Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Martin Siegel, et al., Petitioners v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., et al.
Supreme Court briefNov 5, 2018
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
No. 18In the
Supreme Court of the United States
MARTIN SIEGEL, et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
DELTA AIR LINES, INC.; AND
AIRTRAN AIRWAYS, INC.,
Respondents.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United
States Court of A ppeals for the Eleventh Circuit
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Kevin Russell
Goldstein & Russell, P.C.
7475 Wisconsin Avenue,
Suite 850
Bethesda, MD 20814
(202) 362-0636
Daniel L. Low
Counsel of Record
Kotchen & Low LLP
1745 Kalorama Rd., NW,
Suite 101
Washington, D.C. 20009
(202) 471-1995
dlow@kotchen.com
Counsel for Petitioners
284446
A
(800) 274-3321 • (800) 359-6859
i
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether there is an exception to liability under the
price-fixing provision of the Sherman Antitrust Act for
conspiratorial price-fixing agreements reached through
invitations to collude on public investor earnings calls?
ii
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
AND RULE 29.6 STATEMENT
Pursuant to this Court’s Rule 14 1(b), the following
were parties to the proceeding in the court whose
judgment is sought to be reviewed and are not named in
the caption above:
Avery Insurance Group, Inc.
Dahl, Carla
Gale, Laura
Jachimowicz, Henryk
Powell, Stephen
Terry, David
Pursuant to this Court’s Rule 29.6, undersigned
counsel state that Petitioner Avery Insurance Group, Inc.
is not a publicly held or traded corporation, that it has no
parent corporation, that no corporation owns ten percent
(10%) or more of its stock, and that there is not any other
entity related to, or affiliated with, Avery Insurance
Group, Inc. that has a financial interest in the outcome of
the claims asserted in this case.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTION PRESENTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
AND RULE 29.6 STATEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
TABLE OF APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI . . . . . . . 1
OPINIONS BELOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
JURISDICTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED . . . . . . . . . . 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
I.
Factual History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
II. Procedural History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.
District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.
Court of Appeals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION . . . . 10
iv
Table of Contents
Page
I.
C e r t i or a r i S ho u ld B e G r a nt e d t o
Determine Whether The Eleventh Circuit
Properly Created a New Exception to
the Per Se Prohibition on Horizontal
Price Fixing Where Collusion Is Invited
on a Public Investor Earnings Call. . . . . . . . . . . 10
A. The Eleventh Circuit Defied This
Court’s Long-Standing Per Se Rule
by Consider ing Pro- Competitive
Benefits of Permitting Invitations to
Collude on Public Earnings Calls. . . . . . . . 11
B. The Eleventh Circuit Created a
Conflict with Other Courts by Finding
That Liability for a Horizontal Pricefixing Conspiracy Depends on the
Means of Unlawful Coordination. . . . . . . . 13
C. The Antitrust Enforcement Agencies
Disagree with the Eleventh Circuit
A b out W he t he r I n v it a t ion s t o
C ol lude on I n ve s t or Ea r n i n g s
Calls Are Actionable. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
D. The Eleventh Circuit’s Decision Is of
Great Significance, as Allowing PriceFixing Via Investor Earnings Calls
Would Result in Vast Overcharges to
Purchasers, Such as the Billions in
Overcharges to Petitioners. . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
v
TABLE OF APPENDICES
Page
APPENDIX A — OPINION OF THE UNITED
STAT ES COU RT OF A PPEA LS FOR
T H E ELE V EN T H CI RCU I T, FI LED
MARCH 9, 2018 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1a
A ppendix B — J U DGMEN T of the
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
GEORGIA, ATLANTA DIVISION, FILED
MARCH 29, 2017 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3a
A PPEN DI X C — OR DER OF T H E
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
GEORGIA, ATLANTA DIVISION, FILED
MARCH 28, 2017 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4a
APPENDIX D — DENIAL OF REHEARING
OF T H E U N I T ED S TA T E S C OU RT
OF A PPEA LS FOR THE ELEV ENTH
CIRCUIT, FILED JUNE 8, 2018 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78a
vi
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
FTC v. Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n,
493 U.S. 411 (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 12, 17
Holiday Wholesale Grocery Co. v.
Philip Morris, Inc.,
231 F. Supp. 2d 1253 (N.D. Ga. 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
In re Delta/AirTran Baggage Fee Antitrust
Litig.,
846 F. Supp. 2d 1335 (N.D. Ga. 2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
In re Delta/AirTran Baggage Fee Antitrust
Litig.,
733 F. Supp. 2d 1348 (N.D. Ga. 2010) . . . . . . . . . . 8, 14
In re Domestic Airline Travel Antitrust Litig.,
221 F. Supp. 3d 46 (D.D.C. 2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15, 19
In re Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig.,
906 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 14
In re Travel Agency Comm’n Antitrust Litig.,
898 F. Supp. 685 (D. Minn. 1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
In re Valassis Commc’ns, Inc.,
FTC File No. 051-0008 (Apr. 19, 2006) . . . . . . . . 14, 16
Interstate Circuit v. United States,
306 U.S. 208 (1939) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 13
vii
Cited Authorities
Page
Liu v. Amerco,
677 F.3d 489 (1st Cir. 2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574 (1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp.,
465 U.S. 752 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States,
356 U.S. 1 (1958) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Petruzzi’s IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v.
Darling-Delaware Co.,
998 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Standard Iron Works v. ArcelorMittal,
639 F. Supp. 2d 877 (N.D. Ill. 2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
310 U.S. 150 (1940) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 12
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co.,
273 U.S. 392 (1927) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris USA,
346 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 13
viii
Cited Authorities
Page
STATUTES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES
15 U.S.C. § 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
ABA, 2017 Annual Review, 1-1 Antitrust Law
Developments 1B(1)(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Analysis of Agreement Containing Consent
Order, U-Haul Int’l , Inc. v. A MERCO,
FTC File No. 081-0157 (June 9, 2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Analysis of Agreement, In re Valassis Commc’ns,
Inc., FTC File No. 051-0008 (Mar. 14, 2006) . . . . . . 16
Ass’n of Corporate Counsel, Antitrust Enforcement
& Hot Topics Forum (May 17, 2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Comment, Does the FTC’s Section 5 Statement
Impose Limits on the Commission’s Unfair
Me t h o d s of C o m p e t i t i o n Au t h o r i t y?,
13 J.L. Econ. & Pol’y 243 (2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
David L. Hanselman et al., Bag Fee Case
Highlights Antitrust Risk of Public Statements,
Law360 (Apr. 11, 2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
ix
Cited Authorities
Page
Matthew J. Piehl & Daniel S. Graulich, When
Talk Is “Cheap”: Antitrust Risk for Earnings
Calls After In re Delta/AirTran Baggage
Fee Litigation, A BA, Transportation &
Energy Industries Comm. of the Section
of Antitrust Law (Summer 2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Matthew Perlman, Eleventh Circuit Affirms
Delta , AirTran Win in Bag-Fee MDL,
Law360 (Mar. 12, 2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Paula W. Render et al., Sending the Wrong
Message? Antitrust Liability for Signaling,
31 Antitrust, No. 1 (2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
R . Posner, Antitr ust Law: An Economic
Perspective 146 (1976) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Richard M. Steuer et al., The Application of
Antitrust to Public Companies’ Disclosures,
63 Admin. L. Rev. 159 (2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Wi l l i a m C. Hol mes, 1992 Antitr u st Law
Handbook § 1.03(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
W i l l i a m H . Pa g e , Ta c i t A g r e e m e n t
Un d er Sec tio n 1 of th e Sh er m an Act,
81 Antitrust L.J. 593 (2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioners respectfully petition for a writ of certiorari
to review the judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in this case.
OPINIONS BELOW
The court of appeals order (Pet. App. 1a-2a) is not
published, but is available at 714 F. App’x 986 (March 9,
2018) or 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 6028 (March 9, 2018), reh’g
and reh’g en banc denied by 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 15595
(11th Cir. June 8, 2018) (Pet. App. 78a-79a). The district
court’s opinion (Pet. App. 4a-77a) is published at 245 F.
Supp. 3d 1343 (N.D. Ga. 2017) and the accompanying
judgment is included at Pet. App. 3a.
JURISDICTION
The court of appeals issued its judgment on March 9,
2018, and denied Petitioners’ timely request for rehearing
en banc on June 8, 2018. On August 29, 2018, Justice
Thomas granted a timely application to extend the time
to file this Petition to November 5, 2018. App. No. 18A218.
This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The Sherman Antitrust Act provides, in relevant
part: “Every contract, combination in the form of trust
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade . . . is
declared to be illegal.” 15 U.S.C. § 1.
2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
It is well settled that, absent direct evidence, to
survive summary judgment when alleging a horizontal
price-fixing conspiracy, plaintiffs must present evidence
of parallel conduct accompanied by one or more “plus
factors,” such as an invitation to collude. In this case,
Plaintiffs presented evidence of an invitation to collude.
Specifically, AirTran made clear in a public earnings call
that if AirTran’s principal competitor, Delta, imposed a
fee for first checked bags, AirTran would also impose
the fee. The lower courts did not doubt that Plaintiffs
presented evidence a jury could conclude was an invitation
to collude, but they nonetheless carved out an exception
for invitations to collude extended on a public earnings call
under the theory that the investing public has a legitimate
interest in knowing whether a company would follow the
price leading of a competitor.
But horizontal price-fixing conspiracies are subject to
the per se rule, under which this Court and others have
uniformly prohibited the consideration of pro-competitive
benefits in determining whether a conspiratorial agreement
constitutes an anticompetitive restraint on trade under the
Sherman Act. The Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished decision
here defies these precedents. In addition, courts have
consistently held that the form of communication used in
reaching a price-fixing conspiracy does not determine its
legality. And courts have permitted price-fixing actions to
proceed that are based on invitations to collude on investor
earnings calls, and antitrust enforcement agencies have
initiated investigations based on such invitations.
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision, if allowed to stand,
would be at odds with these decisions, and would authorize
3
publicly traded companies to enter into price-fixing
agreements with their rivals as long as they did so
through statements on earnings calls. This would result
in substantial market inefficiencies and consumers would
be forced to pay vast aggregate overcharges. The petition
should be granted.
I.
Factual History
In the spring and summer of 2008, some major airlines
began charging customers for their first checked bag.
Pet. App. 8a. Other airlines, such as Southwest, publicly
represented that they would not charge the fee and
were benefitting from market share gains from airlines
charging the fee. Respondents Delta and AirTran found
themselves in a competitive standoff, unique in the
industry, that prevented them from imposing the fee. Pet.
App. 10a-18a.
A i r T ran, which ma rkets itsel f as a low- cost
carrier (LCC), publicly stated that it “would be ‘pretty
uncomfortable’ competing in Atlanta with Delta, which
doesn’t charge the fee.” Pet. App. 14a.
Delta reached the same conclusion in an internal
“Value Proposition” study. The study explained that Delta
had thus far declined to adopt the fee because its “main
competitor, AirTran, [did] not have this fee”1 and because
“Delta [is] much more exposed to LCCs” than other major
legacy carriers. 2 Taking into account the potential loss of
market share to LCCs, the report gave a “Best Case,” Mid1. R:556 at PX195 at 2. Record citations are to the district
court docket.
2. E.g., R:556 at PX213 at 7, PX234 at 4.
4
Range,” and “Worst Case” estimate for the net value of
the bag fee to Delta. Pet. App. 18a. Although the numbers
varied in different iterations of the Value Proposition,
every version concluded that the profitability of a first bag
fee turned entirely on whether AirTran also adopted the
fee. 3 For example, the October 22 iteration of the report
concluded that if AirTran failed to follow Delta’s lead (the
“Worst Case” scenario), the loss in business to AirTran in
Atlanta overlap markets alone ($300 million) would exceed
the expected revenues ($265 million), and contribute to a
$243 million net loss for Delta.4
At the same time, Delta was deeply uncertain about
what AirTran would do. As of October 22, the Value
Proposition’s “Mid-Range Estimate” discounted the
expected loss to AirTran by 50% – based on the estimated
50% likelihood that AirTran would follow Delta’s lead –
resulting in an expected net loss of $46 million. Pet. App.
19a. Because the October 22 draft Value Proposition’s
expected that the fee would not be profitable, the executive
responsible for making an internal recommendation to
Delta’s Corporate Leadership Team on a first bag fee
concluded that Delta “would not implement 1st bag fee.”5
Delta would also force Northwest to abandon its fee as
part of a planned merger awaiting federal approval.6
3. E.g., R:556 at PX195, PX213, PX234.
4. R:556 at PX213 at 15. “FL” is an industry abbreviation
for AirTran, while “DL” means Delta, “B6” means JetBlue, and
“WN” means Southwest. See R:556 at PX213 at 11-13.
5. R:557-1 at PX215 at 1.
6. See R:556 at PX149; R:557-1 at PX169 at DLBF36434-35.
5
By mid-summer, both AirTran and Delta realized they
were at an impasse. Pet. App. 15a. In late July, AirTran’s
CEO, Robert Fornaro, received an email from an employee
stating that he had learned through his “internal [Delta]
grapevine” that the airlines were “in a stand-off. D[elta]
is carefully watching us waiting for a move on 1st bag.”
Id.7 Fornaro directed that Delta “should hear through the
grapevine that we are doing the programming to launch
this effort.” Id.8 One executive responded that he was
“hoping we’d be asked on the [quarterly investor earnings]
call,” that “[w]e’ve all but given it to [a newspaper],” and
that “we’ll push it out there.” 9 Another executive, Smith,
responded to Fornaro by assuring him that “[i]t will be
communicated today.” Pet. App. 15a.10 In addition, a few
days later, an AirTran director reported to Smith that he
had met with someone “very connected on the high level
operational and planning side of the house,”11 and was told
that “[t]hey want us to jump first. (we need it more than
they do).” Pet. App. 17a-18a.12
This competitive standoff continued into the fall. After
Continental adopted a fee in early September, a key Delta
employee tasked with coordinating fees with Northwest
emailed Delta COO Steve Gorman to confirm, “I assume
7. R:556 at PX109.
8. Id.
9. R:556 at PX109.
10. R:556 at PX108.
11. R:556 at PX126; see also R:582 at 145:6-14.
12. R:556 at PX126.
6
we still want to hold until airtran moves?”13 Gorman
said he had not yet checked with Delta CEO Richard
Anderson.14 Delta continued to hold.
AirTran made the move Delta was looking for in
late October. Pet. App. 19a. During its October 23, 2008
earnings call, AirTran CEO Fornaro responded to the
question AirTran had been “hoping” for about first bag
fees with an answer he had prepared in advance:15
Let me tell you what we’ve done on the first
bag fee. We have the programming in place to
initiate a first bag fee. And at this point, we
have elected not to do it, primarily because
our largest competitor in Atlanta where we
have 60% of our flights hasn’t done it. [W]e
don’t think we want to be in a position to be out
there alone with a competitor who we compete
on, has two-thirds of our nonstop flights and
probably 80 to 90% of our revenue is not doing
the same thing. So I’m not saying we won’t do
it. But at this point, I think we prefer to be a
follower in a situation rather than a leader
right now.
[Q.] But if they were, you’d consider it? It’s not
a matter of practice?
[A.] We would strongly consider it, yes.16
13. R:557 at PX148 at DLBF187470 (emphasis added).
14. Id.
15. R:361-2 at 216:14-217:2; R:560 at 91:16-92:25.
16. R:556 at PX223 at DLTAPE3264 (emphasis added).
7
Pet. App. 19a. Delta executives discussed Fornaro’s
earnings call statements, and found them “unwise,”
“inappropriate,” and contrary to “antitrust compliance.”
Id. at 20a and n.15.
The day after the call, Delta’s Value Proposition was
changed to reflect Delta’s new “high confidence level”
that AirTran would follow Delta’s lead on the fee, but
discounted it slightly to 90% to account for the possibility
that AirTran would not follow through on what it had
committed to. Pet. App. 20a.17 With this change, the only
real question was how much profit Delta would make from
the fee.18
Four days later, Delta’s Corporate Leadership
Team met, reviewed the Value Proposition, discussed
the profitability of the fee and AirTran’s likely response
based on the call, and agreed to adopt a $15 first bag fee,
effective December 5, 2008. Pet. App. 21a. A week after
Delta’s announcement, AirTran announced that it would
adopt the same $15 first bag fee, effective the same date.
Pet. App. 23a.
II. Procedural History
1.
District Court.
After the Government opened an antitrust investigation
into Respondents’ imposition of identical fees, consumers
filed multiple antitrust actions, which were consolidated
into this multidistrict litigation.
17. R:557-2 at PX371 at 124:14-125:15.
18. R:556 at PX234 at 16.
8
The district court denied Respondents’ motions to
dismiss, finding that Defendants’ public statements were
not “mere price announcements,” “went well beyond
disclosing the type of financial information that companies
must legitimately convey to their shareholders pursuant
to SEC regulations,” and that “collusive communications
can be based upon circumstantial evidence and can occur
in . . . statements on earnings calls.” In re Delta/AirTran
Baggage Fee Antitrust Litig., 733 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1360,
1362, 1364 (N.D. Ga. 2010).
The district court certified a class action, an appeal
of which the Eleventh Circuit accepted under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 23(f). While that appeal was pending, the district court
entered summary judgment in Defendants’ favor. Pet.
App. 4a-77a (order); Pet. App. 3a (judgment)
The district court explained that the Eleventh Circuit
applies “a three-step approach to summary judgment in
the price-fixing context.” Pet. App. 48a.
