Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Joseph David Robertson, Petitioner v. United States

Supreme Court briefNov 7, 2018

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No. _________

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

JOSEPH DAVID ROBERTSON,

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

PETITION FOR

WRIT OF CERTIORARI

MARK MILLER

Pacific Legal Foundation

4440 PGA Blvd., Ste. 307

Palm Beach Gardens, FL 33410

Telephone: (561) 691-5000

MMiller@pacificlegal.org

ANTHONY L. FRANÇOIS*

*Counsel of Record

JEFFREY W. MCCOY

TIMOTHY R. SNOWBALL

Pacific Legal Foundation

930 G Street

Sacramento, CA 95814

Telephone: (916) 419-7111

TFrancois@pacificlegal.org

ETHAN W. BLEVINS

Pacific Legal Foundation

892 Berkeley Drive

North Salt Lake, UT 84054

Telephone: (425) 576-0484

EBlevins@pacificlegal.org

Counsel for Petitioner

i

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Petitioner Joseph David Robertson is an elderly

Navy veteran who ran a fire fighting support truck

business deep in the Montana woods. He dug some

water supply ponds in and around a foot-wide, footdeep channel carrying 2 to 3 garden hoses of flow, 40plus miles from the Jefferson River, the nearest

navigable waterway.

The United States criminally prosecuted

Robertson for digging in “navigable waters” without a

Clean Water Act permit, and for damaging federal

property under 18 U.S.C. § 1361. The district court

denied Robertson’s motions for acquittal under

Criminal Rule 29(c) during a first trial that ended in

mistrial after a hung jury. On retrial, the second jury

convicted, and the court sentenced him to 18 months

in prison and $130,000 in restitution. The Ninth

Circuit affirmed, holding that proof of “navigable

waters” is governed by Justice Kennedy’s concurrence

in Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006), that

“navigable waters” is not void for vagueness, and that

denials of Rule 29(c) motions in a first trial ending in

mistrial are not appealable.

The questions presented are:

1. Is the Clean Water Act term “navigable

waters” void for vagueness, as members of this Court

have suggested? See Sackett v. EPA, 566 U.S. 120,

132-33 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring); United States

Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co., Inc., 136 S.

Ct. 1807, 1816-17 (2016) (Kennedy, Alito, Thomas,

JJ., concurring) (citing Sackett, 566 U.S. at 133 (Alito,

J., concurring)).

ii

2. Should this Court revisit its fractured

decision in Rapanos, to clearly and authoritatively

interpret “navigable waters” under the Clean Water

Act?

3. Whether a defendant who is retried and

convicted for an offense after a hung jury may appeal,

after final judgment, the erroneous denial of his

motion for judgment of acquittal during the first trial,

as recognized in United States v. Gulledge, 739 F.2d

582, 584 (11th Cir. 1984), or whether the appellate

courts may not review such denials, as the Ninth

Circuit held below?

iii

LIST OF ALL PARTIES

Petitioner Joseph David Robertson was the

defendant and appellant below. The United States of

America was the plaintiff and appellee below.

CORPORATE

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Petitioner Joseph David Robertson is a natural

person. There are no corporate parties in this case.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI ................ 1

OPINIONS BELOW ................................................... 1

JURISDICTION.......................................................... 1

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS AT ISSUE ........................................... 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.................................... 2

Legal Background: The Confusing

Legacy of Rapanos v. United States ........................... 2

Facts: A Foot-Wide Channel, at the Top

of the Watershed, More Than 40 Miles

from an Actually Navigable River .............................. 8

Proceedings Below: Criminal Prosecution of

Petitioner Robertson for Digging Ponds in

the Foot-Wide Unnamed Channel ............................ 10

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ............... 13

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................................. 13

ARGUMENT ............................................................. 14

I.

THE COURT SHOULD GRANT

THE PETITION TO DETERMINE

WHETHER THE CLEAN WATER

ACT TERM “NAVIGABLE WATERS”

IS VOID FOR VAGUENESS .......................... 14

A.

Members of This Court,

and Lower Court Judges, Have

Expressed Concern about the

Vagueness of “Navigable Waters” ............ 15

v

B.

This Court’s Recent Decision in

Sessions v. Dimaya Suggests

That “Navigable Waters” Is

Void for Vagueness ................................... 18

C.

The Rapanos Plurality Raises

Similar Void for Vagueness Concerns ..... 21

II.

THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT

THE PETITION TO REVISIT ITS

FRACTURED RAPANOS DECISION

AND REPLACE IT WITH A CLEAR

AND AUTHORITATIVE INTERPRETATION

OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT .................... 23

A.

The Court Should Revisit Rapanos

To Give the Act a Constitutionally

Adequate Interpretation.......................... 23

B.

The Court Should Use This Case To

Cut Through the Thicket of Ongoing

Regulatory and Litigation Chaos Over

the Scope of “Navigable Waters” .............. 24

C.

The Court Should Grant the Petition

To Resolve the Circuit Splits Over

Which (If Either) Opinion in Rapanos

Provides the Controlling Rule of Law ...... 28

III. THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT

THE PETITION TO RESOLVE A

CIRCUIT SPLIT ON REVIEWABILITY

OF ORDERS DENYING MOTIONS

FOR ACQUITTAL IN A FIRST TRIAL

ENDING IN MISTRIAL, FOLLOWED BY

CONVICTION IN A SECOND TRIAL .......... 30

vi

A.

The Circuits Are Split

on This Question ...................................... 31

1. The Eleventh Circuit Allows

Post-Judgment Review of

Sufficiency Rulings................................... 31

2. Multiple Circuits Prohibit

Post-Judgment Review of

Sufficiency Rulings ................................... 33

B.

This Issue Is Both Recurring

and Important .......................................... 35

1. The Issue Arises Often ............................. 35

2. The Issue Is Important to the

Administration of Justice ........................ 36

CONCLUSION.......................................................... 37

APPENDIX

A.

Ninth Circuit Opinion,

Filed Nov. 27, 2017 .......................................A-1

B.

Ninth Circuit Order Denying Rehearing,

Filed July 10, 2018 ........................................B-1

C.

Amended Judgment,

Filed July 26, 2016 ........................................C-1

D.

Transcript of Sentencing,

Filed July 20, 2016 ...................................... D-1

E.

District Court Order Denying Motion for

Acquittal, Filed May 23, 2016 ......................E-1

vii

F.

Verdict,

Filed April 7, 2016......................................... F-1

G.

Transcript of 2016 Jury Trial ...................... G-1

H.

Opinion and Order on Motion for Acquittal,

Filed Nov. 30, 2015 ...................................... H-1

I.

Exhibit 15 ....................................................... I-1

J.

Exhibit 17 ...................................................... J-1

K.

Exhibit 23a ................................................... K-1

viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Abney v. United States,

431 U.S. 651 (1977) ............................................... 34

Cape Fear River Watch, Inc. v. Duke Energy Progress,

Inc., 25 F. Supp. 3d 798 (E.D. N.C., 2014) ............. 6

Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,

467 U.S. 837 (1984) ............................................... 27

Citizens for Peace in Space v. City of Colorado

Springs, 477 F.3d 1212 (10th Cir. 2007) ................ 9

Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,

337 U.S. 541 (1949) ............................................... 32

Connally v. General Construction Co.,

269 U.S. 385 (1926) ............................................... 15

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling

Corp., 204 F.3d 149 (4th Cir. 2000) ........................ 3

Georgia v. Pruitt,

326 F. Supp. 3d 1356 (S.D. Ga. 2018)................... 25

Gibson v. American Cyanamid. Co.,

760 F.3d 600 (7th Cir. 2014) ............................. 7, 29

Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay

Foundation, Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987) ...................... 3

Hawkes Co., Inc. v. United States Army Corps of

Engineers, 782 F.3d 994 (8th Cir. 2015) ............... 16

Hughes v. United States,

138 S. Ct. 1765 (2018) ........................................... 28

In re EPA,

803 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 2015) ................................. 25

ix

In re United States Department of Defense,

713 Fed. Appx. 489 (6th Cir. 2018) ....................... 25

Johnson v. United States,

135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) ..................................... 19, 21

King v. Palmer,

950 F.2d 771 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ........................... 7, 29

Liparota v. United States,

471 U.S. 419 (1985) ................................... 15, 23, 24

Marks v. United States,

430 U.S. 188 (1977) ........................................passim

National Association of Manufacturers

v. Department of Defense,

138 S. Ct. 617(2018) .................................... 7, 16, 25

North Dakota v. EPA,

127 F. Supp. 3d 1047 (D.N.D. 2015) ..................... 25

Northern California River Watch v. City of

Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2007) ............ 18

NRDC v. Calloway,

392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975) .......................... 3, 4

Ohio v. McGill,

No. 99CA25, 2000 WL 1803650,

(Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 8, 2000).................................. 35

Orchard Hill Building Company v. Army Corps,

893 F.3d 1017 (7th Cir. 2018) ......................... 17, 21

People v. Doyle,

765 N.E.2d 85 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) ........................ 35

Rapanos v. United States,

547 U.S. 715 (2006) ........................................passim

x

Richardson v. United States,

468 U.S. 317 (1984) ........................................passim

Sackett v. EPA,

566 U.S. 120 (2012) ......................................... 15, 16

Sessions v. Dimaya,

138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018) ....................................passim

Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v.

United States Army Corps of Engineers,

531 U.S. 159 (2001) ....................................... 4, 6, 21

South Carolina Coastal Conservation League v.

Pruitt, 318 F. Supp. 3d 959 (D.S.C. 2018) ............ 26

Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action,

480 U.S. 370 (1987) ............................................... 33

Texas v. EPA,

No. 3:15-CV-00162, 2018 WL 4518230,

(S.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2018) ...................................... 25

The Daniel Ball,

77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870) .................................. 3

United States Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes

Co., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1807 (2016)................ 15, 16, 21

United States v. Achobe,

560 F.3d 259 (5th Cir. 2008) ........................... 30, 33

United States v. Bailey,

571 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2009) ................................. 28

United States v. Bodey,

607 F.2d 265 (9th Cir. 1979) ................................. 35

United States v. Coleman,

862 F.2d 455 (3d Cir. 1988)............................. 30, 33

United States v. Cooper,

733 F.2d 91 (11th Cir. 1984) ................................. 32

xi

United States v. Cundiff,

555 F.3d 200 (6th Cir. 2009) ................................. 28

United States v. Donovan,

661 F.3d 174 (3rd Cir. 2011) ................................. 29

United States v. Gavin,

No. 09-15518, 2010 WL 3373973

(11th Cir. Aug. 27, 2010) ....................................... 32

United States v. Gulledge,

739 F.2d 582 (11th Cir. 1984) ......................... 30, 31

United States v. Johnson,

467 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2006)................................ 6, 28

United States v. Julien,

318 F.3d 316 (1st Cir. 2003)............................ 30, 33

United States v. Lanier,

520 U.S. 259 (1997) ............................. 14, 15, 23, 24

United States v. Lucero,

No. 16-cr-00107-HSG-1, 2017 WL 9534005

(N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2017) ...................................... 17

United States v. Martinez,

No. 11-12131, 2013 WL 563158

(11th Cir. Feb. 15, 2013) ................................. 30, 32

United States v. Perea-Rey,

680 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2012) ................................. 9

United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,

474 U.S. 121 (1985) ........................................... 4, 21

United States v. Robertson,

875 F.3d 1281 (9th Cir. 2017) ........................passim

United States v. Robison,

505 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2007) ......................... 6, 28

xii

United States v. Rodriguez,

No. 1:CR 09-279-BLW, 2011 WL 1458231

(D. Idaho Apr. 15, 2011) ........................................ 17

United States v. Taylor,

176 F.3d 331 (6th Cir. 1999) ................................. 32

United States v. Willis,

02 F.3d 1078 (10th Cir. 1996) ......................... 30, 33

Yeager v. United States,

557 U.S. 110 (2009) ............................................... 34

Statutes

18 U.S.C. § 1361 ........................................................ 10

18 U.S.C. § 16(b) ............................................ 18, 20-21

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) ..................................................... 1

28 U.S.C. § 1291 ........................................................ 32

33 U.S.C. § 1251, et seq. .............................................. 2

33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) ..................................................... 2

33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2)(A) .......................................... 10

33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) ................................................... 2

33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) ..................................................... 2

Constitution

U.S. Const., amend. V................................................. 2

Federal Regulations

33 C.F.R. §328.3(a)(1) (2004) ...................................... 4

33 C.F.R. §328.3(a)(3) (2004) ...................................... 4

33 C.F.R. §328.3(a)(5) (2004) ...................................... 4

xiii

33 C.F.R. §328.3(a)(7) (2004) ...................................... 4

33 C.F.R. §328.3(c) (2004)........................................... 4

Federal Register

39 Fed. Reg. 12115 (Apr. 3, 1974) .............................. 3

42 Fed. Reg. 37122 (July 19, 1977) ............................ 4

51 Fed. Reg. 41206 (Nov. 13, 1986) ............................ 4

65 Fed. Reg. 12818 (Mar. 9, 2000).............................. 4

Rules

Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 29............................................... 11

Other Authorities

EPA,

Classification and Types of Wetlands,

https://www.epa.gov/wetlands/classification

-and-types-wetlands #marshes

(last updated July 5, 2018) ................................... 20

Hannaford-Agor, Paula L., et al.,

Are Hung Juries a Problem?

National Center for State Courts

(Sept. 30, 2002) ...................................................... 35

Sierra Club,

Trump & Pruitt Repeal the

2015 Clean Water Rule, (June 28, 2017),

https://www.sierraclub.org/ohio/blog/

2017/06/trump-pruitt-repeal-2015-clean-waterrule. ........................................................................ 26

Websters New Int’l Dictionary,

2d ed. 1954 ......................................................... 5, 22

1

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Joseph David Robertson respectfully petitions

this Court for a writ of certiorari to review the

judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Ninth Circuit.

OPINIONS BELOW

The Ninth Circuit’s opinion is published at

United States v. Robertson, 875 F.3d 1281 (9th Cir.

2017), and reproduced in the Appendix at A-1. The

Ninth Circuit’s unpublished order denying rehearing

and rehearing en banc is reproduced in the Appendix

at B-1. The district court’s unpublished Amended

Judgment is reproduced in the Appendix at C-1.

JURISDICTION

The district court entered the Amended

Judgment on July 26, 2016. Petitioner timely

appealed to the Ninth Circuit, whose opinion was

entered on November 27, 2017. Petitioner timely

sought rehearing and rehearing en banc, which the

Ninth Circuit denied on July 10, 2018. On

July 30, 2018, Associate Justice Kennedy granted

Petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file this

petition for writ of certiorari to and including

November 7, 2018. This Court has jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

2

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS AT ISSUE

The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of

the United States provides that “[n]o person shall . . .

be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due

process of law;” U.S. Const. amend. V.

The Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251, et seq.,

provides as follows:

“Except in compliance with . . . section . . . 1344

of this title, the discharge of any pollutant by any

person shall be unlawful.” 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).

“The term “discharge of a pollutant” . . . means

. . . any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters

from any point source,” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12).

“The term “navigable waters” means the waters

of the United States, including the territorial seas.”

33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Legal Background: The Confusing

Legacy of Rapanos v. United States

The Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251, et seq.,

regulates discharges of pollutants from point sources

to “navigable waters.” 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a), § 1362(12).

The Act defines “navigable waters” as “waters of the

United States, including the territorial seas.”

33 U.S.C. § 1362(7). Nonexempt discharges require a

permit from either the Environmental Protection

Agency (EPA) or U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Army

Corps). The permitting regime is time-consuming,

3

expensive, and can require significant changes to the

applicant’s intended operations. See Rapanos v.

United States, 547 U.S. 715, 721 (2006).

A person engaged in unpermitted, nonexempt

discharges or permit violations faces administrative

cease-and-desist

and

compliance

orders,

administrative penalties, civil actions for monetary

civil penalties and injunctive relief, and criminal

prosecution. See generally, Gwaltney of Smithfield,

Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 484 U.S. 49,

52-53 (1987). Liability for violation of the Act is strict,

without regard to the responsible party’s intent or

knowledge. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper

Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 151 (4th Cir. 2000). The

burdens of the permitting regime, and the significance

of the criminal penalties for violating it, make it

critically important that the regulated public know

what is meant by “navigable waters.”

In 1974, EPA and the Army Corps adopted

regulations defining “waters of the United States”

consistently with this Court’s long-standing definition

of the term “navigable waters of the United States,”

appearing in predecessor statutes, as interstate

waters that are navigable in fact or readily susceptible

of being rendered so. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 723 (citing

The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870),

and 39 Fed. Reg. 12115, 12119 (Apr. 3, 1974)). In 1975,

the District Court for the District of Columbia

enjoined this definition as too narrow. Rather than

appealing that decision, the agencies rewrote their

regulations more broadly. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 724

(citing NRDC v. Calloway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686

(D.D.C. 1975)). The new regulations purported to

extend the scope of “navigable waters” to the outer

4

limits of Congress’ commerce power. Id. (citing 42 Fed.

Reg. 37122, 37144 n.2 (July 19,1977)).

By 1986, the agencies had stretched the term

“navigable waters” to include interstate waters,

intrastate waters with various relationships to

interstate or foreign commerce, tributaries of such

waters, and wetlands adjacent to (defined as

bordering, contiguous, or neighboring) such

tributaries and other waters. Id. at 724 (citing

33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(1), (a)(3), (a)(5), (a)(7), and

§328.3(c) (2004)). The agencies also added isolated

waters used by migratory birds. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at

724 (citing 51 Fed. Reg. 41206, 41217 (Nov. 13, 1986).

By 2000, the agencies had swept “ephemeral streams”

and “drainage ditches” with an ordinary high water

mark within the ambit of “tributaries.” Id. at 725

(citing 65 Fed. Reg. 12818, 12823 (Mar. 9, 2000)).

