson argues that Justice Kennedy’s test from
Rapanos is not the controlling test for determining
CWA jurisdiction, and that the trial Court erred by
basing the jury instructions on Justice Kennedy’s test.
III
Robertson’s primary argument is that City of
Healdsburg is not binding in light of Davis. He asserts
that under the “reasoning-based” framework
established by Davis, the Rapanos plurality opinion is
controlling. In reaching this conclusion, Robertson
argues that the court cannot consider Justice
Stevens’s dissent. He argues that if we do not adopt
the plurality decision as controlling, we must conclude
that “no single rationale commanded a majority of the
Rapanos court.”
In Marks v. United States, the Supreme Court
explained that “[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a
case and no single rationale explaining the result
enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the
Court may be viewed as that position taken by those
Members who concurred in the judgments on the
narrowest grounds.’” 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)
(quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15
(1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)).
Recognizing the difficulty that courts have
faced in discerning what the Supreme Court meant by
“narrowest grounds,” we took Davis en banc to clarify
the approach courts should take in applying Marks to
fractured Supreme Court decisions. See Davis, 825
Appendix A-14
F.3d at 1021–22. We adopted a “reasoning-based
approach to applying Marks.” Id. at 1021. As we
explained,
[W]hen applying Marks to a fractured
Supreme Court decision, we look to those
opinions that concurred in the judgment
and determine whether one of those
opinions sets forth a rationale that is the
logical subset of other, broader opinions.
When,
however,
no
“common
denominator of the Court’s reasoning”
exists, we are bound only by the “specific
result.”
Id. at 1028. In Davis, we also assumed, without
deciding, that dissenting opinions may be considered
as part of a Marks analysis. Id. at 1025; see also id. at
1025 n.12.
As explained above, in City of Healdsburg—
relying on Gerke and taking into account the Rapanos
dissent—we held that Justice Kennedy’s “concurrence
is the narrowest ground to which a majority of the
Justices would assent if forced to choose in almost all
cases.” City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d at 999. As Davis
had not yet clarified the issue, we did not engage in a
reasoning-based Marks analysis to reach this
conclusion. Instead, we relied on and accepted the
Seventh Circuit’s explanation in Gerke as to why
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence provided the
controlling rule. See id. at 999–1000. Although the
Seventh Circuit did not engage in an explicit
reasoning-based analysis, the underlying rationale in
Gerke is not inconsistent with that analysis.
Appendix A-15
To assess Robertson’s claim that the district
court applied the wrong standard to determine
whether there was insufficient evidence to conclude
that Robertson discharged pollutants into United
States waters without a permit, we must first decide
whether the en banc decision in Davis rendered
inapplicable our prior conclusion in City of
Healdsburg that Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in
Rapanos would control our decision about what are
waters of the United States.
Our court in Miller v. Gammie, established the
general rule that a three-judge panel is not allowed to
disregard a prior circuit precedent, but rather must
follow it unless or until change comes from a higher
authority. 335 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
Higher authority includes decisions by en banc panels
of our court. Overstreet v. United Bhd. of Carpenters &
Joiners of Am., Local Union No. 1506, 409 F.3d 1199,
1205 n.8 (9th Cir. 2005).
This raises the issue whether the precedent of
City of Healdsburg should have been disregarded by
the court below in light of the later en banc decision in
Davis. Miller v. Gammie sets the rule that the district
court below had to follow City of Healdsburg unless it
was “clearly irreconcilable” with Davis. Miller v.
Gammie, 335 F.3d at 893. So the controlling issue on
whether City of Healdsburg correctly stated the
standard for what are waters of the United States,
relying on Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Rapanos,
is whether City of Healdsburg is clearly irreconcilable
with Davis. If so, we should disregard it. But if not,
City of Healdsburg remains controlling. It is to that
question that we now turn.
Appendix A-16
Some elaboration on the standard developed in
Miller v. Gammie is helpful here. In that case we
considered when “a three-judge panel is free to
reexamine the holding of a prior panel in light of an
inconsistent decision by a court of last resort on a
closely related, but not identical issue.” 335 F.3d at
899. The issue before us was whether, in light of
intervening Supreme Court authority outlining a
functional test for evaluating when immunity applied,
a three-judge panel should have disregarded prior
Ninth Circuit authority granting absolute immunity
to social workers. Id. at 900. Our en banc panel in
Miller v. Gammie held that in cases of “clear
irreconcilability, a three-judge panel of this court and
district courts should consider themselves bound by
the intervening higher authority and reject the prior
opinion of this court as having been effectively
overruled.” Id.
The “clearly irreconcilable” requirement is “a
high standard.” Rodriguez v. AT&T Mobility Servs.
LLC, 728 F.3d 975, 979 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal
quotation marks omitted). So long as the court “can
apply our prior circuit precedent without running
afoul of the intervening authority” it must do so. Lair
v. Bullock, 697 F.3d 1200, 1207 (9th Cir. 2012)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “It is not enough
for there to be some tension between the intervening
higher authority and prior circuit precedent, or for the
intervening higher authority to cast doubt on the prior
circuit precedent.” Id. (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
City of Healdsburg is not clearly irreconcilable
with Davis. Davis holds that an opinion that concurs
in the judgment that is “the logical subset of other,
Appendix A-17
broader opinions” is the “narrowest grounds” and
controlling under Marks. See Davis, 825 F.3d at 1024,
1028. Contrary to Robertson’s argument, Davis did
not forbid consideration of dissents while engaging in
the Marks analysis. See Davis, 825 F.3d at 1025.
Consequently, so long as the opinion that is a “logical
subset” is an opinion that concurred in the judgment,
the “broader opinion” of which it is a subset can be a
dissent.
The overarching issue in Rapanos was whether
the breadth of the Corps’ regulations was permissible.
The narrowest holding was the one that restrained the
Corps’ authority the least. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at
810 n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“I assume that
Justice Kennedy’s approach will be controlling in most
cases because it treats more of the Nation’s waters as
within the Corps’ jurisdiction . . .”); Robison, 505 F.3d
at 1221 (“The issue becomes whether the definition of
‘navigable waters’ in the plurality or concurring
opinions in Rapanos was less far-reaching (i.e., lessrestrictive of CWA jurisdiction).”); Gerke, 464 F.3d at
724–25 (concluding Justice Kennedy’s “test is
narrower (so far as reining in federal authority is
concerned) than the plurality’s in most cases”). The
opinion restricting federal agency discretion the least
was Justice Stevens’s dissent, which would have
provided for the broadest federal jurisdiction of all,
and which stated explicitly that it would be satisfied
and uphold the Corps’ jurisdiction whenever either
the plurality’s or Justice Kennedy’s test was met. See
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 810 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
But under the standard announced in Marks,
when we interpret Rapanos we are to find our
standard in the narrowest opinion joining in the
Appendix A-18
judgment. So the dissent that did not support the
judgment is out for this purpose. We have a contest
then between the plurality opinion of Justice Scalia
and the concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy, both
of which supported the majority judgment. Both the
plurality and Justice Kennedy’s opinions can be
viewed as subsets of Justice Stevens’s dissent because
both narrow the scope of federal jurisdiction. Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence, however, is narrower than the
plurality opinion because it restricts federal authority
less. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 810 n.14 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
Although it does not go through this subset
analysis explicitly, Gerke does recognize that Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence fits within the dissent, and
that it narrows federal authority less than the
plurality’s decision. See Gerke, 464 F.3d at 724–25
(explaining that “[t]he four dissenting Justices took a
much broader view of federal authority” than either
Justice Kennedy or the plurality, and that Justice
Kennedy’s grounds were narrower because the
plurality criticized Justice Kennedy’s expansive
reading, and Justice Kennedy rejected the two
limitations the plurality would have imposed on
federal authority). Its reasoning—how it gets to the
“narrowest” opinion—is not completely undercut by
Davis. See Rodriguez, 728 F.3d at 980. Gerke—and
City of Healdsburg, which adopted and relied upon
Gerke’s reasoning—are not “clearly irreconcilable”
with Davis. City of Healdsburg remains valid and
binding precedent. Here, jurisdiction was determined
to exist under the “significant nexus” test set forth in
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Rapanos. We hold
that there was no error in this.