First, the court must determine whether the
plaintiff has established a pattern of parallel
behavior. Second, it must decide whether the
plaintiff has demonstrated the existence of one
or more plus factors that tends to exclude the
possibility that the alleged conspirators acted
independently. The existence of such a plus
factor generates an inference of illegal price
fixing. Third, if the first two steps are satisfied,
the defendants may rebut the inference of
collusion by presenting evidence establishing
that no reasonable factfinder could conclude
that they entered into a price fixing conspiracy.
9
Id.at 49a (quoting Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris
USA, 346 F.3d at 1287, 1301 (11th Cir. 2003)).
There was no dispute that the first step was satisfied.
Pet. App. 53a-54a. Moving to the second step, the district
court accepted that an invitation to collude is a plus factor.
Id. at 56a (citing, e.g., Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United
States, 306 U.S. 208, 227 (1939)); id. at 69. The court also
did not dispute that a reasonable jury could conclude
that AirTran’s statements amounted to an invitation for
joint action. Id. at 56a-59a. But it believed that “courts
must ‘be careful not to permit inferences of antitrust
conspiracy when to do so would create a significant
irrational dislocation in the market or would result in
significant anticompetitive effects.’” Id. at 59a (quoting
In re Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 906 F.2d 432,
440 (9th Cir. 1990)). The court concluded that prohibiting
a company from addressing how it would respond to
hypothetical future price leading by a competitor would
have that effect. Id at 61a.
Accordingly, the district court created and adopted
the principle of law that so long as an invitation to collude
is extended in a public earnings call, rather than privately,
the invitation cannot be a plus factor if the statements
concern “a topic that was of interest to the . . . industry,”
such as how a company would respond to potential pricing
moves by a competitor. Id. at 59a-60a.
The district court then rejected Plaintiffs’ other
asserted plus factors. Id. at 63a-75a. Having done so, it
did not reach the third Williamson Oil step and therefore
did not evaluate Defendants’ claims that the evidence
rebutted any inference of an agreement.
10
2.
Court of Appeals.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, adopting the
reasoning of the district court in an unpublished decision.
Pet. App. 1a-2a. A petition for rehearing and rehearing en
banc was denied on June 8, 2018. Pet. App. 78a.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
I.
Certiorari Should Be Granted to Determine
Whether The Eleventh Circuit Properly Created
a New Exception to the Per Se Prohibition on
Horizontal Price Fixing Where Collusion Is Invited
on a Public Investor Earnings Call.
The petition seeks review of an Eleventh Circuit decision
that precludes courts from considering, on summary
judgment, evidence of collusive communications on public
investor earnings calls because such communications
about pricing (even when conditioned on hypothetical
future price hikes by competitors) may be of interest
to investors. This decision would effectively immunize
price-fixing agreements reached through investor calls.
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision is at odds with this
Court’s per se rule, which prohibits the consideration of
pro-competitive benefits in determining the illegality of
horizontal price-fixing conspiracies. It also conflicts with
court decisions holding that the means of communication
does not determine the legality of a conspiracy, including
decisions and antitrust enforcement actions related to
invitations to collude on investor earnings calls. Although
the Eleventh Circuit’s decision was unpublished, this case
has been well publicized, and would create a template
for lawful collusion in future cases that would result in
massive overcharges to purchasers, and has resulted in
billions of dollars in overcharges to Petitioners alone.
11
A.
The Eleventh Circuit Defied This Court’s LongStanding Per Se Rule by Considering ProCompetitive Benefits of Permitting Invitations
to Collude on Public Earnings Calls.
This Court has long held that price-fixing among
horizontal competitors is per se unlawful because the
“aim and result of every price-fixing agreement, if
effective, is the elimination of one form of competition.”
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397
(1927). Because price-fixing conspiracies are illegal per
se, such agreements are conclusively presumed unlawful
without any evaluation of their reasonableness or procompetitive benefits, or their “purpose, aim or effect in
the elimination of so-called competitive evils,” United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 228 (1940),
and without regard to any alleged “social justifications.”
FTC v. Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 424
(1990). Similarly, the per se rule prohibits inquiries into
reasonableness even if there is an “expressive component”
to the violation that implicates First Amendment rights.
Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 429-30. “A
rule that would require courts to apply the antitrust laws
‘prudently and with sensitivity’ whenever a[] [horizontal]
boycott has an ‘expressive component’ would create a
gaping hole in the fabric of those laws.” Id. at 431-32.
The per se rule “makes the type of restraints which
are proscribed by the Sherman Act more certain to the
benefit of everyone concerned,” and “avoids the necessity
for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic
investigation into the entire history of the industry
involved….” N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1,
5 (1958). “The per se rules are . . . judicial interpretations
of the Sherman Act . . . [and] have the same force and
12
effect as any other statutory commands.” Super. Ct. Trial
Lawyers, 493 U.S. at 432-33.
Here, the lower courts examined the pro-competitive
benefits and expressive components of the public earnings
call statements through which the alleged conspiracy was
reached. Pet. App. 58a-61a. The lower courts speculated
that “significant anticompetitive effects” would result from
allowing AirTran’s earnings call statements to be used
as evidence of an unlawful conspiracy, as investors were
interested in the statements (e.g., because jointly imposing
the fee with Delta would increase AirTran profits). Id. at 59a
(quotation and citation omitted); see also id. at 58a (“courts
have refused to construe corporate communications as
invitations to collude where the communications contain
‘the type of information companies legitimately convey to
their shareholders’”) (citing Holiday Wholesale Grocery
Co. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1276
(N.D. Ga. 2002)). Without acknowledging or balancing
the countervailing anticompetitive harms that would
result from effectively immunizing conspiracies reached
through earnings call statements, the court found that
the potential procompetitive benefits of the statements
precluded the court from considering the statements as
plus factor evidence of a conspiracy. Pet. App. 58a-60a.
By considering the pro-competitive benefits of
AirTran’s public statements in determining whether
AirTran’s statements could be used as evidence of a pricefixing conspiracy, the court defied the per se rule against
price-fixing established by this Court. See, e.g., Super.
Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 422, 424, 431-33;
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 224 n.59 (“Whatever
economic justification particular price-fixing agreements
may be thought to have, the law does not permit an inquiry
13
into their reasonableness.”). Thus, the Eleventh Circuit’s
decision is at odds with this Court’s precedent.
No exception to the per se rule exists here. The range
of permissible inferences from “ambiguous evidence”
may be more limited in certain circumstances, such as
economically implausible alleged conspiracies or alleged
vertical price-fixing conspiracies. See Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)
(“implausible” claim of unlawful price-cutting that “simply
makes no economic sense” requires “more persuasive
evidence”); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465
U.S. 752, 764 (1984) (plaintiffs in vertical price-fixing
conspiracy needed more than evidence of dealer complaints
– lawful under the Colgate doctrine – to survive summary
judgment). But those circumstances are not present here.
And an invitation to collude has been recognized as “plus
factor” evidence -- not “ambiguous” evidence. Dist. Ct.
Order at 67 (citing Interstate Circuit v. United States,
306 U.S. 208, 227 (1939)); Petruzzi’s IGA Supermarkets,
Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir.
1993) (plus factor exists when “‘one participant expressly
invited common action by the other’”) (quoting William C.
Holmes, 1992 Antitrust Law Handbook § 1.03[3], at 154);
see also Pet. App. 49a (“‘The existence of . . . a plus factor
generates an inference of illegal price fixing.’”) (quoting
Williamson Oil, 346 F.3d at 1301).
B. The Eleventh Circuit Created a Conflict with
Other Courts by Finding That Liability for a
Horizontal Price-fixing Conspiracy Depends
on the Means of Unlawful Coordination.
The decision of the Eleventh Circuit conflicts with
other courts, which have consistently found that liability
14
for a horizontal price-fixing conspiracy does not depend
on the means of unlawful coordination. See, e.g., In re
Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 906 F.2d 432, 447
(9th Cir. 1990) (“the form of the exchange—whether
through a trade association, through private exchange
... or through public announcements of price changes –
should not be determinative of its legality.”) (quoting R.
Posner, Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective 146
(1976)); Standard Iron Works v. ArcelorMittal, 639
F. Supp. 2d 877, 892-95 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (statements at
industry conferences supported an antitrust conspiracy
claim); In re Travel Agency Comm’n Antitrust Litig.,
898 F. Supp. 685, 690 (D. Minn. 1995) (denying summary
judgment to Delta and other defendants in the face
of allegations that they exchanged messages through
public speeches, press releases, and meetings); In re
Valassis Commc’ns, Inc., FTC File No. 051-0008 (Apr.
19, 2006) (“[I]t is clear that anticompetitive coordination
can also be arranged through public signals and public
communications, including speeches, press releases, trade
association meetings and the like”).
And courts have permitted inferences of conspiracy
to be drawn in the specific circumstances at issue here:
where an invitation to collude is made publicly to investors.
In fact, the district court in this case permitted such an
inference to be drawn on a motion to dismiss (before
taking the opposite position on summary judgment). In re
Delta/AirTran Baggage Fee Antitrust Litig., 733 F. Supp.
2d at 1360 (“[C]ollusive communications can be based
upon circumstantial evidence and can occur in speeches
at industry conferences, announcements of future prices,
statements on earnings calls, and in other public ways.”)
(collecting cases).
15
Similarly, in In re Domestic Airline Travel Antitrust
Litigation, a court denied a motion to dismiss an alleged
conspiracy to restrict capacity allegedly reached in part
through Delta’s and other defendants’ public statements,
including allegedly collusive statements made on public
earnings calls. 221 F. Supp. 3d 46, 62-63 (D.D.C. 2016); see
also Liu v. Amerco, 677 F.3d 489, 494 (1st Cir. 2012) (“a
proposal to engage in horizontal price fixing is dangerous
merely because of its potential to cause harm to consumers
if the invitation is accepted”).
C.
The Antitrust Enforcement Agencies Disagree
with the Eleventh Circuit About Whether
Invitations to Collude on Investor Earnings
Calls Are Actionable.
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision – that invitations to
collude on public earnings calls cannot be used as evidence
of a conspiracy – conflicts with the positions taken by
the antitrust enforcement agencies, which have initiated
investigations or enforcement actions based on invitations
to collude made on public earnings calls. For example, the
DOJ launched an investigation into whether the conduct
by Respondents that is at issue in this case amounted to
a price-fixing agreement. In re Delta / AirTran Baggage
Fee Antitrust Litig., 846 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1338 (N.D. Ga.
2012) (referencing DOJ investigation). The DOJ has also
investigated whether Delta and other airlines reached an
agreement to restrict capacity based on public statements,
including earnings calls. In re Domestic Airline Travel,
221 F. Supp. 3d at 65 n.8 (same).
Similarly, the FTC has repeatedly filed enforcement
actions based on public invitations to collude, including
16
invitations made on earnings calls. See, e.g., Analysis of
Agreement, In re Valassis Commc’ns, Inc., FTC File No.
051-0008, at 4-5 (Mar. 14, 2006) (finding Valassis’ CEO
improperly invited collusion on earnings call); Analysis
of Agreement Containing Consent Order, U-Haul Int’l,
Inc. v. AMERCO, FTC File No. 081-0157, at 3 (June 9,
2010) (finding U-Haul’s CEO improperly invited collusion
on a public earnings call where he stated that U-Haul’s
maintaining a price increase was conditional on its main
competitor raising its prices).
Although the FTC’s actions challenged unaccepted
invitations to collude pursuant to Section 5 of the FTC
Act, the Eleventh Circuit’s rationale here – that public
invitations to collude should not be actionable under the
antitrust laws because of investor interest in the content
of the statements – would apply equally in a Section 5 case.
As the FTC explained in Valassis:
[T]he anti-solicitation doctrine serves as a useful
deterrent against conduct that is potentially
harmful and that serves no legitimate business
purpose.
….Given the obligation under the securities laws
not to make false and misleading statements
with regard to material facts, Valassis’ [public]
invitation to collude . . . may have been viewed
. . . as even more credible than a private
communication. If such public invitations
to collude were per se lawful, then covert
invitations to collude would be unnecessary.
Analysis of Agreement at 4 (emphasis added); see
also Comment, Does the FTC’s Section 5 Statement
17
Impose Limits on the Commission’s Unfair Methods of
Competition Authority?, 13 J.L. Econ. & Pol’y 243, 266
(2017) (“[I]nvitations to collude pose a tremendous threat
to competition with arguably no social benefit”).
D.
The Eleventh Circuit’s Decision Is of Great
Significance, as Allowing Price-Fixing Via
Investor Earnings Calls Would Result in
Vast Overcharges to Purchasers, Such as the
Billions in Overcharges to Petitioners.
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision is of great significance
with far-reaching impact.
First, the Eleventh Circuit’s decision creates a
template for lawful collusion that “would create a
gaping hole in the fabric of those laws” against antitrust
conspiracies. Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S.
at 431-32. Under the Eleventh Circuit’s decision there
is nothing to prevent, say, Pepsi from announcing in an
earnings call: “We have done all the internal programming
and other work necessary to raise our prices by 10%,
but we are uncomfortable raising prices when our main
competitor has not done so. In this case, we’d rather be a
follower than a leader. However, if Coke were to raise its
prices by 10%, we’d seriously consider doing the same.”
Such a statement would address “a topic that was of
interest to the [] industry” and to investors, Pet. App.
59a, namely, whether Pepsi was going to raise prices. And
if Coke responded by raising prices 10%, and Pepsi then
followed suit, the Eleventh Circuit decision would treat
that result as entirely lawful, the kind of interdependent
behavior that must be tolerated in an oligopoly.
18
There should be no doubt that others will follow the
template this decision creates. As this case illustrates,
the economic incentives for price collusion are enormous:
AirTran’s offer cleared the way for both airlines to impose
hundreds of millions of dollars annually in new costs on
consumers.
At the same time, the template for collusion approved
by the Eleventh Circuit will not escape the notice of
sophisticated businesses and their counsel simply because
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s legal
ruling in an unpublished decision, as the rulings have
garnered widespread attention in the antitrust press and
bar. See, e.g., Matthew Perlman, Eleventh Circuit Affirms
Delta, AirTran Win in Bag-Fee MDL, Law360 (Mar. 12,
2018); Ass’n of Corporate Counsel, Antitrust Enforcement
& Hot Topics Forum at 11 (May 17, 2018); ABA, 2017
Annual Review, 1-1 Antitrust Law Developments 1B(1)
(a); Matthew J. Piehl & Daniel S. Graulich, When Talk
Is “Cheap”: Antitrust Risk for Earnings Calls After
In re Delta/AirTran Baggage Fee Litigation, ABA,
Transportation & Energy Industries Comm. of the Section
of Antitrust Law (Summer 2017); David L. Hanselman
et al., Bag Fee Case Highlights Antitrust Risk of Public
Statements, Law360 (Apr. 11, 2017); Richard M. Steuer
et al., The Application of Antitrust to Public Companies’
Disclosures, 63 Admin. L. Rev. 159, 167-68 (2011); William
H. Page, Tacit Agreement Under Section 1 of the Sherman
Act, 81 Antitrust L.J. 593, 637-38 (2017); Paula W. Render
et al., Sending the Wrong Message? Antitrust Liability
for Signaling, 31 Antitrust, No. 1, at 83, 84 (2016).
Second, consistent with the Eleventh Circuit’s
template, Delta and others have continued to use similar
tactics in an effort to circumvent the prohibition on price-
19
fixing. See, e.g., In re Domestic Airline Travel Antitrust
Litig., 221 F. Supp. 3d 46 (D.D.C. 2016) (alleging that Delta
and other airlines conspired to restrict capacity, partly
through earnings calls and other public statements). Given
the massive financial incentive to engage in such pricefixing, public corporations will undoubtedly persist in
these tactics if the Eleventh Circuit’s decision is allowed
to stand
Third, Petitioners consist of approximately thirty to
sixty million airline passengers who were overcharged
by Respondents for first bag fees. Petitioners were
overcharged by billions of dollars. AirTran Br. at 3, No.
17-11733 (11th Cir. Oct. 16, 2017).
CONCLUSION
Because the Eleventh Circuit’s decision conflicts
with longstanding precedent and creates a gaping hole
in the antitrust price-fixing laws, the petition for a writ
of certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
Kevin Russell
Goldstein & Russell, P.C.
7475 Wisconsin Avenue,
Suite 850
Bethesda, MD 20814
(202) 362-0636
Daniel L. Low
Counsel of Record
Kotchen & Low LLP
1745 Kalorama Rd., NW,
Suite 101
Washington, D.C. 20009
(202) 471-1995
dlow@kotchen.com
Counsel for Petitioners
November 5, 2018
APPENDIX
1a
APPENDIX A — Appendix
OPINIONAOF THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT, FILED MARCH 9, 2018
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-16401, 17-11733
D.C. Docket No. 1:09-md-02089-TCB.
MARTIN SIEGEL, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF
AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,
STEPHEN POWELL, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF
AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,
HENRYK J. JACHIMOWICZ, ON BEHALF OF
HIMSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY
SITUATED, LAURA GREENBERG GALE, ON
BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS
SIMILARLY SITUATED, CARLA DAHL, ON
BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS
SIMILARLY SITUATED, et al.,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
versus
DELTA AIR LINES, INC.,
AIRTRAN AIRWAYS, INC.,
Defendants - Appellants.
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia.
2a
Appendix A
March 9, 2018, Decided
Before WILSON and DUBINA, Circuit Judges, and
GOLDBERG,* Judge.
PER CURIAM:
After careful review and with the benefit of oral
argument, we affirm based on the well-reasoned decision
of the district court, dated March 28, 2017.
AFFIRMED.
* Honorable Richard W. Goldberg, Judge for the United States
Court of International Trade, sitting by designation.