In United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes,

Inc., this Court upheld the regulation of nonnavigable

wetlands as “navigable waters” as long as the

wetlands “actually abut on” traditional navigable

waters so closely that it is difficult to tell where one

ends and the other begins. 474 U.S. 121, 135 (1985),

cited in Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 724-25. Then in Solid

Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United

States Army Corps of Engineers (SWANNC), this

Court struck down the Migratory Bird Rule, holding

that the Act did not extend to “nonnavigable, isolated,

intrastate waters.” 531 U.S. 159, 171 (2001), cited in

Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 726.

In Rapanos, this Court considered the agency

regulations defining tributaries and adjacent

wetlands as “navigable waters” and invalidated them

for exceeding the scope of the Act. 547 U.S. at 728, id.

5

at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Despite five Justices

agreeing that the regulations exceeded the agencies’

authority, they did not agree why.

A plurality of four Justices would have held

that nonnavigable tributaries are only “navigable

waters” if they are “relatively permanent, standing or

continuously flowing bodies of water “forming

geographic features” that are described in ordinary

parlance as “streams[,] . . . oceans, rivers, [and] lakes.”

547 U.S. at 739 (citing Webster’s New Int’l Dictionary

2882 (2d ed. 1954). The plurality based this view on a

textual analysis of the Act informed by its federalism

purpose and relied on the Clear Statement Rule, both

as to federal usurpation of local land use authority

and Congress’ exercise of its Commerce Clause power

to its furthest limit. 547 U.S. at 738. As to wetlands,

the plurality wrote that “navigable waters” includes

only those wetlands abutting actually navigable

waters or covered tributaries to the degree that, as in

Riverside Bayview, it was doubtful where the wetland

ends and the abutted waterway begins. Id. at 742.

Writing only for himself, Justice Kennedy

concurred in the judgment and that the agency

regulations including all tributaries and adjacent

wetlands were overbroad. Id. at 759 (Kennedy, J.,

concurring). But he read “navigable waters” much

more broadly than did the plurality, concluding that

the term also encompassed intermittent tributaries,

id. at 770, and wetlands that do not abut covered

tributaries but which nonetheless have a significant

nexus, determined alone or in combination with

others “in the region,” with actually navigable waters,

determined on a case-by-case basis according to

6

physical, chemical, and biological factors, id. at 77375.

The Chief Justice joined the plurality, but also

concurred to lament the agencies’ failure to issue valid

new regulations after the SWANCC decision, and that

due to the lack of a majority opinion in the case, “lower

courts and regulated entities will now have to feel

their way on a case-by-case basis.” 547 U.S. at 758

(Roberts, C.J., concurring) (citing Marks v. United

States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977)).

Congress took the same action to clarify

“navigable waters” after Rapanos as it did following

SWANCC: nothing. The agencies adopted informal

guidance in 2008, which used the reasoning of both

the plurality and the concurrence as parallel bases for

identifying “navigable waters.” See Cape Fear River

Watch, Inc. v. Duke Energy Progress, Inc., 25 F. Supp.

3d 798, 808 (E.D.N.C. 2014) (discussing Rapanos

Guidance).

The circuit courts are split on the application of

Rapanos. Some hold under Marks that only the

concurrence is binding. Others hold that jurisdiction

may be proven under either the plurality or the

concurrence. Compare United States v. Johnson, 467

F.3d 56, 66 (1st Cir. 2006) (jurisdiction under plurality

and concurrence), with United States v. Robison, 505

F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2007) (jurisdiction under

concurrence only).

Further, the decision below directly splits with

the Seventh and DC Circuits on the question of

whether a circuit court may consider a dissent in a

fractured decision of this Court in applying Marks.

Compare United States v. Robertson, 875 F.3d 1281,

7

1291 (9th Cir. 2017) (dissent in Rapanos combined

with concurrence to conclude that concurrence

controls), with King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 783 (D.C.

Cir. 1991) (no use of dissent in Marks analysis); accord

Gibson v. American Cyanamid. Co., 760 F.3d 600, 622

(7th Cir. 2014) (Marks bars use of dissents in applying

Rapanos).

As the district court stated during Robertson’s

sentencing below, “there are significant legal

questions in the Supreme Court itself about how to

define ‘waters of the United States.’” Appendix D-3.

In 2015, the agencies finalized a new

regulation, once again broadly defining “navigable

waters,” based principally on Justice Kennedy’s

concurring Rapanos opinion. This rulemaking was

met with multiple lawsuits in both the federal district

and circuit courts. See generally, National Association

of Manufacturers v. Department of Defense, 138 S. Ct.

617, 625-27 (2018) (NAM). In NAM, this Court held

that the district rather than circuit courts have

jurisdiction over these lawsuits. Id. at 624.

Meanwhile, the current administration has

announced its intent to repeal the 2015 Rule and

adopt a new regulatory definition of “navigable

waters,” this time based on the Rapanos plurality

instead of the concurrence. See www.epa.gov/wotusrule/rulemaking-process. It remains unclear how soon

this new regulation will be finalized.

One thing does appear clearly. As long as the

fractured Rapanos decision stands, the agencies will

continue to assert jurisdiction under either or both

opinions, based on political and other considerations,

with the now real prospect that succeeding

8

administrations will toggle the regulatory definition

from plurality to concurrence and back to suit each

other’s electoral constituency.

In all of this, “regulated entities” (including

Petitioner Robertson) remain left to feel their way on

a case-by-case basis, under a statute that is

“hopelessly indeterminate,” interpreted disparately

by the members of this Court and the lower courts,

and administered by agencies that continue to assert

their jurisdiction to the very outward boundaries of

watersheds, over minute channels across which many

“regulated entities” would step without noticing.

This case is about one of these waters.

Facts: A Foot-Wide Channel, at the Top

of the Watershed, More Than 40 Miles

from an Actually Navigable River

The “navigable water” at issue in this case is an

unnamed channel, a foot or so wide and a foot or so

deep, running through a clearing in the woods in

Montana (the Pond Site), carrying two or three garden

hoses worth of flow. Appendix G-2; G-5; G-7-8; K-1.

The Pond Site is more than 40 miles distant from the

nearest actually navigable water body, the Jefferson

River. The unnamed channel flows downhill

discontinuously about half a mile to drain into

Cataract Creek, Appendix I-1, which then flows a

further two miles to meet the Boulder River near

Basin, Montana. From Basin, the Boulder River flows

roughly 40 miles, first east alongside Interstate 15 to

Boulder, Montana, and thence south alongside state

9

highway 69 to meet the Jefferson River near Cardwell,

Montana. Appendix J-1. 1

Forty-plus miles upstream from the Jefferson

River is almost as far as one can follow the Boulder

River, Cataract Creek, and then the unnamed channel

uphill into the woods before running out of water

entirely. There is almost no regular channel

associated with flow uphill of the Pond Site, which

itself is a mere 2,100 feet from the very top of the

watershed. Appendix G-12-15.

The unnamed channel forms on or just below a

patented mining claim called the White Pine Lode. It

then crosses an unpatented mining claim called the

Mohawk Lode, before entering another patented

mining claim called the Manhattan Lode and then

finding its way to Cataract Creek. The White Pine,

Mohawk, and Manhattan Lodes sit just inside the

boundary of the Beaverhead-Deerlodge National

Forest. Appendix D-3-4; I-1 (Exhibit 15 showing

patented claims in dark shading, with the Pond Site

indicated by blue dot, and Forest boundary in dark

red).

Petitioner Joe Robertson is an elderly Navy

veteran. He owns the White Pine Lode and has lived

there with his wife Carri for many years. They also

1 This Court can

take judicial notice of the distance from the

confluence of Cataract Creek with the Boulder River to its

confluence with the Jefferson River as reflected in online

mapping websites and the admitted exhibits in this case. United

States v. Perea-Rey, 680 F.3d 1179, 1182 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012)

(taking judicial notice of Google map distance determination)

(citing Citizens for Peace in Space v. City of Colorado Springs,

477 F.3d 1212, 1218 n.2 (10th Cir. 2007) (same, using different

mapping website)).

10

owned the Manhattan Lode, but lost it in a tax sale in

2013. Robertson has also, at various times, owned the

mineral rights associated with the Mohawk

unpatented mining claim that sits between the White

Pine and Manhattan Lodes. Appendix D-3-5.

The Robertsons ran a fire fighting support

truck business until recently. Living deep in the

woods in an increasingly fire-prone landscape, they

were concerned about their safety and the

vulnerability of their property. Appendix G-15-16. In

2013 and 2014, Joe Robertson dug a series of small

water supply ponds in and about the unnamed

channel at the Pond Site, with a view to being well

prepared should fire strike near his home. Some of the

ponds sit on the Manhattan Lode, and the government

charges that others sit on the Mohawk. Appendix G15-17.

Robertson dug the ponds without approval from

the Forest Service to disturb the surface estate of the

Mohawk Lode, and without permission from the Army

Corps under the Clean Water Act.

Proceedings Below: Criminal Prosecution of

Petitioner Robertson for Digging Ponds

in the Foot-Wide Unnamed Channel

On May 22, 2015, the government indicted

Robertson charging him with two counts of violating

the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2)(A)

(Counts I and III) and one count alleging willful

destruction of government property under 18 U.S.C.

§ 1361 (Count II). Appendix A-4-5. The district court

denied several pretrial motions to dismiss or clarify

the indictment, and the trial commenced on October

5, 2015. Appendix A-5. On October 6, Robertson once

11

again moved to dismiss Counts I and III, arguing that

the current law defining “waters of the United States”

violates due process on vagueness grounds because it

is impossible to determine with any accuracy what

constitutes a violation of the Clean Water Act.

Robertson, 875 F.3d at 1292. The district court

ultimately denied the motion. Appendix A-5, H-2.

Robertson’s trial lasted four days. As to Counts

I and III, the government offered no flow studies for

the unnamed channel, and instead focused on an

alleged ordinary high water mark of the channel.

Appendix H-7. For Count II, the government relied

primarily on cadastral maps to prove that

Mr. Robertson’s work occurred on the unpatented

Mohawk Lode rather than the privately owned White

Pine or Manhattan Lodes. Appendix H-11. The jury

hung on all three counts. Appendix A-5, H-2.

Robertson moved for a judgment of acquittal

under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, during

trial and before the case was submitted to the jury, for

insufficiency of evidence that the unnamed channel is

“navigable waters” and that any of the ponds were

located on the unpatented White Pine Lode. Appendix

A-5, H-2. After the jury failed to return a verdict and

the judge declared mistrial, Robertson once again

moved for judgment of acquittal. Appendix A-5, H-2.

The district court judge denied all motions and reset

the trial. Appendix H-12.

The second trial began on April 4, 2016.

Appendix A-5, E-1. At the second trial, the

government significantly bolstered its evidence and

changed its litigation strategy. For Counts I and III,

the government introduced evidence from a new site

investigation made after the first trial, in November

12

of 2015, Appendix E-4, and provided previously

undeveloped evidence of the flow of the channel,

Appendix E-4. For Count II, the government primarily

relied on Forest Service boundary surveys to prove

that Robertson’s work occurred on the White Pine

Lode, rather than the cadastral maps used in the first

trial. Appendix E-2. On April 7, the jury found

Robertson guilty on all counts. Appendix E-1, F-1-2.

At the second trial, Robertson renewed his

motion to dismiss and made new motions for a

judgment of acquittal. Appendix E-1. After the jury

returned its verdict but before sentencing, Robertson

filed a second motion to dismiss Counts I and III.

Appendix A-5, D-2. Based on an intervening en banc

decision from the Ninth Circuit, the second motion to

dismiss argued that Justice Kennedy’s opinion was

not the controlling opinion of Rapanos. Appendix A-13,

A-24, D-2. While the district court recognized the

seriousness of the legal question of which Rapanos

opinion controls, the court ultimately denied the

second motion to dismiss. Appendix A-5, D-2-3. The

judge sentenced Mr. Robertson to 18 months in prison

for each of the three counts, one year of supervised

release for each of Counts I and III, and three years of

supervised release for Count II. In addition, the judge

sentenced Robertson to pay $129,933.50 in restitution

to the government. Appendix C-4, 10. All sentences

were to run concurrently. Id. 2

Robertson timely appealed his conviction to the

Ninth Circuit. He argued that (1) the Rapanos

concurrence is not the controlling opinion in that

Robertson completed his term of imprisonment on or about

December 5, 2017, and is presently under supervised release and

making payments on his restitution obligation.

2

13

decision, (2) the term “waters of the United States” is

void for vagueness, and (3) the trial court should have

granted his motions for judgment of acquittal from the

first trial. Appendix A-6. Applying Marks, the Ninth

Circuit held that Justice Kennedy’s Rapanos

concurrence is the controlling opinion and rejected

Robertson’s due process vagueness argument, holding

that at the time of conviction a prior Ninth Circuit

decision gave reasonable warning that the Clean

Water Act applied. Appendix A-17-19. Finally, the

court below, citing Richardson v. United States, 468

U.S. 317 (1984), determined that it could not review

Robertson’s motions for acquittal from his first trial.

Appendix A-22.

On July 30, 2018, Justice Kennedy granted

Mr. Robertson’s application to extend the time to file

this petition. See Supreme Court docket # 18A108. He

now submits this petition, requesting that this Court

grant certiorari to review the decision of the Ninth

Circuit.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The meaning of “navigable waters” under the

Clean Water Act is unfinished business; this case

offers an ideal vehicle to rectify that situation. Recent

decisions holding other criminal statutes void for

vagueness suggest that any interpretation of the Act

as covering substantially more than traditionally

navigable waters is void for vagueness. Revisiting

Rapanos would give this Court an immediate

opportunity to clearly and authoritatively interpret

14

the Act, if it can be interpreted constitutionally, in a

way that will provide fair notice to the public and

proper direction to the agencies in their ongoing (and

seemingly perpetual) rulemaking efforts. At the very

least, the Court should direct the lower courts on the

question of which, if either, of the opinions supporting

the judgment in Rapanos is controlling.

The Court should also grant the petition to

resolve a circuit split on whether a defendant may

appeal the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal

at a first trial that ends in mistrial and is followed by

conviction at a second trial. This is a significant

question of criminal procedure that divides the lower

federal and state courts. In those circuits and states

following the decision below, the government is given

an unjust advantage that vitiates the presumption of

innocence and the beyond reasonable doubt standard

of proof: it may retry a defendant after failing to meet

its burden of proof at an initial trial, with no appellate

review of its failure to meet the burden in the first

trial.

ARGUMENT

I

THE COURT SHOULD GRANT THE

PETITION TO DETERMINE WHETHER

THE CLEAN WATER ACT TERM “NAVIGABLE

WATERS” IS VOID FOR VAGUENESS

The Due Process Clause requires that criminal

statutes afford adequate notice of what they proscribe

to those who must comply. United States v. Lanier,

520 U.S. 259, 265-67 (1997) (discussing doctrine,

reciting elements, and citing sources). The three

related considerations of constitutionally fair notice

15

for criminal statutes include: (1) adequate specificity,

such that people “of common intelligence” need not

“guess at its meaning” and will not “differ as to its

application”; (2) application of the rule of lenity to

limit the interpretation of criminal statutes to activity

clearly covered; and (3) exclusion of criminal liability

where a judicial “gloss” that clarifies the law is applied

for the first time. Lanier, 520 U.S. at 266 (quoting

Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385,

391 (1926), and Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S.

419, 427 (1985)).

A.

Members of This Court, and Lower Court

Judges, Have Expressed Concern about

the Vagueness of “Navigable Waters”

Justice Alito has described the phrases

“navigable waters” and “waters of the United States”

in terms that clearly call into question whether they

are void for vagueness under the Due Process Clause:

“The reach of the Clean Water Act is notoriously

unclear.” Sackett v. EPA, 566 U.S. 120, 132 (2012)

(Alito, J., concurring). Further, “[r]eal relief requires

Congress to do what it should have done in the first

place, provide a reasonably clear rule regarding the

reach of the Clean Water Act.” Id. at 133. “Congress

did not define what it meant by “the waters of the

United States”; the phrase was not a term of art with

a known meaning; and the words themselves are

hopelessly indeterminate.” Id. (emphasis added).

Other members of this Court appear to have

taken up the same concern. Hawkes, 136 S. Ct. at 1816

(Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., concurring) (citing

Sackett, 566 U.S. at 130-131 (Alito, J., concurring)); id.

at 1812 (“It is often difficult to determine whether a

particular piece of property contains waters of the

16

United States.”); id. at 1816-17 (Kennedy, Alito,

Thomas, JJ., concurring) (“[T]he reach and systemic

consequences of the Clean Water Act remain a cause

for concern.”); id. at 1816 (citing Sackett, 566 U.S. at

132 (Alito, J., concurring)); see NAM, 138 S. Ct. at 625

(“In decades past, the EPA and the Corps . . . have

struggled to define and apply that statutory term.”).

During oral argument in Army Corps of

Engineers v. Hawkes, Justice Kennedy went so far as

to pose the following question:

Well, I think—I think underlying Justice

Kagan’s question is that the Clean Water

Act is unique in both being quite vague

in its reach, arguably unconstitutionally

vague, and certainly harsh in the civil

and criminal sanctions it puts into

practice. What’s the closest analogous

statute that give the affected party so

little guidance at the front end? 3

Circuit court judges have also expressed

concern about the difficulty of determining whether a

given property contains “navigable waters.” See

Hawkes Co., Inc. v. United States Army Corps of

Engineers, 782 F.3d 994, 1003 (8th Cir. 2015) (Kelly,

J., concurring) (“[T]he Court in Sackett was concerned

with just how difficult and confusing it can be for a

landowner to predict whether or not his or her land

falls within CWA jurisdiction . . . . This is a unique

aspect of the CWA; most laws do not require the hiring

of expert consultants to determine if they even apply

3 Transcript of Oral Argument at 18:11-19, Hawkes, 136 S. Ct.

1807, available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_argument

s/argument_transcripts/2015/15-290_j5fl.pdf.