Appendix A-19
IV
Robertson next argues that the statutory term
“waters of the United States” is “too vague to be
enforced in the due process sense,” because Robertson
could not have had “fair warning” of the meaning of
that term. He asserts that he did not have fair
warning because, in light of Davis, City of Healdsburg
is no longer good law.
Robertson had fair warning that his conduct
was criminal. The Government violates the Fifth
Amendment’s guarantee of due process if it “take[s]
away someone’s life, liberty, or property under a
criminal law so vague that it fails to give ordinary
people fair notice of the conduct it punishes, or so
standardless that it invites arbitrary enforcement.”
Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2556 (2015).
The underlying “principle is that no man shall be held
criminally responsible for conduct which he could not
reasonably understand to be proscribed.” United
States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 265 (1997).
The “touchstone” of whether a statute is
unconstitutionally vague, on the one hand, or the
defendant instead had fair notice, on the other hand,
“is whether the statute, either standing alone or as
construed, made it reasonably clear at the relevant
time that the defendant’s conduct was criminal.” Id.
at 267. So long as prior to the defendant’s offense there
were decisions which gave “reasonable warning that
the law [will] be applied in a certain way,” the
defendant had fair warning that his conduct was
criminal. See Gollehon v. Mahoney, 626 F.3d 1019,
1024 (9th Cir. 2010).
Appendix A-20
Robertson does not challenge the general
validity of the criminal provisions of the CWA. His
argument relies primarily on the effect of Davis on
City of Healdsburg. As explained above, Davis does
not undermine the continuing validity of City of
Healdsburg for purposes of jurisdiction. As for the
notice issue, the conduct at issue in this case took
place between October 2013 and October 2014, well
after this court had issued City of Healdsburg and had
held that Justice Kennedy’s test controlled CWA
jurisdiction, and well before this court’s decision in
Davis. See Davis, 825 F.3d 1014 (published June 13,
2016); City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d at 995 (case
published in 2007). Robertson was on notice from City
of Healdsburg at the time of his excavation activities
that wetlands and non-navigable tributaries are
subject to CWA jurisdiction “if the wetlands, either
alone or in combination with similarly situated lands
in the region, significantly affect the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of other covered
waters more readily understood as ‘navigable.’”
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 780. The jury was instructed in
these terms, and convicted Robertson, holding that
the elements of his crime where shown beyond a
reasonable doubt. Davis—which was not decided until
2016, long after Robertson’s conduct forming the basis
for his convictions—does not affect whether Robertson
had fair notice at the time of his excavation activities. 2
Also, Robertson was warned by an EPA agent that he likely
needed a permit to authorize his excavations. According to the
agent, Robertson was warned that “if he did not have a permit,
then he very likely needed a permit.”
2
Appendix A-21
V
Robertson next argues that the district court
should have granted his Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 29(c) motion to acquit after the jury
deadlocked at his first trial. This circuit has not
explicitly addressed whether a defendant has a viable
sufficiency of the evidence challenge to his first trial,
when his second trial ended in conviction.
If Robertson had prevailed on his sufficiency
challenge at the first trial, any subsequent attempt to
try him would have been barred on double jeopardy
grounds. But such a claim is foreclosed because the
Supreme Court in Richardson v. United States held
that even where the Government has presented
inadequate evidence at the first trial and the jury
deadlocks, if the trial judge rejects the defendants’
insufficiency arguments, double jeopardy protections
do not bar a second trial. 468 U.S. 317, 326 (1984)
(“Regardless of the sufficiency of the evidence at
petitioner’s first trial, he has no valid double jeopardy
claim to prevent his retrial.”).
Several other circuits have held that by
necessary extension Richardson also forecloses any
challenge to the sufficiency of evidence at a prior trial
after a conviction at a later trial. See United States v.
Achobe, 560 F.3d 259, 265–68 (5th Cir. 2008); United
States v. Julien, 318 F.3d 316, 321 (1st Cir. 2003);
United States v. Willis, 102 F.3d 1078, 1081 (10th Cir.
1996); United States v. Coleman, 862 F.2d 455, 460
(3d Cir. 1988). 3 We believe that these decisions are
correct, and we now join them.
3 In United States v. Recio, we held that Richardson did not bar
us from considering whether defendants “may be prosecuted at a
Appendix A-22
Richardson makes clear that the Double
Jeopardy Clause is not implicated simply because the
Government presented insufficient evidence at a
previous trial, and absent double jeopardy protections,
a finding that insufficient evidence was offered at the
first trial would have no impact on the validity of the
second trial. We hold that a criminal defendant cannot
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence presented at
a previous trial following a conviction at a subsequent
trial.
VI
Robertson argues that there are three reasons
why the district court erred in allowing Todd Tillinger,
the Montana State Program Manager for the Corps
and Supervisory Civil Engineer, to testify as an expert
witness. First, Robertson asserts that because the law
on what constitutes a “water of the United States”
subject to CWA jurisdiction is unclear, “the subject
matter of [Tillinger’s] testimony was not suitable for
expert witness consideration.” Second, Tillinger’s
testimony was based on “guidance documents,” which
do not have the force of law. Finally, Robertson argues
that the district court should have rejected Tillinger
as an expert witness “because his jurisdictional
determination relied heavily on what is termed an
ordinary high water mark,” which Justice Kennedy
third trial if the Government presented insufficient evidence at
the first.” 371 F.3d 1093, 1104 (9th Cir. 2004). We explained that
“[t]he procedural posture of this case allows us to consider this
question because the third trial has not yet begun.” Id. at 1104–
05. We specifically declined to address the question of whether
defendants “could also use their first-trial insufficiency argument
to challenge their second trial on double jeopardy grounds.” Id.
at 1105 n.9.
Appendix A-23
rejected as the determinative measure of whether a
water is subject to the CWA.
Robertson’s arguments are not persuasive.
First, it is the district court—not an expert witness—
that instructs the jury on what the law is. See U.S. v.
Weitzsenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1287 (9th Cir. 1993). Here,
the court gave the jury clear instructions on both the
elements of a CWA violation, and the meaning of the
term “waters of the United States.” 4 As discussed
above, the law itself is not unclear. 5
Robertson’s second argument is both belied by
the record and beside the point. The expert disclosure
statement that Robertson relies upon for his
argument states that Tillinger “has substantial
training and experience in the identification and
classification of streams and wetlands to determine if
Jury Instruction 14 provided: “In order for you to find the
defendant guilty of the crimes contained in Counts I or III, the
government must prove each of the following elements beyond a
reasonable doubt . . . 3. That the discharge was to a ‘water of the
United States.’” Jury Instruction 22 provided: “The term ‘waters
of the United States’ includes traditional navigable waters and
tributaries and/or adjacent wetlands that have a significant
nexus to traditional navigable waters. A tributary or adjacent
wetland has a significant nexus to traditional navigable waters
if it (either alone or in combination with similarly situated water
bodies in the region) significantly affects the chemical, physical,
or biological integrity of traditional navigable waters.” These
instructions follow the standard set out in Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence, and that we adopted as controlling in City of
Healdsburg. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 780; City of Healdsburg,
496 F.3d at 999–1000.
4
5 Robertson does not assert that Tillinger improperly testified on
the ultimate issue of law. His argument appears to be that the
law is unclear, and it was improper for any expert to testify about
“waters of the United States.”
