Amicus Curiae Brief — Department of Homeland Security, et al., Petitioners v. Regents of the University of California, et al.

Supreme Court briefOct 4, 2019

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Nos. 18-587, 18-588, and 18-589

In the Supreme Court of the United States

_________________

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, ET AL.,

PETITIONERS,

v.

REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, ET AL.,

RESPONDENTS

____________

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

____________

BRIEF OF FORMER SERVICE SECRETARIES,

MODERN MILITARY ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, AND MILITARY AND VETERAN ADVOCACY ORGANIZATIONS AS AMICI CURIAE IN

SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS

____________

PETER E. PERKOWSKI

Modern Military

Association of America

P.O. Box. 65301

Washington, DC 20035

(202) 328-3244

peter@modermilitary.org

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

Modern Military Association

of America

CHARLES B. KLEIN

Counsel of Record

CLAIRE A. FUNDAKOWSKI

Winston & Strawn LLP

1700 K Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 282-5000

cklein@winston.com

Counsel for Amici Curiae

Additional Captions and Counsel

Listed on Inside Cover

DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,

ET AL., PETITIONERS,

v.

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT

OF COLORED PEOPLE, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

____________

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

____________

KEVIN K. MCALEENAN, ACTING SECRETARY OF

HOMELAND SECURITY, ET AL., PETITIONERS,

v.

MARTÍN JONATHAN BATALLA VIDAL, ET AL.,

RESPONDENTS.

____________

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

____________

HARVEY WEINER

Peabody & Arnold LLP

600 Atlantic Avenue

Boston, MA 02210

hweiner@peabodyarnold.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

Jewish War Veterans of the USA

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page(s)

INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE ............................... 1

STATEMENT................................................................ 5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ...................................... 8

ARGUMENT ................................................................. 9

I.

The Government Must Consider Serious

Reliance Interests When Changing

Existing Policy.................................................... 9

II.

DACA Engendered Serious Reliance

Interests on the Part of Non-Citizens

Enlisted in the Military, Their Families,

and the American People. ................................ 11

A.

Foreign-Born Recruits Are Integral

to the U.S. Military and Vital to Its

Mission. .................................................. 11

B.

Enlistees Rely on DACA for

Eligibility to be Employed by the

Military and for a Path to

Citizenship. ............................................ 14

C.

Enlistees’ Families Rely on DACA

for the Possibility of Parole in Place

or Deferred Action. ................................ 18

D.

The U.S. Military Relies on NonCitizens, Including DACA

ii

Recipients, to Protect the American

People. .................................................... 20

III.

The Government Violated the APA When

It Rescinded DACA Without Considering

Serious Reliance Interests. .............................. 29

CONCLUSION ........................................................... 31

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United

States,

371 U.S. 156 (1962) .............................................. 30

Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro,

136 S. Ct. 2117 (2016) ................................ 9, 10, 31

FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.,

556 U.S. 502 (2009) .............................................. 10

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm

Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,

463 U.S. 29 (1983) .................................................. 9

SEC v. Chenery Corp.,

332 U.S. 194 (1947) .............................................. 30

Statutes

5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) ..................................................... 9

8 U.S.C. § 1439........................................................... 15

8 U.S.C. § 1439(a) ...................................................... 15

8 U.S.C. § 1439(f) ....................................................... 15

8 U.S.C. § 1440........................................................... 15

8 U.S.C. § 1440(a) ...................................................... 15

8 U.S.C. § 1440(c)....................................................... 15

iv

10 U.S.C. § 504(b)(2) ...........................................passim

10 U.S.C. § 513(b)(1)-(3) ............................................ 17

38 U.S.C. §§ 3311 ...................................................... 16

38 U.S.C. § 3702........................................................ 16

Regulations

8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14).............................................. 6

32 C.F.R. § 199.3 ........................................................ 16

Other Authorities

Air Force News, The U.S. Military Helps Naturalize

Non-Citizens (2019),

https://www.military.com/join-armedforces/eligibility-requirements/the-us-militaryhelps-naturlize-non-citizens.html ........................ 23

Baldor, Lolita, Problems for Pentagon’s

immigrant recruit program, AP NEWS

(Sept. 30, 2018),

https://www.apnews.com/84530d3799

004a0a8c15b3d11058e030 ................................... 22

Bennett, Jonah, Pentagon: Fewer Than

900 DACA Recipients Are Currently

Serving In The Military (Sept. 6,

2017), https://stream.org/pentagonfewer-than-900-daca-recipients-arecurrently-serving-in-the-military/ ....................... 13

v

Bowman, Tom, Citizenship For Military

Service Program Under Fire, NPR

(July 11, 2017),

https://www.npr.org/2017/07/11/53663

0223/citizenship-for-military-serviceprogram-under-fire ............................................... 16

Exec. Order 13,269, 67 Fed. Reg. 45287

(July 3, 2002) .................................................. 13, 15

Chief of Naval Personnel Public Affairs,

SECNAV Releases Updated Diversity,

Inclusion Policy Statement (Feb. 25,

2016), available at

https://www.navy.mil/submit/display.

asp?story_id=93282 ........................................ 23, 28

Chishti, Muzaffar, et al., Immigrants in

the Military: Evolving Recruitment

Needs Can Accommodate National

Security Concerns (May 2019),

https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/

default/files/publications/MPINoncitizens-Military-Final.pdf ............................ 24

Courtney, Paul Vincent, Prohibiting

Sexual Orientation Discrimination in

Public Accommodations: A Common

Law Approach, 163 U. Pa. L. Rev.

1497 (2014-2015) .................................................. 26

Dep’t of Def., Defense Language

Transformation Roadmap 3 (Jan.

2005) http://www.defense.gov/news

/mar2005/d20050330roadmap.pdf ....................... 27

vi

Dep’t of Def., DoD Announces Policy

Changes to Lawful Permanent

Residents and the Military Accessions

Vital to the National Interest

(MAVNI) Pilot Program (Oct. 13,

2017), https://www.defense.gov

/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/1

342317/dod-announces-policychanges-to-lawful-permanentresidents-and-the-military-acc/...................... 15, 16

Dep’t of Def., MAVNI Fact Sheet,

https://dod.defense.gov/news/mavnifact-sheet.pdf ........................................................ 14

Dep’t of Def., Population Representation

in the Military Services: Fiscal Year

2010 Summary Report, available at

https://www.cna.org/pop-rep/2010

/summary/PopRep10summ.pdf ............................ 12

Dep’t of Def., Population Representation

in the Military Services: Fiscal Year

2016 Summary Report, available at

https://www.cna.org/pop-rep/2016

/summary/summary.pdf. .................... 12, 14, 21, 24

Dep’t of Def., Remarks by Secretary

Hagel at the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual,

Transgender Pride Month Event in

the Pentagon Auditorium (June 25,

2013), http://archive.defense.gov

/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcrip

tid=5262 ................................................................ 27

vii

Dep’t of Homeland Security, MAVNI

Program Status for Fiscal Year 2017

(Dec. 2, 2016), https://www.ice.gov

/doclib/sevis/pdf/bcm-1612-02.pdf ........................ 14

Eric Fanning, Immigration reform: An Army

recruitment opportunity (Jan. 8, 2018),

https://thehill.com/opinion/nationalsecurity/367839-immigration-reform-an-armyrecruitment-opportunity. ........................ 21, 22, 23