17

to your property.”); Orchard Hill Building Company

v. Army Corps, 893 F.3d 1017, 1025 (7th Cir. 2018)

(“Justice Kennedy did not define ‘similarly situated’—

a broad and ambiguous term . . . .”).

By contrast, only a handful of district courts

have addressed this question and concluded that the

Act affords constitutionally adequate notice under the

Due Process Clause. United States v. Lucero, No. 16cr-00107-HSG-1, 2017 WL 9534005 (N.D. Cal.

Nov. 14, 2017); United States v. Rodriguez, No. 1:CR09-279-BLW, 2011 WL 1458231 (D. Idaho Apr. 15,

2011).

Even the judges of the Ninth Circuit below

appeared concerned about this difficulty. During oral

argument, Judge McKeown asked:

It kind of goes back to the basic question

of notice. If you can’t even figure out

which parts of the Venn Diagram fit

together amongst all these lawyers and

judges, how does a regular citizen figure

it out?

Judge Gould followed with:

I just have the problem in a criminal case

as to whether with that sort of

convoluted analysis under the Marks

theory and sufficiently complex [sic] that

our court took an en banc in Davis to

have another run at it, whether a citizen

18

is supposed to know that, and go to

prison if they don’t know that. 4

And yet the Ninth Circuit concluded in its

decision below that “navigable waters” is not void for

vagueness based on the non sequitur that it had

previously held in Northern California River Watch v.

City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2007), that

Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion was the holding

of Rapanos under Marks. Appendix A-20. City of

Healdsburg may have established the law of the

circuit on how to apply to Rapanos, but deciding which

opinion is the holding under Marks is not directly

germane to whether the Act itself (as interpreted by a

single Justice of this Court or otherwise) is void for

vagueness. Put another way, Justice Kennedy’s

interpretation of the Act may, for the sake of

argument, be the controlling opinion of this Court, but

that does not answer whether that (or any other)

interpretation of the Act is void for vagueness.

B.

This Court’s Recent Decision in Sessions

v. Dimaya Suggests That “Navigable

Waters” Is Void for Vagueness

Sessions v. Dimaya held that 18 U.S.C. § 16(b),

defining “crime of violence” for purposes of the

Immigration and Nationality Act, is void for

vagueness. 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1210 (2018). The Court’s

analysis rested on the statute’s use of two terms: “by

its nature” (as applied to the noun “felony”) and

“substantial risk” (that physical force would be used

in committing the crime). Both terms require an

4 Available at https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_video.

php?pk_vid=0000012065, at 23:55-24:12 (McKeown, J.) and

27:13-42 (Gould, J.).

19

interpreting court to decide, without any standards,

what crimes fall within the definition. Id. at 1213-14.

Relying heavily on its prior decision in Johnson v.

United States, the Court noted that applying the “by

its nature” provision requires a court to determine the

“idealized ordinary case” of a given offense. 138 S. Ct.

1204, 1214 (2018) (quoting Johnson v. United States,

135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557 (2015)). That exercise yields no

clear answer; it depends entirely on a given judge’s

opinion of what the essential nature—or platonic

form—of a given crime involves. 138 S. Ct. at 1214; id.

at 1231-32 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). Secondly, this

indeterminacy is compounded by the requirement

that the judge then determine whether the platonic

form of a crime poses some threshold level of risk—a

“substantial risk”—of violence. Id. at 1214. The

combination of the need to posit an idealized version

of a crime with the question whether the idealized

form poses a threshold risk level crosses the line into

unconstitutional vagueness. Id. (quoting Johnson, 135

S. Ct. at 2561).

The same analytical approach is applicable to

the Rapanos concurrence. As with the statute struck

down in Dimaya, the Rapanos concurrence interprets

“navigable waters” to require two interacting

determinations, one involving an idealized or

otherwise undefinable condition (“wetlands . . . in

combination with similarly situated lands in the

region”), and the second overlaying a threshold

relationship (“significantly affects” traditionally

navigable waters).” 547 U.S. at 780 (Kennedy, J.,

concurring).

The “similarly situated within the region”

provision requires a judge to make two idealized

20

determinations: what two or more wetlands are

“similarly situated” to each other, and what is “the

region” within which those wetlands’ situation must

be similar? As interpreted by Justice Kennedy,

“navigable waters” offers no guidance to answer either

of these questions. Id. (“wetlands, either alone or in

combination with similarly situated lands in the

region”). Wetlands can be similar in any number of

ways: location, size, plant communities, length of

inundation, type of connection to other features,

animal communities that use or rely on them, soil

types, etc. 5 They may, at the same time, be similar in

some of these aspects and dissimilar in others. How is

a judge (or regulated party, agency staff,

administrative law judge, or citizen suit plaintiff or

defendant) to determine whether any two or more

wetlands are similarly situated to the requisite

degree? Nor is the platonic form of “the region” any

more determinate. How large is a region? And how are

its borders defined? If by watershed, how large a part

of the watershed? The portion in which the similarly

situated wetlands appear, or the entire watershed of

the applicable traditionally navigable water? The

larger the region (whether defined by a watershed or

some other geographic concept), the more

indeterminate “similarly situated” becomes.

In this respect, Justice Kennedy’s “similarly

situated within the region” interpretation of

“navigable waters” is even less knowable for the

regulated citizen or enforcement personnel than the

“ordinary case” of any given crime under 18 U.S.C.

See, e.g., EPA, Classification and Types of Wetlands,

https://www.epa.gov/wetlands/classification-and-types-wetlands

#marshes (last updated July 5, 2018).

5

21

§ 16(b). Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” requires

two abstract determinations (“similarly situated” and

“the region”) that entirely depend upon the subjective

judgment of the reviewing court or enforcing agency

staff, whereas the “ordinary case” of a crime only

requires one such imaginative abstraction. See

Orchard Hill Building Company, 893 F.3d at 1025

(“Justice Kennedy did not define ‘similarly situated’—

a broad and ambiguous term . . . .”).

And exactly as in Dimaya and Johnson, this

abstracted concept of similarly situated wetlands in a

region is overlaid by an equally problematic

significance threshold: a significant nexus with

downstream traditionally navigable waters. See

Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1215-16. The combination of the

idealized “similarly situated within the region”

wetland combination that also “significantly affects”

downstream, boat-floating, commerce-supporting

rivers and lakes renders the concurrence’s reading of

“navigable waters” hopelessly vague and far short of

constitutional muster, as Justice Kennedy indeed

intimated during the Hawkes oral argument.

C.

The Rapanos Plurality Raises

Similar Void for Vagueness Concerns

Riverside Bayview holds that non navigable

wetlands which abut navigable waters, such that the

end of one and the beginning of the other are not easy

to distinguish, may be regulated under the Act. 474

U.S. at 132. SWANCC holds that isolated ponds

exceed the scope of the Act and may not be regulated

under it. 531 U.S. at 167. Somewhere between these

two poles, regulated parties must be able to determine

which waters are regulated and which are not. The

Rapanos

plurality

expressly

disclaimed

a

22

comprehensive answer to this question. Rapanos, 547

U.S. at 731 (“We need not decide the precise extent to

which the qualifiers ‘navigable’ and ‘of the United

States’ restrict the coverage of the Act.”).

The Rapanos plurality defines covered

tributaries based on the dictionary definition of

“waters” in Webster’s New International Dictionary.

547 U.S. at 732. Among the features the plurality

found to be included as “waters” are “streams.” Id. at

733. The plurality stated the rule of law based on this

analysis as limiting “navigable waters” to, inter alia,

“relatively permanent, . . . continuously flowing bodies

of water forming geographic features [] described in

ordinary parlance as streams . . . .” Id. at 739 (citing

Webster’s Second) (internal quotation marks omitted

and emphasis added). The plurality establishes no

lower bound on the size of “stream” included within its

definition, unless the expression “geographic features

described in ordinary parlance” provides that

boundary. Id.

The Rapanos plurality also rejects an

interpretation of the Act that would extend its

coverage in a way that tests the limits of Congress’

authority under the Commerce Clause or interferes

with local matters like land use, under the Clear

Statement Rule. 547 U.S. at 737-38.

The clear application of this analysis is that

while the plurality considers certain nonnavigable

tributaries to be covered by the Act, this

interpretation does not encompass every last “stream”

no matter how small or far from an actually navigable

river or lake. A line clearly sits somewhere, but cannot

be discerned from the plurality’s interpretation of the

Act.

23

As with the concurrence, the plurality’s

interpretation of “navigable waters” relies on two

interacting vague standards: whether a tributary is a

“geographic feature described in ordinary parlance as

a stream” and whether its size, location, or other

characteristics would test the limits of the Commerce

Power. The plurality, as much as the concurrence, is

likely void for vagueness under Dimaya.

The Court should grant the petition to answer

the question whether “navigable waters” under the

Act is void for vagueness, either standing on its own

or as interpreted by the plurality and/or concurrence

in Rapanos.

II

THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT

THE PETITION TO REVISIT ITS

FRACTURED RAPANOS DECISION

AND REPLACE IT WITH A CLEAR AND

AUTHORITATIVE INTERPRETATION OF

THE CLEAN WATER ACT

A.

The Court Should Revisit Rapanos

To Give the Act a Constitutionally

Adequate Interpretation

If the Court concludes that an interpretation of

“navigable waters” and “waters of the United States”

is possible that does not run afoul of the void for

vagueness doctrine, then it should grant the Petition

in order to adopt such an interpretation of the Act.

The Due Process Clause requires application of

the rule of lenity to limit the interpretation of criminal

statutes to activity clearly covered. Lanier, 520 U.S.

at 266 (citing Liparota and others).

24

Petitioner argues above that the Court should

grant the petition to decide whether “navigable

waters” is void for vagueness. As shown, the Rapanos

concurrence, which the circuit courts have so far

endorsed as either the holding of Rapanos or an

alternate basis for jurisdiction, appears certainly to be

void for vagueness under this Court’s recent decision

in Dimaya. Likewise, the Rapanos plurality presents

serious void for vagueness problems. However, the

Court should take this case to also consider whether

the Act is susceptible of a constitutional

interpretation. As Liparota and Lanier hold, when the

courts find that an act of Congress is susceptible of

both a constitutional and an unconstitutional

interpretation, the rule of lenity compels the adoption

of the constitutional alternative. Lanier, 520 U.S. at

266; Liparota, 471 U.S. at 427.

This Court should grant the petition, to replace

the

currently

prevailing

unconstitutional

interpretation of the Act set forth in the Rapanos

concurrence with an interpretation that affords the

regulated public with constitutionally adequate

notice.

B.

The Court Should Use This Case

To Cut Through the Thicket of Ongoing

Regulatory and Litigation Chaos Over

the Scope of “Navigable Waters”

Rapanos’ fractured outcome amplified the

confusion engendered by the Clean Water Act rather

than resolving any of it. Instead of the one ambiguous

and excessive regulatory standard for tributaries and

adjacent wetlands (adopted through notice and

comment rulemaking) which Rapanos struck down,

the agencies spent nine years after 2006 using a non

25

binding guidance that asserted they could use either

of the Rapanos interpretations of the statute to

determine jurisdiction. As set forth above, some

circuit courts have agreed with this view, while others

have said only the concurrence may be used.

In 2015 EPA and the Corps adopted a new

regulation that is generally “inspired” by the Kennedy

test, although it has most of the same features that

this Court determined to be illegal about the

regulations invalidated in Rapanos. See In re EPA,

(6th Cir. 2015) (staying 2015 Rule and explaining

challengers’ probability of success on the merits),

vacated for lack of jurisdiction per NAM, see In re

United States Department of Defense, 713 Fed. Appx.

489 (6th Cir. 2018).

Many lawsuits were filed over the 2015

regulation in the federal district courts and in the

federal circuit courts. It took until January of 2018 to

resolve which set of lawsuits the courts had

jurisdiction over, and which were to be dismissed.

NAM, 138 S. Ct. at 627. Those lawsuits continue now

in the district courts, three of which have enjoined the

2015 Rule in a total of 28 states. See Georgia v. Pruitt,

326 F. Supp. 3d 1356 (S.D. Ga. 2018); North Dakota v.

EPA, 127 F. Supp. 3d 1047 (D.N.D. 2015); Texas v.

EPA, No. 3:15-CV-00162, 2018 WL 4518230 (S.D. Tex.

Sept. 12, 2018).

Meanwhile, in 2017, the White House ordered

a change of direction at the agencies from the Rapanos

concurrence to the plurality as the basis for a

regulatory definition. See generally, www.epa.gov/

wotus-rule/rulemaking-process. This process has

lumbered along for almost two years, involving three

separate notice and comment rulemakings. Id. Only

26

one is actually complete, and it was promptly enjoined

nationwide. South Carolina Coastal Conservation

League v. Pruitt, 318 F. Supp. 3d 959 (D.S.C. 2018).

Another pending rulemaking (the Repeal Rule) is

intended to revoke the 2015 regulation and informally

re-adopt the prior (illegal, as per Rapanos)

regulations, and yet another pending rulemaking (the

Replacement Rule) is intended to adopt a new

regulation based on the plurality opinion.

www.epa.gov/wotusrule/rulemaking-process.

Supporters of the 2015 Rule have vowed to sue over

both the Repeal Rule and the Replacement Rule, 6

while the opponents of the 2015 Rule continue to slog

their way through the district courts.

As a result, roughly half of the nation is subject

to the illegal 2015 Rule, while the other half is subject

to a regime in which the illegal pre-2015 regulations

and guidance are used to enforce the Act.

It is impossible to say when (if ever) the

resulting thicket of litigation will be sufficiently

resolved to arrive in this Court. The pending

rulemakings may render the litigation against the

2015 Rule moot, unless litigation over the pending

Repeal or Replacement Rules results in injunctions

against either or both of them.

Again, it is precisely the fractured nature of the

Rapanos decision that stokes this chaos.

The framework is well established under

Rapanos

for

each

successive

presidential

administration to launch a new rulemaking to reset

6See Sierra Club, Trump & Pruitt Repeal the 2015 Clean Water

Rule (June 28, 2017), https://www.sierraclub.org/ohio/blog/

2017/06/trump-pruitt-repeal-2015-clean-water-rule.

27

the regulation to the Rapanos opinion preferred by

that administration’s political coalition, ad infinitem.

The source of this mess is this Court’s split

decision in Rapanos, yielding two very different rules

of decision, both of which the government claims the

authority to enforce either through new regulations or

informal and putatively non binding guidance. The

answer to this ongoing pendulum of regulation and

litigation is for this Court to revisit Rapanos now, in

this case, and adopt a clear majority interpretation of

“navigable waters” that provides the public, the

agencies, and the lower courts with a rule of decision

that makes sense of the statute and affords the due

process minimum of constitutional notice. Indeed, as

the district court below recognized, this case is the

ideal case for resolving the confusion over the

interpretation of “navigable waters.” Appendix D-2-3.

An important aspect of this case that makes it

the ideal vehicle to revisit Rapanos is that since it does

not involve a regulatory interpretation of the Act; the

Court can dispense with any and all issues related to

Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,

467 U.S. 837 (1984) and directly interpret the

statutory text. Waiting until some or all of the ongoing

litigation over the 2015 regulation reaches the Court

will necessitate wading through the Chevron

questions in order to address the central Clean Water

Act question that this case presents cleanly.

28

C.

The Court Should Grant the Petition

To Resolve the Circuit Splits Over

Which (If Either) Opinion in Rapanos

Provides the Controlling Rule of Law

Last term in Hughes v. United States, 138 S. Ct.

1765 (2018), this Court granted certiorari on

questions involving the proper application of Marks v.

United States to this Court’s fractured decisions. Id.

at 1771-72. Ultimately, the Court was able to resolve

the underlying issue of criminal procedure in Hughes,

and did not need to address the Marks questions in

that case. Id. This petition provides a sound vehicle

for the Court to address two discrete questions arising

under Marks, in the event it is not possible to arrive

at a majority opinion to replace Rapanos.

As stated above, the circuit courts’ disparate

efforts to apply the various Rapanos opinions has

resulted in at least two circuit splits, one on whether

Marks applies to Rapanos, and one on whether

dissents may be used in applying Marks.

First, the Ninth Circuit in the decision below

joins the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits in holding

that under Marks, the concurrence is the holding of

Rapanos. See Robertson, 875 F.3d at 1291; Gibson, 760

F.3d at 621; Robison, 505 F.3d at 1221-22. By

contrast, the First, Third, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits

hold that Marks does not apply to Rapanos, and allow

the government to follow both the plurality and the

concurrence. See Johnson, 467 F.3d at 66; United

States v. Cundiff, 555 F.3d 200, 210 (6th Cir. 2009);

United States v. Bailey, 571 F.3d 791, 799 (8th Cir.

2009); United States v. Donovan, 661 F.3d 174, 181 (3d

Cir. 2011).

29

This circuit split is not merely academic. The

results are that in four federal circuits regulated

entities are subject to jurisdiction under both the

Rapanos plurality and concurrence, while in three

others the government is limited to proving

jurisdiction under the concurrence. The Clean Water

Act should be enforced uniformly nationwide. The

Court should grant the petition to eliminate the

existing geographically based double standard.