Appendix A-24
they are considered ‘waters of the United States’
subject to federal regulation under the Clean Water
Act (‘CWA’); implementing regulations; standards set
forth in the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006); and the
following EPA/Army Corps of Engineers post-Rapanos
guidance documents . . . .” Tillinger based his
evaluation on regulations, Rapanos, and guidance
documents.
It does not matter which sources of authority
(binding regulations or enforcement guidelines that
lack the force of law) Tillinger used in evaluating
waters and wetlands because it is the jury, using the
instructions provided by the judge, that ultimately
determines whether the creek and wetland at issue
were “waters of the United States.” See United States
v. Phillips, 367 F.3d 846, 855 n.25 (9th Cir. 2004)
(explaining that “whether the water is navigable [i.e.,
is subject to CWA jurisdiction] is part of one element
of a CWA violation,” which the Government can be
required to prove at trial).
Robertson’s
third
argument
is
also
unpersuasive. At the first trial, Tillinger testified that
in determining whether the channel had a continuous
or relatively permanent flow he looked for a high
water mark. 6 Although Justice Kennedy stated in
Rapanos that the presence of an ordinary high water
mark on a tributary could not be “the determinative
Robertson does not provide a citation for his assertion that
Tillinger’s jurisdictional determination relied on the ordinary
high water mark. The Government cites to Tillinger’s testimony
from the first trial. The parties do not direct us to any specific
testimony from the second trial where Tillinger allegedly relies
on the ordinary high water mark.
6
Appendix A-25
measure” of whether a wetland adjacent to that
tributary is covered by the CWA, he did not forbid the
consideration of an ordinary high water mark. See
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 781. That Tillinger discussed
using a high water mark in his evaluation of whether
the channel next to the wetland was a tributary does
not render his testimony improper. Regardless, it was
the jury (not Tillinger) that—using the court’s
instructions that did not mention the ordinary high
water mark—made the final determination that the
creek and wetlands at issue were “waters of the
United States.” We reject Robertson’s challenges to
Tillinger’s testimony because there was no abuse of
discretion in allowing it.
VII
Robertson next argues that the district court
erred in excluding two documents: the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers Jurisdictional Determination
Form Instruction Guidebook and the Crystal Mine
Study. He asserts that the district court should have
admitted the Manual because it would have permitted
Robertson to show that the Corps “was making its
jurisdictional determination on a factor expressly
forbidden by Justice Kennedy under his substantial
nexus test.” He argues that the district court should
have admitted the Crystal Mine Study because it
showed “that the water quality of the Cataract
drainage is very poor due to the extensive mining
activity,” and the Study “could have supported his
argument of insubstantial connection between the
wetlands and the Jefferson river.”
Appendix A-26
The district court did not abuse its discretion in
excluding either the Guidance Manual or the Crystal
Mine Study. The district court is given “wide latitude”
to determine “the admissibility of evidence because
[the trial judge] is in the best position to assess the
impact and effect of evidence based upon what [the
judge] perceives from the live proceedings of a trial.”
Layton, 767 F.2d at 554 (quoting United States v.
Ford, 632 F.2d 1354, 1377 (9th Cir. 1980)).
The district court explained that the Guidebook
is used by the Corps “in its performance of
jurisdictional determinations and, as such, discusses
the applicable regulations and the law.” The court
excluded the Guidebook under Federal Rule of
Evidence 403, concluding that “the danger of
confusing the issues and misleading the jury
substantially outweighed the potential probative
value of admitting the entire Guidebook.” As the
district court properly explained, the court provides
the law to the jury. See, e.g., Weitzsenhoff, 35 F.3d at
1287. The Guidance Manual explains how and when
the Corps will assert CWA jurisdiction over wetlands
and non-navigable tributaries. It was within the
district court’s discretion to conclude that the
Guidance Manual could confuse the jury because the
standards and considerations outlined in the Manual
were not the same as the jury instructions, i.e., the law
that the jury had to follow. 7 The district court did not
As explained above, Robertson’s arguments regarding
references to the Ordinary High Water Mark and how the Corps’
determines CWA jurisdiction are unpersuasive. The district
court provided jury instructions, and the jury (following those
instructions) made the determination that the discharge was into
“waters of the United States.” How the Corps makes CWA
7
Appendix A-27
abuse its discretion in excluding the Guidance
Manual.
The district court likewise did not abuse its
discretion in excluding the Crystal Mine Study. The
district court concluded that the Study was not
relevant and that “the potential prejudice from its
introduction strongly outweighs any probative value.”
It excluded the Study under Federal Rules of Evidence
401 and 403. The district court acted well within its
discretion. Whether a wetland or non-navigable water
has a significant nexus to a traditionally navigable
water has nothing to do with whether the traditionally
navigable water is healthy. Robertson does not
support his novel argument that a “significant nexus”
exists only when a wetland would be polluting an
otherwise clean water, with any authority. Also, this
argument undermines the very purpose of the CWA,
“to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” See 33
U.S.C. § 1251(a) (emphasis added). In light of this
purpose, it would not make sense to conclude that the
CWA protects only clean waters from pollution from
their non-navigable tributaries, because that would
disregard the CWA’s restoration purpose. The district
court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the
Crystal Mine Study, which addressed the existing
contamination in the watershed. 8 We reject
jurisdictional determinations is not controlling for the purposes
of this criminal appeal.
8 Robertson properly states that the standard of review for
decisions on the admissibility of evidence is abuse of discretion.
However, he also seems to suggest that the court should review
the decisions to determine whether exclusion of the evidence
resulted in constitutional error. Robertson does not present any
substantial argument as to how exclusion of either the Guidance
Appendix A-28
Robertson’s challenges to the district court’s rulings
on the rules of evidence. There was no abuse of
discretion. 9
AFFIRMED.
Manual or the Crystal Mine Study resulted in constitutional
error. Nor could he do so. As explained above, exclusion of both
pieces of evidence was proper. Not only that, but the district court
allowed Robertson to question witnesses using the Guidance
Manual and allowed Robertson to have the witness read relevant
portions of the Manual into the record.
9 Robertson argues that if we reverse on Counts I and III, those
counts will no longer be “offenses of conviction,” and “the district
court’s restitution order should be vacated and the issue should
be remanded for reconsideration.” Robertson does not otherwise
challenge the district court’s restitution order. Because we affirm
the convictions, we also affirm the restitution award.
Appendix B-1
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
Filed July 10 2018
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JOSEPH DAVID ROBERTSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
No.
16-30178
D,C. No.
6:15-cr-00007-DWM-1
District of Montana,
Helena
ORDER
Before: McKEOWN and GOULD, Circuit Judges, and
ROTHSTEIN, * District Judge.
The Constitution Society’s and the Coalition of
Western Property Owners’s motion for leave to file
amicus curiae brief is GRANTED. The Clerk is
directed to file the brief that was received on June 29,
2018.
Appellant’s Petition for Rehearing is DENIED.
The full court has been advised of the Petition
for Rehearing En Banc and no judge of the court has
requested a vote on the Petition for Rehearing En
Banc. Fed. R. App. P. 35. Appellant’s Petition for
Rehearing En Banc is also DENIED.
The Honorable Barbara Jacobs Rothstein, United States
District Judge for the Western District of Washington, sitting by
designation.
Appendix C-1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
HELENA DIVISION DISTRICT OF MONTANA
UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA
V.
JOSEPH* DAVID
ROBERTSON
Date of Original
Judgment: 7/20/2016
(or Date of Last
Amended Judgment)
Reason for
Amendment:
AMENDED
JUDGMENT IN A
CRIMINAL CASE
Case Number: CR 15-07H-DWM
USM Number: 13726-046
Michael Donahoe
(appointed)
Defendant’s Attorney
Correction of
Sentence on
Remand (18 U.S.C.
