Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Martin Siegel, et al., Petitioners v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., et al.

Supreme Court briefNov 5, 2018

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No. 18In the

Supreme Court of the United States

MARTIN SIEGEL, et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

DELTA AIR LINES, INC.; AND

AIRTRAN AIRWAYS, INC.,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United

States Court of A ppeals for the Eleventh Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Kevin Russell

Goldstein & Russell, P.C.

7475 Wisconsin Avenue,

Suite 850

Bethesda, MD 20814

(202) 362-0636

Daniel L. Low

Counsel of Record

Kotchen & Low LLP

1745 Kalorama Rd., NW,

Suite 101

Washington, D.C. 20009

(202) 471-1995

dlow@kotchen.com

Counsel for Petitioners

284446

A

(800) 274-3321 • (800) 359-6859

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether there is an exception to liability under the

price-fixing provision of the Sherman Antitrust Act for

conspiratorial price-fixing agreements reached through

invitations to collude on public investor earnings calls?

ii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

AND RULE 29.6 STATEMENT

Pursuant to this Court’s Rule 14 1(b), the following

were parties to the proceeding in the court whose

judgment is sought to be reviewed and are not named in

the caption above:

Avery Insurance Group, Inc.

Dahl, Carla

Gale, Laura

Jachimowicz, Henryk

Powell, Stephen

Terry, David

Pursuant to this Court’s Rule 29.6, undersigned

counsel state that Petitioner Avery Insurance Group, Inc.

is not a publicly held or traded corporation, that it has no

parent corporation, that no corporation owns ten percent

(10%) or more of its stock, and that there is not any other

entity related to, or affiliated with, Avery Insurance

Group, Inc. that has a financial interest in the outcome of

the claims asserted in this case.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

AND RULE 29.6 STATEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

TABLE OF APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI . . . . . . . 1

OPINIONS BELOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

JURISDICTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED . . . . . . . . . . 1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

I.

Factual History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

II. Procedural History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

1.

District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

2.

Court of Appeals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION . . . . 10

iv

Table of Contents

Page

I.

C e r t i or a r i S ho u ld B e G r a nt e d t o

Determine Whether The Eleventh Circuit

Properly Created a New Exception to

the Per Se Prohibition on Horizontal

Price Fixing Where Collusion Is Invited

on a Public Investor Earnings Call. . . . . . . . . . . 10

A. The Eleventh Circuit Defied This

Court’s Long-Standing Per Se Rule

by Consider ing Pro- Competitive

Benefits of Permitting Invitations to

Collude on Public Earnings Calls. . . . . . . . 11

B. The Eleventh Circuit Created a

Conflict with Other Courts by Finding

That Liability for a Horizontal Pricefixing Conspiracy Depends on the

Means of Unlawful Coordination. . . . . . . . 13

C. The Antitrust Enforcement Agencies

Disagree with the Eleventh Circuit

A b out W he t he r I n v it a t ion s t o

C ol lude on I n ve s t or Ea r n i n g s

Calls Are Actionable. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

D. The Eleventh Circuit’s Decision Is of

Great Significance, as Allowing PriceFixing Via Investor Earnings Calls

Would Result in Vast Overcharges to

Purchasers, Such as the Billions in

Overcharges to Petitioners. . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

v

TABLE OF APPENDICES

Page

APPENDIX A — OPINION OF THE UNITED

STAT ES COU RT OF A PPEA LS FOR

T H E ELE V EN T H CI RCU I T, FI LED

MARCH 9, 2018 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1a

A ppendix B — J U DGMEN T of the

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF

GEORGIA, ATLANTA DIVISION, FILED

MARCH 29, 2017 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3a

A PPEN DI X C — OR DER OF T H E

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF

GEORGIA, ATLANTA DIVISION, FILED

MARCH 28, 2017 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4a

APPENDIX D — DENIAL OF REHEARING

OF T H E U N I T ED S TA T E S C OU RT

OF A PPEA LS FOR THE ELEV ENTH

CIRCUIT, FILED JUNE 8, 2018 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78a

vi

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

FTC v. Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n,

493 U.S. 411 (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 12, 17

Holiday Wholesale Grocery Co. v.

Philip Morris, Inc.,

231 F. Supp. 2d 1253 (N.D. Ga. 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

In re Delta/AirTran Baggage Fee Antitrust

Litig.,

846 F. Supp. 2d 1335 (N.D. Ga. 2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

In re Delta/AirTran Baggage Fee Antitrust

Litig.,

733 F. Supp. 2d 1348 (N.D. Ga. 2010) . . . . . . . . . . 8, 14

In re Domestic Airline Travel Antitrust Litig.,

221 F. Supp. 3d 46 (D.D.C. 2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15, 19

In re Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig.,

906 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 14

In re Travel Agency Comm’n Antitrust Litig.,

898 F. Supp. 685 (D. Minn. 1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

In re Valassis Commc’ns, Inc.,

FTC File No. 051-0008 (Apr. 19, 2006) . . . . . . . . 14, 16

Interstate Circuit v. United States,

306 U.S. 208 (1939) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 13

vii

Cited Authorities

Page

Liu v. Amerco,

677 F.3d 489 (1st Cir. 2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.

Zenith Radio Corp.,

475 U.S. 574 (1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp.,

465 U.S. 752 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States,

356 U.S. 1 (1958) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Petruzzi’s IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v.

Darling-Delaware Co.,

998 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Standard Iron Works v. ArcelorMittal,

639 F. Supp. 2d 877 (N.D. Ill. 2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,

310 U.S. 150 (1940) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 12

United States v. Trenton Potteries Co.,

273 U.S. 392 (1927) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris USA,

346 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 13

viii

Cited Authorities

Page

STATUTES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES

15 U.S.C. § 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

ABA, 2017 Annual Review, 1-1 Antitrust Law

Developments 1B(1)(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Analysis of Agreement Containing Consent

Order, U-Haul Int’l , Inc. v. A MERCO,

FTC File No. 081-0157 (June 9, 2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Analysis of Agreement, In re Valassis Commc’ns,

Inc., FTC File No. 051-0008 (Mar. 14, 2006) . . . . . . 16

Ass’n of Corporate Counsel, Antitrust Enforcement

& Hot Topics Forum (May 17, 2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Comment, Does the FTC’s Section 5 Statement

Impose Limits on the Commission’s Unfair

Me t h o d s of C o m p e t i t i o n Au t h o r i t y?,

13 J.L. Econ. & Pol’y 243 (2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

David L. Hanselman et al., Bag Fee Case

Highlights Antitrust Risk of Public Statements,

Law360 (Apr. 11, 2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

ix

Cited Authorities

Page

Matthew J. Piehl & Daniel S. Graulich, When

Talk Is “Cheap”: Antitrust Risk for Earnings

Calls After In re Delta/AirTran Baggage

Fee Litigation, A BA, Transportation &

Energy Industries Comm. of the Section

of Antitrust Law (Summer 2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Matthew Perlman, Eleventh Circuit Affirms

Delta , AirTran Win in Bag-Fee MDL,

Law360 (Mar. 12, 2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Paula W. Render et al., Sending the Wrong

Message? Antitrust Liability for Signaling,

31 Antitrust, No. 1 (2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

R . Posner, Antitr ust Law: An Economic

Perspective 146 (1976) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Richard M. Steuer et al., The Application of

Antitrust to Public Companies’ Disclosures,

63 Admin. L. Rev. 159 (2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Wi l l i a m C. Hol mes, 1992 Antitr u st Law

Handbook § 1.03(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

W i l l i a m H . Pa g e , Ta c i t A g r e e m e n t

Un d er Sec tio n 1 of th e Sh er m an Act,

81 Antitrust L.J. 593 (2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

1

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioners respectfully petition for a writ of certiorari

to review the judgment of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in this case.

OPINIONS BELOW

The court of appeals order (Pet. App. 1a-2a) is not

published, but is available at 714 F. App’x 986 (March 9,

2018) or 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 6028 (March 9, 2018), reh’g

and reh’g en banc denied by 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 15595

(11th Cir. June 8, 2018) (Pet. App. 78a-79a). The district

court’s opinion (Pet. App. 4a-77a) is published at 245 F.

Supp. 3d 1343 (N.D. Ga. 2017) and the accompanying

judgment is included at Pet. App. 3a.

JURISDICTION

The court of appeals issued its judgment on March 9,

2018, and denied Petitioners’ timely request for rehearing

en banc on June 8, 2018. On August 29, 2018, Justice

Thomas granted a timely application to extend the time

to file this Petition to November 5, 2018. App. No. 18A218.

This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Sherman Antitrust Act provides, in relevant

part: “Every contract, combination in the form of trust

or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade . . . is

declared to be illegal.” 15 U.S.C. § 1.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

It is well settled that, absent direct evidence, to

survive summary judgment when alleging a horizontal

price-fixing conspiracy, plaintiffs must present evidence

of parallel conduct accompanied by one or more “plus

factors,” such as an invitation to collude. In this case,

Plaintiffs presented evidence of an invitation to collude.

Specifically, AirTran made clear in a public earnings call

that if AirTran’s principal competitor, Delta, imposed a

fee for first checked bags, AirTran would also impose

the fee. The lower courts did not doubt that Plaintiffs

presented evidence a jury could conclude was an invitation

to collude, but they nonetheless carved out an exception

for invitations to collude extended on a public earnings call

under the theory that the investing public has a legitimate

interest in knowing whether a company would follow the

price leading of a competitor.

But horizontal price-fixing conspiracies are subject to

the per se rule, under which this Court and others have

uniformly prohibited the consideration of pro-competitive

benefits in determining whether a conspiratorial agreement

constitutes an anticompetitive restraint on trade under the

Sherman Act. The Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished decision

here defies these precedents. In addition, courts have

consistently held that the form of communication used in

reaching a price-fixing conspiracy does not determine its

legality. And courts have permitted price-fixing actions to

proceed that are based on invitations to collude on investor

earnings calls, and antitrust enforcement agencies have

initiated investigations based on such invitations.

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision, if allowed to stand,

would be at odds with these decisions, and would authorize

3

publicly traded companies to enter into price-fixing

agreements with their rivals as long as they did so

through statements on earnings calls. This would result

in substantial market inefficiencies and consumers would

be forced to pay vast aggregate overcharges. The petition

should be granted.

I.

Factual History

In the spring and summer of 2008, some major airlines

began charging customers for their first checked bag.

Pet. App. 8a. Other airlines, such as Southwest, publicly

represented that they would not charge the fee and

were benefitting from market share gains from airlines

charging the fee. Respondents Delta and AirTran found

themselves in a competitive standoff, unique in the

industry, that prevented them from imposing the fee. Pet.

App. 10a-18a.

A i r T ran, which ma rkets itsel f as a low- cost

carrier (LCC), publicly stated that it “would be ‘pretty

uncomfortable’ competing in Atlanta with Delta, which

doesn’t charge the fee.” Pet. App. 14a.

Delta reached the same conclusion in an internal

“Value Proposition” study. The study explained that Delta

had thus far declined to adopt the fee because its “main

competitor, AirTran, [did] not have this fee”1 and because

“Delta [is] much more exposed to LCCs” than other major

legacy carriers. 2 Taking into account the potential loss of

market share to LCCs, the report gave a “Best Case,” Mid1. R:556 at PX195 at 2. Record citations are to the district

court docket.

2. E.g., R:556 at PX213 at 7, PX234 at 4.

4

Range,” and “Worst Case” estimate for the net value of

the bag fee to Delta. Pet. App. 18a. Although the numbers

varied in different iterations of the Value Proposition,

every version concluded that the profitability of a first bag

fee turned entirely on whether AirTran also adopted the

fee. 3 For example, the October 22 iteration of the report

concluded that if AirTran failed to follow Delta’s lead (the

“Worst Case” scenario), the loss in business to AirTran in

Atlanta overlap markets alone ($300 million) would exceed

the expected revenues ($265 million), and contribute to a

$243 million net loss for Delta.4

At the same time, Delta was deeply uncertain about

what AirTran would do. As of October 22, the Value

Proposition’s “Mid-Range Estimate” discounted the

expected loss to AirTran by 50% – based on the estimated

50% likelihood that AirTran would follow Delta’s lead –

resulting in an expected net loss of $46 million. Pet. App.

19a. Because the October 22 draft Value Proposition’s

expected that the fee would not be profitable, the executive

responsible for making an internal recommendation to

Delta’s Corporate Leadership Team on a first bag fee

concluded that Delta “would not implement 1st bag fee.”5

Delta would also force Northwest to abandon its fee as

part of a planned merger awaiting federal approval.6

3. E.g., R:556 at PX195, PX213, PX234.

4. R:556 at PX213 at 15. “FL” is an industry abbreviation

for AirTran, while “DL” means Delta, “B6” means JetBlue, and

“WN” means Southwest. See R:556 at PX213 at 11-13.

5. R:557-1 at PX215 at 1.

6. See R:556 at PX149; R:557-1 at PX169 at DLBF36434-35.

5

By mid-summer, both AirTran and Delta realized they

were at an impasse. Pet. App. 15a. In late July, AirTran’s

CEO, Robert Fornaro, received an email from an employee

stating that he had learned through his “internal [Delta]

grapevine” that the airlines were “in a stand-off. D[elta]

is carefully watching us waiting for a move on 1st bag.”

Id.7 Fornaro directed that Delta “should hear through the

grapevine that we are doing the programming to launch

this effort.” Id.8 One executive responded that he was

“hoping we’d be asked on the [quarterly investor earnings]

call,” that “[w]e’ve all but given it to [a newspaper],” and

that “we’ll push it out there.” 9 Another executive, Smith,

responded to Fornaro by assuring him that “[i]t will be

communicated today.” Pet. App. 15a.10 In addition, a few

days later, an AirTran director reported to Smith that he

had met with someone “very connected on the high level

operational and planning side of the house,”11 and was told

that “[t]hey want us to jump first. (we need it more than

they do).” Pet. App. 17a-18a.12

This competitive standoff continued into the fall. After

Continental adopted a fee in early September, a key Delta

employee tasked with coordinating fees with Northwest

emailed Delta COO Steve Gorman to confirm, “I assume

7. R:556 at PX109.

8. Id.

9. R:556 at PX109.

10. R:556 at PX108.

11. R:556 at PX126; see also R:582 at 145:6-14.

12. R:556 at PX126.

6

we still want to hold until airtran moves?”13 Gorman

said he had not yet checked with Delta CEO Richard

Anderson.14 Delta continued to hold.

AirTran made the move Delta was looking for in

late October. Pet. App. 19a. During its October 23, 2008

earnings call, AirTran CEO Fornaro responded to the

question AirTran had been “hoping” for about first bag

fees with an answer he had prepared in advance:15

Let me tell you what we’ve done on the first

bag fee. We have the programming in place to

initiate a first bag fee. And at this point, we

have elected not to do it, primarily because

our largest competitor in Atlanta where we

have 60% of our flights hasn’t done it. [W]e

don’t think we want to be in a position to be out

there alone with a competitor who we compete

on, has two-thirds of our nonstop flights and

probably 80 to 90% of our revenue is not doing

the same thing. So I’m not saying we won’t do

it. But at this point, I think we prefer to be a

follower in a situation rather than a leader

right now.

[Q.] But if they were, you’d consider it? It’s not

a matter of practice?

[A.] We would strongly consider it, yes.16

13. R:557 at PX148 at DLBF187470 (emphasis added).

14. Id.

15. R:361-2 at 216:14-217:2; R:560 at 91:16-92:25.

16. R:556 at PX223 at DLTAPE3264 (emphasis added).

7

Pet. App. 19a. Delta executives discussed Fornaro’s

earnings call statements, and found them “unwise,”

“inappropriate,” and contrary to “antitrust compliance.”

Id. at 20a and n.15.

The day after the call, Delta’s Value Proposition was

changed to reflect Delta’s new “high confidence level”

that AirTran would follow Delta’s lead on the fee, but

discounted it slightly to 90% to account for the possibility

that AirTran would not follow through on what it had

committed to. Pet. App. 20a.17 With this change, the only

real question was how much profit Delta would make from

the fee.18

Four days later, Delta’s Corporate Leadership

Team met, reviewed the Value Proposition, discussed

the profitability of the fee and AirTran’s likely response

based on the call, and agreed to adopt a $15 first bag fee,

effective December 5, 2008. Pet. App. 21a. A week after

Delta’s announcement, AirTran announced that it would

adopt the same $15 first bag fee, effective the same date.

Pet. App. 23a.

II. Procedural History

1.

District Court.

After the Government opened an antitrust investigation

into Respondents’ imposition of identical fees, consumers

filed multiple antitrust actions, which were consolidated

into this multidistrict litigation.

17. R:557-2 at PX371 at 124:14-125:15.

18. R:556 at PX234 at 16.

8

The district court denied Respondents’ motions to

dismiss, finding that Defendants’ public statements were

not “mere price announcements,” “went well beyond

disclosing the type of financial information that companies

must legitimately convey to their shareholders pursuant

to SEC regulations,” and that “collusive communications

can be based upon circumstantial evidence and can occur

in . . . statements on earnings calls.” In re Delta/AirTran

Baggage Fee Antitrust Litig., 733 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1360,

1362, 1364 (N.D. Ga. 2010).

The district court certified a class action, an appeal

of which the Eleventh Circuit accepted under Fed. R. Civ.

P. 23(f). While that appeal was pending, the district court

entered summary judgment in Defendants’ favor. Pet.

App. 4a-77a (order); Pet. App. 3a (judgment)

The district court explained that the Eleventh Circuit

applies “a three-step approach to summary judgment in

the price-fixing context.” Pet. App. 48a.

