Petitioners Brief — CITGO Asphalt Refining Company, et al., Petitioners v. Frescati Shipping Company, Ltd., et al.

Supreme Court briefJul 9, 2019

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No. 18-565

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

___________

CITGO ASPHALT REFINING COMPANY; CITGO

PETROLEUM CORPORATION; CITGO EAST COAST OIL

CORPORATION,

Petitioners,

v.

FRESCATI SHIPPING COMPANY, LTD.; TSAKOS

SHIPPING & TRADING, S.A.; AND UNITED STATES,

Respondents.

___________

On Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

___________

BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS

___________

DEREK A. WALKER

J. DWIGHT LEBLANC, JR.

DOUGLAS L. GRUNDMEYER

CHAFFE MCCALL, L.L.P.

2300 Energy Centre

1100 Poydras Street

New Orleans, LA 70163

(504) 585-7000

RICHARD Q. WHELAN

FRANK P. DEGIULIO

PALMER, BIEZUP &

HENDERSON LLP

190 N. Independence Mall

West, Suite 401

Philadelphia, PA 19106

(215) 625-9900

July 9, 2019

CARTER G. PHILLIPS*

JACQUELINE G. COOPER

RICHARD E. YOUNG

JORDAN B. CHERRICK

LUCAS CROSLOW

SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP

1501 K Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 736-8000

cphillips@sidley.com

JOHN G. BISSELL

STRONG PIPKIN BISSELL

& LEDYARD, L.L.P.

4900 Woodway Drive

Suite 1200

Houston, TX 77056

(713) 651-1900

Counsel for Petitioners

*Counsel of Record

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether under federal maritime law a safe berth

clause in a voyage charter contract imposes strict

liability on the charterer with respect to a ship’s

safety, or instead imposes at most a duty of due

diligence.

(i)

ii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

The parties to the proceeding are listed in the

caption.

Petitioners CITGO Asphalt Refining

Company, CITGO Petroleum Corporation, and

CITGO East Coast Oil Corporation are collectively

known as CARCO.

RULE 29.6 STATEMENT

CITGO Asphalt Refining Company is not a

corporation and has no parent corporations. It is a

privately held General Partnership whose general

partners are CITGO Petroleum Corporation and

CITGO East Coast Oil Corporation, both of which are

private, non-publicly held entities.

CITGO Petroleum Corporation’s parent is CITGO

Holding, Inc., which is a wholly owned subsidiary of

PDV Holding, Inc., which is a wholly owned

subsidiary of Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (“PDVSA”).

No publicly held company owns 10% or more of

CITGO Petroleum Corporation’s stock.

CITGO East Coast Oil Corporation’s parent is

CITGO Investment Company, a private, non-publicly

held entity. No publicly held company owns 10% or

more of CITGO East Coast Oil Corporation’s stock.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED ...................................

i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING .....................

ii

RULE 29.6 STATEMENT ....................................

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................

v

OPINIONS BELOW .............................................

1

JURISDICTION....................................................

1

CONSTITUTIONAL

AND

STATUTORY

PROVISIONS ....................................................

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE..............................

2

A. Factual and Regulatory Background .......

3

B. Prior Proceedings ......................................

7

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ..............................

14

ARGUMENT .........................................................

18

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS’ INTERPRETATION OF THE SAFE BERTH CLAUSE

AS A WARRANTY MISREADS THE CONTRACTUAL TEXT ........................................

18

A. The Terms Of The Safe Berth Clause Do

Not Provide For Liability Regardless Of

Fault ..........................................................

19

B. The Parties Did Not Intend For CARCO

To Assume Strict Liability........................

25

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS’ INTERPRETATION OF THE SAFE BERTH CLAUSE

AS A WARRANTY IS CONTRARY TO

THIS COURT’S DECISIONS AND LACKS

ANY SOUND LEGAL FOUNDATION ........

27

(iii)

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS—continued

A. The Warranty Interpretation Conflicts

With This Court’s Controlling Decisions...

Page

28

B. The Warranty Interpretation Lacks Any

Sound Legal Foundation...........................

33

III. MARITIME

COMMERCE

IS

BEST

SERVED BY INTERPRETING SAFE

BERTH CLAUSES AS IMPOSING AT

MOST A DUTY OF DUE DILIGENCE ON

CHARTERERS ..............................................

37

A. Strict Liability Is Unwarranted And

Detrimental To Maritime Commerce .......

38

B. The Court Of Appeals’ Reasons For

Adopting The Warranty Interpretation

Are Unsound .............................................

42

C. The Warranty Interpretation Results In

Inconsistent Standards Of Care For

Wharfingers And Charterers....................

47

D. The Warranty Interpretation Produces

An Inequitable Result In This Case .........

49

CONCLUSION .....................................................

51

ADDENDUM

v

CASES

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Air & Liquid Sys. Corp. v. DeVries, 139 S.

Ct. 986 (2019) ........................................... 18, 40

Atkins v. Fibre Disintegrating Co., 2 F. Cas.

78 (E.D.N.Y. 1868) (No. 601), aff’d, 85

U.S. (18 Wall.) 272 (1874) ........................ 28, 29

Atkins v. Fibre Disintegrating Co., 85 U.S.

(18 Wall.) 272 (1874) .......................... 15, 28, 29

Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S.

404 (2009) ...................................................

20

Boudreaux v. Am. Workover, Inc., 680 F.2d

1034 (5th Cir. 1982) ...................................

20

Campbell Soup Co. v. Fed. Motorship Corp.,

1935 WL 57939, 1935 A.M.C. 634

(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 1935) ............................

27

Capt’n Mark v. Sea Fever Corp., 692 F.2d

163 (1st Cir. 1982) ......................................

20

Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347

(1995) ..........................................................

20

Cities Serv. Transp. Co. v. Gulf Ref. Co., 79

F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1935) ............................ 33, 34

In re Complaint of Metlife Capital Corp.,

132 F.3d 818 (1st Cir. 1997) ......................

6

Crisp v. U.S. & Australasia S.S. Co., 124 F.

748 (S.D.N.Y. 1903) ....................................

24

Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v.

Perini N. River Assocs., 459 U.S. 297

(1983) ..........................................................

20

Dutra Grp. v. Batterton, No. 18-266 (U.S.

June 24, 2019) ................................... 20, 40, 47

E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval

Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986) ................... 38, 39, 41

Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno,

150 P. 2d 436 (Cal. 1944) ...........................

39

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued

Page

Exxon Corp. v. Cent. Gulf Lines, Inc., 500

U.S. 603 (1991) ......................................... 18, 37

Ferrara v. A. & V. Fishing, Inc., 99 F.3d

449 (1st Cir. 1996) ......................................

27

The G.R. Booth, 171 U.S. 450 (1898) ............

27

Gatlin Oil Co. v. United States, 169 F.3d

207 (4th Cir. 1999) .....................................

49

The Gazelle & Cargo, 128 U.S. 474

(1888) ........................................................ 30, 31

Hastorf v. O’Brien, 173 F. 346 (2d Cir.

1909) ...........................................................

36

Howlett v. Birkdale Shipping Co., 512 U.S.

92 (1994) .....................................................

20

Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v.

Or. Stevedoring Co., 376 U.S. 315

(1964) ........................................................ 38, 39

Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes

Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527 (1995) ...

18

M. & J. Tracy, Inc. v. Marks, Lissberger &

Son, Inc., 283 F. 100 (2d Cir. 1922) ......... 36, 47

Man Ferrostaal, Inc. v. M/V Akili, 704 F.3d

77 (2d Cir. 2012) .........................................

20

McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S.

337 (1991) ...................................................

20

Mencke v. Cargo of Java Sugar, 187 U.S.

248 (1902) ................................................. 24, 31

Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19

(1990) ..........................................................

20

Neely v. Club Med Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 63

F.3d 166 (3d Cir. 1995) ..............................

20

Norfolk S. Ry. v. Kirby, 543 U.S. 14

(2004) ..................................... 18, 20, 37, 42, 49

Orduna S.A. v. Zen-Noh Grain Corp., 913

F.2d 1149 (5th Cir. 1990) ...................... passim

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued

Page

Paragon Oil Co. v. Republic Tankers, S.A.,

310 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1962) .......................

33

Park S.S. Co. v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 188

F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1951) ..............................

33

Plymouth Transp. Co. v. Red Star Towing

& Transp. Co., 20 F.2d 357 (2d Cir.

1927) ...........................................................

36

Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85

(1946), superseded by statute on other

grounds, Longshoremen’s and Harbor

Workers’ Compensation Act Amendments

of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-576, 86 Stat.

1251 ............................................................

38

Smith v. Burnett, 173 U.S. 430 (1899) ....... 17, 47

Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 543 U.S. 481

(2005) ..........................................................

20

Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l

Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010) .........................

4

Sw. Marine, Inc. v. Gizoni, 502 U.S. 81

(1991) ..........................................................

20

Tweedie Trading Co. v. N.Y. & Bos.

Dyewood Co., 127 F. 278 (2d Cir. 1903) ....

24

Venore Transp. Co. v. Oswego Shipping

Corp., 498 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1974) ............

33

Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V

Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528 (1995) .................

20

Waldie v. Steers Sand & Gravel Corp., 151

F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1945) ..............................

48

CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES

U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 ......................... 1, 18

Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101380, 104 Stat. 484 ......................................

6

viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued

Page

26 U.S.C. § 9509(b) ........................................

7

28 U.S.C. § 1333 ............................................ 1, 8

33 U.S.C. § 2701(32)(A) .................................

6

§ 2702(a) ........................................

6

§ 2703(a)(3) ................................... 7, 49

§ 2704 ............................................

6

§ 2708(a)(1) ...................................

7

§ 2713(b)(1)(B) ..............................

7

§ 2715(a) ........................................

7

46 U.S.C. app. § 183 (2005) ........................... 8, 41

46 U.S.C. § 30701 note ..................................

42

SCHOLARLY AUTHORITIES

Terence Coghlin et al., Time Charters (7th

ed. 2014) .....................................................

35

Julian Cooke et al., Voyage Charters (4th

ed. 2014) ................................. 19, 21, 24, 26, 45

Dan B. Dobbs et al., The Law of Torts (2d

ed. 2011) ................................................... 40, 41

Bernard Eder et al., Scrutton on

Charterparties and Bills of Lading (23d

ed. 2017) .....................................................

35

Grant Gilmore & Charles L. Black, Jr., The

Law of Admiralty (2d ed. 1975) ............ passim

Peter G. Hartman, Comments, Safe

Port/Berth Clauses: Warranty or Due

Diligence?, 21 Tul. Mar. L.J. 537

(1997) ................................................. 20, 36, 45

International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to

Bills of Lading, Aug. 25, 1924, https://

www.jus.uio.no/english/services/library/

treaties/07/7-04/hague-rules.xml ...............

26

ix

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued

Page

Lawrence I. Kiern, Liability, Compensation,

and Financial Responsibility Under the

Oil Pollution Act of 1990: A Review of the

Second Decade, 36 Tul. Mar. L.J. 1

(2011) ..........................................................

41

Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981) ...

18

Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977) ..........

41

2 Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and

Maritime Law (6th ed. 2018) ............ 20, 35, 41

J. Bond Smith, Jr., Time and Voyage

Charters: Safe Port/Safe Berth, 49 Tul. L.

Rev. 860 (1975) ....................................... 36, 46

2A Michael F. Sturley, Benedict on

Admiralty (7th ed. 2014) ............................

35

1 William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims

(4th ed. 2008)..............................................

27

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals, Pet. App. 1a44a, is reported at 886 F.3d 291. The court of

appeals’ order denying CARCO’s petition for panel

rehearing and rehearing en banc, Pet. App. 270a271a, is unreported. The opinion of the district court,

Pet. App. 45a-269a, is reported at 2016 WL 4035994.

An earlier opinion of the court of appeals, Pet. App.

272a-329a, is reported at 718 F.3d 184. The court of

appeals’ order denying CARCO’s petition for panel

rehearing and rehearing en banc of this earlier

opinion, Pet. App. 345a-346a, is unreported. An

earlier opinion of the district court, Pet. App. 330a344a, is reported at 2011 WL 1436878.

