Petition for Writ of Certiorari — In Re Christopher D. Schneider, Petitioner

Supreme Court briefAug 28, 2018

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No.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

In re Christopher D. Schneider

CHRISTOPHER D. SCHNEIDER,

PETITIONER-Plaintiff

vs.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

RESPONDENTS- Defendants

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND/OR PROHIBITION to the

NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS; IN RE: NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF

APPEALS CASE NO. 17-70768; TAX COURT CASE NO. 14514-14

PETITIONER'S VERIFIED MOTION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS

AND/OR PROHIBITION.

Petitioner/Plaintiff in pro per: Christopher D. Schneider

16291 Stone Jug Rd.

Sutter Creek CA 95685

This document was: Prepared and Pnnted Phone: none; Email: horsefun69@yahoo.com

using 100 % local portable SOLAR ENERGY (Both remain unavailable miles away)

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Does Mr. Schneider have a right to both the appearance and actuality of

neutrality; and does mandamus he when that fundamental right is going to be

mooted out and is summarily denied by the appellate court that has repeatedly (and

deliberately) harmed him?

Is it a structural error, in practical terms, to force a litigant to self-censor

his First Amendment court speech (with sm. No. 10 envelopes and about 30-40

pages total (6x9 envelopes)—including all title pages and non-argument pages) due

to the very rural limitations of his home's location, "rural route mailbox" and inter

alia inability to even get "Stamps" "envelopes" or to do everyday common mailings

at a post office (8.5 miles away) without the help of neighbors or friends (due to

continuing daily proximate damages/punishment from his published editorial

speech of March 21, 2014 and retaliatory loss of his driver's license/only photo ID).

Can any "public" courthouse lockout, censor, and deny personal access to

anyone wanting to file critical paperwork, and use all of the "public courthouse"

facilities in person—by arbitrary/invidious discrimination and then e.g. repeatedly

enforcing substantive entry approval "unwritten rules" against the public (e.g

petitioner: Mr. Schneider): (1) based on his known protected speech challenging

local rules, unequal and discriminatory double standards etc.; and/or (2) the fact

that he/someone superficially may appear to a court to be of a lower economic class

(e.g. Homeless/forced to sleep on the streets); or (3) do not possess/do not wish to be

forced to show (e.g. a newspaper reporter) a valid Photo ID as demanded?

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

Petitioner, Christopher D. Schneider, is the petitioner-appellant below.

Respondent, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, is the respondent below.

The real parties in interest are the Ninth Circuit Court', its chief judge Alex

Kozinski, in his official capacity, the U.S. Tax Court, its chief judge Michael B.

Thornton, in his official capacity, the U.S. Marshal Service, and Does 1-50.

STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES/FILINGS

This case is directly related to Schneider v. Bank of America ("BAC") as to

that case's pending S.Ct.2 mandamus petition (Case No. 17-9240) with now many

nearly identical facts and key issues, App. 7; see 9th Dkt. 22 Exh. B (n. 10 below);

and is directly related to the pending BAC Ninth Circuit Appeal Nos. 16-16261; 1815106 both in facts and resulting prejudice (See "Appellant's Verified motion for a

change of venue to the Tenth Circuit Court" at 6-7 of December 27, 2018; Dkt. 11);

a.k.a. "Change of venue"). Also, proximately related to earlier fried Justice Kennedy

stay applications 17A612 (BAC) 13A1264 and (Sutter Amador/DMV license).

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page(s)

Questions Presented.......................................................................................2

Parties to the Proceedings...............................................................................3

1 For simplicity: reference to the Ninth Circuit Court includes the other courts; the issues/facts

likewise apply in full to at least 4 other "public" courthouses (see n.4 below). All issues, facts, and

law are without waiver of any purported rights, or arguments, or combination of law to the facts.

2 Due to envelope page/direct censorship limitations I am using short abbreviations for courts &

documents when I can: e.g. "S.Ct."U.S. Supreme Court; "TC"=Tax Court; "9th"=Ninth Circuit;

Docket Nos. as "Dkt."

; Record = R when known; "Decl." = Schneider Declaration; or acronyms e.g.

ISO for In Support Of and the appendix is severely censored (not by choice). Formatting may be off

(e.g. headings single spaced), with more footnotes then usual, not by choice but due to necessity of

argue under forced envelope/page/stamp constraints (Decl. ISO at 2); arguments also censored.

Statement of related Cases..............................................................................3

Tableof Authorities .................................................................... .................... 5

OpinionsBelow.............................................................................................8

Jurisdiction...................................................................................................9

StatutoryProvisions.....................................................................................10

Statement of the Case...................................................................................10

Reasons for granting the petition....................................................................15

Schneider has no means to avoid Ninth Circuit's Draconian forced mootness

than thru immediate Supreme Court mandamus..............................................15

What the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly and deliberately/maliciouslydone

justifies mandamus and a fully neutral and detached tribunal in another

appellate court district..................................................................................17

A. Events involving Schneider's April 3, 2017 letter were deliberate, and took

his vested property rights to timely notice in both of his cases...................20

Schneider's irreparable court speech has/is being censored and restricted

by the continuing events from March 30, 2014 until today.................................24

VT. Unequally barring any citizen from a public courthouse for no constitutionally

valid reason, or to silence their speech, is against a long line of fundamental

Supreme Court holdings dealing with "public" facilities.....................................27

V. What has been deliberately done to Mr. Schneider is a "structural" error that is

irreparable, not "correctable" at some later time, and for over four years has already

proven to implicate the integrity of the entire judicial process justifying

discretionary mandamus...............................................................................32

Conclusion..................................................................................................34

•

APPENDIX (Volume 1 of 1)

Ninth Circuit's May 24, 2018 Order re: Court's Docket No. 11..............................1

Tax Court's March 1, 2017 Order of dismissal for Failure to properly prosecute......3

Ninth Circuit's July 30, 2018 Order re: Schneider's objections (9th Dkt. 23, 26)......6

Schneider's chart of common issues in both mandamus petitions...........................7

Schneider's Tax Court March 9, 2017 Notice of Appeal........................................9

Schneider's April 3, 2017 letter to Ninth Cir. Clerk re: USPS Service..................10

Schneider's April 3, 2017 letter AS POSTED in Bank of America 16-16261...........11

Rough text of Ninth Circuit's November 13, 2017 Refused ENTRY......................12

Questions page from rejected S.Ct. September 17, 2017 (and Oct. 16, 2017 filing).. 13

Schneider Declaration ISO Change of Venue motion December 27, 2018..............14

Schneider Declaration ISO objections to 9th's Order of June 27, 2018..................15

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Abington School Dist. v. Schemp, 374 U.S. 203, 295 (1963)............................15,20

Ballard v. C.I.R., 544 U.S. 40, 42 (2005)..........................................................22

Bank of Nova Scotia v. U.S. 487 U.S. 250, 257 (1988)........................................33

Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31(1885)......................................................32

Bell v. Maryland, 378 US 226, 248 n.4 (1964)...................................................17

Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979)............................................................32

Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141 (1965).........................................18, 28, 29

Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971)......................................................30

Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965)

. 17

Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35 (1868).............................................................30