First, the court must determine whether the

plaintiff has established a pattern of parallel

behavior. Second, it must decide whether the

plaintiff has demonstrated the existence of one

or more plus factors that tends to exclude the

possibility that the alleged conspirators acted

independently. The existence of such a plus

factor generates an inference of illegal price

fixing. Third, if the first two steps are satisfied,

the defendants may rebut the inference of

collusion by presenting evidence establishing

that no reasonable factfinder could conclude

that they entered into a price fixing conspiracy.

9

Id.at 49a (quoting Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris

USA, 346 F.3d at 1287, 1301 (11th Cir. 2003)).

There was no dispute that the first step was satisfied.

Pet. App. 53a-54a. Moving to the second step, the district

court accepted that an invitation to collude is a plus factor.

Id. at 56a (citing, e.g., Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United

States, 306 U.S. 208, 227 (1939)); id. at 69. The court also

did not dispute that a reasonable jury could conclude

that AirTran’s statements amounted to an invitation for

joint action. Id. at 56a-59a. But it believed that “courts

must ‘be careful not to permit inferences of antitrust

conspiracy when to do so would create a significant

irrational dislocation in the market or would result in

significant anticompetitive effects.’” Id. at 59a (quoting

In re Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 906 F.2d 432,

440 (9th Cir. 1990)). The court concluded that prohibiting

a company from addressing how it would respond to

hypothetical future price leading by a competitor would

have that effect. Id at 61a.

Accordingly, the district court created and adopted

the principle of law that so long as an invitation to collude

is extended in a public earnings call, rather than privately,

the invitation cannot be a plus factor if the statements

concern “a topic that was of interest to the . . . industry,”

such as how a company would respond to potential pricing

moves by a competitor. Id. at 59a-60a.

The district court then rejected Plaintiffs’ other

asserted plus factors. Id. at 63a-75a. Having done so, it

did not reach the third Williamson Oil step and therefore

did not evaluate Defendants’ claims that the evidence

rebutted any inference of an agreement.

10

2.

Court of Appeals.

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, adopting the

reasoning of the district court in an unpublished decision.

Pet. App. 1a-2a. A petition for rehearing and rehearing en

banc was denied on June 8, 2018. Pet. App. 78a.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I.

Certiorari Should Be Granted to Determine

Whether The Eleventh Circuit Properly Created

a New Exception to the Per Se Prohibition on

Horizontal Price Fixing Where Collusion Is Invited

on a Public Investor Earnings Call.

The petition seeks review of an Eleventh Circuit decision

that precludes courts from considering, on summary

judgment, evidence of collusive communications on public

investor earnings calls because such communications

about pricing (even when conditioned on hypothetical

future price hikes by competitors) may be of interest

to investors. This decision would effectively immunize

price-fixing agreements reached through investor calls.

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision is at odds with this

Court’s per se rule, which prohibits the consideration of

pro-competitive benefits in determining the illegality of

horizontal price-fixing conspiracies. It also conflicts with

court decisions holding that the means of communication

does not determine the legality of a conspiracy, including

decisions and antitrust enforcement actions related to

invitations to collude on investor earnings calls. Although

the Eleventh Circuit’s decision was unpublished, this case

has been well publicized, and would create a template

for lawful collusion in future cases that would result in

massive overcharges to purchasers, and has resulted in

billions of dollars in overcharges to Petitioners alone.

11

A.

The Eleventh Circuit Defied This Court’s LongStanding Per Se Rule by Considering ProCompetitive Benefits of Permitting Invitations

to Collude on Public Earnings Calls.

This Court has long held that price-fixing among

horizontal competitors is per se unlawful because the

“aim and result of every price-fixing agreement, if

effective, is the elimination of one form of competition.”

United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397

(1927). Because price-fixing conspiracies are illegal per

se, such agreements are conclusively presumed unlawful

without any evaluation of their reasonableness or procompetitive benefits, or their “purpose, aim or effect in

the elimination of so-called competitive evils,” United

States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 228 (1940),

and without regard to any alleged “social justifications.”

FTC v. Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 424

(1990). Similarly, the per se rule prohibits inquiries into

reasonableness even if there is an “expressive component”

to the violation that implicates First Amendment rights.

Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 429-30. “A

rule that would require courts to apply the antitrust laws

‘prudently and with sensitivity’ whenever a[] [horizontal]

boycott has an ‘expressive component’ would create a

gaping hole in the fabric of those laws.” Id. at 431-32.

The per se rule “makes the type of restraints which

are proscribed by the Sherman Act more certain to the

benefit of everyone concerned,” and “avoids the necessity

for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic

investigation into the entire history of the industry

involved….” N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1,

5 (1958). “The per se rules are . . . judicial interpretations

of the Sherman Act . . . [and] have the same force and

12

effect as any other statutory commands.” Super. Ct. Trial

Lawyers, 493 U.S. at 432-33.

Here, the lower courts examined the pro-competitive

benefits and expressive components of the public earnings

call statements through which the alleged conspiracy was

reached. Pet. App. 58a-61a. The lower courts speculated

that “significant anticompetitive effects” would result from

allowing AirTran’s earnings call statements to be used

as evidence of an unlawful conspiracy, as investors were

interested in the statements (e.g., because jointly imposing

the fee with Delta would increase AirTran profits). Id. at 59a

(quotation and citation omitted); see also id. at 58a (“courts

have refused to construe corporate communications as

invitations to collude where the communications contain

‘the type of information companies legitimately convey to

their shareholders’”) (citing Holiday Wholesale Grocery

Co. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1276

(N.D. Ga. 2002)). Without acknowledging or balancing

the countervailing anticompetitive harms that would

result from effectively immunizing conspiracies reached

through earnings call statements, the court found that

the potential procompetitive benefits of the statements

precluded the court from considering the statements as

plus factor evidence of a conspiracy. Pet. App. 58a-60a.

By considering the pro-competitive benefits of

AirTran’s public statements in determining whether

AirTran’s statements could be used as evidence of a pricefixing conspiracy, the court defied the per se rule against

price-fixing established by this Court. See, e.g., Super.

Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 422, 424, 431-33;

Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 224 n.59 (“Whatever

economic justification particular price-fixing agreements

may be thought to have, the law does not permit an inquiry

13

into their reasonableness.”). Thus, the Eleventh Circuit’s

decision is at odds with this Court’s precedent.

No exception to the per se rule exists here. The range

of permissible inferences from “ambiguous evidence”

may be more limited in certain circumstances, such as

economically implausible alleged conspiracies or alleged

vertical price-fixing conspiracies. See Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)

(“implausible” claim of unlawful price-cutting that “simply

makes no economic sense” requires “more persuasive

evidence”); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465

U.S. 752, 764 (1984) (plaintiffs in vertical price-fixing

conspiracy needed more than evidence of dealer complaints

– lawful under the Colgate doctrine – to survive summary

judgment). But those circumstances are not present here.

And an invitation to collude has been recognized as “plus

factor” evidence -- not “ambiguous” evidence. Dist. Ct.

Order at 67 (citing Interstate Circuit v. United States,

306 U.S. 208, 227 (1939)); Petruzzi’s IGA Supermarkets,

Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir.

1993) (plus factor exists when “‘one participant expressly

invited common action by the other’”) (quoting William C.

Holmes, 1992 Antitrust Law Handbook § 1.03[3], at 154);

see also Pet. App. 49a (“‘The existence of . . . a plus factor

generates an inference of illegal price fixing.’”) (quoting

Williamson Oil, 346 F.3d at 1301).

B. The Eleventh Circuit Created a Conflict with

Other Courts by Finding That Liability for a

Horizontal Price-fixing Conspiracy Depends

on the Means of Unlawful Coordination.

The decision of the Eleventh Circuit conflicts with

other courts, which have consistently found that liability

14

for a horizontal price-fixing conspiracy does not depend

on the means of unlawful coordination. See, e.g., In re

Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 906 F.2d 432, 447

(9th Cir. 1990) (“the form of the exchange—whether

through a trade association, through private exchange

... or through public announcements of price changes –

should not be determinative of its legality.”) (quoting R.

Posner, Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective 146

(1976)); Standard Iron Works v. ArcelorMittal, 639

F. Supp. 2d 877, 892-95 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (statements at

industry conferences supported an antitrust conspiracy

claim); In re Travel Agency Comm’n Antitrust Litig.,

898 F. Supp. 685, 690 (D. Minn. 1995) (denying summary

judgment to Delta and other defendants in the face

of allegations that they exchanged messages through

public speeches, press releases, and meetings); In re

Valassis Commc’ns, Inc., FTC File No. 051-0008 (Apr.

19, 2006) (“[I]t is clear that anticompetitive coordination

can also be arranged through public signals and public

communications, including speeches, press releases, trade

association meetings and the like”).

And courts have permitted inferences of conspiracy

to be drawn in the specific circumstances at issue here:

where an invitation to collude is made publicly to investors.

In fact, the district court in this case permitted such an

inference to be drawn on a motion to dismiss (before

taking the opposite position on summary judgment). In re

Delta/AirTran Baggage Fee Antitrust Litig., 733 F. Supp.

2d at 1360 (“[C]ollusive communications can be based

upon circumstantial evidence and can occur in speeches

at industry conferences, announcements of future prices,

statements on earnings calls, and in other public ways.”)

(collecting cases).

15

Similarly, in In re Domestic Airline Travel Antitrust

Litigation, a court denied a motion to dismiss an alleged

conspiracy to restrict capacity allegedly reached in part

through Delta’s and other defendants’ public statements,

including allegedly collusive statements made on public

earnings calls. 221 F. Supp. 3d 46, 62-63 (D.D.C. 2016); see

also Liu v. Amerco, 677 F.3d 489, 494 (1st Cir. 2012) (“a

proposal to engage in horizontal price fixing is dangerous

merely because of its potential to cause harm to consumers

if the invitation is accepted”).

C.

The Antitrust Enforcement Agencies Disagree

with the Eleventh Circuit About Whether

Invitations to Collude on Investor Earnings

Calls Are Actionable.

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision – that invitations to

collude on public earnings calls cannot be used as evidence

of a conspiracy – conflicts with the positions taken by

the antitrust enforcement agencies, which have initiated

investigations or enforcement actions based on invitations

to collude made on public earnings calls. For example, the

DOJ launched an investigation into whether the conduct

by Respondents that is at issue in this case amounted to

a price-fixing agreement. In re Delta / AirTran Baggage

Fee Antitrust Litig., 846 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1338 (N.D. Ga.

2012) (referencing DOJ investigation). The DOJ has also

investigated whether Delta and other airlines reached an

agreement to restrict capacity based on public statements,

including earnings calls. In re Domestic Airline Travel,

221 F. Supp. 3d at 65 n.8 (same).

Similarly, the FTC has repeatedly filed enforcement

actions based on public invitations to collude, including

16

invitations made on earnings calls. See, e.g., Analysis of

Agreement, In re Valassis Commc’ns, Inc., FTC File No.

051-0008, at 4-5 (Mar. 14, 2006) (finding Valassis’ CEO

improperly invited collusion on earnings call); Analysis

of Agreement Containing Consent Order, U-Haul Int’l,

Inc. v. AMERCO, FTC File No. 081-0157, at 3 (June 9,

2010) (finding U-Haul’s CEO improperly invited collusion

on a public earnings call where he stated that U-Haul’s

maintaining a price increase was conditional on its main

competitor raising its prices).

Although the FTC’s actions challenged unaccepted

invitations to collude pursuant to Section 5 of the FTC

Act, the Eleventh Circuit’s rationale here – that public

invitations to collude should not be actionable under the

antitrust laws because of investor interest in the content

of the statements – would apply equally in a Section 5 case.

As the FTC explained in Valassis:

[T]he anti-solicitation doctrine serves as a useful

deterrent against conduct that is potentially

harmful and that serves no legitimate business

purpose.

….Given the obligation under the securities laws

not to make false and misleading statements

with regard to material facts, Valassis’ [public]

invitation to collude . . . may have been viewed

. . . as even more credible than a private

communication. If such public invitations

to collude were per se lawful, then covert

invitations to collude would be unnecessary.

Analysis of Agreement at 4 (emphasis added); see

also Comment, Does the FTC’s Section 5 Statement

17

Impose Limits on the Commission’s Unfair Methods of

Competition Authority?, 13 J.L. Econ. & Pol’y 243, 266

(2017) (“[I]nvitations to collude pose a tremendous threat

to competition with arguably no social benefit”).

D.

The Eleventh Circuit’s Decision Is of Great

Significance, as Allowing Price-Fixing Via

Investor Earnings Calls Would Result in

Vast Overcharges to Purchasers, Such as the

Billions in Overcharges to Petitioners.

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision is of great significance

with far-reaching impact.

First, the Eleventh Circuit’s decision creates a

template for lawful collusion that “would create a

gaping hole in the fabric of those laws” against antitrust

conspiracies. Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S.

at 431-32. Under the Eleventh Circuit’s decision there

is nothing to prevent, say, Pepsi from announcing in an

earnings call: “We have done all the internal programming

and other work necessary to raise our prices by 10%,

but we are uncomfortable raising prices when our main

competitor has not done so. In this case, we’d rather be a

follower than a leader. However, if Coke were to raise its

prices by 10%, we’d seriously consider doing the same.”

Such a statement would address “a topic that was of

interest to the [] industry” and to investors, Pet. App.

59a, namely, whether Pepsi was going to raise prices. And

if Coke responded by raising prices 10%, and Pepsi then

followed suit, the Eleventh Circuit decision would treat

that result as entirely lawful, the kind of interdependent

behavior that must be tolerated in an oligopoly.

18

There should be no doubt that others will follow the

template this decision creates. As this case illustrates,

the economic incentives for price collusion are enormous:

AirTran’s offer cleared the way for both airlines to impose

hundreds of millions of dollars annually in new costs on

consumers.

At the same time, the template for collusion approved

by the Eleventh Circuit will not escape the notice of

sophisticated businesses and their counsel simply because

the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s legal

ruling in an unpublished decision, as the rulings have

garnered widespread attention in the antitrust press and

bar. See, e.g., Matthew Perlman, Eleventh Circuit Affirms

Delta, AirTran Win in Bag-Fee MDL, Law360 (Mar. 12,

2018); Ass’n of Corporate Counsel, Antitrust Enforcement

& Hot Topics Forum at 11 (May 17, 2018); ABA, 2017

Annual Review, 1-1 Antitrust Law Developments 1B(1)

(a); Matthew J. Piehl & Daniel S. Graulich, When Talk

Is “Cheap”: Antitrust Risk for Earnings Calls After

In re Delta/AirTran Baggage Fee Litigation, ABA,

Transportation & Energy Industries Comm. of the Section

of Antitrust Law (Summer 2017); David L. Hanselman

et al., Bag Fee Case Highlights Antitrust Risk of Public

Statements, Law360 (Apr. 11, 2017); Richard M. Steuer

et al., The Application of Antitrust to Public Companies’

Disclosures, 63 Admin. L. Rev. 159, 167-68 (2011); William

H. Page, Tacit Agreement Under Section 1 of the Sherman

Act, 81 Antitrust L.J. 593, 637-38 (2017); Paula W. Render

et al., Sending the Wrong Message? Antitrust Liability

for Signaling, 31 Antitrust, No. 1, at 83, 84 (2016).

Second, consistent with the Eleventh Circuit’s

template, Delta and others have continued to use similar

tactics in an effort to circumvent the prohibition on price-

19

fixing. See, e.g., In re Domestic Airline Travel Antitrust

Litig., 221 F. Supp. 3d 46 (D.D.C. 2016) (alleging that Delta

and other airlines conspired to restrict capacity, partly

through earnings calls and other public statements). Given

the massive financial incentive to engage in such pricefixing, public corporations will undoubtedly persist in

these tactics if the Eleventh Circuit’s decision is allowed

to stand

Third, Petitioners consist of approximately thirty to

sixty million airline passengers who were overcharged

by Respondents for first bag fees. Petitioners were

overcharged by billions of dollars. AirTran Br. at 3, No.

17-11733 (11th Cir. Oct. 16, 2017).

CONCLUSION

Because the Eleventh Circuit’s decision conflicts

with longstanding precedent and creates a gaping hole

in the antitrust price-fixing laws, the petition for a writ

of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Kevin Russell

Goldstein & Russell, P.C.

7475 Wisconsin Avenue,

Suite 850

Bethesda, MD 20814

(202) 362-0636

Daniel L. Low

Counsel of Record

Kotchen & Low LLP

1745 Kalorama Rd., NW,

Suite 101

Washington, D.C. 20009

(202) 471-1995

dlow@kotchen.com

Counsel for Petitioners

November 5, 2018

APPENDIX

1a

APPENDIX A — Appendix

OPINIONAOF THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT, FILED MARCH 9, 2018

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-16401, 17-11733

D.C. Docket No. 1:09-md-02089-TCB.

MARTIN SIEGEL, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF

AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,

STEPHEN POWELL, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF

AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,

HENRYK J. JACHIMOWICZ, ON BEHALF OF

HIMSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY

SITUATED, LAURA GREENBERG GALE, ON

BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS

SIMILARLY SITUATED, CARLA DAHL, ON

BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS

SIMILARLY SITUATED, et al.,

Plaintiffs - Appellees,

versus

DELTA AIR LINES, INC.,

AIRTRAN AIRWAYS, INC.,

Defendants - Appellants.

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia.

2a

Appendix A

March 9, 2018, Decided

Before WILSON and DUBINA, Circuit Judges, and

GOLDBERG,* Judge.

PER CURIAM:

After careful review and with the benefit of oral

argument, we affirm based on the well-reasoned decision

of the district court, dated March 28, 2017.

AFFIRMED.

* Honorable Richard W. Goldberg, Judge for the United States

Court of International Trade, sitting by designation.