The application of Marks to Rapanos has also

yielded an important express split between the

Seventh and Ninth and D.C. Circuits over whether

Marks allows the use of dissents in determining the

holding of a fractured decision of this Court. Compare

United States v. Robertson, 875 F.3d at 1291 (dissent

in Rapanos combined with concurrence to conclude

that concurrence is holding under Marks), with

Gibson v. American Cyanamid. Co., 760 F.3d at 622

(Marks bars use of dissents in applying Rapanos);

King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d at 783 (no use of dissent in

Marks analysis).

Whether or not a dissent may be used to

determine the holding of a fractured decision is an

important question of law with wide ranging

consequences, which the Court should resolve. This

petition provides a sound vehicle for resolving that

question, since it involves a complete disagreement

between the Seventh and Ninth Circuits on the use of

dissents in applying Marks to the same case.

30

III

THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT

THE PETITION TO RESOLVE A

CIRCUIT SPLIT ON REVIEWABILITY

OF ORDERS DENYING MOTIONS FOR

ACQUITTAL IN A FIRST TRIAL ENDING

IN MISTRIAL, FOLLOWED BY CONVICTION

IN A SECOND TRIAL

In Richardson v. United States, this Court

addressed whether criminal defendants may seek

interlocutory review of orders denying judgments of

acquittal following a mistrial to prevent their retrial,

on the ground that retrial would violate double

jeopardy. The answer is no. But this Court did not

address whether a district court ruling on a motion for

acquittal based on insufficient evidence can, like any

other interlocutory ruling, be reviewed following final

judgment after retrial.

In the decision below, the Ninth Circuit joined

four other circuits in holding that Richardson

prohibits such review. See United States v. Achobe,

560 F.3d 259, 265-68 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v.

Julien, 318 F.3d 316, 321 (1st Cir. 2003); United

States v. Willis, 102 F.3d 1078, 1081 (10th Cir. 1996);

United States v. Coleman, 862 F.2d 455, 460 (3d Cir.

1988). In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit says that

Richardson does not preclude post-judgment review.

United States v. Gulledge, 739 F.2d 582, 584 (11th Cir.

1984). In the Eleventh Circuit, denial of a motion for

judgment of acquittal in a first trial ending in a hung

jury is assumed to be reviewable despite an

individual’s subsequent conviction in a second trial.

See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, No. 11-12131,

2013 WL 563158, at *1 (11th Cir. Feb. 15, 2013).

31

A criminal defendant’s ability to challenge on

appeal the legal sufficiency of the evidence presented

at their first trial should not rise or fall based on

where their prosecution takes place. Yet the circuit

split here has allowed this very circumstance to

prevail for 30-plus years. This Court should grant

certiorari to resolve this express circuit split on a

recurring and important issue.

A.

The Circuits Are Split on This Question

Richardson holds that a retrial following the

erroneous denial of a motion to acquit does not violate

double jeopardy. But this Court did not address in

Richardson whether a defendant can seek review of a

sufficiency ruling in its own right on appeal from final

judgment following a second trial. In the wake of

Richardson, lower courts have split over this question.

1.

The Eleventh Circuit Allows

Post-Judgment Review of

Sufficiency Rulings

In United States v. Gulledge, the district court

denied the defendant’s motion for acquittal at a trial

that ended in a mistrial. 739 F.2d at 583-84. The

defendant sought interlocutory review, challenging

the sufficiency ruling and claiming that his retrial

would violate double jeopardy. Id. at 584. A panel of

the Eleventh Circuit rejected the double-jeopardy

claim in light of the holding in Richardson. Id. at 58485. But it matter-of-factly noted in dicta that a ruling

on the sufficiency of evidence at the first trial, like any

other interlocutory ruling, is reviewable after a final

judgment is rendered. Id. at 584 (“[T]he purported

insufficiency of the evidence in the first trial is

reviewable by this court only on appeal from a

32

conviction after a second trial . . . . ”) (emphasis added).

In the Eleventh Circuit this has been the view, see

United States v. Cooper, 733 F.2d 91, 92 (11th Cir.

1984), and continues to be the view, see Martinez, 2013

WL 563158, at *1 (affirming denial of defendant’s

motion for judgment of acquittal based on sufficiency

of evidence in the first trial that resulted in a hung

jury); United States v. Gavin, No. 09-15518, 2010 WL

3373973, at *1 (11th Cir. Aug. 27, 2010) (same).

This interpretation comports with the common

understanding of the reviewability of interlocutory

rulings after a final judgment. See, e.g., United States

v. Taylor, 176 F.3d 331, 335 (6th Cir. 1999) (“It is

elementary, however, that even though a party may

not file an appeal from [an interlocutory ruling], that

does not mean he may never obtain review of the

decision, once a final order has been entered.”)

(emphasis added). The purpose of the final judgment

rule contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1291 is not to preclude

review of interlocutory rulings altogether, but “to

combine in one review all stages of the proceeding.”

Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541,

546 (1949).

As a consequence, parties can seek review of

allegedly prejudicial interlocutory rulings following

final judgment. “The prohibition against immediate

appeal . . . is offset by the rule that once appeal is

taken from a truly final judgment that ends the

litigation, earlier rulings generally can be reviewed.”

15A C. Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure

§ 3905.1, at 249 (2d ed. 1991) (footnote omitted). The

“appeal from final judgment opens the record and

permits review of all rulings that led up to the

judgment.” Id. at 250-52 n.3 (collecting cases).

33

Consistent with this principle, this Court has

repeatedly noted the availability of post-judgment

review before disallowing interlocutory review of non

final orders that fail the collateral order doctrine. See,

e.g., Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action,

480 U.S. 370, 375-76 (1987).

2.

Multiple Circuits Prohibit PostJudgment Review of Sufficiency

Rulings

The holding of the Ninth Circuit below, like the

rulings of the four circuits on which it relies, 7 is

directly at odds with the more logical position of the

Eleventh Circuit. While it is true that “double

jeopardy protections do not bar a second trial” after a

jury deadlocks, Robertson, 875 F.3d at 1293, it does

not logically follow that this principle prohibits the

reviewability of a denied sufficiency motion after a

final judgment is entered. Robertson did not argue on

appeal after his conviction that his retrial violated

double jeopardy. The attempted double jeopardy

arguments made in Richardson were simply not

present in the appeal before this Court. Robertson

contended only that the district court erred by denying

his motion to acquit at his first trial. Double jeopardy

is “not implicated simply because the Government

presented insufficient evidence at a previous trial.”

Robertson, 875 F.3d at 1294. But the Ninth Circuit

found that Robertson’s ability to challenge the

sufficiency of the evidence at his first trial, unlike any

other interlocutory ruling, was precluded based on

Richardson anyway.

7 See Achobe, 560 F.3d at 265-68; Julien, 318 F.3d at 321; Willis,

102 F.3d at 1081; Coleman, 862 F.2d at 460.

34

But nothing in Richardson disturbs the wellsettled rule that parties may seek review of

interlocutory rulings after a final judgment. See

Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110, 123-24 (2009)

(discussing Richardson’s applicability to double

jeopardy arguments related to mistrial, not the

reviewability of interlocutory rulings). Richardson

addressed only whether a retrial following the

erroneous denial of a motion to acquit would violate

double jeopardy. This Court held retrial would not

violate double jeopardy because the mistrial did not

terminate jeopardy. Richardson, 468 U.S. at 325-26.

The defendant in that case asserted only a doublejeopardy claim, because that was the only sort of claim

that could be reviewed on an interlocutory basis under

Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977). See

Richardson, 468 U.S. at 320. Richardson simply did

not address, and had no reason to address, whether

the erroneous denial of the motion to acquit could be

reviewed in its own right following final judgment just

like any other interlocutory order.

The lack of double jeopardy below had no effect

upon the reviewability of Mr. Robertson’s denied

motion for acquittal based on allegedly deficient

evidence in his first trial after final judgment was

entered in his second trial. Holding that “a criminal

defendant cannot challenge the sufficiency of the

evidence presented at a previous trial following a

conviction at a subsequent trial” is not a “necessary

extension” of the principle that double jeopardy does

not bar that retrial. The two propositions are simply

not related or analogous. It does no violence to the

holding of Richardson to recognize that a defendant

can challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence

presented by the government in the first trial at the

35

conclusion of the second trial. Simply put, the decision

of the Ninth Circuit, like most of the circuit cases on

which it relies, conflates a challenge to a sufficiency

ruling with a double-jeopardy claim.

B.

This Issue Is Both Recurring

and Important

1.

The Issue Arises Often

Even before the present circuit split over

Richardson, this issue repeatedly arose in both federal

and state courts, with lower courts almost uniformly

allowing post-judgment review of denied motions for

acquittal based on insufficient evidence. See, e.g.,

United States v. Bodey, 607 F.2d 265, 267-68 (9th Cir.

1979) (defendant entitled to reversal “if the evidence

at his first trial was insufficient”). Of the

approximately 3,000 federal criminal trials each year,

more than 130 are retrials following mistrials. See

Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Business of

the United States Courts 257 tbl.D-7, 279 tbl.D-13

(2008).

Mistrial rates in state courts, which hear more

than 50,000 criminal trials each year, are even higher

than federal courts. See Paula L. Hannaford-Agor, et

al., Are Hung Juries a Problem? 19-27, National

Center for State Courts (Sept. 30, 2002). Some state

courts currently allow post-judgment review of priortrial sufficiency rulings, see, e.g., Ohio v. McGill,

No. 99CA25, 2000 WL 1803650, at *6-9 (Ohio Ct. App.

Dec. 8, 2000), while others expressly relying on

Richardson reject such claims, see, e.g., People v.

Doyle, 765 N.E.2d 85, 91 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002). These

courts, like their federal counterparts, would benefit

greatly from this Court’s guidance on this question.

36

2.

The Issue is Important to the

Administration of Justice

The reviewability of prior sufficiency rulings at

subsequent trials is a matter of grave importance to

the administration of justice. Rather than the narrow

question addressed in Richardson involving when

defendants can seek review, this case presents the

much broader question of whether such rulings are

reviewable at all. The consequences of the rule applied

below and in the four other circuits denying review is

harsh. Defendants are forever barred from obtaining

review, however patently erroneous the district

court’s ruling may have been.

The decision below thus leaves defendants not

convicted at their first trial worse off than those who

actually are convicted. If a jury convicts a defendant

and the district court erroneously denies his motion to

acquit, that individual can receive review of that

denial on appeal. But under the Ninth Circuit’s

interpretation of Richardson, if a jury is unable to

reach a verdict and there is a retrial, the error is

unreviewable forevermore. This result is patently

unjust.

37

CONCLUSION

The petition for writ of certiorari should be

granted.

DATED: November, 2018.

Respectfully submitted,

MARK MILLER

Pacific Legal Foundation

4440 PGA Blvd., Ste. 307

Palm Beach Gardens, FL 33410

Telephone: (561) 691-5000

MMiller@pacificlegal.org

ANTHONY L. FRANÇOIS*

*Counsel of Record

JEFFREY W. MCCOY

TIMOTHY R. SNOWBALL

Pacific Legal Foundation

930 G Street

Sacramento, CA 95814

Telephone: (916) 419-7111

TFrancois@pacificlegal.org

ETHAN W. BLEVINS

Pacific Legal Foundation

892 Berkeley Drive

North Salt Lake, UT 84054

Telephone: (425) 576-0484

EBlevins@pacificlegal.org

Counsel for Petitioner

Appendix A-1

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JOSEPH DAVID ROBERTSON,

Defendant-Appellant.

No.

16-30178

D,C. No.

6:15-cr-00007-DWM-1

District of Montana,

Helena

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Montana

Donald W. Molloy, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted August 29, 2017

Seattle, Washington

Filed November 27, 2017

Before: M. Margaret McKeown and Ronald M. Gould,

Circuit Judges, and Barbara Jacobs Rothstein,*

District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Gould

The Honorable Barbara Jacobs Rothstein, United States

District Judge for the Western District of Washington, sitting by

designation.

*

Appendix A-2

UNITED STATES V. ROBERTSON

SUMMARY**

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed convictions for violating the

Clean Water Act (CWA) by knowingly discharging

dredged or fill material from a point source into a

water of the United States without a permit; willfully

injuring and committing depredation of property of

the United States, causing more than $1,000 worth of

damage to the property; and knowingly discharging

dredged or fill material from a point source into a

water of the United States on private property

without a permit.

The defendant’s first trial ended with a hung

jury, and the defendant was convicted after a second

trial.

The panel rejected the defendant’s contention

that the Government did not establish that there was

jurisdiction under the CWA. The panel held that

Northern California River Watch v. City of

Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993 (2007) (holding that Justice

Kennedy’s concurrence in Rapanos v. United States,

547 U.S. 715 (2006), is the controlling test for

determining CWA jurisdiction), is not clearly

irreconcilable with United States v. Davis, 825 F.3d

1014 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc), and remains binding

precedent. The panel held that the district court did

not err in determining that CWA jurisdiction existed

under the “significant nexus” test set forth in Justice

Kennedy’s concurrence in Rapanos.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court.

It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the

reader.

Appendix A-3

The panel rejected the defendant’s contentions

that the statutory term “waters of the United States”

is unconstitutionally vague and that he did not have

fair warning of the meaning of that term.

The panel held that a criminal defendant

cannot challenge the sufficiency of the evidence at a

previous trial following conviction at a subsequent

trial. The panel therefore deemed foreclosed the

defendant’s argument that the district court should

have granted his motion to acquit after the jury

deadlocked at his first trial.

The panel held that the district court did not

abuse its discretion in allowing the Montana State

Program Manager for the Army Corps of Engineers

and Supervisory Civil Engineer to testify as an expert

witness. The panel held that the district court did not

abuse its discretion in excluding an Army Corps of

Engineers guidance manual or a crystal mine study.

COUNSEL

Michael Donahoe (argued), Deputy Federal Public

Defender; Anthony R. Gallagher, Federal Defender;

Federal Defenders of Montana, Helena, Montana; for

Defendant-Appellant.

John David Gunter II (argued) and Robert Stockman,

Attorneys; John C. Cruden, Assistant Attorney

General; Environment & Natural Resources Division,

United States Department of Justice, Washington,

D.C.; Bryan R. Whittaker and Eric E. Nelson, Office of

the United States Attorney, Helena, Montana; for

Plaintiff-Appellee.

Appendix A-4

Roger I. Roots, Livingston, Montana, for Amici Curiae

The Constitution Society and Founder and President

Jon Roland.

Anthony L. François, Pacific Legal Foundation,

Sacramento, California, for Amici Curiae Chantell

and Michael Sackett, John Duarte, and Duarte

Nursery Inc.

OPINION

GOULD, Circuit Judge:

Between October 2013 and October 2014,

Joseph David Robertson excavated and constructed a

series of ponds on National Forest System Lands and

on the privately owned Manhattan Lode mining claim.

In the process of creating these ponds, Robertson

discharged dredged and fill material into the

surrounding wetlands and an adjacent tributary,

which flows to Cataract Creek. Cataract Creek is a

tributary of the Boulder River, which in turn is a

tributary of the Jefferson River—a traditionally

navigable water of the United States. Robertson was

warned by an EPA Special Agent that his activities

“very likely” required permits. Yet, he did not get

permits to build the ponds or to discharge dredged or

fill material into waters of the United States.

The Forest Service soon learned of Robertson’s

activities. And on May 22, 2015, a grand jury charged

Robertson with three criminal counts. Count I charged

Robertson with knowingly discharging dredged or fill

material from a point source into a water of the United

States without a permit in violation of the Clean

Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. § 1251–1388. Count II

Appendix A-5

charged Robertson with willfully injuring and

committing depredation of property of the United

States, namely National Forest Service Land, causing

more than $1,000 worth of damage to the property, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1361. Count III charged

Robertson with another CWA violation for knowingly

discharging dredged or fill material from a point

source into a water of the United States on private

property without a permit.

Robertson’s initial jury trial was held from

October 5 to October 8, 2015. At the close of the

Government’s case and at the close of the presentation

of evidence, Robertson unsuccessfully moved for a

judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 29. That first jury trial ended with a hung

jury, and the judge declared a mistrial. Robertson

again moved for acquittal on all three counts, arguing

that the Government’s evidence was insufficient to

sustain a conviction. The district court denied this

motion.

Robertson’s second jury trial was held from

April 4 to April 7, 2016. Robertson again moved for

acquittal on all three counts after the close of the

Government’s case and at the close of evidence. And

the district court again denied both motions. On

April 7, 2016, the jury returned guilty verdicts on all

three counts. On April 21, 2016, Robertson renewed

his motions for acquittal and moved for a new trial.

The district court denied those motions, concluding

that the verdict was supported by sufficient evidence.

Robertson timely filed this appeal, over which

we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

Appendix A-6

I

Robertson argues (1) that the Government did

not establish that there was CWA jurisdiction, and

(2) that he lacked fair warning of the scope of CWA

jurisdiction. He also (3) challenges the sufficiency of

evidence at an earlier trial that ended in a mistrial;

(4) appeals some evidence rulings; and (5) contests the

calculation of restitution. 1

We review the district court’s interpretation of

the jurisdictional bounds of the CWA de novo. See

United States v. Lewis, 67 F.3d 225, 228 (9th Cir.

1995). We also review whether a statute is

unconstitutionally vague de novo. See United States v.

Cooper, 173 F.3d 1192, 1202 (9th Cir. 1999). We

review the challenged evidence rulings and a

challenge to the district court permitting an expert to

testify for abuse of discretion. See United States v.

W.R. Grace, 504 F.3d 745, 759 (9th Cir. 2007); United

States v. Layton, 767 F.2d 549, 553 (9th Cir. 1985).

II

We look first at the CWA jurisdiction issue. To

assess Robertson’s arguments on these points, some

background on the CWA and the cases that have

interpreted it is necessary. Congress enacted the CWA

“to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and

biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 33 U.S.C.