JURISDICTION

The court of appeals issued its opinion on March 29,

2018. Pet. App. 1a-44a. The petition for a writ of

certiorari was timely filed on October 26, 2018. This

Court granted certiorari on April 22, 2019, and has

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS

The Constitution provides that “[t]he judicial Power

shall extend to . . . all Cases of admiralty and

maritime Jurisdiction.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.

28 U.S.C. § 1333 provides that “[t]he district courts

shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the

courts of the States, of: (1) Any civil case of admiralty

or maritime jurisdiction.”

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case involves claims for extraordinary and

unjustified contract damages against CARCO arising

from an oil spill caused when the oil tanker Athos I

struck a submerged and uncharted anchor abandoned

by an unknown party in the Delaware River. CARCO

had chartered the Athos I and owned the marine

terminal to which it was headed. It is undisputed

that CARCO neither knew, nor had any reason to

know, that the anchor was in the river. It is also

undisputed that the Federal Anchorage in which the

anchor was hidden was not maintained or controlled

by CARCO and that CARCO had no role in

navigating the vessel.

Despite the fact that CARCO bears no fault for the

accident, the courts below entered a judgment of

more than $140 million against it, to be split between

the vessel owners and the United States. The courts

relied solely on a commonplace safe berth clause

included in the ship charter contract. In their view,

the safe berth clause is an implied warranty that

imposes strict liability on charterers for all damages

arising out of a vessel’s entry, use, or exit from a

designated berth. The strict liability rule is unsound,

however, both as a matter of contract interpretation

and sensible maritime policy. Indeed, the origins of

that rule are completely obscure. The court of

appeals almost slavishly relied upon a line of Second

Circuit decisions, but those decisions contain little

reasoning and provide no justification for treating the

clause as a guarantee, which assigns massive liability

for all damages arising out of a vessel’s entry, use, or

exit from a designated berth to a mere charterer

without any proof of fault. The decisions also wholly

ignore a decision from this Court that plainly

3

disclaimed the charterer’s strict liability for all

possible risks under a safe berth clause.

This Court should instead adopt the reasoned

position of the Fifth Circuit, wholly endorsed by the

preeminent treatise on admiralty law (and others),

that safe berth clauses impose at most a duty of due

diligence on the charterer. That duty follows from

the fact that safe berth clauses are best interpreted

as limited provisions that grant charterers the right

to select the berth, and that impose on them a

corresponding duty to pay the resulting expenses if a

vessel’s captain exercises the right to reject the

selected berth as unsafe. The clauses do not speak at

all to accidents resulting from unforeseeable dangers

such as occurred in this case. Liability for such

events should be based on tort principles or other

sources of law, such as the federal cost-spreading

scheme for oil spills that addresses precisely the type

of loss that occurred in this case. Courts should not

foist liability on an innocent party based upon

contract language that does not clearly shift liability

to that party.

A. Factual and Regulatory Background.

The Charter Contracts. In 2001, the ship owner,

Frescati Shipping Company, Ltd. (“Frescati”),

chartered (i.e., leased) the Athos I to Star Tankers

Inc. (“Star”) via a standard industry form contract

known as a “time charter,” which granted Star the

right to subcharter the ship for specific voyages under

whatever contractual terms it could negotiate. That

long-term contract between Frescati and Star

contained an English choice-of-law clause. Tsakos

Shipping & Trading, S.A. (“Tsakos”) was the manager

of the Athos I.

4

Three years later, Star subchartered the tanker to

CARCO for a single voyage to carry a cargo of crude

oil from Venezuela to CARCO’s asphalt refinery in

Paulsboro, New Jersey under a “voyage charter”

contract. See Addendum (“Add.) 1a-48a (voyage

charter contract). Voyage charter contracts “are

commonly drafted using highly standardized forms

specific to the particular trades and business needs of

the parties.” Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l

Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 666 n.1 (2010). The form used

here was the ASBATANKVOY charter party form,

Pet. App. 279a, which “is one of the most universally

accepted and widely used charter-parties in the ocean

transportation of crude oil, petroleum products, and

liquid chemicals.” Br. of The Maritime Law Ass’n of

the United States and The Ass’n of Ship Brokers &

Agents (USA) Inc. as Amici Curiae in Support of

Pet’rs 4 (“MLA/ASBA Petition-stage Br.”).

The

contract between Star and CARCO provided that any

disputes between the parties would be governed by

U.S. law. Add. 35a. Frescati, the titled ship owner,

was not a party to the contract and was not

mentioned in the contract.

The voyage charter

defined Star as the “owner” of the vessel for purposes

of the contract. Id. at 1a.

The voyage charter also included the following “safe

berth” clause, see Add. 8a:

[t]he vessel shall load and discharge at any safe

place or wharf, . . . which shall be designated and

procured by the Charterer, provided the Vessel

can proceed thereto, lie at, and depart therefrom

always safely afloat, any lighterage [cargo

transfer] being at the expense, risk and peril of

the Charterer. . . .

It also provided that:

5

The vessel . . . shall, with all convenient

dispatch, proceed as ordered to Loading Port(s)

named . . . or so near thereunto as she may

safely get (always afloat) . . . and being so loaded

shall forthwith proceed, as ordered on signing

Bills of Lading, direct to the Discharging Port(s),

or so near thereunto as she may safely get

(always afloat), and deliver said cargo.

Add. 4a. See also Add. 24a (rider provision specifying

that the discharge ports would be: “One (1) or two (2)

safe port(s) United States Atlantic Coast . . . ”)

(emphasis added).1 Although the voyage charter did

not specify that the discharge berth would be

CARCO’s refinery in Paulsboro, New Jersey, the

Athos I’s captain and crew had notice of the

destination prior to the voyage. See, e.g., Pet. App.

333a (noting that the bill of lading signed by the

captain prior to departure specified Paulsboro, New

Jersey as the destination).

The Casualty. The casualty occurred on

November 26, 2004, near the end of the ship’s 1900mile voyage. During the voyage, CARCO had no role

in operating the vessel or making navigational

decisions. The captain and crew were employed and

controlled by the vessel, not CARCO. In addition, the

vessel (not CARCO) selected, hired, and supervised a

local river pilot and a docking pilot to assist the

captain in navigating the Delaware River and

docking at the Paulsboro berth.

The Athos I was crossing and “approximately

halfway through” an area of the Delaware River

1 Technically, the first quoted provision is a “safe berth”

clause and the other provisions establish a “safe port” obligation.

We refer to these provisions collectively as the “safe berth”

clause, as did the courts below. See Pet. App. 13a-14a, 275a.

6

known as Federal Anchorage No. 9 (the “Federal

Anchorage Area”), when the vessel struck an

abandoned, nine-ton anchor. Pet. App. 281a-282a.

The Anchorage is essentially a federally maintained

and regulated parking lot for large ships waiting to

dock along, or depart from, the Delaware River. The

entirety of the Federal Anchorage Area, including

where the abandoned anchor laid, is open to general

commercial and recreational vessel traffic and “is

neither controlled nor maintained by CARCO.” Id. at

285a. The Athos I was still some 900 feet (or three

football fields) away from CARCO’s berth and well

within the Federal Anchorage Area when it hit the

anchor. Id. at 282a, 329a (illustration). The Athos I

was a single-hull vessel, and its hull was punctured

by contact with the anchor, causing approximately

263,000 gallons of crude oil to spill into the Delaware

River. Id. at 275a, 278a.

The Cleanup under the Oil Pollution Act. The

post-casualty cleanup was conducted pursuant to the

Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (“OPA”), Pub. L. No. 101380, 104 Stat. 484, codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701, et

seq., a statute passed in the wake of the ExxonValdez incident. OPA was designed to “encourage

rapid private party responses” to oil spills, In re

Complaint of Metlife Capital Corp., 132 F.3d 818, 822

(1st Cir. 1997), by identifying “responsible part[ies],”

who are required to pay for a cleanup in the first

instance. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a). As the titled owner of

the vessel that discharged the oil, Frescati was

designated the “responsible party.” Id. § 2701(32)(A).

OPA also functions as a cost-spreading scheme and

permits “responsible part[ies]” to limit their liability.

Id. § 2704. Frescati filed an ex parte administrative

claim asking the National Pollution Fund Center

(“NPFC”) to limit its liability as a responsible party

7

under § 2704 of OPA, and reimburse it for cleanup

costs incurred above the limit. The NPFC limited

Frescati’s liability to $45,475,000 and reimbursed

Frescati from the federal Oil Spill Liability Trust

Fund for approximately $88 million in excess of the

limitation amount that Frescati paid to remediate the

spill. The Trust Fund, which is separate from the

general treasury, consists of taxes collected on

imported petroleum products, plus payments received

from environmental taxes and penalties. 26 U.S.C.

§ 9509(b). The Trust Fund effectively requires all

members of the petroleum industry to contribute to

the costs of oil spill cleanups.

CARCO paid

approximately $103 million into this Fund between

1990 and 2004. Once the Trust Fund reimbursed

Frescati, the United States acquired by subrogation

Frescati’s rights against any third parties for the $88

million paid. 33 U.S.C. § 2715(a).

OPA further provides that a responsible party can

be exonerated from all liability if it demonstrates that

the spill was caused by “an act or omission of a third

party” and the responsible party exercised due care.

33 U.S.C. § 2703(a)(3).

Frescati applied for

exoneration under this provision, claiming quite

sensibly that the incident was the sole fault of the

unknown party that lost or discarded the anchor.

Inexplicably, Frescati voluntarily withdrew this claim

and instead opted to pursue claims against CARCO.

See Pet. App. 284a n.6 (noting that “[i]t is unclear

why Frescati withdrew this claim”). If granted,

Frescati’s exoneration claim would have reimbursed

all of its cleanup costs from the Trust Fund. See 33

U.S.C. §§ 2708(a)(1), 2713(b)(1)(B).

B. Prior Proceedings.

Respondents’ Lawsuits. On January 31, 2005,

Frescati filed an action in the district court pursuant

8

to the court’s admiralty jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1333(1).

This action was a “Petition for

Exoneration from or Limitation of Liability” brought

pursuant to 46 U.S.C. app. § 183 (2005), which caps

liability for vessel owners for certain types of claims

arising from a maritime casualty but not with respect

to liability imposed by OPA. CARCO filed a claim in

this limitation action for the loss of its cargo, and

Frescati then counterclaimed against CARCO in both

contract and tort2 for its unreimbursed cleanup costs

and additional damages (e.g., vessel damage, lost

earnings) totaling nearly $56 million. See Pet. App.

243a-247a. Frescati’s contract claim asserted that

CARCO breached the safe berth clause in the StarCARCO voyage charter contract, even though

Frescati was not a party to that contract. As partial

subrogee to Frescati’s claim, the United States later

filed a separate action against CARCO raising

contract and tort claims, in which it sought to recover

the $88 million paid by the Trust Fund to Frescati.

Star is not a party to either of these actions.

The two disputes involving CARCO were

consolidated for trial. At trial, the United States’

claim was limited to its contract claim because, by

pre-trial agreement, the United States forfeited its

tort-based theories of recovery against CARCO. The

resulting bench trial was conducted over 41 days in

2 The contract claim arose from CARCO’s role as the charterer

of the vessel. The tort claim for negligence arose from CARCO’s

separate role as the wharf owner. The tort claim is no longer at

issue. The court of appeals vacated the district court’s tort

judgment in Frescati’s favor, refusing to affirm the district

court’s holding that CARCO breached any duty owed as the

wharf owner to find the anchor located within the Federal

Anchorage Area. Pet. App. 43a.

9

the fall of 2010, and involved 61 live witnesses, 48

witnesses by deposition, and 1,800 exhibits.

First District Court Decision. The district court

found CARCO “not liable in either tort or contract.”

