Petitioners Brief — CITGO Asphalt Refining Company, et al., Petitioners v. Frescati Shipping Company, Ltd., et al.
Supreme Court briefJul 9, 2019
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No. 18-565
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
___________
CITGO ASPHALT REFINING COMPANY; CITGO
PETROLEUM CORPORATION; CITGO EAST COAST OIL
CORPORATION,
Petitioners,
v.
FRESCATI SHIPPING COMPANY, LTD.; TSAKOS
SHIPPING & TRADING, S.A.; AND UNITED STATES,
Respondents.
___________
On Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
___________
BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS
___________
DEREK A. WALKER
J. DWIGHT LEBLANC, JR.
DOUGLAS L. GRUNDMEYER
CHAFFE MCCALL, L.L.P.
2300 Energy Centre
1100 Poydras Street
New Orleans, LA 70163
(504) 585-7000
RICHARD Q. WHELAN
FRANK P. DEGIULIO
PALMER, BIEZUP &
HENDERSON LLP
190 N. Independence Mall
West, Suite 401
Philadelphia, PA 19106
(215) 625-9900
July 9, 2019
CARTER G. PHILLIPS*
JACQUELINE G. COOPER
RICHARD E. YOUNG
JORDAN B. CHERRICK
LUCAS CROSLOW
SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP
1501 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 736-8000
cphillips@sidley.com
JOHN G. BISSELL
STRONG PIPKIN BISSELL
& LEDYARD, L.L.P.
4900 Woodway Drive
Suite 1200
Houston, TX 77056
(713) 651-1900
Counsel for Petitioners
*Counsel of Record
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether under federal maritime law a safe berth
clause in a voyage charter contract imposes strict
liability on the charterer with respect to a ship’s
safety, or instead imposes at most a duty of due
diligence.
(i)
ii
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
The parties to the proceeding are listed in the
caption.
Petitioners CITGO Asphalt Refining
Company, CITGO Petroleum Corporation, and
CITGO East Coast Oil Corporation are collectively
known as CARCO.
RULE 29.6 STATEMENT
CITGO Asphalt Refining Company is not a
corporation and has no parent corporations. It is a
privately held General Partnership whose general
partners are CITGO Petroleum Corporation and
CITGO East Coast Oil Corporation, both of which are
private, non-publicly held entities.
CITGO Petroleum Corporation’s parent is CITGO
Holding, Inc., which is a wholly owned subsidiary of
PDV Holding, Inc., which is a wholly owned
subsidiary of Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (“PDVSA”).
No publicly held company owns 10% or more of
CITGO Petroleum Corporation’s stock.
CITGO East Coast Oil Corporation’s parent is
CITGO Investment Company, a private, non-publicly
held entity. No publicly held company owns 10% or
more of CITGO East Coast Oil Corporation’s stock.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTION PRESENTED ...................................
i
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING .....................
ii
RULE 29.6 STATEMENT ....................................
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................
v
OPINIONS BELOW .............................................
1
JURISDICTION....................................................
1
CONSTITUTIONAL
AND
STATUTORY
PROVISIONS ....................................................
1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE..............................
2
A. Factual and Regulatory Background .......
3
B. Prior Proceedings ......................................
7
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ..............................
14
ARGUMENT .........................................................
18
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS’ INTERPRETATION OF THE SAFE BERTH CLAUSE
AS A WARRANTY MISREADS THE CONTRACTUAL TEXT ........................................
18
A. The Terms Of The Safe Berth Clause Do
Not Provide For Liability Regardless Of
Fault ..........................................................
19
B. The Parties Did Not Intend For CARCO
To Assume Strict Liability........................
25
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS’ INTERPRETATION OF THE SAFE BERTH CLAUSE
AS A WARRANTY IS CONTRARY TO
THIS COURT’S DECISIONS AND LACKS
ANY SOUND LEGAL FOUNDATION ........
27
(iii)
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS—continued
A. The Warranty Interpretation Conflicts
With This Court’s Controlling Decisions...
Page
28
B. The Warranty Interpretation Lacks Any
Sound Legal Foundation...........................
33
III. MARITIME
COMMERCE
IS
BEST
SERVED BY INTERPRETING SAFE
BERTH CLAUSES AS IMPOSING AT
MOST A DUTY OF DUE DILIGENCE ON
CHARTERERS ..............................................
37
A. Strict Liability Is Unwarranted And
Detrimental To Maritime Commerce .......
38
B. The Court Of Appeals’ Reasons For
Adopting The Warranty Interpretation
Are Unsound .............................................
42
C. The Warranty Interpretation Results In
Inconsistent Standards Of Care For
Wharfingers And Charterers....................
47
D. The Warranty Interpretation Produces
An Inequitable Result In This Case .........
49
CONCLUSION .....................................................
51
ADDENDUM
v
CASES
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Air & Liquid Sys. Corp. v. DeVries, 139 S.
Ct. 986 (2019) ........................................... 18, 40
Atkins v. Fibre Disintegrating Co., 2 F. Cas.
78 (E.D.N.Y. 1868) (No. 601), aff’d, 85
U.S. (18 Wall.) 272 (1874) ........................ 28, 29
Atkins v. Fibre Disintegrating Co., 85 U.S.
(18 Wall.) 272 (1874) .......................... 15, 28, 29
Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S.
404 (2009) ...................................................
20
Boudreaux v. Am. Workover, Inc., 680 F.2d
1034 (5th Cir. 1982) ...................................
20
Campbell Soup Co. v. Fed. Motorship Corp.,
1935 WL 57939, 1935 A.M.C. 634
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 1935) ............................
27
Capt’n Mark v. Sea Fever Corp., 692 F.2d
163 (1st Cir. 1982) ......................................
20
Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347
(1995) ..........................................................
20
Cities Serv. Transp. Co. v. Gulf Ref. Co., 79
F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1935) ............................ 33, 34
In re Complaint of Metlife Capital Corp.,
132 F.3d 818 (1st Cir. 1997) ......................
6
Crisp v. U.S. & Australasia S.S. Co., 124 F.
748 (S.D.N.Y. 1903) ....................................
24
Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v.
Perini N. River Assocs., 459 U.S. 297
(1983) ..........................................................
20
Dutra Grp. v. Batterton, No. 18-266 (U.S.
June 24, 2019) ................................... 20, 40, 47
E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval
Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986) ................... 38, 39, 41
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno,
150 P. 2d 436 (Cal. 1944) ...........................
39
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued
Page
Exxon Corp. v. Cent. Gulf Lines, Inc., 500
U.S. 603 (1991) ......................................... 18, 37
Ferrara v. A. & V. Fishing, Inc., 99 F.3d
449 (1st Cir. 1996) ......................................
27
The G.R. Booth, 171 U.S. 450 (1898) ............
27
Gatlin Oil Co. v. United States, 169 F.3d
207 (4th Cir. 1999) .....................................
49
The Gazelle & Cargo, 128 U.S. 474
(1888) ........................................................ 30, 31
Hastorf v. O’Brien, 173 F. 346 (2d Cir.
1909) ...........................................................
36
Howlett v. Birkdale Shipping Co., 512 U.S.
92 (1994) .....................................................
20
Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v.
Or. Stevedoring Co., 376 U.S. 315
(1964) ........................................................ 38, 39
Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes
Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527 (1995) ...
18
M. & J. Tracy, Inc. v. Marks, Lissberger &
Son, Inc., 283 F. 100 (2d Cir. 1922) ......... 36, 47
Man Ferrostaal, Inc. v. M/V Akili, 704 F.3d
77 (2d Cir. 2012) .........................................
20
McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S.
337 (1991) ...................................................
20
Mencke v. Cargo of Java Sugar, 187 U.S.
248 (1902) ................................................. 24, 31
Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19
(1990) ..........................................................
20
Neely v. Club Med Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 63
F.3d 166 (3d Cir. 1995) ..............................
20
Norfolk S. Ry. v. Kirby, 543 U.S. 14
(2004) ..................................... 18, 20, 37, 42, 49
Orduna S.A. v. Zen-Noh Grain Corp., 913
F.2d 1149 (5th Cir. 1990) ...................... passim
vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued
Page
Paragon Oil Co. v. Republic Tankers, S.A.,
310 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1962) .......................
33
Park S.S. Co. v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 188
F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1951) ..............................
33
Plymouth Transp. Co. v. Red Star Towing
& Transp. Co., 20 F.2d 357 (2d Cir.
1927) ...........................................................
36
Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85
(1946), superseded by statute on other
grounds, Longshoremen’s and Harbor
Workers’ Compensation Act Amendments
of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-576, 86 Stat.
1251 ............................................................
38
Smith v. Burnett, 173 U.S. 430 (1899) ....... 17, 47
Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 543 U.S. 481
(2005) ..........................................................
20
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l
Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010) .........................
4
Sw. Marine, Inc. v. Gizoni, 502 U.S. 81
(1991) ..........................................................
20
Tweedie Trading Co. v. N.Y. & Bos.
Dyewood Co., 127 F. 278 (2d Cir. 1903) ....
24
Venore Transp. Co. v. Oswego Shipping
Corp., 498 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1974) ............
33
Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V
Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528 (1995) .................
20
Waldie v. Steers Sand & Gravel Corp., 151
F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1945) ..............................
48
CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES
U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 ......................... 1, 18
Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101380, 104 Stat. 484 ......................................
6
viii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued
Page
26 U.S.C. § 9509(b) ........................................
7
28 U.S.C. § 1333 ............................................ 1, 8
33 U.S.C. § 2701(32)(A) .................................
6
§ 2702(a) ........................................
6
§ 2703(a)(3) ................................... 7, 49
§ 2704 ............................................
6
§ 2708(a)(1) ...................................
7
§ 2713(b)(1)(B) ..............................
7
§ 2715(a) ........................................
7
46 U.S.C. app. § 183 (2005) ........................... 8, 41
46 U.S.C. § 30701 note ..................................
42
SCHOLARLY AUTHORITIES
Terence Coghlin et al., Time Charters (7th
ed. 2014) .....................................................
35
Julian Cooke et al., Voyage Charters (4th
ed. 2014) ................................. 19, 21, 24, 26, 45
Dan B. Dobbs et al., The Law of Torts (2d
ed. 2011) ................................................... 40, 41
Bernard Eder et al., Scrutton on
Charterparties and Bills of Lading (23d
ed. 2017) .....................................................
35
Grant Gilmore & Charles L. Black, Jr., The
Law of Admiralty (2d ed. 1975) ............ passim
Peter G. Hartman, Comments, Safe
Port/Berth Clauses: Warranty or Due
Diligence?, 21 Tul. Mar. L.J. 537
(1997) ................................................. 20, 36, 45
International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to
Bills of Lading, Aug. 25, 1924, https://
www.jus.uio.no/english/services/library/
treaties/07/7-04/hague-rules.xml ...............
26
ix
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued
Page
Lawrence I. Kiern, Liability, Compensation,
and Financial Responsibility Under the
Oil Pollution Act of 1990: A Review of the
Second Decade, 36 Tul. Mar. L.J. 1
(2011) ..........................................................
41
Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981) ...
18
Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977) ..........
41
2 Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and
Maritime Law (6th ed. 2018) ............ 20, 35, 41
J. Bond Smith, Jr., Time and Voyage
Charters: Safe Port/Safe Berth, 49 Tul. L.
Rev. 860 (1975) ....................................... 36, 46
2A Michael F. Sturley, Benedict on
Admiralty (7th ed. 2014) ............................
35
1 William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims
(4th ed. 2008)..............................................
27
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals, Pet. App. 1a44a, is reported at 886 F.3d 291. The court of
appeals’ order denying CARCO’s petition for panel
rehearing and rehearing en banc, Pet. App. 270a271a, is unreported. The opinion of the district court,
Pet. App. 45a-269a, is reported at 2016 WL 4035994.
An earlier opinion of the court of appeals, Pet. App.
272a-329a, is reported at 718 F.3d 184. The court of
appeals’ order denying CARCO’s petition for panel
rehearing and rehearing en banc of this earlier
opinion, Pet. App. 345a-346a, is unreported. An
earlier opinion of the district court, Pet. App. 330a344a, is reported at 2011 WL 1436878.
JURISDICTION
The court of appeals issued its opinion on March 29,
2018. Pet. App. 1a-44a. The petition for a writ of
certiorari was timely filed on October 26, 2018. This
Court granted certiorari on April 22, 2019, and has
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS
The Constitution provides that “[t]he judicial Power
shall extend to . . . all Cases of admiralty and
maritime Jurisdiction.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
28 U.S.C. § 1333 provides that “[t]he district courts
shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the
courts of the States, of: (1) Any civil case of admiralty
or maritime jurisdiction.”
2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves claims for extraordinary and
unjustified contract damages against CARCO arising
from an oil spill caused when the oil tanker Athos I
struck a submerged and uncharted anchor abandoned
by an unknown party in the Delaware River. CARCO
had chartered the Athos I and owned the marine
terminal to which it was headed. It is undisputed
that CARCO neither knew, nor had any reason to
know, that the anchor was in the river. It is also
undisputed that the Federal Anchorage in which the
anchor was hidden was not maintained or controlled
by CARCO and that CARCO had no role in
navigating the vessel.
Despite the fact that CARCO bears no fault for the
accident, the courts below entered a judgment of
more than $140 million against it, to be split between
the vessel owners and the United States. The courts
relied solely on a commonplace safe berth clause
included in the ship charter contract. In their view,
the safe berth clause is an implied warranty that
imposes strict liability on charterers for all damages
arising out of a vessel’s entry, use, or exit from a
designated berth. The strict liability rule is unsound,
however, both as a matter of contract interpretation
and sensible maritime policy. Indeed, the origins of
that rule are completely obscure. The court of
appeals almost slavishly relied upon a line of Second
Circuit decisions, but those decisions contain little
reasoning and provide no justification for treating the
clause as a guarantee, which assigns massive liability
for all damages arising out of a vessel’s entry, use, or
exit from a designated berth to a mere charterer
without any proof of fault. The decisions also wholly
ignore a decision from this Court that plainly
3
disclaimed the charterer’s strict liability for all
possible risks under a safe berth clause.
This Court should instead adopt the reasoned
position of the Fifth Circuit, wholly endorsed by the
preeminent treatise on admiralty law (and others),
that safe berth clauses impose at most a duty of due
diligence on the charterer. That duty follows from
the fact that safe berth clauses are best interpreted
as limited provisions that grant charterers the right
to select the berth, and that impose on them a
corresponding duty to pay the resulting expenses if a
vessel’s captain exercises the right to reject the
selected berth as unsafe. The clauses do not speak at
all to accidents resulting from unforeseeable dangers
such as occurred in this case. Liability for such
events should be based on tort principles or other
sources of law, such as the federal cost-spreading
scheme for oil spills that addresses precisely the type
of loss that occurred in this case. Courts should not
foist liability on an innocent party based upon
contract language that does not clearly shift liability
to that party.
A. Factual and Regulatory Background.
The Charter Contracts. In 2001, the ship owner,
Frescati Shipping Company, Ltd. (“Frescati”),
chartered (i.e., leased) the Athos I to Star Tankers
Inc. (“Star”) via a standard industry form contract
known as a “time charter,” which granted Star the
right to subcharter the ship for specific voyages under
whatever contractual terms it could negotiate. That
long-term contract between Frescati and Star
contained an English choice-of-law clause. Tsakos
Shipping & Trading, S.A. (“Tsakos”) was the manager
of the Athos I.
4
Three years later, Star subchartered the tanker to
CARCO for a single voyage to carry a cargo of crude
oil from Venezuela to CARCO’s asphalt refinery in
Paulsboro, New Jersey under a “voyage charter”
contract. See Addendum (“Add.) 1a-48a (voyage
charter contract). Voyage charter contracts “are
commonly drafted using highly standardized forms
specific to the particular trades and business needs of
the parties.” Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l
Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 666 n.1 (2010). The form used
here was the ASBATANKVOY charter party form,
Pet. App. 279a, which “is one of the most universally
accepted and widely used charter-parties in the ocean
transportation of crude oil, petroleum products, and
liquid chemicals.” Br. of The Maritime Law Ass’n of
the United States and The Ass’n of Ship Brokers &
Agents (USA) Inc. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Pet’rs 4 (“MLA/ASBA Petition-stage Br.”).
The
contract between Star and CARCO provided that any
disputes between the parties would be governed by
U.S. law. Add. 35a. Frescati, the titled ship owner,
was not a party to the contract and was not
mentioned in the contract.
The voyage charter
defined Star as the “owner” of the vessel for purposes
of the contract. Id. at 1a.
The voyage charter also included the following “safe
berth” clause, see Add. 8a:
[t]he vessel shall load and discharge at any safe
place or wharf, . . . which shall be designated and
procured by the Charterer, provided the Vessel
can proceed thereto, lie at, and depart therefrom
always safely afloat, any lighterage [cargo
transfer] being at the expense, risk and peril of
the Charterer. . . .
It also provided that:
5
The vessel . . . shall, with all convenient
dispatch, proceed as ordered to Loading Port(s)
named . . . or so near thereunto as she may
safely get (always afloat) . . . and being so loaded
shall forthwith proceed, as ordered on signing
Bills of Lading, direct to the Discharging Port(s),
or so near thereunto as she may safely get
(always afloat), and deliver said cargo.
Add. 4a. See also Add. 24a (rider provision specifying
that the discharge ports would be: “One (1) or two (2)
safe port(s) United States Atlantic Coast . . . ”)
(emphasis added).1 Although the voyage charter did
not specify that the discharge berth would be
CARCO’s refinery in Paulsboro, New Jersey, the
Athos I’s captain and crew had notice of the
destination prior to the voyage. See, e.g., Pet. App.
333a (noting that the bill of lading signed by the
captain prior to departure specified Paulsboro, New
Jersey as the destination).
The Casualty. The casualty occurred on
November 26, 2004, near the end of the ship’s 1900mile voyage. During the voyage, CARCO had no role
in operating the vessel or making navigational
decisions. The captain and crew were employed and
controlled by the vessel, not CARCO. In addition, the
vessel (not CARCO) selected, hired, and supervised a
local river pilot and a docking pilot to assist the
captain in navigating the Delaware River and
docking at the Paulsboro berth.
The Athos I was crossing and “approximately
halfway through” an area of the Delaware River
1 Technically, the first quoted provision is a “safe berth”
clause and the other provisions establish a “safe port” obligation.
We refer to these provisions collectively as the “safe berth”
clause, as did the courts below. See Pet. App. 13a-14a, 275a.
6
known as Federal Anchorage No. 9 (the “Federal
Anchorage Area”), when the vessel struck an
abandoned, nine-ton anchor. Pet. App. 281a-282a.
The Anchorage is essentially a federally maintained
and regulated parking lot for large ships waiting to
dock along, or depart from, the Delaware River. The
entirety of the Federal Anchorage Area, including
where the abandoned anchor laid, is open to general
commercial and recreational vessel traffic and “is
neither controlled nor maintained by CARCO.” Id. at
285a. The Athos I was still some 900 feet (or three
football fields) away from CARCO’s berth and well
within the Federal Anchorage Area when it hit the
anchor. Id. at 282a, 329a (illustration). The Athos I
was a single-hull vessel, and its hull was punctured
by contact with the anchor, causing approximately
263,000 gallons of crude oil to spill into the Delaware
River. Id. at 275a, 278a.