3a

Appendix B OF tHE UNITED

APPENDIX B — JUDGMENT

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN

DISTRICT OF GEORGIA, ATLANTA DIVISION,

FILED MARCH 29, 2017

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

ATLANTA DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION FILE NO. 1:09-cv-2089-TCB

IN RE DELTA/AIRTRAN BAGGAGE

FEE ANTITRUST LITIGATION

JUDGMENT

This action having come before the court, Honorable

Timothy C. Batten Sr., United States District Judge, for

consideration of defendants Delta Air Lines, Inc. and

AirTran Airways’ motions for summary judgment, and

the court having GRANTED said motions, it is

Ordered and Adjudged that the plaintiffs take

nothing; that the defendants Delta Air Lines, Inc. and

AirTran Airways recover their costs of this action, and

the action be, and the same hereby, is dismissed.

Dated at Atlanta, Georgia, this 29th day of March,

2017.

JAMES N. HATTEN

CLERK OF COURT

By: s/____________________________

Deputy Clerk

4a

C THE UNITED

APPENDIX C —Appendix

ORDER OF

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN

DISTRICT OF GEORGIA, ATLANTA DIVISION,

FILED MARCH 28, 2017

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR

THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

ATLANTA DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION FILE No. 1:09-md-2089-TCB

IN RE DELTA/AIRTRAN BAGGAGE FEE

ANTITRUST LITIGATION

March 28, 2017, Decided

March 28, 2017, Filed

ORDER

This consolidated antitrust class action comes before

the Court on Defendants’ motions for summary judgment

[350, 353] and three related motions to exclude expert

testimony [625, 631, 632].1

1. The Court’s July 12, 2016 order granting Plaintiffs’ motion for

class certification [665] is presently on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit

pursuant to Rule 23(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

but such an appeal “does not stay proceedings in the district court

unless the district judge or the court of appeals so orders.” Fed. R.

CIv. P. 23(f). The Eleventh Circuit did not so order, and on October

19, 2016 this Court—consistent with the parties’ wishes—declined

to stay the case.

5a

Appendix C

I.

Factual Background2

A.

Delta and AirTran

Defendant Delta Air Lines, Inc., one of the world’s

largest airlines, is headquartered in Atlanta and has its

largest hub at Atlanta’s Hartsfield-Jackson International

Airport. Defendant AirTran Airways, Inc.—a subsidiary

of Defendant AirTran Holdings, Inc. (collectively with

AirTran Airways, “AirTran”)—was an airline that also

maintained a hub in Atlanta for many years until 2014,

when it ceased operations after having been acquired by

Southwest Airlines approximately three years earlier, in

2011.

Although the parties dispute the extent to which each

airline was concerned about the other’s activities, there

is no dispute that Delta and AirTran were competitors

for market share, particularly at their mutual hub in

Atlanta. See, e.g., [569] at 68 (Delta’s CEO testifying that

AirTran was “part of the [competition] equation” but not

conceding that AirTran was Delta’s largest competitor

out of Atlanta); [580] at 13 (AirTran’s CEO testifying that

Delta was AirTran’s number one competitor in Atlanta).

Delta is known as a “legacy carrier” because it had

interstate routes in place at the time of airline deregulation

in 1978. In and prior to early 2008, the legacy carriers in

the United States included Delta, Continental Airlines,

2. Throughout this Order, citations to deposition testimony

and to the parties’ briefs are to the page numbers that appear on

the transcript or brief itself. All other record cites refer to the page

of the PDF document filed on the Court’s electronic docket, not to

the page numbers (if any) reflected on the documents being cited.

6a

Appendix C

Northwest Airlines, American Airlines, US Airways, and

United Airlines. 3

AirTran, by contrast, was what is known as a “lowcost carrier” (“LCC”). In its most literal sense, the LCC

designation is indicative of airlines with business models

that minimize costs and allow airlines to charge lower

fares, but it is also used more generally as a “catchall name

for post-deregulation new entry and, in fact, disguises

diverse airlines and heterogeneous strategies.” Eldad BenYosef, The Evolution of the Airline Industry: Technology,

Entry, and Market Structure—Three Revolutions, 72 J.

a Ir l. & Com. 305, 317 (2007); see also Erica Wessling,

Note, Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.: A

Case for Increased Regulation of the Airline Industry, 6

wm. & Mary Bus. l. Rev. 711, 724 (2015). Prominent LCCs

during the time period in question included Southwest,

JetBlue Airways, Allegiant Air, Frontier Airlines, and

Spirit Airlines.

B. The Trend Toward Unbundling 4 and the

Introduction of Bag Fees

For many years, the purchase of an airline ticket

generally encompassed all or most of the services

3. Alaska Airlines is also a legacy carrier, but it flies only

regional routes.

4. “Unbundling” is somewhat of a loaded term in the context

of this litigation. The Court adopts Defendants’ nomenclature only

for ease of reference. It makes no finding and expresses no opinion

about whether Defendants and other airlines introduced new fees

or simply began to separately itemize charges that had previously

been “bundled” into ticket prices.

7a

Appendix C

associated with air travel. In the early-to-mid-2000s,

however, some airlines began to charge separate fees for

services and products ancillary to the purchase of a seat,

such as meals and snacks, premium beverages, call-center

booking, airport ticketing, and curbside check-in.

In 2006 and 2007, low-cost carriers led the way

in introducing fees for passengers’ checked luggage:

Allegiant introduced a $2-per-bag fee in November 2006;

Spirit began charging for two or more checked bags in

February 2007 and then for a first checked bag in June

of that year; Skybus Airlines implemented fees for first,

second, and third checked bags in May 2007; and Virgin

America began charging for second checked bags in

August 2007. In January 2008, even Southwest, which

markets itself as the “bags fly free” airline, introduced a

fee for a third-checked bag.

Before long, legacy airlines began to follow suit. In

February and March 2008, every legacy carrier except

Alaska announced the introduction of fees for secondchecked bags beginning in May. Delta was the third

legacy carrier to do so, announcing on March 18 that

it would implement a $25 second-bag fee beginning on

May 1. 5 AirTran—which had previously refrained from

5. Fees for second checked bags were announced by United on

February 4, 2008, effective May 5; announced by US Airways on

February 26, effective May 5; announced by Northwest on March

28, effective May 5; announced by Continental on April 4, effective

May 5; and announced by American on April 28, effective May 12.

Alaska, which as noted above is a regional legacy carrier, announced

and implemented its second bag fee on July 1, 2008, later than its

non-regional counterparts.

8a

Appendix C

charging baggage fees—announced on April 11 that it

would implement a second-bag fee of $10 (if paid online)

or $20 (if paid at the airport) beginning on May 15.6

American Airlines then became the first legacy carrier

to introduce a first-bag fee, announcing on May 21, 2008

that it would implement a $15 first-bag fee effective June

15. On June 12, US Airways and United both announced

that they would impose $15 first-bag fees effective July

9 and August 18, respectively. On July 9, Northwest

announced that it would begin charging a $15 first-bag

fee on August 28,7 and on September 5, Continental

announced that it would introduce a $15 first-bag fee on

October 7. By October 8, therefore, Delta and Alaska

were the only legacy carriers that had not implemented

a $15 first-bag fee, and AirTran was among the minority

of LCCs that had not implemented a first-bag fee. See

generally [353-29] at 34-36.

Dur ing this same time frame, Delta’s legacy

competitors made public statements indicating that they

expected ancillary fees—including but not limited to firstbag fees—to prove profitable. On July 9, 2008, Northwest

6. Following AirTran’s announcement, other LCCs that had

yet to introduce a second-bag fee—including JetBlue, Frontier, and

Republic Airlines—announced in April and May 2008 that they would

do so beginning in June.

7. On April 14, 2008, approximately four months before

Northwest announced that it would implement a first-bag fee, Delta

and Northwest had announced that they would merge, forming a

combined carrier that would be called Delta and of which Anderson

would be CEO. [350-55] at 2.

9a

Appendix C

announced that it expected its fee structure, including its

newly announced first-bag fee, to generate between $250

and $300 million in revenue annually. [350-63] at 4; see

also [350-64] at 6 (reiterating during a July 23 earnings

call that Northwest expected increased baggage, service,

and ticket-change fees to “drive between 250 and 300

million in annual revenue improvement”). American stated

during its July 16 earnings call that it expected all of its

fee increases (including its first-bag fee) “to drive several

hundreds of millions of dollars of new revenue” and that

its first-bag fee had resulted in no negative operational

effects. [350-60] at 7, 19.

On July 22, 2008, both United and US Airways held

earnings calls in which they too praised bag fees. [350-61]

at 9, 11 (United stating that unbundling had “creat[ed]

significant incremental revenue” and “estimat[ing] that the

potential revenue from the new baggage service handling

fees will be about $275 million annually in 2009”); [35062] at 8, 17 (US Airways reporting that implementation of

the bag fee had gone smoothly, that it was not seeing “any

difference in market share or bookings between carriers

that [had first-bag fees] and carriers that [didn’t],” and

that it estimated that shifting to “a la carte” pricing would

yield between $400 and $500 million in revenue annually).

On September 5, 2008, when Continental announced

its decision to charge for first-checked bags, it stated that

it had not seen any gain in market share by holding out.

[350-73] at 2. On September 16, the Wall Street Journal

reported that “airline fees are here to stay,” explaining

that “baggage fees and other charges [were] significantly

10a

Appendix C

improving the usually dismal finances of the industry”

because passengers were “paying them, if begrudgingly,

and [weren’t] shifting in large numbers to the few airlines

that don’t charge fees . . . .” [350-89] at 2.

C.

Delta’s Bag-Fee Discussions During the

Summer of 2008

American’s May 21, 2008 first-bag-fee announcement

prompted internal discussions about whether Delta should

introduce a similar fee. In the days following American’s

announcement, Delta’s CEO Richard Anderson and

executive vice president (“EVP”) of operations Steve

Gorman were in agreement that the airline should not

introduce a first-bag fee at that time due to concerns

relating to customer dissatisfaction, operational impacts

during the busy summer travel season, and Anderson’s

belief that “part of the basic bargain” when purchasing

an airplane ticket included one checked bag. [350-49].

EVP of network planning and revenue management Glen

Hauenstein concurred, recommending that if the industry

was moving toward charging a first-bag fee, Delta should

“be the last in.” [556] at 372. On May 28, Anderson closed

the debate, at least for the time being, by sending Gorman

an e-mail that read: “No $15.00 fee. Issue closed. Sit

tight with no announcement.” Id. President Ed Bastian

testified in his deposition that he was in agreement with

that decision. [350-22] at 114.

Fol low i ng t he Ju ne 1 2 , 2 0 0 8 f i r st - ba g -fe e

announcements by US Airways and United, Delta’s

internal bag-fee discussions intensified, although Anderson

11a

Appendix C

and Gorman remained opposed to the idea. [556] at 379.

On June 16, Delta’s Airport Customer Service (“ACS”)

group, which was headed by senior vice president (“SVP”)

Gil West, presented a written analysis of the first-bag fee

to the Corporate Leadership Team (“CLT”). See [350-54];

[366] at 29. 8 The ACS presentation explained that a $15

first-bag fee could potentially yield $220 million annually

in additional revenue even if forty percent of Delta’s

bag-checking passengers stopped checking a bag after

the fee was introduced. [350-54] at 6. The presentation

also recognized potential risks of introducing a first-bag

fee, including negative operational results, the need for

additional gate and ramp staff to collect fees and baggage,

and concerns about the perception that the introduction of

the fee might create. Id. Ultimately, ACS recommended

that Delta not impose a first-bag fee “at this time” but

that it “continue to monitor [other airlines] through the

end of the summer and re-evaluate.” Id.

D e lt a’s le a de r sh ip w a s r e c ept i ve t o AC S ’s

recommendation, as Anderson and Bastian continued

to believe that Delta should not charge a first-bag fee.

See [350-58] at 2; [350-59] at 2; [556] at 491; [557] at 308.

During a Delta earnings call on July 16, 2008, Kevin

Crissey—an airline-industry analyst employed by UBS—

asked about Northwest’s recently announced first-bag fee.

Bastian responded that Delta had “no plans to implement

it at this point” but would “continue to study” the question.

8. The CLT is a group of Delta’s most senior executives—

including, during the time period in question, Anderson, Bastian,

Gorman, and Hauenstein—who serve as an advisory group to the

CEO.

12a

Appendix C

[350-67] at 18. On August 1, Anderson delivered a weekly

recorded message to employees in which he explained that

Delta would increase its second-bag fee but continue to not

charge for a first-checked bag. [557] at 333. He explained

that Delta had an “agreement” with its customers that

with the purchase of a ticket “every customer gets a carryon brief case or purse, one regulation-sized roller bag and

one checked bag weighing no more than 50 pounds.” Id.;

[570] at 189. Anderson also explained that Delta’s bag-fee

policy made sense both “in the fuel environment” and

because Delta is primarily in the business of carrying

passengers, not cargo. [557] at 333.

But internally, Delta was studying the first-bag fee

more closely. In mid-August 2008, Delta’s manager of

baggage performance, Stephen Almeida, circulated a

first-bag fee analysis that noted, among other things, that

brand-tracking studies had indicated that “not charging

for the 1st checked bag” was a primary reason some

passengers chose to book Delta flights. [557] at 394-95.

A September 2008 focus group indicated that Delta’s

customers understood the necessity of charging for bags

but would actively seek out airlines that did not pass on

those charges. [557-1] at 125. On September 30, Pam

Elledge, Delta’s SVP of global sales, sent an e-mail to

Hauenstein, Grimmett, and others in which she explained

that her department was continuing to “quantify” the

issue but believed that “price, schedule and [frequent

flyer] loyalty” were the primary factors that motivated

passengers to book Delta, with first-bag fee being a

“tiebreaker.” [557-1] at 106.

13a

Appendix C

By late September 2008, some Delta executives were

rethinking the wisdom of a first-bag fee. On September 23,

Anderson gave remarks at a CEO forum in which he stated

that Delta was “trying to decide whether or not [it] should

charge for the first checked bag,” noting that it “could

bring [Delta] hundreds of millions in additional revenue

next year.” [557-1] at 129. On September 26, Delta CFO

Hank Halter identified a $15 first-bag fee as an option to

generate additional revenue, potentially as much as $29.7

million during the fourth quarter of 2008 alone. [350-94]

at 2, 13. Two days later, Anderson e-mailed Bastian to

suggest that Delta “think about implementing the [firstbag] fee post merger” because there was “Alot [sic] of

revenue involved.” [350-97]. Bastian agreed but noted

that Hauenstein was opposed to the fee. Id. Anderson and

Bastian both agreed that Delta should discuss the merits

of the fee “at [the] right time.” Id. The next day, September

29, 2008, Anderson, Bastian, Hauenstein, and other Delta

executives attended a quarterly finance meeting at which

first-bag fee was discussed. A “key consideration” was

the risk that Delta’s LCC competition, including but not

limited to AirTran, were promoting the fact that they

did not have the fee. [557-1] at 67. An October 10 e-mail

from Anderson noted that Delta was “still studying” the

first-bag fee. [557-1] at 174.

D.

AirTran’s Bag-Fee Discussions and Monitoring

of Delta During the Summer of 2008

During the summer of 2008, AirTran was engaged

in its own inquiry into the first-bag fee, and Delta was

very much a consideration. That June, CEO Robert

14a

Appendix C

Fornaro told attendees at a Merrill Lynch transportation

conference that AirTran had not instituted a first-bag fee

because it would be “pretty uncomfortable” competing in

Atlanta with Delta, which was not charging a first-bag fee

at that time. [556] at 472; [556-1] at 1511.

When Northwest announced its first-bag fee on July

9, 2008, AirTran was anxiously waiting to see if Delta

would follow suit. AirTran’s SVP of customer service,

Jack Smith, told his subordinate Greg Sayler that he

hoped Delta was “right behind” Northwest. [557] at 197,

211. When senior director of pricing and distribution

Matthew Klein sent an e-mail praising the first-bag fee,

SVP of marketing and planning Kevin Healy responded:

“Cheer louder, the guys with the blue and red tails in

ATL [i.e., Delta] need to hear you.” Id. at 194. On July 10,

AirTran was preparing to introduce a first-bag fee if Delta

did, but it was somewhat concerned about technological

limitations. [557] at 211. Healy suggested that perhaps

AirTran should announce that it would implement a firstbag fee on a future date and back off if Delta didn’t follow.

Id. He also suggested “test[ing] the water” by charging

for a first bag on AirTran’s lowest flights, both to generate

incremental revenue and to show its competitors that it

supported first-bag fees. Id.

By mid-July, AirTran was “desperate for revenue”

according to Klein, and the first-bag fee had become

the airline’s “new number one revenue priority.” [557] at

253-256. Internal projections valued the fee at between

$60 and $84 million per year, even if thirty percent of

AirTran’s bag-checking customers stopped checking bags

15a

Appendix C

in response to the fee. Id. at 258, 260. As AirTran worked

to develop the technological capability to implement a

first-bag fee, id. at 255-260, it remained very concerned

about what Delta planned to do, id. at 314.

On July 12, 2008, Sayler sent an e-mail to Smith

stating that while he had no “official” information, his

wife Robin, who was employed by Northwest, believed

that Delta would introduce a first-bag fee around August

28. [557] at 245; [577] at 52. Smith responded that he

hoped that information was accurate,9 then he forwarded

Sayler’s e-mail to Fornaro, adding only an explanation of

who Robin was and her status as a Northwest employee.

[557] at 245-47.