3a
Appendix B OF tHE UNITED
APPENDIX B — JUDGMENT
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN
DISTRICT OF GEORGIA, ATLANTA DIVISION,
FILED MARCH 29, 2017
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION FILE NO. 1:09-cv-2089-TCB
IN RE DELTA/AIRTRAN BAGGAGE
FEE ANTITRUST LITIGATION
JUDGMENT
This action having come before the court, Honorable
Timothy C. Batten Sr., United States District Judge, for
consideration of defendants Delta Air Lines, Inc. and
AirTran Airways’ motions for summary judgment, and
the court having GRANTED said motions, it is
Ordered and Adjudged that the plaintiffs take
nothing; that the defendants Delta Air Lines, Inc. and
AirTran Airways recover their costs of this action, and
the action be, and the same hereby, is dismissed.
Dated at Atlanta, Georgia, this 29th day of March,
2017.
JAMES N. HATTEN
CLERK OF COURT
By: s/____________________________
Deputy Clerk
4a
C THE UNITED
APPENDIX C —Appendix
ORDER OF
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN
DISTRICT OF GEORGIA, ATLANTA DIVISION,
FILED MARCH 28, 2017
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION FILE No. 1:09-md-2089-TCB
IN RE DELTA/AIRTRAN BAGGAGE FEE
ANTITRUST LITIGATION
March 28, 2017, Decided
March 28, 2017, Filed
ORDER
This consolidated antitrust class action comes before
the Court on Defendants’ motions for summary judgment
[350, 353] and three related motions to exclude expert
testimony [625, 631, 632].1
1. The Court’s July 12, 2016 order granting Plaintiffs’ motion for
class certification [665] is presently on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit
pursuant to Rule 23(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
but such an appeal “does not stay proceedings in the district court
unless the district judge or the court of appeals so orders.” Fed. R.
CIv. P. 23(f). The Eleventh Circuit did not so order, and on October
19, 2016 this Court—consistent with the parties’ wishes—declined
to stay the case.
5a
Appendix C
I.
Factual Background2
A.
Delta and AirTran
Defendant Delta Air Lines, Inc., one of the world’s
largest airlines, is headquartered in Atlanta and has its
largest hub at Atlanta’s Hartsfield-Jackson International
Airport. Defendant AirTran Airways, Inc.—a subsidiary
of Defendant AirTran Holdings, Inc. (collectively with
AirTran Airways, “AirTran”)—was an airline that also
maintained a hub in Atlanta for many years until 2014,
when it ceased operations after having been acquired by
Southwest Airlines approximately three years earlier, in
2011.
Although the parties dispute the extent to which each
airline was concerned about the other’s activities, there
is no dispute that Delta and AirTran were competitors
for market share, particularly at their mutual hub in
Atlanta. See, e.g., [569] at 68 (Delta’s CEO testifying that
AirTran was “part of the [competition] equation” but not
conceding that AirTran was Delta’s largest competitor
out of Atlanta); [580] at 13 (AirTran’s CEO testifying that
Delta was AirTran’s number one competitor in Atlanta).
Delta is known as a “legacy carrier” because it had
interstate routes in place at the time of airline deregulation
in 1978. In and prior to early 2008, the legacy carriers in
the United States included Delta, Continental Airlines,
2. Throughout this Order, citations to deposition testimony
and to the parties’ briefs are to the page numbers that appear on
the transcript or brief itself. All other record cites refer to the page
of the PDF document filed on the Court’s electronic docket, not to
the page numbers (if any) reflected on the documents being cited.
6a
Appendix C
Northwest Airlines, American Airlines, US Airways, and
United Airlines. 3
AirTran, by contrast, was what is known as a “lowcost carrier” (“LCC”). In its most literal sense, the LCC
designation is indicative of airlines with business models
that minimize costs and allow airlines to charge lower
fares, but it is also used more generally as a “catchall name
for post-deregulation new entry and, in fact, disguises
diverse airlines and heterogeneous strategies.” Eldad BenYosef, The Evolution of the Airline Industry: Technology,
Entry, and Market Structure—Three Revolutions, 72 J.
a Ir l. & Com. 305, 317 (2007); see also Erica Wessling,
Note, Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.: A
Case for Increased Regulation of the Airline Industry, 6
wm. & Mary Bus. l. Rev. 711, 724 (2015). Prominent LCCs
during the time period in question included Southwest,
JetBlue Airways, Allegiant Air, Frontier Airlines, and
Spirit Airlines.
B. The Trend Toward Unbundling 4 and the
Introduction of Bag Fees
For many years, the purchase of an airline ticket
generally encompassed all or most of the services
3. Alaska Airlines is also a legacy carrier, but it flies only
regional routes.
4. “Unbundling” is somewhat of a loaded term in the context
of this litigation. The Court adopts Defendants’ nomenclature only
for ease of reference. It makes no finding and expresses no opinion
about whether Defendants and other airlines introduced new fees
or simply began to separately itemize charges that had previously
been “bundled” into ticket prices.
7a
Appendix C
associated with air travel. In the early-to-mid-2000s,
however, some airlines began to charge separate fees for
services and products ancillary to the purchase of a seat,
such as meals and snacks, premium beverages, call-center
booking, airport ticketing, and curbside check-in.
In 2006 and 2007, low-cost carriers led the way
in introducing fees for passengers’ checked luggage:
Allegiant introduced a $2-per-bag fee in November 2006;
Spirit began charging for two or more checked bags in
February 2007 and then for a first checked bag in June
of that year; Skybus Airlines implemented fees for first,
second, and third checked bags in May 2007; and Virgin
America began charging for second checked bags in
August 2007. In January 2008, even Southwest, which
markets itself as the “bags fly free” airline, introduced a
fee for a third-checked bag.
Before long, legacy airlines began to follow suit. In
February and March 2008, every legacy carrier except
Alaska announced the introduction of fees for secondchecked bags beginning in May. Delta was the third
legacy carrier to do so, announcing on March 18 that
it would implement a $25 second-bag fee beginning on
May 1. 5 AirTran—which had previously refrained from
5. Fees for second checked bags were announced by United on
February 4, 2008, effective May 5; announced by US Airways on
February 26, effective May 5; announced by Northwest on March
28, effective May 5; announced by Continental on April 4, effective
May 5; and announced by American on April 28, effective May 12.
Alaska, which as noted above is a regional legacy carrier, announced
and implemented its second bag fee on July 1, 2008, later than its
non-regional counterparts.
8a
Appendix C
charging baggage fees—announced on April 11 that it
would implement a second-bag fee of $10 (if paid online)
or $20 (if paid at the airport) beginning on May 15.6
American Airlines then became the first legacy carrier
to introduce a first-bag fee, announcing on May 21, 2008
that it would implement a $15 first-bag fee effective June
15. On June 12, US Airways and United both announced
that they would impose $15 first-bag fees effective July
9 and August 18, respectively. On July 9, Northwest
announced that it would begin charging a $15 first-bag
fee on August 28,7 and on September 5, Continental
announced that it would introduce a $15 first-bag fee on
October 7. By October 8, therefore, Delta and Alaska
were the only legacy carriers that had not implemented
a $15 first-bag fee, and AirTran was among the minority
of LCCs that had not implemented a first-bag fee. See
generally [353-29] at 34-36.
Dur ing this same time frame, Delta’s legacy
competitors made public statements indicating that they
expected ancillary fees—including but not limited to firstbag fees—to prove profitable. On July 9, 2008, Northwest
6. Following AirTran’s announcement, other LCCs that had
yet to introduce a second-bag fee—including JetBlue, Frontier, and
Republic Airlines—announced in April and May 2008 that they would
do so beginning in June.
7. On April 14, 2008, approximately four months before
Northwest announced that it would implement a first-bag fee, Delta
and Northwest had announced that they would merge, forming a
combined carrier that would be called Delta and of which Anderson
would be CEO. [350-55] at 2.
9a
Appendix C
announced that it expected its fee structure, including its
newly announced first-bag fee, to generate between $250
and $300 million in revenue annually. [350-63] at 4; see
also [350-64] at 6 (reiterating during a July 23 earnings
call that Northwest expected increased baggage, service,
and ticket-change fees to “drive between 250 and 300
million in annual revenue improvement”). American stated
during its July 16 earnings call that it expected all of its
fee increases (including its first-bag fee) “to drive several
hundreds of millions of dollars of new revenue” and that
its first-bag fee had resulted in no negative operational
effects. [350-60] at 7, 19.
On July 22, 2008, both United and US Airways held
earnings calls in which they too praised bag fees. [350-61]
at 9, 11 (United stating that unbundling had “creat[ed]
significant incremental revenue” and “estimat[ing] that the
potential revenue from the new baggage service handling
fees will be about $275 million annually in 2009”); [35062] at 8, 17 (US Airways reporting that implementation of
the bag fee had gone smoothly, that it was not seeing “any
difference in market share or bookings between carriers
that [had first-bag fees] and carriers that [didn’t],” and
that it estimated that shifting to “a la carte” pricing would
yield between $400 and $500 million in revenue annually).
On September 5, 2008, when Continental announced
its decision to charge for first-checked bags, it stated that
it had not seen any gain in market share by holding out.
[350-73] at 2. On September 16, the Wall Street Journal
reported that “airline fees are here to stay,” explaining
that “baggage fees and other charges [were] significantly
10a
Appendix C
improving the usually dismal finances of the industry”
because passengers were “paying them, if begrudgingly,
and [weren’t] shifting in large numbers to the few airlines
that don’t charge fees . . . .” [350-89] at 2.
C.
Delta’s Bag-Fee Discussions During the
Summer of 2008
American’s May 21, 2008 first-bag-fee announcement
prompted internal discussions about whether Delta should
introduce a similar fee. In the days following American’s
announcement, Delta’s CEO Richard Anderson and
executive vice president (“EVP”) of operations Steve
Gorman were in agreement that the airline should not
introduce a first-bag fee at that time due to concerns
relating to customer dissatisfaction, operational impacts
during the busy summer travel season, and Anderson’s
belief that “part of the basic bargain” when purchasing
an airplane ticket included one checked bag. [350-49].
EVP of network planning and revenue management Glen
Hauenstein concurred, recommending that if the industry
was moving toward charging a first-bag fee, Delta should
“be the last in.” [556] at 372. On May 28, Anderson closed
the debate, at least for the time being, by sending Gorman
an e-mail that read: “No $15.00 fee. Issue closed. Sit
tight with no announcement.” Id. President Ed Bastian
testified in his deposition that he was in agreement with
that decision. [350-22] at 114.
Fol low i ng t he Ju ne 1 2 , 2 0 0 8 f i r st - ba g -fe e
announcements by US Airways and United, Delta’s
internal bag-fee discussions intensified, although Anderson
11a
Appendix C
and Gorman remained opposed to the idea. [556] at 379.
On June 16, Delta’s Airport Customer Service (“ACS”)
group, which was headed by senior vice president (“SVP”)
Gil West, presented a written analysis of the first-bag fee
to the Corporate Leadership Team (“CLT”). See [350-54];
[366] at 29. 8 The ACS presentation explained that a $15
first-bag fee could potentially yield $220 million annually
in additional revenue even if forty percent of Delta’s
bag-checking passengers stopped checking a bag after
the fee was introduced. [350-54] at 6. The presentation
also recognized potential risks of introducing a first-bag
fee, including negative operational results, the need for
additional gate and ramp staff to collect fees and baggage,
and concerns about the perception that the introduction of
the fee might create. Id. Ultimately, ACS recommended
that Delta not impose a first-bag fee “at this time” but
that it “continue to monitor [other airlines] through the
end of the summer and re-evaluate.” Id.
D e lt a’s le a de r sh ip w a s r e c ept i ve t o AC S ’s
recommendation, as Anderson and Bastian continued
to believe that Delta should not charge a first-bag fee.
See [350-58] at 2; [350-59] at 2; [556] at 491; [557] at 308.
During a Delta earnings call on July 16, 2008, Kevin
Crissey—an airline-industry analyst employed by UBS—
asked about Northwest’s recently announced first-bag fee.
Bastian responded that Delta had “no plans to implement
it at this point” but would “continue to study” the question.
8. The CLT is a group of Delta’s most senior executives—
including, during the time period in question, Anderson, Bastian,
Gorman, and Hauenstein—who serve as an advisory group to the
CEO.
12a
Appendix C
[350-67] at 18. On August 1, Anderson delivered a weekly
recorded message to employees in which he explained that
Delta would increase its second-bag fee but continue to not
charge for a first-checked bag. [557] at 333. He explained
that Delta had an “agreement” with its customers that
with the purchase of a ticket “every customer gets a carryon brief case or purse, one regulation-sized roller bag and
one checked bag weighing no more than 50 pounds.” Id.;
[570] at 189. Anderson also explained that Delta’s bag-fee
policy made sense both “in the fuel environment” and
because Delta is primarily in the business of carrying
passengers, not cargo. [557] at 333.
But internally, Delta was studying the first-bag fee
more closely. In mid-August 2008, Delta’s manager of
baggage performance, Stephen Almeida, circulated a
first-bag fee analysis that noted, among other things, that
brand-tracking studies had indicated that “not charging
for the 1st checked bag” was a primary reason some
passengers chose to book Delta flights. [557] at 394-95.
A September 2008 focus group indicated that Delta’s
customers understood the necessity of charging for bags
but would actively seek out airlines that did not pass on
those charges. [557-1] at 125. On September 30, Pam
Elledge, Delta’s SVP of global sales, sent an e-mail to
Hauenstein, Grimmett, and others in which she explained
that her department was continuing to “quantify” the
issue but believed that “price, schedule and [frequent
flyer] loyalty” were the primary factors that motivated
passengers to book Delta, with first-bag fee being a
“tiebreaker.” [557-1] at 106.
13a
Appendix C
By late September 2008, some Delta executives were
rethinking the wisdom of a first-bag fee. On September 23,
Anderson gave remarks at a CEO forum in which he stated
that Delta was “trying to decide whether or not [it] should
charge for the first checked bag,” noting that it “could
bring [Delta] hundreds of millions in additional revenue
next year.” [557-1] at 129. On September 26, Delta CFO
Hank Halter identified a $15 first-bag fee as an option to
generate additional revenue, potentially as much as $29.7
million during the fourth quarter of 2008 alone. [350-94]
at 2, 13. Two days later, Anderson e-mailed Bastian to
suggest that Delta “think about implementing the [firstbag] fee post merger” because there was “Alot [sic] of
revenue involved.” [350-97]. Bastian agreed but noted
that Hauenstein was opposed to the fee. Id. Anderson and
Bastian both agreed that Delta should discuss the merits
of the fee “at [the] right time.” Id. The next day, September
29, 2008, Anderson, Bastian, Hauenstein, and other Delta
executives attended a quarterly finance meeting at which
first-bag fee was discussed. A “key consideration” was
the risk that Delta’s LCC competition, including but not
limited to AirTran, were promoting the fact that they
did not have the fee. [557-1] at 67. An October 10 e-mail
from Anderson noted that Delta was “still studying” the
first-bag fee. [557-1] at 174.
D.
AirTran’s Bag-Fee Discussions and Monitoring
of Delta During the Summer of 2008
During the summer of 2008, AirTran was engaged
in its own inquiry into the first-bag fee, and Delta was
very much a consideration. That June, CEO Robert
14a
Appendix C
Fornaro told attendees at a Merrill Lynch transportation
conference that AirTran had not instituted a first-bag fee
because it would be “pretty uncomfortable” competing in
Atlanta with Delta, which was not charging a first-bag fee
at that time. [556] at 472; [556-1] at 1511.
When Northwest announced its first-bag fee on July
9, 2008, AirTran was anxiously waiting to see if Delta
would follow suit. AirTran’s SVP of customer service,
Jack Smith, told his subordinate Greg Sayler that he
hoped Delta was “right behind” Northwest. [557] at 197,
211. When senior director of pricing and distribution
Matthew Klein sent an e-mail praising the first-bag fee,
SVP of marketing and planning Kevin Healy responded:
“Cheer louder, the guys with the blue and red tails in
ATL [i.e., Delta] need to hear you.” Id. at 194. On July 10,
AirTran was preparing to introduce a first-bag fee if Delta
did, but it was somewhat concerned about technological
limitations. [557] at 211. Healy suggested that perhaps
AirTran should announce that it would implement a firstbag fee on a future date and back off if Delta didn’t follow.
Id. He also suggested “test[ing] the water” by charging
for a first bag on AirTran’s lowest flights, both to generate
incremental revenue and to show its competitors that it
supported first-bag fees. Id.
By mid-July, AirTran was “desperate for revenue”
according to Klein, and the first-bag fee had become
the airline’s “new number one revenue priority.” [557] at
253-256. Internal projections valued the fee at between
$60 and $84 million per year, even if thirty percent of
AirTran’s bag-checking customers stopped checking bags
15a
Appendix C
in response to the fee. Id. at 258, 260. As AirTran worked
to develop the technological capability to implement a
first-bag fee, id. at 255-260, it remained very concerned
about what Delta planned to do, id. at 314.
On July 12, 2008, Sayler sent an e-mail to Smith
stating that while he had no “official” information, his
wife Robin, who was employed by Northwest, believed
that Delta would introduce a first-bag fee around August
28. [557] at 245; [577] at 52. Smith responded that he
hoped that information was accurate,9 then he forwarded
Sayler’s e-mail to Fornaro, adding only an explanation of
who Robin was and her status as a Northwest employee.
[557] at 245-47.
Another employee who reported to Smith was Scott
Fasano, AirTran’s director of customer service standards
and a former Delta employee. On July 31, 2008, Fasano
sent an e-mail to Smith reporting that Delta and AirTran
were “in a stand-off” regarding first-bag fees and Delta
was “carefully watching [AirTran] for a move.” [556]
at 591. Smith forwarded that information to Fornaro
and indicated it came from Fasano’s “internal [Delta]
grapevine.” Id. In response, Fornaro stated: “They
should hear through the grapevine that we are doing
the programming to launch this effort.” Smith assured
Fornaro “[i]t will be communicated today.” Id. at 597.10
9. It turned out not to be, as Delta did not announce until
November 5 that it would be imposing a first-bag fee effective
December 5.