Eric Fanning, Secretary of the Army: America’s

Diversity is Our Army’s Strength, ASS’N OF THE

U.S. ARMY (Oct. 1, 2016), available at

https://www.ausa.org/articles/secretary-armyamerica%E2%80%99s-diversity-ourarmy%E2%80%99s-strength............................... 28

Gates, Gary J., The Williams Inst.,

Effects of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” on

Retention Among Lesbian, Gay and

Bisexual Military Personnel (2007),

available at

https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/

wp-content/uploads/GatesEffectsOfDontAskDontTellOnRetenti

on-Mar-2007.pdf ................................................... 26

viii

Horton, Alex, Foreign-born recruits,

promised citizenship by the Pentagon,

flee the country to avoid deportation,

Washington Post (July 17, 2017),

https://www.washingtonpost.com/new

s/checkpoint/wp/2017/07/17/foreignborn-recruits-promised-citizenshipby-the-pentagon-flee-the-country-toavoid-deportation/ ................................................ 18

Horton, Alex, The military looked to

‘dreamers’ to use their vital skills.

Now the U.S. might deport them.,

Washington Post (Sept. 7, 2017),

https://www.washingtonpost.com/new

s/checkpoint/wp/2017/09/07/themilitary-looked-to-dreamers-to-usetheir-vital-skills-now-the-u-s-mightdeport-them .......................................................... 17

Memorandum from Deborah Lee James,

Secretary of the Air Force, Air Force

Diversity & Inclusion (Mar. 4, 2015),

available at

https://www.af.mil/Portals/1/documen

ts/SECAF/FINALDiversity_Inclusion_

Memo1.pdf ...................................................... 22, 28

McIntosh, Molly F., et al., Non-Citizens

in the Enlisted U.S. Military (Nov.

2011), available at

https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/D

0025768.A2.pdf ......................................... 22, 23, 29

ix

Military Leadership Diversity

Commission, From Representation to

Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the

21st-Century Military, Final Report xvi

(2011), https://www.hsdl.org

/?view&did=11390 ................................................ 27

National Immigration Forum, For Love of Country:

New Americans Serving in our Armed Forces:

Executive Summary (Nov. 7, 2017),

https://immigrationforum.org/article/love-countrynew-americans-serving-armed-forces-2/ .............. 29

New American Economy, Outside the

Wire: How Barring the DACA-Eligible

Population from Enlisting Weakens

our Military (Nov. 8, 2017),

https://research.newamericaneconomy

.org/report/outside-the-wire-howbarring-the-daca-eligible-populationfrom-enlisting-weakens-our-military/ ..... 14, 24, 25

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs.,

Adjudicator’s Field Manual, ch.

21.1(c) ........................................................ 18, 19, 20

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs.,

Military Naturalization Statistics,

https://www.uscis.gov/military/militar

y-naturalization-statistics (last

updated Dec. 6, 2018) ..................................... 13, 15

x

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs.,

USCIS Facilities Dedicated to the

Memory of Immigrant Medal of Honor

Recipients, https://www.uscis.gov

/about-us/find-uscis-office/uscisfacilities-dedicated-memoryimmigrant-medal-honor-recipients

(last updated Jan. 24, 2014)................................. 12

U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office,

Immigration Enforcement: Actions

Needed to Better Handle, Identify, and

Track Cases Involving Veterans 7

(2019) ........................................................ 14, 17, 18

Memorandum from Jessica Wright,

Undersecretary of Defense for

Personnel and Readiness, Military

Accessions Vital to the National

Interest Program Changes (Sept. 25,

2014) ..................................................................... 13

Jie Zong & Jeanne Batalova, Immigrant

Veterans in the United States (May

16, 2019),

https://www.migrationpolicy.org/articl

e/immigrant-veterans-united-states. ............. 12, 29

1

INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE 1

The amici curiae are Secretary Eric Fanning, Secretary Deborah Lee James, Secretary Ray Mabus, the

Modern Military Association of America (MMAA), the

National Veterans Legal Services Program (NVLSP),

Jewish War Veterans of the USA (JWV), Blue Star

Families, Minority Veterans of America (MVA), and

Swords to Plowshares. Amici share a common interest in policies that enhance the U.S. military’s readiness and protect the interests of service members and

their families.

Secretary Eric K. Fanning served as the 22nd U.S.

Secretary of the Army. As Secretary, he had statutory responsibility for all matters related in the United

States Army, including manpower, personnel, and

reserve affairs. Previously, he served as Chief of

Staff to the Secretary of Defense, as Acting Secretary

of the Air Force, as Under Secretary of the Air Force,

and as Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy/Deputy

Chief Management Officer. He is the only person to

have held senior appointments in all three military

departments and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Secretary Deborah Lee James served as the 25th

U.S. Secretary of the Air Force. Previously, she

served in the Pentagon as the Assistant Secretary of

Defense for Reserve Affairs, where she was the Secretary of Defense’s Senior Advisor on National Guard

This brief is filed with the consent of the parties pursuant to

Supreme Court Rule 37.3(a). In accordance with Supreme Court

Rule 37.6, counsel for amici curiae states that no counsel for any

party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no person other than amici curiae, its members, or its counsel made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief.

1

2

and Reserve personnel. As a professional staff member on the House Armed Services Committee, she

served as Senior Advisor to the Military Personnel

and Compensation Subcommittee, the NATO Burden

Sharing Panel, and the Chairman’s Member Services

team.

Secretary Ray Mabus served as the 75th U.S. Secretary of the Navy from 2009 to 2017, the longest to

serve as leader of the Navy and Marine Corps since

World War I. Throughout his tenure, he focused on

four key priorities—People, Platforms, Power, and

Partnerships—that enabled the Navy and Marine

Corps’ unique ability to maintain the global presence

that reassures our allies and deters our adversaries.

Among his achievements, he spearheaded the “21st

Century Sailor and Marine” initiative, which was designed to build and maintain the most resilient and

ready force possible and to prepare service members

and their families for the high-tempo operations of

today’s military.

MMAA is one of the country’s largest non-profit,

non-partisan legal services, policy, and watchdog organizations

serving

lesbian,

gay,

bisexual,

transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) military personnel,

veterans, military spouses, family members, and allies, as well as individuals living with HIV. MMAA

was formed through the merger of the American Military Partner Association and OutServe-SLDN, Inc.,

and it has over 75,000 members and supporters.

MMAA has a unique understanding of the challenges

faced by the populations it serves. Since 1993,

MMAA and its predecessor entities have assisted

over 12,500 clients.

3

MMAA regularly engages in high-profile litigation

and participates as amicus curiae to challenge policies that target, stigmatize, or otherwise negatively

affect service members and their families—reducing

morale and diminishing military readiness by inhibiting the military’s efforts at recruiting and retention.