§ 1251(a). To meet this goal, the CWA prohibits the

discharge of dredge or fill material into “navigable

waters” unless authorized by a permit from the

Secretary of the Army through the Army Corps of

We address and reject Robertson’s challenge to the district

court’s ruling compelling Robertson to bear a part of the costs of

his defense in the concurrently filed memorandum disposition.

1

Appendix A-7

Engineers (“the Corps”). Id. §§ 1311(a), 1311(d),

1344(a). Any person who knowingly violates § 1311 by

discharging a pollutant without a permit “shall be

punished” by a fine, imprisonment, or both. Id.

§ 1319(c)(2).

At issue on jurisdiction is the meaning of

“navigable waters,” and the reach of the CWA.

“Navigable waters” is defined as “the waters of the

United States, including the territorial seas.” Id.

§ 1362(7). For there to be CWA jurisdiction here then,

the creek and wetlands that Robertson polluted had to

be “waters of the United States.”

The reach of the Corps’ jurisdiction over

“navigable waters” is controversial and has been the

subject of many Supreme Court cases. See, e.g., United

States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121

(1985) (upholding a Corps’ regulation that extended

the Corps’ authority under § 1344 to wetlands

“adjacent to navigable or interstate waters and their

tributaries”); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v.

U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001)

(invalidating the Corps’ “Migratory Bird Rule”

because the Corps does not have CWA jurisdiction

over non-navigable, isolated, intrastate waters that

are not adjacent to open water).

Central to this appeal is the Supreme Court’s

fractured 4-1-4 decision, Rapanos v. United States,

547 U.S. 715 (2006). In that case, the Court confronted

the issue of whether wetlands, which did not contain

or directly abut traditionally navigable waterways,

were “waters of the United States” subject to the

Corps’ jurisdiction under the CWA. See id. at 729–30

(plurality); id. at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the

judgment). In answering this question, the Court had

Appendix A-8

to address whether the Corps’ regulations were a

permissible interpretation of the CWA. The

regulations had interpreted “waters of the United

States” very broadly, including not just traditionally

navigable interstate waters, but also

“[a]ll

interstate

waters

including

interstate

wetlands,”

[33

C.F.R.]

§ 328.3(a)(2); “[a]ll other waters such as

intrastate

lakes,

rivers,

streams

(including

intermittent

streams),

mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs,

prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa

lakes, or natural ponds, the use,

degradation or destruction of which

could affect interstate or foreign

commerce,”

[id.]

§

328.3(a)(3);

“[t]ributaries of [such] waters,” [id.]

§ 328.3(a)(5); and “[w]etlands adjacent to

[such] waters [and tributaries] (other

than waters that are themselves

wetlands),” [id.] § 328.3(a)(7). The

regulation defines “adjacent” wetlands

as those “bordering, contiguous [to], or

neighboring” waters of the United

States. [Id.] § 328.3(c). It specifically

provides that “[w]etlands separated from

other waters of the United States by

manmade dikes or barriers, natural river

berms, beach dunes and the like are

‘adjacent wetlands.’” [Id.]

Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 724 (plurality).

The plurality opinion, authored by Justice

Scalia, and joined by Chief Justice Roberts, and

Justices Thomas and Alito, concluded that the Corps’

Appendix A-9

regulations were not “based on a permissible

construction of the statute.” Id. at 739 (quoting

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S.

837, 843 (1984)). The plurality held that “the phrase

‘the waters of the United States’ includes only those

relatively permanent, standing or continuously

flowing bodies of water ‘forming geographic features’

that are described in ordinary parlance as ‘streams[,]

. . . oceans, rivers, [and] lakes.’” Id. (quoting Webster’s

Second 2882) (alterations in original). The term,

according to Justice Scalia’s opinion, “does not include

channels through which water flows intermittently or

ephemerally, or channels that periodically provide

drainage for rainfall.” Id. The plurality went on to

conclude that wetlands are covered by the CWA only

if two conditions are met: first, “the adjacent channel

contains a ‘wate[r] of the United States,’ (i.e., a

relatively permanent body of water connected to

traditional interstate navigable waters);” and second,

“the wetland has a continuous surface connection with

that water, making it difficult to determine where the

‘water’ ends and the ‘wetland’ begins.” Id. at 742

(alteration in original). The plurality ultimately

remanded the case to the lower court so that it could

determine, in the first instance, whether the wetlands

at issue were subject to the CWA under the new

standard.

Justice Kennedy, providing the fifth vote

supporting the judgment concurred in the judgment

but rejected the plurality’s test and outlined his own

test to determine whether a wetland that is not

adjacent to and does not contain a navigable-in-fact

water is subject to the CWA. See id. at 758–59, 768–78

(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice

Kennedy concluded that the Corps could reasonably

Appendix A-10

interpret the CWA to cover “impermanent streams,”

id. at 770, and he concluded that the “Corps’ definition

of adjacency is a reasonable one,” id. at 775. Justice

Kennedy held that the Corps could exercise CWA

jurisdiction over a wetland only if there was “a

significant nexus between the wetlands in question

and navigable waters in the traditional sense.” Id. at

779; see also id. at 767. He explained, “wetlands

possess the requisite nexus, and come within the

statutory phrase ‘navigable waters,’ if the wetlands,

either alone or in combination with similarly situated

lands in the region, significantly affect the chemical,

physical, and biological integrity of other covered

waters more readily understood as ‘navigable.’” Id. at

780. When “wetlands’ effects on water quality are

speculative or insubstantial, they fall outside the zone

fairly encompassed by the statutory term ‘navigable

waters.’” Id.

Four members of the Court joined in a dissent

authored by Justice Stevens. His dissent concluded

that Riverside Bayview controlled the cases, that the

Corps’ regulations were a reasonable interpretation of

the CWA, and that any wetland that is adjacent to

navigable waters or their tributaries is subject to the

CWA. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 787, 792 (Stevens, J.,

dissenting). He disagreed with both the plurality and

with Justice Kennedy. He noted that “Justice

Kennedy’s approach had far fewer faults,” and

concluded that both decisions “fail[ed] to give proper

deference to the agencies entrusted by Congress to

implement the Clean Water Act.” Id. at 810. The

dissenting Justices would have upheld the Corps’

jurisdiction in the cases at issue in Rapanos “and in

all other cases in which either the plurality’s or

Justice Kennedy’s test is satisfied.” Id. at 810. Indeed,

Appendix A-11

although the dissent “assume[d] that Justice

Kennedy’s approach will be controlling in most cases

because it treats more of the nation’s waters as within

the Corps’ jurisdiction,” the dissent would uphold

jurisdiction when either test was met—even “in the

unlikely event that the plurality’s test is met but

Justice Kennedy’s is not.” Id. at 810 n.14; see also id.

at 810. The dissent also stated that “in these and

future cases the United States may elect to prove

jurisdiction under either test.” Id. at 810 n.14.

All this paints a rather complex picture, and

one where without more it might not be fair to expect

a layman of normal intelligence to discern what was

the proper standard to determine what are waters of

the United States. But the substance of that picture

was clarified by later decisional law within the Ninth

Circuit.

Specifically, in Northern California River

Watch v. City of Healdsburg, a precedent that is

critical to our decision today, we held that Justice

Kennedy’s opinion was the controlling opinion from

Rapanos. 496 F.3d 993, 995 (2007). We explained that

because it is “the narrowest ground to which a

majority of the Justices would assent if forced to

choose in almost all cases, . . . Justice Kennedy’s

concurrence provides the controlling rule of law for

our case.” Id. at 999–1000; see also United States v.

Moses, 496 F.3d 984, 990 (9th Cir. 2007) (recognizing

Justice Kennedy’s “opinion as the controlling rule of

law”); San Francisco Baykeeper v. Cargill Salt Div.,

481 F.3d 700, 707 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Justice Kennedy’s

controlling concurrence explained that only wetlands

with a significant nexus to a navigable-in-fact

waterway are covered by the Act” (emphasis added)).

Appendix A-12

In reaching this conclusion, we relied upon United

States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723 (7th Cir.

2006). See City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d at 999–1000.

In Gerke, the Seventh Circuit had explained that

Justice Kennedy’s test—which it also found to be

controlling—was “narrower (so far as reining in

federal authority is concerned) than the plurality’s in

most cases.” 464 F.3d at 724–25. The Eleventh Circuit

has also concluded that Justice Kennedy’s test is

controlling. See United States v. Robison, 505 F.3d

1208, 1221 (11th Cir. 2007) (concluding that under the

facts of Rapanos, Justice Kennedy’s opinion is the

narrowest and controlling).

Other circuits have adopted different

approaches. The First, Third, and Eighth Circuits

have explicitly concluded that the federal Government

can establish CWA jurisdiction if it can meet either

the plurality’s or Justice Kennedy’s standard. United

States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 64–66 (1st Cir. 2006);

United States v. Donovan, 661 F.3d 174, 176, 182

(3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Bailey, 571 F.3d 791,

799 (8th Cir. 2009). The Fourth Circuit has used

Justice Kennedy’s test, without deciding whether the

plurality’s test could provide an alternate ground for

establishing CWA jurisdiction. See Precon Dev. Corp.,

Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 633 F.3d 288 (4th

Cir. 2011). The Sixth Circuit has expressly not yet

decided which test is controlling. See United States v.

Cundiff, 555 F.3d 200, 210 (6th Cir. 2009). It appears

that the Fifth Circuit has also not yet decided which

test controls, see United States v. Lucas, 516 F.3d 316,

324–28 (5th Cir. 2008), although it has indicated—

albeit in an unpublished decision—that jurisdiction

could be established under either test, see United

States v. Lipar, 665 F. App’x 322, 325 (5th Cir. 2016).

Appendix A-13

In view of these competing precedents

interpreting Rapanos, and further uncertainty

engendered by our later en banc decision in United

States v. Davis, 825 F.3d 1014 (9th Cir. 2016),

Robertson argues that Justice Kennedy’s test from

Rapanos is not the controlling test for determining

CWA jurisdiction, and that the trial Court erred by

basing the jury instructions on Justice Kennedy’s test.

III

Robertson’s primary argument is that City of

Healdsburg is not binding in light of Davis. He asserts

that under the “reasoning-based” framework

established by Davis, the Rapanos plurality opinion is

controlling. In reaching this conclusion, Robertson

argues that the court cannot consider Justice

Stevens’s dissent. He argues that if we do not adopt

the plurality decision as controlling, we must conclude

that “no single rationale commanded a majority of the

Rapanos court.”

In Marks v. United States, the Supreme Court

explained that “[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a

case and no single rationale explaining the result

enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the

Court may be viewed as that position taken by those

Members who concurred in the judgments on the

narrowest grounds.’” 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)

(quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15

(1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)).

Recognizing the difficulty that courts have

faced in discerning what the Supreme Court meant by

“narrowest grounds,” we took Davis en banc to clarify

the approach courts should take in applying Marks to

fractured Supreme Court decisions. See Davis, 825

Appendix A-14

F.3d at 1021–22. We adopted a “reasoning-based

approach to applying Marks.” Id. at 1021. As we

explained,

[W]hen applying Marks to a fractured

Supreme Court decision, we look to those

opinions that concurred in the judgment

and determine whether one of those

opinions sets forth a rationale that is the

logical subset of other, broader opinions.

When,

however,

no

“common

denominator of the Court’s reasoning”

exists, we are bound only by the “specific

result.”

Id. at 1028. In Davis, we also assumed, without

deciding, that dissenting opinions may be considered

as part of a Marks analysis. Id. at 1025; see also id. at

1025 n.12.

As explained above, in City of Healdsburg—

relying on Gerke and taking into account the Rapanos

dissent—we held that Justice Kennedy’s “concurrence

is the narrowest ground to which a majority of the

Justices would assent if forced to choose in almost all

cases.” City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d at 999. As Davis

had not yet clarified the issue, we did not engage in a

reasoning-based Marks analysis to reach this

conclusion. Instead, we relied on and accepted the

Seventh Circuit’s explanation in Gerke as to why

Justice Kennedy’s concurrence provided the

controlling rule. See id. at 999–1000. Although the

Seventh Circuit did not engage in an explicit

reasoning-based analysis, the underlying rationale in

Gerke is not inconsistent with that analysis.

Appendix A-15

To assess Robertson’s claim that the district

court applied the wrong standard to determine

whether there was insufficient evidence to conclude

that Robertson discharged pollutants into United

States waters without a permit, we must first decide

whether the en banc decision in Davis rendered

inapplicable our prior conclusion in City of

Healdsburg that Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in

Rapanos would control our decision about what are

waters of the United States.

Our court in Miller v. Gammie, established the

general rule that a three-judge panel is not allowed to

disregard a prior circuit precedent, but rather must

follow it unless or until change comes from a higher

authority. 335 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

Higher authority includes decisions by en banc panels

of our court. Overstreet v. United Bhd. of Carpenters &

Joiners of Am., Local Union No. 1506, 409 F.3d 1199,

1205 n.8 (9th Cir. 2005).

This raises the issue whether the precedent of

City of Healdsburg should have been disregarded by

the court below in light of the later en banc decision in

Davis. Miller v. Gammie sets the rule that the district

court below had to follow City of Healdsburg unless it

was “clearly irreconcilable” with Davis. Miller v.

Gammie, 335 F.3d at 893. So the controlling issue on

whether City of Healdsburg correctly stated the

standard for what are waters of the United States,

relying on Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Rapanos,

is whether City of Healdsburg is clearly irreconcilable

with Davis. If so, we should disregard it. But if not,

City of Healdsburg remains controlling. It is to that

question that we now turn.

Appendix A-16

Some elaboration on the standard developed in

Miller v. Gammie is helpful here. In that case we

considered when “a three-judge panel is free to

reexamine the holding of a prior panel in light of an

inconsistent decision by a court of last resort on a

closely related, but not identical issue.” 335 F.3d at

899. The issue before us was whether, in light of

intervening Supreme Court authority outlining a

functional test for evaluating when immunity applied,

a three-judge panel should have disregarded prior

Ninth Circuit authority granting absolute immunity

to social workers. Id. at 900. Our en banc panel in

Miller v. Gammie held that in cases of “clear

irreconcilability, a three-judge panel of this court and

district courts should consider themselves bound by

the intervening higher authority and reject the prior

opinion of this court as having been effectively

overruled.” Id.

The “clearly irreconcilable” requirement is “a

high standard.” Rodriguez v. AT&T Mobility Servs.

LLC, 728 F.3d 975, 979 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal

quotation marks omitted). So long as the court “can

apply our prior circuit precedent without running

afoul of the intervening authority” it must do so. Lair

v. Bullock, 697 F.3d 1200, 1207 (9th Cir. 2012)

(internal quotation marks omitted). “It is not enough

for there to be some tension between the intervening

higher authority and prior circuit precedent, or for the

intervening higher authority to cast doubt on the prior

circuit precedent.” Id. (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted).

City of Healdsburg is not clearly irreconcilable

with Davis. Davis holds that an opinion that concurs

in the judgment that is “the logical subset of other,

Appendix A-17

broader opinions” is the “narrowest grounds” and

controlling under Marks. See Davis, 825 F.3d at 1024,

1028. Contrary to Robertson’s argument, Davis did

not forbid consideration of dissents while engaging in

the Marks analysis. See Davis, 825 F.3d at 1025.

Consequently, so long as the opinion that is a “logical

subset” is an opinion that concurred in the judgment,

the “broader opinion” of which it is a subset can be a

dissent.

The overarching issue in Rapanos was whether

the breadth of the Corps’ regulations was permissible.

The narrowest holding was the one that restrained the

Corps’ authority the least. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at

810 n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“I assume that

Justice Kennedy’s approach will be controlling in most

cases because it treats more of the Nation’s waters as

within the Corps’ jurisdiction . . .”); Robison, 505 F.3d

at 1221 (“The issue becomes whether the definition of

‘navigable waters’ in the plurality or concurring

opinions in Rapanos was less far-reaching (i.e., lessrestrictive of CWA jurisdiction).”); Gerke, 464 F.3d at

724–25 (concluding Justice Kennedy’s “test is

narrower (so far as reining in federal authority is

concerned) than the plurality’s in most cases”). The

opinion restricting federal agency discretion the least

was Justice Stevens’s dissent, which would have

provided for the broadest federal jurisdiction of all,

and which stated explicitly that it would be satisfied

and uphold the Corps’ jurisdiction whenever either

the plurality’s or Justice Kennedy’s test was met. See

Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 810 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

But under the standard announced in Marks,

when we interpret Rapanos we are to find our

standard in the narrowest opinion joining in the

Appendix A-18

judgment. So the dissent that did not support the

judgment is out for this purpose. We have a contest

then between the plurality opinion of Justice Scalia

and the concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy, both

of which supported the majority judgment. Both the

plurality and Justice Kennedy’s opinions can be

viewed as subsets of Justice Stevens’s dissent because

both narrow the scope of federal jurisdiction. Justice

Kennedy’s concurrence, however, is narrower than the

plurality opinion because it restricts federal authority

less. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 810 n.14 (Stevens, J.,

dissenting).

Although it does not go through this subset

analysis explicitly, Gerke does recognize that Justice

Kennedy’s concurrence fits within the dissent, and

that it narrows federal authority less than the

plurality’s decision. See Gerke, 464 F.3d at 724–25

(explaining that “[t]he four dissenting Justices took a

much broader view of federal authority” than either

Justice Kennedy or the plurality, and that Justice

Kennedy’s grounds were narrower because the

plurality criticized Justice Kennedy’s expansive

reading, and Justice Kennedy rejected the two

limitations the plurality would have imposed on

federal authority). Its reasoning—how it gets to the

“narrowest” opinion—is not completely undercut by

Davis. See Rodriguez, 728 F.3d at 980. Gerke—and

City of Healdsburg, which adopted and relied upon

Gerke’s reasoning—are not “clearly irreconcilable”

with Davis. City of Healdsburg remains valid and

binding precedent. Here, jurisdiction was determined

to exist under the “significant nexus” test set forth in

Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Rapanos. We hold

that there was no error in this.