Another employee who reported to Smith was Scott

Fasano, AirTran’s director of customer service standards

and a former Delta employee. On July 31, 2008, Fasano

sent an e-mail to Smith reporting that Delta and AirTran

were “in a stand-off” regarding first-bag fees and Delta

was “carefully watching [AirTran] for a move.” [556]

at 591. Smith forwarded that information to Fornaro

and indicated it came from Fasano’s “internal [Delta]

grapevine.” Id. In response, Fornaro stated: “They

should hear through the grapevine that we are doing

the programming to launch this effort.” Smith assured

Fornaro “[i]t will be communicated today.” Id. at 597.10

9. It turned out not to be, as Delta did not announce until

November 5 that it would be imposing a first-bag fee effective

December 5.

10. Smith later testified that he did not recall what, if anything,

he did with that information and that he did “not always” do what

16a

Appendix C

Healy also informed Fornaro that AirTran was ready

to implement the first-bag fee for travel beginning on

September 4. Id. at 591. He had hoped someone would ask

about it on the most recent earnings call,11 but he assured

Fornaro that he would continue to “push it out there.” Id.

On July 31, 2008, Fasano attempted to send e-mails

to two individuals he had worked with while at Delta—

Gerry Boeckhaus and Amanda Burman—to inquire about

Delta’s first-bag-fee plans. [556] at 853-85.12 However,

unbeknownst to Fasano, both Boeckhaus and Burman

had left Delta’s employ, and it is undisputed that they

did not receive the e-mails Fasano sent to their Delta

e-mail addresses. [554-1] at ¶106; [350-24] at 21; [350-25]

at 8. Fasano then spoke with Mike Rossano and Mike

he told Fornaro he would. [556-1] at 1050, 1056; see also [577] at 67

(answering, in response to whether he typically followed through with

things he tells his boss he will do: “Normally, but not always with

Mr. Fornaro. Sometimes mandates are sent out that I don’t act on.”).

11. For AirTran’s second-quarter 2008 earnings call held in

July 2008, Fornaro had not included first-bag fees in his prepared

remarks but had considered how he would answer a question about

first-bag fees from analysts. [361-2] at 216; [560] at 91-92. “At that

point, it was a variation of, you know, we’re working on the technology,

and we haven’t made a decision. You know that changed to we have

the technology, and we haven’t made a decision.” [361-2] at 216-217.

However, as just noted, that question was not asked on the secondquarter earnings call.

12. Burman had been involved in Delta’s first-bag-fee analysis.

[557] at 67. Boeckhaus’s responsibilities included baggage handling,

so Fasano believed that he would be in a position to know about

Delta’s bag-fee policies. [582] at 130-31.

17a

Appendix C

Ringler, who were Delta’s station managers in Knoxville

and Miami, respectively. [556] at 587; [363] at 46-47, 6667; [582] at 28.13 Fasano reported to Smith that Delta

was “holding and [AirTran had] been included in every

conversation.” [556] at 587. Both Ringler and Rossano

denied having spoken with Fasano about bag fees, and

Ringler denied having spoken with Fasano at all during

the time period in question. [350-40] at 59; [350-41] at 79.

On August 4, 2008, Healy sent an e-mail to two AirTran

employees—Rocky Wiggins and Ted Hutchins—asking

what was known about Delta’s technological capabilities

with respect to the first-bag fee. [557] at 345. He also

advised that “we don’t need to maintain confidentiality on

the fact that we’re working on this as well.” Id.

The next morning, Fasano sent an e-mail to Healy

and Smith “following up on [their] conversation” from

the day before. [556] at 610. Fasano explained that he

“had a cup of coffee with one of [his] former colleagues

who is still embedded in the team amongst the Northwest

crew.” Fasano’s colleague—who remained unnamed

but was described by Fasano as being “very connected

on the high level operational and planning side” of

Delta’s operations—had informed Fasano that Delta’s

functionality was in place to go live with a first-bag fee,

13. Neither Rossano nor Ringler was involved in or had

knowledge of the process leading to Delta’s decision to impose a

first-bag fee. [350-40] at 64; [350-41] at 91. Rossano did participate

in weekly “baggage calls,” but the undisputed evidence is that those

meetings focused on “operational performance” and bag fees were

never discussed. [584] at 148-51; [350-41] at 25, 40, 91.

18a

Appendix C

but Delta “want[ed AirTran] to jump first.” [556] at 610.

Healy reprimanded Fasano and “made it very clear” that

the conversations reflected in his e-mail “can’t happen.”

[353-90] at 187; [353-81] at 161-62.14 There is no suggestion

that Fasano made any further attempts to contact Delta

or learn of its plans vis-à-vis a first-bag fee. On August

8, 2008, Fornaro sent an e-mail to Fornaro and others

stating that AirTran would not impose a first-bag fee

unless Delta did. [556] at 623.

E. October 2008: Defendants’ Final Decisions Are

Made

On October 15, 2008, before either Defendant had

decided to impose a first-bag fee, Delta held its thirdquarter earnings call, during which it stated that “a la

carte pricing is where we need to go as an industry” and

the impending merger with Northwest would give Delta

“another opportunity to look again with respect to where

the fee-based revenues align.” [350-99] at 18.

In the meantime, Delta continued to study the firstbag fee internally. Revenue management, with some input

from other departments such as ACS, prepared a “value

proposition” analysis of the first-bag fee, which it generally

opposed. The PowerPoint deck analyzed the first-bag fee

under best-case, worst-case, and mid-range scenarios

by taking the estimated revenue of the first-bag fee and

offsetting it by the estimated share-shift to other airlines,

14. Healy did relay to Wiggins and Hutchins that he had “heard

. . . that [Delta is] ready and can go anytime.” [557] at 350.

19a

Appendix C

including AirTran. The latter factor depended in part on

the likelihood that other airlines would match Delta’s firstbag fee. Initially, Delta predicted there was only a fifty

percent probability that AirTran would match, yielding

a mid-range estimate of a $46 million loss to Delta. [556]

at 756-57, 786-87.

On October 23, 2008, AirTran held its third-quarter

earnings call. The prepared remarks did not mention firstbag fees, but the first question, which came from Kevin

Crissey, did: “First check bag fee, you don’t have one, do

you? And will you?” Fornaro responded:

Kevin, good question. Let me tell you what

we’ve done on the first bag fee. We have the

programming in place to initiate a first bag fee.

And at this point, we have elected not to do it,

primarily because our largest competitor in

Atlanta where we have 60% of our flights hasn’t

done it. And I think, we don’t think we want

to be in a position to be out there alone with a

competitor who we compete on, has two-thirds

of our nonstop flights and probably 80 to 90%

of our revenue is not doing the same thing. So

I’m not saying we won’t do it. But at this point,

I think we prefer to be a follower in a situation

rather than a leader right now.

[353-16] at 7. Crissey followed up by asking, “But if they

were, you’d consider it? It’s not a matter of practice?”

Fornaro responded: “We would strongly consider it, yes.”

Id.

20a

Appendix C

Delta executives soon learned of Fornaro’s statements

and immediately questioned the wisdom of them. 15

Revenue management updated the value proposition deck

on October 23 and early October 24, 2008, to increase the

likelihood that AirTran would match any first-bag fee

from fifty percent to seventy-five percent, bringing the

estimated annual loss down from $46 million to between

$19 and $35 million. [557-1] at 290-91, 358-59. Later on

October 24, the value proposition was revised to reflect

a ninety-percent likelihood that AirTran would match.

[556] at 844-45. This change was made at Hauenstein’s

direction, [586] at 24, who made the number up but thought

it was a more “realistic” expectation, [567] at 124-25. At

that increased likelihood, Delta’s mid-range estimate

became “slightly positive” for the first time. [556] at 84445.16 Also on October 24, Hauenstein reported to Anderson

that AirTran “clearly want[ed] bag fees” and that the issue

15. Gorman found Fornaro’s comments “inappropriate” in light

of Defendants’ antitrust training and compliance and explained that

Delta was left in “almost disbelief that he made such a comment.”

[588] at 31. Hauenstein similarly described the statement as

“[un]wise” given “antitrust compliance” and prohibitions on

discussing future pricing. [567] at 122. Bastian “found it kind of

odd . . . that AirTran would even talk about that topic on the call

. . . [b]ecause we know not to talk about pricing matters in a public

call.” [366] at 49. Gail Grimmett in revenue management described

the conversations as “could you believe . . . that he made a pricing

comment on a call.” [565] at 200.

16. Delta disputes that the value proposition reflects the “views”

of Delta, as Plaintiffs contend it does. Rather, Delta asserts that

the value proposition was an “advocacy piece” prepared by revenue

management, which opposed a first-bag fee both before and after

October 23, 2008.

21a

Appendix C

would be discussed at the CLT meeting that was planned

for the following Monday, October 27. [556] at 798.

At the October 27, 2008 CLT meeting, revenue

management presented its value proposition analysis—

with the calculations based on a ninety-percent probability

that AirTran would match Delta’s first-bag fee—and

generally advocated against the fee. Gorman and West

reiterated their support for the fee. Bastian then spoke

and advocated in favor of the fee based on the expected

revenues it would generate during the tough economic

times, including Delta’s need to fund its employee pension

plan. Anderson agreed, and ultimately the CLT approved

the first-bag fee at the October 27 meeting.17

One week later, on November 5, 2008, Delta issued a

press release—titled “Delta Aligns Policies and Fees to

Offer Consistency for Customers Traveling on Delta- and

Northwest-Operated Flights”—in which it announced that

for travel beginning on December 5, domestic passengers

would be charged “$15 for the first checked bag and $25 for

the second checked bag . . . , consistent with Northwest’s

existing policies.” [350-127] at 3.18

17. Bastian testified that he came into the October 27 CLT

meeting inclined to adopt the first-bag fee but that he “wanted to

hear the discussion and the debate” before firmly committing. [35022] at 45.

18. In the same press release, Delta announced it was

eliminating certain fuel surcharges, reducing phone-reservation

charges, eliminating its curbside check-in fee, and reducing its

second-bag fee from $50 to $25.

22a

Appendix C

A nderson testified that Fornaro’s October 23

comments “didn’t have any bearing on [the CLT’s] decision

to put in place a first bag fee.” [350-2] at 94; see also [35020] at 68 (Anderson testifying that “AirTran’s match really

wasn’t relevant to the decision”). Bastian similarly testified

that Fornaro’s statement had “[n]o impact whatsoever”

on his stance; his concern was Delta’s survival and that

he “thought the need was for Delta to take care of itself

and not worry about what a relatively small carrier was

going to do.” [350-23] at 77, 85. AirTran was not relevant

to Gorman’s opinion on the first-bag fee either. [350-29]

at 44; [350-30] at 60. Grimmett, West, and Eric Phillips

(one of the authors of the value proposition analysis) did

not recall the chance of AirTran matching being brought

up at the CLT meeting, [350-31] at 214; [350-44] at 185;

[350-38] at 306-07. Hauenstein testified that Delta would

have made the decision to impose a first-bag fee without

regard to what AirTran did. [350-32] at 127.

Delta’s November 5, 2008 press release was circulated

within AirTran shortly after it was published. When Healy

was asked by another AirTran employee whether AirTran

should “take the plunge right away or . . . test whether this

provides any advantage in ATL?,” Healy responded that

he was “[n]ot sure yet . . . .” [350-128]. Healy then sent an

e-mail to Klein and other AirTran employees saying that

he did not believe AirTran had a choice about imposing a

first-bag fee, and the question to him was whether AirTran

should charge a “discount[ed]” fee of $5, $7, or $10. [350129]. Klein responded that he was “working on the new

valuation” but believed $15 was the way to go, and Healy

instructed him that his valuation should “make some

23a

Appendix C

estimate for the value of not implementing the first bag

fee,” such as share shift and good will. Id. At 11:06 p.m.

on November 5, Klein e-mailed Fornaro, AirTran’s CFO

Arne Haak, Healy, and others and attached a spreadsheet

describing the “staggering potential for 1st bag revenue.”

[353-21]. A November 6 e-mail from Haak to Healy stated,

“Should we charge the fee? (I think we have already

decided this.)” [556-1] at 8.

On the morning of Friday, November 7, 2008, AirTran

executives “discuss[ed] the merits of whether [AirTran]

should implement or not implement” a first-bag fee. [35393] at 206; [353-25]. Smith recalled that some people were

“certainly . . . in favor of not charging first-bag fees, saying

that it would give [AirTran] a competitive advantage.” [353104] at 129. He, however, “was of the opinion that we should

do first-bag fees,” and he was “pretty disgusted at the end

of the call because we had the people who were responsible

for generating revenue saying, [‘]Gee, I don’t know if we

really want to do this. We may lose customers.[’]” Id. at

130. Shortly after that meeting, AirTran’s senior director

of corporate finance Jason Bewley circulated an update to

the first-bag-fee analysis that Klein had circulated late on

November 5. Bewley’s analysis “mirror[ed]” Klein’s and

estimated “approximately $100MM of revenue in 2009”

from imposing a first-bag fee. [353-26].

AirTran’s executives decided to “let it sit over the

weekend,” and the final decision to impose a first-bag fee

was made on the morning of November 10, 2008. [353-83]

at 85-86. On November 12, AirTran issued a press release

announcing that it too would impose a $15 first-bag fee on

December 5. [556-1] at 23.

24a

Appendix C

These lawsuits were subsequently filed alleging that

Defendants’ simultaneous imposition of a $15 first-bag fee

was the result of unlawful collusion in violation of § 1 of

the Sherman Act. Defendants have moved for summary

judgment.

II. Daubert Motions

As noted above, the parties have filed several motions

to exclude expert testimony that must be resolved before

the Court turns to the merits of Defendants’ motions for

summary judgment.

A.

Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility

of expert testimony and provides that an expert “may

testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise” if:

(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other

specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact

to understand the evidence or to determine a

fact in issue;

(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts

or data;

(c) the testimony is the product of reliable

principles and methods; and

(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles

and methods to the facts of the case.

25a

Appendix C

The Supreme Court construed and expounded upon

Rule 702’s requirements in Daubert v. Merrell Dow

Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594-95, 113 S. Ct.

2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993), and Kumho Tire Co. v.

Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 145, 119 S. Ct. 1167, 143 L. Ed.

2d 238 (1999), emphasizing that “the inquiry envisioned

by Rule 702 is . . . a flexible one.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.

In this circuit, Daubert motions are governed by a

three-pronged test:

Expert testimony may be admitted into

evidence if: (1) the expert is qualified to testify

competently regarding the matters he intends

to address; (2) the methodology by which the

expert reaches his conclusions is sufficiently

reliable as determined by the sort of inquiry

mandated in Daubert; and (3) the testimony

assists the trier of fact, through the application

of scientific, technical, or specialized expertise,

to understand the evidence or to determine a

fact in issue.

City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548,

562 (11th Cir. 1998) (footnote omitted). “The party offering

the expert has the burden of satisfying each of these three

elements by a preponderance of the evidence.” Rink v.

Cheminova, Inc., 400 F.3d 1286, 1292 (11th Cir. 2005).19

19. None of the Daubert motions presently at issue questions

the experts’ qualifications, and the Court finds that each expert is

qualified by his knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education

to testify competently to the matters contained in his report.

26a

Appendix C

When a Daubert motion challenges the reliability or

helpfulness of an expert opinion, the Court must be wary

of excluding it “based on skepticism as to believability,”

for credibility or believability is “an assessment to be

made by the jury” alone. Bullock v. Volkswagen Grp. of

Am., Inc., 107 F. Supp. 3d 1305, 1309 (M.D. Ga. 2015); see

also Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036,

1049, 194 L. Ed. 2d 124 (2016) (“Once a district court

finds evidence to be admissible, its persuasiveness is, in

general, a matter for the jury.”); Quiet Tech. DC-8, Inc.

v. Hurel-Dubois UK Ltd., 326 F.3d 1333, 1341 (11th Cir.

2003) (Daubert “is not intended to supplant the adversary

system or the role of the jury,” and a court should not

“make ultimate conclusions as to the persuasiveness of the

proffered evidence.”). Doubts regarding the credibility of

or weight that should be given to otherwise reliable and

relevant testimony are best addressed through “[v]igorous

cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and

careful instruction on the burden of proof.” Daubert, 509

U.S. at 596.

B. Defendants’ Motion to Exclude Hal Singer’s

Merits Testimony [625]

Defendants have jointly moved to exclude certain

opinions of Hal Singer, Plaintiffs’ expert economist,

regarding the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims. 20 Defendants

argue that Singer has impermissibly opined about the

ultimate legal issue in this case, adopted a definition

20. Defendants previously moved [399] to exclude the

opinions offered by Singer in support of Plaintiffs’ motion for class

certification, but those opinions are not at issue in the instant motion.

27a

Appendix C

of collusion that is contrary to the Eleventh Circuit’s

definition, relied on factual findings and assumptions

that are not supported by the evidence, and weighed the

evidence and witness credibility.

1.

Ultimate Legal Issue

Defendants first argue that Singer has impermissibly

opined about the ultimate legal issue in this case, namely,

whether Defendants colluded to impose a first-bag fee.

However persuasive this argument might be with respect

to Singer’s initial reports and testimony—in which he

expressly opined about the existence of “collusion” or

a “conspiracy” 21—it does not compel exclusion of the

opinions contained in his amended reports, which are the

only opinions presently at issue. Singer supplemented

and then amended his prior reports to “clarify that [his]

testimony at trial will focus on whether Defendants’

conduct was consistent with anticompetitive coordination,

as opposed to whether Defendants in fact ‘colluded.’” [5661] at 1679. 22

21. See, e.g., [269-4] at ¶ 2 (“Defendants engaged in collusion

to jointly impose first bag fees.”); id. at ¶ 33 (“Delta’s and AirTran’s

decisions to adopt first bag fees were the result of collusion.”); [269-8]

at ¶ 1 (“Delta and AirTran engaged in an anticompetitive conspiracy

to charge a first bag fee . . . .”); [626-4] at 882 (Singer testifying that

“Defendants in my opinion have conspired to raise bag fees”).