10. Smith later testified that he did not recall what, if anything,
he did with that information and that he did “not always” do what
16a
Appendix C
Healy also informed Fornaro that AirTran was ready
to implement the first-bag fee for travel beginning on
September 4. Id. at 591. He had hoped someone would ask
about it on the most recent earnings call,11 but he assured
Fornaro that he would continue to “push it out there.” Id.
On July 31, 2008, Fasano attempted to send e-mails
to two individuals he had worked with while at Delta—
Gerry Boeckhaus and Amanda Burman—to inquire about
Delta’s first-bag-fee plans. [556] at 853-85.12 However,
unbeknownst to Fasano, both Boeckhaus and Burman
had left Delta’s employ, and it is undisputed that they
did not receive the e-mails Fasano sent to their Delta
e-mail addresses. [554-1] at ¶106; [350-24] at 21; [350-25]
at 8. Fasano then spoke with Mike Rossano and Mike
he told Fornaro he would. [556-1] at 1050, 1056; see also [577] at 67
(answering, in response to whether he typically followed through with
things he tells his boss he will do: “Normally, but not always with
Mr. Fornaro. Sometimes mandates are sent out that I don’t act on.”).
11. For AirTran’s second-quarter 2008 earnings call held in
July 2008, Fornaro had not included first-bag fees in his prepared
remarks but had considered how he would answer a question about
first-bag fees from analysts. [361-2] at 216; [560] at 91-92. “At that
point, it was a variation of, you know, we’re working on the technology,
and we haven’t made a decision. You know that changed to we have
the technology, and we haven’t made a decision.” [361-2] at 216-217.
However, as just noted, that question was not asked on the secondquarter earnings call.
12. Burman had been involved in Delta’s first-bag-fee analysis.
[557] at 67. Boeckhaus’s responsibilities included baggage handling,
so Fasano believed that he would be in a position to know about
Delta’s bag-fee policies. [582] at 130-31.
17a
Appendix C
Ringler, who were Delta’s station managers in Knoxville
and Miami, respectively. [556] at 587; [363] at 46-47, 6667; [582] at 28.13 Fasano reported to Smith that Delta
was “holding and [AirTran had] been included in every
conversation.” [556] at 587. Both Ringler and Rossano
denied having spoken with Fasano about bag fees, and
Ringler denied having spoken with Fasano at all during
the time period in question. [350-40] at 59; [350-41] at 79.
On August 4, 2008, Healy sent an e-mail to two AirTran
employees—Rocky Wiggins and Ted Hutchins—asking
what was known about Delta’s technological capabilities
with respect to the first-bag fee. [557] at 345. He also
advised that “we don’t need to maintain confidentiality on
the fact that we’re working on this as well.” Id.
The next morning, Fasano sent an e-mail to Healy
and Smith “following up on [their] conversation” from
the day before. [556] at 610. Fasano explained that he
“had a cup of coffee with one of [his] former colleagues
who is still embedded in the team amongst the Northwest
crew.” Fasano’s colleague—who remained unnamed
but was described by Fasano as being “very connected
on the high level operational and planning side” of
Delta’s operations—had informed Fasano that Delta’s
functionality was in place to go live with a first-bag fee,
13. Neither Rossano nor Ringler was involved in or had
knowledge of the process leading to Delta’s decision to impose a
first-bag fee. [350-40] at 64; [350-41] at 91. Rossano did participate
in weekly “baggage calls,” but the undisputed evidence is that those
meetings focused on “operational performance” and bag fees were
never discussed. [584] at 148-51; [350-41] at 25, 40, 91.
18a
Appendix C
but Delta “want[ed AirTran] to jump first.” [556] at 610.
Healy reprimanded Fasano and “made it very clear” that
the conversations reflected in his e-mail “can’t happen.”
[353-90] at 187; [353-81] at 161-62.14 There is no suggestion
that Fasano made any further attempts to contact Delta
or learn of its plans vis-à-vis a first-bag fee. On August
8, 2008, Fornaro sent an e-mail to Fornaro and others
stating that AirTran would not impose a first-bag fee
unless Delta did. [556] at 623.
E. October 2008: Defendants’ Final Decisions Are
Made
On October 15, 2008, before either Defendant had
decided to impose a first-bag fee, Delta held its thirdquarter earnings call, during which it stated that “a la
carte pricing is where we need to go as an industry” and
the impending merger with Northwest would give Delta
“another opportunity to look again with respect to where
the fee-based revenues align.” [350-99] at 18.
In the meantime, Delta continued to study the firstbag fee internally. Revenue management, with some input
from other departments such as ACS, prepared a “value
proposition” analysis of the first-bag fee, which it generally
opposed. The PowerPoint deck analyzed the first-bag fee
under best-case, worst-case, and mid-range scenarios
by taking the estimated revenue of the first-bag fee and
offsetting it by the estimated share-shift to other airlines,
14. Healy did relay to Wiggins and Hutchins that he had “heard
. . . that [Delta is] ready and can go anytime.” [557] at 350.
19a
Appendix C
including AirTran. The latter factor depended in part on
the likelihood that other airlines would match Delta’s firstbag fee. Initially, Delta predicted there was only a fifty
percent probability that AirTran would match, yielding
a mid-range estimate of a $46 million loss to Delta. [556]
at 756-57, 786-87.
On October 23, 2008, AirTran held its third-quarter
earnings call. The prepared remarks did not mention firstbag fees, but the first question, which came from Kevin
Crissey, did: “First check bag fee, you don’t have one, do
you? And will you?” Fornaro responded:
Kevin, good question. Let me tell you what
we’ve done on the first bag fee. We have the
programming in place to initiate a first bag fee.
And at this point, we have elected not to do it,
primarily because our largest competitor in
Atlanta where we have 60% of our flights hasn’t
done it. And I think, we don’t think we want
to be in a position to be out there alone with a
competitor who we compete on, has two-thirds
of our nonstop flights and probably 80 to 90%
of our revenue is not doing the same thing. So
I’m not saying we won’t do it. But at this point,
I think we prefer to be a follower in a situation
rather than a leader right now.
[353-16] at 7. Crissey followed up by asking, “But if they
were, you’d consider it? It’s not a matter of practice?”
Fornaro responded: “We would strongly consider it, yes.”
Id.
20a
Appendix C
Delta executives soon learned of Fornaro’s statements
and immediately questioned the wisdom of them. 15
Revenue management updated the value proposition deck
on October 23 and early October 24, 2008, to increase the
likelihood that AirTran would match any first-bag fee
from fifty percent to seventy-five percent, bringing the
estimated annual loss down from $46 million to between
$19 and $35 million. [557-1] at 290-91, 358-59. Later on
October 24, the value proposition was revised to reflect
a ninety-percent likelihood that AirTran would match.
[556] at 844-45. This change was made at Hauenstein’s
direction, [586] at 24, who made the number up but thought
it was a more “realistic” expectation, [567] at 124-25. At
that increased likelihood, Delta’s mid-range estimate
became “slightly positive” for the first time. [556] at 84445.16 Also on October 24, Hauenstein reported to Anderson
that AirTran “clearly want[ed] bag fees” and that the issue
15. Gorman found Fornaro’s comments “inappropriate” in light
of Defendants’ antitrust training and compliance and explained that
Delta was left in “almost disbelief that he made such a comment.”
[588] at 31. Hauenstein similarly described the statement as
“[un]wise” given “antitrust compliance” and prohibitions on
discussing future pricing. [567] at 122. Bastian “found it kind of
odd . . . that AirTran would even talk about that topic on the call
. . . [b]ecause we know not to talk about pricing matters in a public
call.” [366] at 49. Gail Grimmett in revenue management described
the conversations as “could you believe . . . that he made a pricing
comment on a call.” [565] at 200.
16. Delta disputes that the value proposition reflects the “views”
of Delta, as Plaintiffs contend it does. Rather, Delta asserts that
the value proposition was an “advocacy piece” prepared by revenue
management, which opposed a first-bag fee both before and after
October 23, 2008.
21a
Appendix C
would be discussed at the CLT meeting that was planned
for the following Monday, October 27. [556] at 798.
At the October 27, 2008 CLT meeting, revenue
management presented its value proposition analysis—
with the calculations based on a ninety-percent probability
that AirTran would match Delta’s first-bag fee—and
generally advocated against the fee. Gorman and West
reiterated their support for the fee. Bastian then spoke
and advocated in favor of the fee based on the expected
revenues it would generate during the tough economic
times, including Delta’s need to fund its employee pension
plan. Anderson agreed, and ultimately the CLT approved
the first-bag fee at the October 27 meeting.17
One week later, on November 5, 2008, Delta issued a
press release—titled “Delta Aligns Policies and Fees to
Offer Consistency for Customers Traveling on Delta- and
Northwest-Operated Flights”—in which it announced that
for travel beginning on December 5, domestic passengers
would be charged “$15 for the first checked bag and $25 for
the second checked bag . . . , consistent with Northwest’s
existing policies.” [350-127] at 3.18
17. Bastian testified that he came into the October 27 CLT
meeting inclined to adopt the first-bag fee but that he “wanted to
hear the discussion and the debate” before firmly committing. [35022] at 45.
18. In the same press release, Delta announced it was
eliminating certain fuel surcharges, reducing phone-reservation
charges, eliminating its curbside check-in fee, and reducing its
second-bag fee from $50 to $25.
22a
Appendix C
A nderson testified that Fornaro’s October 23
comments “didn’t have any bearing on [the CLT’s] decision
to put in place a first bag fee.” [350-2] at 94; see also [35020] at 68 (Anderson testifying that “AirTran’s match really
wasn’t relevant to the decision”). Bastian similarly testified
that Fornaro’s statement had “[n]o impact whatsoever”
on his stance; his concern was Delta’s survival and that
he “thought the need was for Delta to take care of itself
and not worry about what a relatively small carrier was
going to do.” [350-23] at 77, 85. AirTran was not relevant
to Gorman’s opinion on the first-bag fee either. [350-29]
at 44; [350-30] at 60. Grimmett, West, and Eric Phillips
(one of the authors of the value proposition analysis) did
not recall the chance of AirTran matching being brought
up at the CLT meeting, [350-31] at 214; [350-44] at 185;
[350-38] at 306-07. Hauenstein testified that Delta would
have made the decision to impose a first-bag fee without
regard to what AirTran did. [350-32] at 127.
Delta’s November 5, 2008 press release was circulated
within AirTran shortly after it was published. When Healy
was asked by another AirTran employee whether AirTran
should “take the plunge right away or . . . test whether this
provides any advantage in ATL?,” Healy responded that
he was “[n]ot sure yet . . . .” [350-128]. Healy then sent an
e-mail to Klein and other AirTran employees saying that
he did not believe AirTran had a choice about imposing a
first-bag fee, and the question to him was whether AirTran
should charge a “discount[ed]” fee of $5, $7, or $10. [350129]. Klein responded that he was “working on the new
valuation” but believed $15 was the way to go, and Healy
instructed him that his valuation should “make some
23a
Appendix C
estimate for the value of not implementing the first bag
fee,” such as share shift and good will. Id. At 11:06 p.m.
on November 5, Klein e-mailed Fornaro, AirTran’s CFO
Arne Haak, Healy, and others and attached a spreadsheet
describing the “staggering potential for 1st bag revenue.”
[353-21]. A November 6 e-mail from Haak to Healy stated,
“Should we charge the fee? (I think we have already
decided this.)” [556-1] at 8.
On the morning of Friday, November 7, 2008, AirTran
executives “discuss[ed] the merits of whether [AirTran]
should implement or not implement” a first-bag fee. [35393] at 206; [353-25]. Smith recalled that some people were
“certainly . . . in favor of not charging first-bag fees, saying
that it would give [AirTran] a competitive advantage.” [353104] at 129. He, however, “was of the opinion that we should
do first-bag fees,” and he was “pretty disgusted at the end
of the call because we had the people who were responsible
for generating revenue saying, [‘]Gee, I don’t know if we
really want to do this. We may lose customers.[’]” Id. at
130. Shortly after that meeting, AirTran’s senior director
of corporate finance Jason Bewley circulated an update to
the first-bag-fee analysis that Klein had circulated late on
November 5. Bewley’s analysis “mirror[ed]” Klein’s and
estimated “approximately $100MM of revenue in 2009”
from imposing a first-bag fee. [353-26].
AirTran’s executives decided to “let it sit over the
weekend,” and the final decision to impose a first-bag fee
was made on the morning of November 10, 2008. [353-83]
at 85-86. On November 12, AirTran issued a press release
announcing that it too would impose a $15 first-bag fee on
December 5. [556-1] at 23.
24a
Appendix C
These lawsuits were subsequently filed alleging that
Defendants’ simultaneous imposition of a $15 first-bag fee
was the result of unlawful collusion in violation of § 1 of
the Sherman Act. Defendants have moved for summary
judgment.
II. Daubert Motions
As noted above, the parties have filed several motions
to exclude expert testimony that must be resolved before
the Court turns to the merits of Defendants’ motions for
summary judgment.
A.
Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility
of expert testimony and provides that an expert “may
testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise” if:
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts
or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable
principles and methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles
and methods to the facts of the case.
25a
Appendix C
The Supreme Court construed and expounded upon
Rule 702’s requirements in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594-95, 113 S. Ct.
2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993), and Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 145, 119 S. Ct. 1167, 143 L. Ed.
2d 238 (1999), emphasizing that “the inquiry envisioned
by Rule 702 is . . . a flexible one.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
In this circuit, Daubert motions are governed by a
three-pronged test:
Expert testimony may be admitted into
evidence if: (1) the expert is qualified to testify
competently regarding the matters he intends
to address; (2) the methodology by which the
expert reaches his conclusions is sufficiently
reliable as determined by the sort of inquiry
mandated in Daubert; and (3) the testimony
assists the trier of fact, through the application
of scientific, technical, or specialized expertise,
to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue.
City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548,
562 (11th Cir. 1998) (footnote omitted). “The party offering
the expert has the burden of satisfying each of these three
elements by a preponderance of the evidence.” Rink v.
Cheminova, Inc., 400 F.3d 1286, 1292 (11th Cir. 2005).19
19. None of the Daubert motions presently at issue questions
the experts’ qualifications, and the Court finds that each expert is
qualified by his knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education
to testify competently to the matters contained in his report.
26a
Appendix C
When a Daubert motion challenges the reliability or
helpfulness of an expert opinion, the Court must be wary
of excluding it “based on skepticism as to believability,”
for credibility or believability is “an assessment to be
made by the jury” alone. Bullock v. Volkswagen Grp. of
Am., Inc., 107 F. Supp. 3d 1305, 1309 (M.D. Ga. 2015); see
also Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036,
1049, 194 L. Ed. 2d 124 (2016) (“Once a district court
finds evidence to be admissible, its persuasiveness is, in
general, a matter for the jury.”); Quiet Tech. DC-8, Inc.
v. Hurel-Dubois UK Ltd., 326 F.3d 1333, 1341 (11th Cir.
2003) (Daubert “is not intended to supplant the adversary
system or the role of the jury,” and a court should not
“make ultimate conclusions as to the persuasiveness of the
proffered evidence.”). Doubts regarding the credibility of
or weight that should be given to otherwise reliable and
relevant testimony are best addressed through “[v]igorous
cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and
careful instruction on the burden of proof.” Daubert, 509
U.S. at 596.
B. Defendants’ Motion to Exclude Hal Singer’s
Merits Testimony [625]
Defendants have jointly moved to exclude certain
opinions of Hal Singer, Plaintiffs’ expert economist,
regarding the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims. 20 Defendants
argue that Singer has impermissibly opined about the
ultimate legal issue in this case, adopted a definition
20. Defendants previously moved [399] to exclude the
opinions offered by Singer in support of Plaintiffs’ motion for class
certification, but those opinions are not at issue in the instant motion.
27a
Appendix C
of collusion that is contrary to the Eleventh Circuit’s
definition, relied on factual findings and assumptions
that are not supported by the evidence, and weighed the
evidence and witness credibility.
1.
Ultimate Legal Issue
Defendants first argue that Singer has impermissibly
opined about the ultimate legal issue in this case, namely,
whether Defendants colluded to impose a first-bag fee.
However persuasive this argument might be with respect
to Singer’s initial reports and testimony—in which he
expressly opined about the existence of “collusion” or
a “conspiracy” 21—it does not compel exclusion of the
opinions contained in his amended reports, which are the
only opinions presently at issue. Singer supplemented
and then amended his prior reports to “clarify that [his]
testimony at trial will focus on whether Defendants’
conduct was consistent with anticompetitive coordination,
as opposed to whether Defendants in fact ‘colluded.’” [5661] at 1679. 22
21. See, e.g., [269-4] at ¶ 2 (“Defendants engaged in collusion
to jointly impose first bag fees.”); id. at ¶ 33 (“Delta’s and AirTran’s
decisions to adopt first bag fees were the result of collusion.”); [269-8]
at ¶ 1 (“Delta and AirTran engaged in an anticompetitive conspiracy
to charge a first bag fee . . . .”); [626-4] at 882 (Singer testifying that
“Defendants in my opinion have conspired to raise bag fees”).