The Cleanup under the Oil Pollution Act. The
post-casualty cleanup was conducted pursuant to the
Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (“OPA”), Pub. L. No. 101380, 104 Stat. 484, codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701, et
seq., a statute passed in the wake of the ExxonValdez incident. OPA was designed to “encourage
rapid private party responses” to oil spills, In re
Complaint of Metlife Capital Corp., 132 F.3d 818, 822
(1st Cir. 1997), by identifying “responsible part[ies],”
who are required to pay for a cleanup in the first
instance. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a). As the titled owner of
the vessel that discharged the oil, Frescati was
designated the “responsible party.” Id. § 2701(32)(A).
OPA also functions as a cost-spreading scheme and
permits “responsible part[ies]” to limit their liability.
Id. § 2704. Frescati filed an ex parte administrative
claim asking the National Pollution Fund Center
(“NPFC”) to limit its liability as a responsible party
7
under § 2704 of OPA, and reimburse it for cleanup
costs incurred above the limit. The NPFC limited
Frescati’s liability to $45,475,000 and reimbursed
Frescati from the federal Oil Spill Liability Trust
Fund for approximately $88 million in excess of the
limitation amount that Frescati paid to remediate the
spill. The Trust Fund, which is separate from the
general treasury, consists of taxes collected on
imported petroleum products, plus payments received
from environmental taxes and penalties. 26 U.S.C.
§ 9509(b). The Trust Fund effectively requires all
members of the petroleum industry to contribute to
the costs of oil spill cleanups.
CARCO paid
approximately $103 million into this Fund between
1990 and 2004. Once the Trust Fund reimbursed
Frescati, the United States acquired by subrogation
Frescati’s rights against any third parties for the $88
million paid. 33 U.S.C. § 2715(a).
OPA further provides that a responsible party can
be exonerated from all liability if it demonstrates that
the spill was caused by “an act or omission of a third
party” and the responsible party exercised due care.
33 U.S.C. § 2703(a)(3).
Frescati applied for
exoneration under this provision, claiming quite
sensibly that the incident was the sole fault of the
unknown party that lost or discarded the anchor.
Inexplicably, Frescati voluntarily withdrew this claim
and instead opted to pursue claims against CARCO.
See Pet. App. 284a n.6 (noting that “[i]t is unclear
why Frescati withdrew this claim”). If granted,
Frescati’s exoneration claim would have reimbursed
all of its cleanup costs from the Trust Fund. See 33
U.S.C. §§ 2708(a)(1), 2713(b)(1)(B).
B. Prior Proceedings.
Respondents’ Lawsuits. On January 31, 2005,
Frescati filed an action in the district court pursuant
8
to the court’s admiralty jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1333(1).
This action was a “Petition for
Exoneration from or Limitation of Liability” brought
pursuant to 46 U.S.C. app. § 183 (2005), which caps
liability for vessel owners for certain types of claims
arising from a maritime casualty but not with respect
to liability imposed by OPA. CARCO filed a claim in
this limitation action for the loss of its cargo, and
Frescati then counterclaimed against CARCO in both
contract and tort2 for its unreimbursed cleanup costs
and additional damages (e.g., vessel damage, lost
earnings) totaling nearly $56 million. See Pet. App.
243a-247a. Frescati’s contract claim asserted that
CARCO breached the safe berth clause in the StarCARCO voyage charter contract, even though
Frescati was not a party to that contract. As partial
subrogee to Frescati’s claim, the United States later
filed a separate action against CARCO raising
contract and tort claims, in which it sought to recover
the $88 million paid by the Trust Fund to Frescati.
Star is not a party to either of these actions.
The two disputes involving CARCO were
consolidated for trial. At trial, the United States’
claim was limited to its contract claim because, by
pre-trial agreement, the United States forfeited its
tort-based theories of recovery against CARCO. The
resulting bench trial was conducted over 41 days in
2 The contract claim arose from CARCO’s role as the charterer
of the vessel. The tort claim for negligence arose from CARCO’s
separate role as the wharf owner. The tort claim is no longer at
issue. The court of appeals vacated the district court’s tort
judgment in Frescati’s favor, refusing to affirm the district
court’s holding that CARCO breached any duty owed as the
wharf owner to find the anchor located within the Federal
Anchorage Area. Pet. App. 43a.
9
the fall of 2010, and involved 61 live witnesses, 48
witnesses by deposition, and 1,800 exhibits.
First District Court Decision. The district court
found CARCO “not liable in either tort or contract.”
Pet. App. 336a. The court determined that there was
“no evidence” that CARCO or any other party to the
litigation “knew or had reason to believe that the
anchor was in the river.” Id. at 334a. “After hearing
all of the evidence,” the court concluded that “the
fault for the casualty lies with the anchor’s former
owner, who abandoned it in the river without
notifying anyone.” Id. at 344a; see also id. at 334a
(noting “supposition” that the anchor “may have been
used as part of dredging operations” by a federal
contractor).
The district court denied Frescati’s claim (and the
United States’ claim as its subrogee) that CARCO
was liable in contract pursuant to the safe berth
clause in the voyage charter. Although Frescati was
not a party to that contract, it sought to invoke the
clause “as an intended third-party beneficiary.” Pet.
App. 340a. The district court rejected this argument.
Id. at 340a-341a. The court also held that CARCO
did not breach the safe berth clause. Id. at 341a342a. The court acknowledged that some courts have
interpreted such clauses “as an unconditional
guarantee, in effect imposing strict liability” upon
charterers. Id. at 341a. The district court, however,
found “more persuasive” the view of the Fifth Circuit
in Orduna S.A. v. Zen-Noh Grain Corp., 913 F.2d
1149, 1156-57 (5th Cir. 1990), that such clauses
instead “impose[] upon the charterer a duty of due
diligence to select a safe berth.” Pet. App. 341a-342a.
The district court found that “CARCO fulfilled its
duty of due diligence” and that “the port and berth
were generally safe,” given the “volume of commercial
10
traffic that passed without incident through the
Anchorage.” Pet. App. 342a. The court further found
that Frescati was “familiar” with the port and berth,
because 14 vessels operated by Tsakos had called at
the Paulsboro berth in the six years prior to the
casualty, including the sister ship to the Athos I. Id.
at 343a. The court also observed that “the crew of the
ATHOS I did not devote the care and attention to
preparation of the voyage planning that might have
been advisable.” Id. at 344a.
Finally, the district court rejected Frescati’s
negligence claim against CARCO in its role as the
wharfinger (the operator of the Paulsboro wharf)
because the court concluded that CARCO “had no
duty to scan for hazards within the Anchorage.” Pet.
App. 338a.
Initial Third Circuit Decision. The court of
appeals vacated most of the district court’s opinion
and remanded. It determined that the district court’s
narrative discussion of its factual findings and legal
conclusions, and the “overall dearth of clear factual
findings,” constituted “a violation” of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 52 and necessitated a remand. Pet.
App. 291a-292a. Despite its conclusion that proper
appellate review was not possible, the court of
appeals proceeded to review the case and make its
own legal determinations.
The court concluded that Frescati’s contract claim
is viable. The court of appeals acknowledged that
third-party beneficiary status requires proof that the
contracting parties intended to confer a benefit on the
third party (not merely that a benefit accrued to it).
Nevertheless, the court held that “the Athos I—and
by extension, its owner, Frescati—was an implied” or
“corollary” beneficiary of the safe berth clause in the
voyage charter between Star and CARCO because the
11
clause “necessarily benefits the vessel.”
277a, 295a.
Pet. App.
The court of appeals then turned to the scope of
CARCO’s safe berth obligation and held that the
district court had “incorrectly” adopted the Fifth
Circuit’s position in Orduna that a safe berth
provision “require[s] only due diligence.” Pet. App.
298a; see also id. at 304a (“we . . . decline to follow”
the Fifth Circuit). Instead, the Third Circuit adopted
what it called the Second Circuit’s “longstanding
formulation” that a safe berth provision guarantees
the safety of the berth “without regard to the amount
of diligence taken by the charterer.” Id. at 303a304a; see also id. at 303a (clause is an “‘express
assurance’ warranty”), 304a n.18 (emphasizing the
“strict nature” of the “warranty” and rejecting the
argument that it “applies only to known hazards”).
The court of appeals remanded the question
whether the safe berth clause “was actually
breached.” Pet. App. 305a. It reasoned that the
relevant inquiry was whether the berth was “unsafe
for a ship of the Athos I’s agreed-upon dimensions
and draft,” and that the district court’s findings did
not answer that question.
Id. at 304a-305a.
Although Frescati’s negligence claim was allowed to
proceed because the court of appeals found that
CARCO had a duty of care, the court remanded the
questions of the exact standard of care required,
breach of duty, and causation. Id. at 312a-324a.
The court of appeals denied rehearing and
rehearing en banc. Pet. App. 345a-346a. This Court
denied certiorari. Citgo Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Frescati
Shipping Co., 134 S. Ct. 1279 (2014).
District Court Decision on Remand. In the
remand proceeding, CARCO newly faced the prospect
12
of strict liability to Frescati under CARCO’s contract
with Star. After a “successor-judge” hearing under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 63 that took place
over 31 days in 2015, the district court ruled for
Frescati on the contract and negligence claims. With
respect to the contract claim, the district court stated
that it was bound by the Third Circuit’s rulings that
Frescati was a third-party beneficiary of the StarCARCO contract and that the safe berth provision
constitutes an absolute guarantee of the safety of the
berth. Pet. App. 79a-80a, 165a-168a. Applying that
strict liability standard, it found CARCO liable based
upon its view that the safe berth provision was an
express assurance that the Athos I would reach the
berth safely, provided that it maintained a draft of 37
feet or less, and its finding that the vessel maintained
that draft at the time of the casualty. Id. at 168a171a.3 The district court made its liability determination without any consideration of CARCO’s
diligence and notwithstanding the undisputed fact
that CARCO had no knowledge of, and bore no fault
for, the hidden anchor. The court awarded Frescati
$55.5 million in damages, and awarded the
3 The Athos I’s draft at the time of the casualty—the
measurement from the water-line to the vessel’s bottom—was
sharply disputed. Since the district court could not rely on the
vessel’s own unreliable documentation to determine its draft,
the court’s finding that the vessel’s draft was 37 feet or less
ultimately depended upon its finding that at some unknown
point in time the nine-ton anchor had sprung upright from its
resting “flukes-down” position on the riverbed. That finding in
turn depended upon the court’s speculation—without
evidentiary support—that an unidentified vessel’s “sweeping
anchor chain” somehow snagged the anchor and pulled it
upright in time for the casualty. Pet. App. 126a-127a. And that
finding further depended upon the notion that somehow the
anchor returned to the “flukes-down” position in which it was
discovered after the casualty. Id. at 127a-128a.
13
government $88 million for its subrogated contract
claim. Id. at 258a-259a. Recognizing the incredibly
unfair outcome of imposing the full costs of the oil
spill on the one party least able to prevent it, the
court then applied the doctrine of equitable
recoupment and halved the government’s award to
$44 million. Id. at 233a-234a, 259a.
Subsequent Third Circuit Decision. A different
panel of the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s
damages awards. The new panel applied (with no
further analysis) the strict liability contract ruling of
the prior panel. Quoting the earlier opinion, the
court below accepted that the safe berth obligation is
“an express assurance made without regard to the
amount of diligence taken by the charterer.” Pet.
App. 9a, 14a (quoting 718 F.3d at 203). Thus, it did
not matter whether the district court’s wholly
speculative explanation for the accident—the
“sweeping anchor chain” theory—was “plausible or
implausible.” Id. at 17a. And, like the district court,
the panel made no inquiry into CARCO’s conduct and
found no shortcomings in the diligence that CARCO
exercised as the vessel charterer.
The panel vacated the district court’s judgment in
favor of Frescati on the negligence claim. The district
court had created from whole cloth a purported duty
that CARCO should have used side-scan sonar in the
federally-controlled Anchorage to discover potential
hazards. Pet. App. 25a-29a, 43a. Thus, even though
the panel did not dispute that CARCO bore no fault
for the casualty, it affirmed the district court’s
damages award. The panel below also vacated the
district court’s equitable-recoupment holding, id. at
35a-39a, which increased CARCO’s exposure by $44
million and resulted in an award of more than $140
million (plus tens of millions more in pre- and post-
14
judgment interest). CARCO thus was illogically and
unfairly left to pay the entire tab for the oil spill.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. The language of the safe berth clause provides no
support for the court of appeals’ interpretation that
the clause is an implied warranty that imposes strict
liability on charterers for all damages arising out of a
vessel’s entry, use, or exit from a designated berth.
Under the plain language, the charterer gains the
right to select the place or wharf of discharge, and the
vessel gains the corresponding right to refuse an
unsafe berth, with the charterer bearing any extra
expenses resulting from the vessel master’s refusal to
enter the unsafe berth. Although the charterer’s duty
to select a “safe” berth naturally implies an obligation
to exercise some diligence in doing so, nothing in the
text can be construed as a warranty against unknown
and unknowable risks.
Leading commentators Gilmore & Black adopt this
textual view of safe berth clauses. They acknowledge
that charterer liability for losses resulting from a
ship entering an unsafe berth may be appropriate in
certain circumstances, such as where a charterer has
special knowledge of existing risks. The charterer’s
liability in these circumstances does not arise from
the contract clause, however, but instead should be
based on tort principles or other bodies of law. Under
Gilmore & Black’s purely textual view, safe berth
clauses simply do not speak to accidents resulting
from unforeseeable dangers such as occurred in this
case.
The court of appeals’ assertion that the clause’s
“always afloat” language supports the warranty
interpretation misses the mark. This Court and
others have given the words “always afloat” their
15
ordinary meaning, construing them simply to require
that the berth or port permit the vessel to float,
rather than strike the ground.
The record contains no evidence that the parties
intended for CARCO to assume strict liability, and
other provisions in the voyage charter contract
confirm that this was not the parties’ intent. This
contextual evidence includes numerous negotiated
express warranties in the contract, which show that
the parties knew the importance of using express
language to create warranties when that was their
intent. The contract also required Star Tankers to
maintain $1 billion in oil pollution insurance, which
provides powerful evidence that the parties never
intended for CARCO to bear strict liability for an oil
spill.
II. The warranty interpretation conflicts with this
Court’s controlling precedent. This Court has never
interpreted safe berth clauses as warranties. To the
contrary, it disclaimed the warranty interpretation in
Atkins v. Fibre Disintegrating Co., 85 U.S. (18 Wall.)
272, 299 (1874), affirming a ruling of the district
court. This Court’s rulings in Atkins and its other
safe berth decisions are consistent with Gilmore &
Black’s textual interpretation of safe berth clauses as
limited provisions focused on resolving disputes over
expenses incurred when designated discharge
locations involved known or knowable hazards. This
Court’s rulings did not hold charterers liable for the
consequences of unknown and unknowable hazards.
The warranty interpretation lacks a solid
foundation. The court of appeals principally relied
upon a line of Second Circuit decisions that adopted
the warranty interpretation, but none of them
addressed this Court’s precedents or provided any
reasoning to support the assertion that a safe berth
16
clause is an unqualified warranty that imposes strict
liability. Moreover, earlier Second Circuit decisions
did not always follow this approach and that court
has never explained its abrupt shift. Given the
uncertain origin and scant justification for the
warranty interpretation, the Fifth Circuit properly
rejected it in favor of the due diligence interpretation.
III. Maritime policy considerations demonstrate
that maritime commerce is best served by
interpreting safe berth clauses as requiring
charterers to do no more than exercise due diligence.
The warranty interpretation is a form of strict
liability for charterers, yet the rationale for this
approach is a mystery. This Court has invoked
special justifications to adopt strict liability in limited
maritime contexts: liability should be imposed on the
party best able to protect persons from hazardous
equipment, and solicitude for the welfare of uniquely
vulnerable maritime workers. These justifications
are completely lacking in the context of safe berth
clauses. Those purely contractual provisions merely
allocate
monetary
responsibility
between
sophisticated commercial entities for economic losses.
Because there is no economic or public policy
justification for interpreting safe berth clauses as
strict liability warranties, imposing strict and
unlimited liability on charterers would be
detrimental to maritime commerce.
The court of appeals’ policy rationales for adopting
the warranty interpretation are unsound. The court’s
principal rationale was that the charterer has
superior information about a berth and port, but this
is plainly not true today (if it ever was), where
charterer and vessel owner both have abundant
information
from
modern
equipment
and
instantaneous information sources. A clear policy
17
disadvantage of the strict liability approach is that it
precludes
consideration
of
the
facts
and
circumstances of individual cases, resulting in
liability on wholly innocent charterers.
The
judgment against CARCO starkly illustrates the
harsh results for which the strict liability approach
has been rightly criticized.
The warranty interpretation also incongruously
results in different standards of care for wharfingers
and charterers. This Court held long ago that
wharfingers are held to a “reasonable diligence”
standard in operating their berths, Smith v. Burnett,
173 U.S. 430, 433 (1899), and the court of appeals
reversed the negligence judgment against CARCO
under that standard. No sound rationale exists for
this Court to hold that charterers face a different,
and significantly more onerous, standard of care
when they select the berths for vessels that they hire.
Finally, the warranty interpretation produces an
inequitable result in this case. The court of appeals’
judgment, which shifts all liability to CARCO for an
extraordinary accident that was not its fault, is
grossly unfair. This is particularly true because
Congress provided for a much different outcome in
OPA, which includes a cost-spreading mechanism for
oil spill cleanups. Congress provided for the OPA
Trust Fund to absorb the entire cost of a spill, if
caused by an unknown third party. That approach
effectively spreads the costs to the whole industry.
The judgment turns OPA on its head by requiring
CARCO—not subject to any liability under OPA—to
bear all of the costs, even though CARCO already
paid tens of millions of dollars into the OPA Fund.
The judgment should be reversed.
18
ARGUMENT
Where, as here, a contract “is a maritime one, and
the dispute is not inherently local, federal law
controls the contract interpretation.” Norfolk S. Ry.
v. Kirby, 543 U.S. 14, 22-23 (2004). This lawmaking
power in the federal courts derives from their
exclusive jurisdiction over maritime cases. Id.; U.S.
Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see Air & Liquid Sys. Corp.
v. DeVries, 139 S. Ct. 986, 992 (2019) (“the federal
courts fashion federal maritime law”). This Court’s
task, therefore, is to interpret the plain terms of the
parties’ agreement and “set an efficient default rule”
for the maritime contract at issue. Kirby, 543 U.S. at
32.
In performing this task, the Court looks to the
fundamental “purpose of the grant” of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction, which is “the protection of
maritime commerce.” Exxon Corp. v. Cent. Gulf
Lines, Inc., 500 U.S. 603, 608 (1991) (quoting Sisson
v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 367 (1990)); see Jerome B.
Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513
U.S. 527, 544 (1995). When formulating federal
maritime principles, this Court “may examine, among
other sources, judicial opinions, legislation, treatises,
and scholarly writings.” DeVries, 139 S. Ct. at 992.
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS’ INTERPRETATION OF THE SAFE BERTH CLAUSE AS A
WARRANTY MISREADS THE CONTRACTUAL TEXT.
Maritime contracts are “construed like any other
contracts,” that is, “by their terms and consistent
with the intent of the parties.” Kirby, 543 U.S. at 31;
see Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 212(1) (1981)
(“The interpretation of an integrated agreement is
directed to the meaning of the terms of the writing or
19
writings in light of the circumstances”). The appropriate place to start is therefore the language of the
safe berth clause. That language provides no support
for the court of appeals’ interpretation of the safe
berth clause as a warranty that imposes liability
regardless of fault.
The text of the safe berth provision in the StarCARCO agreement provides:
[t]he vessel shall load and discharge at any safe
place or wharf, . . . which shall be designated and
procured by the Charterer, provided the Vessel
can proceed thereto, lie at, and depart therefrom
always safely afloat, any lighterage [transfer of
cargo] being at the expense, risk and peril of the
Charterer. . . .
Add. 8a.
A. The Terms Of The Safe Berth Clause Do
Not Provide For Liability Regardless Of
Fault.
1. Under the plain language of the safe berth
provision, the charterer gains the right to select the
place or wharf of discharge: the discharge location
“shall be designated and procured by the Charterer.”
Add. 8a. The requirement that the berth be a “safe”
berth has been interpreted to mean that “during the
relevant period of time, the particular chartered
vessel can proceed to it, use it, and depart from it
without, in the absence of abnormal weather or other
occurrences, being exposed to dangers which cannot
be avoided by good navigation and seamanship.”
Julian Cooke et al., Voyage Charters ¶ 5A.21 (4th ed.
2014) (“Cooke”).
Under the “provided” clause, the vessel gains the
corresponding right to refuse an unsafe berth, with
20
the charterer bearing any extra expenses resulting
from the vessel master’s refusal to enter the unsafe
berth. See Grant Gilmore & Charles L. Black, Jr.,
The Law of Admiralty § 4-4, at 204 (2d ed. 1975)
(“Gilmore & Black”)4 (“It is clear on the face of it that,
if the port or the berth is unsafe, the master is
excused from taking his ship in, and the charterer
must bear the extra expense, such as lighterage,
entailed by the refusal.”); 2 Thomas J. Schoenbaum,
Admiralty and Maritime Law § 11-10 (6th ed. 2018)
(“Schoenbaum”) (“the ship can refuse to proceed to
the port nominated without being in breach of the
charter”); Peter G. Hartman, Safe Port/Berth
Clauses: Warranty or Due Diligence?, 21 Tul. Mar.
4 This
Court routinely cites Gilmore & Black on admiralty
matters. See, e.g., Dutra Grp. v. Batterton, No. 18-266, slip op.
at 7-8 (U.S. June 24, 2019); Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557
U.S. 404, 412, 413, 423-24 (2009); Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co.,
543 U.S. 481, 487-88 (2005); Kirby, 543 U.S. at 24; Vimar
Seguros y Reaseguros, S A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528,
533-34 (1995); Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 354, 356
(1995); Howlett v. Birkdale Shipping Co., 512 U.S. 92, 97, 102
(1994); Sw. Marine, Inc. v. Gizoni, 502 U.S. 81, 91-92 (1991);
McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 342-43 (1991);
Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 25 (1990); and Dir.,
Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Perini N. River Assocs.,
459 U.S. 297, 310-11, 324 n.33 (1983).
The principal maritime Circuits also look to Gilmore & Black
as a leading treatise. See, e.g., Man Ferrostaal, Inc. v. M/V
Akili, 704 F.3d 77, 85 (2d Cir. 2012) (“the classic admiralty
treatise”); Neely v. Club Med Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 63 F.3d 166,
176 (3d Cir. 1995) (en banc) (“a leading admiralty treatise”);
Boudreaux v. Am. Workover, Inc., 680 F.2d 1034, 1046 (5th Cir.
1982) (en banc) (“the highly respected Gilmore and Black”);
Capt’n Mark v. Sea Fever Corp., 692 F.2d 163, 167 (1st Cir.
1982) (“[a] leading treatise”). Indeed, a Westlaw search found
that the Gilmore & Black treatise has been cited 960 times by
this Court and the federal courts of appeals, including 56 times
by this Court and more than 50 times by the Third Circuit.
21
L.J. 537, 550 (1997) (“Hartman”) (“the very
terminology of these clauses indicates that the
master has the right to refuse to enter an unsafe port
or dock at an unsafe berth.”). The vessel’s right of
refusal provides a significant protection to vessel
owners because “[c]ourts and arbitrators have
generally accorded great latitude to a master’s
decision to refuse to enter a port or berth on the
grounds that it is unsafe.” Cooke, supra, at ¶ 5A.34.
Although the charterer’s duty to select a “safe”
berth naturally implies an obligation to exercise some
diligence in doing so, nothing in the text of the
provision can be construed as a warranty against
unknown and unknowable risks. And there is no
language assigning all risk of loss to the charterer,
regardless of fault. Leading commentators, Gilmore
& Black, state that safe berth clauses expressly
provide the vessel with the right to refuse a berth
that the master regards as unsafe, and require
charterers to pay the shipowner’s expenses attendant
to such a refusal (e.g., lighterage, delay charges). But
they go on to argue that “it is by no means necessary
that [safe berth clauses] be given the quite different
meaning of creating an affirmative liability of
charterer to ship, in case of mishap.” Gilmore &
Black, supra, § 4-4 at 205. In their view, “[v]ery clear
language” should be required in order for “liability [to
be] shifted to the charterer,” and “this clarity of
language is missing” from standard clauses such as
the ASBATANKVOY clause. Id.
Given the narrow circumstances addressed by safe
berth clauses, Gilmore & Black persuasively argue
that the clauses cannot support the sweeping liability
imposed on charterers by the courts below. They
acknowledge that charterer liability for losses
resulting from a ship entering an unsafe berth may
22
be appropriate in “compelling special circumstances,”
such as where a charterer’s “special knowledge or
actions make it reasonable to charge him.” Id. at 205,
207. Special circumstances may exist, for example,
where the charterer has knowledge of conditions that
render the berth unsafe but the master lacks such
knowledge, or where the charterer should reasonably
have a special “duty of inquiry.” Id. at 205. The
charterer’s liability in these circumstances does not
arise from the safe berth clause, however, but instead
because “it ought to be held to be an actionable wrong
for [the charterer] to invite the ship without warning
into a peril known to him, with or without the [safe
berth] clause[].” Id. (noting that absent special
factors, there is “no reason” for holding charterers
liable for mishap “on the basis of the safe-port and
safe-berth clauses”). Thus, Gilmore & Black adopt a
textually faithful view of safe berth clauses as limited
provisions that resolve disputes over expenses
incurred when masters refuse designated discharge
locations.
The clauses simply do not speak to
accidents resulting from unforeseeable dangers such
as occurred in this case. Liability for such events, in
Gilmore & Black’s view, should arise out of tort
principles or other sources of law.
The Fifth Circuit properly adopted Gilmore &
Black’s textual analysis. The court agreed that
giving safe berth clauses the “meaning of creating an
affirmative liability of charterer to ship, in case of
mishap” is “by no means necessary.” Orduna, 913
F.2d at 1156-57 (quoting Gilmore & Black, supra, § 44 at 205).5 The court therefore construed safe berth
clauses as “impos[ing] upon the charterer a duty of
5 The safe berth clause in Orduna “provided that the
charterers should designate ‘safe discharging berths [the] vessel
being always afloat.’” 913 F.3d at 1155 n.6.
23
due diligence to select a safe berth.” Id. at 1157. On
the facts of the case before it, the Fifth Circuit
vacated the district court’s judgment, which had held
a non-negligent charterer liable for damage to a ship
in a berth that occurred when it was struck by a steel
loading arm that fell from a grain elevator tower
owned by another company. Id. The liability finding
of the district court in Orduna illustrates the onerous
reach of the warranty approach in holding charterers
liable for accidents that they had no ability to
prevent. The Fifth Circuit properly rejected it as a
matter of law.
Notably, the Association of Ship Brokers & Agents
(USA) Inc. (“ASBA”)—the trade association that
promulgated and updates the ASBATANKVOY
form—rejects any suggestion that the text of the form
clause should be construed as a warranty. To the
contrary, it has informed the Court that the safe
berth provision in the CARCO-Star contract “does not
specify whether it imposes a strict-liability warranty
or a due-diligence obligation.” MLA/ASBA Petitionstage Br. 23. This confirms that the warranty
interpretation has no foundation in the text of the
provision.
2. The court of appeals asserted that the clause’s
“always afloat” language “plainly suggests an express
assurance,” but it offered no explanation or support.
Pet. App. 304a; see also U.S. Opp. 13-14. As noted,
ASBA repudiates this view of the form language that
it created. MLA/ASBA Petition-stage Br. 23. And
rightly so, because that simple phrasing is hardly
“very clear language” articulating a risk-allocation
between the parties, much less an onerous allocation
of unforeseeable risk to the charterer of liability
without regard to fault.
24
Indeed, this Court and others have given the words
“always afloat” their ordinary meaning, construing
them simply to require that the berth or port permit
the vessel to float, rather than strike the ground (or
encounter physical barriers that block the ship’s
path). In Mencke v. Cargo of Java Sugar, 187 U.S.
248, 253 (1902), for example, this Court explained
that “a ship could not be said to be afloat, whether
the obstacle encountered was a shoal or a bar in the
port for which she could not proceed, or a bridge
under or through which she could not pass.” The
court in Tweedie Trading Co. v. New York & Boston
Dyewood Co., 127 F. 278, 280-81 (2d Cir. 1903),
similarly explained that “the provision that the vessel
shall load and discharge where she can always safely
lie afloat can be given no other construction than that
the respondent became bound to assign to the ship a
berth in a suitable depth of water.” See also Crisp v.
U.S. & Australasia S.S. Co., 124 F. 748, 749-50
(S.D.N.Y. 1903) (“‘always safely lie afloat’’’ implies
“that a port to be named by the charterer shall be one
where the vessel can safely get with her whole cargo
and can discharge her whole cargo without touching
the ground”); Cooke, supra, at ¶ 5.60 (explaining that
although “[a] vessel may lie aground and be safe,” the
purpose of “‘lie always afloat’” language is to “put the
matter beyond doubt” and specify that the vessel
“should remain afloat”); Gilmore & Black, supra, § 44 at 203 n.31 (noting that without “always afloat”
language, a “mere stipulation for a safe berth does
not always imply an undertaking that the vessel will
be afloat at low tide”).
These interpretations of “always afloat” reflect the
recognition that grounding poses a significant risk of
vessel damage, which owners wish to avoid, and
which charterers can foresee and prevent by choosing
25
a berth or port with sufficient water depth. Given
this straightforward meaning of “always afloat,” the
court of appeals’ unsupported assertion that the
words instead are some sort of code for strict liability
for all risks incurred in accessing or using a port or
berth is untenable.
B. The Parties Did Not Intend For CARCO
To Assume Strict Liability.
As to the parties’ intent, the court of appeals did
not cite any record evidence—and there is none—
remotely indicating that the intention of the parties
was for CARCO to assume absolute liability for all
possible hazards (including unknown hazards) near
the designated berth. Indeed, it would be foolhardy
for a charterer to assume sweeping liability for any
accident that occurs as a ship approaches the
charterer’s
nominated
destination,
including
accidents caused by hazards that were created by
others and of which the charterer is unaware.
Moreover, other provisions in the voyage charter
contract confirm that this was not the parties’ intent.
For example, the parties made numerous express
warranties in the charter. The charter contains the
“Charterer’s warrant that all necessary details
required by [U.S. Customs and Border Patrol] for
clearance of the cargo” would be supplied prior to the
discharge port. Add. 26a. It also includes more than
a dozen owner “warrant[ies]” that bound Star
Tankers, including warranties that the vessel would
be in compliance with all U.S. Coast Guard
regulations, Add. 30a; Star Tankers would have a
drug and alcohol abuse policy in effect during the
charter, Add. 41a; the vessel would be in compliance
with international and U.S. tanker safety
regulations, Add. 43a; the vessel had not traded to
Cuba in the last six months, Add. 44a; and the vessel
26
had submitted an oil spill response plan to the U.S.
Coast Guard in compliance with OPA, Add. 44a-45a.
These clauses make plain that the parties knew the
importance of using express language to create
warranties when that was their intent. Accordingly,
the absence of any express warranty language in the
safe berth clause confirms that the parties did not
intend for it to be a warranty.6
One of the owner warranties is also noteworthy
because of its substance. Star Tankers warranted
that it would maintain $1 billion in “insurance
coverage for oil pollution” throughout the period of
the charter. Add. 42a. This provision requiring Star
Tankers to carry insurance for the precise type of loss
that occurred in this case indicates that the parties
contemplated that Star Tankers or its insurer, rather
than CARCO, would pay the expenses and damages
for an oil spill cleanup. It therefore provides powerful
evidence that the parties never intended for the safe
berth clause to render CARCO strictly liable for an oil
spill, particularly to an entity not a party to the
contract. Cf. Gilmore & Black, supra, § 4-4 at 205
(noting that the fact that vessel owners carry
insurance covering damage to the ship “cannot be
irrelevant to an evaluation of the suitability of the
allocation of risk” under safe berth clauses).
6 The voyage charter expressly provided that Star Tanker’s
duty to provide a seaworthy vessel was a due diligence
obligation. Add. 4a. As explained by Cooke, supra, at ¶ 52.5,
this due diligence language in the ASBATANKVOY form
“merely reflect[ed]” the rule that otherwise applied under
“Article IV rule 1 of the Hague Rules” (International Convention
for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of
Lading, Aug. 25, 1924, https://www.jus.uio.no/english/services/
library/treaties/07/7-04/hague-rules.xml).
27
In addition, Paragraph 19 of the ASBATANKVOY
form (General Exceptions Clause) provides that a
charterer is not liable for loss or damages resulting
from “perils of the seas.” Add. 14a. “Perils of the
sea[s]” are “those perils which are peculiar to the
sea,” and which are “unforeseeable” and “cannot be
guarded against by the ordinary exertions of human
skill and prudence.” Ferrara v. A. & V. Fishing, Inc.,
99 F.3d 449, 454 (1st Cir. 1996). It has long been
established that “perils of the seas” include collision
with a submerged object. See, e.g., The G.R. Booth,
171 U.S. 450, 461 (1898) (referring to a “ship coming
against a rock or shoal or other external object” as a
“peril of the sea”); Ferrara, 99 F.3d at 454 (“striking a
submerged object” is a “peril of the sea”); Campbell
Soup Co. v. Fed. Motorship Corp., 1935 WL 57939,
1935 A.M.C. 634, 641 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 1935)
(“vessel striking an unknown submerged body” is “a
peril of the sea”); 1 William Tetley, Marine Cargo
Claims, at 1060 (4th ed. 2008) (perils of the sea
include “the ship striking sunken rock”).
This
General Exceptions clause therefore further confirms
that the parties did not intend for the safe berth
clause to impose liability on CARCO—strict or
otherwise—for maritime hazards that it could not
foresee or prevent, such as the Athos I striking the
unknown anchor.
To have held otherwise
misconstrues the nature of the safe berth clause.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS’ INTERPRETATION OF THE SAFE BERTH CLAUSE AS
A WARRANTY IS CONTRARY TO THIS
COURT’S DECISIONS AND LACKS ANY
SOUND LEGAL FOUNDATION.
In addition to being atextual and at odds with the
contract’s contextual language, the court of appeals’
interpretation of the safe berth clause as a warranty
28
is contrary to this Court’s precedent and lacks a
sound foundation in judicial opinions and other
maritime authority.
A. The Warranty Interpretation Conflicts
With This Court’s Controlling Decisions.
This Court’s decisions involving safe berth clauses
date back to the nineteenth century and have stood
for more than 100 years. The Court has never
interpreted the clauses as warranties. Instead, it has
disclaimed the warranty interpretation.
This Court first addressed a safe berth clause in
Atkins v. Fibre Disintegrating Co., 85 U.S. (18 Wall.)
272, 299 (1874), affirming a ruling of the district
court. See Atkins v. Fibre Disintegrating Co., 2 F.
Cas. 78 (E.D.N.Y. 1868) (No. 601) (Benedict, J.). The
district court held that a charterer was not liable
under a safe berth clause7 for damage that a vessel
incurred when it struck a reef while departing from
Port Morant, Jamaica after the breeze failed. The
district court did not hold that the clause was a
warranty.
To the contrary, it held that the
charterer’s obligation was limited to providing “a port
which this vessel could enter and depart from
without legal restraint, and without incurring more
than the ordinary perils of the seas.” Id. at 79
(emphasis added).
The court’s interpretation that the selected port
could not pose “more than” the ordinary perils of the
seas clearly indicates that the charterer does not
guarantee that the port is free of all perils and that
7 The charter contract provided that the vessel would load a
cargo of bamboo in Kingston, Jamaica and that the charterer
had the privilege of sending the vessel to a “second safe port” to
load additional cargo. 2 F. Cas. at 79.
29
the charterer undertakes no duty and assumes no
liability with respect to “ordinary perils.” Applying
that standard, the district court found that Port
Morant could not “be held to be a safe port” for the
vessel at issue because it posed an unusual and
known hazard: any ship of the vessel’s size “must
strike the reefs if, by chance, the breeze should fail
her while passing in or out.”
Id.
The court
nevertheless held that the charterer was not liable
because the ship master had knowledge of this
danger and did not exercise his right to reject the
unsafe port. Id. The district court also spurned the
vessel owner’s argument that the charterer’s agent
had made “representations which amounted to a
warranty.” Id. at 79-80.
This Court affirmed the district court’s ruling. The
Court mostly addressed a jurisdictional issue, but
also addressed the merits and stated that it had
conducted “a careful examination of the record” and
“found no reason to dissent from the views of the
learned district judge.” 85 U.S. at 299. It explained
that it would “announce the same conclusions” as the
district judge because they were “clearly expressed”
and “ably vindicated.” Id. The Court thus endorsed
the district court’s view that the safe berth clause is
not a warranty, and instead disclaims the charterer’s
liability for “ordinary perils” of maritime navigation.
The court of appeals tersely brushed Atkins aside in
a footnote, asserting that the outcome was
attributable to the fact that the ship’s master was
“fully aware of the port’s dangers and yet did not
object.” Pet. App. 301a-302a n.14. While this is a
correct characterization of the outcome, it ignores
that this Court also approved the district court’s
interpretation of the safe berth clause as a disclaimer
30
of the charterer’s liability for “ordinary perils” of
maritime transportation.
Notably, none of the Second Circuit decisions that
the court of appeals followed in adopting the
warranty approach addressed, or even cited, Atkins.
The Fifth Circuit, in contrast, discussed and relied
upon Atkins in rejecting the warranty approach.