Pet. App. 336a. The court determined that there was

“no evidence” that CARCO or any other party to the

litigation “knew or had reason to believe that the

anchor was in the river.” Id. at 334a. “After hearing

all of the evidence,” the court concluded that “the

fault for the casualty lies with the anchor’s former

owner, who abandoned it in the river without

notifying anyone.” Id. at 344a; see also id. at 334a

(noting “supposition” that the anchor “may have been

used as part of dredging operations” by a federal

contractor).

The district court denied Frescati’s claim (and the

United States’ claim as its subrogee) that CARCO

was liable in contract pursuant to the safe berth

clause in the voyage charter. Although Frescati was

not a party to that contract, it sought to invoke the

clause “as an intended third-party beneficiary.” Pet.

App. 340a. The district court rejected this argument.

Id. at 340a-341a. The court also held that CARCO

did not breach the safe berth clause. Id. at 341a342a. The court acknowledged that some courts have

interpreted such clauses “as an unconditional

guarantee, in effect imposing strict liability” upon

charterers. Id. at 341a. The district court, however,

found “more persuasive” the view of the Fifth Circuit

in Orduna S.A. v. Zen-Noh Grain Corp., 913 F.2d

1149, 1156-57 (5th Cir. 1990), that such clauses

instead “impose[] upon the charterer a duty of due

diligence to select a safe berth.” Pet. App. 341a-342a.

The district court found that “CARCO fulfilled its

duty of due diligence” and that “the port and berth

were generally safe,” given the “volume of commercial

10

traffic that passed without incident through the

Anchorage.” Pet. App. 342a. The court further found

that Frescati was “familiar” with the port and berth,

because 14 vessels operated by Tsakos had called at

the Paulsboro berth in the six years prior to the

casualty, including the sister ship to the Athos I. Id.

at 343a. The court also observed that “the crew of the

ATHOS I did not devote the care and attention to

preparation of the voyage planning that might have

been advisable.” Id. at 344a.

Finally, the district court rejected Frescati’s

negligence claim against CARCO in its role as the

wharfinger (the operator of the Paulsboro wharf)

because the court concluded that CARCO “had no

duty to scan for hazards within the Anchorage.” Pet.

App. 338a.

Initial Third Circuit Decision. The court of

appeals vacated most of the district court’s opinion

and remanded. It determined that the district court’s

narrative discussion of its factual findings and legal

conclusions, and the “overall dearth of clear factual

findings,” constituted “a violation” of Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 52 and necessitated a remand. Pet.

App. 291a-292a. Despite its conclusion that proper

appellate review was not possible, the court of

appeals proceeded to review the case and make its

own legal determinations.

The court concluded that Frescati’s contract claim

is viable. The court of appeals acknowledged that

third-party beneficiary status requires proof that the

contracting parties intended to confer a benefit on the

third party (not merely that a benefit accrued to it).

Nevertheless, the court held that “the Athos I—and

by extension, its owner, Frescati—was an implied” or

“corollary” beneficiary of the safe berth clause in the

voyage charter between Star and CARCO because the

11

clause “necessarily benefits the vessel.”

277a, 295a.

Pet. App.

The court of appeals then turned to the scope of

CARCO’s safe berth obligation and held that the

district court had “incorrectly” adopted the Fifth

Circuit’s position in Orduna that a safe berth

provision “require[s] only due diligence.” Pet. App.

298a; see also id. at 304a (“we . . . decline to follow”

the Fifth Circuit). Instead, the Third Circuit adopted

what it called the Second Circuit’s “longstanding

formulation” that a safe berth provision guarantees

the safety of the berth “without regard to the amount

of diligence taken by the charterer.” Id. at 303a304a; see also id. at 303a (clause is an “‘express

assurance’ warranty”), 304a n.18 (emphasizing the

“strict nature” of the “warranty” and rejecting the

argument that it “applies only to known hazards”).

The court of appeals remanded the question

whether the safe berth clause “was actually

breached.” Pet. App. 305a. It reasoned that the

relevant inquiry was whether the berth was “unsafe

for a ship of the Athos I’s agreed-upon dimensions

and draft,” and that the district court’s findings did

not answer that question.

Id. at 304a-305a.

Although Frescati’s negligence claim was allowed to

proceed because the court of appeals found that

CARCO had a duty of care, the court remanded the

questions of the exact standard of care required,

breach of duty, and causation. Id. at 312a-324a.

The court of appeals denied rehearing and

rehearing en banc. Pet. App. 345a-346a. This Court

denied certiorari. Citgo Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Frescati

Shipping Co., 134 S. Ct. 1279 (2014).

District Court Decision on Remand. In the

remand proceeding, CARCO newly faced the prospect

12

of strict liability to Frescati under CARCO’s contract

with Star. After a “successor-judge” hearing under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 63 that took place

over 31 days in 2015, the district court ruled for

Frescati on the contract and negligence claims. With

respect to the contract claim, the district court stated

that it was bound by the Third Circuit’s rulings that

Frescati was a third-party beneficiary of the StarCARCO contract and that the safe berth provision

constitutes an absolute guarantee of the safety of the

berth. Pet. App. 79a-80a, 165a-168a. Applying that

strict liability standard, it found CARCO liable based

upon its view that the safe berth provision was an

express assurance that the Athos I would reach the

berth safely, provided that it maintained a draft of 37

feet or less, and its finding that the vessel maintained

that draft at the time of the casualty. Id. at 168a171a.3 The district court made its liability determination without any consideration of CARCO’s

diligence and notwithstanding the undisputed fact

that CARCO had no knowledge of, and bore no fault

for, the hidden anchor. The court awarded Frescati

$55.5 million in damages, and awarded the

3 The Athos I’s draft at the time of the casualty—the

measurement from the water-line to the vessel’s bottom—was

sharply disputed. Since the district court could not rely on the

vessel’s own unreliable documentation to determine its draft,

the court’s finding that the vessel’s draft was 37 feet or less

ultimately depended upon its finding that at some unknown

point in time the nine-ton anchor had sprung upright from its

resting “flukes-down” position on the riverbed. That finding in

turn depended upon the court’s speculation—without

evidentiary support—that an unidentified vessel’s “sweeping

anchor chain” somehow snagged the anchor and pulled it

upright in time for the casualty. Pet. App. 126a-127a. And that

finding further depended upon the notion that somehow the

anchor returned to the “flukes-down” position in which it was

discovered after the casualty. Id. at 127a-128a.

13

government $88 million for its subrogated contract

claim. Id. at 258a-259a. Recognizing the incredibly

unfair outcome of imposing the full costs of the oil

spill on the one party least able to prevent it, the

court then applied the doctrine of equitable

recoupment and halved the government’s award to

$44 million. Id. at 233a-234a, 259a.

Subsequent Third Circuit Decision. A different

panel of the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s

damages awards. The new panel applied (with no

further analysis) the strict liability contract ruling of

the prior panel. Quoting the earlier opinion, the

court below accepted that the safe berth obligation is

“an express assurance made without regard to the

amount of diligence taken by the charterer.” Pet.

App. 9a, 14a (quoting 718 F.3d at 203). Thus, it did

not matter whether the district court’s wholly

speculative explanation for the accident—the

“sweeping anchor chain” theory—was “plausible or

implausible.” Id. at 17a. And, like the district court,

the panel made no inquiry into CARCO’s conduct and

found no shortcomings in the diligence that CARCO

exercised as the vessel charterer.

The panel vacated the district court’s judgment in

favor of Frescati on the negligence claim. The district

court had created from whole cloth a purported duty

that CARCO should have used side-scan sonar in the

federally-controlled Anchorage to discover potential

hazards. Pet. App. 25a-29a, 43a. Thus, even though

the panel did not dispute that CARCO bore no fault

for the casualty, it affirmed the district court’s

damages award. The panel below also vacated the

district court’s equitable-recoupment holding, id. at

35a-39a, which increased CARCO’s exposure by $44

million and resulted in an award of more than $140

million (plus tens of millions more in pre- and post-

14

judgment interest). CARCO thus was illogically and

unfairly left to pay the entire tab for the oil spill.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

I. The language of the safe berth clause provides no

support for the court of appeals’ interpretation that

the clause is an implied warranty that imposes strict

liability on charterers for all damages arising out of a

vessel’s entry, use, or exit from a designated berth.

Under the plain language, the charterer gains the

right to select the place or wharf of discharge, and the

vessel gains the corresponding right to refuse an

unsafe berth, with the charterer bearing any extra

expenses resulting from the vessel master’s refusal to

enter the unsafe berth. Although the charterer’s duty

to select a “safe” berth naturally implies an obligation

to exercise some diligence in doing so, nothing in the

text can be construed as a warranty against unknown

and unknowable risks.

Leading commentators Gilmore & Black adopt this

textual view of safe berth clauses. They acknowledge

that charterer liability for losses resulting from a

ship entering an unsafe berth may be appropriate in

certain circumstances, such as where a charterer has

special knowledge of existing risks. The charterer’s

liability in these circumstances does not arise from

the contract clause, however, but instead should be

based on tort principles or other bodies of law. Under

Gilmore & Black’s purely textual view, safe berth

clauses simply do not speak to accidents resulting

from unforeseeable dangers such as occurred in this

case.

The court of appeals’ assertion that the clause’s

“always afloat” language supports the warranty

interpretation misses the mark. This Court and

others have given the words “always afloat” their

15

ordinary meaning, construing them simply to require

that the berth or port permit the vessel to float,

rather than strike the ground.

The record contains no evidence that the parties

intended for CARCO to assume strict liability, and

other provisions in the voyage charter contract

confirm that this was not the parties’ intent. This

contextual evidence includes numerous negotiated

express warranties in the contract, which show that

the parties knew the importance of using express

language to create warranties when that was their

intent. The contract also required Star Tankers to

maintain $1 billion in oil pollution insurance, which

provides powerful evidence that the parties never

intended for CARCO to bear strict liability for an oil

spill.

II. The warranty interpretation conflicts with this

Court’s controlling precedent. This Court has never

interpreted safe berth clauses as warranties. To the

contrary, it disclaimed the warranty interpretation in

Atkins v. Fibre Disintegrating Co., 85 U.S. (18 Wall.)

272, 299 (1874), affirming a ruling of the district

court. This Court’s rulings in Atkins and its other

safe berth decisions are consistent with Gilmore &

Black’s textual interpretation of safe berth clauses as

limited provisions focused on resolving disputes over

expenses incurred when designated discharge

locations involved known or knowable hazards. This

Court’s rulings did not hold charterers liable for the

consequences of unknown and unknowable hazards.

The warranty interpretation lacks a solid

foundation. The court of appeals principally relied

upon a line of Second Circuit decisions that adopted

the warranty interpretation, but none of them

addressed this Court’s precedents or provided any

reasoning to support the assertion that a safe berth

16

clause is an unqualified warranty that imposes strict

liability. Moreover, earlier Second Circuit decisions

did not always follow this approach and that court

has never explained its abrupt shift. Given the

uncertain origin and scant justification for the

warranty interpretation, the Fifth Circuit properly

rejected it in favor of the due diligence interpretation.

III. Maritime policy considerations demonstrate

that maritime commerce is best served by

interpreting safe berth clauses as requiring

charterers to do no more than exercise due diligence.

The warranty interpretation is a form of strict

liability for charterers, yet the rationale for this

approach is a mystery. This Court has invoked

special justifications to adopt strict liability in limited

maritime contexts: liability should be imposed on the

party best able to protect persons from hazardous

equipment, and solicitude for the welfare of uniquely

vulnerable maritime workers. These justifications

are completely lacking in the context of safe berth

clauses. Those purely contractual provisions merely

allocate

monetary

responsibility

between

sophisticated commercial entities for economic losses.

Because there is no economic or public policy

justification for interpreting safe berth clauses as

strict liability warranties, imposing strict and

unlimited liability on charterers would be

detrimental to maritime commerce.