For example, MMAA has filed lawsuits challenging

laws and regulations that discriminate against and

stigmatize LGBTQ service members, including: the

former “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” law requiring that lesbian, gay, and bisexual service members conceal their

sexual orientation; regulations prohibiting same-sex

military spouses from receiving spousal benefits; the

current ban on openly transgender people serving in

the U.S. military; and regulations negatively affecting service members with HIV. MMAA has a strong

interest in advocating for its members who may be

affected by DACA’s rescission as well as an interest

in advocating for a ruling in this case that would affirm the need for government agencies to consider

how their policy choices would harm the military by

stigmatizing and otherwise negatively affecting service members and their families.

NVLSP is an independent nonprofit organization

that has worked since 1981 to ensure that our nation’s 22 million veterans and active duty personnel

receive the federal benefits they have earned through

service to our nation. NVLSP advocates before federal agencies, courts, and Congress to protect service

members and veterans irrespective of whether they

joined the military as citizens or non-citizens.

NVLSP has represented thousands of individual service members and veterans, served as counsel for certified classes of veteran-plaintiffs, and participated as

4

amicus curiae in support of service members and veterans in numerous agency and court actions.

JWV, organized in 1986 by Jewish veterans of the

Civil War, is the oldest active national veterans’ service organization in America. Incorporated in 1924,

and chartered by an act of Congress in 1983, see 36

U.S.C. § 110103, JWV’s objectives include to “encourage the doctrine of universal liberty, equal rights, and

full justice to all men,” id § 110103(5), “combat the

powers of bigotry and darkness wherever originating

and whatever the target”, id § 110103(6), and “preserve the spirit of comradeship by mutual helpfulness

to comrades and their families,” id § 110103(7).

JWV has long taken an interest in the right to

serve in the military. Jewish immigrants and refugees have fought and died for America, particularly

in World War II against the Nazis. Over one third of

the Jews awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor

were born in a foreign country.

Blue Star Families is a national, nonprofit organization that exists to support active-duty members,

veterans, and their families from all ranks and services—including National Guard and Reserve. BSF

strengthens military families and connects America

to the Armed Forces through a robust array of morale, empowerment, education and employment programs. Additionally, BSF’s annual Military Family

Lifestyle Survey creates opportunities to support the

health and sustainability of our all-volunteer Force

by increasing dialogue and understanding between

the military community and broader American society.

Blue Star Families exists to support military families, regardless of their documented legal status. We,

5

therefore, join with the MMAA in advocating for a

ruling that would affirm the need for government

agencies to consider how their policy choices would

harm the military by stigmatizing and otherwise

negatively affecting service members and their families.

MVA is a nonprofit organization dedicated to creating community belonging and advancing equality

for minority veterans, including veterans of color,

women

veterans,

LGBTQ

veterans,

and

(non)religious minority veterans. MVA is built on

four fundamental values: inclusivity, advocacy, allyship, and education. By advocating for the needs of

veteran communities without a majority voice, MVA

strives to improve the lives of veterans who may otherwise be forgotten.

Swords to Plowshares is a community-based notfor-profit organization that provides needs assessment and case management, employment and training, housing, and legal assistance to veterans in the

San Francisco Bay Area. Swords to Plowshares promotes and protects the rights of veterans through advocacy, public education, and partnerships with local,

state, and national entities.

STATEMENT

On September 5, 2017, the Government issued a

brief memorandum rescinding the Deferred Action for

Childhood Arrivals program (DACA). Since 2012,

DACA, implemented by the Department of Homeland

Security (DHS), has conferred life-changing benefits

to nearly 800,000 non-citizens. In addition to DACA’s

promise of a reduced likelihood of removal, these

benefits include numerous advantages under existing

policies, such as the ability to obtain employment

6

lawfully. See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14). DACA has

permitted its recipients to remain in the United

States with their families and obtain a 91% employment rate, benefitting not only DACA recipients, but

also strengthening and maintaining their families.

The American people also rely on DACA to enhance U.S. national security through military readiness. As of September 2017, when the Government

rescinded DACA, over 800 DACA recipients were actively serving in the U.S. military under the Military

Accessions Vital to the National Interest program

(MAVNI). That program allows the military to recruit non-citizens who have skills “vital to the national interest,” including health care professionals

and individuals with specific language and cultural

skills. See 10 U.S.C. § 504(b)(2). The U.S. military

has relied on the efforts of these non-citizens, including DACA recipients, to further such vital national

interests that promote national security and protect

Americans.

The Government overlooked such reliance interests when rescinding DACA. The rescission memorandum contains just one sentence explaining the

Government’s rationale for changing its existing policy: “Taking into consideration the Supreme Court’s

and the Fifth Circuit’s rulings in the ongoing litigation, and the September 4, 2017, letter from the Attorney General, it is clear that the June 15, 2012,

DACA program should be terminated.” Regents Pet.

App. 117a.

Numerous parties brought actions alleging that

the Government’s decision to rescind DACA was unlawful on several grounds, including that the rescission was arbitrary and capricious under the Adminis-

7

trative Procedure Act (APA). Three of these cases are

now before the Court: Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California, No. 18587 (Regents), in the Ninth Circuit; McAleenan v. Batalla Vidal, No. 18-589 (Batalla Vidal), in the Eastern District of New York; and Trump v. NAACP,

No. 18-588 (NAACP), in the District Court for the

District of Columbia. The courts below have uniformly agreed to enjoin or vacate the Government’s decision to rescind DACA.

In Regents, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a preliminary injunction requiring, among other things, that

the Government “allow[] DACA enrollees to renew

their enrollments.” Regents Pet. App. 66a; Regents

Pet. Supp. App. 45a-46a. The Eastern District of

New York preliminarily enjoined the rescission of

DACA on similar terms. Batalla Vidal Pet. App. 126128a. Both courts concluded that the Government’s

rescission of DACA was likely arbitrary and capricious, determining that the Government’s sole rationale for rescinding DACA relied on a legally erroneous premise. Regents Pet. App. 42a; Batalla Vidal

Pet. App. 91a. In Batalla Vidal, the court further explained that the Government “acted arbitrarily and

capriciously by ending [the DACA] program without

taking any account of reliance interests that program

has engendered.” Batalla Vidal Pet. App. 113-117a.

In NAACP, the District Court for the District of

Columbia granted partial summary judgment against

the Government and vacated the rescission of DACA,

holding that it violated the APA’s substantive requirements. The court emphasized that the “Department’s failure to give an adequate explanation of

its legal judgment was particularly egregious here in

light of the reliance interests involved,” which “en-

8

gendered the reliance of hundreds of thousands of

beneficiaries, many of whom had structured their education, employment, and other life activities on the

assumption that they would be able to renew their

DACA benefits.” NAACP Pet. App. 54a. The court

stayed its mandate for ninety days “to allow the

agency an opportunity to better explain its rescission

decision.” Id. at 3a.