22. See, e.g., [556-1] at 1562 (“Defendants’ actions are more
consistent with a conspiracy to jointly impose first bag fees than
with unilateral conduct.”); id. at 1565 (concluding that “Defendants’
actions were inconsistent with unilateral conduct”); id. at 1575
(opining that certain evidence confirms that Defendants’ decisions
28a
Appendix C
Courts in this circuit and others regularly admit expert
testimony that certain conduct or evidence is “consistent
with a finding that Defendants engaged in a conspiracy to
fix prices.” In re Polypropylene Carpet Antitrust Litig.,
93 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1355 (N.D. Ga. 2000); Harcros, 158
F.3d at 565 (holding that expert testimony is admissible
so long as it “constitute[s] one piece of the puzzle that the
plaintiffs endeavor to assemble before the jury”); see also
In re Urethane Antitrust Litig., 152 F. Supp. 3d 357, 35961 (D.N.J. 2016) (admitting expert economic testimony
that certain evidence was “not consistent with the
existence of a price-fixing conspiracy”); In re Processed
Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., 81 F. Supp. 3d 412, 424 (E.D.
Pa. 2015) (“An economic expert may permissibly testify
as to whether certain conduct is consistent with collusion
or an entity or individual’s self-interest . . . .”); U.S. Info.
Sys., Inc. v. IBEW Local Union No. 3, 313 F. Supp. 2d 213,
240 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Economists often explain whether
conduct is indicative of collusion.”). 23 The Court will not
exclude Singer’s testimony on this basis.
to adopt first-bag fees “were more consistent with conspiracy than
unilateral conduct); id. at 1688 (replacing a prior reference to “an
anticompetitive conspiracy to charge a first bag fee” with a reference
to actions that “are more consistent with conspiracy than unilateral
conduct”).
23. In fact, Defendants’ own experts have submitted their
opinions that Defendants’ conduct was more consistent with
unilateral activity than collusion. See, e.g., [632-3] at ¶ 16 (Andrew
Dick opining that Defendants’ conduct was “consistent with economic
theories and principles identifying unilateral conduct”).
29a
Appendix C
2.
Singer’s Definition of Collusion
Defendants next urge that even if an expert may, as a
general principle, testify that certain conduct is consistent
with conspiracy, Singer’s opinions remain inadmissible
because his definition of collusion is at odds with the
Eleventh Circuit’s definition. Specifically, Defendants
accuse Singer of defining collusion in an overly broad
manner that would encompass situations the Eleventh
Circuit has defined as “conscious parallelism.” If true, this
would indeed mandate exclusion of Singer’s testimony.
Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d
1287, 1323 (11th Cir. 2003) (affirming exclusion of expert
testimony where expert “defined ‘collusion’ to include
conscious parallelism,” i.e., he failed to “differentiate
between legal and illegal pricing behavior, and instead
simply grouped both of these phenomena under the
umbrella of illegal, collusive price fixing”).
When isolated and taken out of context, the deposition
testimony quoted by Defendants might support their
position. However, when the entirety of Singer’s opinions
is considered in context, it is apparent that he properly
distinguishes between unlawful collusion and lawful
conscious parallelism. See generally E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 277 F.R.D. 286,
2011 WL 13079484, at *1 (E.D. Va. 2011) (denying
motion to exclude testimony that was “based largely
on statements taken out of context from [the expert’s]
report or deposition”); Reed v. City of Greenwood, No.
4:02-cv-287, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14654, 2005 WL
6000490, at *1 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 30, 2005) (“The Court
30a
Appendix C
has reviewed the deposition testimony at issue and finds
that when [the expert’s] testimony is viewed in its entirety
rather than in isolation as presented by the defendants,
it is evident that the defendants’ motion to strike [the
expert’s opinions] is without merit.”).
Singer defines collusion as “a type of coordinated
interaction whereby ostensibly independent firms act
jointly only as a result of a prior assurance between
firms.” [399-4] at ¶19 (emphasis added). He never
purported to define collusion solely by reference to
whether a communication “had a material effect” on a
competitor’s decision, as Defendants suggest. [625-1] at
8 (quoting [626-5] at 1089). According to Singer, such a
showing is necessary—but not by itself sufficient—to
support a finding of collusion:
[I]f the fact f inder here concludes that
. . . AirTran’s overtures had no bearing on
Delta’s decision making, then I would gladly
admit that consumers are no worse off as a
result of the communication. . . . I do think that
. . . to generate economic harm . . . a critical
inquiry is whether or not the communication
had a material effect on Delta’s decision making.
[626-5] at 1089.
Throughout his reports and his deposition testimony,
Singer properly contrasts unlawful collusion with other
types of “coordinated interaction,” much of which he
concedes is not “illegal under the antitrust laws” and
31a
Appendix C
is “generally considered benign when each firm acts
independently.” [399-4] at ¶19. He also testified that
“the facts and the evidence in this case, when analyzed
under the proper economic lens, is more consistent with
plaintiff’s allegations of a conspiracy than it is with
the alternative hypothesis of unilateral conduct or
. . . conscious parallelism.” [626-6] at 115-16 (emphasis
added); see also id. at 118-19 (explaining the difference
between collusion and conscious parallelism).
When viewed in the appropriate context, Singer’s
testimony and opinions properly account for the well
recognized distinction between conscious parallelism and
unlawful collusion. Thus, the Court will deny this aspect
of Defendants’ motion to exclude as well.
3.
Singer’s Game-Theory Analysis
Singer’s opinions regarding collusion employ an
economic modeling tool known as game theory, and
specifically, a permutation thereof known as the prisoner’s
dilemma. The prisoner’s dilemma model purports to
depict the payoffs to two “players” of various strategies
in a “game” played with each other in order to predict
the strategy that each player will pursue and provides
insight, from an economic perspective, into the effects of
those choices on individual and collective welfare.
Singer relies on the prisoner’s dilemma “to test
whether Delta and AirTran, as rational, profit-maximizing
firms, would have chosen to adopt first bag fees unilaterally
(that is, absent the alleged conspiracy).” According to him,
32a
Appendix C
“[t]he results of [his] analysis show that neither Delta
nor AirTran would have rationally adopted a first bag
fee independently.” [556-1] at 1572. Defendants, however,
assert that the output of Singer’s game-theory analysis is
rendered unreliable by virtue of the inputs Singer relied
on.
Defendants fault Singer’s game-theory analysis
insofar as it relies on figures contained in the value
proposition document as a proxy for measuring Delta’s
payoffs. Defendants argue that the undisputed evidence
shows that “those slides neither represented the views
of ‘Delta’ nor were intended to be Delta’s estimates of
revenues that might be gained or lost if Delta implemented
a first bag fee.” [625-1] at 15. Defendants also argue that
Singer’s analysis is inadmissible because he improperly
weighed the credibility of witnesses and substituted his
own views of the evidence for the testimony of those with
firsthand knowledge. Finally, Defendants assert that the
model erroneously assumes that Defendants were making
their bag-fee decisions with complete information about
each other, simultaneously and as though those decisions
could not subsequently be changed. Whatever fodder
these arguments might provide for cross-examination of
Singer about his game-theory model, they do not warrant
exclusion of his opinions.
“When facts are in dispute, experts sometimes reach
different conclusions based on competing versions of the
facts.” Fed. R. EvId. 702 advisory committee’s note to
2000 amendments. The critical inquiry at this stage of
the analysis is whether Singer’s testimony and opinions
33a
Appendix C
have “a reasonable factual basis.” United States v. 0.161
Acres of Land, 837 F.2d 1036, 1040 (11th Cir. 1988) (noting
that an expert’s opinion is admissible “provided that he
states the assumptions on which his opinions are based,”
even if those assumptions omit certain evidence). In other
words, the facts relied upon by an expert “must find some
support . . . in the record” and “must be supported by
more than subjective belief and unsupported speculation,”
but “mere weaknesses in the factual basis of an expert
witness’ opinion bear on the weight of the evidence rather
than on its admissibility.” McLean v. 988011 Ontario, Ltd.,
224 F.3d 797, 800-01 (6th Cir. 2000) (internal punctuation
omitted); accord Boucher v. U.S. Suzuki Motor Corp.,
73 F.3d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1996) (expert testimony should be
excluded where “it is based on assumptions that are so
unrealistic and contradictory as to suggest bad faith or
to be in essence an apples and oranges comparison,” but
“other contentions that the assumptions are unfounded
go to the weight, not the admissibility, of the testimony”)
(internal punctuation omitted).
Courts have excluded expert testimony founded upon
facts that find no support in the record. See, e.g., Holiday
Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 231 F. Supp.
2d 1253, 1288 (N.D. Ga. 2002) (where an expert premised
his opinions “to a major degree” on what he admitted to be
a “mistaken” understanding of the evidence, that opinion
was inadmissible), aff’d sub nom Williamson Oil, 346
F.3d at 1323. But so long as the expert relies upon record
evidence and identifies the facts on which he relies, “it is
for opposing counsel to inquire into the expert’s factual
basis,” and “[i]mportantly, the jury is instructed that it is
34a
Appendix C
completely free to accept or reject an expert’s testimony,
and to evaluate the weight given such testimony in light
of the reasons the expert supplies for his opinion.” 0.161
Acres of Land, 837 F.2d at 1040-41.
Singer’s game-theory analysis satisfies these criteria.
His reports and testimony set out in detail the record
evidence on which he bases his opinions. When there is
additional or conflicting evidence in the record, Singer
addresses it head-on in his reports, which at times does
include his analysis of the credibility of other witnesses.
See generally Maiz v. Virani, 253 F.3d 641, 667 (11th
Cir. 2001) (noting that an expert is permitted to make
reasonable assumptions and explain them). But he does not
intend to offer such testimony at trial, [556-1] at ¶3, and
the Court will disregard his opinions regarding witness
credibility for purposes of resolving the pending motions
for summary judgment. Nor does Singer fail to account
for alternative explanations in a manner that is fatal to
the admissibility of his opinions. In sum, the Court finds
that the inputs relied upon by Singer in connection with
his game theory model are not so unsound or unsupported
as to render the model’s outputs unreliable. Because
Singer’s opinions are supported by a reasonable—even if
not infallible—factual basis, they are admissible.
In conclusion, Si nger ’s opi n ions sat isf y t he
requirements of Rule 702 and Daubert, and Defendants’
arguments to the contrary merely highlight issues that
go to the weight that a fact-finder should give Singer’s
opinions. Defendants’ motion to exclude Singer’s testimony
will therefore be denied.
35a
Appendix C
C.
Plaintiffs’ Motion to Exclude Dennis Carlton’s
Testimony [631]
Plaintiffs have filed a motion to exclude each of the
three opinions offered by Dennis Carlton, Delta’s expert
economist. The Court will address each in turn.
1.
Antitrust Policy
Carlton first opines that even if Delta did rely on
AirTran’s public statement in deciding to impose a
first-bag fee, there are “good economic reasons why
Delta should not be held liable for acting upon publiclyavailable information to maximize its profits.” [631-2] at
¶5. Specifically, Carlton explains that “[a] pro-competitive
antitrust policy should allow companies to act upon public
information” in order to vindicate “the goals of antitrust
policy,” avoid “uncertainty for companies,” and ultimately
increase consumer welfare. Id. The Court agrees with
Plaintiffs that this opinion is not admissible.
It is well settled that an expert may not “merely tell
the jury what result to reach.” Montgomery v. Aetna Cas.
& Sur. Co., 898 F.2d 1537, 1541 (11th Cir. 1990). Thus, while
an expert may testify about whether certain conduct is
or is not indicative of collusion, an expert may not testify
that certain conduct did or did not violate the law. In re
Titanium Dioxide Antitrust Litig., No. RDB-10-0318,
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62394, 2013 WL 1855980, at *4
(D. Md. May 1, 2013).
36a
Appendix C
[E]xpert testimony that usurps either the
role of the trial judge in instructing the jury
as to the applicable law or the role of the jury
in applying that law to the facts before it by
definition does not aid the jury in making a
decision; rather, it undertakes to tell the jury
what result to reach, and thus attempts to
substitute the expert’s judgment for the jury’s.
Nimely v. City of New York, 414 F.3d 381, 397 (2d Cir.
2005) (internal punctuation and citation omitted).
Carlton’s first opinion runs afoul of these bedrock
principles because he plainly expresses an opinion about
what conduct the antitrust laws should and should not
punish. Such testimony accomplishes nothing more than
telling the jury what result to reach and supplanting the
Court’s instructions about the law. Moreover, insofar as
Carlton opines about antitrust law in aspirational terms,
his opinion potentially encourages jury nullification by
encouraging the trier of fact to make a decision based
not on the law as it currently exists but as it should, in
Carlton’s opinion, be applied by the courts. See generally
Specht v. Jensen, 853 F.2d 805, 810 (10th Cir. 1988)
(“[W]hen the purpose of [expert] testimony is to direct
the jury’s understanding of the legal standards upon
which their verdict must be based, the testimony cannot
be allowed.”).Thus, Carlton’s first opinion will be excluded.
2.
Inevitability of Delta’s Bag-Fee Decision
Second, Carlton opines that given the trend in the
industry toward charging first-bag fees in 2008, “Delta
37a
Appendix C
very likely would have implemented the first-bag fee even
in the absence of information about AirTran’s willingness
to implement a first-bag fee.” [631-2] at ¶5. Plaintiffs
contend that this opinion is unreliable and does not fit
the facts of this case, but the Court concludes that the
arguments raised by Plaintiffs—much like the arguments
raised by Defendants with respect to Singer—relate to
the weight that Carlton’s second opinion should be given
and not its admissibility.
Carlton discusses in his report several reasons for
his opinion, including that “airlines have tended to adopt
similar pricing models unless they can differentiate
themselves with a different model.” [631-2] at ¶22. He
explains that although Southwest was able to differentiate
itself as the “bags fly free” airline, “Delta believed that
it could not successfully reposition itself as a no fee/low
fee carrier, so it was more likely to keep a pricing model
that was similar to other legacy carriers.” Id. (footnotes
omitted) (citing the DOJ deposition of Delta’s president
Ed Bastian). Additionally, the legacy carriers that had
imposed first-bag fees had left them in place, suggesting
to Delta—at least according to Carlton—that the fees
were profitable. Id. at ¶23.
Carlton’s opinion is distinguishable from the expert
opinion at issue in Cameron v. Peach County, No.
5:02-cv-41-1 (CAR), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30974, 2004
WL 5520003, at *5 (M.D. Ga. June 28, 2004), on which
Plaintiffs rely. There, an expert opined about risks posed
by a landfill site, but the court found that the opinion
consisted of “blanket generalizations,” was premised
38a
Appendix C
on unsupported assumptions, and failed to account for
the county’s efforts to mitigate or prevent the danger
posed by the landfill. In the case at hand, by contrast,
Carlton has not drawn such blanket generalizations. His
reasoning, though not impervious to cross-examination,
is outlined and relies on no logical fallacies or speculative
leaps of faith. Plaintiffs disagree with his conclusion, but
they have pointed to nothing that warrants exclusion of
this opinion. The Court will therefore deny the motion to
exclude Carlton’s second opinion.
3.
Delta’s Business Justifications
Finally, Carlton is of the opinion that “Delta
had economically rational business justifications for
implementing the first-bag fee when it did.” [631-2] at ¶5.
Specifically, he explains that following the consummation
of the Delta-Northwest merger, “it would be uneconomic
to maintain separate . . . fee structures . . . .” Id. at ¶25.
And for the same reasons supporting his second opinion,
Carlton opines that it made sense for the post-merger
combined airline to retain the first-bag fee that Northwest
had already implemented. Id. at ¶26.
Plaintiffs assert that this opinion is inconsistent with
empirical evidence showing that AirTran and Southwest
maintained separate fee structures for more than three
years after their merger. Plaintiffs also contend that
Carlton’s third opinion is based not on economic data
but on the self-serving testimony of Delta’s executives,
and that it ignores documents suggesting that Delta
was planning to withdraw Northwest’s bag fee after the
39a
Appendix C
merger. But the AirTran/Southwest merger took place
three years after Carlton issued his report, and Plaintiffs
fail to explain how his opinion is rendered unreliable by
failing to account for facts that had not yet occurred.
Moreover, as all of Carlton’s opinions are supported by
a reasonable evidentiary basis, the Court finds that his
testimony is admissible. See Larson v. Kempker, 414 F.3d
936, 940 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that expert testimony
that “is so fundamentally unreliable that it can offer no
assistance to the jury” must be excluded, but “otherwise,
the factual basis of the testimony goes to the weight of the
evidence”); Quiet Tech., 326 F.3d at 1345 (noting that the
role of cross-examination is to identify flaws in otherwise
reliable expert evidence). Accordingly, this opinion is
likewise admissible.
In sum, the Court is persuaded by Plaintiffs’
arguments concerning Carlton’s first opinion—regarding
what antitrust law should or should not prohibit—and will
grant the Daubert motion as to that opinion. The motion
will be denied in all other respects.
D.
Plaintiffs’ Motion to Exclude Andrew Dick’s
Testimony [632]
The final evidentiary motion before the Court is
Plaintiffs’ motion to exclude three opinions offered by
Andrew Dick, AirTran’s expert economist.
1.
Economic Theory’s Definition of Collusion
The first opinion with which Plaintiffs take issue is
Dick’s testimony regarding the manner in which economic
40a
Appendix C
theory defines collusion. In his deposition and his expert
report, Dick opines that “the economic plausibility of
[P]laintiffs’ allegations” must be evaluated with respect to
economic theory’s definition of collusion, which he explains
consists of “three pillars”:
One is the mutual exchange of assurances
leading to an agreement or its equivalent;
second is that there has to be a means to detect
deviations or cheating from that . . . agreement;
and the third is that there has to be credible
threats of punishment for deviations or cheating
from the . . . agreement.
[593] at 21; [632-3] at 12. For Dick to conclude that
Defendants colluded in this case, he would have to see
“evidence to indicate that there’s a likelihood that each of
those criteria—high likel[ihood] that each of those criteria
is met.” [593] at 22. He has seen no such evidence, id., and
therefore opines in his rebuttal report that “the absence
of credible mechanisms to monitor and punish defections
from the alleged agreement” causes “Plaintiffs’ theory of
collusion [to] fail[] as a matter of economics,” [632-4] at 2.