Appendix A-19

IV

Robertson next argues that the statutory term

“waters of the United States” is “too vague to be

enforced in the due process sense,” because Robertson

could not have had “fair warning” of the meaning of

that term. He asserts that he did not have fair

warning because, in light of Davis, City of Healdsburg

is no longer good law.

Robertson had fair warning that his conduct

was criminal. The Government violates the Fifth

Amendment’s guarantee of due process if it “take[s]

away someone’s life, liberty, or property under a

criminal law so vague that it fails to give ordinary

people fair notice of the conduct it punishes, or so

standardless that it invites arbitrary enforcement.”

Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2556 (2015).

The underlying “principle is that no man shall be held

criminally responsible for conduct which he could not

reasonably understand to be proscribed.” United

States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 265 (1997).

The “touchstone” of whether a statute is

unconstitutionally vague, on the one hand, or the

defendant instead had fair notice, on the other hand,

“is whether the statute, either standing alone or as

construed, made it reasonably clear at the relevant

time that the defendant’s conduct was criminal.” Id.

at 267. So long as prior to the defendant’s offense there

were decisions which gave “reasonable warning that

the law [will] be applied in a certain way,” the

defendant had fair warning that his conduct was

criminal. See Gollehon v. Mahoney, 626 F.3d 1019,

1024 (9th Cir. 2010).

Appendix A-20

Robertson does not challenge the general

validity of the criminal provisions of the CWA. His

argument relies primarily on the effect of Davis on

City of Healdsburg. As explained above, Davis does

not undermine the continuing validity of City of

Healdsburg for purposes of jurisdiction. As for the

notice issue, the conduct at issue in this case took

place between October 2013 and October 2014, well

after this court had issued City of Healdsburg and had

held that Justice Kennedy’s test controlled CWA

jurisdiction, and well before this court’s decision in

Davis. See Davis, 825 F.3d 1014 (published June 13,

2016); City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d at 995 (case

published in 2007). Robertson was on notice from City

of Healdsburg at the time of his excavation activities

that wetlands and non-navigable tributaries are

subject to CWA jurisdiction “if the wetlands, either

alone or in combination with similarly situated lands

in the region, significantly affect the chemical,

physical, and biological integrity of other covered

waters more readily understood as ‘navigable.’”

Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 780. The jury was instructed in

these terms, and convicted Robertson, holding that

the elements of his crime where shown beyond a

reasonable doubt. Davis—which was not decided until

2016, long after Robertson’s conduct forming the basis

for his convictions—does not affect whether Robertson

had fair notice at the time of his excavation activities. 2

Also, Robertson was warned by an EPA agent that he likely

needed a permit to authorize his excavations. According to the

agent, Robertson was warned that “if he did not have a permit,

then he very likely needed a permit.”

2

Appendix A-21

V

Robertson next argues that the district court

should have granted his Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 29(c) motion to acquit after the jury

deadlocked at his first trial. This circuit has not

explicitly addressed whether a defendant has a viable

sufficiency of the evidence challenge to his first trial,

when his second trial ended in conviction.

If Robertson had prevailed on his sufficiency

challenge at the first trial, any subsequent attempt to

try him would have been barred on double jeopardy

grounds. But such a claim is foreclosed because the

Supreme Court in Richardson v. United States held

that even where the Government has presented

inadequate evidence at the first trial and the jury

deadlocks, if the trial judge rejects the defendants’

insufficiency arguments, double jeopardy protections

do not bar a second trial. 468 U.S. 317, 326 (1984)

(“Regardless of the sufficiency of the evidence at

petitioner’s first trial, he has no valid double jeopardy

claim to prevent his retrial.”).

Several other circuits have held that by

necessary extension Richardson also forecloses any

challenge to the sufficiency of evidence at a prior trial

after a conviction at a later trial. See United States v.

Achobe, 560 F.3d 259, 265–68 (5th Cir. 2008); United

States v. Julien, 318 F.3d 316, 321 (1st Cir. 2003);

United States v. Willis, 102 F.3d 1078, 1081 (10th Cir.

1996); United States v. Coleman, 862 F.2d 455, 460

(3d Cir. 1988). 3 We believe that these decisions are

correct, and we now join them.

3 In United States v. Recio, we held that Richardson did not bar

us from considering whether defendants “may be prosecuted at a

Appendix A-22

Richardson makes clear that the Double

Jeopardy Clause is not implicated simply because the

Government presented insufficient evidence at a

previous trial, and absent double jeopardy protections,

a finding that insufficient evidence was offered at the

first trial would have no impact on the validity of the

second trial. We hold that a criminal defendant cannot

challenge the sufficiency of the evidence presented at

a previous trial following a conviction at a subsequent

trial.

VI

Robertson argues that there are three reasons

why the district court erred in allowing Todd Tillinger,

the Montana State Program Manager for the Corps

and Supervisory Civil Engineer, to testify as an expert

witness. First, Robertson asserts that because the law

on what constitutes a “water of the United States”

subject to CWA jurisdiction is unclear, “the subject

matter of [Tillinger’s] testimony was not suitable for

expert witness consideration.” Second, Tillinger’s

testimony was based on “guidance documents,” which

do not have the force of law. Finally, Robertson argues

that the district court should have rejected Tillinger

as an expert witness “because his jurisdictional

determination relied heavily on what is termed an

ordinary high water mark,” which Justice Kennedy

third trial if the Government presented insufficient evidence at

the first.” 371 F.3d 1093, 1104 (9th Cir. 2004). We explained that

“[t]he procedural posture of this case allows us to consider this

question because the third trial has not yet begun.” Id. at 1104–

05. We specifically declined to address the question of whether

defendants “could also use their first-trial insufficiency argument

to challenge their second trial on double jeopardy grounds.” Id.

at 1105 n.9.

Appendix A-23

rejected as the determinative measure of whether a

water is subject to the CWA.

Robertson’s arguments are not persuasive.

First, it is the district court—not an expert witness—

that instructs the jury on what the law is. See U.S. v.

Weitzsenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1287 (9th Cir. 1993). Here,

the court gave the jury clear instructions on both the

elements of a CWA violation, and the meaning of the

term “waters of the United States.” 4 As discussed

above, the law itself is not unclear. 5

Robertson’s second argument is both belied by

the record and beside the point. The expert disclosure

statement that Robertson relies upon for his

argument states that Tillinger “has substantial

training and experience in the identification and

classification of streams and wetlands to determine if

Jury Instruction 14 provided: “In order for you to find the

defendant guilty of the crimes contained in Counts I or III, the

government must prove each of the following elements beyond a

reasonable doubt . . . 3. That the discharge was to a ‘water of the

United States.’” Jury Instruction 22 provided: “The term ‘waters

of the United States’ includes traditional navigable waters and

tributaries and/or adjacent wetlands that have a significant

nexus to traditional navigable waters. A tributary or adjacent

wetland has a significant nexus to traditional navigable waters

if it (either alone or in combination with similarly situated water

bodies in the region) significantly affects the chemical, physical,

or biological integrity of traditional navigable waters.” These

instructions follow the standard set out in Justice Kennedy’s

concurrence, and that we adopted as controlling in City of

Healdsburg. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 780; City of Healdsburg,

496 F.3d at 999–1000.

4

5 Robertson does not assert that Tillinger improperly testified on

the ultimate issue of law. His argument appears to be that the

law is unclear, and it was improper for any expert to testify about

“waters of the United States.”

Appendix A-24

they are considered ‘waters of the United States’

subject to federal regulation under the Clean Water

Act (‘CWA’); implementing regulations; standards set

forth in the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in

Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006); and the

following EPA/Army Corps of Engineers post-Rapanos

guidance documents . . . .” Tillinger based his

evaluation on regulations, Rapanos, and guidance

documents.

It does not matter which sources of authority

(binding regulations or enforcement guidelines that

lack the force of law) Tillinger used in evaluating

waters and wetlands because it is the jury, using the

instructions provided by the judge, that ultimately

determines whether the creek and wetland at issue

were “waters of the United States.” See United States

v. Phillips, 367 F.3d 846, 855 n.25 (9th Cir. 2004)

(explaining that “whether the water is navigable [i.e.,

is subject to CWA jurisdiction] is part of one element

of a CWA violation,” which the Government can be

required to prove at trial).

Robertson’s

third

argument

is

also

unpersuasive. At the first trial, Tillinger testified that

in determining whether the channel had a continuous

or relatively permanent flow he looked for a high

water mark. 6 Although Justice Kennedy stated in

Rapanos that the presence of an ordinary high water

mark on a tributary could not be “the determinative

Robertson does not provide a citation for his assertion that

Tillinger’s jurisdictional determination relied on the ordinary

high water mark. The Government cites to Tillinger’s testimony

from the first trial. The parties do not direct us to any specific

testimony from the second trial where Tillinger allegedly relies

on the ordinary high water mark.

6

Appendix A-25

measure” of whether a wetland adjacent to that

tributary is covered by the CWA, he did not forbid the

consideration of an ordinary high water mark. See

Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 781. That Tillinger discussed

using a high water mark in his evaluation of whether

the channel next to the wetland was a tributary does

not render his testimony improper. Regardless, it was

the jury (not Tillinger) that—using the court’s

instructions that did not mention the ordinary high

water mark—made the final determination that the

creek and wetlands at issue were “waters of the

United States.” We reject Robertson’s challenges to

Tillinger’s testimony because there was no abuse of

discretion in allowing it.

VII

Robertson next argues that the district court

erred in excluding two documents: the U.S. Army

Corps of Engineers Jurisdictional Determination

Form Instruction Guidebook and the Crystal Mine

Study. He asserts that the district court should have

admitted the Manual because it would have permitted

Robertson to show that the Corps “was making its

jurisdictional determination on a factor expressly

forbidden by Justice Kennedy under his substantial

nexus test.” He argues that the district court should

have admitted the Crystal Mine Study because it

showed “that the water quality of the Cataract

drainage is very poor due to the extensive mining

activity,” and the Study “could have supported his

argument of insubstantial connection between the

wetlands and the Jefferson river.”

Appendix A-26

The district court did not abuse its discretion in

excluding either the Guidance Manual or the Crystal

Mine Study. The district court is given “wide latitude”

to determine “the admissibility of evidence because

[the trial judge] is in the best position to assess the

impact and effect of evidence based upon what [the

judge] perceives from the live proceedings of a trial.”

Layton, 767 F.2d at 554 (quoting United States v.

Ford, 632 F.2d 1354, 1377 (9th Cir. 1980)).

The district court explained that the Guidebook

is used by the Corps “in its performance of

jurisdictional determinations and, as such, discusses

the applicable regulations and the law.” The court

excluded the Guidebook under Federal Rule of

Evidence 403, concluding that “the danger of

confusing the issues and misleading the jury

substantially outweighed the potential probative

value of admitting the entire Guidebook.” As the

district court properly explained, the court provides

the law to the jury. See, e.g., Weitzsenhoff, 35 F.3d at

1287. The Guidance Manual explains how and when

the Corps will assert CWA jurisdiction over wetlands

and non-navigable tributaries. It was within the

district court’s discretion to conclude that the

Guidance Manual could confuse the jury because the

standards and considerations outlined in the Manual

were not the same as the jury instructions, i.e., the law

that the jury had to follow. 7 The district court did not

As explained above, Robertson’s arguments regarding

references to the Ordinary High Water Mark and how the Corps’

determines CWA jurisdiction are unpersuasive. The district

court provided jury instructions, and the jury (following those

instructions) made the determination that the discharge was into

“waters of the United States.” How the Corps makes CWA

7

Appendix A-27

abuse its discretion in excluding the Guidance

Manual.

The district court likewise did not abuse its

discretion in excluding the Crystal Mine Study. The

district court concluded that the Study was not

relevant and that “the potential prejudice from its

introduction strongly outweighs any probative value.”

It excluded the Study under Federal Rules of Evidence

401 and 403. The district court acted well within its

discretion. Whether a wetland or non-navigable water

has a significant nexus to a traditionally navigable

water has nothing to do with whether the traditionally

navigable water is healthy. Robertson does not

support his novel argument that a “significant nexus”

exists only when a wetland would be polluting an

otherwise clean water, with any authority. Also, this

argument undermines the very purpose of the CWA,

“to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and

biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” See 33

U.S.C. § 1251(a) (emphasis added). In light of this

purpose, it would not make sense to conclude that the

CWA protects only clean waters from pollution from

their non-navigable tributaries, because that would

disregard the CWA’s restoration purpose. The district

court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the

Crystal Mine Study, which addressed the existing

contamination in the watershed. 8 We reject

jurisdictional determinations is not controlling for the purposes

of this criminal appeal.

8 Robertson properly states that the standard of review for

decisions on the admissibility of evidence is abuse of discretion.

However, he also seems to suggest that the court should review

the decisions to determine whether exclusion of the evidence

resulted in constitutional error. Robertson does not present any

substantial argument as to how exclusion of either the Guidance

Appendix A-28

Robertson’s challenges to the district court’s rulings

on the rules of evidence. There was no abuse of

discretion. 9

AFFIRMED.

Manual or the Crystal Mine Study resulted in constitutional

error. Nor could he do so. As explained above, exclusion of both

pieces of evidence was proper. Not only that, but the district court

allowed Robertson to question witnesses using the Guidance

Manual and allowed Robertson to have the witness read relevant

portions of the Manual into the record.

9 Robertson argues that if we reverse on Counts I and III, those

counts will no longer be “offenses of conviction,” and “the district

court’s restitution order should be vacated and the issue should

be remanded for reconsideration.” Robertson does not otherwise

challenge the district court’s restitution order. Because we affirm

the convictions, we also affirm the restitution award.

Appendix B-1

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Filed July 10 2018

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JOSEPH DAVID ROBERTSON,

Defendant-Appellant.

No.

16-30178

D,C. No.

6:15-cr-00007-DWM-1

District of Montana,

Helena

ORDER

Before: McKEOWN and GOULD, Circuit Judges, and

ROTHSTEIN, * District Judge.

The Constitution Society’s and the Coalition of

Western Property Owners’s motion for leave to file

amicus curiae brief is GRANTED. The Clerk is

directed to file the brief that was received on June 29,

2018.

Appellant’s Petition for Rehearing is DENIED.

The full court has been advised of the Petition

for Rehearing En Banc and no judge of the court has

requested a vote on the Petition for Rehearing En

Banc. Fed. R. App. P. 35. Appellant’s Petition for

Rehearing En Banc is also DENIED.

The Honorable Barbara Jacobs Rothstein, United States

District Judge for the Western District of Washington, sitting by

designation.

Appendix C-1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

HELENA DIVISION DISTRICT OF MONTANA

UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA

V.

JOSEPH* DAVID

ROBERTSON

Date of Original

Judgment: 7/20/2016

(or Date of Last

Amended Judgment)

Reason for

Amendment:

AMENDED

JUDGMENT IN A

CRIMINAL CASE

Case Number: CR 15-07H-DWM

USM Number: 13726-046

Michael Donahoe

(appointed)

Defendant’s Attorney

Correction of

Sentence on

Remand (18 U.S.C.

3742(f)(1) and (2))

Modification of

Supervision Conditions

(18 U.S.C. §§ 3563(c) or

3583(e))

Reduction of

Sentence for

Chanced Circumstances

(Fed. R. Crim. P. 25(b))

Modification of

Imposed Term of

Imprisonment for

Extraordinary and

Compelling Reasons (18

U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1))

Correction of

Sentence by

Sentencing Court (Fed.

R. Crim. P. 35(a))

Correction of

Sentence for

Clerical Mistake (Fed.

R. Crim. P. 36)

Modification of

Imposed Term of

Imprisonment for

Retroactive

Amendments(s)

to the Sentencing

Guidelines (18 U.S.C. §

3582(c)(2))

Appendix C-2

Direct Motion to

District Court Pursuant

G28 U.S.C. § 2255 or G18

U.S.C. § 3559(c)(7)

THE DEFENDANT:

Modification of

Restitution Order (18

U.S.C. § 3664)

pleaded guilty to count(s)

pleaded nolo contendere to count(s)

which was accepted by the court.

was found guilty on count(s) I, II, III

after a plea of not guilty.

The defendant is adjudicated guilty of these offenses:

Title &

Section

33 U.S.C.

1311(a);

1319(c)(2)(A)

18 U.S.C.

1361, 2

Nature of

Offense

Unauthorized

Discharge of

Pollutants into

Waters of the

US

Offense

Ended

10/2014

Count

Malicious

Mischief-Injury

/Depredation of

Property of the

US

10/2014

II

I

The defendant is sentenced as provided in

pages 2 through 7 of this judgment. The sentence is

imposed pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of

1984.

Appendix C-3

The defendant has been found not guilty on

court(s)

Count(s)

G is G are dismissed on the

motion of the United States.

It is ordered that the defendant must notify the

United States Attorney for this district within 30 days

of any change of name, residence, or mailing address

until all fines, restitution, costs, and special

assessments imposed by this judgment are fully paid.

If ordered to pay restitution, the defendant must

notify the court and United States attorney of

material changes in economic circumstances.

FILED

Jul 26 2016

Clerk, U S

District

Court

District of

Montana

Missoula

7/26/2016

Date of Imposition of Judgment

s/ Donald W. Molloy

Signature of Judge

Donald W. Molloy, District Judge

Name of Judge

Title of Judge

July 26, 2016

Date

ADDITIONAL COUNTS OF CONVICTION

Title &

Section

33 U.S.C.

1311(a),

1319(c)(2)(A)

Nature of

Offense

Unauthorized

Discharge of

Pollutants into

Waters of the

US

Offense

Ended

05/2014

Count

III

Appendix C-4

IMPRISONMENT

The defendant is hereby committed to the

custody of the United States Bureau of Prisons to be

imprisoned for a total term of

Count I: 18 months, Count II: 18 Months, Count III:

18 months, the sentences to run concurrently.