In response, on June 22, 2018, DHS Secretary

Kirstjen M. Nielsen issued a second memorandum

“declin[ing] to disturb the Duke memorandum’s rescission of the DACA policy.” Regents Pet. App. 121a.

The Nielsen memorandum stated, “I am keenly

aware that DACA recipients have availed themselves

of the policy in continuing their presence in this country and pursuing their lives,” but concluded “I do not

believe that the asserted reliance interests outweigh

the questionable legality of the DACA policy and the

other reasons for ending the policy discussed above.”

Id. at 125a. Secretary Nielsen’s memorandum did

not mention, much less address, the reliance interests

of DACA family members, or how the U.S. military

relies on DACA to advance national security, which

in turn serves the interests of the American people.

On August 3, 2018, the NAACP court concluded

the Nielsen memorandum did not alter the court’s

earlier conclusions. NAACP Pet. App. 80a-109a. The

Government petitioned for writs of certiorari in all

three cases. The Court granted certiorari and consolidated the cases for briefing and oral argument.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This Court should affirm the decisions below,

which correctly enjoined or vacated the Government’s

decision to rescind DACA on the basis of arbitrary

9

and capricious agency action in violation of the APA.

The Government provided a legally deficient rescission rationale because, among other reasons, it failed

to address how “longstanding [DACA] policies may

have engendered serious reliance interests that must

be taken into account.” Encino Motorcars, LLC v.

Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2126 (2016). For example,

the Government did not adequately consider the “serious reliance interests” of DACA beneficiaries who

have enlisted in the military and are pursuing a path

to citizenship, the interests of military family members who are direct or indirect beneficiaries of DACA,

and the interests of the American people, who rely on

a military that has been significantly strengthened

by the DACA program.

ARGUMENT

The courts below have uniformly—and correctly—

preliminarily or permanently set aside the Government’s rescission of DACA on the basis of arbitrary

and capricious agency action. This Court should affirm.

I. The Government Must Consider Serious Re-

liance Interests When Changing Existing

Policy.

The APA directs that arbitrary and capricious

Government actions be set aside as unlawful. 5

U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). While “[a]gencies are free to

change their existing policies,” they must “provide a

reasoned explanation for the change.” Encino, 136 S.

Ct. at 2125. If the explanation for the policy change

“entirely fail[s] to consider an important aspect of the

problem,” it will not survive arbitrary-and-capricious

review. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut.

Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).

10

To survive such review, the Government must

demonstrate it is “cognizant that longstanding policies may have engendered serious reliance interests

that must be taken into account.” Encino, 136 S. Ct.

at 2126. The Government also must explain its reason “for disregarding facts and circumstances that

underlay or were engendered by the prior policy.”

FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502,

515-16 (2009).

In Encino, this Court set aside a policy change for

failure to consider serious reliance interests. There,

the Court recognized that the retail automobile and

truck industry had “significant reliance interests” in

an agency’s prior position that service advisors were

exempt from certain overtime pay provisions. 136 S.

Ct. at 2126. These significant reliance interests included the compensation plans negotiated between

dealerships and service advisors, which the Court

recognized “could necessitate systemic, significant

changes” under the agency’s revised policy. Ibid.

The Court also observed that dealerships who failed

to compensate their service advisors under the revised policy could face significant liability. Ibid.

Where, as in Encino, significant reliance interests

are present, the agency must provide “a more reasoned explanation for its decision to depart from its

existing enforcement policy.” Ibid. And where an

agency’s proffered rationale “f[a]ll[s] short of the

agency’s duty to explain why it deemed it necessary

to overrule its previous position,” the agency’s change

in position is arbitrary and capricious and therefore

unlawful under the APA. Id. at 2126-27.

11

II. DACA Engendered Serious Reliance Inter-

ests on the Part of Non-Citizens Enlisted in

the Military, Their Families, and the American People.

DACA offers more than deferred removal, and the

program affects more than its direct beneficiaries.

DACA recipients and their families benefit from numerous pre-exiting policies, which they would not

have access to but for DACA. DACA recipients are

eligible for employment authorization documents,

commonly known as work permits, and recipients

with specialized medical or linguistic and cultural

skills are eligible to enlist through MAVNI. For

those who have enlisted, the military offers the opportunity to serve their adopted country and a path

to citizenship. This policy keeps families with noncitizens together and, as explained in depth below,

offers the possibility of deferred action or parole in

place regardless of DACA eligibility.

For the American people, DACA has facilitated

the military readiness on which the country depends,

such as enabling the military to approach its recruiting and retention goals by leveraging immigrant and

minority communities with unique skills vital to the

national interest. DACA has promoted these expectations for more than five years.

A.

Foreign-Born Recruits Are Integral

to the U.S. Military and Vital to Its

Mission.

The United States has long relied on foreign-born

recruits to protect our country. From the Revolutionary War through the 1840s, half of the U.S. military’s

12

recruits were foreign born. 2 During the Civil War,

approximately 300,000 foreign-born members of the

military served in the Union Army. Ibid. These and

other foreign-born recruits account for half a million

of our country’s veterans, more than 700 of whom

have received Medals of Honor. Ibid. 3

Our country’s reliance on foreign-born recruits—

and specifically, non-citizens—has persisted in recent

decades. Between 1999 and 2010, “some 80,000 noncitizens enlisted across all four services, accounting

for 4 percent of all accessions” among the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. 4 As of June 2010

alone, approximately 16,500 non-citizens were actively serving in the military. Id. at 39. Another 5,255

non-citizens first enlisted in the military in 2016. 5

In light of our military’s seasoned reliance on the

foreign born, it is not surprising that our Government

has repeatedly recognized the importance of noncitizen recruits to the U.S. military. Nearly two dec2 Jie Zong & Jeanne Batalova, Immigrant Veterans in the United

States (May 16, 2019), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article

/immigrant-veterans-united-states.

3 See also U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., USCIS Fa-

cilities Dedicated to the Memory of Immigrant Medal of Honor

Recipients, https://www.uscis.gov/about-us/find-uscis-office/uscis

-facilities-dedicated-memory-immigrant-medal-honor-recipients

(last updated Jan. 24, 2014).

4 Dep’t of Def., Population Representation in the Military Services: Fiscal Year 2010 Summary Report, at 41, available at

https://www.cna.org/pop-rep/2010/summary

/PopRep10summ.pdf.

Dep’t of Def., Population Representation in the Military Services: Fiscal Year 2016 Summary Report, at 41, available at

https://www.cna.org/pop-rep/2016/summary/summary.pdf.

5

13

ades ago, President George W. Bush issued an Executive Order creating an incentive for non-citizens to

serve in the military in exchange for expedited naturalization. Exec. Order 13,269, 67 Fed. Reg. 45287

(July 3, 2002). Under this program, as of 2018, the

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)

reports that “[s]ince Oct. 1, 2001, USCIS has naturalized 129,587 members of the military.” 6 In 2008, the

Secretary of Defense authorized the MAVNI program,

designed to recruit non-citizens who have skills that

are “vital to the national interest,” including health

care professionals and individuals with specific language and cultural skills. See 10 U.S.C. § 504(b)(2).