De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 US 353, 365 (1937).....................................................25

Douglas v. California, 386 U.S. 355, 357 (1963)................................................30

Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976).........................................................26

Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972).........................................................22

Gomez v. U.S., 490 U.S. 858, 876 (1989)......................................................19, 33

Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505, 509 (1971)...................................................19

Hamilton v. Alabama, 376 U.S. 650 (1964).......................................................17

Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, (1966)................................30

In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948)......................................................15, 18, 19, 24

In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955).........................................................18, 19

Johnson v. Avery, 383 U.S. 483 (1969).........................................................8, 26

Johnson v. Virginia 373 U.S. 61 (1963).......................................................18, 28

Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006)..............................................................22

L.A. Brush Mfg. Corp. v. James, 272 U.S. 701, 707 (1927)..................................33

Laird v. Tatum, 409 US 824, 838 (1972)..........................................................15

Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 229 (1957)................................................10

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)...................................................28, 30

Meyers v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)...................................................25

Muallane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950)...............22

•

N.A..A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)

. 31

N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963)...................................................24, 31

Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 609 (1976)...........................26

New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964).......................................25

Nixon v. Henderson, 273 U.S. 536 (1926).........................................................18

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)...........................................................18

Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)....................................................25

Reynolds v. Sims, 377 US 533, 566 (1964).........................................25, 28, 30, 31

Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962)..............................................10

Schneider v. Bank of America, Supreme Court case No. 17A612..................Passim

Schneider v. Bank of America, Supreme Court mandamus case No. 17-9240 ... Passim

Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939)....................................................25

Schneider v. Sutter Amador, Supreme Court case No. 13A1264.......................3, 29

Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 561 (1975)................17, 26

Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958).....................................................25

Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).................................................................18

United States v. American Friends Service Committee, 419 US 7, 16 (1974)...........28

Will v. Calvert Fire Insurance Co., 437 US 655, 677 (1978).................................16

CONSTITUTION AND OTHER AUTHORITIES

FirstAmendment..................................................................................Passim

FifthAmendment.................................................................................Passim

STATUTES AND LAWS

26 U.S.C. §7482(b)(1) ............................................... ............................ 10, 14, 19

28 U.S.C. § 452..................................................................................10, 14, 16

28 U.S.C. § 1291..........................................................................................10

28 U.S.C.A. § 1651(a).....................................................................................9

28 U.S.C.A. §2101(e)......................................................................................9

Rules of Appellate Procedure R. 45 (a)(2), (b)(1), (b)(3)..................................10, 16

Judicial Disability Rule 26............................................................................19

OPINIONS BELOW

On May 24, 2018 the Ninth Circuit Court issued an order (App. 1) that oddly

references a tiny twelve page with exhibits—only Tenth Circuit applicable—submotion of petitioner's Change of Appellate Venue Motion and 9th Cir. apparently

denying petitioner's main motion "it is denied" without even reading it, its exhibits,

or Schneider's Declaration ISO (?) (not? included in 9th's Dkt. 11 listing)3. The

Northern District Court of California has not issued any opinions; is a real party by

being directly involved in the repeated denials of Schneider's entry to that public

courthouse (San Francisco Tax Courthouse location). The Tax Court's last Order

was dated March 1, 2017 dismissing petitioner's case "for failure to properly

prosecute" (App. 3). There are numerous other 9th Cir. Orders with the last: July

30, 2018 ordering petitioner to file his opening within 30 days (App. 6).

Unknown exactly what is/is not in 9th Dkt. 11, but all files-motions were served on courts; see also

similar concerns in notes 7, 10, 11 below regarding 9th Dkts. 6.7, 22-23, 28.

JURISDICTION

The court's jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1651(a) to

petition for a redress of the invidious and unequal class and personal discrimination

of the lower courts4 combined with the Ninth Circuit's deliberate conduct in

censoring Schneider and refusing to allow petitioner to equally, timely, and

personally exercise his First Amendment rights inter alia to file necessary

paperwork in person in this case (and related case 16-16261); enter their public

courthouses and use their "public" facilities including the "public" law library on

August 11 and November 13, 2017 (S.Ct. 17A612 Dec. ISO at 2-3, Exh.R2 at 2-3;

Tenth Circuit Change of Venue Motion at 8, n.3). Nearly identical events occurred

with the San Francisco Tax Court/Northern District Court of California on March 7

and November 28, 2016 (Id. Exh. R2 at 3-7, 10-11 with deprivations again including

a "public" law library and Schneider's own Tax Court trial). If the court considers

this a petition for a writ of certiorari; the jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to 28

U.S.C.A. §2101(e) (or other as appropriate). The Ninth Circuit Court has/had

Mr. Schneider has been physically locked out/denied all entry into (1) the Ninth Circuit Court as

argued here; (2) the Northern District of California Court and San Francisco Tax court as also

argued in 17-70768 (Dkt. 6-7? But very inaccurately and vaguely described), and other docket nos.,

Supreme Court stay application 17A612; (3) the Tax Court's District of Columbia courthouse on

December 1, 2017 (in 9th Dkt. 11 Venue Change Motion Decl. ISO; Decl. ISO 17A612 Exh. Ri); and

(4) on July 18, 2016 in the Eastern District Court of California Sacramento (S.Ct. 17-9240 n.3), Mr.

Schneider specifically verified as a prior restraint that he will be (is) personally locked out pursuant

to policy if he does not identify himself (also demanding a "photo ID") to be allowed to enter that

public courthouse and thus remains de facto barred from that court also (see also 9th Cir. verified TC

Dkt. No. 12, on June 19, 2015, Exh. A, pg. 15 "to even get into any public courthouse to file papers in

person"; Verified TC Dkt. No. 20 at 2:17 to 3:19; TC Dkt. No. 35 Exh. A, Decl. ISO generally all pages

but at 5 No. 16 "At all times.. .1 have been without access to almost everything and every imaginable

[including] necessary legal resources and nationwide relevant authorities needed

'liberty' interest

for all of my case or to e.g. be able to look up case law cited by the court." (original emphasis). Key

facts argued here, and repeated/unchallenged declarations filed in every single case in all courts.

...

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 from Schneider's timely notice of appeal (App. 9)

from the Tax Court's March 1, 2017 final Order dismissing his TC case (App. 3).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED (forced censorship/very limited)5

First Amendment: Congress shall make no law

...

abridging the freedom of

speech, or of the press... and to petition the government for a redress of grievances."

Fifth Amendment: "[N]or [shall anyone] be deprived of life, liberty, or

property, without due process of law

28 U.S.C. § 452: "All courts of the United States shall be deemed always open

for the purposes of filing proper papers... and making motions and orders."