The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that this opinion
is inadmissible, at least when it is framed in terms of
preconditions to a finding of collusion. Experts may not
testify as to governing legal standards or legal implications
of conduct; “the court must be the jury’s only source of
law.” Montgomery, 898 F.2d at 1541; see also Burkhart
v. WMATA, 112 F.3d 1207, 1213, 324 U.S. App. D.C. 241
(D.D.C. 1997) (“Each courtroom comes equipped with a
41a
Appendix C
‘legal expert,’ called a judge, and it is his or her province
alone to instruct the jury on the relevant legal standards.”).
However, as noted above, an expert economist may testify
that certain conduct is or is not consistent with a finding
of collusion. See, e.g., Polypropylene Carpet, 93 F. Supp.
2d at 1355. Thus, although Dick may not testify that the
jury may find in favor of Plaintiffs only if all three of his
conditions are satisfied, he may testify to his opinion that
Defendants’ conduct is inconsistent with collusion because
one or more of those criteria are missing. 24
The Court disagrees with Plaintiffs, however, to the
extent they suggest that Dick’s testimony is inadmissible
because it contains internal inconsistencies. In response
to a question asking him to assume that Defendants
exchanged explicit mutual assurances, Dick testified
that he would find collusion occurred. But that is not
because mutual assurances alone are sufficient, as
Plaintiffs contend, but because in an economist’s view,
there is a reasonable expectation that such explicit
mutual assurances contain built-in means of detecting
and punishing defections. [593] at 21-24. The Court does
not find Dick’s testimony in this regard inconsistent; to
the extent any incongruity exists, it is more appropriately
addressed on cross-examination than in a Daubert motion.
24. Insofar as Plaintiffs dispute the applicability of those
criteria, they are free to cross-examine Dick about them, but the
Court declines to preclude his testimony as to their relevance from
an economic perspective.
42a
Appendix C
2.
Effect of AirTran’s Public Statements
In Dick’s report, he analyzes and tests Singer’s
prisoner’s dilemma model in light of the “cheap talk”
framework in economic literature, which views one
company’s non-binding forward-looking statements as
insufficient to influence a competitor’s strategic choices
and facilitate reaching an agreement unless those
statements are both self-signaling and self-committing.
See [632-3] at ¶¶116-121. Disagreeing with Singer’s
conclusions, Dick opines that under this paradigm “Delta
would . . . rationally ignore AirTran’s [October 23, 2008
earnings call] announcement as being unreliable.” Id. at
¶120.
Plaintiffs reject Dick’s reliance on the “cheap talk”
paradigm, which some economists—including Delta’s
expert Dennis Carlton—have rejected. But other
economists embrace the technique. See [632-3] at ¶¶11516 & accompanying footnote citations. To pass muster
under Daubert and Rule 702, an expert’s methods must
be reliable, but they need not be universal. See In re Paoli
R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 744 (3d Cir. 1994) (“The
evidentiary requirement of reliability is lower than the
merits standard of correctness. . . . The grounds for the
expert’s opinion merely have to be good, they do not have to
be perfect.”); Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge
Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295, 332 (D. Vt. 2007)
(“Daubert requires general, not universal acceptance;
even substantial criticism as to one theory or procedure
will not be enough to find that the theory/procedure is
not generally accepted.”) (internal punctuation omitted);
43a
Appendix C
United States v. Monteiro, 407 F. Supp. 2d 351, 366 (D.
Mass. 2006) (“Daubert and Kumho Tire do not make the
perfect the enemy of the reliable; an expert need not use
the best method of evaluation, only a reliable one.”). The
“cheap talk” paradigm is not without its critics, but the
Court is not persuaded that it is so unfounded as to render
Dick’s opinion unreliable.
Plaintiffs also take issue with Dick’s application of the
cheap-talk paradigm to Singer’s analysis, arguing that
Dick ignores evidence that AirTran intended to use its
earnings call to send a signal to Delta about AirTran’s
willingness to collude. Additionally, they suggest that
Dick’s opinion is unhelpful because this case is about what
Delta actually did, not about what it rationally might have
done. But as is true of many of the arguments raised in
both parties’ Daubert motions, these issues speak to the
weight of Dick’s opinions, not their admissibility. The
factual predicates on which his opinion rests find support
in the record, and the challenged opinion is relevant to—
even if not dispositive of—the question of Defendants’ selfinterests and incentives. Moreover, because the challenged
opinion serves to test Singer’s own paradigm, the Court
finds that the concerns Plaintiffs raise are best addressed
through cross-examination. The Court therefore finds that
this opinion is admissible.
3.
Disputed Factual Issues
Finally, Plaintiffs seek to prevent Dick from offering
five opinions that Plaintiffs characterize as disputed
factual issues unrelated to his economic expertise. Again,
the Court disagrees.
44a
Appendix C
The Court’s decision above that Dick’s methods are
reliable renders moot Plaintiffs’ argument that some of the
factual assertions in his report are not supported by “any
reliable economic test” and ignore portions of the record.
[632-1] at 16. Other factual assertions Plaintiffs point to
in Dick’s report—for example, his reference to the need
to harmonize a fee structure for Delta and Northwest in
view of their impending merger—are nothing more than
Dick’s explanation of the factual foundations on which his
opinions rest. As discussed above, an expert’s opinion is
admissible if the facts upon which it is premised “find
some support . . . in the record,” even where the opposing
party contends that those assumptions are contradicted
by other evidence. McLean, 224 F.3d at 800-01.
In still other instances, Dick relies on testimony and
other evidence from this case to apply or explain the
general economic principles discussed in his report. For
example, after explaining how unbundling can stimulate
passenger demand, Dick relies on Healy’s deposition
testimony to illustrate how, in his opinion, AirTran’s
introduction of a first-bag fee might have facilitated the
air line’s route expansion. [632-3] at ¶138. Elsewhere, he
relies on Fornaro’s deposition testimony as an example
comporting with the concept of the “signal-to-noise” ratio.
Id. at ¶42 & n.33. As Plaintiffs pointed out in defense of
Singer’s expert report, it is permissible for an expert “to
review the factual record and formulate a hypothesis that
can then be tested using economic theory.” Processed Egg
Prods., 81 F. Supp. 3d at 424. Indeed, Singer’s amended
merits report takes a similar approach: after giving his
opinion that Defendants’ actions were inconsistent with
45a
Appendix C
unilateral conduct, he “demonstrate[s] how this analysis
is supported and corroborated by direct evidence.” [5561] at 1565.
Just as the Court declined to exclude Singer’s opinions
because he relied on facts that Defendants dispute, it
declines to exclude Dick’s opinions because he relies on
facts that Plaintiffs dispute. None of the expert witnesses
in this case has relied on facts that are so lacking in
evidentiary support that it renders the ensuing opinions
unreliable.
For these reasons, the Court will disregard Dick’s
legal conclusion that Plaintiffs’ theory fails under
economic theory’s definition of collusion, but it will deny
the remainder of Plaintiffs’ motion to exclude Dick’s
opinions and testimony.
III. Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment
A.
Summary Judgment in the Context of § 1 PriceFixing Claims
Summary judgment is appropriate only when “the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. CIv. P. 56(a). There is a “genuine”
dispute as to a material fact if “the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248,
106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). When analyzing
a motion for summary judgment, the Court must “view
46a
Appendix C
all the evidence and all factual inferences reasonably
drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party.” Stewart v. Happy Herman’s
Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1285 (11th Cir. 1997);
Williamson Oil, 346 F.3d at 1298.
These general principles are well settled and apply
with as much force to this antitrust case as any other type
of lawsuit. In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig.,
801 F.3d 383, 396 (3d Cir. 2015) (“[T]he summary judgment
standard in antitrust cases is generally no different from
the standard in other cases.”); see also Eastman Kodak
Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 468, 112
S. Ct. 2072, 119 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1992) (noting that there is no
“special burden on plaintiffs facing summary judgment in
antitrust cases”). However, “antitrust law limits the range
of permissible inferences from ambiguous evidence in a
§ 1 case.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538
(1986); see also Holiday Wholesale, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 1269
(“[T]he inferences that can be drawn on summary
judgment are limited in the antitrust context.”).
This inferential limitation is grounded in
the unique nature of the law of antitrust
conspiracy. . . . [A] Sherman Act conspiracy
differs sharply from the more typical concept
of conspiracy found in other contexts. Under
the criminal drug laws, for example, both the
underlying act and the conspiracy are illegal—
that is, the laws make it an offense for anyone
to violate, as well as conspire to violate, the
47a
Appendix C
federal drug statutes. In contrast, under the
Sherman Act, it is the conspiracy alone that is
prohibited; the underlying independent conduct
is not necessarily unlawful and, indeed, may
be precompetitive and of a nature that the
antitrust laws would want to foster. . . .
Coleman v. Cannon Oil Co., 849 F. Supp. 1458, 1465 (M.D.
Ala. 1993) (internal citation omitted).
Along those lines, the Eleventh Circuit has highlighted
the “important” distinction “between collusive price fixing,
i.e., a ‘meeting of the minds’ to collusively control prices,
which is prohibited under the Sherman and Clayton Acts,
and ‘conscious parallelism,’ which is not.” Williamson
Oil, 346 F.3d at 1298-99 (footnote omitted); see also id.
at 1291 (describing conscious parallelism as “a perfectly
legal phenomenon commonly associated with oligopolistic
industries”). Conscious parallelism refers to synchronous
pricing and related behaviors that “are the product of a
rational, independent calculus by each member of [an]
oligopoly,” even when they result in the setting of prices
“at a profit-maximizing, supracompetitive level” and
are based on the recognition of the oligopolists’ “shared
economic interests and their interdependence with respect
to price and output decisions.” Id. at 1299.
But it is often difficult to discern when lawful
coordination crosses the line and becomes unlawful
collusion. “Over time, courts have become attuned to
the economic costs associated with using circumstantial
evidence to distinguish between altogether lawful,
48a
Appendix C
independent, consciously parallel decision-making within
an oligopoly on the one hand, and illegal, collusive price
fixing on the other.” Id. at 1300. “In order to ensure that
only potentially meritorious claims survive summary
judgment, the Supreme Court has required that inferences
of a price fixing conspiracy drawn from circumstantial
evidence be reasonable.” Id.
To survive summary judgment, therefore, § 1 plaintiffs
must do more than come forward with “evidence of conduct
that is consistent with both legitimate competition and an
illegal conspiracy.” Thompson Everett, Inc. v. Nat’l Cable
Advert., L.P., 57 F.3d 1317, 1323 (4th Cir. 1995); accord
Williamson Oil, 346 F.3d at 1300 (“Evidence that does
not support the existence of a price fixing conspiracy any
more strongly than it supports conscious parallelism is
insufficient to survive a defendant’s summary judgment
motion.”). They “must present evidence ‘that tends to
exclude the possibility’ that the alleged conspirators acted
independently.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588 (quoting
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764,
104 S. Ct. 1464, 79 L. Ed. 2d 775 (1984)). Put differently,
plaintiffs “must show that the inference of conspiracy
is reasonable in light of the competing inferences of
independent action or collusive action that could not have
harmed [them].” Id.
Applying this standard requires the Court to employ
a three-step approach to summary judgment in the pricefixing context:
49a
Appendix C
First, the court must determine whether the
plaintiff has established a pattern of parallel
behavior. Second, it must decide whether the
plaintiff has demonstrated the existence of one
or more plus factors that tends to exclude the
possibility that the alleged conspirators acted
independently. The existence of such a plus
factor generates an inference of illegal price
fixing. Third, if the first two steps are satisfied,
the defendants may rebut the inference of
collusion by presenting evidence establishing
that no reasonable factfinder could conclude
that they entered into a price fixing conspiracy.
Williamson Oil, 346 F.3d at 1301 (internal citation
omitted).
“[I]t unquestionably is the duty of the district court
to evaluate the evidence proffered by the plaintiffs not
to ascertain its credibility, but instead to determine
whether that evidence, if credited, ‘tends to’ establish a
conspiracy more than it indicates conscious parallelism.”
Id. (emphasis added). Plaintiffs need not affirmatively
exclude the possibility of conscious parallelism, nor must
the existence of a conspiracy be the sole inference that a
reasonable juror could draw. Id. at 1302. They must simply
present some evidence that tends to exclude the possibility
of conscious parallelism or that tends to establish a pricefixing conspiracy; “nothing more, nothing less.” Id.
Matsushita teaches that the determination of
whether underlying circumstantial conduct is
50a
Appendix C
sufficient to support an inference of a Sherman
Act violation, and thus to fall within the
prohibitive reach of the Act, is a legal issue for
the court. Of course, if the underlying conduct
is sufficient to support such an inference, it is
still up to the jury to make the inference.
Coleman, 849 F. Supp. at 1465.
In making this inquiry, the Court should not “tightly
compartmentaliz[e] the various factual components and
wipe the slate clean after scrutiny of each” because “[t]he
character and effect of a conspiracy are not to be judged by
dismembering it and viewing its separate parts, but only
by looking at it as a whole.” Continental Ore Co. v. Union
Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 699, 82 S. Ct. 1404,
8 L. Ed. 2d 777 (1962). A “trap to be avoided in evaluating
evidence of an antitrust conspiracy for purposes of ruling
on the defendants’ motion for summary judgment is to
suppose that if no single item of evidence presented by the
plaintiff points unequivocally to conspiracy, the evidence
as a whole cannot defeat summary judgment.” In re High
Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 655
(7th Cir. 2002). It is only “[w]here the record taken as a
whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the
non-moving party” that “there is no ‘genuine issue for
trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (emphasis added). 25
25. In their briefs, the parties disputed whether a heightened
summary-judgment standard might apply in this case. See, e.g.,
[632-1] at 7; [643] at 9. At the hearing held on the pending motions
for summary judgment, however, Defendants conceded that no such
heightened standard applies, and even absent that concession, the
51a
Appendix C
With these standards in mind, the Court now turns to
the merits of Defendants’ motions for summary judgment.
B. Implied Preclusion
The Court begins its analysis by briefly revisiting
an argument it has previously rejected. Shortly after
these cases were consolidated, both Defendants moved to
dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims. Among the grounds raised by
AirTran was that the federal securities laws precluded any
antitrust claim arising from statements made on quarterly
earnings calls. See [72-1] at 33. The Court rejected that
argument, noting that “at [that] early stage of the case,
Defendants ha[d] failed to demonstrate that implied
preclusion applie[d]” and that “[n]otably, Defendants ha[d]
not cited any cases in which the securities laws precluded
an antitrust challenge to collusion reached through public
disclosures.” In re Delta/AirTran Baggage Fee Antitrust
Litig., 733 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1364 & n.12 (N.D. Ga. 2010).
Defendants renew their implied-preclusion argument
in their motions for summary judgment, but that
argument fares no better today than it did seven years
ago. Implied preclusion remains disfavored and applies
only when antitrust and securities laws are “clearly
incompatible.” Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing,
551 U.S. 264, 271, 275, 127 S. Ct. 2383, 168 L. Ed. 2d 145
(2007); see also Hinds County v. Wachovia Bank N.A., 700
Court would not find any heightened standard appropriate. Rather,
the Court applies general summary-judgment principles subject only
to the inferential limitations that apply in all antitrust-conspiracy
cases.
52a
Appendix C
F. Supp. 2d 378, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“The Supreme Court
in Billing[, 551 U.S. at 271,] was careful to caution that
competing statutory schemes should be reconciled where
possible, ‘rather than holding one completely ousted.’”).
Whether the securities laws and the antitrust laws are
so repugnant that the former can be said to preclude the
latter is determined by four factors:
(1) whether the challenged practices lie squarely
within an area of financial market activity that
the securities laws seek to regulate; (2) the
existence of regulatory authority under the
securities laws to supervise the activities in
question; (3) ongoing SEC regulation; and (4)
a resulting risk that the securities laws and
antitrust laws, if both applicable, would conflict.
Delta/AirTran Baggage Fee, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1364 (citing
Billing, 551 U.S. at 285).
The Court is unpersuaded that its initial assessment
of the four Billing factors warrants reconsideration. Only
rarely have the securities laws been held to impliedly
preclude application of the antitrust laws, and never
in a case in which a conspiracy otherwise unrelated
to securities was merely alleged to have been effected
through earnings calls. Cf. Billing, 551 U.S. at 285
(applying preclusion to antitrust lawsuit brought against
securities underwriters that marketed and distributed
securities); Elec. Trading Grp., LLC v. Banc of Am. Sec.
LLC, 588 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 2009) (applying preclusion
to antitrust lawsuit alleging that securities brokers
conspired to fix the prices of certain securities).
53a
Appendix C
Defendants cite to no caselaw, and the Court has
located none, that would support immunizing Defendants
from antitrust liability based on anything said on an
earnings call. Indeed, in the years since AirTran first
raised this argument, other courts have come to recognize
that earnings calls can be vehicles for public signaling.
See, e.g., In re Domestic Airline Travel Antitrust Litig.,
221 F. Supp. 3d 46, Misc. No. 15-1404 (CKK), 2016 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 149608, 2016 WL 6426366, at *8 (D.D.C. Oct.
28, 2016) (denying motion to dismiss § 1 claim premised
on “statements made by Defendants’ executives during
earnings calls, industry summits, industry conferences,
and investment conferences”). The Court therefore again
rejects Defendants’ implied-preclusion arguments.
C.
Existence of an Agreement to Restrain Trade
The existence of an agreement to restrain trade is
“a threshold requirement of every antitrust conspiracy
claim” under the Sherman Act. Harcros, 158 F.3d at 569.