The court of appeals’ policy rationales for adopting

the warranty interpretation are unsound. The court’s

principal rationale was that the charterer has

superior information about a berth and port, but this

is plainly not true today (if it ever was), where

charterer and vessel owner both have abundant

information

from

modern

equipment

and

instantaneous information sources. A clear policy

17

disadvantage of the strict liability approach is that it

precludes

consideration

of

the

facts

and

circumstances of individual cases, resulting in

liability on wholly innocent charterers.

The

judgment against CARCO starkly illustrates the

harsh results for which the strict liability approach

has been rightly criticized.

The warranty interpretation also incongruously

results in different standards of care for wharfingers

and charterers. This Court held long ago that

wharfingers are held to a “reasonable diligence”

standard in operating their berths, Smith v. Burnett,

173 U.S. 430, 433 (1899), and the court of appeals

reversed the negligence judgment against CARCO

under that standard. No sound rationale exists for

this Court to hold that charterers face a different,

and significantly more onerous, standard of care

when they select the berths for vessels that they hire.

Finally, the warranty interpretation produces an

inequitable result in this case. The court of appeals’

judgment, which shifts all liability to CARCO for an

extraordinary accident that was not its fault, is

grossly unfair. This is particularly true because

Congress provided for a much different outcome in

OPA, which includes a cost-spreading mechanism for

oil spill cleanups. Congress provided for the OPA

Trust Fund to absorb the entire cost of a spill, if

caused by an unknown third party. That approach

effectively spreads the costs to the whole industry.

The judgment turns OPA on its head by requiring

CARCO—not subject to any liability under OPA—to

bear all of the costs, even though CARCO already

paid tens of millions of dollars into the OPA Fund.

The judgment should be reversed.

18

ARGUMENT

Where, as here, a contract “is a maritime one, and

the dispute is not inherently local, federal law

controls the contract interpretation.” Norfolk S. Ry.

v. Kirby, 543 U.S. 14, 22-23 (2004). This lawmaking

power in the federal courts derives from their

exclusive jurisdiction over maritime cases. Id.; U.S.

Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see Air & Liquid Sys. Corp.

v. DeVries, 139 S. Ct. 986, 992 (2019) (“the federal

courts fashion federal maritime law”). This Court’s

task, therefore, is to interpret the plain terms of the

parties’ agreement and “set an efficient default rule”

for the maritime contract at issue. Kirby, 543 U.S. at

32.

In performing this task, the Court looks to the

fundamental “purpose of the grant” of admiralty and

maritime jurisdiction, which is “the protection of

maritime commerce.” Exxon Corp. v. Cent. Gulf

Lines, Inc., 500 U.S. 603, 608 (1991) (quoting Sisson

v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 367 (1990)); see Jerome B.

Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513

U.S. 527, 544 (1995). When formulating federal

maritime principles, this Court “may examine, among

other sources, judicial opinions, legislation, treatises,

and scholarly writings.” DeVries, 139 S. Ct. at 992.

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS’ INTERPRETATION OF THE SAFE BERTH CLAUSE AS A

WARRANTY MISREADS THE CONTRACTUAL TEXT.

Maritime contracts are “construed like any other

contracts,” that is, “by their terms and consistent

with the intent of the parties.” Kirby, 543 U.S. at 31;

see Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 212(1) (1981)

(“The interpretation of an integrated agreement is

directed to the meaning of the terms of the writing or

19

writings in light of the circumstances”). The appropriate place to start is therefore the language of the

safe berth clause. That language provides no support

for the court of appeals’ interpretation of the safe

berth clause as a warranty that imposes liability

regardless of fault.

The text of the safe berth provision in the StarCARCO agreement provides:

[t]he vessel shall load and discharge at any safe

place or wharf, . . . which shall be designated and

procured by the Charterer, provided the Vessel

can proceed thereto, lie at, and depart therefrom

always safely afloat, any lighterage [transfer of

cargo] being at the expense, risk and peril of the

Charterer. . . .

Add. 8a.

A. The Terms Of The Safe Berth Clause Do

Not Provide For Liability Regardless Of

Fault.

1. Under the plain language of the safe berth

provision, the charterer gains the right to select the

place or wharf of discharge: the discharge location

“shall be designated and procured by the Charterer.”

Add. 8a. The requirement that the berth be a “safe”

berth has been interpreted to mean that “during the

relevant period of time, the particular chartered

vessel can proceed to it, use it, and depart from it

without, in the absence of abnormal weather or other

occurrences, being exposed to dangers which cannot

be avoided by good navigation and seamanship.”

Julian Cooke et al., Voyage Charters ¶ 5A.21 (4th ed.

2014) (“Cooke”).

Under the “provided” clause, the vessel gains the

corresponding right to refuse an unsafe berth, with

20

the charterer bearing any extra expenses resulting

from the vessel master’s refusal to enter the unsafe

berth. See Grant Gilmore & Charles L. Black, Jr.,

The Law of Admiralty § 4-4, at 204 (2d ed. 1975)

(“Gilmore & Black”)4 (“It is clear on the face of it that,

if the port or the berth is unsafe, the master is

excused from taking his ship in, and the charterer

must bear the extra expense, such as lighterage,

entailed by the refusal.”); 2 Thomas J. Schoenbaum,

Admiralty and Maritime Law § 11-10 (6th ed. 2018)

(“Schoenbaum”) (“the ship can refuse to proceed to

the port nominated without being in breach of the

charter”); Peter G. Hartman, Safe Port/Berth

Clauses: Warranty or Due Diligence?, 21 Tul. Mar.

4 This

Court routinely cites Gilmore & Black on admiralty

matters. See, e.g., Dutra Grp. v. Batterton, No. 18-266, slip op.

at 7-8 (U.S. June 24, 2019); Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557

U.S. 404, 412, 413, 423-24 (2009); Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co.,

543 U.S. 481, 487-88 (2005); Kirby, 543 U.S. at 24; Vimar

Seguros y Reaseguros, S A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528,

533-34 (1995); Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 354, 356

(1995); Howlett v. Birkdale Shipping Co., 512 U.S. 92, 97, 102

(1994); Sw. Marine, Inc. v. Gizoni, 502 U.S. 81, 91-92 (1991);

McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 342-43 (1991);

Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 25 (1990); and Dir.,

Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Perini N. River Assocs.,

459 U.S. 297, 310-11, 324 n.33 (1983).

The principal maritime Circuits also look to Gilmore & Black

as a leading treatise. See, e.g., Man Ferrostaal, Inc. v. M/V

Akili, 704 F.3d 77, 85 (2d Cir. 2012) (“the classic admiralty

treatise”); Neely v. Club Med Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 63 F.3d 166,

176 (3d Cir. 1995) (en banc) (“a leading admiralty treatise”);

Boudreaux v. Am. Workover, Inc., 680 F.2d 1034, 1046 (5th Cir.

1982) (en banc) (“the highly respected Gilmore and Black”);

Capt’n Mark v. Sea Fever Corp., 692 F.2d 163, 167 (1st Cir.

1982) (“[a] leading treatise”). Indeed, a Westlaw search found

that the Gilmore & Black treatise has been cited 960 times by

this Court and the federal courts of appeals, including 56 times

by this Court and more than 50 times by the Third Circuit.

21

L.J. 537, 550 (1997) (“Hartman”) (“the very

terminology of these clauses indicates that the

master has the right to refuse to enter an unsafe port

or dock at an unsafe berth.”). The vessel’s right of

refusal provides a significant protection to vessel

owners because “[c]ourts and arbitrators have

generally accorded great latitude to a master’s

decision to refuse to enter a port or berth on the

grounds that it is unsafe.” Cooke, supra, at ¶ 5A.34.

Although the charterer’s duty to select a “safe”

berth naturally implies an obligation to exercise some

diligence in doing so, nothing in the text of the

provision can be construed as a warranty against

unknown and unknowable risks. And there is no

language assigning all risk of loss to the charterer,

regardless of fault. Leading commentators, Gilmore

& Black, state that safe berth clauses expressly

provide the vessel with the right to refuse a berth

that the master regards as unsafe, and require

charterers to pay the shipowner’s expenses attendant

to such a refusal (e.g., lighterage, delay charges). But

they go on to argue that “it is by no means necessary

that [safe berth clauses] be given the quite different

meaning of creating an affirmative liability of

charterer to ship, in case of mishap.” Gilmore &

Black, supra, § 4-4 at 205. In their view, “[v]ery clear

language” should be required in order for “liability [to

be] shifted to the charterer,” and “this clarity of

language is missing” from standard clauses such as

the ASBATANKVOY clause. Id.

Given the narrow circumstances addressed by safe

berth clauses, Gilmore & Black persuasively argue

that the clauses cannot support the sweeping liability

imposed on charterers by the courts below. They

acknowledge that charterer liability for losses

resulting from a ship entering an unsafe berth may

22

be appropriate in “compelling special circumstances,”

such as where a charterer’s “special knowledge or

actions make it reasonable to charge him.” Id. at 205,

207. Special circumstances may exist, for example,

where the charterer has knowledge of conditions that

render the berth unsafe but the master lacks such

knowledge, or where the charterer should reasonably

have a special “duty of inquiry.” Id. at 205. The

charterer’s liability in these circumstances does not

arise from the safe berth clause, however, but instead

because “it ought to be held to be an actionable wrong

for [the charterer] to invite the ship without warning

into a peril known to him, with or without the [safe

berth] clause[].” Id. (noting that absent special

factors, there is “no reason” for holding charterers

liable for mishap “on the basis of the safe-port and

safe-berth clauses”). Thus, Gilmore & Black adopt a

textually faithful view of safe berth clauses as limited

provisions that resolve disputes over expenses

incurred when masters refuse designated discharge

locations.

The clauses simply do not speak to

accidents resulting from unforeseeable dangers such

as occurred in this case. Liability for such events, in

Gilmore & Black’s view, should arise out of tort

principles or other sources of law.

The Fifth Circuit properly adopted Gilmore &

Black’s textual analysis. The court agreed that

giving safe berth clauses the “meaning of creating an

affirmative liability of charterer to ship, in case of

mishap” is “by no means necessary.” Orduna, 913

F.2d at 1156-57 (quoting Gilmore & Black, supra, § 44 at 205).5 The court therefore construed safe berth

clauses as “impos[ing] upon the charterer a duty of

5 The safe berth clause in Orduna “provided that the

charterers should designate ‘safe discharging berths [the] vessel

being always afloat.’” 913 F.3d at 1155 n.6.

23

due diligence to select a safe berth.” Id. at 1157. On

the facts of the case before it, the Fifth Circuit

vacated the district court’s judgment, which had held

a non-negligent charterer liable for damage to a ship

in a berth that occurred when it was struck by a steel

loading arm that fell from a grain elevator tower

owned by another company. Id. The liability finding

of the district court in Orduna illustrates the onerous

reach of the warranty approach in holding charterers

liable for accidents that they had no ability to

prevent. The Fifth Circuit properly rejected it as a

matter of law.

Notably, the Association of Ship Brokers & Agents

(USA) Inc. (“ASBA”)—the trade association that

promulgated and updates the ASBATANKVOY

form—rejects any suggestion that the text of the form

clause should be construed as a warranty. To the

contrary, it has informed the Court that the safe

berth provision in the CARCO-Star contract “does not

specify whether it imposes a strict-liability warranty

or a due-diligence obligation.” MLA/ASBA Petitionstage Br. 23. This confirms that the warranty

interpretation has no foundation in the text of the

provision.

2. The court of appeals asserted that the clause’s

“always afloat” language “plainly suggests an express

assurance,” but it offered no explanation or support.

Pet. App. 304a; see also U.S. Opp. 13-14. As noted,

ASBA repudiates this view of the form language that

it created. MLA/ASBA Petition-stage Br. 23. And

rightly so, because that simple phrasing is hardly

“very clear language” articulating a risk-allocation

between the parties, much less an onerous allocation

of unforeseeable risk to the charterer of liability

without regard to fault.

24

Indeed, this Court and others have given the words

“always afloat” their ordinary meaning, construing

them simply to require that the berth or port permit

the vessel to float, rather than strike the ground (or

encounter physical barriers that block the ship’s

path). In Mencke v. Cargo of Java Sugar, 187 U.S.