3742(f)(1) and (2))
Modification of
Supervision Conditions
(18 U.S.C. §§ 3563(c) or
3583(e))
Reduction of
Sentence for
Chanced Circumstances
(Fed. R. Crim. P. 25(b))
Modification of
Imposed Term of
Imprisonment for
Extraordinary and
Compelling Reasons (18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1))
Correction of
Sentence by
Sentencing Court (Fed.
R. Crim. P. 35(a))
Correction of
Sentence for
Clerical Mistake (Fed.
R. Crim. P. 36)
Modification of
Imposed Term of
Imprisonment for
Retroactive
Amendments(s)
to the Sentencing
Guidelines (18 U.S.C. §
3582(c)(2))
Appendix C-2
Direct Motion to
District Court Pursuant
G28 U.S.C. § 2255 or G18
U.S.C. § 3559(c)(7)
THE DEFENDANT:
Modification of
Restitution Order (18
U.S.C. § 3664)
pleaded guilty to count(s)
pleaded nolo contendere to count(s)
which was accepted by the court.
was found guilty on count(s) I, II, III
after a plea of not guilty.
The defendant is adjudicated guilty of these offenses:
Title &
Section
33 U.S.C.
1311(a);
1319(c)(2)(A)
18 U.S.C.
1361, 2
Nature of
Offense
Unauthorized
Discharge of
Pollutants into
Waters of the
US
Offense
Ended
10/2014
Count
Malicious
Mischief-Injury
/Depredation of
Property of the
US
10/2014
II
I
The defendant is sentenced as provided in
pages 2 through 7 of this judgment. The sentence is
imposed pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984.
Appendix C-3
The defendant has been found not guilty on
court(s)
Count(s)
G is G are dismissed on the
motion of the United States.
It is ordered that the defendant must notify the
United States Attorney for this district within 30 days
of any change of name, residence, or mailing address
until all fines, restitution, costs, and special
assessments imposed by this judgment are fully paid.
If ordered to pay restitution, the defendant must
notify the court and United States attorney of
material changes in economic circumstances.
FILED
Jul 26 2016
Clerk, U S
District
Court
District of
Montana
Missoula
7/26/2016
Date of Imposition of Judgment
s/ Donald W. Molloy
Signature of Judge
Donald W. Molloy, District Judge
Name of Judge
Title of Judge
July 26, 2016
Date
ADDITIONAL COUNTS OF CONVICTION
Title &
Section
33 U.S.C.
1311(a),
1319(c)(2)(A)
Nature of
Offense
Unauthorized
Discharge of
Pollutants into
Waters of the
US
Offense
Ended
05/2014
Count
III
Appendix C-4
IMPRISONMENT
The defendant is hereby committed to the
custody of the United States Bureau of Prisons to be
imprisoned for a total term of
Count I: 18 months, Count II: 18 Months, Count III:
18 months, the sentences to run concurrently.
The court makes the following recommendations
to the Bureau of Prisons:
The defendant is remanded to the custody of the
United States Marshal.
The defendant shall surrender to the United
States Marshal for this district:
G at _____________ G a.m. G p.m. on ___________.
G as notified by the United States Marshal.
The defendant shall surrender for service of
sentence at the institution designated by the
Bureau of Prisons:
G before 2 p.m. on
.
G as notified by the United States Marshal.
G as notified by the Probation of Pretrial Services
Office.
RETURN
I have executed this judgment as follows:
Defendant delivered on
to
at
with a certified copy of this judgment.
UNITED STATES MARSHAL
By
DEPUTY UNITED STATES MARSHAL
Appendix C-5
SUPERVISED RELEASE
Upon release from imprisonment, the
defendant shall be on supervised release for a term of
Count I: 1 year, Count II: 3 years, Count III: 1 year, to
run concurrently.
The defendant must report to the probation
office in the district to which the defendant is released
within 72 hours of release from the custody of the
Bureau of Prisons.
The defendant shall not commit another federal, state,
or local crime.
The defendant shall not unlawfully possess a
controlled substance. The defendant shall refrain from
any unlawful use of a controlled substance. The
defendant shall submit to one drug test within 15 days
of release from imprisonment and at least two periodic
drug tests thereafter, as determined by the court.
The above drug testing condition is suspended,
based on the court’s determination that the
defendant poses a low risk of future substance abuse.
(Check, if applicable.)
The defendant shall not possess a firearm,
ammunition, destructive device, or any other
dangerous weapon. (Check, if applicable.)
The defendant shall cooperate in the collection of
DNA a directed by the probation officer. (Check, if
applicable.)
The defendant shall register with the state sex
offender registration agency in the state where
the defendant resides, works, or is a student, as
Appendix C-6
directed by
applicable.)
the
probation
officer.
(Check,
if
The defendant shall participate in an approved
program for domestic violence. (Check, if
applicable.)
If this judgment imposes a fine or restitution, it
is a condition of supervised release that the defendant
pay in accordance with the Schedule of Payments
sheet of this judgment.
The defendant must comply with the standard
conditions that have been adopted by this court as well
as with any additional conditions on the attached
page.
STANDARD CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION
1) the defendant shall not leave the judicial
district without the permission of the court or
probation officer;
2) the defendant shall report to the probation
officer in a manner and frequency directed by
the court or probation officer;
3) the defendant shall answer truthfully all
inquiries by the probation officer and follow the
instructions of the probation officer;
4) the defendant shall support his or her
dependents
and
meet
other
family
responsibilities;
5) the defendant shall work regularly at a lawful
occupation, unless excused by the probation
officer for schooling, training, or other
acceptable reasons;
Appendix C-7
6) the defendant shall notify the probation officer
at least ten days prior to any change in
residence or employment;
7) the defendant shall refrain from excessive use
of alcohol and shall not purchase, possess, use,
distribute, or administer any controlled
substance or any paraphernalia related to any
controlled substances, except as prescribed by a
physician;
8) the defendant shall not frequent places where
controlled substances are illegally sold, used
distributed, or administered;
9) the defendant shall not associate with any
persons engaged in criminal activity and shall
not associate with any person convicted of a
felony, unless granted permission to do so by
the probation officer;
10) the defendant shall permit a probation officer
to visit him or her at any time at home or
elsewhere and shall permit confiscation of any
contraband observed in plain view of the
probation officer;
11) the defendant shall notify the probation officer
within seventy-two hours of being arrested or
questioned by a law enforcement officer;
12) the defendant shall not enter into any
agreement to act as an informer or a special
agent of a law enforcement agency without the
permission of the court; and
13) as directed by the probation officer, the
defendant shall notify third parties of risks that
may be occasioned by the defendant’s criminal
record, personal history, or characteristics and
Appendix C-8
shall permit the probation officer to make such
notifications and confirm the defendant’s
compliance with such notification requirement.
SPECIAL CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION
1. The defendant shall participate in and complete
a program of substance abuse treatment as
directed by the United States Probation Office,
until the defendant is released from the
program by the probation officer. The
defendant is to pay part or all of the cost of this
treatment, depending upon the defendant’s
ability to pay, as directed by the United States
Probation Office.
2. The defendant shall participate in a program
for mental health treatment as directed by the
United States Probation Office, until such time
as the defendant is released from the program
by the probation officer. The defendant is to pay
part or all of the cost of this treatment,
depending upon the defendant’s ability to pay,
as directed by the United States Probation
Office.
3. The defendant shall abstain from the
consumption of alcohol and shall not enter
establishments where alcohol is the primary
item of sale. This condition supersedes
standard condition number 7 with respect to
alcohol consumption only.