In the absence of any direct evidence of collusion, Plaintiffs
here attempt to establish the existence of an agreement
by showing a pattern of parallel behavior by Defendants
and the existence of “plus factors” that tend to exclude
the possibility of independent action. Williamson Oil, 346
F.3d at 1301.
The first inquiry is quickly resolved in Plaintiffs’
favor, as the undisputed record evidence plainly shows
that Defendants engaged in a pattern of parallel conduct
when they simultaneously imposed first-bag fees of $15
effective on December 5, 2008. True, Plaintiffs rely on
54a
Appendix C
only a single pricing decision, but that is not fatal to their
claim. See In re Travel Agency Comm’n Antitrust Litig.,
898 F. Supp. 685, 687 (D. Minn. 1995) (denying summary
judgment in a § 1 case arising from the defendants’ onetime revision of a commission structure).
Similarly, the fact that Defendants’ once-parallel
pricing diverged after six months does not defeat the
requisite finding of synchronous action. 26 “What is critical
is that the jury could . . . reasonably conclude from the
evidence that the defendants engaged in parallel pricing
for some of their . . . products for substantial periods of
time.” Coleman, 849 F. Supp. at 1466; see also Petruzzi’s
IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Del. Co., 998 F.2d
1224, 1243 (3d Cir. 1993) (defining “parallel behavior” to
require similar—but not identical—behavior); Domestic
Airline Travel, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149608, 2016 WL
6426366, at *13 (noting that parallel conduct does not
require Defendants to have acted in “exactly the same
way”).
It is well settled that a pattern of parallel behavior,
standing alone, is insufficient to withstand a motion
for summary judgment in a § 1 case. Rather, parallel
conduct gives rise to an inference of conspiracy only in
combination with “‘plus factors’ that ‘tend to exclude the
possibility that the defendants merely were engaged in
lawful conscious parallelism.’” Holiday Wholesale, 231
F. Supp. 2d at 1274 (quoting Harcros, 158 F.3d at 572);
26. Delta increased its first-bag fee in July 2009 and then again
in January 2010. AirTran kept its first-bag fee at $15 until September
2010. [353-29] at 35-36.
55a
Appendix C
see also Williamson Oil, 346 F.3d at 1301 (“[P]rice fixing
plaintiffs must demonstrate the existence of ‘plus factors’
that remove their evidence from the realm of equipoise
and render that evidence more probative of conspiracy
than of conscious parallelism.”).
There is no finite list of potential plus factors.
“Although our caselaw has identified some specific plus
factors, . . . any showing . . . that ‘tends to exclude the
possibility of independent action’ can qualify as a ‘plus
factor.’” Williamson Oil, 346 F.3d at 1301 (quoting Harcros,
158 F.3d at 571 n.35). But “[m]erely labeling something a
‘plus factor’ does not make it so . . . .” Holiday Wholesale,
231 F. Supp. 2d at 1272. “A ‘plus factor’ . . . needs to have
some substance in order to tilt the balance. . . . , and a
weak ‘plus factor’ is not sufficient to withstand a motion
for summary judgment because the ‘plus factor’ analysis is
really a surrogate for looking at a case in its entirety.” Id.
In this case, Plaintiffs identify six plus factors that
they contend support their claim and preclude summary
judgment in favor of Defendants: “(1) an invitation to
collude; (2) collusive communications followed closely
by a parallel price increase; (3) evidence that collusive
communications affected Delta’s [first-bag-fee] decision;
(4) actions against unilateral economic self-interest; (5)
pretextual explanations for changed business practices;
and (6) motive and intent to conspire.” [554] at 51-52. The
Court will address each in turn.
56a
Appendix C
1.
Invitation to Collude
Plaintiffs first contend that a plus factor exists by
virtue of Fornaro’s statements on AirTran’s October
23, 2008 earnings call, which they characterize as an
invitation to Delta to engage in collusion.
“ The term ‘invitation to collude’ describes an
improper communication from a firm to an actual or
potential competitor that the firm is ready and willing to
coordinate on price or output or other important terms
of competition.” In re Fortiline, LLC a N.C. Ltd. Liab.
Co., File No. 151-0000, 2016 WL 4379041, at *11 (F.T.C.
Aug. 9, 2016). The quintessential invitation to collude was
discussed in United States v. American Airlines, Inc., 743
F.2d 1114, 1116 (5th Cir. 1984), in which the president of
an airline called the president of a competitor and said:
“I have a suggestion for you. Raise your . . . fares twenty
percent. I’ll raise mine the next morning. . . . You’ll make
more money and I will too.”
Numerous cases have recognized that an invitation
to collude can serve as evidence of a conspiracy. See, e.g.,
Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 227, 59 S.
Ct. 467, 83 L. Ed. 610 (1939) (“Acceptance by competitors,
without previous agreement, of an invitation to participate
in a plan, the necessary consequence of which, if carried
out, is restraint of interstate commerce, is sufficient to
establish an unlawful conspiracy under the Sherman
Act.”); Gainesville Utilities Dep’t v. Fla. Power & Light
57a
Appendix C
Co., 573 F.2d 292, 300-01 (5th Cir. 1978)27 (holding that
correspondence that “contemplated and invited” concerted
action was a plus factor); Fishman v. Wirtz, Nos. 74 C
2814 & 78 C 3621, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9998, 1981 WL
2153, at *59 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 28, 1981) (“One of the strongest
circumstantial indicators of a conspiracy is the existence
of a common invitation or request to join into a concerted
plan of action.”).
But Defendants correctly point out that many of the
cases discussing invitations to collude—including In re
Fortiline and American Airlines—involved claims under
§ 5 of the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) Act or
analogous laws prohibiting even unilateral unfair methods
of competition. See, e.g., Liu v. Amerco, 677 F.3d 489 (1st
Cir. 2012) (discussing invitation to collude in the context
of a claim under a Massachusetts statute that, like § 5 of
the FTC Act, prohibits unfair methods of competition and
reaches even unsuccessful solicitations to conspire); see
also Susan S. DeSanti & Ernest A. Nagata, CompetItor
CommunIcatIons: FacIlItatInG PractIces or InvItatIons
to Collude? a n a pplIcatIon of TheorIes to Proposed
HorIzontal a Greements S ubmItted for a ntItrust
R evIew, 63 Antitrust L.J. 93, 93 (1994) (describing
invitations to collude as potential violations of § 5 of
the FTC Act or, “[u]nder more limited circumstances,”
§ 2 of the Sherman Act, but making no mention of § 1).
Defendants dispute that a mere “invitation” can properly
be viewed as a plus factor under § 1 of the Sherman Act,
27. The Eleventh Circuit has adopted as binding precedent all
Fifth Circuit decisions issued before October 1, 1981. Bonner v. City
of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
58a
Appendix C
which unlike § 5 of the FTC Act prohibits “contract[s]” and
“conspirac[ies]” in restraint of trade. See generally N.C.
Bd. of Dental Examiners v. FTC, 717 F.3d 359, 371 (4th
Cir. 2013) (noting that § 1 applies only to “concerted action”
and “unilateral conduct is excluded from its purview”).
Even assuming that an invitation to collude may
constitute a plus factor in some cases, however, it is not
a plus factor here. The Eleventh Circuit has stated in no
uncertain terms that evidence may be characterized as a
plus factor in a given case only if it “tends to exclude the
possibility of independent action.” Harcros, 158 F.3d at
571 n.35; Williamson Oil, 346 F.3d at 1301. Thus, courts
have refused to construe corporate communications as
invitations to collude where the communications contain
“the type of information companies legitimately convey to
their shareholders,” instead restricting such findings to
cases involving “far more detailed communications with
no public purpose.” Holiday Wholesale, 231 F. Supp. 2d
at 1276.
In Gainesville Utilities, 573 F.2d at 300-01, for example,
the former Fifth Circuit found that the “continuous
exchange of correspondence between high executives
of” two competitors “border[ed] on a blatant agreement
to divide the market” and gave rise to an “irresistible”
inference that the correspondence “contemplated and
invited” collusion. Likewise, in In re Medical X-Ray Film
Antitrust Litigation, 946 F. Supp. 209, 218-21 (E.D.N.Y.
1996), the court found that an agreement to fix prices
could be inferred from evidence showing that competitors
exchanged internal pricing memoranda and met privately
59a
Appendix C
to discuss and exchange pricing information in advance
of announcing price increases.
Significant, though not dispositive, is the fact that
“invitations to collude” in the context of antitrust
conspiracy claims have almost universally been private
communications, not public disclosures like the AirTran
comments at issue in this case. The Court does not suggest
that public remarks by a company could never give rise
to liability under § 1 of the Sherman Act, because “‘the
form of the exchange—whether . . . through private
exchange . . . or through public announcements of price
changes—should not be determinative of its legality.’”
In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum
Prods. Antitrust Litig., 906 F.2d 432, 447 (9th Cir. 1990)
(quoting RIchard Posner, a ntItrust law: a n EconomIc
P erspectIve 146 (1976)). But courts must “be careful
not to permit inferences of antitrust conspiracy when to
do so would create a significant irrational dislocation in
the market or would result in significant anticompetitive
effects.” Petroleum Prods., 906 F.2d at 440 (citing
Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 763-64). That instruction cannot
be squared with Plaintiffs’ allegations of an invitation to
collude.
Fornaro’s statement was made publicly on a quarterly
earnings call with AirTran’s analysts and investors.
It concerned a topic that was of interest to the airline
industry at the time, as evidenced by both the widespread
adoption of bag fees by airlines during the first three
quarters of 2008 and the fact that bag fees and ancillary
fees were discussed on several airlines’ earnings calls
60a
Appendix C
in 2008. 28 This is precisely “the type of information
companies legitimately convey to their shareholders,”
Holiday Wholesale, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 1277, and courts
are properly reluctant to characterize them as evidence of
unlawful conspiracies, Petroleum Prods., 906 F.2d at 440.
“Because in competitive markets, particularly oligopolies,
companies will monitor each other’s communications with
the market in order to make their own strategic decisions,
antitrust law permits such discussions even when they
relate to pricing . . . .” Holiday Wholesale, 231 F. Supp.
2d at 1276.
Plaintiffs speculate that AirTran planted the bag-fee
question for its third-quarter earnings call, but even if
that would alter the Court’s analysis of this plus factor, it
is unsupported by the evidence. Kevin Crissey—the UBS
analyst who posed the question to AirTran—declared
under penalty of perjury that the question was not
planted and that he asked it because of his own interest
in bag fees. [434-16] at 17-19. This declaration testimony
is uncontradicted, 29 and it is corroborated by other
28. See [350-99] at 18 (Delta’s third-quarter earnings call
transcript); [350-103] at 32 (JetBlue’s third-quarter earnings call
transcript); [350-103] at 47-48 (US Airways’ third-quarter earnings
call transcript). The question was also asked during second-quarter
earnings calls for airlines that had already introduced it at that
point. See, e.g., [350-60] at 19 (American Airlines’ second-quarter
earnings call transcript).
29. Plaintiffs’ cursory assertion that the question Crissey posed
was “incongruent with his level of sophistication and more consistent
with planted questions,” [554] at n.55, is insufficient to contradict
Crissey’s declaration testimony for purposes of withstanding
summary judgment.
61a
Appendix C
earnings-call transcripts, which reveal that Crissey asked
several airlines about bag fees. See, e.g., [350-60] at 19
(Crissey asking American Airlines in July 2008 about the
operational impact of having introduced the first-bag fee);
[350-67] at 18 (Crissey asking Delta in July 2008 about
Northwest’s first-bag fee); [350-103] at 32 (Crissey asking
JetBlue in October 2008 about the effect of ancillary fees
on its revenue practices); Id. at 47-48 (Crissey asking US
Airways in October 2008 whether its first-bag fee had led
to a significant decrease in the number of checked bags).
“The public announcement of a pricing decision cannot
be twisted into an invitation or signal to conspire; it is
instead an economic reality to which all other competitors
must react.” Hall v. United Air Lines, Inc., 296 F. Supp.
2d 652, 670 n.23 (E.D.N.C. 2003) (granting summary
judgment on § 1 claims and finding that the defendants’
statements in trade press articles and interviews were
not plus factors supporting an inference of conspiracy),
aff’d sub nom. Hall v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 118 F. App’x
680 (4th Cir. 2004).
Plaintiffs’ invitation-to-collude argument, at least
under the circumstances of this case, would take unilateral
action by a company (i.e., Delta) and deem it collusive
merely because it was preceded in time by another
unilateral action by a competitor (i.e., AirTran). But
one company’s public statements cannot “immobilize[]”
a competitor and preclude it from subsequently taking
otherwise lawful actions. United States v. Standard Oil
Co., 316 F.2d 884, 896 (7th Cir. 1963).
62a
Appendix C
Two additional facts make the inference Plaintiffs
would draw particularly untenable. First, the conduct at
issue—the imposition of a first-bag fee in the fall of 2008—
was not unprecedented but rather Defendants’ conformity
to a decision made by many of their competitors in the
preceding months. Those competitors, in turn, had
uniformly reported that they had experienced little if
any share shift and operational problems from bag fees.
Second, the evidence shows that AirTran was not firmly
committed to a first-bag fee at the time it extended the
would-be invitation to Delta. Between November 5 and
7, AirTran executives circulated quantitative analyses of
the first-bag fee and conferred with each other about the
decision whether to impose one. The final decision was not
made until November 10, more than two weeks after the
October 23 earnings call. It is therefore far from clear that
AirTran was “ready and willing to coordinate” activity
on October 23. In re Fortiline, 2016 WL 4379041, at *11.
In Williamson Oil, 346 F.3d at 1307, the Eleventh
Circuit rejected the argument that forward-looking
pricing statements such as “we have no wish to escalate
[the price war, b]ut we shall be ready to respond tactically
where necessary” constituted improper signals. The
statements that Plaintiffs would construe as an invitation
to collude in this case are, at best, on par with the
“signals” in Williamson Oil. The Court therefore finds
that an invitation to collude is not a plus factor because
the evidence Plaintiffs point to is “no more indicative of
collusion than it is of lawful, rational pricing behavior.” Id.
63a
Appendix C
2.
Collusive Communications Followed
Closely by Parallel Price Increases
Plaintiffs next assert that a conspiracy to fix
prices can be inferred from what they describe as an
“overwhelming pattern of [collusive] communications”
between Defendants in the time period leading up to their
parallel imposition of a first-bag fee. [554] at 53, 57. 30
The first such communication Plaintiffs rely on
is Fornaro’s June 18, 2008 statement at the investor
conference that “AirTran had not instituted a first bag
fee because AirTran would be uncomfortable competing
in Atlanta with Delta, which was not charging a first bag
fee.” But Plaintiffs concede that this statement “did not
elicit any reaction by Delta.” [554] at 7. “[C]ommunications
between competitors do not permit an inference of an
agreement to fix prices unless those communications rise
30. At the outset, AirTran suggests that a communication may
be credited as a plus factor only if three criteria are satisfied, see
[604] at 17-18, but the Court disagrees. Whether a communication
constitutes a plus factor is an inquiry not susceptible to determination
by any rigid test. In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 782 F.3d
867, 878 (7th Cir. 2015), on which AirTran relies, did not treat
any particular factors as dispositive; it merely suggested that the
evidence before it would have been more persuasive if those factors
were present. And Plaintiffs correctly point out that the causation
requirement AirTran would impose improperly puts the cart before
the horse in the context of a motion for summary judgment in a § 1
conspiracy claim. However, the other considerations identified by
AirTran—the parties to the conversation, the detail of its contents,
and its timing vis-à-vis the challenged action—are certainly among
those relevant to whether a communication constitutes a plus factor.
64a
Appendix C
to the level of an agreement, tacit or otherwise.” In re
Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 126 (3d Cir. 1999)
(internal punctuation omitted) (holding that the district
court properly discounted evidence about allegedly
collusive communications where, among other things, the
defendant receiving those communications “generally did
not act on any information obtained through” them).
Plaintiffs next rely on Fasano’s communications and
attempted communications with Delta during July and
August 2008. But this too is unavailing. Fasano’s e-mails
to Boeckhaus and Burman were never received because
Boeckhaus and Burman had already left Delta’s employ, so
they clearly do not tend to establish a conspiracy between
Defendants. As for the rest of Fasano’s communications
discussed above, “[e]vidence of sporadic exchanges of
shop talk among [employees] who lack pricing authority is
insufficient to survive summary judgment. Furthermore,
to survive summary judgment, there must be evidence
that the exchanges of information had an impact on
pricing decisions.” Baby Food, 166 F.3d at 125. Fasano’s
communications show, at most, the AirTran was anxious
about competing with Delta and wanted to know, perhaps
desperately so, what Delta was going to do on a first-bag
fee. This is not inconsistent with, and thus does not tend
to exclude the possibility of, conscious parallelism, as
“[c]ompetitors in concentrated markets watch each other
like hawks.” Text Messaging, 782 F.3d at 875. 31 In the
31. Indeed, Jack Smith confirmed that AirTran was “always
looking to see what the grapevine is . . . on what other competitors
[were] doing,” even though such information usually came in the form
of “gossip, chatter, and rumors” that were of unreliable accuracy.
[360] at 69-70.
65a
Appendix C
absence of evidence that Fasano ever communicated with
anybody involved in Delta’s first-bag fee decision, these
communications are not a plus factor tending to exclude
the possibility of independent conduct.