22. See, e.g., [556-1] at 1562 (“Defendants’ actions are more

consistent with a conspiracy to jointly impose first bag fees than

with unilateral conduct.”); id. at 1565 (concluding that “Defendants’

actions were inconsistent with unilateral conduct”); id. at 1575

(opining that certain evidence confirms that Defendants’ decisions

28a

Appendix C

Courts in this circuit and others regularly admit expert

testimony that certain conduct or evidence is “consistent

with a finding that Defendants engaged in a conspiracy to

fix prices.” In re Polypropylene Carpet Antitrust Litig.,

93 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1355 (N.D. Ga. 2000); Harcros, 158

F.3d at 565 (holding that expert testimony is admissible

so long as it “constitute[s] one piece of the puzzle that the

plaintiffs endeavor to assemble before the jury”); see also

In re Urethane Antitrust Litig., 152 F. Supp. 3d 357, 35961 (D.N.J. 2016) (admitting expert economic testimony

that certain evidence was “not consistent with the

existence of a price-fixing conspiracy”); In re Processed

Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., 81 F. Supp. 3d 412, 424 (E.D.

Pa. 2015) (“An economic expert may permissibly testify

as to whether certain conduct is consistent with collusion

or an entity or individual’s self-interest . . . .”); U.S. Info.

Sys., Inc. v. IBEW Local Union No. 3, 313 F. Supp. 2d 213,

240 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Economists often explain whether

conduct is indicative of collusion.”). 23 The Court will not

exclude Singer’s testimony on this basis.

to adopt first-bag fees “were more consistent with conspiracy than

unilateral conduct); id. at 1688 (replacing a prior reference to “an

anticompetitive conspiracy to charge a first bag fee” with a reference

to actions that “are more consistent with conspiracy than unilateral

conduct”).

23. In fact, Defendants’ own experts have submitted their

opinions that Defendants’ conduct was more consistent with

unilateral activity than collusion. See, e.g., [632-3] at ¶ 16 (Andrew

Dick opining that Defendants’ conduct was “consistent with economic

theories and principles identifying unilateral conduct”).

29a

Appendix C

2.

Singer’s Definition of Collusion

Defendants next urge that even if an expert may, as a

general principle, testify that certain conduct is consistent

with conspiracy, Singer’s opinions remain inadmissible

because his definition of collusion is at odds with the

Eleventh Circuit’s definition. Specifically, Defendants

accuse Singer of defining collusion in an overly broad

manner that would encompass situations the Eleventh

Circuit has defined as “conscious parallelism.” If true, this

would indeed mandate exclusion of Singer’s testimony.

Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d

1287, 1323 (11th Cir. 2003) (affirming exclusion of expert

testimony where expert “defined ‘collusion’ to include

conscious parallelism,” i.e., he failed to “differentiate

between legal and illegal pricing behavior, and instead

simply grouped both of these phenomena under the

umbrella of illegal, collusive price fixing”).

When isolated and taken out of context, the deposition

testimony quoted by Defendants might support their

position. However, when the entirety of Singer’s opinions

is considered in context, it is apparent that he properly

distinguishes between unlawful collusion and lawful

conscious parallelism. See generally E.I. du Pont de

Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 277 F.R.D. 286,

2011 WL 13079484, at *1 (E.D. Va. 2011) (denying

motion to exclude testimony that was “based largely

on statements taken out of context from [the expert’s]

report or deposition”); Reed v. City of Greenwood, No.

4:02-cv-287, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14654, 2005 WL

6000490, at *1 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 30, 2005) (“The Court

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has reviewed the deposition testimony at issue and finds

that when [the expert’s] testimony is viewed in its entirety

rather than in isolation as presented by the defendants,

it is evident that the defendants’ motion to strike [the

expert’s opinions] is without merit.”).

Singer defines collusion as “a type of coordinated

interaction whereby ostensibly independent firms act

jointly only as a result of a prior assurance between

firms.” [399-4] at ¶19 (emphasis added). He never

purported to define collusion solely by reference to

whether a communication “had a material effect” on a

competitor’s decision, as Defendants suggest. [625-1] at

8 (quoting [626-5] at 1089). According to Singer, such a

showing is necessary—but not by itself sufficient—to

support a finding of collusion:

[I]f the fact f inder here concludes that

. . . AirTran’s overtures had no bearing on

Delta’s decision making, then I would gladly

admit that consumers are no worse off as a

result of the communication. . . . I do think that

. . . to generate economic harm . . . a critical

inquiry is whether or not the communication

had a material effect on Delta’s decision making.

[626-5] at 1089.

Throughout his reports and his deposition testimony,

Singer properly contrasts unlawful collusion with other

types of “coordinated interaction,” much of which he

concedes is not “illegal under the antitrust laws” and

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is “generally considered benign when each firm acts

independently.” [399-4] at ¶19. He also testified that

“the facts and the evidence in this case, when analyzed

under the proper economic lens, is more consistent with

plaintiff’s allegations of a conspiracy than it is with

the alternative hypothesis of unilateral conduct or

. . . conscious parallelism.” [626-6] at 115-16 (emphasis

added); see also id. at 118-19 (explaining the difference

between collusion and conscious parallelism).

When viewed in the appropriate context, Singer’s

testimony and opinions properly account for the well

recognized distinction between conscious parallelism and

unlawful collusion. Thus, the Court will deny this aspect

of Defendants’ motion to exclude as well.

3.

Singer’s Game-Theory Analysis

Singer’s opinions regarding collusion employ an

economic modeling tool known as game theory, and

specifically, a permutation thereof known as the prisoner’s

dilemma. The prisoner’s dilemma model purports to

depict the payoffs to two “players” of various strategies

in a “game” played with each other in order to predict

the strategy that each player will pursue and provides

insight, from an economic perspective, into the effects of

those choices on individual and collective welfare.

Singer relies on the prisoner’s dilemma “to test

whether Delta and AirTran, as rational, profit-maximizing

firms, would have chosen to adopt first bag fees unilaterally

(that is, absent the alleged conspiracy).” According to him,

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“[t]he results of [his] analysis show that neither Delta

nor AirTran would have rationally adopted a first bag

fee independently.” [556-1] at 1572. Defendants, however,

assert that the output of Singer’s game-theory analysis is

rendered unreliable by virtue of the inputs Singer relied

on.

Defendants fault Singer’s game-theory analysis

insofar as it relies on figures contained in the value

proposition document as a proxy for measuring Delta’s

payoffs. Defendants argue that the undisputed evidence

shows that “those slides neither represented the views

of ‘Delta’ nor were intended to be Delta’s estimates of

revenues that might be gained or lost if Delta implemented

a first bag fee.” [625-1] at 15. Defendants also argue that

Singer’s analysis is inadmissible because he improperly

weighed the credibility of witnesses and substituted his

own views of the evidence for the testimony of those with

firsthand knowledge. Finally, Defendants assert that the

model erroneously assumes that Defendants were making

their bag-fee decisions with complete information about

each other, simultaneously and as though those decisions

could not subsequently be changed. Whatever fodder

these arguments might provide for cross-examination of

Singer about his game-theory model, they do not warrant

exclusion of his opinions.

“When facts are in dispute, experts sometimes reach

different conclusions based on competing versions of the

facts.” Fed. R. EvId. 702 advisory committee’s note to

2000 amendments. The critical inquiry at this stage of

the analysis is whether Singer’s testimony and opinions

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have “a reasonable factual basis.” United States v. 0.161

Acres of Land, 837 F.2d 1036, 1040 (11th Cir. 1988) (noting

that an expert’s opinion is admissible “provided that he

states the assumptions on which his opinions are based,”

even if those assumptions omit certain evidence). In other

words, the facts relied upon by an expert “must find some

support . . . in the record” and “must be supported by

more than subjective belief and unsupported speculation,”

but “mere weaknesses in the factual basis of an expert

witness’ opinion bear on the weight of the evidence rather

than on its admissibility.” McLean v. 988011 Ontario, Ltd.,

224 F.3d 797, 800-01 (6th Cir. 2000) (internal punctuation

omitted); accord Boucher v. U.S. Suzuki Motor Corp.,

73 F.3d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1996) (expert testimony should be

excluded where “it is based on assumptions that are so

unrealistic and contradictory as to suggest bad faith or

to be in essence an apples and oranges comparison,” but

“other contentions that the assumptions are unfounded

go to the weight, not the admissibility, of the testimony”)

(internal punctuation omitted).

Courts have excluded expert testimony founded upon

facts that find no support in the record. See, e.g., Holiday

Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 231 F. Supp.

2d 1253, 1288 (N.D. Ga. 2002) (where an expert premised

his opinions “to a major degree” on what he admitted to be

a “mistaken” understanding of the evidence, that opinion

was inadmissible), aff’d sub nom Williamson Oil, 346

F.3d at 1323. But so long as the expert relies upon record

evidence and identifies the facts on which he relies, “it is

for opposing counsel to inquire into the expert’s factual

basis,” and “[i]mportantly, the jury is instructed that it is

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completely free to accept or reject an expert’s testimony,

and to evaluate the weight given such testimony in light

of the reasons the expert supplies for his opinion.” 0.161

Acres of Land, 837 F.2d at 1040-41.

Singer’s game-theory analysis satisfies these criteria.

His reports and testimony set out in detail the record

evidence on which he bases his opinions. When there is

additional or conflicting evidence in the record, Singer

addresses it head-on in his reports, which at times does

include his analysis of the credibility of other witnesses.

See generally Maiz v. Virani, 253 F.3d 641, 667 (11th

Cir. 2001) (noting that an expert is permitted to make

reasonable assumptions and explain them). But he does not

intend to offer such testimony at trial, [556-1] at ¶3, and

the Court will disregard his opinions regarding witness

credibility for purposes of resolving the pending motions

for summary judgment. Nor does Singer fail to account

for alternative explanations in a manner that is fatal to

the admissibility of his opinions. In sum, the Court finds

that the inputs relied upon by Singer in connection with

his game theory model are not so unsound or unsupported

as to render the model’s outputs unreliable. Because

Singer’s opinions are supported by a reasonable—even if

not infallible—factual basis, they are admissible.

In conclusion, Si nger ’s opi n ions sat isf y t he

requirements of Rule 702 and Daubert, and Defendants’

arguments to the contrary merely highlight issues that

go to the weight that a fact-finder should give Singer’s

opinions. Defendants’ motion to exclude Singer’s testimony

will therefore be denied.

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C.

Plaintiffs’ Motion to Exclude Dennis Carlton’s

Testimony [631]

Plaintiffs have filed a motion to exclude each of the

three opinions offered by Dennis Carlton, Delta’s expert

economist. The Court will address each in turn.

1.

Antitrust Policy

Carlton first opines that even if Delta did rely on

AirTran’s public statement in deciding to impose a

first-bag fee, there are “good economic reasons why

Delta should not be held liable for acting upon publiclyavailable information to maximize its profits.” [631-2] at

¶5. Specifically, Carlton explains that “[a] pro-competitive

antitrust policy should allow companies to act upon public

information” in order to vindicate “the goals of antitrust

policy,” avoid “uncertainty for companies,” and ultimately

increase consumer welfare. Id. The Court agrees with

Plaintiffs that this opinion is not admissible.

It is well settled that an expert may not “merely tell

the jury what result to reach.” Montgomery v. Aetna Cas.

& Sur. Co., 898 F.2d 1537, 1541 (11th Cir. 1990). Thus, while

an expert may testify about whether certain conduct is

or is not indicative of collusion, an expert may not testify

that certain conduct did or did not violate the law. In re

Titanium Dioxide Antitrust Litig., No. RDB-10-0318,

2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62394, 2013 WL 1855980, at *4

(D. Md. May 1, 2013).

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[E]xpert testimony that usurps either the

role of the trial judge in instructing the jury

as to the applicable law or the role of the jury

in applying that law to the facts before it by

definition does not aid the jury in making a

decision; rather, it undertakes to tell the jury

what result to reach, and thus attempts to

substitute the expert’s judgment for the jury’s.

Nimely v. City of New York, 414 F.3d 381, 397 (2d Cir.

2005) (internal punctuation and citation omitted).

Carlton’s first opinion runs afoul of these bedrock

principles because he plainly expresses an opinion about

what conduct the antitrust laws should and should not

punish. Such testimony accomplishes nothing more than

telling the jury what result to reach and supplanting the

Court’s instructions about the law. Moreover, insofar as

Carlton opines about antitrust law in aspirational terms,

his opinion potentially encourages jury nullification by

encouraging the trier of fact to make a decision based

not on the law as it currently exists but as it should, in

Carlton’s opinion, be applied by the courts. See generally

Specht v. Jensen, 853 F.2d 805, 810 (10th Cir. 1988)

(“[W]hen the purpose of [expert] testimony is to direct

the jury’s understanding of the legal standards upon

which their verdict must be based, the testimony cannot

be allowed.”).Thus, Carlton’s first opinion will be excluded.

2.

Inevitability of Delta’s Bag-Fee Decision

Second, Carlton opines that given the trend in the

industry toward charging first-bag fees in 2008, “Delta

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very likely would have implemented the first-bag fee even

in the absence of information about AirTran’s willingness

to implement a first-bag fee.” [631-2] at ¶5. Plaintiffs

contend that this opinion is unreliable and does not fit

the facts of this case, but the Court concludes that the

arguments raised by Plaintiffs—much like the arguments

raised by Defendants with respect to Singer—relate to

the weight that Carlton’s second opinion should be given

and not its admissibility.

Carlton discusses in his report several reasons for

his opinion, including that “airlines have tended to adopt

similar pricing models unless they can differentiate

themselves with a different model.” [631-2] at ¶22. He

explains that although Southwest was able to differentiate

itself as the “bags fly free” airline, “Delta believed that

it could not successfully reposition itself as a no fee/low

fee carrier, so it was more likely to keep a pricing model

that was similar to other legacy carriers.” Id. (footnotes

omitted) (citing the DOJ deposition of Delta’s president

Ed Bastian). Additionally, the legacy carriers that had

imposed first-bag fees had left them in place, suggesting

to Delta—at least according to Carlton—that the fees

were profitable. Id. at ¶23.

Carlton’s opinion is distinguishable from the expert

opinion at issue in Cameron v. Peach County, No.

5:02-cv-41-1 (CAR), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30974, 2004

WL 5520003, at *5 (M.D. Ga. June 28, 2004), on which

Plaintiffs rely. There, an expert opined about risks posed

by a landfill site, but the court found that the opinion

consisted of “blanket generalizations,” was premised

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on unsupported assumptions, and failed to account for

the county’s efforts to mitigate or prevent the danger

posed by the landfill. In the case at hand, by contrast,

Carlton has not drawn such blanket generalizations. His

reasoning, though not impervious to cross-examination,

is outlined and relies on no logical fallacies or speculative

leaps of faith. Plaintiffs disagree with his conclusion, but

they have pointed to nothing that warrants exclusion of

this opinion. The Court will therefore deny the motion to

exclude Carlton’s second opinion.

3.

Delta’s Business Justifications

Finally, Carlton is of the opinion that “Delta

had economically rational business justifications for

implementing the first-bag fee when it did.” [631-2] at ¶5.

Specifically, he explains that following the consummation

of the Delta-Northwest merger, “it would be uneconomic

to maintain separate . . . fee structures . . . .” Id. at ¶25.

And for the same reasons supporting his second opinion,

Carlton opines that it made sense for the post-merger

combined airline to retain the first-bag fee that Northwest

had already implemented. Id. at ¶26.

Plaintiffs assert that this opinion is inconsistent with

empirical evidence showing that AirTran and Southwest

maintained separate fee structures for more than three

years after their merger. Plaintiffs also contend that

Carlton’s third opinion is based not on economic data

but on the self-serving testimony of Delta’s executives,

and that it ignores documents suggesting that Delta

was planning to withdraw Northwest’s bag fee after the

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merger. But the AirTran/Southwest merger took place

three years after Carlton issued his report, and Plaintiffs

fail to explain how his opinion is rendered unreliable by

failing to account for facts that had not yet occurred.

Moreover, as all of Carlton’s opinions are supported by

a reasonable evidentiary basis, the Court finds that his

testimony is admissible. See Larson v. Kempker, 414 F.3d

936, 940 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that expert testimony

that “is so fundamentally unreliable that it can offer no

assistance to the jury” must be excluded, but “otherwise,

the factual basis of the testimony goes to the weight of the

evidence”); Quiet Tech., 326 F.3d at 1345 (noting that the

role of cross-examination is to identify flaws in otherwise

reliable expert evidence). Accordingly, this opinion is

likewise admissible.

In sum, the Court is persuaded by Plaintiffs’

arguments concerning Carlton’s first opinion—regarding

what antitrust law should or should not prohibit—and will

grant the Daubert motion as to that opinion. The motion

will be denied in all other respects.

D.

Plaintiffs’ Motion to Exclude Andrew Dick’s

Testimony [632]

The final evidentiary motion before the Court is

Plaintiffs’ motion to exclude three opinions offered by

Andrew Dick, AirTran’s expert economist.

1.

Economic Theory’s Definition of Collusion

The first opinion with which Plaintiffs take issue is

Dick’s testimony regarding the manner in which economic

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theory defines collusion. In his deposition and his expert

report, Dick opines that “the economic plausibility of

[P]laintiffs’ allegations” must be evaluated with respect to

economic theory’s definition of collusion, which he explains

consists of “three pillars”:

One is the mutual exchange of assurances

leading to an agreement or its equivalent;

second is that there has to be a means to detect

deviations or cheating from that . . . agreement;

and the third is that there has to be credible

threats of punishment for deviations or cheating

from the . . . agreement.