Orduna, 913 F.2d at 1156-57. Commentators also
have rightfully criticized the warranty approach as
“inconsistent” with the better reading of Atkins. See
Gilmore & Black, supra, § 4-4 at 207; see also id. at
205 (noting that Atkins has never been “overruled or
weakened” by this Court).
Frescati and the United States argued at the
petition stage that this Court’s subsequent decision in
The Gazelle & Cargo, 128 U.S. 474 (1888), embraced
the warranty approach. Frescati Opp. 13, 15; U.S.
Opp. 12. This is wishful thinking. In The Gazelle,
this Court did not address whether the safe berth
clause at issue8 provided a warranty (a term not used
in the opinion). Tellingly, the Second Circuit never
relied upon The Gazelle in any of its decisions
interpreting safe berth clauses as warranties.
The question in The Gazelle was whether the
charterer was liable for expenses and lost revenue
resulting from the ship master’s refusal of a berth
with a known and insurmountable safety hazard: the
berth was “in a fjord or inlet having a bar across its
mouth, which it was impossible for the Gazelle to
pass.” 128 U.S. at 485. This Court stated that the
8 The safe berth clause in The Gazelle provided that “the
charterers were bound to order the vessel ‘to a safe, direct,
Norwegian or Danish port, or as near thereunto as she can
safely get, and always lay and discharge afloat.’” The Gazelle,
128 U.S. at 485.
31
“clear meaning” of the safe berth clause was that the
charterer was bound to order the Gazelle “to a port
which she can safely enter with her cargo.” Id. It
reasonably found that the charterer was “rightly held
to be in default and answerable in damages” because
it had “insisted on ordering her” to the obviously
dangerous port. Id. at 486. The Court therefore
found the charterer liable for the vessel owner’s lost
freight revenue under the charter and other
expenses. Id. at 486-87. Because the charterer in
The Gazelle designated a berth with a known hazard
that the master rightly refused, its liability for
damages under the safe berth clause was clear and
this Court had no occasion to address whether the
clause imposed strict liability on the charterer for
unknown and unknowable risks.
This Court reached a similar result in Mencke, 187
U.S. 248. The Court again did not describe the safe
berth clause at issue9 as a warranty; in fact it never
used that term. The question in Mencke was whether
the charterer was liable for extra expenses resulting
from the ship master’s refusal of a berth that would
have required the ship to pass under the Brooklyn
Bridge—which the ship could not do because its steel
mast was too tall. This Court sensibly found that “an
overhead bridge which prevents access to the place
designated for the discharge quite as effectively
renders it unsafe for the ship as a sandbar or other
obstacle under the water.” Id. at 257. It therefore
held that the charterer was liable for the additional
9 The safe berth clause in Mencke provided that the ship
would “discharge at New York or Boston or Philadelphia or
Baltimore, or so near the port of discharge as she may safely get
and deliver the same, always afloat, in a customary place and
manner, in such dock, as directed by charterers, agreeably to
bills of lading.” Mencke, 187 U.S. at 251.
32
costs incurred when the cargo had to be unloaded at a
different dock. Like The Gazelle, Mencke involved a
known hazard that rendered the charterer’s chosen
berth obviously unsafe and unsuitable, and provides
no support for the notion that a safe berth clause
imposes strict liability on the charterer for all other
risks.
The outcomes in Atkins, The Gazelle, and Mencke
are in accord with Gilmore & Black’s interpretation of
the text of safe berth clauses. All of these cases
involved charterers who designated berths with
known features that rendered them hazardous to the
chartered vessels. The charterers in The Gazelle and
Mencke were found liable for the expenses and
economic damages that the vessel owners incurred
when the ship masters justifiably exercised their
right to refuse the unsafe berths, which is precisely
what the clauses provide. In Atkins, the charterer
was found not liable for damage the vessel incurred
when departing the berth because the ship master
had knowledge of the danger and did not exercise his
right to reject the unsafe berth. That is, because the
master had a right to refuse the berth, and the
charterer did not have any “special knowledge” of the
berth’s risks that was unavailable to the master, the
charterer was not liable for the ship damage.
None of these decisions involved a charterer’s
liability with respect to an unknown and unknowable
hazard, as in this case. Nevertheless, this Court’s
interpretation of the safe berth clause in Atkins—as
disclaiming the charterer’s liability for “ordinary
perils of the seas”—convincingly suggests that
CARCO should not be held liable for the casualty that
damaged the Athos I. That casualty was caused by
an unknown submerged object, which is a classic
peril of the sea to which vessels are subject during
33
any maritime voyage. See, supra, at 27. Accordingly,
under this Court’s interpretation in Atkins, the safe
berth clause does not remotely provide a basis for
shifting all costs of the multi-million dollar
environmental cleanup to CARCO.
B. The Warranty Interpretation Lacks Any
Sound Legal Foundation.
In adopting the interpretation that the safe berth
clause is a warranty, the court of appeals sided with
what it characterized as the Second Circuit’s
“longstanding” interpretation, and asserted that the
Fifth Circuit’s approach “deviated from this wellestablished standard.” Pet. App. 303a-304a. At the
petition stage, Frescati and the United States
repeated the refrain that the warranty interpretation
is an “established” and “settled” understanding,
asserting that it is grounded in “130 years of
precedent from this Court and more than 80 years of
case law from the Second Circuit.” Frescati Opp. 11,
13; U.S. Opp. 13. These assertions do not withstand
scrutiny. The Second Circuit decisions upon which
the court of appeals relied in adopting the warranty
interpretation were: Venore Transp. Co. v. Oswego
Shipping Corp., 498 F.2d 469, 472-73 (2d Cir. 1974)
(voyage charterer “had an express obligation to
provide a completely safe berth”) (emphasis added);
Paragon Oil Co. v. Republic Tankers, S.A., 310 F.2d
169, 173 (2d Cir. 1962) (clause is a “warranty”); Park
S.S. Co. v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 188 F.2d 804, 806 (2d
Cir. 1951) (clause is “an express assurance that the
berth [is] safe”); and Cities Serv. Transp. Co. v. Gulf
Ref. Co., 79 F.2d 521, 521 (2d Cir. 1935) (per curiam)
(“the charter [contract is] itself an express assurance,
on which the master [is] entitled to rely, that at the
berth ‘indicated’ the ship would be able to lie ‘always
afloat’”). See Pet. App. 299a-300a.
34
First, the Second Circuit decisions are not derived
from or consistent with this Court’s earlier safe berth
decisions: Atkins, The Gazelle, and Mencke. As noted,
the Second Circuit decisions do not mention, much
less discuss, any of those precedents. In particular,
the Second Circuit did not address this Court’s
agreement in Atkins that the safe berth clause was
not a warranty, because it did not create any
charterer liability for “ordinary perils” of the seas.
Accordingly, the Second Circuit’s warranty approach
is “inconsistent” with Atkins. Gilmore & Black,
supra, § 4-4 at 207.
Second, one might assume from the court of
appeals’ reliance on the Second Circuit’s opinions
that they provide a cogent rationale for the warranty
approach and a thorough treatment of the issue, but
that is plainly not so. The Second Circuit’s opinions
contain no reasoning or discussion to support the
court’s naked assertion that a safe berth clause is an
unqualified warranty that imposes strict liability.
For example, Cities Service, 79 F.2d 521, the oldest
decision, is a single-paragraph, per curiam opinion in
which the charterer was found liable for a ship’s
grounding because the port captain had given
“express assurance to the master at the time that the
berth was fair.” Id. In the last sentence of the brief
opinion, the court reasoned in the alternative that
even if such assurances had not been given, “the
charter party was itself an express assurance, on
which the master was entitled to rely, that at the
berth ‘indicated’ the ship would be able to lie ‘always
afloat.’”
Id.
The court, however, provided no
reasoning or authority in support of that conclusion.
None of the subsequent Second Circuit decisions—
Park S.S. Co., Paragon, and Venore—shed any more
light on the origin of the warranty interpretation or
35
what interests it serves. These decisions do little
more than rely upon and repeat the unsupported
misinterpretation of safe berth clauses in Cities
Service, which then became an unverified selffulfilling statement.
The decisions contain no
analysis of why the charterer should be held strictly
liable, either under the contract or as a matter of
maritime policy. Or why the issue should not be
resolved solely by tort law or some other source of law
that deals directly with the type of injury incurred.
The handful of commentators who characterize the
safe berth clause as a warranty, Pet. App. 303a, do
not supply any better rationale for the warranty
interpretation than the Second Circuit does. These
treatises do little more than recite the warranty
interpretation, without providing any commentary or
explanation for its basis. See Schoenbaum, supra,
§ 11-10 & n.1 (citing Second Circuit decisions); 2A
Michael F. Sturley, Benedict on Admiralty § 175, at
17-24 to 17-25 (7th ed. 2014) (same); Terence Coghlin
et al., Time Charters ¶¶ 10A.3-10A.6 (7th ed. 2014)
(“Coghlin”) (same); Bernard Eder et al., Scrutton on
Charter Parties and Bills of Lading, § IX, art. 85, at
166 (23d ed. 2017). The Coghlin treatise endorses the
warranty interpretation on the ground that it is “a
matter of contract” and an accepted “custom of the
trade,” Coghlin, supra, at ¶ 10A.10, but these
conclusory
assertions
ignore
this
Court’s
interpretation in Atkins and the existing circuit split
on the meaning of the clause, and they provide no
justification for the interpretation.
Third, contrary to the court of appeals’ suggestion
that the Second Circuit has unvaryingly adhered to
the warranty approach, prior to Cities Service the
Second Circuit held in several cases that a charterer
or consignee who selects a berth is only required to
36
exercise reasonable care under the circumstances,
and is not an insurer or warrantor. See, e.g.,
Plymouth Transp. Co. v. Red Star Towing & Transp.
Co., 20 F.2d 357, 358 (2d Cir. 1927) (“reasonable care
to ascertain the condition of a berth and give notice of
any concealed danger”); M. & J. Tracy, Inc. v. Marks,
Lissberger & Son, Inc., 283 F. 100, 102 (2d Cir. 1922)
(safe berth duty requires “exercise [of] due care
according to the circumstances,” and is “no warranty
or insurance”); Hastorf v. O’Brien, 173 F. 346, 347-48
(2d Cir. 1909) (“ordinary care”). Tellingly, under the
court’s “due care” standard, the consignee in M. & J.
Tracy was found not liable for the sinking of a barge
by a boulder on the river bottom, where the boulder
was unknown to the consignee and the public.
These cases apparently did not involve voyage
charters, but Cities Service failed to address this line
of authority, or explain the abrupt shift to the
warranty approach. See Hartman, supra, at 541
(Cities Service was a “departure from the previous
prudent man standard”); J. Bond Smith, Jr., Time
and Voyage Charters: Safe Port/Safe Berth, 49 Tul.
L. Rev. 860, 862 (1975) (“Smith”) (“Until
comparatively recently, the decisions, with few
exceptions, held that the charterer’s liability under
safe port clauses was not that of an insurer or
warrantor.”). Thus, history does not support strict
liability.
Given the uncertain origin and scant justification
for the warranty interpretation, the Fifth Circuit
properly took a fresh look at the issue in Orduna, 913
F.2d 1149. It considered the fact that distinguished
commentators such as Gilmore & Black have
“strongly criticized” the Second Circuit’s liabilitywithout-fault approach, including because it has no
foundation in the contract language, 913 F.2d at
37
1156; that the Second Circuit’s approach is contrary
to this Court’s decision in Atkins, id. at 1156-57; and
that the Second Circuit has not always followed the
warranty interpretation, id. at 1156.
It also
examined the relevant maritime policy considerations
(discussed further below) and concluded that “no
legitimate legal or social policy is furthered by
making the charterer warrant the safety of the berth
it selects.” Id. at 1157. The Fifth Circuit therefore
held that a safe berth clause “does not make a
charterer the warrantor of the safety of a berth,” and
“[i]nstead the safe berth clause imposes upon the
charterer a duty of due diligence to select a safe
berth.” Id. There is no question that CARCO did all
that it could to select a safe berth.
As demonstrated below, the Fifth Circuit’s
interpretation of the safe berth clause is the rule that
this Court should adopt.
III. MARITIME COMMERCE IS BEST SERVED
BY
INTERPRETING
SAFE
BERTH
CLAUSES AS IMPOSING AT MOST A DUTY
OF DUE DILIGENCE ON CHARTERERS.
This Court should reject the court of appeals’
interpretation of the safe berth clause as a warranty
because it is inconsistent with the Court’s decisions
and the contractual text and context. Even if the
Court were writing on a blank slate, however, the
court of appeals’ interpretation is detrimental to
maritime commerce. See Kirby, 543 U.S. at 32 (the
Court’s task is to “set an efficient default rule” for the
maritime contract at issue).
As noted, the
fundamental “purpose of the grant” of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction is “the protection of maritime
commerce.” Exxon Corp., 500 U.S. at 608 (quoting
Sisson, 497 U.S. at 367).
38
A. Strict Liability Is Unwarranted And
Detrimental To Maritime Commerce.
The warranty interpretation is a form of “strict
liability” for charterers. Orduna, 913 F.2d at 1157;
Pet. App. 341. Under that rule, charterers are
subject to “liability without fault” for losses caused by
most factors (excluding abnormal weather or other
occurrences, or negligence by the master). Orduna,
913 F.2d at 1156. And the charterer’s liability under
the warranty approach is unlimited, as the massive
judgment in this case illustrates.
The rationale for this counterintuitive approach is,
however, a mystery. Neither the Second Circuit
decisions, nor the treatises, provide any justification
for strict liability in this context. There is none. The
traditional bases upon which the law imposes strict
liability are wholly lacking here.
As a result,
subjecting charterers to strict and unlimited liability
would be detrimental to maritime commerce.
Strict liability is not common in maritime law.
Where it does apply, its special justifications have no
application to safe berth clauses. In East River
Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476
U.S. 858, 865 (1986), for example, this Court
“recogniz[ed] products liability, including strict
liability, as part of the general maritime law.” The
Court reasoned that its “precedents relating to
injuries of maritime workers long have pointed in
th[e] direction” of strict products liability, id.,
invoking its decisions recognizing strict liability for
breach of the vessel owner’s duty to provide a
seaworthy vessel, Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328
U.S. 85, 94 (1946), and for breach of the stevedore’s
implied warranty of workmanlike service, Italia
Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v. Or. Stevedoring
Co., 376 U.S. 315, 322 (1964). This Court explained
39
that its “rationale in [the maritime worker] cases—
that strict liability should be imposed on the party
best able to protect persons from hazardous
equipment—is equally applicable when the claims
are based on products liability.” 476 U.S. at 866.
The public policy rationale for strict liability in the
maritime products and worker contexts—that
manufacturers, vessel owners, and stevedores are
best able to prevent injury from hazardous products,
equipment, and vessel conditions—does not support
strict liability for charterers under safe berth clauses.
Manufacturers who make products and market them
to the public are subject to unique duties because
they “can anticipate some hazards and guard against
the recurrence of others, as the public cannot.”
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P. 2d
436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) (cited in
East River, 476 U.S. at 866-67). Similarly, stevedores
are subject to strict liability in contexts where they
are “best situated to adopt preventive measures and
thereby to reduce the likelihood of injury,” i.e., where
the “injury-producing and defective equipment is
under the[ir] supervision and control.”
Or.
Stevedoring Co., 376 U.S. at 324.
Charterers, by contrast, need not own or operate
the berths that they select pursuant to safe berth
clauses. In their capacity as charterers, they lack
both supervision and control over the pertinent
facilities and sources of risk, which are the critical
factors that support strict liability against
manufacturers and those who injure maritime
workers. In addition, as explained below, vessel
owners have access to full information concerning
whether a particular berth is safe for a particular
vessel, and vessel captains (not charterers) make the
navigational decision to bring the vessel into the
40
berth. See, infra, at 43-44. Indeed, the underlying
premise of the vessel master’s right to refuse an
unsafe berth is that vessel owners have the superior
ability to assess the risks of the designated berth.
This scheme forecloses any argument that charterers
are in a unique position to prevent injury, which is
the classic justification for imposing strict liability.
This Court’s imposition of strict liability in the
maritime worker context is also based on maritime
law’s “special solicitude for the welfare of those who
undertake to venture upon hazardous and
unpredictable sea voyages.” DeVries, 139 S. Ct. at
995; Dutra Grp. v. Batterton, No. 18-266, slip op. at 78, 18 (U.S. June 24, 2019) (explaining that this Court
“transformed” the vessel owner’s duty to provide a
seaworthy vessel from due diligence to strict liability
based on “humanitarian” considerations). As this
Court explained in Sieracki, the vessel owner’s duty
to furnish a seaworthy vessel exists regardless of
fault because of “the hazards of marine service which
unseaworthiness places on the men who perform it,”
workers’ “helplessness to ward off such perils,” and
“the harshness of forcing them to shoulder alone the
resulting personal disability and loss” from personal
injuries. 328 U.S. at 93-94. These “humanitarian”
concerns have no purchase in the context of safe
berth clauses, which allocate monetary responsibility
between sophisticated commercial entities for
economic losses. Indeed, this Court acknowledged in
Dutra Grp., slip op. at 18, that “in contemporary
maritime law,” the “special solicitude to sailors has
only a small role to play.”
It also is worth noting that outside the maritime
context, strict liability is strictly confined.
In
American tort law, strict liability is “not so common.”
Dan B. Dobbs et al., The Law of Torts § 437 (2d ed.
41
2011).
It is principally limited to “two factual
settings” apart from products liability: harms caused
by animals, and harms caused by abnormally
dangerous activities. Id.; see Restatement (Second) of
Torts §§ 504-524A (1977).
Selecting berths for
maritime voyages is not an “abnormally dangerous
activity,” and Frescati did not assert a tort claim
against CARCO under a strict liability theory.
Because there is no public policy or economic
justification for interpreting safe berth clauses as
strict liability warranties, imposing strict and
unlimited liability on charterers would be
detrimental to maritime commerce. Commentators
have long recognized that open-ended liability can
discourage maritime commerce and render insurance
unattainable.
See Schoenbaum, supra, § 15-1;
Lawrence I. Kiern, Liability, Compensation, and
Financial Responsibility Under the Oil Pollution Act
of 1990: A Review of the Second Decade, 36 Tul. Mar.
L.J. 1, 43-45 (2011).
This Court similarly pointed to the chilling effects
of open-ended liability when it rejected products
liability claims for purely economic damages as part
of the general maritime law in East River, 476 U.S.
858. The Court noted that such damages were
problematic because they “could subject the
manufacturer to damages of an indefinite amount” or
“for vast sums.” Id. at 874.
Congress has similarly recognized in several
statutes governing maritime commerce that openended liability is detrimental. For example, 46
U.S.C. app. § 183, the basis for Frescati’s original
action to limit its liability, caps vessel owners’
financial liability for maritime casualties when they
are not at fault. OPA implemented caps on liability
for oil spills, precisely the maritime casualty that
42
occurred in this case. In addition, Congress rejected
strict liability in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act
(“COGSA”), 46 U.S.C. § 30701 note, which
“facilitate[s] efficient contracting in contracts for
carriage by sea,” Kirby, 543 U.S. at 29, and governs
bills of lading.