The other communications Plaintiffs point to are
equally unavailing as plus factors. A statement cannot
constitute a plus factor if it requires the jury to engage in
speculation and conjecture to such a degree as to render
its finding a guess or mere possibility. Williamson Oil,
346 F.3d at 1302. Plaintiffs allege very generally that at
unspecified times in 2008, “a lot of competitive information
. . . was relayed through vendors,” AirTran’s employees
“very frequently” relayed what they learned about
competitors, and Defendants’ employees had discussions
“all the time.” [554] at 55-56. Other than offering string
citations to a litany of exhibits without even so much as a
parenthetical explanation as to the significance of those
exhibits, Plaintiffs wholly fail to explain the content of
these so-called communications. Having concluded that
the comments Plaintiffs did specifically point to are
insufficient to constitute a plus factor, the Court declines
Plaintiffs’ invitation to parse through the voluminous
record in a search for anything else that might possibly
be construed as collusive communications. United States
v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) (“Judges are
not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.”).
The communications on which Plaintiffs rely are
perfectly consistent with conscious parallelism by
members of an oligopoly. Plaintiffs rely on hindsight to
paint them as collusive in light of Defendants’ parallel
66a
Appendix C
pricing—which occurred many months later than some of
the communications at issue—but a reasonable factfinder
could not so find. These communications do not tend to
exclude the possibility of independent action.
3.
Evidence that Exchanges of Information
Affected Delta’s First-Bag-Fee Decision
Plaintiffs also argue that a plus factor exists in
this case because the evidence shows that exchanges of
information between Defendants affected Delta’s first-bagfee decision. There is no question that the mere “exchange
of price data and other information among competitors
does not invariably have anticompetitive effects” and
therefore does “not constitute a per se violation of the
Sherman Act.” United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438
U.S. 422, 441 n.16, 98 S. Ct. 2864, 57 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1978);
see also Amey, Inc. v. Gulf Abstract & Title, Inc., 758
F.2d 1486, 1505 (11th Cir. 1985) (“Absent an agreement
to fix prices, there is nothing unlawful about competitors
meeting and exchanging price information or discussing
problems common in their industry, or even exchanging
information as to the cost of their product.”). However,
there are circumstances under which the exchange of such
information followed by a parallel price increase can give
rise to an inference of a conspiratorial agreement to fix
prices. See, e.g., In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d
350, 369 (3d Cir. 2004); In re SRAM Antitrust Litig., No.
07-md-1819 CW, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132172, 2010 WL
5138859, at *6-7 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2010).
67a
Appendix C
In SRAM, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132172, 2010
WL 5138859, at *6, an employee who was indisputably
“involved in setting prices” (even though he personally
lacked “ultimate pricing authority”) “relayed regular
reports about competitors’ pricing and production directly
to pricing authorities . . . as well as to other [of the
defendant’s] personnel, who appear to have played roles in
setting prices . . . .” “He exchanged information with other
high level managers from competitor firms, and exercised
direct influence over the prices that buyers paid” for the
products at issue. Id. Thus, the court concluded that there
was sufficient evidence from which a jury could infer the
existence of a conspiratorial price-fixing agreement.
The SRAM court analogized the facts before it to
those of Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 368-69. In that case, the
Third Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs had presented
sufficient evidence of a price-fixing conspiracy to survive
summary judgment where the defendants’ high-level
employees had exchanged pricing information and the
evidence was sufficient to infer that the defendants
had used that information to implement collusive price
increases. For example, one defendant (AFG) had faxed to
another defendant (PPG) an internal memorandum about
a planned future price increase that had not been publicly
announced. PPG then announced an identical increase
before AFG, and the rest of the producers followed with
identical price increases. In addition, “[s]everal . . . key
documents emphasize[d] that the relevant price increases
were not economically justified or supportable, but
required competitors to hold the line.” Id. at 369.
68a
Appendix C
Both SRAM and Flat Glass found their facts factually
distinguishable from those in Baby Food, 166 F.3d at
124-26, in which the Third Circuit affirmed the grant of
summary judgment to the defendants where “the evidence
did not support an inference of a conspiracy to fix prices
but portrayed nothing more than intense efforts on the
part of three large and strong competing companies . . . to
ascertain ‘what their competitors would be doing with
regard to pricing, promotions, and products.’” (quoting
the district court’s opinion). The documents that the
competitors had exchanged—primarily between lower
level employees—reflected “competitive information
concerning the discontinuance of products or changes
in product ingredients or in packaging,” and thus the
exchange of that information “was consistent with
independent action and not grounds for assuming ‘some
shadowy conspiracy.’” Id. at 125.
As explained by the Flat Glass court, 385 F.3d at
369, “[t]he In re Baby Food plaintiffs simply could not
correlate information exchanges with specific collusive
behavior,” instead making “the more amorphous claim
that the exchanges of information ‘impacted the market
as a whole.’” The SRAM court, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
132172, 2010 WL 5138859 at *7, further elaborated that
“[t]here was no indication” in Baby Food that the employee
who had obtained a competitor’s pricing information
“communicated the information directly to pricing
authorities at the firm, or participated in any discussions
to decide what prices would be set.”
69a
Appendix C
The Court concludes that the facts of this case are
more analogous to Baby Food than Flat Glass, SRAM, or
other cases in which the exchange of pricing information
was found to support an inference of conspiracy. The
information exchanges Plaintiffs point to might reflect
“intense efforts” to monitor competitors’ activity, even
pricing activity, but they do not tend to exclude the
possibility of unilateral action by oligopolists. “Gathering
competitors’ price information can be consistent with
independent competitor behavior,” particularly within
the airline industry, which at all relevant times has been
so concentrated and highly competitive that “it makes
common sense to obtain as much information as possible
of the pricing policies . . . of one’s competitors.” Baby Food,
166 F.3d at 126; see also Text Messaging, 782 F.3d at 875
(“Competitors in concentrated markets watch each other
like hawks.”).
Plaintiffs place much stock in the fact that Delta’s
value proposition analysis was revised after AirTran’s
third-quarter earnings call, and they characterize Delta’s
decision to impose a first-bag fee as an “abrupt shift from
the past.” [554] at 61 (citing Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc. v. FTC,
221 F.3d 928, 935 (7th Cir. 2000)). But Delta’s decision
not to impose a first-bag fee during the summer of 2008
does not make any subsequent revisiting of that decision
conspiratorial, especially in light of the fact that every
other legacy airline except Alaska had adopted first-bag
fees by the time Delta did so. An inference of conspiracy
is less plausible from this so-called “abrupt shift” in light
of the fact that Defendants’ alleged collusive behavior
involved conformity to what had become industry norms,
70a
Appendix C
even if those norms were not universally in place. See
Baby Food, 166 F.3d at 135 (“Parallel pricefixing must be
so unusual that in the absence of an advance agreement,
no reasonable firm would have engaged in it.”).
Furthermore, even giving full credit to Plaintiffs’
characterization of the value proposition document as
reflecting Delta’s views on the issue, the fact that Delta
“analyzed possible competitor responses” is “a strong
indicator that there was no actual agreement among the
airlines, as it shows that [Delta was] uncertain of [its]
rivals’ potential reaction.” Hall, 296 F. Supp. 2d at 671.
This is all the more true where the analysis was driven
not by clandestine internal exchanges but by the public
statements of a competitor. See Williamson Oil, 346 F.3d at
1305 (“[I]n competitive markets, particularly oligopolies,
companies monitor each other’s communications with the
market in order to make their own strategic decisions.”).
Those public statements, moreover, were viewed by Delta
employees as “inappropriate,” “[un]wise,” “odd,” and
otherwise problematic specifically because of Defendants’
antitrust obligations, see supra n. 14, making the inference
that Delta would have accepted any such invitation less
plausible. And Delta’s employees testified uniformly
that AirTran’s comments were simply not discussed as a
factor at Delta’s October 27, 2008 CLT meeting. Thus, it
is far less clear in this case than in Flat Glass that any
information exchanges actually affected Delta’s decision
to impose a first-bag fee in a way that is at all inconsistent
with conscious parallelism within an oligopolistic market.
71a
Appendix C
4.
Actions Against Unilateral Economic SelfInterest
“One prominent ‘plus factor,’ to which antitrust
plaintiffs often take recourse, is a showing that the
defendants’ behavior would not be reasonable or explicable
(i.e., not in their legitimate economic self-interest) if they
were not conspiring to fix prices or otherwise restrain
trade . . . .” Harcros, 158 F.3d at 571; see also Williamson
Oil, 346 F.3d at 1310 (“It is firmly established that
actions that are contrary to an actor’s economic interest
constitute a plus factor that is sufficient to satisfy a price
fixing plaintiff’s burden in opposing a summary judgment
motion.”).
But the concept of ‘action against self interest’
is an ambiguous one and one of its meanings
could merely constitute a restatement of
interdependence. For example, refusing to raise
or lower prices unless rivals do the same could
be against a firm’s self interest but it would
constitute mere interdependence. . . . Therefore,
to satisfy the requirements of a conspiracy,
the action that is against self interest must go
beyond mere interdependence. . . . [P]arallel
price fixing which would be so unusual that
in the absence of advanced agreement no
reasonable firm would engage . . . could be
sufficient to establish a conspiracy.
Coleman, 849 F. Supp. at 1467 (emphasis added).
72a
Appendix C
Moreover, courts “must exercise prudence in labeling
a given action as being contrary to the actor’s economic
interests, lest we be too quick to second-guess wellintentioned business judgments of all kinds.” Williamson
Oil, 346 F.3d at 1310. “[F]irms must have broad discretion
to make decisions based on their judgments of what is
best for them and . . . business judgments should not be
second-guessed even where the evidence concerning the
rationality of the challenged activities might be subject
to reasonable dispute.” In re Citric Acid Litig., 191 F.3d
1090, 1101 (9th Cir. 1999). “[I]f a benign explanation for
the action is equally or more plausible than a collusive
explanation, the action cannot constitute a plus factor.
Equipoise is not enough to take the case to the jury.”
Williamson Oil, 346 F.3d at 1310. “Thus, no conspiracy
should be inferred from ambiguous evidence or from mere
parallelism when defendants’ conduct can be explained
by independent business reasons.” Baby Food, 166 F.3d
at 122.
In the fall of 2008, the airline industry faced nearly
unprecedented circumstances. “[T]he economy was
collapsing, and [Delta was] seeing a tremendous amount
of reductions in terms of bookings.” [366] at 59; see also
[559] at 39-40 (Healy testifying that AirTran similarly
projected a decreased demand in the fall and winter
of 2008). At Delta, these industry-wide issues were
compounded by concerns about funding Delta’s pension.
[366] at 72. By this same time period, every other legacy
carrier except Alaska had introduced first-bag fees and
reported them to be profitable and to have resulted in
no significant share-shift. On September 16, the Wall
73a
Appendix C
Street Journal reported that “airline fees are here to
stay,” explaining that “baggage fees and other charges
[were] significantly improving the usually dismal finances
of the industry” because passengers were “paying them,
if begrudgingly, and [weren’t] shifting in large numbers
to the few airlines that don’t charge fees . . .” [350-89] at
2. As early as June 2008, one article noting the divide in
the airline industry over first-bag fees posited that Delta
and Northwest might have been holding off in light of
their need to obtain regulatory approval for their pending
merger: “‘They don’t want to swat the hornets’ nest,’
[aviation consultant Robert] Mann says.” [556] at 472.
As Plaintiffs point out, there were differing opinions
within Delta about whether to impose a first-bag fee, and
some employees worried about adding or increasing fees
during a period of softening demand. [366] at 63; [556] at
694; [363] at 91-92. And Plaintiffs’ expert posits that from
an economic perspective, there were valid justifications
to refrain from introducing these fees, including that
fuel costs were falling. But “evidence of a price increase
disconnected from changes in cost or demand only raises
the question” of what motivated the price increase, it does
not answer that question. Chocolate Confectionary, 801
F.3d at 400.
The overwhelming evidence before the Court reflects
Defendants’ subjective beliefs that there were valid
reasons to impose a first-bag fee, including Defendants’
need for revenue during an economic downturn. The
Court declines to infer the existence of a conspiratorial
agreement merely because the wisdom of Defendants’
decisions might not be impervious to questioning. See
74a
Appendix C
H.L. Moore Drug Exchange v. Eli Lilly & Co., 662 F.2d
935, 941 (2d Cir. 1981) (“[T]he mere fact that a business
reason advanced by a defendant . . . is undermined does
not, by itself, justify the inference that the conduct was
therefore the result of a conspiracy.”); Seagood Trading
Corp. v. Jerrico, Inc., 924 F.2d 1555, 1574 (11th Cir. 1991)
(“[ W ]hen the defenda nt put s for th a plausible,
procompetitive explanation for his actions, we will not
be quick to infer, from circumstantial evidence, that a
violation of the antitrust laws has occurred.”).
5.
Pretextual Explanations for Changed
Business Practices
Plaintiffs next attempt to conjure a plus factor
from what they characterize as Defendants’ pretextual
explanations for imposing first-bag fees. See generally
Chocolate Confectionary, 801 F.3d at 410-11 (citing case
law for the proposition that “pretextual explanations
for disputed conduct would disprove the likelihood of
independent action”) (internal punctuation omitted).
“Although pretextual reasons have some probative value,
. . . they are insufficient to create a genuine issue of
material fact without other evidence pointing to a pricefixing agreement.” Miles Distribs., Inc. v. Specialty
Constr. Brands, Inc., 476 F.3d 442, 452 (7th Cir. 2007).
Too, the “pretextual” reasons Plaintiffs rely on are not
inconsistent or false. Rather, Plaintiffs point to evidence
showing only the business reality that a business must
contend with a multitude of factors when making any
significant decision. Such evidence does not tend to exclude
the possibility of independent action by Defendants and
is thus not a plus factor.
75a
Appendix C
6.
Motive and Intent to Conspire
The final plus factor on which Plaintiffs rely is
Defendants’ motive and intent to conspire. See [554]
at 31-32. But the Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly held
that “the mere opportunity to conspire among antitrust
defendants does not, standing alone, permit the inference
of conspiracy.” Williamson Oil, 346 F.2d at 1319 (quoting
Todorov v. DCH Healthcare Auth., 921 F.2d 1438, 1456
(11th Cir. 1991)); Seagood Trading, 924 F.2d at 1574 (same);
see also Holiday Wholesale, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 1306 (“As
an initial matter, the court notes that the characterization
of motive as a ‘plus factor’ is questionable.”). And the
Eleventh Circuit is not alone, as other courts have
similarly recognized that “common motive does not
suggest an agreement” and is not indicative of anything
beyond interdependence. In re Musical Instruments &
Equip. Antitrust Litig., 798 F.3d 1186, 1194 (9th Cir. 2015).
However, the Court need not decide whether motive
could ever be a plus factor because in this case, Plaintiffs’
reliance on this would-be plus factor is little more than
a rehashing of their prior arguments. See [554] at 31-32
(arguing that Defendants were motivated to conspire
because they “both understood that it was contrary to
their economic interest[s] to unilaterally impose a [firstbag fee] before the other”). In the absence of any other
evidence from which an agreement to fix prices could
reasonably be inferred, there is no basis to infer such an
agreement from the mere motive or intent to conspire.
Such evidence, even if it existed here, “could not be said by
a reasonable factfinder to tend to exclude the possibility of
independent behavior.” Williamson Oil, 346 F.3d at 1302.
76a
Appendix C
7.
Cumulative Effect of Plus Factors
Even when viewed in the light most favorable to
Plaintiffs, the evidence in this case simply does not
permit a reasonable factfinder to infer the existence of a
conspiracy, as it does not “‘tend[] to exclude the possibility’
that the alleged conspirators acted independently.”
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588 (quoting Monsanto, 465
U.S. at 764). Although the Court has analyzed each of
Plaintiff’s would-be plus factors sequentially, the outcome
is the same when they are considered cumulatively.
See generally Continental Ore, 370 U.S. at 699 (“[t]he
character and effect of a conspiracy are not to be judged by
dismembering it and viewing its separate parts, but only
by looking at it as a whole”); High Fructose Corn Syrup,
295 F.3d at 655 (cautioning against a supposition that
“if no single item of evidence presented by the plaintiff
points unequivocally to conspiracy, the evidence as a whole
cannot defeat summary judgment”).
“In other words, in this case the whole of the
manufacturers’ actions is no greater than the sum of its
parts.” Williamson Oil, 346 F.3d at 1310. “[T]he record
taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to
find” that Defendants engaged in a conspiracy to fix prices
rather than lawful conscious parallelism. Matsushita, 475
U.S. at 587. Accordingly, “there is no ‘genuine issue for
trial,’” and Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.
Id.
77a
Appendix C
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to
exclude Singer’s testimony [625] is denied; Plaintiffs’
motion to exclude Carlton’s testimony [631] is granted as
to Carlton’s first opinion but otherwise denied; Plaintiffs’
motion to exclude Dick’s testimony [632] is granted as
to his opinion regarding the definition of collusion from
an economics perspective but otherwise denied; Delta’s
motion for summary judgment [350] is granted; and
AirTran’s motion for summary judgment [353] is granted.
In light of this holding, Delta’s motion for summary
judgment as to the claim asserted by Plaintiff Henryk
Jachimowicz [219] and Delta’s motion to exclude the
opinions and testimony of Bruce Pixley [433] are denied
as moot. 32
IT IS SO ORDERED this 28th day of March, 2017.
/s/ Timothy C. Batten, Sr.
Timothy C. Batten, Sr.
United States District Judge
32. Nine of Plaintiffs’ exhibits—Exhibits 444, 446-452, and
454—were timely provided to the Court for filing in connection with
Plaintiffs’ opposition to Defendants’ motions for summary judgment
but inadvertently omitted from the docket. These documents have
been provided to the Clerk’s office today for filing to ensure that the
record is complete, and nothing about their belated entries on the
docket should suggest that they were not available for the Court’s
review in connection with the pending motions.
78a
AppendixOF
D REHEARING OF
APPENDIX D — DENIAL
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT, FILED JUNE 8, 2018
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-16401-EE; 17-11733 -BB
MARTIN SIEGEL, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF
AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,
STEPHEN POWELL, ON BEHALF OF
This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.