The court makes the following recommendations

to the Bureau of Prisons:

The defendant is remanded to the custody of the

United States Marshal.

The defendant shall surrender to the United

States Marshal for this district:

G at _____________ G a.m. G p.m. on ___________.

G as notified by the United States Marshal.

The defendant shall surrender for service of

sentence at the institution designated by the

Bureau of Prisons:

G before 2 p.m. on

.

G as notified by the United States Marshal.

G as notified by the Probation of Pretrial Services

Office.

RETURN

I have executed this judgment as follows:

Defendant delivered on

to

at

with a certified copy of this judgment.

UNITED STATES MARSHAL

By

DEPUTY UNITED STATES MARSHAL

Appendix C-5

SUPERVISED RELEASE

Upon release from imprisonment, the

defendant shall be on supervised release for a term of

Count I: 1 year, Count II: 3 years, Count III: 1 year, to

run concurrently.

The defendant must report to the probation

office in the district to which the defendant is released

within 72 hours of release from the custody of the

Bureau of Prisons.

The defendant shall not commit another federal, state,

or local crime.

The defendant shall not unlawfully possess a

controlled substance. The defendant shall refrain from

any unlawful use of a controlled substance. The

defendant shall submit to one drug test within 15 days

of release from imprisonment and at least two periodic

drug tests thereafter, as determined by the court.

The above drug testing condition is suspended,

based on the court’s determination that the

defendant poses a low risk of future substance abuse.

(Check, if applicable.)

The defendant shall not possess a firearm,

ammunition, destructive device, or any other

dangerous weapon. (Check, if applicable.)

The defendant shall cooperate in the collection of

DNA a directed by the probation officer. (Check, if

applicable.)

The defendant shall register with the state sex

offender registration agency in the state where

the defendant resides, works, or is a student, as

Appendix C-6

directed by

applicable.)

the

probation

officer.

(Check,

if

The defendant shall participate in an approved

program for domestic violence. (Check, if

applicable.)

If this judgment imposes a fine or restitution, it

is a condition of supervised release that the defendant

pay in accordance with the Schedule of Payments

sheet of this judgment.

The defendant must comply with the standard

conditions that have been adopted by this court as well

as with any additional conditions on the attached

page.

STANDARD CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

1) the defendant shall not leave the judicial

district without the permission of the court or

probation officer;

2) the defendant shall report to the probation

officer in a manner and frequency directed by

the court or probation officer;

3) the defendant shall answer truthfully all

inquiries by the probation officer and follow the

instructions of the probation officer;

4) the defendant shall support his or her

dependents

and

meet

other

family

responsibilities;

5) the defendant shall work regularly at a lawful

occupation, unless excused by the probation

officer for schooling, training, or other

acceptable reasons;

Appendix C-7

6) the defendant shall notify the probation officer

at least ten days prior to any change in

residence or employment;

7) the defendant shall refrain from excessive use

of alcohol and shall not purchase, possess, use,

distribute, or administer any controlled

substance or any paraphernalia related to any

controlled substances, except as prescribed by a

physician;

8) the defendant shall not frequent places where

controlled substances are illegally sold, used

distributed, or administered;

9) the defendant shall not associate with any

persons engaged in criminal activity and shall

not associate with any person convicted of a

felony, unless granted permission to do so by

the probation officer;

10) the defendant shall permit a probation officer

to visit him or her at any time at home or

elsewhere and shall permit confiscation of any

contraband observed in plain view of the

probation officer;

11) the defendant shall notify the probation officer

within seventy-two hours of being arrested or

questioned by a law enforcement officer;

12) the defendant shall not enter into any

agreement to act as an informer or a special

agent of a law enforcement agency without the

permission of the court; and

13) as directed by the probation officer, the

defendant shall notify third parties of risks that

may be occasioned by the defendant’s criminal

record, personal history, or characteristics and

Appendix C-8

shall permit the probation officer to make such

notifications and confirm the defendant’s

compliance with such notification requirement.

SPECIAL CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

1. The defendant shall participate in and complete

a program of substance abuse treatment as

directed by the United States Probation Office,

until the defendant is released from the

program by the probation officer. The

defendant is to pay part or all of the cost of this

treatment, depending upon the defendant’s

ability to pay, as directed by the United States

Probation Office.

2. The defendant shall participate in a program

for mental health treatment as directed by the

United States Probation Office, until such time

as the defendant is released from the program

by the probation officer. The defendant is to pay

part or all of the cost of this treatment,

depending upon the defendant’s ability to pay,

as directed by the United States Probation

Office.

3. The defendant shall abstain from the

consumption of alcohol and shall not enter

establishments where alcohol is the primary

item of sale. This condition supersedes

standard condition number 7 with respect to

alcohol consumption only.

4. The defendant shall participate in substance

abuse testing, to include not more than 180

urinalysis test, not more than 180 breathalyzer

tests, and not more than 36 sweat patch

applications annually during the period of

Appendix C-9

supervision. The defendant shall pay all or part

of the costs of testing, depending upon the

defendant’s to pay, as directed by the United

States Probation Office.

5. The defendant will provide the United States

Probation Officer with any requested financial

information and shall incur no new lines of

credit in the defendant’s own name or in the

name of any other person or entity without

prior written approval of the United States

Probation Officer.

6. The defendant shall apply all monies received

from income tax refunds, lottery winnings,

judgments, and/or any other anticipated or

unexpected financial gains to the outstanding

court-ordered financial obligations regarding

restitution.

7. The defendant shall submit his person,

residence, place of employment, vehicles, and

papers, to a search, with or without a warrant

by any probation officer based on reasonable

suspicion of contraband or evidence in violation

of a condition of release. Failure to submit to

search may be grounds for revocation. The

defendant shall warn any other occupants,

adults and minors, that the premises may be

subject to searches pursuant to this condition.

The defendant shall allow seizure of suspected

contraband for further examination.

8. The defendant shall not possess a firearm,

ammunition, destructive devices, or any other

dangerous weapon. This prohibition extends to

all property and land on which he resides,

including all vehicles and structures to which

Appendix C-10

he has access. Upon release by the BOP, the

defendant

shall

remove

all

firearms,

ammunition, destructive devices, or any other

dangerous weapons within 5 days of the date of

release and provide written verification and

contact information for individuals taking

possession of the firearms, ammunition,

destructive devices, or any other dangerous

weapons.

9. The defendant shall not knowingly enter any

dwelling or house where firearms are present,

and shall not enter or stay in any dwelling or

house where there are one or more persons in

possession of firearms, without the prior

written approval of the supervising probation

officer. The defendant shall not knowingly

enter any automobile where a person possesses

a firearm, nor shall he allow anyone onto his

property if they are in possession of a firearm.

10. The defendant shall not possess any police

radio scanning devices or possess computer

hardware or software that would enable the

defendant to monitor law enforcement activity,

to include video and audio surveillance devices.

11. Restitution is ordered in the amount of

$129,933.50 to be paid following release at a

rate of $400 per month or as otherwise directed

by the United States Probation Office

depending upon the defendant’s ability to pay.

CRIMINAL MONETARY PENALTIES

The defendant must pay the following total

criminal monetary penalties under the schedule of

payments on Sheet 6.

Appendix C-11

Assessment

TOTALS

$ 300.00

Fine

Restitution

$

$129,933.50

G

The determination of restitution is deferred until ____

An Amended Judgment in a Criminal Case (AO

245C) will be entered after such determination.

O

The defendant shall make restitution (including

community restitution) to the following payees in

the amount listed below.

If the defendant makes a partial payment, each

payee

shall

receive

an

approximately

proportioned payment, unless specified otherwise

in the priority order or percentage payment

column below. However, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

§ 3664(i), all nonfederal victims must be paid

before the United States is paid.

Name of

Payee

Total Loss*

Restitution

Ordered

U.S.

Forest

Service

$129,933.50

$129,933.50

Priority or

Percentage

TOTALS $ 129,933.50 $129,933.50

Restitution amount ordered pursuant to plea

agreement $

The defendant must pay interest on restitution and

a fine of more than $2,500, unless the restitution or

fine is paid in full before the fifteenth day after the

date of the judgment, pursuant 18 U.S.C. § 3612(f).

All of the payment options on Sheet 6 may be

subject to penalties for delinquency and default,

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(g).

*Findings for the total amount of losses are required under

Chapters 109A, 110, 110A, and 113A of Title 18 for offenses

committed on or after September 13, 1994, but before April 23,

1996.

Appendix C-12

O The court determined that the defendant does not

have the ability to pay interest, and it is ordered that:

O the interest requirement is waived for

G fine

O restitution.

G the interest requirement for G fine

G restitution is modified as follows:

*Findings for the total amount of losses are required

under Chapters 109A, 110, 110A, and 113A of Title 18

for offenses committed on or after September 13, 1994,

but before April 23, 1996.

SCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS

Having assessed the defendant’s ability to pay,

payment of the total criminal monetary penalties

shall be due as follows:

A

O Lump sum payment

immediately, balance due

G Not later than

of

$300.00

due

, or

O In accordance with G C, G D, G E, or O F

below; or

B

G Payment to begin immediately (may be

combined with G C, G D, or G F below); or

C

G Payment in equal

(e.g., weekly,

monthly, quarterly) installments of $

over a period of

(e.g., months or

years), to commence

(e.g., 30 or 60

days) after the date of this judgment; or

D

G Payment in equal

(e.g., weekly,

monthly, quarterly) installments of $

Appendix C-13

over a period of

(e.g., months or

years), to commence

(e.g., 30 or 60

days) after release from imprisonment to a term

of supervision; or

E

G Payment during the term of supervised

release will commence within

(e.g.,

30 or 60 days) after release from imprisonment.

The court will set the payment plan based on an

assessment of the defendant’s ability pay at

that time; or

F

O Special instructions regarding the payment

of criminal monetary penalties:

Criminal monetary penalty payments

are due during imprisonment at the rate

of not less than $25.00 per quarter, and

payment shall be through the Bureau of

Prisons’ Inmate Financial Responsibility

Program. Criminal monetary payments

shall be made to the Clerk, United States

District Court, P.O. Box 8537, Missoula,

MT 59807.

Restitution in the amount of $129,933.50

is to be paid following release at a rate of

$400 per month or as otherwise directed

by the United States Probation Office

dependent upon your ability to pay.

Unless the court has expressly ordered otherwise, if

this judgment imposes imprisonment, payment of

criminal monetary penalties is due during the period

of imprisonment. All criminal monetary penalties,

except those payments made through the Federal

Bureau of Prisons’ Inmate Financial Responsibility

Program, are made to the clerk of the court.

Appendix C-14

The defendant shall receive credit for all payments

previously made toward any criminal monetary

penalties imposed.

Joint and Several

Defendant and Co-Defendant Names and Case

Numbers (including defendant number), Joint

and Several Amount, and corresponding payee, if

appropriate.

The defendant shall pay the cost of prosecution.

The defendant shall pay the following court

cost(s):

The defendant shall forfeit the defendant’s

interest in the following property to the United

States:

Payments shall be applied in the following order:

(1) assessment,

(2)

restitution

principal,

(3) restitution interest, (4) fine principal, (5) fine

interest, (6) community restitution, (7) penalties, and

(8) costs, including cost of prosecution and court costs.

Appendix D-1

JoAnn Corson Bacheller

Registered Diplomate Reporter

Certified Realtime Reporter

P.O. Box 8006

Missoula, Montana 59807-8006

406/829-7123 office

406/542-7272 fax

joann_bacheller@mtd.uscourts.gov

United States Court Reporter

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA

HELENA DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) No. CR 15-7-H-DWM

Plaintiff,

)

) TRANSCRIPT OF

vs.

)

SENTENCING

)

JOSEPH DAVID ROBERTSON, )

Defendant.

)

BEFORE THE HONORABLE DONALD W. MOLLOY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA

Russell Smith United States Courthouse

201 East Broadway

Missoula, Montana 59802

Wednesday, July 20, 2016

10:02:27 to 13:15:32

Proceedings recorded by machine shorthand

Transcript produced by computer-assisted transcription

Appendix D-2

APPEARANCES

For the Plaintiff:

MR. BRYAN R. WHITTAKER

Assistant U.S. Attorney

901 Front Street, Suite 1100

Helena, Montana 59626

MR. ERIC E. NELSON

Special Assistant U.S.

Attorney

U.S. Environmental

Protection Agency

Box 25227

Denver, Colorado 80225

For the Defendant:

MR. MICHAEL DONAHOE

Attorney at Law

Federal Defenders of Montana

50 West 14th Street, Suite

300

Helena, Montana 59624

[27]

*****

THE COURT: . . .

I think there is a remarkably complete and good

record made in this case, particularly by the efforts of

Mr. Donahoe, to raise this serious legal question, but

I think it’s a situation where I am going to abide by

the decisions that I’ve made in the past. It does require

an answer, and I think that the Ninth Circuit is the

correct authority to answer the question, if not the

Appendix D-3

United States Supreme Court. And I think that the

record in this case probably is as good a record for

answering the question of what are waters of the

United States of any of the cases, I think, that exist.

*****

[78]

*****

start.

THE COURT: Well, that may be. But let me

And where I will start is basically the critical

and essential question, and that is that the Congress

of the United States enacted the statutes and required

the Corps of Engineers and the EPA to enforce the

law.

However, as has been pointed out in the

extensive arguments here today, that there are

significant legal questions in the Supreme Court itself

about how to define “waters of the United States.”

So I’m going to start with a quote from the chief

justice, who said, “It is unfortunate,” in talking about

the Rapanos decision, “It is unfortunate that no

opinion,” of the Supreme Court, “commands a majority

of the court on precisely how to read Congress’ limits

on the reach of the Clean Water Act. Lower courts and

regulated entities will now have to feel their way on a

case-by-case basis.”

[79]

*****

. . . . Joseph David Robertson has owned

numerous patented and unpatented mining claims in

Jefferson County.

Appendix D-4

A patented claim is a valid mining claim that

has been sold by the government to an individual and

is no longer public land. Both the land and the

minerals contained in it become the property of the

patent holder.

On the other hand, an unpatented claim is a

possessory interest in a particular area solely for the

purpose of mining, and it reserves to the United States

the right to manage and dispose of surface resources.

And the use of an unpatented mining claim on

public land is limited to activities that are reasonably

incident to prospecting, mining, and processing

operations and subject to the right of the United

States to manage the surface resources.

Mr. Robertson and his wife, Carri Robertson,

[80] currently own and reside on a 20-acre parcel

known as the White Pine Lode. White Pine Lode is

adjacent to an unpatented parcel of national Forest

Service lands directly to the south, which is known as

the Mohawk Lode, and a third patented parcel known

as the Manhattan Lode, consisting of approximately

14 acres, and that is adjacent to the south of the

Mohawk Lode.

An unnamed tributary flows through all three

parcels and eventually runs into Cataract Creek

approximately 1 mile from the parcels. Cataract Creek

is a tributary of the Boulder River, which is a

tributary of the Jefferson River. The Jefferson River is

a traditionally navigable water of the United States.

That is a fact the parties agreed to before the trial of

this defendant.

*****

[97]

Appendix D-5

*****

He is a veteran of the Navy. He claims that he

is a Vietnam-era veteran with posttraumatic stress.

He has been hospitalized on several occasions and, as

indicated, completed the TRU program through the

Veterans Administration.

*****

Appendix E-1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA

HELENA DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

vs.

JOSEPH DAVID ROBERTSON,

Defendant.

CR 15-07-H-DWM

ORDER

FILED

May 23, 2016

Clerk, U.S. Courts

District of Montana,

Missoula Division

A jury trial was held April 4 through April 7,

2016. After the close of the government’s case,

Defendant Joseph Robertson moved for acquittal as to

all three counts of the Indictment pursuant to Rule 29

of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Trial Tr.

590-98.) That motion was denied. Robertson renewed

his motion at the close of all the evidence, and the

Court reserved ruling, Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(b).

(Trial Tr. 830.) On April 7, 2016, the jury returned

guilty verdicts on all three counts: two violations of

the Clean Water Act (Counts I, III) and one count of

willful injury to property of the United States

(Count II). (Doc. 204.) On April 21, 2016, Robertson

renewed his motions and moved for a new trial

pursuant to Rule 33. (Doc. 213.) His motions are

denied.

1

1 The first jury trial in this case occurred on October 5 to 8, 2015,

and resulted in a hung jury. (See Doc. 78. Decl. of Mistrial.) A

second trial was set on December 14, 2015, (Doc. 79), but

Robertson did not appear due to alleged medical issues, and it

was continued, (see Doc. 135).

Appendix E-2

I.

Rule 29—Sufficiency of the Evidence

Pursuant to Rule 29(c)(2), “[i]f the jury has

returned a guilty verdict, the court may set aside the

verdict and enter an acquittal.” A Rule 29 motion may

not be granted if “viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of

fact could have found the essential elements of the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); United States v.

Nevils, 598 F .3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 2010). Here,

Robertson contends the evidence presented at trial

was insufficient to support a conviction. For Count II,

he argues that the government failed to present

evidence of property boundaries. For Counts I and III,

he argues that the evidence presented was insufficient

to show that the waters in question are “waters of the

United States.” 2 Those arguments are addressed in

turn.

A.