COGSA expressly rejects the
imposition of liability without fault upon shippers.
Instead, it provides that a shipper “shall not be
responsible for loss or damage sustained by the
carrier or the ship arising or resulting from any cause
without the act, fault, or neglect of the shipper, his
agents, or his servants.” 46 U.S.C. § 30701 note, Title
I, Section 4(3). COGSA also generally limits a
carrier’s liability for cargo losses to $500 per package
or customary freight unit. Id. at Title I, Section 4(5).
Imposing uncapped liability for oil spills on
charterers for risks that they cannot foresee or
prevent is fundamentally inconsistent with the wellfounded policy concerns that led Congress to adopt
the provisions in OPA and COGSA that reject openended liability and liability without fault.
B. The Court Of Appeals’ Reasons For
Adopting The Warranty Interpretation
Are Unsound.
The court of appeals’ policy rationales for adopting
the warranty interpretation are unsound, and ignore
the onerous and unwarranted liability this
interpretation imposes upon charterers. The court of
appeals’ principal rationale was that the charterer, as
the party that selects the berth and port, is
“normally” in a “better position” than the ship master
“to appraise a port’s more subtle dangers.” Pet. App.
302a.
The reasoning of the Fifth Circuit and
commentators casts serious doubt upon the premise
that the charterer “normally” has superior
information about a berth and port. As the Fifth
43
Circuit explained, “the master on the scene, rather
than a distant charterer, is in a better position to
judge the safety of a particular berth.” Orduna, 913
F.2d at 1156. This is because the master is “an
expert in navigation,” “knows the draft and trim of
his vessel,” and is “on the spot.” Id. The charterer, in
contrast, is “usually a merchant” who knows “nothing
about navigation or the vessel” and “is ordinarily far
from the scene.” Id.; see also id. (“the charterer
customarily chooses ports and berths based on
commercial as opposed to nautical grounds”); Smith,
supra, at 868 (“the charterer is usually a merchant
with limited knowledge as to actual conditions and
even less control over a port or berth”).
More fundamentally, whether it was ever true that
charterers “normally” had better access to
information about berths and ports than distant
vessel owners or crews, it is not true today. With
modern information sources such as the internet,
both charterers and vessel owners have equal access
to pertinent and detailed information about berths
and ports. Moreover, as vessel captains approach a
berth, they use sophisticated navigation equipment
and instantaneous communication methods to obtain
real-time information about current conditions and
traffic. They may also hire local river and docking
pilots, as were utilized in this case. Local pilots are
the persons with the most knowledge of and
experience with the designated discharge location,
constantly receive updates on changing conditions at
the port and berth, and are present on the vessel to
advise the captain. Vessel captains therefore have
the most up-to-date information, and the last clear
opportunity to avoid a problem because they control
the vessel and make the final decision. For all of
these reasons, the court of appeals’ information
44
asymmetry rationale for imposing strict liability on
charterers is outdated and no longer has any validity.
Accordingly, safe berth clauses are best interpreted
as provisions that grant charterers the right to select
the berth, and impose a corresponding duty to pay
the resulting expenses if a vessel exercises its right to
reject the selected berth as unsafe.
The United States and Frescati suggested at the
petition stage that CARCO was the least-cost avoider
in this case because it owned and operated the berth
at issue (near its own refinery). Frescati Opp. 24;
U.S. Opp. 17. But CARCO’s separate role as the
wharfinger (in addition to being the charterer) gave
rise to independent duties under maritime tort law.
The rationale for those duties should not affect this
Court’s analysis of the proper default interpretation
of the charter contract provision between CARCO and
Star, which was entered into before the Paulsboro
berth was selected. Pet. App. 310a. And even if
CARCO’s tort duties were relevant, the court of
appeals vacated the negligence judgment against
CARCO in its role as wharfinger because it had no
special knowledge of the underwater anchor, which
was unknown to everyone.
The United States’ suggestion that CARCO was the
least-cost avoider in this case is particularly selfserving because the casualty occurred in Federal
Anchorage waters that the United States maintains,
and for which CARCO bears no responsibility. As the
court of appeals explained, the Army Corps of
Engineers surveys and dredges the Anchorage to
maintain its desired depth, and the Corps works with
the Coast Guard and National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration “to remove or mark
obstructions when they are discovered.” Pet. App. 6a;
see also Pet. App. 223a-233a (describing the
45
responsibilities and activities of the federal agencies
with respect to the Anchorage). CARCO, in contrast,
had no responsibility under federal statutes or
regulations to maintain the Anchorage or search for
obstructions. To be sure, no federal agency is tasked
with affirmatively searching the Anchorage for
hazards. Id. at 6a. This prompted the district court
to observe that there is a “void” in the federal scheme
because nobody has a duty to search for obstructions
in the Anchorage. Id. at 231a-232a. This “void,”
however, is entirely of the government’s making. It
persists to this day.
A further disadvantage of the strict liability
approach is that it fills that “void” in a blunderbuss
manner that precludes consideration of the facts and
circumstances of individual cases. As a result, the
court of appeals’ approach inevitably results in
liability on wholly “innocent[]” charterers. Cooke,
supra, at ¶ 5A.10; see also Gilmore & Black, supra,
§ 4-4 at 204 (holding the charterer liable “regardless
of fault” is “quite inconsonant with the positions of
the parties” with respect to vessel safety); Smith,
supra, at 868 (the absolute warranty approach places
“an undeserved burden on the charterer” while the
due diligence approach achieves “more equitable
result[s]”); Hartman, supra, at 555 (“[u]nless the
charterer is negligent in some manner, such as
having particular knowledge concerning the unsafe
status of a port that the shipowner does not have,
there is no economic reason to place the risk of
damage on the charterer”).
This case starkly illustrates the harsh results for
which the strict liability approach has been rightly
criticized.
CARCO had no knowledge of the
abandoned anchor (in a federally maintained
waterway) that caused the casualty. Pet. App. 334a
46
(finding no evidence that CARCO “knew or had
reason to believe that the anchor was in the river”).
Yet because the court of appeals imposed an absolute
warranty where none was bargained for, CARCO
faces liability for more than $140 million in damages,
plus interest, even though it exercised due diligence.
Nothing in the court of appeals’ decisions
persuasively explains why a mere contracting party
(rather than the owner of the vessel that made the
ultimate decision to enter the berth or the United
States operating the Anchorage) should bear the
massive risk from a hazard the charterer could not
possibly have anticipated or avoided. Moreover, the
court of appeals’ ruling goes further than even the
Second Circuit’s approach, by extending the
charterer’s obligation beyond mere vessel damage to
encompass environmental cleanup costs and damages
not remotely addressed by the text of the provision.
This is unprecedented. The due diligence standard
avoids such manifestly unjust results. See Smith,
supra, at 868 (due diligence approach avoids placing
“an undeserved burden on the charterer”).
Frescati and the United States asserted at the
petition stage that there is nothing harsh about this
result because CARCO bargained for it. Frescati
Opp. 24-25; U.S. Opp. 17. Putting aside the fact that
Frescati was not a party to the contract, that of
course begs the question of what duties CARCO
assumed in the charter contract, which is the
question that this Court granted certiorari to decide.
What is clear from the contract’s language and
context is that CARCO did not bargain for this kind
of liability simply by accepting the duty to select a
port and berth for its shipment.
47
C. The Warranty Interpretation Results In
Inconsistent Standards Of Care For
Wharfingers And Charterers.
An additional flaw of the warranty approach is that
it is inconsistent with the maritime negligence
principles that govern the duty of wharfingers to
provide safe berths. See Dutra Grp., slip op. at 17
(rejecting maritime rule that would “create bizarre
disparities in the law”). As the court of appeals
recognized in addressing Frescati’s negligence claim,
this Court established long ago that a wharfinger
“does not guaranty the safety of vessels coming to his
wharves,” but instead is only “bound to exercise
reasonable diligence in ascertaining the condition of
the berths.” Smith, 173 U.S. at 433; see Pet. App.
26a, 312a. Under that standard, the court of appeals
reversed the negligence judgment against CARCO.
No sound rationale exists for this Court to hold that
charterers face a different, and more onerous,
standard of care when they select the berths for
vessels that they hire. The underlying obligations of
wharfingers and charterers to provide a safe berth
are related and linked by the common purpose of
protecting the welfare of vessels. The wharfinger
owns and operates the berth and, therefore, has the
direct obligation “to watch, maintain, and keep in
order that which he asks the public to pay him for the
use of.” M. & J. Tracy, 283 F. at 102. The charterer,
by contrast, does not own or control the berth, but
instead selects it for particular vessels.
The
charterer therefore is only “bound to acquaint himself
with the reputation and commonly known
characteristics of what the wharfinger offers for hire.”
Id. Given that wharfingers and charterers perform
complementary roles with respect to providing safe
berths for vessels, there is no reason for charterers to
48
face a higher standard of liability. If anything, the
wharfinger’s knowledge of the conditions of the berth,
exclusive control of the facility, and invitation to
users suggest that, if a higher standard of care were
to apply, it should logically fall on the wharfinger.
See, e.g., Waldie v. Steers Sand & Gravel Corp., 151
F.2d 129, 130-31 (2d Cir. 1945) (“the reputation of a
wharf” may excuse a charterer or tugboat for
selecting a berth, “though it would not excuse a
wharfinger” who “has not exercised care” in operating
the berth).
The imposition of two drastically different
standards of care is particularly irrational because
the wharfinger and the charterer are often the same
entity, as in this case.
It is the height of
arbitrariness for the same party in the same incident
to face strict liability in its role as the charterer, but
be subject to a due diligence standard in its role as
the wharfinger. If the contract expressly imposed a
bargained-for higher standard on the charterer, that
would be one thing. But the default rule should be
that the wharfinger and charterer have the same
obligations and assume the same risks. Asymmetry
produces anomalous results. This case is a clear
example, where the court of appeals vacated the
negligence judgment against CARCO as the
wharfinger, but upheld its liability as the charterer.
This incongruity does not exist under the due
diligence approach adopted by the Fifth Circuit,
which applies consistent standards of care to the
charterer and the wharfinger.
Frescati argued at the petition stage that it is not
anomalous to hold charterers to a higher standard
because “a contractual duty is assumed voluntarily.”
Frescati Opp. 25. But this again begs the question of
what duty a charterer assumes under a safe berth
49
clause. The fundamental question is what is the
default rule when the language does not clearly
reflect that one party voluntarily assumed a
particular duty.
D. The Warranty Interpretation Produces
An Inequitable Result In This Case.
Finally, in adopting maritime rules, this Court
considers which approach “produces an equitable
result” in the case at issue. Kirby, 543 U.S. at 35.
Here, a decision rejecting the court of appeals’
warranty interpretation produces an equitable result.
The court of appeals’ judgment, which shifts all
liability to CARCO for an extraordinary accident that
was not its fault, is grossly unfair and illustrates the
inequities
produced
by
the
strict
liability
interpretation of the safe berth clause. To be sure,
liability could not be aligned with fault in this case
because the unnamed anchor-dropper was never
found. But the court of appeals’ reliance on the safe
berth clause to impose massive liability on CARCO
reveals the error of using that limited contract
provision, rather than other sources of law, to
allocate liability for catastrophic events.
Congress envisioned and provided for a much
different outcome by enacting OPA. As noted, the
OPA Trust Fund is a cost-spreading mechanism for
oil spill cleanups that is financed by industry
members, including CARCO.
Indeed, Congress
presciently addressed the scenario where an
unknown third party is wholly culpable for a loss,
providing that the responsible party can obtain full
exoneration from financial liability, which leaves the
Fund to absorb the entire cost and then recoup it by
taxing the entire industry. 33 U.S.C. § 2703(a)(3).
See Gatlin Oil Co. v. United States, 169 F.3d 207,
209-10 (4th Cir. 1999) (storage tank owner entitled to
50
recover from the Fund costs to clean up oil spill
caused by unknown vandal).
Frescati initially
pursued that statutory remedy, but later withdrew
its exoneration claim—an action that has never been
explained. See Pet. App. 284a n.6. Instead, Frescati
sued CARCO, and the government willingly joined in
as Frescati’s subrogee.
The resulting judgment, if allowed to stand, turns
OPA on its head. Frescati, the “responsible party”
that Congress determined should bear liability for the
spill in the first instance, will pay nothing. The
federal Trust Fund likewise will pay nothing, despite
the fact that it is a cost-spreading mechanism for oil
spills. Instead, CARCO—who was not a party in the
post-spill U.S. Coast Guard investigation and cleanup
and not subject to any liability for the casualty under
OPA—will bear all of the costs, even though CARCO
already paid tens of millions of dollars into the OPA
Fund. Moreover, Congress created a mechanism for
the Trust Fund to foot the bill when an absent third
party is at fault. The court of appeals erred in relying
on the safe berth clause to reach an incongruous
result, which by itself demonstrates beyond question
the unsoundness of interpreting the clause to impose
strict liability on an unsuspecting party and thereby
assigning liability for the entire costs of an oil spill.10
10 The inequity of the $55.5 million contract remedy in favor of
Frescati is compounded by the fact that it was never a party to
the voyage charter contract in the first place. It is particularly
anomalous to impose this massive liability on CARCO based on
a contract entered into between Star and CARCO, when the
parties could not remotely have envisioned that CARCO would
pay all of Frescati’s costs of remediating an oil spill.
51
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court
of appeals should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
DEREK A. WALKER
J. DWIGHT LEBLANC, JR.
DOUGLAS L. GRUNDMEYER
CHAFFE MCCALL, L.L.P.
2300 Energy Centre
1100 Poydras Street
New Orleans, LA 70163
(504) 585-7000
RICHARD Q. WHELAN
FRANK P. DEGIULIO
PALMER, BIEZUP &
HENDERSON LLP
190 N. Independence Mall
West, Suite 401
Philadelphia, PA 19106
(215) 625-9900
July 9, 2019
CARTER G. PHILLIPS*
JACQUELINE G. COOPER
RICHARD E. YOUNG
JORDAN B. CHERRICK
LUCAS CROSLOW
SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP
1501 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 736-8000
cphillips@sidley.com
JOHN G. BISSELL
STRONG PIPKIN BISSELL
& LEDYARD, L.L.P.
4900 Woodway Drive
Suite 1200
Houston, TX 77056
(713) 651-1900
Counsel for Petitioners
*Counsel of Record
ADDENDUM
1a
ADDENDUM A
[LOGO]
Charles R. Weber Company, Inc.
Association of Ship Brokers
& Agents (U.S.A.), Inc.
October 1977
CODE WORD FOR THIS CHARTER
PARTY: ASBATANKVOY
TANKER VOYAGE CHARTER PARTY
PREAMBLE
Greenwich, CT
Place
November 12, 2004
Date
IT IS THIS DAY AGREED between HEIDENREICH
MARINE INC. AS AGENTS FOR STAR TANKERS
INC. chartered owner/owner (hereinafter called the
“Owner”) of the Cyprus
SS/MS “ATHOS I”
(hereinafter called the “Vessel”)
and CITGO ASPHALT REFINING COMPANY
(hereinafter called the “Charterer”)
that the transportation herein provided for will be
performed subject to the terms and conditions of this
Charter Party, which includes this Preamble and Part
I and Part II. In the event of a conflict, the provisions
of Part I will prevail over those contained in Part II.
PART I
A. Description and Position of Vessel:
Deadweight: 60,880 metric
Classed: Lloyd’s Register
tons
(2240
lbs.)
2a
Loaded draft of Vessel on assigned summer freeboard 12.423 meters ft. in. in salt water.
Capacity for cargo: 70,674 M3 tons (of 2240 lbs.
each) 98% more or less, Vessel’s option.Slops @ 98%
2,832 M3
Coated: [ ]Yes [ ] No
Coiled: [X] Yes [ ] No
Last three two cargoes: Fuel Oil / Crude / Crude
Now: Vessel Spot Caribbean Sea
Expected Ready: Guarano Pilot Station for Bajo
Grande November 12, 2004 1600 hrs
B. Laydays:
Commencing: November 16, 2004
Cancelling: November 18, 2004
C. Loading Port(s): See Special Provisions # 1
Charterer’s Option
D. Discharging Port(s): See Special Provisions # 2
Charterer’s Option
E. Cargo: See Special Provisions # 3
Charterer’s Option
F. Freight Rate: Worldscale 400 basis discharge
United States Atlantic Coast, U.S. Gulf, plus 10
Worldscale points (minimum flat USD 2.50 PMT)
basis discharge Caribbean Sea, plus 5 Worldscale
points for high heat. Overage, if any at 50% of the fixing
rate per ton (of 2240 lbs each).
G. Freight Payable to: See Special Provisions # 4 at
Total Laytime in Running Hours: 72
3a
I. Demurrage per day:/pro rata: USD 42,000.00
J. Commission of 1.25 % is payable by Owner to
Charles R. Weber Company, Inc. on the actual amount
freight, deadfreight and demurrage when and as
freight is paid.
K. The place of General Average and arbitration
proceedings to be London/New York (strike out one).
L. Tovalop: Owner warrants Vessel to be a member of
TOVALOP scheme and will be so maintained
throughout duration of this charter.
M. Special Provisions:
Nos. 1 - 19 and Citgo Clauses, as attached, with noted
amendments/deletions to be deemed a part of this
Charter Party.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have caused
this Charter, consisting of a Preamble, Parts I and II,
to be executed in duplicate as of the day and year first
above written.
Witness the signature of: HEIDENREICH MARINE
INC. AS AGENTS FOR
STAR TANKERS INC.
/s/ Helen Hastings
By: /s/ James M. Healy
Witness the Signature of: CITGO ASPHALT REFINING COMPANY
By:
This Charterparty is a computer generated copy of
ASBATANKVOY form, printed under licence from the
Association of Ship Brokers & Agents (U.S.A.), Inc.,
using software which is the copyright of Strategic
Software Limited. It is a precise copy of the original
document which can be modified, amended or added to
4a
only by the striking out of original characters, or the
insertion of new characters, such characters being
clearly highlighted as having been made by the
licensee or end user as appropriate and not by the
author.
PART II
1. WARRANTY - VOYAGE - CARGO. The vessel,
classed as specified in Part I hereof, and to be so
maintained during the currency of this Charter, shall,
with all convenient dispatch, proceed as ordered to
Loading Port(s) named in accordance with Clause 4
hereof, or so near thereunto as she may safely get
(always afloat), and being seaworthy, and having all
pipes, pumps and heater coils in good working order,
and being in every respect fitted for the voyage, so far
as the foregoing conditions can be attained by the
exercise of due diligence, perils of the sea and any
other cause of whatsoever kind beyond the Owner’s
and/or Master’s control excepted, shall load (always
afloat), from the factors of the Charterer a full and
complete cargo of petroleum and/or its products in
bulk,not exceeding what she can reasonably stow and
carry over and above her bunker fuel, consumable
stores, boiler feed, culinary and drinking water, and
complement and their effects (sufficient space to be
left in the tanks to provide for the expansion of the
cargo), and being so loaded shall forthwith proceed, as
ordered on signing Bills of Lading, direct to the
Discharging Port(s), or so near thereunto as she may
safely get (always afloat), and deliver said cargo. If
heating of the cargo is requested by the Charterer, the
Owner shall exercise due diligence to maintain the
temperatures requested.