Most recently, in 2014, the Department of Defense

provided a pathway for DACA recipients to enlist in

the military under MAVNI. 7 As of September 2017,

more than 800 highly skilled DACA recipients were

serving in the U.S. military through MAVNI. 8 Many

more await final background checks so that they too

can begin serving. These DACA recipients, along

with other MAVNI service members, possess “critical

skills” and are “vital” to protecting the American people.

6 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., Military Naturaliza-

tion

Statistics,

https://www.uscis.gov/military/militarynaturalization-statistics (last updated Dec. 6, 2018).

7 Memorandum from Jessica Wright, Undersecretary of Defense

for Personnel and Readiness, Military Accessions Vital to the

National Interest Program Changes (Sept. 25, 2014).

Jonah Bennett, Pentagon: Fewer Than 900 DACA Recipients

Are Currently Serving In The Military (Sept. 6, 2017),

https://stream.org/pentagon-fewer-than-900-daca-recipients-arecurrently-serving-in-the-military/.

8

14

B.

Enlistees Rely on DACA for Eligibility to be Employed by the Military

and for a Path to Citizenship.

DACA opened a path for certain non-citizens to

obtain work permits and to serve in the military if

they possess a “critical skill or expertise” that is both

“vital to the national interest” and useful to the

armed forces on a daily basis.

See 10 U.S.C.

§ 504(b)(2). For example, the military’s MAVNI recruiting program targets immigrants with critical

medical skills or expertise in certain foreign languages and cultures. 9 The program has recruited

10,400 immigrants from 2008 to 2016. 10,11 In 2016

alone, 359 MAVNI recruits were talented immigrants

who could not have participated in the program without DACA. 12

9

Dep’t

of

Def.,

MAVNI

Fact

Sheet,

https://dod.defense.gov/news/mavni-fact-sheet.pdf.

1,

U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Immigration Enforcement:

Actions Needed to Better Handle, Identify, and Track Cases Involving Veterans 7 (2019).

10

11 MAVNI recruiting was indefinitely suspended at the end of

fiscal year 2016 pending the implementation of increased security protocols. See Dep’t of Homeland Security, MAVNI Program

Status for Fiscal Year 2017 (Dec. 2, 2016), https://www.ice.gov

/doclib/sevis/pdf/bcm-1612-02.pdf. As discussed below, many

MAVNI recruits still await the completion of their background

checks so that they can begin serving.

12 New American Economy, Outside the Wire: How Barring the

DACA-Eligible Population from Enlisting Weakens our Military

(Nov. 8, 2017), https://research.newamericaneconomy.org/report

/outside-the-wire-how-barring-the-daca-eligible-population-fromenlisting-weakens-our-military/; see also Dep’t of Def., MAVNI

Fact Sheet, 1.

15

DACA beneficiaries rely on military service to

provide a path to citizenship. The United States has

long granted citizenship to non-citizens in exchange

for their military service. See Exec. Order 13,269, 67

Fed. Reg. 45287 (July 3, 2002). By permitting DACA

beneficiaries to enlist in the military, the Government has provided them the opportunity to earn citizenship by serving honorably for one year under 8

U.S.C. § 1439(a), or by serving honorably on active

duty for a shorter period under 8 U.S.C. § 1440(a). 13

More than 129,000 immigrants earned their citizenship through military service between the attacks on

September 11, 2001, and the end of last year. U.S.

Citizenship and Immigration Servs., Military Naturalization Statistics.

DACA also enables its beneficiaries who have

skills vital to the national interest an opportunity to

serve in the U.S. military and to become lawful citizens of the country in which they were raised. Beneficiaries wanting to serve and undertake the benefits

and responsibilities of citizenship enlisted. After enlisting, they organized their lives around the com13 On October 13, 2017, the Department of Defense announced

that instead of requiring a single day of active-duty service it

would require 180 days before certifying honorable service under 8 U.S.C. § 1440(a). Dep’t of Def., DoD Announces Policy

Changes to Lawful Permanent Residents and the Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest (MAVNI) Pilot Program (Oct.

13, 2017), https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release

/Article/1342317/dod-announces-policy-changes-to-lawfulpermanent-residents-and-the-military-acc/. Citizenship granted

under either 8 U.S.C. § 1439 or 8 U.S.C. § 1440 could be revoked

if the soldier was “separated from the Armed Forces under other

than honorable conditions before the person ha[d] served honorably for a period or periods aggregating five years.” 8 U.S.C.

§§ 1439(f), 1440(c).

16

mitment to hold themselves constantly ready to serve

as soon as their background investigations finished.

Rescinding DACA undermines the reliance interests inherent in the life-changing demands of military

service, as well as the path to citizenship offered

through the MAVNI program. Like all non-citizens—

including otherwise lawful permanent residents—

DACA beneficiaries who enlisted are unable to begin

basic training until their background investigations

are completed. 14

Less than two months before

DACA’s rescission, NPR reported that more than

4,000 MAVNI recruits were awaiting basic training. 15

Without DACA’s protection, DACA recruits awaiting

training or who have not served long enough to apply

for citizenship will lose their eligibility to participate

in MAVNI. They also risk losing their work permits

and a range of military employment benefits, including health care, home loans, and educational funds,

that generally vest only after a recruit begins or completes a specified term of active-duty service. See 38

U.S.C. §§ 3311, 3702; 32 C.F.R. § 199.3. In addition

to

threatening

enlistees’

ability

to

access

these benefits, DACA’s rescission even threatens enlistees with the prospect of being deported.

This threat was not eliminated by the grandfathering provisions in the DACA rescission memorandum. DHS announced that it would not terminate

previously issued deferred action determinations or

14 See Dep’t of Def., DoD Announces Policy Changes to Lawful

Permanent Residents and the Military Accessions Vital to the

National Interest (MAVNI) Pilot Program (Oct. 13, 2017).

15 Tom Bowman, Citizenship For Military Service Program Un-

der Fire, NPR (July 11, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/07/11

/536630223/citizenship-for-military-service-program-under-fire.

17

work permits based on the rescission. Regents Pet.

App. 118a. It also announced that, if requested within 30 days, it would consider a one-time renewal of

DACA benefits for individuals whose periods of deferred action were set to expire within 180 days.

Ibid. But DACA benefits last only two years. Regents Pet. App. 99-100a. Military background checks

take up to three. See 10 U.S.C. § 513(b)(1)-(3). This

means that DACA beneficiaries face a very real prospect that they will lose their DACA benefits before

obtaining background clearance, getting scheduled

for training, and freeing themselves of the need for

DACA by completing the term of service necessary to

obtain citizenship. 16

This fear of deportation after DACA’s rescission is

not merely hypothetical. A recent report by the Government Accountability Office states that DHS has a

system of policies in place for deporting veterans—

and that the protections the system offers are not

consistently observed. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Immigration Enforcement, 10-12. Although the

data is incomplete, available records show that “approximately 250 veterans were placed in removal

proceedings or removed from the United States from

fiscal years 2013 through 2018.” Id. at 16. At the

16 See, e.g., Alex Horton, The military looked to ‘dreamers’ to use

their vital skills. Now the U.S. might deport them., Washington

Post (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news

/checkpoint/wp/2017/09/07/the-military-looked-to-dreamers-touse-their-vital-skills-now-the-u-s-might-deport-them/ (reporting

on plight of recruits like Zion Dirgantara, a MAVNI recruit

awaiting the completion of his background check who came to

the United States at the age of 12, did not know he lacked lawful status until he applied for a driver’s license, and now finds

himself alongside “hundreds of others in a race against time to

avoid deportation back to now unfamiliar nations”).