[593] at 21; [632-3] at 12. For Dick to conclude that

Defendants colluded in this case, he would have to see

“evidence to indicate that there’s a likelihood that each of

those criteria—high likel[ihood] that each of those criteria

is met.” [593] at 22. He has seen no such evidence, id., and

therefore opines in his rebuttal report that “the absence

of credible mechanisms to monitor and punish defections

from the alleged agreement” causes “Plaintiffs’ theory of

collusion [to] fail[] as a matter of economics,” [632-4] at 2.

The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that this opinion

is inadmissible, at least when it is framed in terms of

preconditions to a finding of collusion. Experts may not

testify as to governing legal standards or legal implications

of conduct; “the court must be the jury’s only source of

law.” Montgomery, 898 F.2d at 1541; see also Burkhart

v. WMATA, 112 F.3d 1207, 1213, 324 U.S. App. D.C. 241

(D.D.C. 1997) (“Each courtroom comes equipped with a

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‘legal expert,’ called a judge, and it is his or her province

alone to instruct the jury on the relevant legal standards.”).

However, as noted above, an expert economist may testify

that certain conduct is or is not consistent with a finding

of collusion. See, e.g., Polypropylene Carpet, 93 F. Supp.

2d at 1355. Thus, although Dick may not testify that the

jury may find in favor of Plaintiffs only if all three of his

conditions are satisfied, he may testify to his opinion that

Defendants’ conduct is inconsistent with collusion because

one or more of those criteria are missing. 24

The Court disagrees with Plaintiffs, however, to the

extent they suggest that Dick’s testimony is inadmissible

because it contains internal inconsistencies. In response

to a question asking him to assume that Defendants

exchanged explicit mutual assurances, Dick testified

that he would find collusion occurred. But that is not

because mutual assurances alone are sufficient, as

Plaintiffs contend, but because in an economist’s view,

there is a reasonable expectation that such explicit

mutual assurances contain built-in means of detecting

and punishing defections. [593] at 21-24. The Court does

not find Dick’s testimony in this regard inconsistent; to

the extent any incongruity exists, it is more appropriately

addressed on cross-examination than in a Daubert motion.

24. Insofar as Plaintiffs dispute the applicability of those

criteria, they are free to cross-examine Dick about them, but the

Court declines to preclude his testimony as to their relevance from

an economic perspective.

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2.

Effect of AirTran’s Public Statements

In Dick’s report, he analyzes and tests Singer’s

prisoner’s dilemma model in light of the “cheap talk”

framework in economic literature, which views one

company’s non-binding forward-looking statements as

insufficient to influence a competitor’s strategic choices

and facilitate reaching an agreement unless those

statements are both self-signaling and self-committing.

See [632-3] at ¶¶116-121. Disagreeing with Singer’s

conclusions, Dick opines that under this paradigm “Delta

would . . . rationally ignore AirTran’s [October 23, 2008

earnings call] announcement as being unreliable.” Id. at

¶120.

Plaintiffs reject Dick’s reliance on the “cheap talk”

paradigm, which some economists—including Delta’s

expert Dennis Carlton—have rejected. But other

economists embrace the technique. See [632-3] at ¶¶11516 & accompanying footnote citations. To pass muster

under Daubert and Rule 702, an expert’s methods must

be reliable, but they need not be universal. See In re Paoli

R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 744 (3d Cir. 1994) (“The

evidentiary requirement of reliability is lower than the

merits standard of correctness. . . . The grounds for the

expert’s opinion merely have to be good, they do not have to

be perfect.”); Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge

Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295, 332 (D. Vt. 2007)

(“Daubert requires general, not universal acceptance;

even substantial criticism as to one theory or procedure

will not be enough to find that the theory/procedure is

not generally accepted.”) (internal punctuation omitted);

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United States v. Monteiro, 407 F. Supp. 2d 351, 366 (D.

Mass. 2006) (“Daubert and Kumho Tire do not make the

perfect the enemy of the reliable; an expert need not use

the best method of evaluation, only a reliable one.”). The

“cheap talk” paradigm is not without its critics, but the

Court is not persuaded that it is so unfounded as to render

Dick’s opinion unreliable.

Plaintiffs also take issue with Dick’s application of the

cheap-talk paradigm to Singer’s analysis, arguing that

Dick ignores evidence that AirTran intended to use its

earnings call to send a signal to Delta about AirTran’s

willingness to collude. Additionally, they suggest that

Dick’s opinion is unhelpful because this case is about what

Delta actually did, not about what it rationally might have

done. But as is true of many of the arguments raised in

both parties’ Daubert motions, these issues speak to the

weight of Dick’s opinions, not their admissibility. The

factual predicates on which his opinion rests find support

in the record, and the challenged opinion is relevant to—

even if not dispositive of—the question of Defendants’ selfinterests and incentives. Moreover, because the challenged

opinion serves to test Singer’s own paradigm, the Court

finds that the concerns Plaintiffs raise are best addressed

through cross-examination. The Court therefore finds that

this opinion is admissible.

3.

Disputed Factual Issues

Finally, Plaintiffs seek to prevent Dick from offering

five opinions that Plaintiffs characterize as disputed

factual issues unrelated to his economic expertise. Again,

the Court disagrees.

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The Court’s decision above that Dick’s methods are

reliable renders moot Plaintiffs’ argument that some of the

factual assertions in his report are not supported by “any

reliable economic test” and ignore portions of the record.

[632-1] at 16. Other factual assertions Plaintiffs point to

in Dick’s report—for example, his reference to the need

to harmonize a fee structure for Delta and Northwest in

view of their impending merger—are nothing more than

Dick’s explanation of the factual foundations on which his

opinions rest. As discussed above, an expert’s opinion is

admissible if the facts upon which it is premised “find

some support . . . in the record,” even where the opposing

party contends that those assumptions are contradicted

by other evidence. McLean, 224 F.3d at 800-01.

In still other instances, Dick relies on testimony and

other evidence from this case to apply or explain the

general economic principles discussed in his report. For

example, after explaining how unbundling can stimulate

passenger demand, Dick relies on Healy’s deposition

testimony to illustrate how, in his opinion, AirTran’s

introduction of a first-bag fee might have facilitated the

air line’s route expansion. [632-3] at ¶138. Elsewhere, he

relies on Fornaro’s deposition testimony as an example

comporting with the concept of the “signal-to-noise” ratio.

Id. at ¶42 & n.33. As Plaintiffs pointed out in defense of

Singer’s expert report, it is permissible for an expert “to

review the factual record and formulate a hypothesis that

can then be tested using economic theory.” Processed Egg

Prods., 81 F. Supp. 3d at 424. Indeed, Singer’s amended

merits report takes a similar approach: after giving his

opinion that Defendants’ actions were inconsistent with

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unilateral conduct, he “demonstrate[s] how this analysis

is supported and corroborated by direct evidence.” [5561] at 1565.

Just as the Court declined to exclude Singer’s opinions

because he relied on facts that Defendants dispute, it

declines to exclude Dick’s opinions because he relies on

facts that Plaintiffs dispute. None of the expert witnesses

in this case has relied on facts that are so lacking in

evidentiary support that it renders the ensuing opinions

unreliable.

For these reasons, the Court will disregard Dick’s

legal conclusion that Plaintiffs’ theory fails under

economic theory’s definition of collusion, but it will deny

the remainder of Plaintiffs’ motion to exclude Dick’s

opinions and testimony.

III. Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment

A.

Summary Judgment in the Context of § 1 PriceFixing Claims

Summary judgment is appropriate only when “the

movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. CIv. P. 56(a). There is a “genuine”

dispute as to a material fact if “the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving

party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248,

106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). When analyzing

a motion for summary judgment, the Court must “view

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all the evidence and all factual inferences reasonably

drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party.” Stewart v. Happy Herman’s

Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1285 (11th Cir. 1997);

Williamson Oil, 346 F.3d at 1298.

These general principles are well settled and apply

with as much force to this antitrust case as any other type

of lawsuit. In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig.,

801 F.3d 383, 396 (3d Cir. 2015) (“[T]he summary judgment

standard in antitrust cases is generally no different from

the standard in other cases.”); see also Eastman Kodak

Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 468, 112

S. Ct. 2072, 119 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1992) (noting that there is no

“special burden on plaintiffs facing summary judgment in

antitrust cases”). However, “antitrust law limits the range

of permissible inferences from ambiguous evidence in a

§ 1 case.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538

(1986); see also Holiday Wholesale, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 1269

(“[T]he inferences that can be drawn on summary

judgment are limited in the antitrust context.”).

This inferential limitation is grounded in

the unique nature of the law of antitrust

conspiracy. . . . [A] Sherman Act conspiracy

differs sharply from the more typical concept

of conspiracy found in other contexts. Under

the criminal drug laws, for example, both the

underlying act and the conspiracy are illegal—

that is, the laws make it an offense for anyone

to violate, as well as conspire to violate, the

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federal drug statutes. In contrast, under the

Sherman Act, it is the conspiracy alone that is

prohibited; the underlying independent conduct

is not necessarily unlawful and, indeed, may

be precompetitive and of a nature that the

antitrust laws would want to foster. . . .

Coleman v. Cannon Oil Co., 849 F. Supp. 1458, 1465 (M.D.

Ala. 1993) (internal citation omitted).

Along those lines, the Eleventh Circuit has highlighted

the “important” distinction “between collusive price fixing,

i.e., a ‘meeting of the minds’ to collusively control prices,

which is prohibited under the Sherman and Clayton Acts,

and ‘conscious parallelism,’ which is not.” Williamson

Oil, 346 F.3d at 1298-99 (footnote omitted); see also id.

at 1291 (describing conscious parallelism as “a perfectly

legal phenomenon commonly associated with oligopolistic

industries”). Conscious parallelism refers to synchronous

pricing and related behaviors that “are the product of a

rational, independent calculus by each member of [an]

oligopoly,” even when they result in the setting of prices

“at a profit-maximizing, supracompetitive level” and

are based on the recognition of the oligopolists’ “shared

economic interests and their interdependence with respect

to price and output decisions.” Id. at 1299.

But it is often difficult to discern when lawful

coordination crosses the line and becomes unlawful

collusion. “Over time, courts have become attuned to

the economic costs associated with using circumstantial

evidence to distinguish between altogether lawful,

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independent, consciously parallel decision-making within

an oligopoly on the one hand, and illegal, collusive price

fixing on the other.” Id. at 1300. “In order to ensure that

only potentially meritorious claims survive summary

judgment, the Supreme Court has required that inferences

of a price fixing conspiracy drawn from circumstantial

evidence be reasonable.” Id.

To survive summary judgment, therefore, § 1 plaintiffs

must do more than come forward with “evidence of conduct

that is consistent with both legitimate competition and an

illegal conspiracy.” Thompson Everett, Inc. v. Nat’l Cable

Advert., L.P., 57 F.3d 1317, 1323 (4th Cir. 1995); accord

Williamson Oil, 346 F.3d at 1300 (“Evidence that does

not support the existence of a price fixing conspiracy any

more strongly than it supports conscious parallelism is

insufficient to survive a defendant’s summary judgment

motion.”). They “must present evidence ‘that tends to

exclude the possibility’ that the alleged conspirators acted

independently.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588 (quoting

Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764,

104 S. Ct. 1464, 79 L. Ed. 2d 775 (1984)). Put differently,

plaintiffs “must show that the inference of conspiracy

is reasonable in light of the competing inferences of

independent action or collusive action that could not have

harmed [them].” Id.

Applying this standard requires the Court to employ

a three-step approach to summary judgment in the pricefixing context:

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First, the court must determine whether the

plaintiff has established a pattern of parallel

behavior. Second, it must decide whether the

plaintiff has demonstrated the existence of one

or more plus factors that tends to exclude the

possibility that the alleged conspirators acted

independently. The existence of such a plus

factor generates an inference of illegal price

fixing. Third, if the first two steps are satisfied,

the defendants may rebut the inference of

collusion by presenting evidence establishing

that no reasonable factfinder could conclude

that they entered into a price fixing conspiracy.

Williamson Oil, 346 F.3d at 1301 (internal citation

omitted).

“[I]t unquestionably is the duty of the district court

to evaluate the evidence proffered by the plaintiffs not

to ascertain its credibility, but instead to determine

whether that evidence, if credited, ‘tends to’ establish a

conspiracy more than it indicates conscious parallelism.”

Id. (emphasis added). Plaintiffs need not affirmatively

exclude the possibility of conscious parallelism, nor must

the existence of a conspiracy be the sole inference that a

reasonable juror could draw. Id. at 1302. They must simply

present some evidence that tends to exclude the possibility

of conscious parallelism or that tends to establish a pricefixing conspiracy; “nothing more, nothing less.” Id.

Matsushita teaches that the determination of

whether underlying circumstantial conduct is

50a

Appendix C

sufficient to support an inference of a Sherman

Act violation, and thus to fall within the

prohibitive reach of the Act, is a legal issue for

the court. Of course, if the underlying conduct

is sufficient to support such an inference, it is

still up to the jury to make the inference.

Coleman, 849 F. Supp. at 1465.

In making this inquiry, the Court should not “tightly

compartmentaliz[e] the various factual components and

wipe the slate clean after scrutiny of each” because “[t]he

character and effect of a conspiracy are not to be judged by

dismembering it and viewing its separate parts, but only

by looking at it as a whole.” Continental Ore Co. v. Union

Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 699, 82 S. Ct. 1404,

8 L. Ed. 2d 777 (1962). A “trap to be avoided in evaluating

evidence of an antitrust conspiracy for purposes of ruling

on the defendants’ motion for summary judgment is to

suppose that if no single item of evidence presented by the

plaintiff points unequivocally to conspiracy, the evidence

as a whole cannot defeat summary judgment.” In re High

Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 655

(7th Cir. 2002). It is only “[w]here the record taken as a

whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

non-moving party” that “there is no ‘genuine issue for

trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (emphasis added). 25

25. In their briefs, the parties disputed whether a heightened

summary-judgment standard might apply in this case. See, e.g.,

[632-1] at 7; [643] at 9. At the hearing held on the pending motions

for summary judgment, however, Defendants conceded that no such

heightened standard applies, and even absent that concession, the

51a

Appendix C

With these standards in mind, the Court now turns to

the merits of Defendants’ motions for summary judgment.

B. Implied Preclusion

The Court begins its analysis by briefly revisiting

an argument it has previously rejected. Shortly after

these cases were consolidated, both Defendants moved to

dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims. Among the grounds raised by

AirTran was that the federal securities laws precluded any

antitrust claim arising from statements made on quarterly

earnings calls. See [72-1] at 33. The Court rejected that

argument, noting that “at [that] early stage of the case,

Defendants ha[d] failed to demonstrate that implied

preclusion applie[d]” and that “[n]otably, Defendants ha[d]

not cited any cases in which the securities laws precluded

an antitrust challenge to collusion reached through public

disclosures.” In re Delta/AirTran Baggage Fee Antitrust

Litig., 733 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1364 & n.12 (N.D. Ga. 2010).

Defendants renew their implied-preclusion argument

in their motions for summary judgment, but that

argument fares no better today than it did seven years

ago. Implied preclusion remains disfavored and applies

only when antitrust and securities laws are “clearly

incompatible.” Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing,

551 U.S. 264, 271, 275, 127 S. Ct. 2383, 168 L. Ed. 2d 145

(2007); see also Hinds County v. Wachovia Bank N.A., 700

Court would not find any heightened standard appropriate. Rather,

the Court applies general summary-judgment principles subject only

to the inferential limitations that apply in all antitrust-conspiracy

cases.

52a

Appendix C

F. Supp. 2d 378, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“The Supreme Court

in Billing[, 551 U.S. at 271,] was careful to caution that

competing statutory schemes should be reconciled where

possible, ‘rather than holding one completely ousted.’”).

Whether the securities laws and the antitrust laws are

so repugnant that the former can be said to preclude the

latter is determined by four factors:

(1) whether the challenged practices lie squarely

within an area of financial market activity that

the securities laws seek to regulate; (2) the

existence of regulatory authority under the

securities laws to supervise the activities in

question; (3) ongoing SEC regulation; and (4)

a resulting risk that the securities laws and

antitrust laws, if both applicable, would conflict.

Delta/AirTran Baggage Fee, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1364 (citing

Billing, 551 U.S. at 285).

The Court is unpersuaded that its initial assessment

of the four Billing factors warrants reconsideration. Only

rarely have the securities laws been held to impliedly

preclude application of the antitrust laws, and never

in a case in which a conspiracy otherwise unrelated

to securities was merely alleged to have been effected

through earnings calls. Cf. Billing, 551 U.S. at 285

(applying preclusion to antitrust lawsuit brought against

securities underwriters that marketed and distributed

securities); Elec. Trading Grp., LLC v. Banc of Am. Sec.

LLC, 588 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 2009) (applying preclusion

to antitrust lawsuit alleging that securities brokers

conspired to fix the prices of certain securities).

53a

Appendix C

Defendants cite to no caselaw, and the Court has

located none, that would support immunizing Defendants

from antitrust liability based on anything said on an

earnings call. Indeed, in the years since AirTran first

raised this argument, other courts have come to recognize

that earnings calls can be vehicles for public signaling.

See, e.g., In re Domestic Airline Travel Antitrust Litig.,

221 F. Supp. 3d 46, Misc. No. 15-1404 (CKK), 2016 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 149608, 2016 WL 6426366, at *8 (D.D.C. Oct.

28, 2016) (denying motion to dismiss § 1 claim premised

on “statements made by Defendants’ executives during

earnings calls, industry summits, industry conferences,

and investment conferences”). The Court therefore again

rejects Defendants’ implied-preclusion arguments.

C.

Existence of an Agreement to Restrain Trade

The existence of an agreement to restrain trade is

“a threshold requirement of every antitrust conspiracy

claim” under the Sherman Act. Harcros, 158 F.3d at 569.