Count II: Property of United States

Count II charges Robertson with willfully

injuring property of the United States. Robertson

argues that the government failed to present evidence

as to the property boundary. (See Trial Tr. 592-93.) He

is incorrect. Agent Fisher testified at some length to

the various property boundaries in the area. (Id. at 8792). Two surveys were conducted by the Forest

Service, (id. at 88; see Ex. 47), and the boundaries

were marked, (Trial Tr. 88; see Ex. 2u (depicting red

2 Robertson raises numerous arguments for the first time in his

reply brief that are not addressed herein. Thompson v. Comm’r,

631 F.2d 642, 649 (9th Cir. 1980). Even if the Court were to

consider his untimely arguments, the issues he raises have been

previously considered and rejected. (See Docs. 37, 107, 117, 172,

& 175.)

Appendix E-3

and yellow corner boundary marker); Ex. 2v (depicting

yellow boundary sign and red paint on tree)). The

record also includes the property record from the

Montana Cadastral. (Trial Tr. 533; Ex. 58.)

Additionally, both Agent Fisher and Agent Siler

testified to where the property line fell in relation to

the ponds, indicating that at least five ponds are on

National Forest System lands. (Trial Tr. 106, 121-22

(Fisher); 571, 578-79 (Siler).) The evidence presented

was sufficient for a rational juror to conclude beyond

a reasonable doubt that the property at issue in Count

II belonged to the United States.

B.

Counts I, III: Clean Water Act

Robertson further argues that the government

failed to present sufficient proof to show that the

waters at issue in Counts I and III were “waters of the

United States,” a necessary element of the Clean

Water Act. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). His position is

belied by the record.

As a starting point, sufficient evidence was

presented from which a rational juror could find that

the tributary and its adjacent wetlands have a

hydrological connection with traditionally navigable

waters. While a mere hydrological connection is

insufficient to establish the existence of a significant

nexus, Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 785

(2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring), such a connection is

relevant because completely isolated waters are

generally beyond the Clean Water Act’s scope, Solid

Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of

Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 171-72, 174 (2001). Here, the

parties agree that the Jefferson River is a

traditionally navigable water. (Instr. No. 22, Doc. 196

at 23.) During his testimony, Todd Tillinger, a civil

Appendix E-4

engineer with the Army Corps of Engineers, outlined

the Cataract Creek watershed, including the drainage

in question, (Trial Tr. 401-06; Exs. 13, 15, 17), and

explained the hydrological connection between the

unnamed tributary and the Jefferson River, via

Cataract Creek and the Boulder River, (Trial Tr. 398,

406). Tillinger showed an aerial image of the length of

the stream, (id. at 407-11; Ex. 18), and discussed

walking the entire length of the tributary from the

ponds to Cataract Creek, noting the tributary’s flow

the entire length of the way, (Trial Tr. 425-35 (October

2014 site visit); 440-41 (November 2015 site visit)).

Richard Clark, an environmental scientist for the

Environmental Protection Agency and an expert in

the field of identification and classification of

wetlands, also testified to walking the length of the

tributary and observing both a defined bed and bank,

as well as flowing water. (Id. at 489.)

Additionally, Scott Gillilan, an aquatic

restoration expert, testified that he performed a visual

flow test on the tributary near the ponds, estimating

the tributary’s flow at 8-16 gallons per minute. (Id. at

519; see also id. at 693 (defense witness Gary Hopkins

testified that flow at end of tributary into Cataract

Creek measured 8 gallons per minute); Ex. 28 at

p. 296 (Plan of Operations indicating that at least 2-5

gallons per minute were flowing in area prior to

disturbance).) And, both Agent Fisher and Agent Siler

stated that every time they visited the site they saw

water flowing in the still-existing portions of the

tributary near the ponds. (Trial Tr. 131, 145 (Fisher);

576 (Siler).) Viewed as a whole, this evidence was

sufficient for a jury to find a hydrological connection

even with the possibility that the tributary was

entirely frozen during portions of the year. (See, e.g.,

Appendix E-5

Trial Tr. 306, 335); United States v. Moses, 496 F.3d

984, 990-91 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding intermittent,

seasonal streams can be waters of the United States).

The next question then is whether there was

sufficient evidence presented to show that the

hydrological connection was chemically, physically, or

biologically significant. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 780

(Kennedy, J., concurring). There was. Tillinger

testified at length about the chemical, physical, and

biological effects this tributary and adjacent wetland

have on the water system. (See Trial Tr. 374-78, 43539.) Darin Watschke, a fisheries biologist for the

United States Forest Service, and Ron Spoon, a

fisheries biologist with the Montana Fish, Wildlife and

Parks, both testified that the turbidity and

temperatures of the water in the tributary and

adjacent wetlands at issue affect downstream waters,

impacting fish populations in Cataract Creek and the

Jefferson River. (Id. at 286, 290-91 (Watschke), 236,

247, 249-50 (Spoon).) Clark testified to the existence

of wetland conditions at the site, (id. at 495-97;

Exs. 61, 62, 63), and identified the wetlands as “high

watershed wetlands, or upland watersheds” that

affect water temperatures, flood and erosion control,

and animal and insect habitat for the entire system,

(Trial Tr. 498-501). Gillilan also remarked on the

nature of the undisturbed wetlands he was able to

view between and around the ponds, describing them

as “pristine and high quality, good condition. Very

diverse wetland and very healthy.” (Id. at 518.)

Gillilan further commented on the high quality of the

tributary based on the important role small

headwater stream systems such as this play in the

larger water system. (Id. at 432-34, 522.) He explained

how the headwaters streams and wetlands act as a

Appendix E-6

giant sponge for the watershed, filtering sediments,

processing

nutrients,

and

regulating

water

temperature, noting that “everything is cumulative.”

(Id. at 523.) Tillinger and Spoon also emphasized the

cumulative impact of this tributary and its adjacent

wetlands based on other similarly situated

headwaters tributaries in the area. (Id. at 402, 476

(Tillinger); 257, 274 (Spoon).)

To the extent that Robertson’s argument is

premised on the idea that the government was

required to show the results of various tests or that

Robertson’s discharge caused harm to traditional

navigable waterways, such a showing is not required

under the law. See United States v. Iverson, 162 F.3d

1015, 1021 (9th Cir. 1998) (affirming district court’s

decision not to give instruction that required

government to show pollutive effect). Construing the

proof in the light most favorable to the government,

sufficient evidence was presented from which a

rational juror could find that the significant nexus test

was met for both the tributary and its adjacent

wetlands.

II.

Rule 33—New Trial on Counts I and III

Robertson further requests a new trial

pursuant to Rule 33 as to Counts I and III for the

improper exclusion of the EPA/Corps Guidance

Manual, (Ex. 549), and for prohibiting defense counsel

from questioning Mr. Spoon on, and refusing to grant

judicial notice of, the Crystal Mine Study, (see Doc. 65

(offer of proof)). A “court may vacate any judgment and

grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires.”

Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a). In considering a motion for a

new trial, district courts are not obliged to view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, but

Appendix E-7

are free to weigh the evidence and evaluate the

credibility of witnesses. United States v. Kellington,

217 F.3d 1084, 1097 (9th Cir. 2000).

Robertson first argues the Court erred in

refusing to admit Exhibit 549, a guidance manual

titled “U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Jurisdictional

Determination Form Instruction Guidebook.” He is

incorrect. Exclusion of the Guidebook was proper

under Rule 403 as the danger of confusing the issues

and misleading the jury substantially outweighed the

potential probative value of admitting the entire

Guidebook. The Guidebook is used by the Army Corps

of Engineers in its performance of jurisdictional

determinations and, as such, discusses the applicable

regulations and the law. It is well settled, however,

that while questions of fact are to be decided by the

jury, questions of law are to be decided by the Court.

See United States v. Amparo, 68 F.3d 1222, 1224 (9th

Cir. 1995) (“While the jury is the arbiter of the facts,

the judge is the arbiter of the law: the judge must be

permitted to instruct the jury on the law and to insist

that the jury follow his instructions.”). Regardless of

the status of the law under the Clean Water Act or

how the law was explained in the Guidebook, the jury

was instructed on a comprehensible standard that it

was to follow. Moreover, defense counsel questioned

Tillinger about certain provisions in the Guidebook,

(Trial Tr. 456-57 (asking Tillinger about ditches)), and

was given the opportunity to have the witness read

relevant portions of the Guidebook into the record

pursuant to Rule 803(18), which allows for a

statement contained in a learned treatise that is relied

upon by the expert on direct examination and is

established as a reliable authority by the expert’s

Appendix E-8

testimony to be read into evidence, but not received,

(id. at 465).

Finally, Robertson insists a new trial is

warranted because the Court did not judicially note

nor allow defense counsel to question Mr. Spoon on the

Crystal Mine Study. (Doc. 65.) Robertson argues that

the failure to do so gave the distorted picture of

Cataract Creek as a healthy waterway despite

extensive mining pollution. The exclusion was

appropriate because the significant nexus test is not

contingent on a healthy watershed. Iverson, 162 F.3d

at 1021. The Crystal Mine Study is not relevant, Fed.

R. Evid. 401, and the potential prejudice from its

introduction strongly outweighs any probative value,

Fed. R. Evid. 403.

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Robertson’s

motions for acquittal and for a new trial (Doc. 213) are

DENIED.

Dated this 23rd day of May, 2016.

s/ Donald W. Molloy

Donald W. Molloy, District Judge

United States District Court

Appendix F-1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA

HELENA DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

vs.

JOSEPH DAVID ROBERTSON,

Defendant.

CR 15-07-H-DWM

VERDICT

FILED

April 7, 2016

Clerk, U.S. District

Court

District of Montana

Missoula

1.

We, the Jury in the above-entitled

matter, unanimously find the defendant, Joseph

David Robertson:

Not Guilty

X

Guilty

of unauthorized discharge of pollutants into waters of

the United States, as charged in Count I of the

indictment.

2.

We, the Jury in the above-entitled

matter, unanimously find the defendant, Joseph

David Robertson:

Not Guilty

X

Guilty

of malicious mischief/injury to property of the United

States, as charged in Count II of the indictment.

Appendix F-2

3.

We, the Jury in the above-entitled

matter, unanimously find the defendant, Joseph

David Robertson:

Not Guilty

X

Guilty

of unauthorized discharged of pollutants into waters

of the United States, as charged in Count III of the

indictment.

Date this 7th day of April, 2016.

Foreperson signature redacted. Original document

filed under seal.

Appendix G-1

JoAnn Corson Bacheller

Registered Diplomata Reporter

Certified Realtime Reporter

P. O. Box 8006

Missoula, Montana 59807-8006

406/829-7123 office

406/542-7272 fax

joann_bacheller@mtd.uscourts.gov

United States Court Reporter

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA

HELENA DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

vs.

JOSEPH DAVID ROBERTSON,

Defendant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CR 15-7-H-DWM

VOLUME 1

TRANSCRIPT OF

JURY TRIAL

BEFORE THE HONORABLE DONALD W. MOLLOY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA

Russell Smith United States Courthouse

201 East Broadway

Missoula, Montana 59802

Monday, April 4, 2016

08:05:32 to 09:18:05, 12:08:01 to 17:07:10

Proceedings recorded by machine shorthand

Transcript produced by computer-assisted transcription

Appendix G-2

[184]

*****

MR. WHITTAKER: The government calls Tom

Carey.

THE COURT: Mr. Carey, would you come all

the way up to the front, in front of the clerk here, raise

your right hand and be sworn?

(Oath administered to the witness.)

THE COURT: Have a seat right over here.

Would you tell the jury your full name? And, if you

would, spell your last name for them.

THE WITNESS: Thomas Gilbert Carey, Jr.,

C-a-r-e-y.

*****

[203]

*****

Q

Okay. And is that channel that you’re talking

about, how wide is it?

A

It was probably a foot wide.

Q

And about 18 inches deep? Is that what you’re

saying?

A

If I remember correctly, yes.

*****

[213]

VOLUME 1 REPORTER’S CERTIFICATE

I, JoAnn Corson Bacheller, a Registered

Diplomate Reporter and Certified Realtime Reporter,

Appendix G-3

certify that the foregoing transcript is a true and

correct record of the proceedings given at the time and

place hereinbefore mentioned; that the proceedings

were reported by me in machine shorthand and

thereafter reduced to typewriting using computerassisted transcription; that after being reduced to

typewriting, a certified copy of this transcript will be

filed electronically with the Court.

I further certify that I am not attorney for, nor

employed by, nor related to any of the parties or

attorneys to this action, nor financially interested in

this action.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have set my hand

at Missoula, Montana this 14th day of April, 2016.

/s/ JoAnn Corson Bacheller

JoAnn Corson Bacheller

United States Court Reporter

Appendix G-4

JoAnn Corson Bacheller

Registered Diplomate Reporter

Certified Realtime Reporter

P. O. Box 8006

Missoula, Montana 59807-8006

406/829-7123 office

406/542-7272 fax

joann_bacheller@mtd.uscourts.gov

United States Court Reporter

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA

HELENA DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

vs.

JOSEPH DAVID ROBERTSON,

Defendant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CR 15-7-H-DWM

VOLUME 2

TRANSCRIPT OF

JURY TRIAL

BEFORE THE HONORABLE DONALD W. MOLLOY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA

Russell Smith United States Courthouse

201 East Broadway

Missoula, Montana 59802

Tuesday, April 5, 2016

08:17:18 to 17:16:51

Proceedings recorded by machine shorthand

Transcript produced by computer-assisted transcription

Appendix G-5

*****

[230]

*****

WHEREUPON,

MR. RONALD L. SPOON, called for

examination by counsel for plaintiff, after having been

first duly sworn to testify the truth, the whole truth,

and nothing but the truth, testified as follows:

*****

[243]

Q

Okay. How would you describe the stream?

A

It was a small stream that runs through a

meadow with timber on both sides of this meadow, and

a stream that’s less than a foot or two wide and less

than a foot deep.

*****

[367]

MR. NELSON: The government calls Todd

Tillinger.

THE COURT: Would you come up to the front

of the room, in front of the clerk here, raise your right

hand, and be sworn as a witness?

(Oath administered to the witness.)

THE COURT: Have a seat right over here,

please. Would you please tell the jury your full name?

THE WITNESS: My name is Todd Nicholas

Tillinger.

*****

Appendix G-6

[403]

I’d like to show you Exhibit 15, which is already

in evidence.

And what is the jury looking at here?

A

This is a printout from the same software

package but it’s a—it’s the same image you would find

on the 1-to-24,000 or 7.5-minute USGS quadrangle

map. The ponds, you can see the place right there, it

says “Ponds,” and it’s got a latitude and longitude on

it. This is a zoomed-in view of the bottom part of that

Cataract Creek watershed. Cataract Creek would go

from the top of the screen, flowing from the top to the

bottom. And then there’s a solid blue line here that

goes up, and there’s another blue line that comes in

down here, and the pond area would be, you know, up

in this area.

*****

[406]

*****

Q

All right. I’d like to show you Exhibit 17. And is

this another topographic map, different scale?

A

It is. It’s a slightly zoomed-out scale, 1 to

250,000. And again, the pond area is in the same

location here, but it’s zoomed out far enough that you

have, you know, Cataract Creek coming down here.

You’ve got the Boulder River coming this way,

eventually flowing into the Jefferson River. And the

Jefferson River comes here, joins—the Boulder joins

it.

*****

Appendix G-7

[427]

*****

But the channel is there. I mean, it’s a

continuous channel about 1 to 2 feet wide, you know,

6 inches deep, and

*****

[432]

*****

Q

All right. I’d like to show you Exhibit 23A,

which is already in evidence so the jury can see it.

A

Okay.

Q

Could you describe what we’re looking at there?

A

Yeah. This is my right arm and hand. There’s a

GPS unit, a little hand-held like you’d use on a hike or

a backpacking trip. And this is a small channel here.

It gives you an idea of the size of channel at this place.

It’s, you know, several inches deep. And this is, this is

representative of the size and scale of channel that

flows for almost half a mile down to Cataract Creek.

*****

[514]

*****

THE WITNESS: My name is Scott Gillilan,

G-i-l-l-i-l-a-n.

THE COURT: And, Mr. Gillilan, what city do

you live in?

THE WITNESS: I live in Bozeman.

Appendix G-8

THE COURT: And what is your profession or

occupation?

THE WITNESS: I am a hydrologist.

THE COURT: Mr . Nelson.

WHEREUPON,

MR. SCOTT GILLILAN, called for examination

by counsel for plaintiff, after having been first duly

sworn to testify the truth, the whole truth, and

nothing but the truth, testified as follows:

*****

[519]

*****

Q

Did you try to estimate or could you estimate,

just based on visual observation, some estimate of the

amount of flow?

A

Yeah. I estimated, when I was out in the field,

8 to 16 gallons per minute. Basically two or three

garden hoses at one time are about, you know, three

or four minutes to fill a 55-gallon drum.

*****

[550]

VOLUME 2 REPORTER’S CERTIFICATE

I, JoAnn Corson Bacheller, a Registered

Diplomate Reporter and Certified Realtime Reporter,

certify that the foregoing transcript is a true and

correct record of the proceedings given at the time and

place hereinbefore mentioned; that the proceedings

were reported by me in machine shorthand and

thereafter reduced to typewriting using computerassisted transcription; that after being reduced to

Appendix G-9

typewriting, a certified copy of this transcript will be

filed electronically with the Court.

I further certify that I am not attorney for, nor

employed by, nor related to any of the parties or

attorneys to this action, nor financially interested in

this action.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have set my hand

at Missoula, Montana this 15th day of April, 2016.

/s/ JoAnn Corson Bacheller

JoAnn Corson Bacheller

United States Court Reporter

JoAnn Corson Bacheller

Appendix G-10

Registered Diplomate Reporter

Certified Realtime Reporter

P.O. Box 8006

Missoula, Montana 59807-8006

406/829-7123 office

406/542-7272 fax

joann_bacheller@mtd.uscourts.gov

United State

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