18

time of the study, about 115 of them had been ordered removed and only 25 had been granted relief or

protection from removal. Ibid. Recruits who have

not served are likely to receive less favorable treatment. Some have already fled the country to avoid

deportation to countries where they believe their lives

would be in danger. 17

C.

Enlistees’ Families Rely on DACA for

the Possibility of Parole in Place or

Deferred Action.

Enlistees’ families also have relied on DACA. In

addition to families’ general interest in policies that

protect their relatives from deportation—and consequently keep families together—DACA grants family

members access to additional benefits as well.

USCIS offers consideration for parole in place or

deferred action to the families of service men and

women, with the goal of “[f]acilitating military morale

and readiness and supporting DoD recruitment policies.” U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services,

Adjudicator’s Field Manual, Chapter 21.1(c). Parole

in place is a one-year period of authorization to stay

in the United States, subject to extensions as appropriate. Id. at Chapter 21.1(c)(1).

Alex Horton, Foreign-born recruits, promised citizenship by

the Pentagon, flee the country to avoid deportation, Washington

Post (July 17, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news

/checkpoint/wp/2017/07/17/foreign-born-recruits-promisedcitizenship-by-the-pentagon-flee-the-country-to-avoiddeportation/ (telling story of Ranj Rafeeq, an Iraqi Kurd who

translated for the U.S. military in 2005 and came to the United

States in 2012 hoping to join the Army after earning a graduate

degree in civil engineering but who fled to Canada in fear that

his path to citizenship would fail and that he would become a

target of the Islamic State if deported to Iraq).

17

19

Although a grant of parole in place is discretionary, the fact that an immediate family member serves

in the U.S. military “ordinarily weighs heavily in favor of parole in place,” so that a grant of parole in

place is generally appropriate absent a criminal conviction or other serious adverse factors. Ibid. Parole

in place is available only to individuals who are not

lawfully admitted to the United States. Ibid. Parolees are eligible to apply for work permits during the

period of their parole. Ibid.

Deferred action for family members of service

members is similar to parole in place, but it is available only to individuals who have been lawfully admitted to the United States and have overstayed their

authorized period of admission.

Id. at Chapter

21.1(c)(2)(A). Deferred action is available in two-year

increments and, like parole in place, makes the recipient eligible to apply for work permits. Id. at Chapter

21.1(c)(2)(C). Deferred action determinations are

“case-by-case, discretionary judgments based on the

totality of the evidence.” Id. at Chapter 21.1(c)(2)(A).

Although being an immediate family member of a

MAVNI recruit or other enlistee awaiting basic training is no guarantee of deferred action, it is considered

a strong positive factor. Ibid. On the other hand,

USCIS may terminate any period of deferred action

awarded to the family members of an enlistee awaiting basic training who later becomes disqualified

from military service. Ibid.

As explained above, DACA’s rescission placed enlistees at risk of becoming disqualified for employment and for participation in MAVNI. In so doing, it

also placed family members of enlistees at risk of losing their work permits and even of being deported.

20

This is true not only of family members who are direct beneficiaries of DACA, but also of family members who are beneficiaries of parole in place or of deferred action for families of service men and women.

As the USCIS Adjudicator’s Field Manual notes, “the

family members of such recruits often lose their lawful statuses because their statuses depend on those of

the recruits.” Ibid.

Immigrant families have sacrificed for the United

States by supporting their relatives in enlisting for

military service. They have counted on staying together and earning a living while their relatives were

on duty. Whether directly or indirectly, they relied

on DACA—and their reliance interests are serious.

D.

The U.S. Military Relies on NonCitizens, Including DACA Recipients,

to Protect the American People.

The serious consequences of DACA’s rescission extend to the American people, who rely on having a

strong, ready military to promote and defend U.S. national interests. Unraveling DACA will negatively

affect the military’s ability to recruit and retain highly qualified service members, which in turn jeopardizes the protection of the American people.

1. The American people rely on a strong, ready

U.S. military to promote and defend U.S. national interests. One critical component of a strong military is

ensuring that the military is able to recruit and retain enough soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, and

coast guardsmen to meet the myriad of challenges

these men and women are asked to tackle every day.

As a result, meeting annual accession goals is a critical component of ensuring military readiness.

21

In recent years, the U.S. military, and by extension its largest branch, the U.S. Army, has

“struggl[ed] to find candidates who meet [its] requirements.” 18 Because only 30% of potential recruits qualify to join the military, in 2017, the U.S.

Army Recruiting Command was “forced to lower its

recruiting standards in hopes of reaching its goal of

80,000 new soldiers.” Ibid. In 2016, 1.6% of Army

recruits placed in the bottom third of military exams,

ibid.—scores that typically lead the Army to deny enlistment— and only 56% of Army recruits were

deemed “high-quality personnel.” Dep’t of Def., Population Representation in the Military Services: Fiscal

Year 2016 Summary Report, at 3, 17. Yet as difficulties with military recruitment have risen, Congress

has directed the Army to increase its number of active-duty soldiers. Fanning, Immigration reform: An

Army recruitment opportunity (Jan. 8, 2018).

DACA recipients do not just add necessary numbers to the U.S. military; they also bring necessary

skills. As a statutory prerequisite to enlistment as

non-citizens without green cards, each of the hundreds of DACA recipients enlisted in the military

must possess “critical skill[s] . . . vital to the national

interest.” 10 U.S.C. § 504(b)(2). These and other

MAVNI recruits serve an important role in the military’s ability to protect the American people. As explained by Air Force Maj. Carla Gleason, a Pentagon

spokeswoman, “the unique skill sets these individuals

bring is one of the reasons the U.S. military is the

18 Eric Fanning, Immigration reform: An Army recruitment op-

portunity (Jan. 8, 2018), https://thehill.com/opinion/nationalsecurity/367839-immigration-reform-an-army-recruitmentopportunity.

22

world’s premier fighting force.” 19 Former Secretary of

the Army Eric Fanning has likewise explained that

MAVNI recipients serve an important role in forming

“a skilled, diverse military force with high levels of

integrity that can adapt to today’s emerging threats.”

Fanning, Immigration reform: An Army recruitment

opportunity (Jan. 8, 2018). Removing protections for

these vital service members and subjecting such service members to discharge runs counter to American

interests in protecting our country.