In the absence of any direct evidence of collusion, Plaintiffs

here attempt to establish the existence of an agreement

by showing a pattern of parallel behavior by Defendants

and the existence of “plus factors” that tend to exclude

the possibility of independent action. Williamson Oil, 346

F.3d at 1301.

The first inquiry is quickly resolved in Plaintiffs’

favor, as the undisputed record evidence plainly shows

that Defendants engaged in a pattern of parallel conduct

when they simultaneously imposed first-bag fees of $15

effective on December 5, 2008. True, Plaintiffs rely on

54a

Appendix C

only a single pricing decision, but that is not fatal to their

claim. See In re Travel Agency Comm’n Antitrust Litig.,

898 F. Supp. 685, 687 (D. Minn. 1995) (denying summary

judgment in a § 1 case arising from the defendants’ onetime revision of a commission structure).

Similarly, the fact that Defendants’ once-parallel

pricing diverged after six months does not defeat the

requisite finding of synchronous action. 26 “What is critical

is that the jury could . . . reasonably conclude from the

evidence that the defendants engaged in parallel pricing

for some of their . . . products for substantial periods of

time.” Coleman, 849 F. Supp. at 1466; see also Petruzzi’s

IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Del. Co., 998 F.2d

1224, 1243 (3d Cir. 1993) (defining “parallel behavior” to

require similar—but not identical—behavior); Domestic

Airline Travel, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149608, 2016 WL

6426366, at *13 (noting that parallel conduct does not

require Defendants to have acted in “exactly the same

way”).

It is well settled that a pattern of parallel behavior,

standing alone, is insufficient to withstand a motion

for summary judgment in a § 1 case. Rather, parallel

conduct gives rise to an inference of conspiracy only in

combination with “‘plus factors’ that ‘tend to exclude the

possibility that the defendants merely were engaged in

lawful conscious parallelism.’” Holiday Wholesale, 231

F. Supp. 2d at 1274 (quoting Harcros, 158 F.3d at 572);

26. Delta increased its first-bag fee in July 2009 and then again

in January 2010. AirTran kept its first-bag fee at $15 until September

2010. [353-29] at 35-36.

55a

Appendix C

see also Williamson Oil, 346 F.3d at 1301 (“[P]rice fixing

plaintiffs must demonstrate the existence of ‘plus factors’

that remove their evidence from the realm of equipoise

and render that evidence more probative of conspiracy

than of conscious parallelism.”).

There is no finite list of potential plus factors.

“Although our caselaw has identified some specific plus

factors, . . . any showing . . . that ‘tends to exclude the

possibility of independent action’ can qualify as a ‘plus

factor.’” Williamson Oil, 346 F.3d at 1301 (quoting Harcros,

158 F.3d at 571 n.35). But “[m]erely labeling something a

‘plus factor’ does not make it so . . . .” Holiday Wholesale,

231 F. Supp. 2d at 1272. “A ‘plus factor’ . . . needs to have

some substance in order to tilt the balance. . . . , and a

weak ‘plus factor’ is not sufficient to withstand a motion

for summary judgment because the ‘plus factor’ analysis is

really a surrogate for looking at a case in its entirety.” Id.

In this case, Plaintiffs identify six plus factors that

they contend support their claim and preclude summary

judgment in favor of Defendants: “(1) an invitation to

collude; (2) collusive communications followed closely

by a parallel price increase; (3) evidence that collusive

communications affected Delta’s [first-bag-fee] decision;

(4) actions against unilateral economic self-interest; (5)

pretextual explanations for changed business practices;

and (6) motive and intent to conspire.” [554] at 51-52. The

Court will address each in turn.

56a

Appendix C

1.

Invitation to Collude

Plaintiffs first contend that a plus factor exists by

virtue of Fornaro’s statements on AirTran’s October

23, 2008 earnings call, which they characterize as an

invitation to Delta to engage in collusion.

“ The term ‘invitation to collude’ describes an

improper communication from a firm to an actual or

potential competitor that the firm is ready and willing to

coordinate on price or output or other important terms

of competition.” In re Fortiline, LLC a N.C. Ltd. Liab.

Co., File No. 151-0000, 2016 WL 4379041, at *11 (F.T.C.

Aug. 9, 2016). The quintessential invitation to collude was

discussed in United States v. American Airlines, Inc., 743

F.2d 1114, 1116 (5th Cir. 1984), in which the president of

an airline called the president of a competitor and said:

“I have a suggestion for you. Raise your . . . fares twenty

percent. I’ll raise mine the next morning. . . . You’ll make

more money and I will too.”

Numerous cases have recognized that an invitation

to collude can serve as evidence of a conspiracy. See, e.g.,

Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 227, 59 S.

Ct. 467, 83 L. Ed. 610 (1939) (“Acceptance by competitors,

without previous agreement, of an invitation to participate

in a plan, the necessary consequence of which, if carried

out, is restraint of interstate commerce, is sufficient to

establish an unlawful conspiracy under the Sherman

Act.”); Gainesville Utilities Dep’t v. Fla. Power & Light

57a

Appendix C

Co., 573 F.2d 292, 300-01 (5th Cir. 1978)27 (holding that

correspondence that “contemplated and invited” concerted

action was a plus factor); Fishman v. Wirtz, Nos. 74 C

2814 & 78 C 3621, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9998, 1981 WL

2153, at *59 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 28, 1981) (“One of the strongest

circumstantial indicators of a conspiracy is the existence

of a common invitation or request to join into a concerted

plan of action.”).

But Defendants correctly point out that many of the

cases discussing invitations to collude—including In re

Fortiline and American Airlines—involved claims under

§ 5 of the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) Act or

analogous laws prohibiting even unilateral unfair methods

of competition. See, e.g., Liu v. Amerco, 677 F.3d 489 (1st

Cir. 2012) (discussing invitation to collude in the context

of a claim under a Massachusetts statute that, like § 5 of

the FTC Act, prohibits unfair methods of competition and

reaches even unsuccessful solicitations to conspire); see

also Susan S. DeSanti & Ernest A. Nagata, CompetItor

CommunIcatIons: FacIlItatInG PractIces or InvItatIons

to Collude? a n a pplIcatIon of TheorIes to Proposed

HorIzontal a Greements S ubmItted for a ntItrust

R evIew, 63 Antitrust L.J. 93, 93 (1994) (describing

invitations to collude as potential violations of § 5 of

the FTC Act or, “[u]nder more limited circumstances,”

§ 2 of the Sherman Act, but making no mention of § 1).

Defendants dispute that a mere “invitation” can properly

be viewed as a plus factor under § 1 of the Sherman Act,

27. The Eleventh Circuit has adopted as binding precedent all

Fifth Circuit decisions issued before October 1, 1981. Bonner v. City

of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).

58a

Appendix C

which unlike § 5 of the FTC Act prohibits “contract[s]” and

“conspirac[ies]” in restraint of trade. See generally N.C.

Bd. of Dental Examiners v. FTC, 717 F.3d 359, 371 (4th

Cir. 2013) (noting that § 1 applies only to “concerted action”

and “unilateral conduct is excluded from its purview”).

Even assuming that an invitation to collude may

constitute a plus factor in some cases, however, it is not

a plus factor here. The Eleventh Circuit has stated in no

uncertain terms that evidence may be characterized as a

plus factor in a given case only if it “tends to exclude the

possibility of independent action.” Harcros, 158 F.3d at

571 n.35; Williamson Oil, 346 F.3d at 1301. Thus, courts

have refused to construe corporate communications as

invitations to collude where the communications contain

“the type of information companies legitimately convey to

their shareholders,” instead restricting such findings to

cases involving “far more detailed communications with

no public purpose.” Holiday Wholesale, 231 F. Supp. 2d

at 1276.

In Gainesville Utilities, 573 F.2d at 300-01, for example,

the former Fifth Circuit found that the “continuous

exchange of correspondence between high executives

of” two competitors “border[ed] on a blatant agreement

to divide the market” and gave rise to an “irresistible”

inference that the correspondence “contemplated and

invited” collusion. Likewise, in In re Medical X-Ray Film

Antitrust Litigation, 946 F. Supp. 209, 218-21 (E.D.N.Y.

1996), the court found that an agreement to fix prices

could be inferred from evidence showing that competitors

exchanged internal pricing memoranda and met privately

59a

Appendix C

to discuss and exchange pricing information in advance

of announcing price increases.

Significant, though not dispositive, is the fact that

“invitations to collude” in the context of antitrust

conspiracy claims have almost universally been private

communications, not public disclosures like the AirTran

comments at issue in this case. The Court does not suggest

that public remarks by a company could never give rise

to liability under § 1 of the Sherman Act, because “‘the

form of the exchange—whether . . . through private

exchange . . . or through public announcements of price

changes—should not be determinative of its legality.’”

In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum

Prods. Antitrust Litig., 906 F.2d 432, 447 (9th Cir. 1990)

(quoting RIchard Posner, a ntItrust law: a n EconomIc

P erspectIve 146 (1976)). But courts must “be careful

not to permit inferences of antitrust conspiracy when to

do so would create a significant irrational dislocation in

the market or would result in significant anticompetitive

effects.” Petroleum Prods., 906 F.2d at 440 (citing

Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 763-64). That instruction cannot

be squared with Plaintiffs’ allegations of an invitation to

collude.

Fornaro’s statement was made publicly on a quarterly

earnings call with AirTran’s analysts and investors.

It concerned a topic that was of interest to the airline

industry at the time, as evidenced by both the widespread

adoption of bag fees by airlines during the first three

quarters of 2008 and the fact that bag fees and ancillary

fees were discussed on several airlines’ earnings calls

60a

Appendix C

in 2008. 28 This is precisely “the type of information

companies legitimately convey to their shareholders,”

Holiday Wholesale, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 1277, and courts

are properly reluctant to characterize them as evidence of

unlawful conspiracies, Petroleum Prods., 906 F.2d at 440.

“Because in competitive markets, particularly oligopolies,

companies will monitor each other’s communications with

the market in order to make their own strategic decisions,

antitrust law permits such discussions even when they

relate to pricing . . . .” Holiday Wholesale, 231 F. Supp.

2d at 1276.

Plaintiffs speculate that AirTran planted the bag-fee

question for its third-quarter earnings call, but even if

that would alter the Court’s analysis of this plus factor, it

is unsupported by the evidence. Kevin Crissey—the UBS

analyst who posed the question to AirTran—declared

under penalty of perjury that the question was not

planted and that he asked it because of his own interest

in bag fees. [434-16] at 17-19. This declaration testimony

is uncontradicted, 29 and it is corroborated by other

28. See [350-99] at 18 (Delta’s third-quarter earnings call

transcript); [350-103] at 32 (JetBlue’s third-quarter earnings call

transcript); [350-103] at 47-48 (US Airways’ third-quarter earnings

call transcript). The question was also asked during second-quarter

earnings calls for airlines that had already introduced it at that

point. See, e.g., [350-60] at 19 (American Airlines’ second-quarter

earnings call transcript).

29. Plaintiffs’ cursory assertion that the question Crissey posed

was “incongruent with his level of sophistication and more consistent

with planted questions,” [554] at n.55, is insufficient to contradict

Crissey’s declaration testimony for purposes of withstanding

summary judgment.

61a

Appendix C

earnings-call transcripts, which reveal that Crissey asked

several airlines about bag fees. See, e.g., [350-60] at 19

(Crissey asking American Airlines in July 2008 about the

operational impact of having introduced the first-bag fee);

[350-67] at 18 (Crissey asking Delta in July 2008 about

Northwest’s first-bag fee); [350-103] at 32 (Crissey asking

JetBlue in October 2008 about the effect of ancillary fees

on its revenue practices); Id. at 47-48 (Crissey asking US

Airways in October 2008 whether its first-bag fee had led

to a significant decrease in the number of checked bags).

“The public announcement of a pricing decision cannot

be twisted into an invitation or signal to conspire; it is

instead an economic reality to which all other competitors

must react.” Hall v. United Air Lines, Inc., 296 F. Supp.

2d 652, 670 n.23 (E.D.N.C. 2003) (granting summary

judgment on § 1 claims and finding that the defendants’

statements in trade press articles and interviews were

not plus factors supporting an inference of conspiracy),

aff’d sub nom. Hall v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 118 F. App’x

680 (4th Cir. 2004).

Plaintiffs’ invitation-to-collude argument, at least

under the circumstances of this case, would take unilateral

action by a company (i.e., Delta) and deem it collusive

merely because it was preceded in time by another

unilateral action by a competitor (i.e., AirTran). But

one company’s public statements cannot “immobilize[]”

a competitor and preclude it from subsequently taking

otherwise lawful actions. United States v. Standard Oil

Co., 316 F.2d 884, 896 (7th Cir. 1963).

62a

Appendix C

Two additional facts make the inference Plaintiffs

would draw particularly untenable. First, the conduct at

issue—the imposition of a first-bag fee in the fall of 2008—

was not unprecedented but rather Defendants’ conformity

to a decision made by many of their competitors in the

preceding months. Those competitors, in turn, had

uniformly reported that they had experienced little if

any share shift and operational problems from bag fees.

Second, the evidence shows that AirTran was not firmly

committed to a first-bag fee at the time it extended the

would-be invitation to Delta. Between November 5 and

7, AirTran executives circulated quantitative analyses of

the first-bag fee and conferred with each other about the

decision whether to impose one. The final decision was not

made until November 10, more than two weeks after the

October 23 earnings call. It is therefore far from clear that

AirTran was “ready and willing to coordinate” activity

on October 23. In re Fortiline, 2016 WL 4379041, at *11.

In Williamson Oil, 346 F.3d at 1307, the Eleventh

Circuit rejected the argument that forward-looking

pricing statements such as “we have no wish to escalate

[the price war, b]ut we shall be ready to respond tactically

where necessary” constituted improper signals. The

statements that Plaintiffs would construe as an invitation

to collude in this case are, at best, on par with the

“signals” in Williamson Oil. The Court therefore finds

that an invitation to collude is not a plus factor because

the evidence Plaintiffs point to is “no more indicative of

collusion than it is of lawful, rational pricing behavior.” Id.

63a

Appendix C

2.

Collusive Communications Followed

Closely by Parallel Price Increases

Plaintiffs next assert that a conspiracy to fix

prices can be inferred from what they describe as an

“overwhelming pattern of [collusive] communications”

between Defendants in the time period leading up to their

parallel imposition of a first-bag fee. [554] at 53, 57. 30

The first such communication Plaintiffs rely on

is Fornaro’s June 18, 2008 statement at the investor

conference that “AirTran had not instituted a first bag

fee because AirTran would be uncomfortable competing

in Atlanta with Delta, which was not charging a first bag

fee.” But Plaintiffs concede that this statement “did not

elicit any reaction by Delta.” [554] at 7. “[C]ommunications

between competitors do not permit an inference of an

agreement to fix prices unless those communications rise

30. At the outset, AirTran suggests that a communication may

be credited as a plus factor only if three criteria are satisfied, see

[604] at 17-18, but the Court disagrees. Whether a communication

constitutes a plus factor is an inquiry not susceptible to determination

by any rigid test. In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 782 F.3d

867, 878 (7th Cir. 2015), on which AirTran relies, did not treat

any particular factors as dispositive; it merely suggested that the

evidence before it would have been more persuasive if those factors

were present. And Plaintiffs correctly point out that the causation

requirement AirTran would impose improperly puts the cart before

the horse in the context of a motion for summary judgment in a § 1

conspiracy claim. However, the other considerations identified by

AirTran—the parties to the conversation, the detail of its contents,

and its timing vis-à-vis the challenged action—are certainly among

those relevant to whether a communication constitutes a plus factor.

64a

Appendix C

to the level of an agreement, tacit or otherwise.” In re

Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 126 (3d Cir. 1999)

(internal punctuation omitted) (holding that the district

court properly discounted evidence about allegedly

collusive communications where, among other things, the

defendant receiving those communications “generally did

not act on any information obtained through” them).

Plaintiffs next rely on Fasano’s communications and

attempted communications with Delta during July and

August 2008. But this too is unavailing. Fasano’s e-mails

to Boeckhaus and Burman were never received because

Boeckhaus and Burman had already left Delta’s employ, so

they clearly do not tend to establish a conspiracy between

Defendants. As for the rest of Fasano’s communications

discussed above, “[e]vidence of sporadic exchanges of

shop talk among [employees] who lack pricing authority is

insufficient to survive summary judgment. Furthermore,

to survive summary judgment, there must be evidence

that the exchanges of information had an impact on

pricing decisions.” Baby Food, 166 F.3d at 125. Fasano’s

communications show, at most, the AirTran was anxious

about competing with Delta and wanted to know, perhaps

desperately so, what Delta was going to do on a first-bag

fee. This is not inconsistent with, and thus does not tend

to exclude the possibility of, conscious parallelism, as

“[c]ompetitors in concentrated markets watch each other

like hawks.” Text Messaging, 782 F.3d at 875. 31 In the

31. Indeed, Jack Smith confirmed that AirTran was “always

looking to see what the grapevine is . . . on what other competitors

[were] doing,” even though such information usually came in the form

of “gossip, chatter, and rumors” that were of unreliable accuracy.

[360] at 69-70.

65a

Appendix C

absence of evidence that Fasano ever communicated with

anybody involved in Delta’s first-bag fee decision, these

communications are not a plus factor tending to exclude

the possibility of independent conduct.