5a
2. FREIGHT. Freight shall be at the rate stipulated in Part I and shall be computed on intake
quantity (except deadfreight as per Clause 3) as shown
on the Inspector’s Certificate of Inspection. Payment
of freight shall be made by Charterer without
discount upon delivery of cargo at destination, less any
disbursements or advances made to the Master or
Owner’s agents at ports of loading and/or discharge
and cost of insurance thereon. No deduction of freight
shall be made for water and/or sediment contained in
the cargo. The services of the Petroleum Inspector
shall be arranged and paid for by the Charterer who
shall furnish the Owner with a copy of the Inspector’s
Certificate.
3. DEADFREIGHT. Should the Charterer fail to
supply a full cargo, the Vessel may, at the Master’s
option, and shall, upon request of the Charterer,
proceed on her voyage, provided that the tanks in
which cargo is loaded are sufficiently filled to put her
in seaworthy condition. In that event, however,
deadfreight shall be paid at the rate specified in Part
I hereof on the difference between the intake quantity
and the quantity the Vessel would have carried if
loaded to her minimum permissible freeboard for the
voyage.
4.
NAMING LOADING AND DISCHARGE PORTS.
(a) The Charterer shall name the loading port or
ports at least twenty-four (24) hours prior to the
Vessel’s readiness to sail from the last previous port
of discharge, or from bunkering port for the voyage,
or upon signing this Charter if the Vessel has
already sailed. However, Charterer shall have the
option of ordering the Vessel to the following
destinations for wireless orders:
6a
On a voyage to a port or ports in:
ST.KITTS
Carribean or U.S. Gulf loading
port(s)
PORT SAID Eastern Mediterranean or Persian
Gulf loading port(s)
(from ports west of Port Said.)
(b) If lawful and consistent with Part I and with
the Bills of Lading, the Charterer shall have the
option of nominating a discharging port or ports by
radio to the Master on or before the Vessel’s arrival
at or off the following places:
Place
On a voyage to a port or ports in:
LAND’S END United Kingdom/Continent
(Bordeaux/Hamburg range) or
Scandinavia (including Denmark)
SUEZ
Mediterranean (from Persian Gulf)
GIBRALTAR Mediterranean (from Western
Hemisphere).
(c) Any extra expense incurred in connection with
any change in loading or discharging ports (so
named) shall be paid for by the Charterer and any
time thereby lost to the Vessel shall count as used
Laytime.
5. LAYDAYS. Laytime shall not commence before
the date stipulated in Part I, except with the
Charterer’s sanction. Should the Vessel not be ready
to load by 4:00 o’clock P.M. (local time) on the
cancelling date stipulated in Part I, the Charterer
shall have the option of cancelling this Charter by
giving Owner notice of such cancellation within
twenty-four (24) hours after such cancellation date;
7a
otherwise this Charter to remain in full force and
effect.
6. NOTICE OF READINESS. Upon arrival at
customary anchorage at each port of loading or
discharge, the Master or his agent shall give the
Charterer or his agent notice by letter, telegraph,
wireless or telephone that the Vessel is ready to load
or discharge cargo, berth or no berth, and laytime, as
hereinafter provided, shall commence upon the expiration of six (6) hours after receipt of such notice, or upon
the Vessel’s arrival in berth (i.e., finished mooring
when at a sealoading or discharging terminal and all
fast when loading or discharging alongside a wharf),
whichever first occurs. However, where delay is
caused to Vessel getting into berth after giving notice
or readiness for any reason over which Charterer has
no control, such delay shall not count as used laytime.
7. HOURS FOR LOADING AND DISCHARGING.
The number of running hours specified as laytime in
Part I shall be permitted the Charterer as laytime for
loading and discharging cargo but any delay due to the
Vessel’s condition or breakdown or inability of the
Vessel’s facilities to load or discharge cargo within the
time allowed shall not count as used laytime. If
regulations of the Owner or port authorities prohibit
loading or discharging of the cargo at night, time so
lost shall not count as used laytime; if the Charterer,
shipper or consignee prohibits loading or discharging
at night, time so lost shall count as used laytime. Time
consumed by the vessel in moving from loading or
discharge port anchorage to her loading or discharge
berth, discharging ballast water or slops, will not
count as used laytime.
8. DEMURRAGE. Charterer shall pay demurrage
per running hour and pro rata for a part thereof at the
8a
rate specified in Part I for all time that loading and
discharging and used laytime as elsewhere herein
provided exceeds the allowed laytime elsewhere
herein specified. If, however, demurrage shall be
incurred at ports of loading and/or discharge by reason
of fire, explosion, storm or by a strike, lockout,
stoppage or restraint of labor or by breakdown of
machinery or equipment in or about the plant of the
Charterer, supplier, shipper or consignee of the cargo,
the rate of demurrage shall be reduced one-half of the
amount stated in Part I per running hour or pro rata
for part of an hour for demurrage so incurred. The
Charterer shall not be liable for any demurrage for
delay caused by strike, lockout, stoppage or restraint
of labor for Master, officers and crew of the Vessel or
tugboat or pilots.
9.
SAFE BERTHING - SHIFTING. The vessel
shall load and discharge at any safe place or wharf, or
alongside vessels or lighters reachable on her arrival,
which shall be designated and procured by the
Charterer, provided the Vessel can proceed thereto, lie
at, and depart therefrom always safely afloat, any
lighterage being at the expense, risk and peril of the
Charterer. The Charterer shall have the right of
shifting the Vessel at ports of loading and/or discharge
from one safe berth to another on payment of all
towage and pilotage shifting to next berth, charges for
running lines on arrival at and leaving that berth,
additional agency charges and expense, customs
overtime and fees, and any other extra port charges or
port expenses incurred by reason of using more than
one berth. Time consumed on account of shifting shall
count as used laytime except as otherwise provided in
Clause 15.
9a
10. PUMPING IN AND OUT. The cargo shall be
pumped into the Vessel at the expense, risk and peril
of the Charterer, and shall be pumped out of the Vessel
at the expense of the Vessel, but at the risk and peril
of the Vessel only so far as the Vessel’s permanent
hose connections, where delivery of the cargo shall be
taken by the Charterer or its consignee. If required
by Charterer, Vessel after discharging is to clear
shore pipe lines of cargo by pumping water through
them and time consumed for this purpose shall apply
against allowed laytime. The Vessel shall supply her
pumps and the necessary power for discharging in all
ports, as well as necessary hands. However, should the
Vessel be prevented from supplying such power by
reason of regulations prohibiting fires on board, the
Charterer or consignee shall supply, at its expense, all
power necessary for discharging as well as loading, but
the Owner shall pay for power supplied to the Vessel
for other purposes. If cargo is loaded from lighters, the
Vessel shall furnish steam at Charterer’s expense for
pumping cargo into its Vessel, if requested by the
Charterer, providing the Vessel has facilities for
generating steam and is permitted to have fires on
board. All overtime of officers and crew incurred in
loading and/or discharging shall be for account of the
Vessel.
11. HOSES: MOORING AT SEA TERMINALS.
Hoses for loading and discharging shall be furnished
by the Charterer and shall be connected and disconnected by the Charterer, or, at the option of the Owner,
by the Owner at the Charterer’s risk and expense.
Laytime shall continue until the hoses have been
disconnected. When Vessel loads or discharges at a sea
terminal, the Vessel shall be properly equipped at
Owner’s expense for loading or discharging at such
10a
place, including suitable ground tackle, mooring lines
and equipment for handling submarine hoses.
12. DUES - TAXES - WHARFAGE. The Charterer
shall pay all taxes, dues and other charges on
the cargo, including but not limited to Customs
overtime on the cargo, Venezuelan Habilitation Tax,
C.I.M. Taxes at Le Havre and Portuguese Imposto de
Comercio Maritime. The Charterer shall also pay all
taxes on freight at loading or discharging ports and
any unusual taxes, assessments and governmental
charges which are not presently in effect but which
may be imposed in the future on the Vessel or freight.
The Owner shall pay all dues and other charges on
the Vessel (whether or not such dues or charges are
assessed on the basis of quantity of cargo), including
but not limited to French droits de quai and Spanish
derramas taxes. The Vessel shall be free of charges for
the use of any wharf, dock, place or mooring facility
arranged by the Charterer for the purpose of loading
or discharging cargo; however, the Owner shall be
responsible for charges for such berth when used
solely for Vessel’s purposes, such as awaiting Owner’s
orders, tank cleaning, repairs, etc. before, during or
after loading or discharging.
13. (a). CARGOES EXCLUDED VAPOR PRESSURE. Cargo shall not be shipped which has a vapor
pressure at one hundred degrees Fahrenheit (100 deg
F.) in excess of thirteen and one-half pounds (13.5 lbs.)
as determined by the current A.S.T.M. Method (Reid)
D-323.
(b)
FLASH POINT. Cargo having a flash point
under one hundred and fifteen degrees Fahrenheit
(115 deg F.) (closed cup) A.S.T.M. Method D-56 shall
not be loaded from lighters but this clause shall not
restrict the Charterer from loading or topping off
11a
Crude Oil from vessels or barges inside or outside the
bar at any port or place where bar conditions exist.
14. (a). ICE. In case port of loading or discharge
should be inaccessible owing to ice, the Vessel shall
direct her course according to Master’s judgment,
notifying by telegraph or radio, if available, the
Charterers, shipper or consignee, who is bound to
telegraph or radio orders for another port, which is
free from ice and where there are facilities for the
loading or reception of the cargo in bulk. The whole of
the time occupied from the time the Vessel is diverted
by reason of the ice until her arrival at an ice-free port
of loading or discharge, as the case may be, shall
be paid for by the Charterer at the demurrage rate
stipulated in Part I.
(b) If on account of ice the Master considers
it dangerous to enter or remain at any loading or
discharging place for fear of the Vessel being frozen
in or damaged, the Master shall communicate by
telegraph or radio, if available, with the Charterer,
shipper or consignee of the cargo, who shall telegraph
or radio him in reply, giving orders to proceed to
another port as per Clause 14 (a) where there is no
danger of ice and where there are the necessary
facilities for the loading or reception of the cargo in
bulk, or to remain at the original port at their risk, and
in either case Charterer to pay for the time that the
Vessel may be delayed, at the demurrage rate
stipulated in Part I.
15. TWO OR MORE PORTS COUNTING AS
ONE. To the extent that the freight rate standard of
reference specified in Part I F hereof provides for
special groupings or combinations of ports or
terminals, any two or more ports or terminals within
each such grouping or combination shall count as one
12a
port for purposes of calculating freight and demurrage
only, subject to the following conditions:
(a) Charterer shall pay freight at the highest rate
payable under Part I F hereof for a voyage
between the loading and discharge ports used by
Charterer.
(b) All charges normally incurred by reason of using
more than one berth shall be for Charterer’s
account as provided in Clause 9 hereof.
(c) Time consumed shifting between the ports
or terminals within the particular grouping or
combination shall not count as used laytime.
(d) Time consumed shifting between berths within
one of the ports or terminals of the particular
grouping or combination shall count as used
laytime.
16. GENERAL CARGO. The Charterer shall not be
permitted to ship any packaged goods or non-liquid
bulk cargo of any description; the cargo the Vessel is
to load under this Charter is to consist only of liquid
bulk cargo as specified in Clause I.
17. (a). QUARANTINE. Should the Charterer send
the Vessel to any port or place where a quarantine
exists, any delay thereby caused to the Vessel shall
count as used laytime; but should the quarantine not
be declared until the Vessel is on passage to such port,
the Charterer shall not be liable for any resulting
delay.
(b) FUMIGATION. If the Vessel, prior to or after
entering upon this Charter, has docked or docks at any
wharf which is not rat-free or stegomyia-free, she
shall, before proceeding to a rat-free or stegomyia-free
wharf, be fumigated by the Owner at his expense,
13a
except that if the Charterer ordered the Vessel to an
infected wharf the Charterer shall bear the expense of
fumigation.
18. CLEANING. The Owner shall clean the tanks,
pipes and pumps of the Vessel to the satisfaction of
the Charterer’s Inspector. The Vessel shall not be
responsible for any admixture if more than one quality
of oil is shipped, nor for leakage, contamination or
deterioration in quality of the cargo unless the
admixture, leakage, contamination or deterioration
results from (a) unseaworthiness existing at the time
of loading or at the inception of the voyage which was
discoverable by the exercise of due diligence, or
(b) error or fault of the servants of the Owner in the
loading, care or discharge of the cargo.
19. GENERAL EXCEPTIONS CLAUSE. The
Vessel, her Master and Owner shall not, unless
otherwise in this Charter expressly provided, be
responsible for any loss or damage, or delay or failure
in performing hereunder, arising or resulting from:any act, neglect, default or barratry of the Master,
pilots, mariners or other servants of the Owner in the
navigation or management of the Vessel; fire, unless
caused by the personal design or neglect of the Owner;
collision, stranding or peril, danger or accident of the
sea or other navigable waters; saving or attempting to
save life or property; wastage in weight or bulk, or any
other loss or damage arising from inherent defect,
quality or vice of the cargo; any act or omission of the
Charterer or Owner, shipper or consignee of the cargo,
their agents or representatives; insufficiency of packing; insufficiency or inadequacy or marks; explosion,
bursting of boilers, breakage of shafts, or any latent
defect in hull, equipment or machinery; unseaworthiness of the Vessel unless caused by want of due
14a
diligence on the part of the Owner to make the Vessel
seaworthy or to have her properly manned, equipped
and supplied; or from any other cause of whatsoever
kind arising without the actual fault of privity of the
Owner. And neither the Vessel nor Master or owner,
nor the Charterer, shall, unless otherwise in this
Charter expressly provided, be responsible for any loss
of damage or delay or failure in performing hereunder,
arising or resulting from:- Act of God; act of war; perils
of the seas; act of public enemies, pirates or assailing
thieves; arrest or restraint of princes, rulers or people;
or seizure under legal process provided bond is
promptly furnished to release the Vessel or cargo;
strike or lockout or stoppage or restraint of labor from
whatever cause, either partial or general; or riot or
civil commotion.
20. ISSUANCE AND TERMS OF BILLS OF
LADING.
(a) The Master shall, upon request, sign Bills of
Lading in the form appearing below for all cargo
shipped but without prejudice to the rights of the
Owner and Charterter under the terms of this
Charter. The Master shall not be required to sign Bills
of Lading for any port which, the Vessel cannot enter,
remain at and leave in safety and always afloat nor for
any blockaded port.
(b) The carriage of cargo under this Charter Party
and under all Bills of Lading issued for the cargo shall
be subject to the statutory provisions and other terms
set forth or specified in sub-paragraphs (i) through
(vii) of this clause and such terms shall be incorporated verbatim or be deemed incorporated by the
reference in any such Bill of Lading. In such subparagraphs and in any Act referred to therein, the
15a
word “carrier” shall include the Owner and the
Chartered Owner of the Vessel.
(i)
CLAUSE PARAMOUNT. This Bill of Lading
shall have effect subject to the provisions of the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Acts of the United States,
approved April 16, 1936, except that if this Bill of
Lading is issued at a place where any other Act,
ordinance or legislation gives statutory effect to
the International Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules relating to Bills of Lading at Brussels,
August 1924, then this Bill of Lading shall have effect,
subject to the provisions of such Act, ordinance or
legislation. The applicable Act, ordinance or legislation (hereinafter called the “Act”) shall be deemed to
be incorporated herein and nothing herein contained
shall be deemed a surrender by the Owner of any of its
rights or immunities or an increase of any of its
responsibilities or liabilities under the Act. If any term
of this Bill of Lading be repugnant to the Act to any
extent, such term shall be void to the extent but no
further.
(ii) JASON CLAUSE. In the event of accident,
danger, damage or disaster before or after the
commencement of the voyage, resulting from any
cause whatsoever, whether due to negligence or not,
for which, or for the consequence of which, the Owner
is not responsible, by statute, contract or otherwise,
the cargo shippers, consignees or owners of the cargo
shall contribute with the Owner in General Average to
the payment of any sacrifices, losses or expenses of a
General Average nature that may be made or incurred
and shall pay salvage and special charges incurred in
respect of the cargo. If a salving ship is owned or
operated by the Owner, salvage shall be paid for as
fully as if the said salving ship or ships belonged to
16a
strangers. Such deposit as the Owner or his agents
may deem sufficient to cover the estimated contribution of the cargo and any salvage and special charges
thereon shall, if required, be made by the cargo,
shippers, consignees or owners of the cargo to the
carrier before delivery.
(iii) GENERAL AVERAGE. General Average shall
be adjusted, stated and sealed according to York/
Antwerp Rules l950 and, as to matters not provided
for by those rules, according to the laws and usages at
the port of New York or at the port of London,
whichever place is specified in Part I of this Charter.
If a General Average statement is required, it shall be
prepared at such port or place in the United States or
United Kingdom, whichever country is specified in
Part I of this Charter, as may be selected by the
Owner, unless otherwise mutually agreed, by an
Adjuster appointed by the Owner and approved by the
Charterer. Such Adjuster shall attend to the settlement and the collection of the General Average, subject
to customary charges. General Average Agreements
and/or security shall be furnished by Owner and/or
Charterer, and/or Owner and/or Consignee of cargo, if
requested. Any cash deposit being made as security to
pay General Average and/or salvage shall be remitted
to the Average Adjuster and shall be held by him at
his risk in a special account in a duly authorized and
licensed bank at the place where the General Average
statement is prepared.
(iv) BOTH TO BLAME. If the Vessel comes into
collision with another ship as a result of the negligence
of the other ship and any act, neglect or default of the
Master, maringer, pilot or the servants of the Owner
in the navigation or in the management of the Vessel,
the owners of the cargo carried hereunder shall
17a
indemnify the Owner against all loss or liability to the
other or non-carrying ship or her owners in so far as
such loss or liability represents loss of, or damage to,
or any claim whatsoever of the owners of said cargo,
paid or payable by the other or recovered by the
other or non-carrying ship or her owners as part of
their claim against the carrying ship or Owner. The
foregoing provisions shall also apply where the
owners, operators or those in charge of any ships or
objects other than, or in addition to, the colliding ships
or object are at fault in respect of a collision or contact.
(v) LIMITATION OF LIABILITY. Any provision
of this Charter to the contrary notwithstanding, the
Owner shall have the benefit of all limitations of, and
exemptions from, liability accorded to the owner or
chartered owner of vessels by any statute or rule of law
for the time being in force.