Research and practice have confirmed that noncitizen service members, such as DACA recipients,

meet critical needs for the military. As the Center for

Naval Analyses (CNA) observed, “noncitizens are []

an attractive recruiting resource” because “a substantial share of the recruitable U.S. non-citizen population comes from diverse backgrounds and potentially

possesses language and cultural skills that are of

strategic interest to the U.S. military.” 20 Recognizing

the importance of such language and cultural skills,

Former Secretary of the Air Force Deborah Lee

James emphasized, “diversity of background, experience, demographics, perspective, thought and even

organization are essential to our ultimate success.” 21

Former Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus echoed this

19 Lolita Baldor, Problems for Pentagon’s immigrant recruit pro-

gram, AP NEWS (Sept. 30, 2018), https://www.apnews.com

/84530d3799004a0a8c15b3d11058e030.

20 Molly F. McIntosh et al., Non-Citizens in the Enlisted U.S.

Military, at 57 (Nov. 2011), available at https://www.cna.org

/CNA_files/PDF/D0025768.A2.pdf.

21 Memorandum from Deborah Lee James, Secretary of the Air

Force, Air Force Diversity & Inclusion (Mar. 4, 2015), available

at

https://www.af.mil/Portals/1/documents/SECAF

/FINALDiversity_Inclusion_Memo1.pdf.

23

sentiment, explaining “[a] more diverse force is a

stronger force.” 22 As succinctly stated by Secretary

Fanning, “[o]ur nation’s military is stronger when it

reflects the diversity it aims to defend.” Fanning,

Immigration reform: An Army recruitment opportunity (Jan. 8, 2018). Today, the military continues to

target recruits who are “more diverse linguistically

and culturally than citizen recruits . . . [because they

are] particularly valuable as the U.S. faces the challenges of the Global War on Terrorism.” 23

CNA projects that non-citizens likely will play a

crucial role in meeting recruitment goals in coming

years, and thus recommends that “the services should

develop strategies to recruit non-citizens more effectively.” McIntosh et al., Non-Citizens in the Enlisted

U.S. Military, at 2 (Nov. 2011). Notably, “non-citizen

recruits are significantly and substantially less likely

than citizen recruits to attrite in the first term.” Ibid.

After three years, “attrition rates for non-citizens are

between nine and 20 percentage points lower than

those for white citizens, the largest demographic

group in the military.” Air Force News, The U.S. Military Helps Naturalize Non-Citizens (2019). Other

analysts have similarly estimated that the attrition

rate for non-citizens is more than 10% lower than for

22 Chief of Naval Personnel Public Affairs, SECNAV Releases

Updated Diversity, Inclusion Policy Statement (Feb. 25, 2016),

available at https://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id

=93282.

Air Force News, The U.S. Military Helps Naturalize NonCitizens

(2019),

https://www.military.com/join-armedforces/eligibility-requirements/the-us-military-helps-naturlizenon-citizens.html.

23

24

citizens, “meaning that noncitizens are more likely to

serve in the military for extended periods of time.” 24

The Department of Defense’s data has reinforced

the significance of the American people’s interest in

the military’s ability to recruit and retain noncitizens, including DACA recipients. In 2016, the

Department of Defense reported that “the majority of

non-citizen [non-prior service] accessions are highquality recruits, with Tier 1 education credentials

and an [Armed Forces Qualification Test] score in the

top 50 percentiles.” Dep’t of Def., Population Representation in the Military Services: Fiscal Year 2016

Summary Report, at 42. In the Army, the Department of Defense observed that 4.8% of accessions in

2016 were non-citizens, and “[a] higher percentage of

non-citizen accessions in the Army were high quality

compared to citizen accessions (66 percent versus 54

percent).” Id. at 41-42. That same year, hundreds of

DACA recipients newly enlisted in the Army. New

American Economy, Outside the Wire: How Barring

the DACA-Eligible Population from Enlisting Weakens our Military (Nov. 8, 2017).

The military’s reliance on programs such as DACA

to protect the American people is not limited to those

DACA recipients who currently serve in the military.

Analysts have estimated that the military could target many more DACA recipients to improve military

readiness. Of the 45 languages the military has

deemed “vital to military success,” the New American

Economy estimated that “[m]ore than 169,000 mem24 Muzaffar Chishti, et al., Immigrants in the Military: Evolving

Recruitment Needs Can Accommodate National Security Concerns (May 2019), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default

/files/publications/MPI-Noncitizens-Military-Final.pdf.

25

bers of the DACA-eligible population—or more than

one in seven of them—speak one of these languages

at home.” Ibid. This organization further concluded

that “a substantial portion of the DACA-eligible population has language or workforce training that could

help address the military’s recruitment challenges.”

Ibid. The authors thus concluded that “[t]here is a

strategic advantage to having [DACA recipients]

serve in the military, as they will have cultural and

linguistic expertise which could be of critical importance.” Ibid.

Unraveling of DACA protections will likely dissuade these many qualified recipients from enlisting

in the military due to the lengthy delays in accession

and uncertainty surrounding shipment dates, making

it difficult for the military to meet its recruiting

goals. Upon rescission of DACA, the military is likely

to find that a large number of potential high-quality

recruits are ineligible for accession or have left the

United States. Thus, a policy with the stated goal of

improving the country’s national security is likely to

undermine that goal by impairing military readiness.

2. In addition to recruitment and retention, another key component of a strong military is morale.

As precedent has shown in other contexts, however,

ignoring the reliance interests of DACA recipients

could significantly damage the relationship of currently serving DACA recipients to the military, undermining their morale and negatively impacting

unit cohesion, thus curbing the military’s ability to

recruit and retain additional non-citizens and immigrants unaffected by DACA.

For example, history has shown that discriminatory policies such as Don’t Ask Don’t Tell (DADT)—

26

which prohibited military service by openly lesbian,

gay, and bisexual people—diminished morale among

active and prospective LGB service members. One

analysis studying the negative effects of DADT estimated that in 2004 alone, “nearly 1,000 active duty

LGB soldiers would have been retained if they had

been able to serve and be open about their sexual orientation.” 25 Even more would have joined but for

DADT. See ibid. And evidence suggests that discriminatory policies like DADT affected morale and

recruitment and retention even among those who

were not directly subject to it, such as service members or prospective service members with LGB relatives. 26 Repeal of DADT corrected this: As explained

by then-Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel upon

DADT’s repeal, permitting service members to “serve

openly, with full honor, integrity, and respect . . .

makes our military and our nation stronger.” 27

A discriminatory policy like DACA rescission here

would likely have the same detrimental effects on

25 See, e.g., Gary J. Gates, The Williams Inst., Effects of “Don’t

Ask, Don’t Tell” on Retention Among Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual

Military

Personnel

(2007),

available

at

https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/GatesEffectsOfDontAskDontTellOnRetention-Mar-2007.pdf; accord

26 See Paul Vincent Courtney, Prohibiting Sexual Orientation

Discrimination in Public Accommodations: A Common Law Approach, 163 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1497, 1534 (2014-2015)

(“[D]iscrimination harms not only the dignity of the immediate

victim of the discriminatory act but also the dignity and autonomy of those who, fearing such discrimination, feel forced to

comply with heterosexual norms.”).