The other communications Plaintiffs point to are

equally unavailing as plus factors. A statement cannot

constitute a plus factor if it requires the jury to engage in

speculation and conjecture to such a degree as to render

its finding a guess or mere possibility. Williamson Oil,

346 F.3d at 1302. Plaintiffs allege very generally that at

unspecified times in 2008, “a lot of competitive information

. . . was relayed through vendors,” AirTran’s employees

“very frequently” relayed what they learned about

competitors, and Defendants’ employees had discussions

“all the time.” [554] at 55-56. Other than offering string

citations to a litany of exhibits without even so much as a

parenthetical explanation as to the significance of those

exhibits, Plaintiffs wholly fail to explain the content of

these so-called communications. Having concluded that

the comments Plaintiffs did specifically point to are

insufficient to constitute a plus factor, the Court declines

Plaintiffs’ invitation to parse through the voluminous

record in a search for anything else that might possibly

be construed as collusive communications. United States

v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) (“Judges are

not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.”).

The communications on which Plaintiffs rely are

perfectly consistent with conscious parallelism by

members of an oligopoly. Plaintiffs rely on hindsight to

paint them as collusive in light of Defendants’ parallel

66a

Appendix C

pricing—which occurred many months later than some of

the communications at issue—but a reasonable factfinder

could not so find. These communications do not tend to

exclude the possibility of independent action.

3.

Evidence that Exchanges of Information

Affected Delta’s First-Bag-Fee Decision

Plaintiffs also argue that a plus factor exists in

this case because the evidence shows that exchanges of

information between Defendants affected Delta’s first-bagfee decision. There is no question that the mere “exchange

of price data and other information among competitors

does not invariably have anticompetitive effects” and

therefore does “not constitute a per se violation of the

Sherman Act.” United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438

U.S. 422, 441 n.16, 98 S. Ct. 2864, 57 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1978);

see also Amey, Inc. v. Gulf Abstract & Title, Inc., 758

F.2d 1486, 1505 (11th Cir. 1985) (“Absent an agreement

to fix prices, there is nothing unlawful about competitors

meeting and exchanging price information or discussing

problems common in their industry, or even exchanging

information as to the cost of their product.”). However,

there are circumstances under which the exchange of such

information followed by a parallel price increase can give

rise to an inference of a conspiratorial agreement to fix

prices. See, e.g., In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d

350, 369 (3d Cir. 2004); In re SRAM Antitrust Litig., No.

07-md-1819 CW, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132172, 2010 WL

5138859, at *6-7 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2010).

67a

Appendix C

In SRAM, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132172, 2010

WL 5138859, at *6, an employee who was indisputably

“involved in setting prices” (even though he personally

lacked “ultimate pricing authority”) “relayed regular

reports about competitors’ pricing and production directly

to pricing authorities . . . as well as to other [of the

defendant’s] personnel, who appear to have played roles in

setting prices . . . .” “He exchanged information with other

high level managers from competitor firms, and exercised

direct influence over the prices that buyers paid” for the

products at issue. Id. Thus, the court concluded that there

was sufficient evidence from which a jury could infer the

existence of a conspiratorial price-fixing agreement.

The SRAM court analogized the facts before it to

those of Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 368-69. In that case, the

Third Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs had presented

sufficient evidence of a price-fixing conspiracy to survive

summary judgment where the defendants’ high-level

employees had exchanged pricing information and the

evidence was sufficient to infer that the defendants

had used that information to implement collusive price

increases. For example, one defendant (AFG) had faxed to

another defendant (PPG) an internal memorandum about

a planned future price increase that had not been publicly

announced. PPG then announced an identical increase

before AFG, and the rest of the producers followed with

identical price increases. In addition, “[s]everal . . . key

documents emphasize[d] that the relevant price increases

were not economically justified or supportable, but

required competitors to hold the line.” Id. at 369.

68a

Appendix C

Both SRAM and Flat Glass found their facts factually

distinguishable from those in Baby Food, 166 F.3d at

124-26, in which the Third Circuit affirmed the grant of

summary judgment to the defendants where “the evidence

did not support an inference of a conspiracy to fix prices

but portrayed nothing more than intense efforts on the

part of three large and strong competing companies . . . to

ascertain ‘what their competitors would be doing with

regard to pricing, promotions, and products.’” (quoting

the district court’s opinion). The documents that the

competitors had exchanged—primarily between lower

level employees—reflected “competitive information

concerning the discontinuance of products or changes

in product ingredients or in packaging,” and thus the

exchange of that information “was consistent with

independent action and not grounds for assuming ‘some

shadowy conspiracy.’” Id. at 125.

As explained by the Flat Glass court, 385 F.3d at

369, “[t]he In re Baby Food plaintiffs simply could not

correlate information exchanges with specific collusive

behavior,” instead making “the more amorphous claim

that the exchanges of information ‘impacted the market

as a whole.’” The SRAM court, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

132172, 2010 WL 5138859 at *7, further elaborated that

“[t]here was no indication” in Baby Food that the employee

who had obtained a competitor’s pricing information

“communicated the information directly to pricing

authorities at the firm, or participated in any discussions

to decide what prices would be set.”

69a

Appendix C

The Court concludes that the facts of this case are

more analogous to Baby Food than Flat Glass, SRAM, or

other cases in which the exchange of pricing information

was found to support an inference of conspiracy. The

information exchanges Plaintiffs point to might reflect

“intense efforts” to monitor competitors’ activity, even

pricing activity, but they do not tend to exclude the

possibility of unilateral action by oligopolists. “Gathering

competitors’ price information can be consistent with

independent competitor behavior,” particularly within

the airline industry, which at all relevant times has been

so concentrated and highly competitive that “it makes

common sense to obtain as much information as possible

of the pricing policies . . . of one’s competitors.” Baby Food,

166 F.3d at 126; see also Text Messaging, 782 F.3d at 875

(“Competitors in concentrated markets watch each other

like hawks.”).

Plaintiffs place much stock in the fact that Delta’s

value proposition analysis was revised after AirTran’s

third-quarter earnings call, and they characterize Delta’s

decision to impose a first-bag fee as an “abrupt shift from

the past.” [554] at 61 (citing Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc. v. FTC,

221 F.3d 928, 935 (7th Cir. 2000)). But Delta’s decision

not to impose a first-bag fee during the summer of 2008

does not make any subsequent revisiting of that decision

conspiratorial, especially in light of the fact that every

other legacy airline except Alaska had adopted first-bag

fees by the time Delta did so. An inference of conspiracy

is less plausible from this so-called “abrupt shift” in light

of the fact that Defendants’ alleged collusive behavior

involved conformity to what had become industry norms,

70a

Appendix C

even if those norms were not universally in place. See

Baby Food, 166 F.3d at 135 (“Parallel pricefixing must be

so unusual that in the absence of an advance agreement,

no reasonable firm would have engaged in it.”).

Furthermore, even giving full credit to Plaintiffs’

characterization of the value proposition document as

reflecting Delta’s views on the issue, the fact that Delta

“analyzed possible competitor responses” is “a strong

indicator that there was no actual agreement among the

airlines, as it shows that [Delta was] uncertain of [its]

rivals’ potential reaction.” Hall, 296 F. Supp. 2d at 671.

This is all the more true where the analysis was driven

not by clandestine internal exchanges but by the public

statements of a competitor. See Williamson Oil, 346 F.3d at

1305 (“[I]n competitive markets, particularly oligopolies,

companies monitor each other’s communications with the

market in order to make their own strategic decisions.”).

Those public statements, moreover, were viewed by Delta

employees as “inappropriate,” “[un]wise,” “odd,” and

otherwise problematic specifically because of Defendants’

antitrust obligations, see supra n. 14, making the inference

that Delta would have accepted any such invitation less

plausible. And Delta’s employees testified uniformly

that AirTran’s comments were simply not discussed as a

factor at Delta’s October 27, 2008 CLT meeting. Thus, it

is far less clear in this case than in Flat Glass that any

information exchanges actually affected Delta’s decision

to impose a first-bag fee in a way that is at all inconsistent

with conscious parallelism within an oligopolistic market.

71a

Appendix C

4.

Actions Against Unilateral Economic SelfInterest

“One prominent ‘plus factor,’ to which antitrust

plaintiffs often take recourse, is a showing that the

defendants’ behavior would not be reasonable or explicable

(i.e., not in their legitimate economic self-interest) if they

were not conspiring to fix prices or otherwise restrain

trade . . . .” Harcros, 158 F.3d at 571; see also Williamson

Oil, 346 F.3d at 1310 (“It is firmly established that

actions that are contrary to an actor’s economic interest

constitute a plus factor that is sufficient to satisfy a price

fixing plaintiff’s burden in opposing a summary judgment

motion.”).

But the concept of ‘action against self interest’

is an ambiguous one and one of its meanings

could merely constitute a restatement of

interdependence. For example, refusing to raise

or lower prices unless rivals do the same could

be against a firm’s self interest but it would

constitute mere interdependence. . . . Therefore,

to satisfy the requirements of a conspiracy,

the action that is against self interest must go

beyond mere interdependence. . . . [P]arallel

price fixing which would be so unusual that

in the absence of advanced agreement no

reasonable firm would engage . . . could be

sufficient to establish a conspiracy.

Coleman, 849 F. Supp. at 1467 (emphasis added).

72a

Appendix C

Moreover, courts “must exercise prudence in labeling

a given action as being contrary to the actor’s economic

interests, lest we be too quick to second-guess wellintentioned business judgments of all kinds.” Williamson

Oil, 346 F.3d at 1310. “[F]irms must have broad discretion

to make decisions based on their judgments of what is

best for them and . . . business judgments should not be

second-guessed even where the evidence concerning the

rationality of the challenged activities might be subject

to reasonable dispute.” In re Citric Acid Litig., 191 F.3d

1090, 1101 (9th Cir. 1999). “[I]f a benign explanation for

the action is equally or more plausible than a collusive

explanation, the action cannot constitute a plus factor.

Equipoise is not enough to take the case to the jury.”

Williamson Oil, 346 F.3d at 1310. “Thus, no conspiracy

should be inferred from ambiguous evidence or from mere

parallelism when defendants’ conduct can be explained

by independent business reasons.” Baby Food, 166 F.3d

at 122.

In the fall of 2008, the airline industry faced nearly

unprecedented circumstances. “[T]he economy was

collapsing, and [Delta was] seeing a tremendous amount

of reductions in terms of bookings.” [366] at 59; see also

[559] at 39-40 (Healy testifying that AirTran similarly

projected a decreased demand in the fall and winter

of 2008). At Delta, these industry-wide issues were

compounded by concerns about funding Delta’s pension.

[366] at 72. By this same time period, every other legacy

carrier except Alaska had introduced first-bag fees and

reported them to be profitable and to have resulted in

no significant share-shift. On September 16, the Wall

73a

Appendix C

Street Journal reported that “airline fees are here to

stay,” explaining that “baggage fees and other charges

[were] significantly improving the usually dismal finances

of the industry” because passengers were “paying them,

if begrudgingly, and [weren’t] shifting in large numbers

to the few airlines that don’t charge fees . . .” [350-89] at

2. As early as June 2008, one article noting the divide in

the airline industry over first-bag fees posited that Delta

and Northwest might have been holding off in light of

their need to obtain regulatory approval for their pending

merger: “‘They don’t want to swat the hornets’ nest,’

[aviation consultant Robert] Mann says.” [556] at 472.

As Plaintiffs point out, there were differing opinions

within Delta about whether to impose a first-bag fee, and

some employees worried about adding or increasing fees

during a period of softening demand. [366] at 63; [556] at

694; [363] at 91-92. And Plaintiffs’ expert posits that from

an economic perspective, there were valid justifications

to refrain from introducing these fees, including that

fuel costs were falling. But “evidence of a price increase

disconnected from changes in cost or demand only raises

the question” of what motivated the price increase, it does

not answer that question. Chocolate Confectionary, 801

F.3d at 400.

The overwhelming evidence before the Court reflects

Defendants’ subjective beliefs that there were valid

reasons to impose a first-bag fee, including Defendants’

need for revenue during an economic downturn. The

Court declines to infer the existence of a conspiratorial

agreement merely because the wisdom of Defendants’

decisions might not be impervious to questioning. See

74a

Appendix C

H.L. Moore Drug Exchange v. Eli Lilly & Co., 662 F.2d

935, 941 (2d Cir. 1981) (“[T]he mere fact that a business

reason advanced by a defendant . . . is undermined does

not, by itself, justify the inference that the conduct was

therefore the result of a conspiracy.”); Seagood Trading

Corp. v. Jerrico, Inc., 924 F.2d 1555, 1574 (11th Cir. 1991)

(“[ W ]hen the defenda nt put s for th a plausible,

procompetitive explanation for his actions, we will not

be quick to infer, from circumstantial evidence, that a

violation of the antitrust laws has occurred.”).

5.

Pretextual Explanations for Changed

Business Practices

Plaintiffs next attempt to conjure a plus factor

from what they characterize as Defendants’ pretextual

explanations for imposing first-bag fees. See generally

Chocolate Confectionary, 801 F.3d at 410-11 (citing case

law for the proposition that “pretextual explanations

for disputed conduct would disprove the likelihood of

independent action”) (internal punctuation omitted).

“Although pretextual reasons have some probative value,

. . . they are insufficient to create a genuine issue of

material fact without other evidence pointing to a pricefixing agreement.” Miles Distribs., Inc. v. Specialty

Constr. Brands, Inc., 476 F.3d 442, 452 (7th Cir. 2007).

Too, the “pretextual” reasons Plaintiffs rely on are not

inconsistent or false. Rather, Plaintiffs point to evidence

showing only the business reality that a business must

contend with a multitude of factors when making any

significant decision. Such evidence does not tend to exclude

the possibility of independent action by Defendants and

is thus not a plus factor.

75a

Appendix C

6.

Motive and Intent to Conspire

The final plus factor on which Plaintiffs rely is

Defendants’ motive and intent to conspire. See [554]

at 31-32. But the Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly held

that “the mere opportunity to conspire among antitrust

defendants does not, standing alone, permit the inference

of conspiracy.” Williamson Oil, 346 F.2d at 1319 (quoting

Todorov v. DCH Healthcare Auth., 921 F.2d 1438, 1456

(11th Cir. 1991)); Seagood Trading, 924 F.2d at 1574 (same);

see also Holiday Wholesale, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 1306 (“As

an initial matter, the court notes that the characterization

of motive as a ‘plus factor’ is questionable.”). And the

Eleventh Circuit is not alone, as other courts have

similarly recognized that “common motive does not

suggest an agreement” and is not indicative of anything

beyond interdependence. In re Musical Instruments &

Equip. Antitrust Litig., 798 F.3d 1186, 1194 (9th Cir. 2015).

However, the Court need not decide whether motive

could ever be a plus factor because in this case, Plaintiffs’

reliance on this would-be plus factor is little more than

a rehashing of their prior arguments. See [554] at 31-32

(arguing that Defendants were motivated to conspire

because they “both understood that it was contrary to

their economic interest[s] to unilaterally impose a [firstbag fee] before the other”). In the absence of any other

evidence from which an agreement to fix prices could

reasonably be inferred, there is no basis to infer such an

agreement from the mere motive or intent to conspire.

Such evidence, even if it existed here, “could not be said by

a reasonable factfinder to tend to exclude the possibility of

independent behavior.” Williamson Oil, 346 F.3d at 1302.

76a

Appendix C

7.

Cumulative Effect of Plus Factors

Even when viewed in the light most favorable to

Plaintiffs, the evidence in this case simply does not

permit a reasonable factfinder to infer the existence of a

conspiracy, as it does not “‘tend[] to exclude the possibility’

that the alleged conspirators acted independently.”

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588 (quoting Monsanto, 465

U.S. at 764). Although the Court has analyzed each of

Plaintiff’s would-be plus factors sequentially, the outcome

is the same when they are considered cumulatively.

See generally Continental Ore, 370 U.S. at 699 (“[t]he

character and effect of a conspiracy are not to be judged by

dismembering it and viewing its separate parts, but only

by looking at it as a whole”); High Fructose Corn Syrup,

295 F.3d at 655 (cautioning against a supposition that

“if no single item of evidence presented by the plaintiff

points unequivocally to conspiracy, the evidence as a whole

cannot defeat summary judgment”).

“In other words, in this case the whole of the

manufacturers’ actions is no greater than the sum of its

parts.” Williamson Oil, 346 F.3d at 1310. “[T]he record

taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to

find” that Defendants engaged in a conspiracy to fix prices

rather than lawful conscious parallelism. Matsushita, 475

U.S. at 587. Accordingly, “there is no ‘genuine issue for

trial,’” and Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.

Id.

77a

Appendix C

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to

exclude Singer’s testimony [625] is denied; Plaintiffs’

motion to exclude Carlton’s testimony [631] is granted as

to Carlton’s first opinion but otherwise denied; Plaintiffs’

motion to exclude Dick’s testimony [632] is granted as

to his opinion regarding the definition of collusion from

an economics perspective but otherwise denied; Delta’s

motion for summary judgment [350] is granted; and

AirTran’s motion for summary judgment [353] is granted.

In light of this holding, Delta’s motion for summary

judgment as to the claim asserted by Plaintiff Henryk

Jachimowicz [219] and Delta’s motion to exclude the

opinions and testimony of Bruce Pixley [433] are denied

as moot. 32

IT IS SO ORDERED this 28th day of March, 2017.

/s/ Timothy C. Batten, Sr.

Timothy C. Batten, Sr.

United States District Judge

32. Nine of Plaintiffs’ exhibits—Exhibits 444, 446-452, and

454—were timely provided to the Court for filing in connection with

Plaintiffs’ opposition to Defendants’ motions for summary judgment

but inadvertently omitted from the docket. These documents have

been provided to the Clerk’s office today for filing to ensure that the

record is complete, and nothing about their belated entries on the

docket should suggest that they were not available for the Court’s

review in connection with the pending motions.

78a

AppendixOF

D REHEARING OF

APPENDIX D — DENIAL

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT, FILED JUNE 8, 2018

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-16401-EE; 17-11733 -BB

MARTIN SIEGEL, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF

AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,

STEPHEN POWELL, ON BEHALF OF

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