STATEMENT OF THE CASE/ISSUES (Limited-see also Decl. ISO)

This petition goes to the immediate and substantial fundamental structural

fairness in every lower court, and how equality under the rule of law actually exists

in at least6 four public courthouses; with particular emphasis on the Ninth Circuit

Court. June 23, 2014 Schneider filed a Tax Court ("TC") case (TC 1). Schneider filed

I have not listed nor argued (but wanted to: not waived) many statutory provisions that are

relevant to the issues/facts here due to the extremely limited page count/mailbox/envelope/stamps I

actually have issues. Some are: Appellate Rules 45 and 47; Rules Enabling Act; Judicial Oath; All

Writs Act; Civil Rules 1, 83; 28 U.S.C. § 2071 et. seq.; Local rules/texts on pro se filing, court's hours

etc.; Tax Court Rule No. 1, 26 U.S.C. 7482(b)(1) (within text of rule, but not intended to be). I have

also had to censor the filing of an RJN of key facts, more extensive declarations ISO, etc. unlike prior

vs. C.I.R. refused S.Ct. filing of June 19, 2015 (TC Dkt. 12 Exh. A, B re: inter alia TC trial Date of

June 22, 2015) and September 18, 2017 (9th Dkts. 6-9?): both shipped w/neighbor help in Lrg. Box.

6 J believe the deliberate/invidious class-based discrimination by the U.S.

public Courts as to (i)

"poor" looking people or "pro se" (ii) anyone without a photo ID, or wishing to not show one, in order

to be "allowed" to "enter" a public courthouse is silently rampant. Petitioner has done nothing illegal

at all; yet almost five years later continues to be punished by court and government action in

defending his rights in all areas of his daily life; e.g. First Amendment speech and "status" Robinson

v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962) of believing that the U.S. Constitution, and binding case law,

should stand for something more meaningful then penalties and daily disabilities foisted upon

petitioner "unaccompanied by any activity whatsoever" Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 229

(1957) or worse, for his speech. How can theftny government expect any citizen loyalty or respect,

when it repeatedly refuses those very same items at very critical times to its simplest citizens?

two TC verified stay applications (and verified declarations/filings) TC Dkt. 12 (June

19, 2015) with copy of Supreme Court Stay No. 1 refuse dlcensoredlrejected by S.Ct.

clerk, and Dkt. 20 (November 30, 2015 with Schneider's BAC deposition highlights

re: forced sleeping on street, why etc.) along with numerous pretrial memoranda e.g.

Dkt. 9 of June 10, 2015 highlighting "lack of access to fundamental legal resources"

n. 2; how Schneider "has improperly been precluded from access to the courts and

necessary legal resources and from fundamental adversarial fairness at the heart of

our judicial system." Id. at 4; Dkt. 35 (February 05, 2016) e.g. "and reiterates the

continuing structural error

[and howl he is unable to even 'look up' needed

...

authorities cited by the CIR..." n. 1 with Declaration ISO (Exh. A) showing summary

facts between October 29, 2015 to December 3, 2015 of his daily life. Similarly, on

multiple occasions the TC set trial dates: with the last two of March 7, and

November 28, 2016 where Schneider was refused all entry into the NDCA

courthouse and Tax court to attend his own tax court trial (Decl. Exhs. Ri & R2 also

in Decl. ISO 17A612, should be in 9th Dkt. 11). The security sign showing a

"Foreign National" non-U.S. Citizen without a "photo ID"—would be allowed to

"enter" courthouse—but Schneider, a U.S. Citizen is refused entry (Dkt. 11 Decl.

R2 at 3!). "The TC dismissed case on March 1, 2017, sent via certified mail, which

Schneider cannot pick-up until March 9, 2017 and only with neighbor help to get to

post office (App.3). March 9, 2017 Schneider serves his Notice of Appeal (App. 9);

entered March 14, 2017, and returned notice to Schneider's actually confirming

entry receipt received on March 23, 2017. Ten days later—on April 3, 2017—

Schneider sends the 9th his direct and simple letter requesting USPS service

(App.10) never hearing back from the Court. April 12, 2017 opposing counsel in

BAC's EDCA case fries declaration with a copy of Schneider's April 3, 2017 letter

attached that was scanned into Schneider's 9th BAC case 16-16261 as Dkt. 5

(App. 11), Schneider gets this later. July 10, 2017 Schneider fries a motion and

declaration seeking basic information from 9th on his scheduling Order etc. (Dkt. 5)

declaring under penalty of perjury in part i.e. No. 2 "I have never received anything

from the [9th] ..." and No. 3(G). August 11, 2017 Schneider is refused entry into the

Ninth Circuit Courthouse when he intended to inter alia Me documents in both his

cases. On September 18, 2017 Schneider files a U.S. Supreme Court stay

application to justice Kennedy re: events complained of here as to Ninth circuit

Court (9th Dkts. 6-9?) with service on the 9th (Questions pg. as App. 13). This S.Ct.

filing was sua sponte censored/rejected on October 11, 2017 under Rule 1 because he

did not Me (1) an IFP Declaration and (2) an IFP Form 4 statement. Schneider

receives this S.Ct. returned box on October 14, 2017 and October 19, 2017 re-files

the stay application along with a verified "Motion to have stay application served on

September 18, 2017 filed forthwith" with exhibits showing that no "fee" is ever due

on a stay application per S.Ct. letter attached: This motion is also then

censored/refused again by S.Ct. Clerk for a long nunc pro tunc new list of refused

reason on October 24, 2017 with Schneider's $300 money order returned. Solely due

to issues with S.Ct. censorship Schneider never actually gets this filed in the S.Ct.

These docket entries make little sense to me vs. what docket shows was actually filed. Yet, were

served in full on the Ninth Circuit (9th Dkt. 11 Exhs. 6-7). Because of the repeated refused entry to

courthouse I still do not know what is or is not actually filed on these key documents that like 9th

Dkt. 11 are now very relevant records and had I know on e.g. August 11, 2017 1 could of then acted.

Then next thing Schneider receives from the 9th is its order of November 22,

2017 (9th Dkt. 10) now deciding to treat Dkt. No. 5 "as a motion to reinstate.118

November 13, 2017 Schneider is—again---denied all access to the Ninth Circuit's

public courthouse to do anything including filing paperwork in his BAC and CIR

cases, for no reason what-so-ever (App. 12; Dkt. 11 at 2 incorporating-including

17A612 Deci. ISO at 2-3, Exh, Ri and R2). December 1, 2017 Schneider, solely with

the help of his neighbors, physically travels by bus (as he remains blacklisted to Fly

or take Amtrak (which he would of done): both require a "photo ID") to Washington

D.C. and (1) is then refused entry into the TC'S courthouse there also, (S.Ct. 179240) and spends another 4 nights forced sleeping on the streets in front of the S.Ct.

On December 27, 2017 Schneider inter alia files his change of appellate venue

motion with exhibits (63 pages) to the Tenth Circuit Court along with Declaration

ISO and all exhibits Ri, R2 from 17A612 Decl. ISO. 9

All year-2018--: On May 11 the C.I.R. filed a letter notice with 9th clerk

regarding its opposition to change of venue Dkt. 12. May 24 the 9th issued an Order

citing Schneider's six page sub-motion and then "To the extent that the motion [9th

Dkt. 11] seeks to transfer this appeal to the [10th Cir.], it is denied. See 26 U.S.C.

Had Schneider's vs. CIR (Ninth Circuit) S.Ct. stay applications of September 18, 2017 and re-file

motion of October 16, 2017 not been censored, this Ninth Circuit order would not be here and that

censorship has had a drastic and irreparable harm in this action and to Schneider's rights to redress.