248, 253 (1902), for example, this Court explained

that “a ship could not be said to be afloat, whether

the obstacle encountered was a shoal or a bar in the

port for which she could not proceed, or a bridge

under or through which she could not pass.” The

court in Tweedie Trading Co. v. New York & Boston

Dyewood Co., 127 F. 278, 280-81 (2d Cir. 1903),

similarly explained that “the provision that the vessel

shall load and discharge where she can always safely

lie afloat can be given no other construction than that

the respondent became bound to assign to the ship a

berth in a suitable depth of water.” See also Crisp v.

U.S. & Australasia S.S. Co., 124 F. 748, 749-50

(S.D.N.Y. 1903) (“‘always safely lie afloat’’’ implies

“that a port to be named by the charterer shall be one

where the vessel can safely get with her whole cargo

and can discharge her whole cargo without touching

the ground”); Cooke, supra, at ¶ 5.60 (explaining that

although “[a] vessel may lie aground and be safe,” the

purpose of “‘lie always afloat’” language is to “put the

matter beyond doubt” and specify that the vessel

“should remain afloat”); Gilmore & Black, supra, § 44 at 203 n.31 (noting that without “always afloat”

language, a “mere stipulation for a safe berth does

not always imply an undertaking that the vessel will

be afloat at low tide”).

These interpretations of “always afloat” reflect the

recognition that grounding poses a significant risk of

vessel damage, which owners wish to avoid, and

which charterers can foresee and prevent by choosing

25

a berth or port with sufficient water depth. Given

this straightforward meaning of “always afloat,” the

court of appeals’ unsupported assertion that the

words instead are some sort of code for strict liability

for all risks incurred in accessing or using a port or

berth is untenable.

B. The Parties Did Not Intend For CARCO

To Assume Strict Liability.

As to the parties’ intent, the court of appeals did

not cite any record evidence—and there is none—

remotely indicating that the intention of the parties

was for CARCO to assume absolute liability for all

possible hazards (including unknown hazards) near

the designated berth. Indeed, it would be foolhardy

for a charterer to assume sweeping liability for any

accident that occurs as a ship approaches the

charterer’s

nominated

destination,

including

accidents caused by hazards that were created by

others and of which the charterer is unaware.

Moreover, other provisions in the voyage charter

contract confirm that this was not the parties’ intent.

For example, the parties made numerous express

warranties in the charter. The charter contains the

“Charterer’s warrant that all necessary details

required by [U.S. Customs and Border Patrol] for

clearance of the cargo” would be supplied prior to the

discharge port. Add. 26a. It also includes more than

a dozen owner “warrant[ies]” that bound Star

Tankers, including warranties that the vessel would

be in compliance with all U.S. Coast Guard

regulations, Add. 30a; Star Tankers would have a

drug and alcohol abuse policy in effect during the

charter, Add. 41a; the vessel would be in compliance

with international and U.S. tanker safety

regulations, Add. 43a; the vessel had not traded to

Cuba in the last six months, Add. 44a; and the vessel

26

had submitted an oil spill response plan to the U.S.

Coast Guard in compliance with OPA, Add. 44a-45a.

These clauses make plain that the parties knew the

importance of using express language to create

warranties when that was their intent. Accordingly,

the absence of any express warranty language in the

safe berth clause confirms that the parties did not

intend for it to be a warranty.6

One of the owner warranties is also noteworthy

because of its substance. Star Tankers warranted

that it would maintain $1 billion in “insurance

coverage for oil pollution” throughout the period of

the charter. Add. 42a. This provision requiring Star

Tankers to carry insurance for the precise type of loss

that occurred in this case indicates that the parties

contemplated that Star Tankers or its insurer, rather

than CARCO, would pay the expenses and damages

for an oil spill cleanup. It therefore provides powerful

evidence that the parties never intended for the safe

berth clause to render CARCO strictly liable for an oil

spill, particularly to an entity not a party to the

contract. Cf. Gilmore & Black, supra, § 4-4 at 205

(noting that the fact that vessel owners carry

insurance covering damage to the ship “cannot be

irrelevant to an evaluation of the suitability of the

allocation of risk” under safe berth clauses).

6 The voyage charter expressly provided that Star Tanker’s

duty to provide a seaworthy vessel was a due diligence

obligation. Add. 4a. As explained by Cooke, supra, at ¶ 52.5,

this due diligence language in the ASBATANKVOY form

“merely reflect[ed]” the rule that otherwise applied under

“Article IV rule 1 of the Hague Rules” (International Convention

for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of

Lading, Aug. 25, 1924, https://www.jus.uio.no/english/services/

library/treaties/07/7-04/hague-rules.xml).

27

In addition, Paragraph 19 of the ASBATANKVOY

form (General Exceptions Clause) provides that a

charterer is not liable for loss or damages resulting

from “perils of the seas.” Add. 14a. “Perils of the

sea[s]” are “those perils which are peculiar to the

sea,” and which are “unforeseeable” and “cannot be

guarded against by the ordinary exertions of human

skill and prudence.” Ferrara v. A. & V. Fishing, Inc.,

99 F.3d 449, 454 (1st Cir. 1996). It has long been

established that “perils of the seas” include collision

with a submerged object. See, e.g., The G.R. Booth,

171 U.S. 450, 461 (1898) (referring to a “ship coming

against a rock or shoal or other external object” as a

“peril of the sea”); Ferrara, 99 F.3d at 454 (“striking a

submerged object” is a “peril of the sea”); Campbell

Soup Co. v. Fed. Motorship Corp., 1935 WL 57939,

1935 A.M.C. 634, 641 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 1935)

(“vessel striking an unknown submerged body” is “a

peril of the sea”); 1 William Tetley, Marine Cargo

Claims, at 1060 (4th ed. 2008) (perils of the sea

include “the ship striking sunken rock”).

This

General Exceptions clause therefore further confirms

that the parties did not intend for the safe berth

clause to impose liability on CARCO—strict or

otherwise—for maritime hazards that it could not

foresee or prevent, such as the Athos I striking the

unknown anchor.

To have held otherwise

misconstrues the nature of the safe berth clause.

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS’ INTERPRETATION OF THE SAFE BERTH CLAUSE AS

A WARRANTY IS CONTRARY TO THIS

COURT’S DECISIONS AND LACKS ANY

SOUND LEGAL FOUNDATION.

In addition to being atextual and at odds with the

contract’s contextual language, the court of appeals’

interpretation of the safe berth clause as a warranty

28

is contrary to this Court’s precedent and lacks a

sound foundation in judicial opinions and other

maritime authority.

A. The Warranty Interpretation Conflicts

With This Court’s Controlling Decisions.

This Court’s decisions involving safe berth clauses

date back to the nineteenth century and have stood

for more than 100 years. The Court has never

interpreted the clauses as warranties. Instead, it has

disclaimed the warranty interpretation.

This Court first addressed a safe berth clause in

Atkins v. Fibre Disintegrating Co., 85 U.S. (18 Wall.)

272, 299 (1874), affirming a ruling of the district

court. See Atkins v. Fibre Disintegrating Co., 2 F.

Cas. 78 (E.D.N.Y. 1868) (No. 601) (Benedict, J.). The

district court held that a charterer was not liable

under a safe berth clause7 for damage that a vessel

incurred when it struck a reef while departing from

Port Morant, Jamaica after the breeze failed. The

district court did not hold that the clause was a

warranty.

To the contrary, it held that the

charterer’s obligation was limited to providing “a port

which this vessel could enter and depart from

without legal restraint, and without incurring more

than the ordinary perils of the seas.” Id. at 79

(emphasis added).

The court’s interpretation that the selected port

could not pose “more than” the ordinary perils of the

seas clearly indicates that the charterer does not

guarantee that the port is free of all perils and that

7 The charter contract provided that the vessel would load a

cargo of bamboo in Kingston, Jamaica and that the charterer

had the privilege of sending the vessel to a “second safe port” to

load additional cargo. 2 F. Cas. at 79.

29

the charterer undertakes no duty and assumes no

liability with respect to “ordinary perils.” Applying

that standard, the district court found that Port

Morant could not “be held to be a safe port” for the

vessel at issue because it posed an unusual and

known hazard: any ship of the vessel’s size “must

strike the reefs if, by chance, the breeze should fail

her while passing in or out.”

Id.

The court

nevertheless held that the charterer was not liable

because the ship master had knowledge of this

danger and did not exercise his right to reject the

unsafe port. Id. The district court also spurned the

vessel owner’s argument that the charterer’s agent

had made “representations which amounted to a

warranty.” Id. at 79-80.

This Court affirmed the district court’s ruling. The

Court mostly addressed a jurisdictional issue, but

also addressed the merits and stated that it had

conducted “a careful examination of the record” and

“found no reason to dissent from the views of the

learned district judge.” 85 U.S. at 299. It explained

that it would “announce the same conclusions” as the

district judge because they were “clearly expressed”

and “ably vindicated.” Id. The Court thus endorsed

the district court’s view that the safe berth clause is

not a warranty, and instead disclaims the charterer’s

liability for “ordinary perils” of maritime navigation.

The court of appeals tersely brushed Atkins aside in

a footnote, asserting that the outcome was

attributable to the fact that the ship’s master was

“fully aware of the port’s dangers and yet did not

object.” Pet. App. 301a-302a n.14. While this is a

correct characterization of the outcome, it ignores

that this Court also approved the district court’s

interpretation of the safe berth clause as a disclaimer

30

of the charterer’s liability for “ordinary perils” of

maritime transportation.

Notably, none of the Second Circuit decisions that

the court of appeals followed in adopting the

warranty approach addressed, or even cited, Atkins.

The Fifth Circuit, in contrast, discussed and relied

upon Atkins in rejecting the warranty approach.

Orduna, 913 F.2d at 1156-57. Commentators also

have rightfully criticized the warranty approach as

“inconsistent” with the better reading of Atkins. See

Gilmore & Black, supra, § 4-4 at 207; see also id. at

205 (noting that Atkins has never been “overruled or

weakened” by this Court).

Frescati and the United States argued at the

petition stage that this Court’s subsequent decision in

The Gazelle & Cargo, 128 U.S. 474 (1888), embraced

the warranty approach. Frescati Opp. 13, 15; U.S.

Opp. 12. This is wishful thinking. In The Gazelle,

this Court did not address whether the safe berth

clause at issue8 provided a warranty (a term not used

in the opinion). Tellingly, the Second Circuit never

relied upon The Gazelle in any of its decisions

interpreting safe berth clauses as warranties.

The question in The Gazelle was whether the

charterer was liable for expenses and lost revenue

resulting from the ship master’s refusal of a berth

with a known and insurmountable safety hazard: the

berth was “in a fjord or inlet having a bar across its

mouth, which it was impossible for the Gazelle to

pass.” 128 U.S. at 485. This Court stated that the

8 The safe berth clause in The Gazelle provided that “the

charterers were bound to order the vessel ‘to a safe, direct,

Norwegian or Danish port, or as near thereunto as she can

safely get, and always lay and discharge afloat.’” The Gazelle,

128 U.S. at 485.

31

“clear meaning” of the safe berth clause was that the

charterer was bound to order the Gazelle “to a port

which she can safely enter with her cargo.” Id. It

reasonably found that the charterer was “rightly held

to be in default and answerable in damages” because

it had “insisted on ordering her” to the obviously

dangerous port. Id. at 486. The Court therefore

found the charterer liable for the vessel owner’s lost

freight revenue under the charter and other

expenses. Id. at 486-87. Because the charterer in

The Gazelle designated a berth with a known hazard

that the master rightly refused, its liability for

damages under the safe berth clause was clear and

this Court had no occasion to address whether the

clause imposed strict liability on the charterer for

unknown and unknowable risks.