(vi) WAR RISKS. (a) If any port of loading or of
discharge named in this Charter Party or to which the
Vessel may properly be ordered pursuant to the terms
of the Bills of Lading be blockaded, or
(b) If owing to any war, hostilities, warlike operations, civil war, civil commotions, revolutions or the
operation of international law (a) entry to any such
port of loading or of discharge or the loading or
discharge of cargo at any such port be considered
by the Master or Owners in his or their discretion
dangerous or prohibited or (b) it be considered by the
Master or Owners in his or their discretion dangerous
or impossible for the Vessel to reach any such port of
loading or discharge - the Charterers shall have the
right to order the cargo or such part of it as may be
affected to be loaded or discharged at any other safe
port of loading or of discharge within the range of
loading or discharging ports respectively established
18a
under the provisions of the Charter Party (provided
such other port is not blockaded or that entry thereto
or loading or discharge of cargo thereat is not in
the Master’s or Owner’s discretion dangerous or
prohibited). If in respect of a port of discharge no
orders be received from the Charterers within 48
hours after they or their agents have received from the
Owners a request for the nomination of a substitute
port, the Owners shall then be at liberty to discharge
the cargo at any safe port which they or the Master
may in their or his discretion decide on (whether
within the range of discharging ports established
under the provisions of the Charter Party or not) and
such discharge shall be deemed to be due fulfillment
of the contract or contracts of affreightment so far as
cargo so discharged is concerned. In the event of the
cargo being loaded or discharged at any such other
port within the respective range of loading or
discharging ports established under the provisions of
the Charter Party, the Charter Party shall be read in
respect of freight and all other conditions whatsoever
as if the voyage performed were that originally
designated. In the event, however, that the Vessel
discharges the cargo at a port outside the range of
discharging ports established under the provisions of
the Charter Party, freight shall be paid as for the
voyage originally designated and all extra expenses
involved in reaching the actual port of discharge and
or discharging the cargo thereat shall be paid by the
Charterers or Cargo Owners. In the latter event the
Owners shall have a lien on the cargo for all such extra
expenses.
(c) The Vessel shall have liberty to comply with
any directions or recommendations as to departure,
arrival, routes, ports of call, stoppages, destinations,
zones, waters, delivery or in any otherwise whatsoever
19a
given by the government of the nations under whose
flag the Vessel sails or any other government or
local authority including any de facto government or
local authority or by any person or body acting or
purporting to act as or with the authority of any such
government or authority or by any committee or
person having under the terms of the war risks
insurance on the vessel the right to give any such
directions or recommendations. If by reason of or in
compliance with any such directions or recommendations, anything is done or is not done such shall not be
deemed a deviation.
If by reason of or in compliance with any such
direction or recommendation the Vessel does not
proceed to the port or ports of discharge originally
designated or to which she may have been ordered
pursuant to the terms of the Bills of Lading, the Vessel
may proceed to any safe port of discharge which the
Master or Owners in his or their discretion may decide
on and there discharge the cargo. Such discharge shall
be deemed to be due fulfillment of the contract or
contracts of affreightment and the Owners shall be
entitled to freight as if discharge has been effected at
the port or ports originally designated or to which the
vessel may have been ordered pursuant to the terms
of the Bills of Lading. All extra expenses involved in
reaching and discharging the cargo at any such other
port of discharge shall be paid by the Charterers
and/or Cargo Owners and the Owners shall have a lien
on the cargo for freight and all such expenses.
(vii) DEVIATION CLAUSE. The Vessel shall have
liberty to call at any ports in any order, to sail with or
without pilots, to tow or to be towed, to go to the
assistance of vessels in distress, to deviate for the
purpose of saving life or property or of landing any ill
20a
or injured person on board, and to call for fuel at any
port or ports in or out of the regular course of the
voyage. Any salvage shall be for the sole benefit of the
Owner.
21. LIEN. The Owner shall have an absolute lien
on the cargo for all freight, deadfreight, demurrage
and costs, including attorney fees, of recovering the
same, which lien shall continue after delivery of the
cargo into the possession of the Charterer, or of the
holders of any Bills of Lading covering the same or of
any storageman.
22. AGENTS. The Owner shall appoint Vessel’s
agents at all ports.
23. BREACH. Damages for breach of this Charter
shall include all provable damages, and all costs of suit
and attorney fees incurred in any action hereunder.
24. ARBITRATION. Any and all differences and
disputes of whatsoever nature arising out of this
Charter shall be put to arbitration in the City of New
York or in the City of London whichever place is
specified in Part I of this charter pursuant to the laws
relating to arbitration there in force, before a board
of three persons, consisting of one arbitrator to be
appointed by the Owner, one by the Charterer, and one
by the two so chosen. The decision of any two of the
three on any point or points shall be final. Either party
hereto may call for such arbitration by service upon
any officer of the other, wherever he may be found, of
a written notice specifying the name and address of
the arbitrator chosen by the first moving party and a
brief description of the disputes or differences which
such party desires to put to arbitration. If the other
party shall not, by notice served upon an officer of the
first moving party within twenty days of the service of
21a
such first notice, appoint its arbitrator to arbitrate the
dispute or differences specified, then the first moving
party shall have the right without further notice to
appoint a second arbitrator, who shall be a disinterested person with precisely the same force and effect
as if said second arbitrator has been appointed by the
other party. In the event that the two arbitrators fail
to appoint a third arbitrator within twenty days of the
appointment of the second arbitrator, either arbitrator
may apply to a Judge of any court of maritime jurisdiction in the city abovementioned for the appointment of
a third arbitrator, and the appointment of such
arbitrator by such Judge on such application shall
have precisely the same force and effect as if such
arbitrator had been appointed by the two arbitrators.
Until such time as the arbitrators finally close the
hearings either party shall have the right by written
notice served on the arbitrators and on an officer of the
other party to specify further disputes or differences
under this Charter for hearing and determination.
Awards made in pursuance to this clause may include
costs, including a reasonable allowance for attorney’s
fees, and judgement may be entered upon any award
made hereunder in any Court having jurisdiction in
the premises.
25. SUBLET. Charterer shall have the right to
sublet the Vessel. However, Charterer shall always
remain responsible for the fulfillment of this Charter
in all its terms and conditions.
26. OIL POLLUTION CLAUSE. Owner agrees
to participate in Charterer’s program covering oil
pollution avoidance. Such program prohibits discharge
overboard of all oily water, oily ballast or oil in any
form of a persistent nature, except under extreme
22a
circumstances whereby the safety of the vessel, cargo
or life at sea would be imperiled.
Upon notice being given to the Owner that Oil
Pollution Avoidance controls are required, the Owner
will instruct the Master to retain on board the vessel
all oily residues from consolidated tank washings,
dirty ballast, etc., in one compartment, after separation of all possible water has taken place. All water
separated to be discharged overboard.
If the Charterer requires that demulsifiers shall be
used for the separation of oil/water, such demulsifiers
shall be obtained by the Owner and paid for by
Charterer.
The oil residues will be pumped ashore at the
loading or discharging terminal, either as segregated
oil, dirty ballast or co-mingled with cargo as it is
possible for Charterers to arrange. If it is necessary to
retain the residue on board co-mingled with or
segregated from the cargo to be loaded, Charterers
shall pay for any deadfreight so incurred.
The Charterer agrees to pay freight as per the
terms of the Charter Party on any consolidated tank
washings, dirty ballast, etc., retained on board under
Charterer’s instructions during the loaded portion of
the voyage up to a maximum of 1% of the total
deadweight of the vessel that could be legally carried
for such voyage. Any extra expenses incurred by the
vessel at loading or discharging port in pumping
ashore oil residues shall be for Charterer’s account,
and extra time, if any, consumed for this operation
shall count as used laytime.
23a
BILL OF LADING
Shipped in apparent good order and condition by
on board the
Steamship/Motorship
whereof
is Master, at the port of
to be delivered at the port of
or so near thereto as the Vessel can safely get, always
afloat, unto
or order on payment of freight at the rate of
This shipment is carried under and pursuant to the
terms of the contract/charter dated New York/London
between
and
, as Charterer, and
all the terms whatsoever of the said contract/charter
except the rate and payment of freight specified
therein apply to and govern the rights of the parties
concerned in this shipment.
In witness whereof the Master has signed______ Bills
of Lading of this tenor and date, one of which being
accomplished, the others will be void.
Dated at_______this_______day of
_____________
___________________________________________Master
This Charter Party is a computer generated copy of the
ASBATANKVOY form, printed under licence from the
Association of Ship Brokers & Agents (U.S.A.), Inc.,
using software which is the copyright of Strategic
Software Limited.
It is a precise copy of the original document which can
be modified, amended or added to only by striking
24a
out of original characters, or the insertion of new
characters, such characters clearly highlighted by
underlining or use of colour or use of a larger font and
marked as having been made by the licensee or end
user as appropriate and not by the author.
SPECIAL PROVISIONS NOS. 1 - 19
to M/T “ATHOS I” CHARTER PARTY
DATED November 12, 2004
1. LOADING PORT(S): One (1) or two (2) safe
port(s) Caribbean Sea excluding Cuba, Orinoco River,
Haiti and Caripito.
2. DISCHARGE PORT(S): One (1) or two (2) safe
port(s) United States Atlantic Coast if New York not
North of George Washington Bridge excluding Florida
or Charterer’s option one (1) or two (2) safe port(s) U.S.
Gulf excluding Florida or Charterer’s option one (1) or
two (2) safe port(s) Caribbean Sea excluding Cuba,
Orinoco River, Haiti and Caripito / Martinique.
3. CARGO DESCRIPTION: Part cargo minimum
50,000 metric tons Charterer’s option up to full cargo,
with no deadfreight for Charterer’s account provided
minimum quantity supplied. Crude and/or Dirty
Petroleum Products, excluding Low Sulphur Waxy
Residue and Carbon Black Feedstock but including
Vacuum Gas Oil. Maximum two (2) grades within
Vessel’s natural segregation.
HEATING: Charterer’s option see Citgo Clauses
Number 31 and 37. Vessel maximum loaded temperature 165 degrees Fahrenheit.
ATHOS I warranted lift 47,000 metric tons basis
36 feet fresh water sailing draft at load port.
25a
Owners confirm Vessel(s) able to maintain
maximum 50 feet waterline to manifold during
discharge at Savannah, Georgia.
Owners confirm Vessel(s) complies with maximum air draft of 180 feet.
4. FREIGHT PAYABLE: In U.S. Dollars via
telegraphic transfer: Citibank, N.A., New York, New
York ABA No. 021000089, account number 30426088,
favor: Star Tankers Inc.
5. Any delays and/or costs, not normally incurred,
due to U.S.C.G. or other U.S. Government Inspections,
to be shared equally between Owners and Charterers.
6. At New York, if escort tugs required, then such
cost to be for Charterers’ account.
7. Notwithstanding any other clause in this
charter party to the contrary, a nomination of or
request or order to change port(s) in the U.S. must be
given to Owner verbally and confirmed in writing
latest 96 hours prior to estimated arrival in order to be
valid. Any delay expense or other consequence of
failing to give such timely request/order shall be for
Charterer’s account.
8. TAXES: Any taxes and or dues on cargo and/or
freight for Charterers account.
9. WORLDSCALE: Worldscale hours, terms and
conditions to apply.
10. EXXON EARLY LOADING CLAUSE: In the
event charterer agrees to load vessel prior to commencement of laydays all such time to be credited
against any time vessel is on demurrage. For purposes
of this clause, time to count when vessel is all fast at
the load port.
26a
11. CITGO COMPLIANCE WITH U.S. CUSTOMS
AND BORDER PROTECTION MANIFEST REGULATIONS CLAUSE: The Vessel Owner shall comply with
all applicable U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(“CBP”) regulations, including, but not limited to,
19 CFR §4.7 pertaining to electronically filing the
manifest for the cargo with CBP at least 24 hours prior
to arrival at a U.S. Port, to having a current International Carriers Bond, and to having a Standard
Carrier Alpha Code (“SCAC”) unique number.
12. HEIDMAR U.S. CUSTOMS CLAUSE: U.S.
Customs clearance for cargo discharging in, or transiting a U.S. Port or territory subject to control by
the bureau of U.S. Customs and Border Patrol
(CBP, Charterer’s warrant that all necessary details
required by CBP for clearance of the cargo, inclusive
of but not limited to, shipper, consignee and notify
party full name, address and phone number or telex
number, will be included on each Bill of Lading or
alternatively supplied to Owner in writing a minimum
of 36 hours prior to Vessel’s arrival at the first
designated U.S. Port of discharge. For voyages of less
than 24 hours in duration this information must be
supplied prior to departure from the load place or
port. Any delays, fines or penalties incurred due to
Charterer’s failure to comply with the above will be for
Charterer’s account.
13. Any delays incurred entering or departing ports
in Lake Maracaibo caused by awaiting tugs, pilots
and unlit buoys shall count as laytime or time on
demurrage if the vessel is already on demurrage.
14. VITOL ISPS (REV 06/08/04): ISPS CLAUSE
FOR VOYAGE CHARTER PARTIES (A)(i) It is a
condition of this charter party that, from the date of
coming into force of the International Code for the
27a
Security of Ships and of Port Facilities and the
relevant amendments to Chapter XI of SOLAS (ISPS
Code) in relation to the Vessel, both the Vessel and
“the Company” (as defined by the ISPS Code) shall
comply with the requirements of the ISPS Code
relating to the Vessel and “the Company”. Upon
request the Owners shall provide a copy of the
relevant International Ship Security Certificate (or
the Interim International Ship Security Certificate) to
the Charterers. The original of the ISSC, or interim
ISSC, and the original of the Continuous Synopsis
Record (mandatory after 1st July 2004) must be on
board the vessel at all times. The Owners shall provide
the Charterers with the full style contact details of the
Company Security Officer (CSO).
(ii) Except as otherwise provided in this Charter
Party, loss, damage, expense or delay (which shall not
count as laytime or, if the vessel is on demurrage, as
time on demurrage),” “excluding consequential loss,
caused by failure on the part of the Owners or “the
Company” or the Vessel and/or its crew to comply with
the requirements of the ISPS Code or this Clause shall
be for the Owners’ account.
(B) (i) Upon the specific request of Owner, the
Charterers shall provide the CSO and the Ship
Security Officer (SSO)/Master with their full style
contact details and any other available information
the Owners reasonably require to comply with the
ISPS Code.
(ii) Except as otherwise provided in this Charter
Party, loss, damage, expense, excluding consequential
loss, caused by failure on the part of the Charterers to
comply with this Clause shall be for the Charterers’
account and any delay caused by such failure shall
28a
count as laytime or, if the vessel is on demurrage, as
time on demurrage.
(B) Provided that the delay is not caused by the
Owners’ failure to comply with their obligations under
the ISPS Code, and that the measure imposed by the
port facility or by relevant authorities applies to all
vessels in that port and not specifically to Owners
vessel, the following shall apply:
(i) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary
provided in this Charter Party, the Vessel shall be
entitled to tender Notice of Readiness even if not
cleared due to applicable security regulations or
measures imposed by a port facility or any relevant
authority under the ISPS Code.
(ii) Any delay resulting from measures imposed by
a port facility or by any relevant authority under the
ISPS Code shall count as half laytime or half time on
demurrage if the Vessel is on demurrage. If the delay
occurs before laytime has started or after laytime or
time on demurrage has ceased to count as provided for
elsewhere within this charter party, it shall nevertheless count as half laytime or, if the vessel is on
demurrage, as half time on demurrage, and always
in accordance with A(ii) and except for any reason
directly attributable to the status/circumstances of the
Owners and/or Master and/or Crew and/or Vessel.
(iii) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary
provided in this Charter Party, any additional costs or
expenses whatsoever solely arising out of or related to
security regulations or measures required by the port
facility or any relevant authority in accordance with
the ISPS Code including, but not limited to, security
guards, launch services, tug escorts, port security fees
or taxes and inspections, unless such costs or expenses
29a
result solely from the Owners’ negligence shall be
shared equally between owner and Charterer.
(D) All measures required by the Owners to comply
with the Ship Security Plan shall be for the Owners’
account.
(E) If either party makes any payment, which is for
the other party’s account according to this Clause, the
other party shall reimburse the paying party all such
reasonable and proven expenses.
15. OWNER’S FULL ADDRESS: Heidenreich
Marine, Inc. As Agents For Star Tankers Inc., 320 Post
Road, Darien, Ct 06820.
16. APPROVALS: To the best of Owner’s knowledge the Vessel is approved by the following:
ConocoPhillips, El Paso, Star Tankers, USCG and
C.O.C.
17. QUALIFIED INDIVIDUALS: O’Brien’s Oil Pollution Services
18. OIL SPILL: Marine Spill Response Corp.
19. USCG COC EXPIRE: October 13, 2005
30a
CITGO PETROLEUM CORPORATION
(Or Nominee)CLAUSES
REVISED May 27, 1999
Charter Party Form: ASBATANKVOY
1.
ITOPF (NEW 2/97)
OWNERS WARRANT THAT VESSEL IS
ENTERED WITH THE INTERNATIONAL TANKER
OWNERS POLLUTION FEDERATION (ITOPF) AT
THE COMMENCEMENT OF THIS CHARTER AND
WILL SO REMAIN DURING ITS TERM.
2.
YORK/ANTWERP (REVISED 2/97)
YORK/ANTWERP RULES, 1974, AS AMENDED
1994, SHALL APPLY FOR ADJUSTMENT OF
GENERAL AVERAGE.
3. U. S. COAST GUARD COMPLIANCE (REVISED 4/96)
OWNER WARRANTS THAT DURING THE TERM
OF THIS CHARTER PARTY THE VESSEL WILL BE
IN FULL COMPLIANCE WITH ALL APPLICABLE
U.S. COAST GUARD REGULATIONS INCLUDING
POLLUTION PREVENTION REGULATIONS AS
SPECIFICALLY DESCRIBED AS 33 CFR PARTS
150, 151, 154, 156, 157 AND 164 OR WILL HOLD
NECESSARY WAIVERS IF NOT IN COMPLIANCE.
ANY DELAY AS A RESULT OF NON-COMPLIANCE
SHALL NOT COUNT AS USED LAYTIME OR
DEMURRAGE, IF ON DEMURRAGE.
FURTHER, OWNER AND THE VESSEL SHALL
COMPLY WITH ALL APPLICABLE STATE AND
LOCAL LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND ORDINANCE
PERTAINING TO MARINE TRANSFER OPERATIONS AND THE MOORING AND BOOMING OF
VESSELS.
4.
31a
FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (REVISED 2/97)
OWNER WARRANTS TO HAVE SECURED AND
CARRY ABOARD THE VESSEL A U.S. COAST
GUARD CERTIFICATE OF FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AS REQUIRED BY THE FEDERAL WATER
POLLUTION CONTROL ACT (33 U.S.C. 1321), AS
AMENDED BY THE CLEAN WATER ACT OF 1977
AND AS MAY BE AMENDED IN THE FUTURE.
IN NO CASE SHALL CHARTERERS BE LIABLE
FOR DEMURRAGE AS A RESULT OF OWNERS
FAILURE TO OBTAIN THE AFOREMENTIONED
CERTIFICATE.
5.