4. The defendant shall participate in substance
abuse testing, to include not more than 180
urinalysis test, not more than 180 breathalyzer
tests, and not more than 36 sweat patch
applications annually during the period of
Appendix C-9
supervision. The defendant shall pay all or part
of the costs of testing, depending upon the
defendant’s to pay, as directed by the United
States Probation Office.
5. The defendant will provide the United States
Probation Officer with any requested financial
information and shall incur no new lines of
credit in the defendant’s own name or in the
name of any other person or entity without
prior written approval of the United States
Probation Officer.
6. The defendant shall apply all monies received
from income tax refunds, lottery winnings,
judgments, and/or any other anticipated or
unexpected financial gains to the outstanding
court-ordered financial obligations regarding
restitution.
7. The defendant shall submit his person,
residence, place of employment, vehicles, and
papers, to a search, with or without a warrant
by any probation officer based on reasonable
suspicion of contraband or evidence in violation
of a condition of release. Failure to submit to
search may be grounds for revocation. The
defendant shall warn any other occupants,
adults and minors, that the premises may be
subject to searches pursuant to this condition.
The defendant shall allow seizure of suspected
contraband for further examination.
8. The defendant shall not possess a firearm,
ammunition, destructive devices, or any other
dangerous weapon. This prohibition extends to
all property and land on which he resides,
including all vehicles and structures to which
Appendix C-10
he has access. Upon release by the BOP, the
defendant
shall
remove
all
firearms,
ammunition, destructive devices, or any other
dangerous weapons within 5 days of the date of
release and provide written verification and
contact information for individuals taking
possession of the firearms, ammunition,
destructive devices, or any other dangerous
weapons.
9. The defendant shall not knowingly enter any
dwelling or house where firearms are present,
and shall not enter or stay in any dwelling or
house where there are one or more persons in
possession of firearms, without the prior
written approval of the supervising probation
officer. The defendant shall not knowingly
enter any automobile where a person possesses
a firearm, nor shall he allow anyone onto his
property if they are in possession of a firearm.
10. The defendant shall not possess any police
radio scanning devices or possess computer
hardware or software that would enable the
defendant to monitor law enforcement activity,
to include video and audio surveillance devices.
11. Restitution is ordered in the amount of
$129,933.50 to be paid following release at a
rate of $400 per month or as otherwise directed
by the United States Probation Office
depending upon the defendant’s ability to pay.
CRIMINAL MONETARY PENALTIES
The defendant must pay the following total
criminal monetary penalties under the schedule of
payments on Sheet 6.
Appendix C-11
Assessment
TOTALS
$ 300.00
Fine
Restitution
$
$129,933.50
G
The determination of restitution is deferred until ____
An Amended Judgment in a Criminal Case (AO
245C) will be entered after such determination.
O
The defendant shall make restitution (including
community restitution) to the following payees in
the amount listed below.
If the defendant makes a partial payment, each
payee
shall
receive
an
approximately
proportioned payment, unless specified otherwise
in the priority order or percentage payment
column below. However, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3664(i), all nonfederal victims must be paid
before the United States is paid.
Name of
Payee
Total Loss*
Restitution
Ordered
U.S.
Forest
Service
$129,933.50
$129,933.50
Priority or
Percentage
TOTALS $ 129,933.50 $129,933.50
Restitution amount ordered pursuant to plea
agreement $
The defendant must pay interest on restitution and
a fine of more than $2,500, unless the restitution or
fine is paid in full before the fifteenth day after the
date of the judgment, pursuant 18 U.S.C. § 3612(f).
All of the payment options on Sheet 6 may be
subject to penalties for delinquency and default,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(g).
*Findings for the total amount of losses are required under
Chapters 109A, 110, 110A, and 113A of Title 18 for offenses
committed on or after September 13, 1994, but before April 23,
1996.
Appendix C-12
O The court determined that the defendant does not
have the ability to pay interest, and it is ordered that:
O the interest requirement is waived for
G fine
O restitution.
G the interest requirement for G fine
G restitution is modified as follows:
*Findings for the total amount of losses are required
under Chapters 109A, 110, 110A, and 113A of Title 18
for offenses committed on or after September 13, 1994,
but before April 23, 1996.
SCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS
Having assessed the defendant’s ability to pay,
payment of the total criminal monetary penalties
shall be due as follows:
A
O Lump sum payment
immediately, balance due
G Not later than
of
$300.00
due
, or
O In accordance with G C, G D, G E, or O F
below; or
B
G Payment to begin immediately (may be
combined with G C, G D, or G F below); or
C
G Payment in equal
(e.g., weekly,
monthly, quarterly) installments of $
over a period of
(e.g., months or
years), to commence
(e.g., 30 or 60
days) after the date of this judgment; or
D
G Payment in equal
(e.g., weekly,
monthly, quarterly) installments of $
Appendix C-13
over a period of
(e.g., months or
years), to commence
(e.g., 30 or 60
days) after release from imprisonment to a term
of supervision; or
E
G Payment during the term of supervised
release will commence within
(e.g.,
30 or 60 days) after release from imprisonment.
The court will set the payment plan based on an
assessment of the defendant’s ability pay at
that time; or
F
O Special instructions regarding the payment
of criminal monetary penalties:
Criminal monetary penalty payments
are due during imprisonment at the rate
of not less than $25.00 per quarter, and
payment shall be through the Bureau of
Prisons’ Inmate Financial Responsibility
Program. Criminal monetary payments
shall be made to the Clerk, United States
District Court, P.O. Box 8537, Missoula,
MT 59807.
Restitution in the amount of $129,933.50
is to be paid following release at a rate of
$400 per month or as otherwise directed
by the United States Probation Office
dependent upon your ability to pay.
Unless the court has expressly ordered otherwise, if
this judgment imposes imprisonment, payment of
criminal monetary penalties is due during the period
of imprisonment. All criminal monetary penalties,
except those payments made through the Federal
Bureau of Prisons’ Inmate Financial Responsibility
Program, are made to the clerk of the court.
Appendix C-14
The defendant shall receive credit for all payments
previously made toward any criminal monetary
penalties imposed.
Joint and Several
Defendant and Co-Defendant Names and Case
Numbers (including defendant number), Joint
and Several Amount, and corresponding payee, if
appropriate.
The defendant shall pay the cost of prosecution.
The defendant shall pay the following court
cost(s):
The defendant shall forfeit the defendant’s
interest in the following property to the United
States:
Payments shall be applied in the following order:
(1) assessment,
(2)
restitution
principal,
(3) restitution interest, (4) fine principal, (5) fine
interest, (6) community restitution, (7) penalties, and
(8) costs, including cost of prosecution and court costs.
Appendix D-1
JoAnn Corson Bacheller
Registered Diplomate Reporter
Certified Realtime Reporter
P.O. Box 8006
Missoula, Montana 59807-8006
406/829-7123 office
406/542-7272 fax
joann_bacheller@mtd.uscourts.gov
United States Court Reporter
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
HELENA DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) No. CR 15-7-H-DWM
Plaintiff,
)
) TRANSCRIPT OF
vs.
)
SENTENCING
)
JOSEPH DAVID ROBERTSON, )
Defendant.
)
BEFORE THE HONORABLE DONALD W. MOLLOY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
Russell Smith United States Courthouse
201 East Broadway
Missoula, Montana 59802
Wednesday, July 20, 2016
10:02:27 to 13:15:32
Proceedings recorded by machine shorthand
Transcript produced by computer-assisted transcription
Appendix D-2
APPEARANCES
For the Plaintiff:
MR. BRYAN R. WHITTAKER
Assistant U.S. Attorney
901 Front Street, Suite 1100
Helena, Montana 59626
MR. ERIC E. NELSON
Special Assistant U.S.