This Court reached a similar result in Mencke, 187

U.S. 248. The Court again did not describe the safe

berth clause at issue9 as a warranty; in fact it never

used that term. The question in Mencke was whether

the charterer was liable for extra expenses resulting

from the ship master’s refusal of a berth that would

have required the ship to pass under the Brooklyn

Bridge—which the ship could not do because its steel

mast was too tall. This Court sensibly found that “an

overhead bridge which prevents access to the place

designated for the discharge quite as effectively

renders it unsafe for the ship as a sandbar or other

obstacle under the water.” Id. at 257. It therefore

held that the charterer was liable for the additional

9 The safe berth clause in Mencke provided that the ship

would “discharge at New York or Boston or Philadelphia or

Baltimore, or so near the port of discharge as she may safely get

and deliver the same, always afloat, in a customary place and

manner, in such dock, as directed by charterers, agreeably to

bills of lading.” Mencke, 187 U.S. at 251.

32

costs incurred when the cargo had to be unloaded at a

different dock. Like The Gazelle, Mencke involved a

known hazard that rendered the charterer’s chosen

berth obviously unsafe and unsuitable, and provides

no support for the notion that a safe berth clause

imposes strict liability on the charterer for all other

risks.

The outcomes in Atkins, The Gazelle, and Mencke

are in accord with Gilmore & Black’s interpretation of

the text of safe berth clauses. All of these cases

involved charterers who designated berths with

known features that rendered them hazardous to the

chartered vessels. The charterers in The Gazelle and

Mencke were found liable for the expenses and

economic damages that the vessel owners incurred

when the ship masters justifiably exercised their

right to refuse the unsafe berths, which is precisely

what the clauses provide. In Atkins, the charterer

was found not liable for damage the vessel incurred

when departing the berth because the ship master

had knowledge of the danger and did not exercise his

right to reject the unsafe berth. That is, because the

master had a right to refuse the berth, and the

charterer did not have any “special knowledge” of the

berth’s risks that was unavailable to the master, the

charterer was not liable for the ship damage.

None of these decisions involved a charterer’s

liability with respect to an unknown and unknowable

hazard, as in this case. Nevertheless, this Court’s

interpretation of the safe berth clause in Atkins—as

disclaiming the charterer’s liability for “ordinary

perils of the seas”—convincingly suggests that

CARCO should not be held liable for the casualty that

damaged the Athos I. That casualty was caused by

an unknown submerged object, which is a classic

peril of the sea to which vessels are subject during

33

any maritime voyage. See, supra, at 27. Accordingly,

under this Court’s interpretation in Atkins, the safe

berth clause does not remotely provide a basis for

shifting all costs of the multi-million dollar

environmental cleanup to CARCO.

B. The Warranty Interpretation Lacks Any

Sound Legal Foundation.

In adopting the interpretation that the safe berth

clause is a warranty, the court of appeals sided with

what it characterized as the Second Circuit’s

“longstanding” interpretation, and asserted that the

Fifth Circuit’s approach “deviated from this wellestablished standard.” Pet. App. 303a-304a. At the

petition stage, Frescati and the United States

repeated the refrain that the warranty interpretation

is an “established” and “settled” understanding,

asserting that it is grounded in “130 years of

precedent from this Court and more than 80 years of

case law from the Second Circuit.” Frescati Opp. 11,

13; U.S. Opp. 13. These assertions do not withstand

scrutiny. The Second Circuit decisions upon which

the court of appeals relied in adopting the warranty

interpretation were: Venore Transp. Co. v. Oswego

Shipping Corp., 498 F.2d 469, 472-73 (2d Cir. 1974)

(voyage charterer “had an express obligation to

provide a completely safe berth”) (emphasis added);

Paragon Oil Co. v. Republic Tankers, S.A., 310 F.2d

169, 173 (2d Cir. 1962) (clause is a “warranty”); Park

S.S. Co. v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 188 F.2d 804, 806 (2d

Cir. 1951) (clause is “an express assurance that the

berth [is] safe”); and Cities Serv. Transp. Co. v. Gulf

Ref. Co., 79 F.2d 521, 521 (2d Cir. 1935) (per curiam)

(“the charter [contract is] itself an express assurance,

on which the master [is] entitled to rely, that at the

berth ‘indicated’ the ship would be able to lie ‘always

afloat’”). See Pet. App. 299a-300a.

34

First, the Second Circuit decisions are not derived

from or consistent with this Court’s earlier safe berth

decisions: Atkins, The Gazelle, and Mencke. As noted,

the Second Circuit decisions do not mention, much

less discuss, any of those precedents. In particular,

the Second Circuit did not address this Court’s

agreement in Atkins that the safe berth clause was

not a warranty, because it did not create any

charterer liability for “ordinary perils” of the seas.

Accordingly, the Second Circuit’s warranty approach

is “inconsistent” with Atkins. Gilmore & Black,

supra, § 4-4 at 207.

Second, one might assume from the court of

appeals’ reliance on the Second Circuit’s opinions

that they provide a cogent rationale for the warranty

approach and a thorough treatment of the issue, but

that is plainly not so. The Second Circuit’s opinions

contain no reasoning or discussion to support the

court’s naked assertion that a safe berth clause is an

unqualified warranty that imposes strict liability.

For example, Cities Service, 79 F.2d 521, the oldest

decision, is a single-paragraph, per curiam opinion in

which the charterer was found liable for a ship’s

grounding because the port captain had given

“express assurance to the master at the time that the

berth was fair.” Id. In the last sentence of the brief

opinion, the court reasoned in the alternative that

even if such assurances had not been given, “the

charter party was itself an express assurance, on

which the master was entitled to rely, that at the

berth ‘indicated’ the ship would be able to lie ‘always

afloat.’”

Id.

The court, however, provided no

reasoning or authority in support of that conclusion.

None of the subsequent Second Circuit decisions—

Park S.S. Co., Paragon, and Venore—shed any more

light on the origin of the warranty interpretation or

35

what interests it serves. These decisions do little

more than rely upon and repeat the unsupported

misinterpretation of safe berth clauses in Cities

Service, which then became an unverified selffulfilling statement.

The decisions contain no

analysis of why the charterer should be held strictly

liable, either under the contract or as a matter of

maritime policy. Or why the issue should not be

resolved solely by tort law or some other source of law

that deals directly with the type of injury incurred.

The handful of commentators who characterize the

safe berth clause as a warranty, Pet. App. 303a, do

not supply any better rationale for the warranty

interpretation than the Second Circuit does. These

treatises do little more than recite the warranty

interpretation, without providing any commentary or

explanation for its basis. See Schoenbaum, supra,

§ 11-10 & n.1 (citing Second Circuit decisions); 2A

Michael F. Sturley, Benedict on Admiralty § 175, at

17-24 to 17-25 (7th ed. 2014) (same); Terence Coghlin

et al., Time Charters ¶¶ 10A.3-10A.6 (7th ed. 2014)

(“Coghlin”) (same); Bernard Eder et al., Scrutton on

Charter Parties and Bills of Lading, § IX, art. 85, at

166 (23d ed. 2017). The Coghlin treatise endorses the

warranty interpretation on the ground that it is “a

matter of contract” and an accepted “custom of the

trade,” Coghlin, supra, at ¶ 10A.10, but these

conclusory

assertions

ignore

this

Court’s

interpretation in Atkins and the existing circuit split

on the meaning of the clause, and they provide no

justification for the interpretation.

Third, contrary to the court of appeals’ suggestion

that the Second Circuit has unvaryingly adhered to

the warranty approach, prior to Cities Service the

Second Circuit held in several cases that a charterer

or consignee who selects a berth is only required to

36

exercise reasonable care under the circumstances,

and is not an insurer or warrantor. See, e.g.,

Plymouth Transp. Co. v. Red Star Towing & Transp.

Co., 20 F.2d 357, 358 (2d Cir. 1927) (“reasonable care

to ascertain the condition of a berth and give notice of

any concealed danger”); M. & J. Tracy, Inc. v. Marks,

Lissberger & Son, Inc., 283 F. 100, 102 (2d Cir. 1922)

(safe berth duty requires “exercise [of] due care

according to the circumstances,” and is “no warranty

or insurance”); Hastorf v. O’Brien, 173 F. 346, 347-48

(2d Cir. 1909) (“ordinary care”). Tellingly, under the

court’s “due care” standard, the consignee in M. & J.

Tracy was found not liable for the sinking of a barge

by a boulder on the river bottom, where the boulder

was unknown to the consignee and the public.

These cases apparently did not involve voyage

charters, but Cities Service failed to address this line

of authority, or explain the abrupt shift to the

warranty approach. See Hartman, supra, at 541

(Cities Service was a “departure from the previous

prudent man standard”); J. Bond Smith, Jr., Time

and Voyage Charters: Safe Port/Safe Berth, 49 Tul.

L. Rev. 860, 862 (1975) (“Smith”) (“Until

comparatively recently, the decisions, with few

exceptions, held that the charterer’s liability under

safe port clauses was not that of an insurer or

warrantor.”). Thus, history does not support strict

liability.

Given the uncertain origin and scant justification

for the warranty interpretation, the Fifth Circuit

properly took a fresh look at the issue in Orduna, 913

F.2d 1149. It considered the fact that distinguished

commentators such as Gilmore & Black have

“strongly criticized” the Second Circuit’s liabilitywithout-fault approach, including because it has no

foundation in the contract language, 913 F.2d at

37

1156; that the Second Circuit’s approach is contrary

to this Court’s decision in Atkins, id. at 1156-57; and

that the Second Circuit has not always followed the

warranty interpretation, id. at 1156.

It also

examined the relevant maritime policy considerations

(discussed further below) and concluded that “no

legitimate legal or social policy is furthered by

making the charterer warrant the safety of the berth

it selects.” Id. at 1157. The Fifth Circuit therefore

held that a safe berth clause “does not make a

charterer the warrantor of the safety of a berth,” and

“[i]nstead the safe berth clause imposes upon the

charterer a duty of due diligence to select a safe

berth.” Id. There is no question that CARCO did all

that it could to select a safe berth.

As demonstrated below, the Fifth Circuit’s

interpretation of the safe berth clause is the rule that

this Court should adopt.

III. MARITIME COMMERCE IS BEST SERVED

BY

INTERPRETING

SAFE

BERTH

CLAUSES AS IMPOSING AT MOST A DUTY

OF DUE DILIGENCE ON CHARTERERS.

This Court should reject the court of appeals’

interpretation of the safe berth clause as a warranty

because it is inconsistent with the Court’s decisions

and the contractual text and context. Even if the

Court were writing on a blank slate, however, the

court of appeals’ interpretation is detrimental to

maritime commerce. See Kirby, 543 U.S. at 32 (the

Court’s task is to “set an efficient default rule” for the

maritime contract at issue).

As noted, the

fundamental “purpose of the grant” of admiralty and

maritime jurisdiction is “the protection of maritime

commerce.” Exxon Corp., 500 U.S. at 608 (quoting

Sisson, 497 U.S. at 367).

38

A. Strict Liability Is Unwarranted And

Detrimental To Maritime Commerce.

The warranty interpretation is a form of “strict

liability” for charterers. Orduna, 913 F.2d at 1157;

Pet. App. 341. Under that rule, charterers are

subject to “liability without fault” for losses caused by

most factors (excluding abnormal weather or other

occurrences, or negligence by the master). Orduna,

913 F.2d at 1156. And the charterer’s liability under

the warranty approach is unlimited, as the massive

judgment in this case illustrates.

The rationale for this counterintuitive approach is,

however, a mystery. Neither the Second Circuit

decisions, nor the treatises, provide any justification

for strict liability in this context. There is none. The

traditional bases upon which the law imposes strict

liability are wholly lacking here.

As a result,

subjecting charterers to strict and unlimited liability

would be detrimental to maritime commerce.

Strict liability is not common in maritime law.