PUMPING (AMENDED)
OWNER WARRANTS THAT VESSEL WILL DISCHARGE THE ENTIRE CARGO WITHIN 33 HOURS
OR MAINTAIN 100 PSI AT THE VESSELS MANIFOLD EXCEPT WHEN PERFORMING STRIPPING MAXIMUM THREE (3) HOURS PROVIDING SHORE FACILITIES CAN ACCEPT. ANY
DELAYS DUE TO VESSELS INABILITY TO
DISCHARGE WITHIN 33 HOURS OR MAINTAIN
100 PSI AT THE VESSELS MANIFOLD WILL BE
FOR OWNERS ACCOUNT AND WILL NOT COUNT
AS LAYTIME OR DEMURRAGE. OWNER WILL
PROVIDE A COPY OF NOTE OF PROTEST, VESSELS PUMPING RECORD SIGNED BY A TERMINAL REPRESENTATIVE WITH THE DEMURRAGE
CLAIM. TIME SAVED IN PUMPING CANNOT BE
ADDED TO THE STRIPPING ALLOWANCE.
6.
BUNKER INSPECTION
OWNER TO ALLOW CHARTERERS INDEPENDENT INSPECTORS TO SURVEY BUNKERS ON
VESSELS LOADING AND DISCHARGING.
7.
32a
CARGO RETENTION
IN THE EVENT THAT ANY CARGO REMAINS
ON BOARD UPON COMPLETION OF DISCHARGE,
CHARTERER SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT TO
DEDUCT FROM FREIGHT AN AMOUNT EQUAL
TO THE FOB PORT OF LOADING VALUE OF SUCH
CARGO PLUS FREIGHT DUE WITH RESPECT
THERETO, PROVIDED THAT THE VOLUME OF
CARGO REMAINING ON BOARD IS PUMPABLE
BY VESSELS STRIPPING SYSTEM AS DETERMINED BY AN INDEPENDENT SURVEYOR. ANY
ACTION OR LACK OF ACTION IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE PROVISION SHALL BE WITHOUT
PREJUDICE TO ANY RIGHTS OR OBLIGATIONS
OF THE PARTIES.
OWNER AGREES TO SHARE EQUALLY WITH
CHARTERER ALL EXPENSES INCURRED WITH
REGARD
TO
USING
AN
INDEPENDENT
SURVEYOR.
8.
INERT GAS SYSTEM (AMENDED)
OWNER WARRANTS THAT VESSEL HAS A
WORKING INERT GAS SYSTEM AND OFFICERS
AND CREW ARE EXPERIENCED IN THE OPERATION OF THE SYSTEM. OWNERS AGREE TO
DEPRESSURIZE THE TANKS OF INERT GAS
EQUIPPED VESSEL FOR ULLAGE MEASUREMENTS BY DESIGNATED INSPECTORS. TIME
FOR DE/RE-INERTING SHALL BE FOR CHARTERER’S ACCOUNT.
9.
CRUDE OIL WASHING (REVISED 4/96)
IF REQUESTED IN CHARTERER’S VOYAGE
INSTRUCTIONS, OWNER AGREES TO CONDUCT
CRUDE OIL WASHING OF CARGO TANKS AT
33a
DISCHARGE PORT(S) SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH
CARGO DISCHARGE OPERATIONS. COW OPERATIONS WILL BE PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE PROCEDURES OF ICS/OCIMF “GUIDELINES FOR TANKWASHING WITH CRUDE OIL”
IN, THE ABSENCE OF EXPRESS CONTRARY
INSTRUCTIONS OF THE CHARTERER. ANY
ADDITIONAL TIME CONSUMED AS A RESULT OF
CRUDE OIL WASHING UP TO A MAXIMUM OF
EIGHT (8) HOURS OR PRORATA ON THE BASIS
OF THE NUMBER OF TANKS CLEANED TO THE
NUMBER OF TANKS LOADED SHALL CONSTITUTE USED LAYTIME. OWNER AGREES TO COMPLY WITH APPLICABLE PORT AND TERMINAL
REGULATIONS AND IF NECESSARY TO SUBMIT
ANY ADVANCE INFORMATION OR TECHNICAL
DATA THAT MAY BE REQUIRED BY LOCAL
AUTHORITIES RELATIVE TO C.O.W. OPERATIONS. OWNER WILL INSTRUCT DISPORT
AGENTS TO RECORD COW DATE/TIMES ON
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
IN CHARTERER REQUESTS C.O.W., THE VESSEL FAILS TO C.O.W. ANY MEASURABLE CARGO
RETAINED ON BOARD SHALL BE DEEMED
LIQUID AND PUMPABLE, AND CHARTERER
SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT TO DEDUCT FROM
FREIGHT AN AMOUNT EQUAL TO THE FOB
PORT OF LOADING VALUE OF SUCH CARGO
PLUS FREIGHT DUE WITH RESPECT THERETO.
10. SHIP-TO-SHIP
(AMENDED)
TRANSFER
CLAUSE
CHARTERERS SHALL HAVE THE OPTION TO
LOAD OR DISCHARGE THE VESSEL VIA SHIP-TOSHIP TRANSFER, (WEATHER PERMITTING AND
SUBJECT TO MASTERS APPROVAL WHICH IS
34a
NOT TO BE UNREASONABLY WITHHELD), AT
ANCHOR, UNDERWAY OR ADRIFT. CHARTERER
WILL PROVIDE ADEQUATE FENDERS, HOSES
AND EQUIPMENT NECESSARY TO PERFORM
THE LIGHTERING OPERATION. OWNER AGREE
TO ALLOW CHARTERER’S SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL ON BOARD, INCLUDING MOORING
MASTER, TO ASSIST IN THE PERFORMANCE OF
THE LIGHTERING OPERATION.
ALL TIME CONSUMED FROM VESSEL’S
ARRIVAL AT THE TRANSFER LOCATION UNTIL
CARGO HOSES ARE DISCONNECTED SHALL
COUNT AS USED LAYTIME AS CALCULATED IN
PART II EXCEPT THOSE DELAYS CAUSED BY
WEATHER CONDITIONS WHICH SHALL COUNT
AS FULL LAYTIME OR IF ON DEMURRAGE AS
FULL DEMURRAGE. THE LIGHTERING LOCATION SHALL NOT COUNT AS ADDITIONAL DISCHARGE PORT OR DISCHARGE BERTH WHEN
COMPUTING FREIGHT BASED ON PUBLISHED
WORLDSCALE RATES.
11. IN-TRANSIT LOSS CLAUSE (AMENDED)
OWNER SHALL BE LIABLE FOR IN-TRANSIT
LOSS OF CARGO ABOVE .30% AND CHARTERER
SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT TO DEDUCT FROM
FREIGHT AN AMOUNT EQUAL TO THE FOB
PORT OF LOADING VALUE OF SUCH LOST
CARGO PLUS FREIGHT DUE WITH RESPECT
THERETO. IN-TRANSIT LOSS IS DEFINED AS
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE A.P.I. TOTAL
CALCULATED SHIP VOLUMES AFTER LOADING
AT THE LOADING PORT(S) AND BEFORE
UNLOADING AT THE DISCHARGING PORT(S).
CARGO QUANTITIES WILL BE DETERMINED BY
INDEPENDENT INSPECTORS ACCOMPANIED BY
35a
SHIP PERSONNEL AND QUANTITIES SO DETERMINED SHALL BE FINAL. OWNER SHALL HAVE
THE BURDEN OF PROVING, BY PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE, ANY OTHERWISE AVAILABLE DEFENSE RESPECTING A LOSS ABOVE
.30%. LIQUID PUMPABLE CARGO REMAINING
ON BOARD AFTER COMPLETION OF DISCHARGE
SHALL NOT BE DEFINED AS AN IN-TRANSIT
LOSS. ANY ACTION OR LACK OF ACTION IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THIS PROVISION SHALL
BE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO ANY RIGHTS OR
OBLIGATIONS OF THE PARTIES.
12. JURISDICTION CLAUSE
THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE OF THIS CHARTER PARTY NOTWITHSTANDING, DISPUTES
CONCERNING NON-DELIVERY OR DAMAGE TO
CARGO MAY, AT CHARTERER’S OPTION, BE
SUBMITTED FOR ADJUDICATION TO THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK AND BOTH
PARTIES HEREBY SUBMIT TO THE JURISDICTION OF THAT COURT FOR SUCH PURPOSES.
13. CITGO BILL OF LADING AND INDEMNITY
CLAUSE(DELETED) REPLACED WITH THE
FOLLOWING: CHEVRON BILL OF LADING
INDEMNITY (10-31-02) ALWAYS U.S. LAW TO
APPLY
THE DISCHARGE PORT(S) SHOWN IN THE
ORIGINAL BILL OF LADING SHALL NOT CONSTITUTE A DECLARATION OF DISCHARGE PORT(S)
AND CHARTERER SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT TO
ORDER VESSEL TO ANY PORT(S) WITHIN THE
TERMS OF THIS CHARTER PARTY. CHARTERER
HEREBY INDEMNIFIES OWNER AGAINST CLAIMS
36a
BROUGHT BY HOLDERS OF ORIGINAL BILLS
OF LADING AGAINST OWNER BY REASON OF
CHANGE OF DESTINATION ORDERED BY THE
CHARTERER.
IN THE EVENT THAT THE ORIGINAL BILLS OF
LADING ARE NOT AVAILABLE AT THE ACTUAL
DISCHARGE PORT ON VESSEL’S ARRIVAL,
OWNER AGREES TO DISCHARGE CARGO AT
FACILITY(IES)/PORT(S) TO RECEIVER(S) DESIGNATED BY CHARTERER IN THE VOYAGE
ORDERS WITHOUT PRESENTATION OF ORIGINAL BILLS OF LADING UPON RECEIPT OF
CHARTERER’S INVOCATION OF OWNER’S APPROVED P&I CLUB RECOMMENDED “LETTER OF
INDEMNITY” WORDING. OWNER’S APPROVED
P&I CLUB IS STANDARD STEAMSHIP OWNERS
P AND I ASSOCIATION (BERMUDA) LTD.. OWNER
AND CHARTERER AGREE THAT ANY REQUIREMENT CONTAINED IN THE ABOVE REFERENCED “LETTER OF INDEMNITY” WORDING FOR
A BANK GUARANTEE IS HEREBY WAIVED.
APPROVED P&I CLUBS:
STEAMSHIP MUTUAL UNDERWRITING ASSOCIATION (BERMUDA) LTD.
UNITED KINGDOM MUTUAL STEAM SHIP
ASSURANCE ASSOCIATION (BERMUDA)
LTD.
WEST OF ENGLAND SHIP OWNERS MUTUAL
INSURANCE ASSOCIATION (LUXEMBOURG)
JAPAN SHIP OWNERS’ MUTUAL PROTECTION & INDEMNITY ASSOCIATION
ASSURANCEFORENINGEN GARD
ASSURANCEFORENINGEN SKULD
37a
THE SWEDISH CLUB (SVERIGES ANGFARTYGS ASSURANS FORENING)
BRITANNIA STEAMSHIP INSURANCE ASSOCIATION LTD.
LONDON STEAMSHIP OWNER’S MUTUAL
INSURANCE ASSOCIATION LTD.
SHIPOWNERS’ MUTUAL INSURANCE (SEAMEN’S BENEFITS) ASSOCIATION
STANDARD STEAMSHIP OWNERS’ MUTUAL
WAR RISKS ASSOCIATION LTD.
AMERICAN STEAMSHIP OWNERS MUTUAL
P&I ASSOCIATION
NORTH OF ENGLAND P&I ASSOCIATION
LIMITED
14. LIGHTERING (REVISED 5/27/99) (AMENDED)
IF LIGHTERING IS REQUIRED AT A
CUSTOMARY LIGHTERING ANCHORAGE FOR
DESIGNATED PORT, TIME USED IN LIGHTERING
SHALL COUNT AS LAYTIME AND COMMENCE
SIX (6) HOURS AFTER ARRIVING AT THE
LIGHTERING POSITION OR WHENEVER THE
FIRST LIGHTERING CRAFT IS ALONGSIDE,
WHICHEVER OCCURS FIRST. LAYTIME SHALL
END WHEN HOSES ARE OFF FOLLOWING THE
LIGHTERING OPERATION. UNLESS OTHERWISE STIPULATED BY WORLDSCALE SUCH
ANCHORAGE SHALL NOT BE CONSIDERED AS A
SECOND DISCHARGE PORT OR SECOND DISCHARGE BERTH, IN THE COMPUTATION OF
FREIGHT RATE FROM PUBLISHED WORLDSCALE 100 RATES, WITH FREIGHT PAYMENT
BASED ON THE ENTIRE CARGO QUANTITY
38a
LOADED FROM ACTUAL LOAD PORT(S) TO
ACTUAL FINAL DISPORT(S). RUNNING TIME
FROM SUCH ANCHORAGE TO BERTH SHALL
NOT COUNT AS LAYTIME OR DEMURRAGE,
IF LAYTIME HAS EXPIRED. ALL COSTS IN
CONNECTION WITH SUCH LIGHTERAGE
OPERATION TO BE FOR CHARTERER’S
ACCOUNT.
USCG REGULATIONS, COVERING LIGHTERING OPERATIONS, REQUIRE THE OWNER OR
OPERATOR OF A VESSEL TO ENSURE THE
AVAILABILITY OF, THROUGH CONTRACT OR
OTHER APPROVED MEANS, RESPONSE RESOURCES THAT WILL RESPOND TO AN AVERAGE MOST PROBABLE DISCHARGE (AMPD)
CITGO PETROLEUM CORPORATION, AS CHARTERER AND/OR RECEIVER OF THE CARGO,
AT ITS EXPENSE, WILL PROVIDE SUCH AMPD
COVERAGE FOR THE VESSEL TO COMPLY
WITH THESE REGULATIONS. SHOULD A SPILL
OCCUR, THE VESSEL SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT
TO CALL OUT THE AMPD RESPONSE RESOURCES
AS PROVIDED THIS COVERAGE, CITGO PETROLEUM CORPORATION. BY PROVIDING THIS
COVERAGE, CITGO PETROLEUM CORPORATION
IS NOT AND SHALL NOT BE LIABLE OF THE
COSTS OF THE SPILL RESPONSE AND DEMURRAGE ARISING THEREFROM.
15. LAYTIME (REVISED 5/98) (AMENDED)
AT THE END OF NO.7 PART II, “HOURS
FOR LOADING AND DISCHARGING” ADD TIME
CONSUMED AWAITING PRATIQUE, CUSTOMS,
IMMIGRATION, DAYLIGHT, TIDE, OPENING OF
LOCKS, RAISINGOF BRIDGES, PILOT AND/OR
TUGS SHALL COUNT AS ONE HALF LAYTIME
39a
OR DEMURRAGE, IF LAYTIME HAS EXPIRED
OR ONE HALF DEMURRAGE IF VESSEL ON
DEMURRAGE.
IF FOR ANY REASON LAYTIME HAS EXPIRED,
CHARTERER TO BE ALLOWED THE BENEFITS
OF CLAUSE 6, 7, AND 8, PART II AT EACH
PORT OF LOADING OR DISCHARGE BEFORE
DEMURRAGE SHALL BE INCURRED WHETHER
PREVIOUSLY ON DEMURRAGE OR NOT.
16. WEATHER (AMENDED)
DELAYS DUE TO WEATHER CONDITIONS AND
THEIR EFFECT ON THE SEA AT LOAD OR
DISCHARGE PORTS IN BERTHING, LOADING,
DISCHARGING SHALL COUNT AS ONE HALF
LAYTIME OR IF ON DEMURRAGE ONE HALF
TIME ON DEMURRAGE.
17. AGENCY CLAUSE
OWNER AGREE TO APPOINT AGENTS AS
NOMINATED BY CHARTERERS AT LOAD AND
DISCHARGE PORTS. SUCH AGENTS SHALL BE
OWNER’S AGENT FOR ALL PURPOSES UNDER
THIS CHARTER.
18. BOARDING CLAUSE
OWNER AGREES TO ALLOW CHARTERER’S
REPRESENTATIVE(S) TO BOARD VESSEL AT
LOAD AND/OR DISCHARGE PORTS TO OBSERVE
CARGO LOADING/DISCHARGING OPERATION.
19. CITGO SHORE RELEASE (REVISED 5/98)
TIME SPENT WAITING VESSEL RELEASE BY
SHORE AUTHORITIES AND/OR CARGO INSPECTORS AFTER DISCONNECTION OF HOSES IN
EXCESS OF THREE HOURS SHALL COUNT AS
40a
USED LAYTIME OR DEMURRAGE IF VESSEL
IS ON DEMURRAGE. FOR PURPOSES OF THIS
CLAUSE, VESSEL RELEASE AT LOAD PORT
SHALL BE EFFECTED BY THE CARGO DOCUMENTS BEING PLACED ON BOARD.
20. LAYDAYS-NOTICE OF READINESS (REVISED 4/96)
AT THE END OF NO. 6, PART II “NOTICE OF
READINESS” ADD CHARTERER IS NOT OBLIGATED TO ACCEPT NOTICE OF READINESS
PRIOR TO COMMENCEMENT OF LAYDAYS AS
PROVIDED FOR IN PART I ARTICLE B.
IN THE EVENT THAT NOTICE OF READINESS
IS GIVEN PRIOR TO COMMENCEMENT OF LAYDAYS AS PROVIDED FOR IN PART I ARTICLE B,
LAYTIME SHALL NOT BEGIN UNTIL 0600 LOCAL
TIME ON THE FIRST DAY OF LAYDAYS OR UPON
VESSEL’S ARRIVAL IN BERTH WHICHEVER
OCCURS FIRST.
21. HOSES
OWNER AGREES TO CONNECT AND DISCONNECT HOSES IF SO REQUESTED BY CHARTERERS AT OWNER’S RISK AND EXPENSE.
22. CITGO DIVERSION CLAUSE
NOTWITHSTANDING ANYTHING TO THE CONTRARY IN THIS CHARTER PARTY AND NOTWITHSTANDING NOMINATION OF LOADING
AND/OR DISCHARGE PORTS AND ISSUANCE OF
BILL OF LADING, CHARTERERS SHALL HAVE
THE RIGHT TO CHANGE ITS NOMINATION OF
LOADING AND/OR DISPORT IN ACCORDANCE
WITH PART I C AND D OF THE CHARTER PARTY.
ANY EXTRA TIME AND EXPENSE INCURRED BY
41a
OWNERS IN COMPLYING WITH CHARTERERS
INSTRUCTIONS SHALL BE FOR CHARTERERS
ACCOUNT AND CALCULATED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH PART II CLAUSE 4 OF THIS CHARTER.
FREIGHT TO BE BASED ON THE VOYAGE
ACTUALLY PERFORMED. CHARTER SHALL
HAVE THE RIGHT TO MAKE AS MANY CHANGES
AS IT DEEMS NECESSARY.
23. FLORIDA STRAIT TRANSIT CLAUSE
VESSEL, WHEN TRANSITING THE FLORIDA
STRAITS AREA FROM KEY BISCAYNE SOUTH TO
THE DRY TORTUGAS S
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