Attorney
U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency
Box 25227
Denver, Colorado 80225
For the Defendant:
MR. MICHAEL DONAHOE
Attorney at Law
Federal Defenders of Montana
50 West 14th Street, Suite
300
Helena, Montana 59624
[27]
*****
THE COURT: . . .
I think there is a remarkably complete and good
record made in this case, particularly by the efforts of
Mr. Donahoe, to raise this serious legal question, but
I think it’s a situation where I am going to abide by
the decisions that I’ve made in the past. It does require
an answer, and I think that the Ninth Circuit is the
correct authority to answer the question, if not the
Appendix D-3
United States Supreme Court. And I think that the
record in this case probably is as good a record for
answering the question of what are waters of the
United States of any of the cases, I think, that exist.
*****
[78]
*****
start.
THE COURT: Well, that may be. But let me
And where I will start is basically the critical
and essential question, and that is that the Congress
of the United States enacted the statutes and required
the Corps of Engineers and the EPA to enforce the
law.
However, as has been pointed out in the
extensive arguments here today, that there are
significant legal questions in the Supreme Court itself
about how to define “waters of the United States.”
So I’m going to start with a quote from the chief
justice, who said, “It is unfortunate,” in talking about
the Rapanos decision, “It is unfortunate that no
opinion,” of the Supreme Court, “commands a majority
of the court on precisely how to read Congress’ limits
on the reach of the Clean Water Act. Lower courts and
regulated entities will now have to feel their way on a
case-by-case basis.”
[79]
*****
. . . . Joseph David Robertson has owned
numerous patented and unpatented mining claims in
Jefferson County.
Appendix D-4
A patented claim is a valid mining claim that
has been sold by the government to an individual and
is no longer public land. Both the land and the
minerals contained in it become the property of the
patent holder.
On the other hand, an unpatented claim is a
possessory interest in a particular area solely for the
purpose of mining, and it reserves to the United States
the right to manage and dispose of surface resources.
And the use of an unpatented mining claim on
public land is limited to activities that are reasonably
incident to prospecting, mining, and processing
operations and subject to the right of the United
States to manage the surface resources.
Mr. Robertson and his wife, Carri Robertson,
[80] currently own and reside on a 20-acre parcel
known as the White Pine Lode. White Pine Lode is
adjacent to an unpatented parcel of national Forest
Service lands directly to the south, which is known as
the Mohawk Lode, and a third patented parcel known
as the Manhattan Lode, consisting of approximately
14 acres, and that is adjacent to the south of the
Mohawk Lode.
An unnamed tributary flows through all three
parcels and eventually runs into Cataract Creek
approximately 1 mile from the parcels. Cataract Creek
is a tributary of the Boulder River, which is a
tributary of the Jefferson River. The Jefferson River is
a traditionally navigable water of the United States.
That is a fact the parties agreed to before the trial of
this defendant.
*****
[97]
Appendix D-5
*****
He is a veteran of the Navy. He claims that he
is a Vietnam-era veteran with posttraumatic stress.
He has been hospitalized on several occasions and, as
indicated, completed the TRU program through the
Veterans Administration.
*****
Appendix E-1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
HELENA DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JOSEPH DAVID ROBERTSON,
Defendant.
CR 15-07-H-DWM
ORDER
FILED
May 23, 2016
Clerk, U.S. Courts
District of Montana,
Missoula Division
A jury trial was held April 4 through April 7,
2016. After the close of the government’s case,
Defendant Joseph Robertson moved for acquittal as to
all three counts of the Indictment pursuant to Rule 29
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Trial Tr.
590-98.) That motion was denied. Robertson renewed
his motion at the close of all the evidence, and the
Court reserved ruling, Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(b).
(Trial Tr. 830.) On April 7, 2016, the jury returned
guilty verdicts on all three counts: two violations of
the Clean Water Act (Counts I, III) and one count of
willful injury to property of the United States
(Count II). (Doc. 204.) On April 21, 2016, Robertson
renewed his motions and moved for a new trial
pursuant to Rule 33. (Doc. 213.) His motions are
denied.
1
1 The first jury trial in this case occurred on October 5 to 8, 2015,
and resulted in a hung jury. (See Doc. 78. Decl. of Mistrial.) A
second trial was set on December 14, 2015, (Doc. 79), but
Robertson did not appear due to alleged medical issues, and it
was continued, (see Doc. 135).
Appendix E-2
I.
Rule 29—Sufficiency of the Evidence
Pursuant to Rule 29(c)(2), “[i]f the jury has
returned a guilty verdict, the court may set aside the
verdict and enter an acquittal.” A Rule 29 motion may
not be granted if “viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); United States v.
Nevils, 598 F .3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 2010). Here,
Robertson contends the evidence presented at trial
was insufficient to support a conviction. For Count II,
he argues that the government failed to present
evidence of property boundaries. For Counts I and III,
he argues that the evidence presented was insufficient
to show that the waters in question are “waters of the
United States.” 2 Those arguments are addressed in
turn.
A.
Count II: Property of United States
Count II charges Robertson with willfully
injuring property of the United States. Robertson
argues that the government failed to present evidence
as to the property boundary. (See Trial Tr. 592-93.) He
is incorrect. Agent Fisher testified at some length to
the various property boundaries in the area. (Id. at 8792). Two surveys were conducted by the Forest
Service, (id. at 88; see Ex. 47), and the boundaries
were marked, (Trial Tr. 88; see Ex. 2u (depicting red
2 Robertson raises numerous arguments for the first time in his
reply brief that are not addressed herein. Thompson v. Comm’r,
631 F.2d 642, 649 (9th Cir. 1980). Even if the Court were to
consider his untimely arguments, the issues he raises have been
previously considered and rejected. (See Docs. 37, 107, 117, 172,
& 175.)
Appendix E-3
and yellow corner boundary marker); Ex. 2v (depicting
yellow boundary sign and red paint on tree)). The
record also includes the property record from the
Montana Cadastral. (Trial Tr. 533; Ex. 58.)
Additionally, both Agent Fisher and Agent Siler
testified to where the property line fell in relation to
the ponds, indicating that at least five ponds are on
National Forest System lands. (Trial Tr. 106, 121-22
(Fisher); 571, 578-79 (Siler).) The evidence presented
was sufficient for a rational juror to conclude beyond
a reasonable doubt that the property at issue in Count
II belonged to the United States.
B.
Counts I, III: Clean Water Act
Robertson further argues that the government
failed to present sufficient proof to show that the
waters at issue in Counts I and III were “waters of the
United States,” a necessary element of the Clean
Water Act. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). His position is
belied by the record.
As a starting point, sufficient evidence was
presented from which a rational juror could find that
the tributary and its adjacent wetlands have a
hydrological connection with traditionally navigable
waters. While a mere hydrological connection is
insufficient to establish the existence of a significant
nexus, Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 785
(2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring), such a connection is
relevant because completely isolated waters are
generally beyond the Clean Water Act’s scope, Solid
Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 171-72, 174 (2001). Here, the
parties agree that the Jefferson River is a
traditionally navigable water. (Instr. No. 22, Doc. 196
at 23.) During his testimony, Todd Tillinger, a civil
Appendix E-4
engineer with the Army Corps of Engineers, outlined
the Cataract Creek watershed, including the drainage
in question, (Trial Tr. 401-06; Exs. 13, 15, 17), and
explained the hydrological connection between the
unnamed tributary and the Jefferson River, via
Cataract Creek and the Boulder River, (Trial Tr. 398,
406). Tillinger showed an aerial image of the length of
the stream, (id. at 407-11; Ex. 18), and discussed
walking the entire length of the tributary from the
ponds to Cataract Creek, noting the tributary’s flow
the entire length of the way, (Trial Tr. 425-35 (October
2014 site visit); 440-41 (November 2015 site visit)).