Where it does apply, its special justifications have no

application to safe berth clauses. In East River

Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476

U.S. 858, 865 (1986), for example, this Court

“recogniz[ed] products liability, including strict

liability, as part of the general maritime law.” The

Court reasoned that its “precedents relating to

injuries of maritime workers long have pointed in

th[e] direction” of strict products liability, id.,

invoking its decisions recognizing strict liability for

breach of the vessel owner’s duty to provide a

seaworthy vessel, Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328

U.S. 85, 94 (1946), and for breach of the stevedore’s

implied warranty of workmanlike service, Italia

Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v. Or. Stevedoring

Co., 376 U.S. 315, 322 (1964). This Court explained

39

that its “rationale in [the maritime worker] cases—

that strict liability should be imposed on the party

best able to protect persons from hazardous

equipment—is equally applicable when the claims

are based on products liability.” 476 U.S. at 866.

The public policy rationale for strict liability in the

maritime products and worker contexts—that

manufacturers, vessel owners, and stevedores are

best able to prevent injury from hazardous products,

equipment, and vessel conditions—does not support

strict liability for charterers under safe berth clauses.

Manufacturers who make products and market them

to the public are subject to unique duties because

they “can anticipate some hazards and guard against

the recurrence of others, as the public cannot.”

Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P. 2d

436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) (cited in

East River, 476 U.S. at 866-67). Similarly, stevedores

are subject to strict liability in contexts where they

are “best situated to adopt preventive measures and

thereby to reduce the likelihood of injury,” i.e., where

the “injury-producing and defective equipment is

under the[ir] supervision and control.”

Or.

Stevedoring Co., 376 U.S. at 324.

Charterers, by contrast, need not own or operate

the berths that they select pursuant to safe berth

clauses. In their capacity as charterers, they lack

both supervision and control over the pertinent

facilities and sources of risk, which are the critical

factors that support strict liability against

manufacturers and those who injure maritime

workers. In addition, as explained below, vessel

owners have access to full information concerning

whether a particular berth is safe for a particular

vessel, and vessel captains (not charterers) make the

navigational decision to bring the vessel into the

40

berth. See, infra, at 43-44. Indeed, the underlying

premise of the vessel master’s right to refuse an

unsafe berth is that vessel owners have the superior

ability to assess the risks of the designated berth.

This scheme forecloses any argument that charterers

are in a unique position to prevent injury, which is

the classic justification for imposing strict liability.

This Court’s imposition of strict liability in the

maritime worker context is also based on maritime

law’s “special solicitude for the welfare of those who

undertake to venture upon hazardous and

unpredictable sea voyages.” DeVries, 139 S. Ct. at

995; Dutra Grp. v. Batterton, No. 18-266, slip op. at 78, 18 (U.S. June 24, 2019) (explaining that this Court

“transformed” the vessel owner’s duty to provide a

seaworthy vessel from due diligence to strict liability

based on “humanitarian” considerations). As this

Court explained in Sieracki, the vessel owner’s duty

to furnish a seaworthy vessel exists regardless of

fault because of “the hazards of marine service which

unseaworthiness places on the men who perform it,”

workers’ “helplessness to ward off such perils,” and

“the harshness of forcing them to shoulder alone the

resulting personal disability and loss” from personal

injuries. 328 U.S. at 93-94. These “humanitarian”

concerns have no purchase in the context of safe

berth clauses, which allocate monetary responsibility

between sophisticated commercial entities for

economic losses. Indeed, this Court acknowledged in

Dutra Grp., slip op. at 18, that “in contemporary

maritime law,” the “special solicitude to sailors has

only a small role to play.”

It also is worth noting that outside the maritime

context, strict liability is strictly confined.

In

American tort law, strict liability is “not so common.”

Dan B. Dobbs et al., The Law of Torts § 437 (2d ed.

41

2011).

It is principally limited to “two factual

settings” apart from products liability: harms caused

by animals, and harms caused by abnormally

dangerous activities. Id.; see Restatement (Second) of

Torts §§ 504-524A (1977).

Selecting berths for

maritime voyages is not an “abnormally dangerous

activity,” and Frescati did not assert a tort claim

against CARCO under a strict liability theory.

Because there is no public policy or economic

justification for interpreting safe berth clauses as

strict liability warranties, imposing strict and

unlimited liability on charterers would be

detrimental to maritime commerce. Commentators

have long recognized that open-ended liability can

discourage maritime commerce and render insurance

unattainable.

See Schoenbaum, supra, § 15-1;

Lawrence I. Kiern, Liability, Compensation, and

Financial Responsibility Under the Oil Pollution Act

of 1990: A Review of the Second Decade, 36 Tul. Mar.

L.J. 1, 43-45 (2011).

This Court similarly pointed to the chilling effects

of open-ended liability when it rejected products

liability claims for purely economic damages as part

of the general maritime law in East River, 476 U.S.

858. The Court noted that such damages were

problematic because they “could subject the

manufacturer to damages of an indefinite amount” or

“for vast sums.” Id. at 874.

Congress has similarly recognized in several

statutes governing maritime commerce that openended liability is detrimental. For example, 46

U.S.C. app. § 183, the basis for Frescati’s original

action to limit its liability, caps vessel owners’

financial liability for maritime casualties when they

are not at fault. OPA implemented caps on liability

for oil spills, precisely the maritime casualty that

42

occurred in this case. In addition, Congress rejected

strict liability in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act

(“COGSA”), 46 U.S.C. § 30701 note, which

“facilitate[s] efficient contracting in contracts for

carriage by sea,” Kirby, 543 U.S. at 29, and governs

bills of lading.

COGSA expressly rejects the

imposition of liability without fault upon shippers.

Instead, it provides that a shipper “shall not be

responsible for loss or damage sustained by the

carrier or the ship arising or resulting from any cause

without the act, fault, or neglect of the shipper, his

agents, or his servants.” 46 U.S.C. § 30701 note, Title

I, Section 4(3). COGSA also generally limits a

carrier’s liability for cargo losses to $500 per package

or customary freight unit. Id. at Title I, Section 4(5).

Imposing uncapped liability for oil spills on

charterers for risks that they cannot foresee or

prevent is fundamentally inconsistent with the wellfounded policy concerns that led Congress to adopt

the provisions in OPA and COGSA that reject openended liability and liability without fault.

B. The Court Of Appeals’ Reasons For

Adopting The Warranty Interpretation

Are Unsound.

The court of appeals’ policy rationales for adopting

the warranty interpretation are unsound, and ignore

the onerous and unwarranted liability this

interpretation imposes upon charterers. The court of

appeals’ principal rationale was that the charterer, as

the party that selects the berth and port, is

“normally” in a “better position” than the ship master

“to appraise a port’s more subtle dangers.” Pet. App.

302a.

The reasoning of the Fifth Circuit and

commentators casts serious doubt upon the premise

that the charterer “normally” has superior

information about a berth and port. As the Fifth

43

Circuit explained, “the master on the scene, rather

than a distant charterer, is in a better position to

judge the safety of a particular berth.” Orduna, 913

F.2d at 1156. This is because the master is “an

expert in navigation,” “knows the draft and trim of

his vessel,” and is “on the spot.” Id. The charterer, in

contrast, is “usually a merchant” who knows “nothing

about navigation or the vessel” and “is ordinarily far

from the scene.” Id.; see also id. (“the charterer

customarily chooses ports and berths based on

commercial as opposed to nautical grounds”); Smith,

supra, at 868 (“the charterer is usually a merchant

with limited knowledge as to actual conditions and

even less control over a port or berth”).

More fundamentally, whether it was ever true that

charterers “normally” had better access to

information about berths and ports than distant

vessel owners or crews, it is not true today. With

modern information sources such as the internet,

both charterers and vessel owners have equal access

to pertinent and detailed information about berths

and ports. Moreover, as vessel captains approach a

berth, they use sophisticated navigation equipment

and instantaneous communication methods to obtain

real-time information about current conditions and

traffic. They may also hire local river and docking

pilots, as were utilized in this case. Local pilots are

the persons with the most knowledge of and

experience with the designated discharge location,

constantly receive updates on changing conditions at

the port and berth, and are present on the vessel to

advise the captain. Vessel captains therefore have

the most up-to-date information, and the last clear

opportunity to avoid a problem because they control

the vessel and make the final decision. For all of

these reasons, the court of appeals’ information

44

asymmetry rationale for imposing strict liability on

charterers is outdated and no longer has any validity.

Accordingly, safe berth clauses are best interpreted

as provisions that grant charterers the right to select

the berth, and impose a corresponding duty to pay

the resulting expenses if a vessel exercises its right to

reject the selected berth as unsafe.

The United States and Frescati suggested at the

petition stage that CARCO was the least-cost avoider

in this case because it owned and operated the berth

at issue (near its own refinery). Frescati Opp. 24;

U.S. Opp. 17. But CARCO’s separate role as the

wharfinger (in addition to being the charterer) gave

rise to independent duties under maritime tort law.

The rationale for those duties should not affect this

Court’s analysis of the proper default interpretation

of the charter contract provision between CARCO and

Star, which was entered into before the Paulsboro

berth was selected. Pet. App. 310a. And even if

CARCO’s tort duties were relevant, the court of

appeals vacated the negligence judgment against

CARCO in its role as wharfinger because it had no

special knowledge of the underwater anchor, which

was unknown to everyone.

The United States’ suggestion that CARCO was the

least-cost avoider in this case is particularly selfserving because the casualty occurred in Federal

Anchorage waters that the United States maintains,

and for which CARCO bears no responsibility. As the

court of appeals explained, the Army Corps of

Engineers surveys and dredges the Anchorage to

maintain its desired depth, and the Corps works with

the Coast Guard and National Oceanic and

Atmospheric Administration “to remove or mark

obstructions when they are discovered.” Pet. App. 6a;

see also Pet. App. 223a-233a (describing the

45

responsibilities and activities of the federal agencies

with respect to the Anchorage). CARCO, in contrast,

had no responsibility under federal statutes or

regulations to maintain the Anchorage or search for

obstructions. To be sure, no federal agency is tasked

with affirmatively searching the Anchorage for

hazards. Id. at 6a. This prompted the district court

to observe that there is a “void” in the federal scheme

because nobody has a duty to search for obstructions

in the Anchorage. Id. at 231a-232a. This “void,”

however, is entirely of the government’s making. It

persists to this day.

A further disadvantage of the strict liability

approach is that it fills that “void” in a blunderbuss

manner that precludes consideration of the facts and

circumstances of individual cases. As a result, the

court of appeals’ approach inevitably results in

liability on wholly “innocent[]” charterers. Cooke,

supra, at ¶ 5A.10; see also Gilmore & Black, supra,

§ 4-4 at 204 (holding the charterer liable “regardless

of fault” is “quite inconsonant with the positions of

the parties” with respect to vessel safety); Smith,

supra, at 868 (the absolute warranty approach places

“an undeserved burden on the charterer” while the

due diligence approach achieves “more equitable

result[s]”); Hartman, supra, at 555 (“[u]nless the

charterer is negligent in some manner, such as

having particular knowledge concerning the unsafe

status of a port that the shipowner does not have,

there is no economic reason to place the risk of

damage on the charterer”).

This case starkly illustrates the harsh results for

which the strict liability approach has been rightly

criticized.

CARCO had no knowledge of the

abandoned anchor (in a federally maintained

waterway) that caused the casualty. Pet. App. 334a

46

(finding no evidence that CARCO “knew or had

reason to believe that the anchor was in the river”).

Yet because the court of appeals imposed an absolute

warranty where none was bargained for, CARCO

faces liability for more than $140 million in damages,

plus interest, even though it exercised due diligence.

Nothing in the court of appeals’ decisions

persuasively explains why a mere contracting party

(rather than the owner of the vessel that made the

ultimate decision to enter the berth or the United

States operating the Anchorage) should bear the

massive risk from a hazard the charterer could not

possibly have anticipated or avoided. Moreover, the

court of appeals’ ruling goes further than even the

Second Circuit’s approach, by extending the

charterer’s obligation beyond mere vessel damage to

encompass environmental cleanup costs and damages

not remotely addressed by the text of the provision.

This is unprecedented. The due diligence standard

avoids such manifestly unjust results. See Smith,

supra, at 868 (due diligence approach avoids placing

“an undeserved burden on the charterer”).