This information was also served on—and should be filed in/with my Change of Appellate Venue

Motion at pg. 7—maybe the Ninth Circuit Docket No. 11 (?), but since I have never seen almost all of

the actual docket documents as entered (and was twice refused entry to look at the docket) I do not

know what has or has not truly been filed under various docket numbers to my prejudice. But the

order of May 24, 2018 (App. 1) makes very little sense to me now, as does the reason why (or if) the

actual docket entry No. 11 does not list the other 98% of what was served on the Ninth Circuit court

as the critical documents that are now—predictably to the Ninth Circuit court—front and center of

this very mandamus petition (and the similar one in BAC S. Ct. 17-9240; see also App. 7).

•

§7482(b)(1)." (App. 1). June 19 Schneider served a verified stay motion in light of his

pending S.Ct. mandamus petition in related BAG case as "The outcome of 17-9240 is

proximately related to the very heart of this appeal and all of the key current

facts.., which are nearly, or exactly identical to the currently pending S.Ct.

mandamus petition." (Dkt. 18 at 2) and citing to 28 U.S.C. § 452, with a copy of

S.Ct. docketing letter (Dkt. 16), the 9th denied this on June 27 (Dkt. 18) and due to

mail delays before receiving Dkt. 18, Schneider filed for a opening brief extension on

June 28 and how "It makes no sense at all for me to Me any opening brief when

what (or how) any ruling [by S.Ct.] is a necessary predicate to me intelligently filing

further papers." (Dkt. 19 @ 2 fn. omitted). Both motions were opposed by C.I.R. with

Schneider never receiving any copies of these oppositions before the 9th ruled in

Dkt. 21 on July 3. Once Schneider did receive the actual court and CIR paperwork

he then served on July 5 verified objections, to June 27 order, and a Deci. ISO

served with his RJN DVD (Dkt. 22?). Dkt. 23, with App. 7 as Exh. B, shows only his

second filed objections of July 7, 2018 to the then received 9th's Order dated July 3).

Upon receipt of Schneider's RJN Motion, the 9th clerk issued a notice of a

"serious" rules deficiency demanding that Schneider Me another separate motion

"requesting permission" to file his RJN motion (Dkt. 22?). Schneider also filed an

official reply to the CIR's opposition once he actually saw it (Dkt. 24). July 16, a 9th

appellate commissioner denied Schneider's objections (Dkt. 25) and on that day

10 Nowhere in the 9ths docket can I see my objections to Order of June 27 highlighting how even the

simplest reconciliation between what is shown and what may actually be filed continues in every

court to work to my severe prejudice (here on a last resort mandamus petition under constraints).

When with my prior life of fundamental mobility NONE of this would even exist, and any errors, e.g.

to my prejudice, I would vigorously defend vs. now I am only able to see delayed information, or

worse, none at all: having to argue blindly. Due process dictates more and I object.

Schneider sent a letter to 9th asking for his filed RJN motion in searchable PDF on

DVD back "if the court is still holding my make shift 6x9 envelope (See Schneider

Declaration of July 4, 2018 (App. 15)" (Dkt. 26). July 24, 2018 9th is believed to

have filed Schneider's RJN without opinion/any explanation of facts etc. July 30

Schneider gets envelope with nothing but a copy of docket with Dkt. 27 highlighted.

He files comments and objections on July 31 (Dkt. ?). Was the 'serious' rules

violation a mistake; how did it happen exactly; Is it going to be later held against

Schneider in a sandbagged fashion? The 9th files July 30 order (App.6; Dtk. ?).

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I. Schneider has no means to avoid Ninth Circuit's Draconian forced

mootness than thru immediate Supreme Court mandamus

The 9th Order to file his opening brief by the end of August (App.6), by an

appellate commissioner over my specific objections (Dkt.?), is forcing Schneider into

a Draconian—no due process at least, and possibly without jurisdiction—situation

that will moot out the very heart of this mandamus: Schneider's right to a neutral

and detached tribunal: both in appearance and actuality. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257

(1948), "What may not be done directly may not be done indirectly least the [First

Amendment right to petition] become a mockery." Abington School Dist. v. Schemp,

374 U.S. at 230; Laird v. Tatum, 409 US 824, 838 (1972) "Every litigant is entitled

to have his case heard by a judge mindful of his oath." This Mandamus stemming in

large part from the insane irreparable discrimination/censorship issues by the court

itself in refusing to admit Schneider (and others like him, e.g. appearing poor/forced

My SASE's from multiple recently filed 9th documents ("to file" stamp copy included) a month plus

later have never been returned to me. This lack of fundamental and timely information is very

prejudicial given the cited issues (see also main Dkt. 11 (incorporated past issues w/9th Id. at 21-23 .

•.

to sleep on the streets) and continuing damages over the deliberate/malicious

refusal to file and notify Schneider—in spite of his April 3, 2017 letter—of key

Court orders, deadlines etc. and other unexplained events that are a 9th deliberate

course of action of unequal specific treatment (see below, both now and in the past).

What use is Schneider's "clear and indispensable" right to; (1) have 28 U.S.C.

§ 452 command of "All courts of the United States shall be deemed always open for

the purposes of filing proper papers... and making motions and orders." become a

mockery of injustice; (2) Appellate Rule 45(a)(2) "must be open during business

hours" and (b)(1) "must record all papers filed with the court" and (b)(3) "must

immediately serve a notice of entry

. . .

with a copy of any opinion;" and (3) have a

mandamus petition to the S.Ct. considered—as the only option to "justice" under

the facts known to the courts themselves about repeatedly refusing Schneider entry,

discrimination, "unwritten" rules, protocols, apparent neutrality etc.—when the

very courts who have directly created this situation can sua sponte (under the guise

of ?), and unilaterally do an "end run" around the entire meaningful review system

by demanding that Schneider file his "opening brief' (in both cases) before the

S.Ct. mandamus petitions can even be heard or considered? And at the same time

forcing Schneider to immediately file two stay applications to a S.Ct. justice

simultaneously in both case; leaving aside all the other motions, objections,

declaration etc. that Schneider has had to file since he was barred from the public

courthouses. Will v. Calvert Fire Insurance Co., 437 US 655, 677 (1978) "Mandamus

would he to correct a [fundamental structural error] and to preserve a proper

federal court determination of a federal issue."

II. What the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly and deliberately/maliciously

done justifies mandamus and a fully neutral and detached tribunal in

another appellate court district.

Like the reprehensible and unjust flaws in Southeastern Promotions Mr.