Richard Clark, an environmental scientist for the
Environmental Protection Agency and an expert in
the field of identification and classification of
wetlands, also testified to walking the length of the
tributary and observing both a defined bed and bank,
as well as flowing water. (Id. at 489.)
Additionally, Scott Gillilan, an aquatic
restoration expert, testified that he performed a visual
flow test on the tributary near the ponds, estimating
the tributary’s flow at 8-16 gallons per minute. (Id. at
519; see also id. at 693 (defense witness Gary Hopkins
testified that flow at end of tributary into Cataract
Creek measured 8 gallons per minute); Ex. 28 at
p. 296 (Plan of Operations indicating that at least 2-5
gallons per minute were flowing in area prior to
disturbance).) And, both Agent Fisher and Agent Siler
stated that every time they visited the site they saw
water flowing in the still-existing portions of the
tributary near the ponds. (Trial Tr. 131, 145 (Fisher);
576 (Siler).) Viewed as a whole, this evidence was
sufficient for a jury to find a hydrological connection
even with the possibility that the tributary was
entirely frozen during portions of the year. (See, e.g.,
Appendix E-5
Trial Tr. 306, 335); United States v. Moses, 496 F.3d
984, 990-91 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding intermittent,
seasonal streams can be waters of the United States).
The next question then is whether there was
sufficient evidence presented to show that the
hydrological connection was chemically, physically, or
biologically significant. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 780
(Kennedy, J., concurring). There was. Tillinger
testified at length about the chemical, physical, and
biological effects this tributary and adjacent wetland
have on the water system. (See Trial Tr. 374-78, 43539.) Darin Watschke, a fisheries biologist for the
United States Forest Service, and Ron Spoon, a
fisheries biologist with the Montana Fish, Wildlife and
Parks, both testified that the turbidity and
temperatures of the water in the tributary and
adjacent wetlands at issue affect downstream waters,
impacting fish populations in Cataract Creek and the
Jefferson River. (Id. at 286, 290-91 (Watschke), 236,
247, 249-50 (Spoon).) Clark testified to the existence
of wetland conditions at the site, (id. at 495-97;
Exs. 61, 62, 63), and identified the wetlands as “high
watershed wetlands, or upland watersheds” that
affect water temperatures, flood and erosion control,
and animal and insect habitat for the entire system,
(Trial Tr. 498-501). Gillilan also remarked on the
nature of the undisturbed wetlands he was able to
view between and around the ponds, describing them
as “pristine and high quality, good condition. Very
diverse wetland and very healthy.” (Id. at 518.)
Gillilan further commented on the high quality of the
tributary based on the important role small
headwater stream systems such as this play in the
larger water system. (Id. at 432-34, 522.) He explained
how the headwaters streams and wetlands act as a
Appendix E-6
giant sponge for the watershed, filtering sediments,
processing
nutrients,
and
regulating
water
temperature, noting that “everything is cumulative.”
(Id. at 523.) Tillinger and Spoon also emphasized the
cumulative impact of this tributary and its adjacent
wetlands based on other similarly situated
headwaters tributaries in the area. (Id. at 402, 476
(Tillinger); 257, 274 (Spoon).)
To the extent that Robertson’s argument is
premised on the idea that the government was
required to show the results of various tests or that
Robertson’s discharge caused harm to traditional
navigable waterways, such a showing is not required
under the law. See United States v. Iverson, 162 F.3d
1015, 1021 (9th Cir. 1998) (affirming district court’s
decision not to give instruction that required
government to show pollutive effect). Construing the
proof in the light most favorable to the government,
sufficient evidence was presented from which a
rational juror could find that the significant nexus test
was met for both the tributary and its adjacent
wetlands.
II.
Rule 33—New Trial on Counts I and III
Robertson further requests a new trial
pursuant to Rule 33 as to Counts I and III for the
improper exclusion of the EPA/Corps Guidance
Manual, (Ex. 549), and for prohibiting defense counsel
from questioning Mr. Spoon on, and refusing to grant
judicial notice of, the Crystal Mine Study, (see Doc. 65
(offer of proof)). A “court may vacate any judgment and
grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires.”
Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a). In considering a motion for a
new trial, district courts are not obliged to view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, but
Appendix E-7
are free to weigh the evidence and evaluate the
credibility of witnesses. United States v. Kellington,
217 F.3d 1084, 1097 (9th Cir. 2000).
Robertson first argues the Court erred in
refusing to admit Exhibit 549, a guidance manual
titled “U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Jurisdictional
Determination Form Instruction Guidebook.” He is
incorrect. Exclusion of the Guidebook was proper
under Rule 403 as the danger of confusing the issues
and misleading the jury substantially outweighed the
potential probative value of admitting the entire
Guidebook. The Guidebook is used by the Army Corps
of Engineers in its performance of jurisdictional
determinations and, as such, discusses the applicable
regulations and the law. It is well settled, however,
that while questions of fact are to be decided by the
jury, questions of law are to be decided by the Court.
See United States v. Amparo, 68 F.3d 1222, 1224 (9th
Cir. 1995) (“While the jury is the arbiter of the facts,
the judge is the arbiter of the law: the judge must be
permitted to instruct the jury on the law and to insist
that the jury follow his instructions.”). Regardless of
the status of the law under the Clean Water Act or
how the law was explained in the Guidebook, the jury
was instructed on a comprehensible standard that it
was to follow. Moreover, defense counsel questioned
Tillinger about certain provisions in the Guidebook,
(Trial Tr. 456-57 (asking Tillinger about ditches)), and
was given the opportunity to have the witness read
relevant portions of the Guidebook into the record
pursuant to Rule 803(18), which allows for a
statement contained in a learned treatise that is relied
upon by the expert on direct examination and is
established as a reliable authority by the expert’s
Appendix E-8
testimony to be read into evidence, but not received,
(id. at 465).
Finally, Robertson insists a new trial is
warranted because the Court did not judicially note
nor allow defense counsel to question Mr. Spoon on the
Crystal Mine Study. (Doc. 65.) Robertson argues that
the failure to do so gave the distorted picture of
Cataract Creek as a healthy waterway despite
extensive mining pollution. The exclusion was
appropriate because the significant nexus test is not
contingent on a healthy watershed. Iverson, 162 F.3d
at 1021. The Crystal Mine Study is not relevant, Fed.
R. Evid. 401, and the potential prejudice from its
introduction strongly outweighs any probative value,
Fed. R. Evid. 403.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Robertson’s
motions for acquittal and for a new trial (Doc. 213) are
DENIED.
Dated this 23rd day of May, 2016.
s/ Donald W. Molloy
Donald W. Molloy, District Judge
United States District Court
Appendix F-1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
HELENA DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JOSEPH DAVID ROBERTSON,
Defendant.
CR 15-07-H-DWM
VERDICT
FILED
April 7, 2016
Clerk, U.S. District
Court
District of Montana
Missoula
1.
We, the Jury in the above-entitled
matter, unanimously find the defendant, Joseph
David Robertson:
Not Guilty
X
Guilty
of unauthorized discharge of pollutants into waters of
the United States, as charged in Count I of the
indictment.
2.
We, the Jury in the above-entitled
matter, unanimously find the defendant, Joseph
David Robertson:
Not Guilty
X
Guilty
of malicious mischief/injury to property of the United
States, as charged in Count II of the indictment.
Appendix F-2
3.
We, the Jury in the above-entitled
matter, unanimously find the defendant, Joseph
David Robertson:
Not Guilty
X
Guilty
of unauthorized discharged of pollutants into waters
of the United States, as charged in Count III of the
indictment.
Date this 7th day of April, 2016.