27 Dep’t of Def., Remarks by Secretary Hagel at the Lesbian, Gay,

Bisexual, Transgender Pride Month Event in the Pentagon Auditorium (June 25, 2013), http://archive.defense.gov/transcripts

/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5262.

27

military morale as DADT did. The negative effects of

rescission would spread to a broader population of

non-citizens, immigrants, and others who simply seek

to serve their Nation with honor and dignity, volunteering to face extreme hardships, endure lengthy

deployments and separation from family and friends,

and to willingly make the ultimate sacrifice of their

lives.

Another insidious effect of declining morale and

reduced recruitment and retention of non-citizens

will be that fewer foreign-born service members will

advance to senior-enlisted positions, resulting in a

less diverse military leadership to the military’s detriment. Ongoing concern over diversity in the military’s leadership recently prompted Congress to establish what became the Military Leadership Diversity Commission (MLDC), an independent body comprised of current and former military officers, senior

enlisted personnel, and civilians. 28 As the MLDC reported, “[i]ncluding a broad range of men and women

from different backgrounds can increase the likelihood that the U.S. military ‘knows the enemy’ and is

better able to work with international partners by

adding to the cultural and linguistic knowledge base

from which U.S. forces may draw.” Id. at 17. 29

28 From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the

21st-Century

Military,

Final

Report

xvi

(2011),

https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=11390.

See also Dep’t of Def., Defense Language Transformation

Roadmap

3

(Jan.

2005)

https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/

fulltext/u2/b313370.pdf (describing the need for expertise on

“less-commonly-taught languages” in order to sustain coalitions,

pursue regional stability, and conduct multi-national missions.).

29

28

The U.S. military has shared MLDC’s concerns

over the importance of diversity to national security.

In describing strategies imperative to military readiness, Secretary Mabus observed that “[o]rganizations

that embrace myriad backgrounds and perspectives

will attract the best talent and remain ready” to protect the American people. Chief of Naval Personnel,

SECNAV Releases Updated Diversity, Inclusion Policy Statement (Feb. 25, 2016). Secretary Fanning

likewise observed that “most importantly, [the U.S.

military] need[s] teams of people who think differently from one another and yet are joined together in

common cause.” 30 He therefore advised that “we

must harness the power of diverse teams and draw

further from one of America’s greatest advantages:

our diverse population.” Ibid. As Secretary James

emphasized, “diversity and inclusion are not programs or initiatives; they are national security imperatives and critical force multipliers.” Secretary

James Memorandum (Mar. 4, 2015).

A reduction in the number of leaders acting as

prominent immigrant role models in the military

would create a negative feedback loop, further inhibiting the military’s ability to recruit and retain future

generations of foreign-born service members. But

this population is critical for the future health of the

U.S. military: Analysts have observed that immigrants are an important population to recruit in the

military because “immigration is projected to be the

only source of net growth in the U.S. population

30 Eric Fanning, Secretary of the Army: America’s Diversity is

Our Army’s Strength (Oct. 1, 2016), available

https://www.ausa.org/articles/secretary-armyamerica%E2%80%99s-diversity-our-army%E2%80%99sstrength.

at

29

among 18- to 24-year-olds in the coming decades.”

McIntosh et al., Non-Citizens in the Enlisted U.S.

Military, at 57. The number of potential recruits

multiplies when considering children of immigrants.

Nearly 1.9 million veterans are children of immigrants, accounting for 10% of all veterans. Zong &

Batalova, Immigrant Veterans in the United States.

Thus in coming years, “the segment of the population

most likely to enlist[] will come entirely from immigrants and the children of immigration.” 31

Rescinding policies such as DACA—which relinquish the protections of active and prospective service

members based on their country of origin—will impede the military’s ability to retain quality service

members for years to come. The immediate and future harms to the composition of the U.S. military

adversely affects military readiness and frustrates it

from reaching its goals, contrary to the interests of

the American people.

III. The Government Violated the APA When It

Rescinded DACA Without Considering Serious Reliance Interests.

Despite the breadth of reliance by DACA recipients, their families, and the military itself, the Duke

memorandum contained a single sentence purportedly explaining the Government’s rationale for changing its existing policy: “Taking into consideration the

Supreme Court’s and the Fifth Circuit’s rulings in the

ongoing litigation, and the September 4, 2017, letter

from the Attorney General, it is clear that the June

National Immigration Forum, For Love of Country: New

Americans Serving in our Armed Forces: Executive Summary

(Nov.

7,

2017),

https://immigrationforum.org/article/lovecountry-new-americans-serving-armed-forces-2/.

31

30

15, 2012, DACA program should be terminated.” Regents Pet. App. 117a. No other analysis regarding

the interests of those relying on the DACA program

were provided. In short, the Government did not

consider any reliance interests at all.

Secretary Nielsen’s memorandum, published more

than nine months after the rescission, merely consists of post-hoc rationalizations that cannot overcome the inadequacies of the original rescission

memorandum. See Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v.

United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168-69 (1962) (agency

action may be “upheld, if at all, on the same basis articulated in the order by the agency itself”) (citing

SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947)).

Even if the Nielsen memorandum were given weight,

the D.C. District Court correctly noted that it failed

to offer meaningful consideration of “DACA’s benefits

to DACA recipients and to society at large.” NAACP

Pet. App. 107a. The memorandum conveys only a

blanket recognition “that DACA recipients have

availed themselves of the policy in continuing their

presence in this country and pursuing their lives.”

Regents Pet. App. 125a. Nowhere does it consider the

indirect beneficiaries of DACA, the sacrifice and service of currently enlisted DACA recipients and their

families, or the serious risks posed to the American

public if the military lost access to a significant number of non-citizen recruits.

DACA has engendered serious reliance interests

for each of these stakeholders. Their interests deserved due consideration by the Government before

deciding to rescind that policy.

The Government’s bases for rescinding DACA fall

far short of the reasoned explanation the APA re-

31

quires. As in Encino, “[w]hatever potential reasons

the Department might have given, the agency in fact

gave almost no reasons at all” for rescinding DACA.

136 S. Ct. at 2127. “In light of the serious reliance

interests at stake, the [Government’s] conclusory

statements do not suffice to explain its decision.”

Ibid. The Government’s decision to rescind DACA is

entitled to no deference and should be held unlawful

under the APA.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Supreme Court

should affirm the judgments and orders below.

Respectfully submitted.

PETER E. PERKOWSKI

Modern Military

Association of America

P.O. Box. 65301

Washington, DC 20035

peter@modermilitary.org

Counsel for Amicus

Curiae Modern Military

Association of America

CHARLES B. KLEIN

Counsel of Record

CLAIRE A. FUNDAKOWSKI

Winston & Strawn LLP

1700 K Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 282-5000

cklein@winston.com

Counsel for Amici Curiae

HARVEY WEINER

Peabody & Arnold LLP

600 Atlantic Avenue

Boston, MA 02210

hweiner@peabodyarnold.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae Jewish War Veterans of the USA

OCTOBER 2019

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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