Schneider is the one forced into now having that "burden of obtaining [the initial]

judicial review [of the court's own deliberate harms to his rights and now even] at

the later stages of the litigation" 420 U.S. at 562 Schneider is being forced before

the only court left: the U.S. Supreme Court. Analogously, what is happening here

right now with the 9th and Mr. Schneider's fundamental right to a neutral tribunal

in actuality and appearance (and First, Fifth Amendment rights) is like: (1) Miss

Hamilton in Hamilton v. Alabama, 376 U.S. 650 (1964) being forced on appeal

before the same judge/court that maliciously/deliberately refused the simple

equality, respect, and human consideration of addressing her as "Miss Hamilton"

vs. "Mary" when she was on the stand and demanded such respect from the "fair"

Alabama Court—which then thru her in jail for contempt; (See partial exchange

quoted by justice Douglas in Bell v. Maryland, 378 US 226, 248 n.4 (1964); (2) the

censored (and then arrested) civil rights preacher in Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536

(1965) then being forced on appeal before that very officer as "judge" in an action

directly and reprehensibly involving his actions, words, and beliefs shown by

comment to preacher of "take them back from whence they came." Id. at 540. Which

word-for-word eerily mirrors—fifty years later both the words and utter

contempt/malice for another human being—what Schneider as the parting comment

behind his back as he turned to leave the Ninth Circuit court, was told by the Ninth

Circuit Court's representative on November 13, 2017 "Go back to where you came

from" App. 12; S.Ct. 17A612 Deci. ISO stay at 2); (3) the "public" library users in

Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141 (1965) looking to simply use the facilities on

equal terms in all respects to whites being forced on appeal before the same officer

that arrested them under the complete pretext of a system of deliberate systemic

discrimination and de facto "separate-but-equal" doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163

U.S. 537 (1896); (4) the citizens in Johnson v. Virginia 373 U.S. 61 (1963) who were

forced into segregated courtrooms being then forced on appeal before the very judge

who harmed them/violated his judicial oath and the Constitution in the first place;

and in the off quoted cases (5) the lVlichigan citizens in In re Murchison, 349 U.S.

133 (1955); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) who challenged being forced before a

judge as a "one man grand jury" with contempt powers, then being forced on appeal

before that same judge yet again; (6) the citizen in Nixon v. Henderson, 273 U.S. 536

(1926) being forced before the very same judges of elections on appeal who also were

the one who denied him the fundamental right to vote in a primary election.

The plain and clear import of each case—in this small sample—reinforces

the current central idea of both of Schneider's mandamus petitions: That he is

fundamentally entitled to "A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of

due process"; In re Oliver; Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927). What has already

transpired in this case and S.Ct. No. 17-9240 facts, and accompanying papers,

violates due process and fundamental fairness: in essence forcing Schneider to

argue to the S.Ct. the exact equivalent of every motion that a Death Row Inmate

(including two stay applications to individual justices as soon as he can write them

after this mandamus petition is served) would be filing but now here in two cases

simultaneously that were initially "timed" like this by the 9th when they never

would have been and importantly when Schneider has committed no crime. Rather

is simply seeks to exercise his First, and Fifth Amendment fundamental rights, to

have a neutral, detached, and non secret, tribunal in a non involved appellate court.

Analogously, the structural constitutional issues that animate why a "change

of venue" motion would be a mandatory right in a misdemeanor criminal trial by "a

panel of impartial, 'indifferent' jurors"; Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505, 509

(1971); also illustrates the structural errors in this instance, but with much more

force as the 9ths actions and inactions have now made that court the key interested

litigant, while at exactly the same time: (1) sua sponte allowing them to also be the

First Amendment censor, judge, jury, and executioner; "Among those basic fair trial

rights that 'can never be treated as harmless' is a defendant's 'right to an impartial

adjudicator, be it judge or jury'." Gomez v. U.S., 490 U.S. 858, 876 (1989); In re

Murchison; in re Oliver;

(2) then—I would argue improperly under the

circumstances—ruling that under 26 U.S.C. §7482(b)(1)'s authority the change of

venue "is denied"; App. 1; allowing three court's deliberate actions and Draconian

injustices to go unaccounted for; while (3) improperly mooting out the very

arguments on the violations of Schneider's fundamental rights by forcing Schneider

to file an opening brief with the 9th before the S.Ct. can even rule: justifying S.Ct.

mandamus as the only option.

The key structural bias issue are the same: whether it is an appellate court, a

jury trial, or a "judicial misconduct/disability" complaint under Disability Rule 26

"Transfer to Another Judicial Council" for an impartial and detached decision when

the extraordinary facts of a given case justify such a transfer in both the interests of

justice and the public appearance of justice: What is good enough for any judge's due

process rights should equally apply to everyone else: including Mr. Schneider.

"Nothing in the Constitution compels the organs of government to be blind to what

everyone else perceives" Abington School Dist. v. Schemp, 374 U.S. 203, 295 (1963).

"This court has a special obligation to administer justice impartially and to set an

example of impartiality for other courts to emulate. When the court appears to favor

the government over the ordinary litigant, it seriously compromises its ability to

discharge that important duty." U.S. v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 59 (1992) Stevens

dissenting (applicable to the 9th). This is a civil case by one man vs. the government

& Internal Revenue Service, but the impartiality issues are the same.

A. Events involving Schneider's April 3, 2017 letter were deliberate,

and took his vested property rights to timely notice in both of his cases

On April 3, 2017, two weeks after filing his notice of appeal, Schneider filed

the letter (App. 10) that is at bottom a direct petition to the government for a redress

under the First Amendment on a routine ministerial function of the court. This

short simple letter really requested one critical thing; "I therefore request that I be

timely mailed any and all Court correspondence" and began with an unambiguous

heading: "RE: Courts (sic) service of all documents" and statement "I do not know if

anything has been generated in either of these cases in the prior 45+ days as I do

not have any access to any email." Nothing about this letter is confusing, and the

subject of the very first sentence is "Schneider v. CIR

...

case number unknown" a

I It

fact which not only specifically states that he does not know the CIR case number,

but also that if anything has been generated, then he has never seen it; period. It

is beyond belief that the court can go out of its way to specifically highlight all

"Prior Cases" unequally applied only in a filed by pro se case, but cannot do a five

second name search to locate its CIR case number that Schneider had never seen—

until a week later—when the CIR served him their appearance form—a ministerial

form that was entered properly and approved by the 9th that same day (Docket.

Nos. 2-3). In fact: the letter of April 3, 2017 apparently has deliberately never been

scanned into the CIR Me at all to this day, yet amazingly the court can add a phone

number ("650-836-2215") that has never appeared on any Schneider CIR motion and

has been inactive for many years (BAC EDCA R. 49 pg. 2 #4). This information

must have come from another old court file/pro se dossier. Further, in Schneider's

first motion to Me ECF on September 23, 2013, he also similarly stated "However,

he lives in a rural home and does not have either telephone or internet access in his

home in order to receive or send any electronic filings he must drive to town" (Ninth

Cir. Case No. 13-16387, Dkt. No. 4 at 1); so all facts have been long known to 9th.

Schneider to this day has yet to ever even see, or be served with, the ORDER

of DISMISSAL from June 27, 2017 (9th Dkt. 4)—even in spite of a years worth of

extensive court filings over this, the April 3, 2017 letter, and on July 10, 2017 Dkt. 5

motion's statement "Appellant requests... (3) that he be served with all documents

via USPS hard copy..." renewed request with another declaration (Id. at 2-3). Nor is

this some kind of "harmless error" and is unbelievable: What use is a party timely

and immediately notifying the court of basic ministerial routine address or service

issues when the court is just going to ignore them to the detriment of the appellant?

Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006) is squarely applicable here, "that someone

[court] who actually wanted to alert [Mr. Schneider] that [his property rights were

being taken sua sponte by the court] would do more when [specifically and timely

notified by Schneider's letter of April 3, 2018], and that there was more that

reasonably could be done [simply sending notice with a 50 cent stamp, so that

Schneider would actually be informed of the court's orders and conduct]

Id. 547

U.S. at 238 instead the court then deliberately ignored the facts; so as to precipitate

a default in this case, and no timely notice in 16-16261. Muallane v. Cent. Hanover

Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950) idea of "But when notice is a person's

due, process which is a mere gesture is not due process." Which "actually informs

the absentee" is highly relevant combined with "at a meaningful time" as expressed

in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972) "to ensure abstract fair play to the

individual

. . .

to minimize substantially unfair or mistaken deprivations of property."

It was appellant's vested property right to have his CIR case argued on a

timeline that he knew, planned on at that time, and should of began (even with a

slight delay; had he actually had the court's ministerial duty: basic notice) at the

latest in June or July (when he wrote his letter, trying to preserve his rights!). So

instead of Schneider knowing and thus choosing the briefing schedule, as it should

have been as required by Rule; Ballard v. C.I.R., 544 U.S. 40, 42 (2005) the court's

actions of no notice in two cases (and they knew it), have now substituted its own

timing, where it has been and continues to be detrimental not only in dual tracking

forced in two major cases on extaordianry events and S.Ct. filings but created

•

conflicts with his BAC case, conflicts that have remained a complete constant

ever since the 19th's actions like some kind of 18th century dunking stool. All

without Schneider doing anything wrong.

In fact, tacitly highlighted by the 9th's actions/orders this last year +,

Schneider: (1) writing an immediate letter (April 3, 2017) can be ignored by the

court to his detriment; (2) Filing a timely motion (July 10, 2017) (and expecting a

timely response, which he never got) can be ignored to his detriment; (3) then in

August 201712 Schneider physically going to the "public courthouse" and being

forced to sleep on the streets again, getting very sick for weeks afterwards, and

getting totally stranded in Sacramento without any means of getting home at all

except for insane generosity of friends/neighbors (Dkt. 11 Deci. R2 at 2-3, 5-10) can

be also ignored by the court to his detriment; (4) then in September and October

2017 Schneider files with the S.Ct. as his only option: which likewise was

functionally censored to his detriment; (5) forcing him back before the very court

who then after all this decides to issue an Order (only in this case, BAC case 9th

then still refused to serve him with that case's scheduling Order too, see App. 11,

S.Ct. 17-9240) that treats all of Schneider's unnecessary pain, blatant and

unprecedented violation of his civil rights etc. as nothing at all—"harmless"—to be

silently ignored; and (6) after notice to the 9th of all these facts: in November 2017

the 9th ups the ante by then refusing to let Schneider in again with the parting

comment of "go back to where you came from" (App. 12) all very coincidentally just

In June-July- August 2017 Schneider had a working copier (very critical), a little more neighbor

mobility and there never would have been dual track sandbagging in conjunction with the BAC 9th

case Orders, filing deadlines etc. (in BAC now ordered to file his opening brief by August 28, 2018).

after he is/was challenging—as unconstitutional—the court's August 2017 actions

(9th Dkts. 6-9?). All due respect to any court on anything written here: this is

beyond all belief from the U.S. Government, towards any citizen. The 9ths

actions/inactions, at minimum,13 are a continuing violation of substantive and

procedural due process, Schneider's First Amendment rights (see also Dkt. 28?

Schneider's July 31, 2018 comments/objections re: 9th RJN refusal to Me), as well

as his fundamental rights to a neutral judiciary (appellate court) both in

appearance and actuality; In re Oliver.

II. Schneider's irreparable court speech has/is being censored and

restricted by the continuing events from March 30, 2014 until today.

A courthouse is quintessentially a "public forum" that "by long tradition or by

government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate." Perry Education Assn.

v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). A courthouse is property

"open for use by the public as a place for expressive activity." Id. at 46. As to

Schneider's First Amendment speech, it is established that; (1) legal action is

protected "First Amendment" speech; N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); (2)

"The right to be heard must necessarily embody the right to file motions and

pleadings to present claims and raise relevant issues." Holt v. Virginia, 381 U.S.

131, 136 (1965); (3) "without a doubt" includes "the right of the individual to

That the 9th has granted some extensions does not make up for what was lost by their deliberate

actions, inactions etc. in the first place! Analogously, it is like getting raped by a police officer, and

then because that same police officer did not write you a $50 speeding ticket: You should be Happy—

"harmless error"—that the later self-serving actions eliminate the illegality of the former. See recent

case, audio, and video of how a U.S. Citizen Sandra Bland tragically committed suicide and died

in the Texas justice system over a "failure to signal" and her very appropriate citizen Speech.

All because she sadly learned, like Schneider has, that what they believed and had been taught that

the Constitution stands for with its "protections" against tyranny and oppression: is a he. The

SANDRA BLAND case, like so many others that actually got out to the public, does not need any

government "interpretation" to the people of the WORLD; the insanity of it is immediately apparent.

•1

contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful

knowledge... [and] to enjoy those privileges long established at common law as

essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness of free men" Meyers v. Nebraska, 262

U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (emphasis mine) and "must be respected" Id. at 401; (4) free

speech "lies at the foundation of free government and by free men." Schneider v.

State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939); (5) our "Constitution protects the right to receive

information and ideas.. .is fundamental to our free society" Stanley v. Georgia, 394

U.S. 557, 564 (1969); (6) "the constitutional rights of free speech, free press, and

free assembly... [is central] to the end that government may be responsive to the will

of the people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means.

Therein lies the security of the Republic, the very foundation of constitutional

government." De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U5 353, 365 (1937); (7) "A denial of

[fundamental] constitutionally protected rights demands judicial protection; our

oath and our office require no less of us." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U5 533, 566 (1964);

(8) speech "does not loose its constitutional protection merely because it is effective

criticism [of "government officials" over civil rights abuses that fill volumes of

Supreme Court reports];" New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964); (9)

speech cannot be punished—abridged directly or indirectly where "In practical

operation, therefore, this procedural device must necessarily produce a result which

the State could not command directly. It can only result in a deterrence of speech

which the Constitution makes free." Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958) as

repeated-paraphrased in many opinions; and (10) speech cannot be abridged by a de

facto prior restraint and censorship where "if judicial review is made unduly

•j

onerous, by reason of delay or otherwise, [such facts-delay] in practice may be final."

Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 561 (1975) where First

Amendment prior-restraints [e.g. refusing Schneider entry into a public courthouse

and other Ninth Circuit actions/inactions] "fall on speech with a brutality and a

finality all their own. Even if they are ultimately lifted they cause irreparable loss."

Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 609 (1976) at 559 "A prior

restraint, by contrast, and by definition, has an immediate and irreversible

sanction. If it can be said that a threat of criminal or civil sanctions after

publication 'chills' speech, prior restraint 'freezes' it at least for the time."

The continuing (1) severe irreparable impacts on Schneider's speech Elrod u.

Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976) "The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even

minimum periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury" Id. at 373;

(2) censorship and forced page and size limitations due to rural mailbox (can't even

mail a box), inability to even get stamps for this and prior filings etc. (see Schneider

Decl. ISO June 27 Order Objections (App. 15 at 1-5; Not even on 9th Circuit Docket,

yet mailed in same 6x9 envelope as Dkt. No. 22); 9th Dkt. 11 Decl. at 1 ISO—App.

14; Dkt. 5 at 2; and many references in TC and S.Ct. records both filed or censored).

I object when I would have already ran out of stamps14 (App-15 at 1; TC Dkt. 22

14 App. 15 July 5, 2018 Deci. ISO objections at 1, Schneider stated 'exactly' what stamps he had, and

in spite of this, the 9th demand he use all these stamps and more or risk great loss forcing even more

neighbor help. Where if my neighbors did not help me? Obviously, not "harmless" instead: I would

then be thrown out of court in the most unjust manner; Johnson v. Avery, 383 U.S. 483 (1969); and

could very well starve (i.e. see n. 15 above; 9th Dkt. 11 No.3 pg. 5.6; TC Dkt. 12 pg. 2 12:18), leaving

aside all of the other facts of my isolated location. I again object to the "Heads you loose, Tails you

loose" forced punishment of me by every court for the fact that my neighbors have help me at random

to survive. It is like throwing a person into a pond chained up, if they happen to survive, like

Houdini—h armless error—if they die (like everyone else would) then Gee: likely mootness.

, S

(see n. 10, 11 above;) from the next events of 9th's orders etc. and (3) as No. 2 above

shows I do not know if the appellate "record" is even complete: so I include it here

for reference as App. 15-21 the Declaration from July 4, 2018 (9th Dkt. 22 ??).

A perfect example of the difference between having "normal" everyday access

to the U.S. mail system with a car, living in a city, or even being a prisoner (access

which the 9th, C.I.R., and other real parties all have) and the severe forced

limitations of Schneider over the last year + to only small envelopes of a few ounces

(and page counts as small as 20 pages—as here) is strikingly illustrated in the

related BAC Ninth Circuit case No. 16-16261 Docket No.?? (BAC opposition) fried on

December 18, 2018 containing a 3-page opposition along with a 150 page Exhibit A

that was shipped FeclEx in a 9.5 x 15.5 envelope (appears to be many pages of S.Ct.

stay application 17A612). It is impossible for Schneider to file anything like this

now without the help of neighbors or fundamental personal transportation to town

under the constraints that I have had since March 30, 2014 that are severely

limiting me in the filing of this very mandamus petition (leaving aside the issue of

me getting stamps). Similarly, when I have received a "returned" S.Ct. filing in the

past they have likewise; (1) contained much more than 20-30 sheets of paper (often

many hundreds of sheets); and (2) been shipped in a large Priority Mail box or 9.5 x

12.5 envelope (9th Dkt. 27 RJN Video Nos. 1-3 showing the actual S.Ct. postmarked

May 7, 2018 envelope being impossible to fit in every rural mailbox for miles).

VI. Unequally barring any citizen from a public courthouse for no

constitutionally valid reason, or to silence their speech, is against a long

line of fundamental Supreme Court holdings dealing with "public"

facilities.

• •

Opinions long ago abrogated the Machiavellian "separate-but-equal" doctrine

or Dalits caste system and similar schemes in any and all public schools: but the

same has been held to apply to inter alia; (1) public libraries; Brown, 383 U.S. @ 141

(1965) "We are here dealing with an aspect of a basic constitutional right—the right

under the First and Fourteenth Amendments

...

to petition the government for a

redress of grievances;" (2) public courtrooms Johnson, 373 Us 61 (1963) "[Invidious

Discrimination] in a court of justice is a manifest violation of the [appellate court's]

duty to deny no one equal protection of its laws"; (3) public's equal and fundamental

right to vote with equal representation Reynolds v Sims, 377 Us 533 (1964); and in

literally every other area of every citizen's daily public life.

These rights should not be subject to some kind of ad hoc "balancing" test

under Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) on a "case-by-case" basis. All

involve a "strict scrutiny" like Schneider's First Amendment and other fundamental

rights that are immediately and irreparably implicated by the 9ths deliberate

actions, unwritten rules, policies, and now forced ruling attempting to moot out any

meaningful review of his change of appellate venue motion, that the court may have

not even read (see facts above; App. 1). If "Congress [can not] require a federal court

to take action in violation of the Constitution" United States v. American Friends

Service Committee, 419 US 7, 16 (1974) then surely no court can "take [such] action"

as continues to occur here?

Many of these public access case holdings deal either directly with citizen's

"fundamental" rights or are so closely associated with those as to be subject to the

• (

same First Amendment "independent examination" and exacting review of the

"whole" record; Bose Corp. v. Consumer Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485,

499 (1984) such review involving the court's own actions is more important here

when the actions were either ministerial (April 3, 2017 letter) or involved no judicial

"discretion" at all (invidious discrimination/exclusion of Schneider for no reason etc.)

"Even though the government purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose

cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties

when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgment

must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic

purpose." Shelton v. Tucker, 364 US 479, 488 (1960) (emphasis mine). Here exactly

like in Brown, 383 at 143 "A [court]... may of course, regulate the use of its libraries

or other public facilities. But it must do so in a reasonable and nondiscriminatory

manner, equally applicable to all and administered with equality to all. It may not

do so as to some and not as to all

...

And it may not invoke [published/unpublished]

regulations as to use [or entry] as a pretext for pursuing those engaged in lawful,

constitutionally protected exercise of their fundamental rights."

Particularly, "where the parties will presumably object loudly, perhaps

through legal action..." Haig v. Agee, 453 US 280, 315 (1981) as the only effective

means to vindicate their rights15 and unlike "The rich [who] can buy advertisements

Schneider has also briefly by mail petitioned the Executive and legislative branches (Senate

Judiciary committee) over the repeated events, but such "petitions" are not a realistically effective

remedy for the "average" American without the options of wealth, extensive news media coverage or

pressure for public rights. Nor, without fundamental mobility, access to banking, to buy "postage

stamps" or pursue a common calling anymore (9th Dkt. 11 Exh. 1 (13A1264 Renewed Deci. ISO;)—

many requiring a "photo ID" when living in a very rural area— can Schneider organize First

• 0

in newspapers, purchase radio, or television time, and rent billboard space. Those

less affluent [or those driven to poverty] are restricted to the use of handbills, or

petitions..." Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 336 (1967) and "The rich man can

require the court to listen to arguments of counsel before deciding on the merits, but

a poor man cannot." Douglas v. California, 386 U.S. 355, 357 (1963); Harper v.

Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, (1966) "Wealth, like race, creed, or color

is not germane to one's ability to [enter a public courthouse or library]... "Id. at 668.