Foreperson signature redacted. Original document
filed under seal.
Appendix G-1
JoAnn Corson Bacheller
Registered Diplomata Reporter
Certified Realtime Reporter
P. O. Box 8006
Missoula, Montana 59807-8006
406/829-7123 office
406/542-7272 fax
joann_bacheller@mtd.uscourts.gov
United States Court Reporter
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
HELENA DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JOSEPH DAVID ROBERTSON,
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
No. CR 15-7-H-DWM
VOLUME 1
TRANSCRIPT OF
JURY TRIAL
BEFORE THE HONORABLE DONALD W. MOLLOY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
Russell Smith United States Courthouse
201 East Broadway
Missoula, Montana 59802
Monday, April 4, 2016
08:05:32 to 09:18:05, 12:08:01 to 17:07:10
Proceedings recorded by machine shorthand
Transcript produced by computer-assisted transcription
Appendix G-2
[184]
*****
MR. WHITTAKER: The government calls Tom
Carey.
THE COURT: Mr. Carey, would you come all
the way up to the front, in front of the clerk here, raise
your right hand and be sworn?
(Oath administered to the witness.)
THE COURT: Have a seat right over here.
Would you tell the jury your full name? And, if you
would, spell your last name for them.
THE WITNESS: Thomas Gilbert Carey, Jr.,
C-a-r-e-y.
*****
[203]
*****
Q
Okay. And is that channel that you’re talking
about, how wide is it?
A
It was probably a foot wide.
Q
And about 18 inches deep? Is that what you’re
saying?
A
If I remember correctly, yes.
*****
[213]
VOLUME 1 REPORTER’S CERTIFICATE
I, JoAnn Corson Bacheller, a Registered
Diplomate Reporter and Certified Realtime Reporter,
Appendix G-3
certify that the foregoing transcript is a true and
correct record of the proceedings given at the time and
place hereinbefore mentioned; that the proceedings
were reported by me in machine shorthand and
thereafter reduced to typewriting using computerassisted transcription; that after being reduced to
typewriting, a certified copy of this transcript will be
filed electronically with the Court.
I further certify that I am not attorney for, nor
employed by, nor related to any of the parties or
attorneys to this action, nor financially interested in
this action.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have set my hand
at Missoula, Montana this 14th day of April, 2016.
/s/ JoAnn Corson Bacheller
JoAnn Corson Bacheller
United States Court Reporter
Appendix G-4
JoAnn Corson Bacheller
Registered Diplomate Reporter
Certified Realtime Reporter
P. O. Box 8006
Missoula, Montana 59807-8006
406/829-7123 office
406/542-7272 fax
joann_bacheller@mtd.uscourts.gov
United States Court Reporter
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
HELENA DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JOSEPH DAVID ROBERTSON,
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
No. CR 15-7-H-DWM
VOLUME 2
TRANSCRIPT OF
JURY TRIAL
BEFORE THE HONORABLE DONALD W. MOLLOY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
Russell Smith United States Courthouse
201 East Broadway
Missoula, Montana 59802
Tuesday, April 5, 2016
08:17:18 to 17:16:51
Proceedings recorded by machine shorthand
Transcript produced by computer-assisted transcription
Appendix G-5
*****
[230]
*****
WHEREUPON,
MR. RONALD L. SPOON, called for
examination by counsel for plaintiff, after having been
first duly sworn to testify the truth, the whole truth,
and nothing but the truth, testified as follows:
*****
[243]
Q
Okay. How would you describe the stream?
A
It was a small stream that runs through a
meadow with timber on both sides of this meadow, and
a stream that’s less than a foot or two wide and less
than a foot deep.
*****
[367]
MR. NELSON: The government calls Todd
Tillinger.
THE COURT: Would you come up to the front
of the room, in front of the clerk here, raise your right
hand, and be sworn as a witness?
(Oath administered to the witness.)
THE COURT: Have a seat right over here,
please. Would you please tell the jury your full name?
THE WITNESS: My name is Todd Nicholas
Tillinger.
*****
Appendix G-6
[403]
I’d like to show you Exhibit 15, which is already
in evidence.
And what is the jury looking at here?
A
This is a printout from the same software
package but it’s a—it’s the same image you would find
on the 1-to-24,000 or 7.5-minute USGS quadrangle
map. The ponds, you can see the place right there, it
says “Ponds,” and it’s got a latitude and longitude on
it. This is a zoomed-in view of the bottom part of that
Cataract Creek watershed. Cataract Creek would go
from the top of the screen, flowing from the top to the
bottom. And then there’s a solid blue line here that
goes up, and there’s another blue line that comes in
down here, and the pond area would be, you know, up
in this area.
*****
[406]
*****
Q
All right. I’d like to show you Exhibit 17. And is
this another topographic map, different scale?
A
It is. It’s a slightly zoomed-out scale, 1 to
250,000. And again, the pond area is in the same
location here, but it’s zoomed out far enough that you
have, you know, Cataract Creek coming down here.
You’ve got the Boulder River coming this way,
eventually flowing into the Jefferson River. And the
Jefferson River comes here, joins—the Boulder joins
it.
*****
Appendix G-7
[427]
*****
But the channel is there. I mean, it’s a
continuous channel about 1 to 2 feet wide, you know,
6 inches deep, and
*****
[432]
*****
Q
All right. I’d like to show you Exhibit 23A,
which is already in evidence so the jury can see it.
A
Okay.
Q
Could you describe what we’re looking at there?
A
Yeah. This is my right arm and hand. There’s a
GPS unit, a little hand-held like you’d use on a hike or
a backpacking trip. And this is a small channel here.
It gives you an idea of the size of channel at this place.
It’s, you know, several inches deep. And this is, this is
representative of the size and scale of channel that
flows for almost half a mile down to Cataract Creek.
*****
[514]
*****
THE WITNESS: My name is Scott Gillilan,
G-i-l-l-i-l-a-n.
THE COURT: And, Mr. Gillilan, what city do
you live in?
THE WITNESS: I live in Bozeman.
Appendix G-8
THE COURT: And what is your profession or
occupation?
THE WITNESS: I am a hydrologist.
THE COURT: Mr . Nelson.
WHEREUPON,
MR. SCOTT GILLILAN, called for examination
by counsel for plaintiff, after having been first duly
sworn to testify the truth, the whole truth, and
nothing but the truth, testified as follows:
*****
[519]
*****
Q
Did you try to estimate or could you estimate,
just based on visual observation, some estimate of the
amount of flow?
A
Yeah. I estimated, when I was out in the field,
8 to 16 gallons per minute. Basically two or three
garden hoses at one time are about, you know, three
or four minutes to fill a 55-gallon drum.
*****
[550]
VOLUME 2 REPORTER’S CERTIFICATE
I, JoAnn Corson Bacheller, a Registered
Diplomate Reporter and Certified Realtime Reporter,
certify that the foregoing transcript is a true and
correct record of the proceedings given at the time and
place hereinbefore mentioned; that the proceedings
were reported by me in machine shorthand and
thereafter reduced to typewriting using computerassisted transcription; that after being reduced to
Appendix G-9
typewriting, a certified copy of this transcript will be
filed electronically with the Court.
I further certify that I am not attorney for, nor
employed by, nor related to any of the parties or
attorneys to this action, nor financially interested in
this action.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have set my hand
at Missoula, Montana this 15th day of April, 2016.
/s/ JoAnn Corson Bacheller
JoAnn Corson Bacheller
United States Court Reporter
JoAnn Corson Bacheller
Appendix G-10
Registered Diplomate Reporter
Certified Realtime Reporter
P.O. Box 8006
Missoula, Montana 59807-8006
406/829-7123 office
406/542-7272 fax
joann_bacheller@mtd.uscourts.gov
United State
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