If Mr. Schneider can be summarily/repeatedly (at least 4 times) be denied all

access to a large public court law library of resources for personal education to

protect his First Amendment rights/petition the government for a redress: then

what use is the uneducated fundamental "right" to; (1) earn a living or learn any

trade; Slaughter-house cases, 83 US 36 (1872); (2) unrestricted interstate travel;

Crandall v. Nevada, 73 US 35 (1868); (3) Citizenship and the right to reside abroad

without penalty; Schneider v. Rusk; 377 US 163 (1964); (3) personal privacy/medical

Info etc. Roe v. Wade, 410 US 113 (1973); (4) Due Process; Mathews v. Eldridge, 424

US 319 (1976); (5) Marriage; Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 US 371 (1971) and; (6) right

to vote; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 US 533, 561 (1964) which "involves one of the basic

civil rights of man ("human rights")" as a "fundamental matter... preservative of

other basic civil and political rights... [that] must be carefully and meticulously

scrutinized." Id.@ 562 that without question "demands judicial protection" Id. @ 566.

It is sadly ironic that Schneider's personal right to educate himself in a public

Amendment protests as he has already done in the past, when he ran for State senate, to effectively

bring wide attention to these very important and far reaching public issues.

•a

library is not protected, yet as an effective state Senate candidate or Lockwood Fire

Board member and treasurer for years he must have educational competency in the

law for his past actual judicial type administrative "closed session" hearing/fiscal

responsibilities. The "right to Vote" is secondary to personally/continually educate

oneself. Reynolds v. Sims truthfully stated that all "Other rights, even the most

basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined. Our Constitution leaves no

room for classification of people in a way that unnecessarily abridges this right." Id.

at 560 quoting Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) stressing how the "invidious

discrimination [rights violated]

. . .

are individual and personal." Id. at 561.

Yet, if any citizen is ignorant of the law and cannot educate themselves in a

library on the details of their actual civil rights, vs. what propaganda may be/is

being pushed on them by a candidate for office, governmental agent, or media outlet

etc. Then, the right to vote is almost meaningless without a foundational education.

No direct "holding" on a "fundamental" right to access a "public courthouse

law library" or to "Me any court paperwork in person" as speech N.A.A.C.P. v.

Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) should be

required, but it seems that it is in this case: justifying a writ of mandamus. Since

Schneider is denied "access to the law" and multiple courts' public libraries then it

is structurally impossible for Schneider to highlight "questions of law [that] become

the focus of appellate review" Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 US 225, 232

(199 1) and the same disability is true to federal case and statutory laws: both

immediately and extraordinarily implicated in this action. Nor should any citizen

i Is .

• •

ever need to "get arrested" after being told "You cannot enter the building" "Even

the library" Schneider asked; "Yes, everything is closed" was the reply. All long

before he ever was questioned at all about his "photo ID" in the 9th on November

13, 2017: a regular business day where the courthouse was open to other members

of the "public" (App. 12); or on August 11, 2017 submit to a demand to produce an

approved "photo ID,116 (17A612 Decl. Exh. R2 at 2-3) in order to personally,

effectively, and equally use the public courthouse's, restroom, drinking fountain,

restaurant, clerk's office, copier, court docket computers etc. etc.

V. What has been deliberately done to Mr. Schneider is a "structural"

error that is irreparable, not "correctable" at some later time, and for over

four years has already proven to implicate the integrity of the entire

judicial process justifying discretionary mandamus.

Justice is every citizen's fundamental right in the organization of our society

"In the enjoyment of their personal and civil rights; that all persons should be

equally entitled to pursue their happiness

the courts

...

that they should have like access to

for the protection of their persons and property, the prevention and

redress of wrongs." Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885) and no less

fundamentally so then their right to travel, vote, or speak. The truth of facts of Mr.

Schneider's repeated denials of any and all entry into all of the Courts as declared

by Schneider in 17A612, e.g. 9th Dkt. 11, are completely known to, and easily

verified by them, via their own security video, audio (if it exists), internal emails,

computer files/ESI, protocols etc. and prior instances of similar and/or identical

class and personal discrimination against others as a matter of unwritten rules,

Particularly, as here, where "in the absence of any basis for suspecting [Schneider] of misconduct

such a stop ["requiring him to identify himself'] violated the Fourth Amendment because officers

lacked any reasonable suspicion [of criminal conduct]" Brown V. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979).

IsIs-

•1- ..

4.. ,-

policy, and protocols. But the substantive deprivations of Schneider's rights cannot

be calculated by any "after the fact" without a trial over any disputed facts or even

under any simple "harmless" error analysis, as "The nature of the violation allow[] a

presumption [of]

...

prejudice" and "any inquiry into harmless error would

requir[e] unguided speculation." Bank of Nova Scotia v. U.S. 487 U.S. 250, 257

(1988); Gomez v. U.S., 490 U.S. at 876 (1989) cited above. What has transpired is a

"structural error" that has already infected the entirety of all of Schneider's cases, it

was a "structural error" when the TC locked Schneider out; and it was a far worse

"structural error" when the 9th circuit repeatedly did so.

How can any courts with such direct interest in what has transpired already

(see 9th Dkt. 11 incorporated in full for all events concerning April 3 letter) put any

value on the denial of "justice" from the series of continuing multi-court and two

case events daily impacting the inability of Mr. Schneider to not only research

fundamental legal knowledge, but also now not have his case become "moot" by the

very court that Schneider is challenging. "Even a sensible and efficient use of the

supervisory power, however, is invalid if it conflicts with constitutional or statutory

provisions. A contrary result 'would confer on the judiciary discretionary power to

disregard the considered limitations of the law it is charged with enforcing.' United

States v. Payer, 447 US 727, 737 (1980); "Were it to find that the rules have been

practically nullified by a district judge or by a concert of action on the part of

several district judges, it would not hesitate to restrain them." L.A. Brush Mfg.

Corp. v. James, 272 U.S. 701, 707 (1927).

• . 1.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons outlined here, in supporting papers, and in the court records:

Petitioner, Christopher D. Schneider, respectfully petitions for a writ of mandamus

and/or prohibition and/or other relief directed to (1) the Ninth Circuit Court of

California and its chief judge, Alex Kozinski, e.g. from the court's actions, inactions,

protocols, unwritten rules, as outlined above and in supporting papers and also

related to the opinion entered on May 24, 2018; (2) the U.S. Tax Court and its chief

judge, Michael Thornton, e.g. from that court's actions, inactions,

protocols/unwritten rules as shown above/in supporting papers; and/or (3) any other

appropriate relief as Schneider remains without fundamental access to the very

legal resources he needs to intelligently even formulate "other relief requests" that

should be done: e.g. allowing refilling of Schneider's earlier S.Ct. clerk censored stay

applications of June 2015, September 18, 2018, and October 16, 2017 verified

motion to file—so the S.Ct. can actually see and consider the petition for a redress—

or issuing a stay of the Ninth Circuit's briefing schedule or granting certiorari.

Verification: I Christopher D. Schneider declare under penalty of perjury

that the forging facts are true and correct and that all attached appendix, exhibits

and/or declarations are true/correct copies of documents to best of my ability.

Dated: August 18, 2018 in Sutter Creek California

Resp ectfuRv-SiLbmitted

Christopher D. Schneider: Petitioner

This document was: Prepared and Punted

16291 Stone Jug Rd.

using 100% local portable SOLAR ENERGY

Sutter Creek CA 95685

Phone: none; Email: horsefun69@yahoo.com (Both unavailable miles away)

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.