Frescati and the United States asserted at the

petition stage that there is nothing harsh about this

result because CARCO bargained for it. Frescati

Opp. 24-25; U.S. Opp. 17. Putting aside the fact that

Frescati was not a party to the contract, that of

course begs the question of what duties CARCO

assumed in the charter contract, which is the

question that this Court granted certiorari to decide.

What is clear from the contract’s language and

context is that CARCO did not bargain for this kind

of liability simply by accepting the duty to select a

port and berth for its shipment.

47

C. The Warranty Interpretation Results In

Inconsistent Standards Of Care For

Wharfingers And Charterers.

An additional flaw of the warranty approach is that

it is inconsistent with the maritime negligence

principles that govern the duty of wharfingers to

provide safe berths. See Dutra Grp., slip op. at 17

(rejecting maritime rule that would “create bizarre

disparities in the law”). As the court of appeals

recognized in addressing Frescati’s negligence claim,

this Court established long ago that a wharfinger

“does not guaranty the safety of vessels coming to his

wharves,” but instead is only “bound to exercise

reasonable diligence in ascertaining the condition of

the berths.” Smith, 173 U.S. at 433; see Pet. App.

26a, 312a. Under that standard, the court of appeals

reversed the negligence judgment against CARCO.

No sound rationale exists for this Court to hold that

charterers face a different, and more onerous,

standard of care when they select the berths for

vessels that they hire. The underlying obligations of

wharfingers and charterers to provide a safe berth

are related and linked by the common purpose of

protecting the welfare of vessels. The wharfinger

owns and operates the berth and, therefore, has the

direct obligation “to watch, maintain, and keep in

order that which he asks the public to pay him for the

use of.” M. & J. Tracy, 283 F. at 102. The charterer,

by contrast, does not own or control the berth, but

instead selects it for particular vessels.

The

charterer therefore is only “bound to acquaint himself

with the reputation and commonly known

characteristics of what the wharfinger offers for hire.”

Id. Given that wharfingers and charterers perform

complementary roles with respect to providing safe

berths for vessels, there is no reason for charterers to

48

face a higher standard of liability. If anything, the

wharfinger’s knowledge of the conditions of the berth,

exclusive control of the facility, and invitation to

users suggest that, if a higher standard of care were

to apply, it should logically fall on the wharfinger.

See, e.g., Waldie v. Steers Sand & Gravel Corp., 151

F.2d 129, 130-31 (2d Cir. 1945) (“the reputation of a

wharf” may excuse a charterer or tugboat for

selecting a berth, “though it would not excuse a

wharfinger” who “has not exercised care” in operating

the berth).

The imposition of two drastically different

standards of care is particularly irrational because

the wharfinger and the charterer are often the same

entity, as in this case.

It is the height of

arbitrariness for the same party in the same incident

to face strict liability in its role as the charterer, but

be subject to a due diligence standard in its role as

the wharfinger. If the contract expressly imposed a

bargained-for higher standard on the charterer, that

would be one thing. But the default rule should be

that the wharfinger and charterer have the same

obligations and assume the same risks. Asymmetry

produces anomalous results. This case is a clear

example, where the court of appeals vacated the

negligence judgment against CARCO as the

wharfinger, but upheld its liability as the charterer.

This incongruity does not exist under the due

diligence approach adopted by the Fifth Circuit,

which applies consistent standards of care to the

charterer and the wharfinger.

Frescati argued at the petition stage that it is not

anomalous to hold charterers to a higher standard

because “a contractual duty is assumed voluntarily.”

Frescati Opp. 25. But this again begs the question of

what duty a charterer assumes under a safe berth

49

clause. The fundamental question is what is the

default rule when the language does not clearly

reflect that one party voluntarily assumed a

particular duty.

D. The Warranty Interpretation Produces

An Inequitable Result In This Case.

Finally, in adopting maritime rules, this Court

considers which approach “produces an equitable

result” in the case at issue. Kirby, 543 U.S. at 35.

Here, a decision rejecting the court of appeals’

warranty interpretation produces an equitable result.

The court of appeals’ judgment, which shifts all

liability to CARCO for an extraordinary accident that

was not its fault, is grossly unfair and illustrates the

inequities

produced

by

the

strict

liability

interpretation of the safe berth clause. To be sure,

liability could not be aligned with fault in this case

because the unnamed anchor-dropper was never

found. But the court of appeals’ reliance on the safe

berth clause to impose massive liability on CARCO

reveals the error of using that limited contract

provision, rather than other sources of law, to

allocate liability for catastrophic events.

Congress envisioned and provided for a much

different outcome by enacting OPA. As noted, the

OPA Trust Fund is a cost-spreading mechanism for

oil spill cleanups that is financed by industry

members, including CARCO.

Indeed, Congress

presciently addressed the scenario where an

unknown third party is wholly culpable for a loss,

providing that the responsible party can obtain full

exoneration from financial liability, which leaves the

Fund to absorb the entire cost and then recoup it by

taxing the entire industry. 33 U.S.C. § 2703(a)(3).

See Gatlin Oil Co. v. United States, 169 F.3d 207,

209-10 (4th Cir. 1999) (storage tank owner entitled to

50

recover from the Fund costs to clean up oil spill

caused by unknown vandal).

Frescati initially

pursued that statutory remedy, but later withdrew

its exoneration claim—an action that has never been

explained. See Pet. App. 284a n.6. Instead, Frescati

sued CARCO, and the government willingly joined in

as Frescati’s subrogee.

The resulting judgment, if allowed to stand, turns

OPA on its head. Frescati, the “responsible party”

that Congress determined should bear liability for the

spill in the first instance, will pay nothing. The

federal Trust Fund likewise will pay nothing, despite

the fact that it is a cost-spreading mechanism for oil

spills. Instead, CARCO—who was not a party in the

post-spill U.S. Coast Guard investigation and cleanup

and not subject to any liability for the casualty under

OPA—will bear all of the costs, even though CARCO

already paid tens of millions of dollars into the OPA

Fund. Moreover, Congress created a mechanism for

the Trust Fund to foot the bill when an absent third

party is at fault. The court of appeals erred in relying

on the safe berth clause to reach an incongruous

result, which by itself demonstrates beyond question

the unsoundness of interpreting the clause to impose

strict liability on an unsuspecting party and thereby

assigning liability for the entire costs of an oil spill.10

10 The inequity of the $55.5 million contract remedy in favor of

Frescati is compounded by the fact that it was never a party to

the voyage charter contract in the first place. It is particularly

anomalous to impose this massive liability on CARCO based on

a contract entered into between Star and CARCO, when the

parties could not remotely have envisioned that CARCO would

pay all of Frescati’s costs of remediating an oil spill.

51

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court

of appeals should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

DEREK A. WALKER

J. DWIGHT LEBLANC, JR.

DOUGLAS L. GRUNDMEYER

CHAFFE MCCALL, L.L.P.

2300 Energy Centre

1100 Poydras Street

New Orleans, LA 70163

(504) 585-7000

RICHARD Q. WHELAN

FRANK P. DEGIULIO

PALMER, BIEZUP &

HENDERSON LLP

190 N. Independence Mall

West, Suite 401

Philadelphia, PA 19106

(215) 625-9900

July 9, 2019

CARTER G. PHILLIPS*

JACQUELINE G. COOPER

RICHARD E. YOUNG

JORDAN B. CHERRICK

LUCAS CROSLOW

SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP

1501 K Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 736-8000

cphillips@sidley.com

JOHN G. BISSELL

STRONG PIPKIN BISSELL

& LEDYARD, L.L.P.

4900 Woodway Drive

Suite 1200

Houston, TX 77056

(713) 651-1900

Counsel for Petitioners

*Counsel of Record

ADDENDUM

1a

ADDENDUM A

[LOGO]

Charles R. Weber Company, Inc.

Association of Ship Brokers

& Agents (U.S.A.), Inc.

October 1977

CODE WORD FOR THIS CHARTER

PARTY: ASBATANKVOY

TANKER VOYAGE CHARTER PARTY

PREAMBLE

Greenwich, CT

Place

November 12, 2004

Date

IT IS THIS DAY AGREED between HEIDENREICH

MARINE INC. AS AGENTS FOR STAR TANKERS

INC. chartered owner/owner (hereinafter called the

“Owner”) of the Cyprus

SS/MS “ATHOS I”

(hereinafter called the “Vessel”)

and CITGO ASPHALT REFINING COMPANY

(hereinafter called the “Charterer”)

that the transportation herein provided for will be

performed subject to the terms and conditions of this

Charter Party, which includes this Preamble and Part

I and Part II. In the event of a conflict, the provisions

of Part I will prevail over those contained in Part II.

PART I

A. Description and Position of Vessel:

Deadweight: 60,880 metric

Classed: Lloyd’s Register

tons

(2240

lbs.)

2a

Loaded draft of Vessel on assigned summer freeboard 12.423 meters ft. in. in salt water.

Capacity for cargo: 70,674 M3 tons (of 2240 lbs.

each) 98% more or less, Vessel’s option.Slops @ 98%

2,832 M3

Coated: [ ]Yes [ ] No

Coiled: [X] Yes [ ] No

Last three two cargoes: Fuel Oil / Crude / Crude

Now: Vessel Spot Caribbean Sea

Expected Ready: Guarano Pilot Station for Bajo

Grande November 12, 2004 1600 hrs

B. Laydays:

Commencing: November 16, 2004

Cancelling: November 18, 2004

C. Loading Port(s): See Special Provisions # 1

Charterer’s Option

D. Discharging Port(s): See Special Provisions # 2

Charterer’s Option

E. Cargo: See Special Provisions # 3

Charterer’s Option

F. Freight Rate: Worldscale 400 basis discharge

United States Atlantic Coast, U.S. Gulf, plus 10

Worldscale points (minimum flat USD 2.50 PMT)

basis discharge Caribbean Sea, plus 5 Worldscale

points for high heat. Overage, if any at 50% of the fixing

rate per ton (of 2240 lbs each).

G. Freight Payable to: See Special Provisions # 4 at

Total Laytime in Running Hours: 72

3a

I. Demurrage per day:/pro rata: USD 42,000.00

J. Commission of 1.25 % is payable by Owner to

Charles R. Weber Company, Inc. on the actual amount

freight, deadfreight and demurrage when and as

freight is paid.

K. The place of General Average and arbitration

proceedings to be London/New York (strike out one).

L. Tovalop: Owner warrants Vessel to be a member of

TOVALOP scheme and will be so maintained

throughout duration of this charter.

M. Special Provisions:

Nos. 1 - 19 and Citgo Clauses, as attached, with noted

amendments/deletions to be deemed a part of this

Charter Party.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have caused

this Charter, consisting of a Preamble, Parts I and II,

to be executed in duplicate as of the day and year first

above written.

Witness the signature of: HEIDENREICH MARINE

INC. AS AGENTS FOR

STAR TANKERS INC.

/s/ Helen Hastings

By: /s/ James M. Healy

Witness the Signature of: CITGO ASPHALT REFINING COMPANY

By:

This Charterparty is a computer generated copy of

ASBATANKVOY form, printed under licence from the

Association of Ship Brokers & Agents (U.S.A.), Inc.,

using software which is the copyright of Strategic

Software Limited. It is a precise copy of the original

document which can be modified, amended or added to

4a

only by the striking out of original characters, or the

insertion of new characters, such characters being

clearly highlighted as having been made by the

licensee or end user as appropriate and not by the

author.

PART II

1. WARRANTY - VOYAGE - CARGO. The vessel,

classed as specified in Part I hereof, and to be so

maintained during the currency of this Charter, shall,

with all convenient dispatch, proceed as ordered to

Loading Port(s) named in accordance with Clause 4

hereof, or so near thereunto as she may safely get

(always afloat), and being seaworthy, and having all

pipes, pumps and heater coils in good working order,

and being in every respect fitted for the voyage, so far

as the foregoing conditions can be attained by the

exercise of due diligence, perils of the sea and any

other cause of whatsoever kind beyond the Owner’s

and/or Master’s control excepted, shall load (always

afloat), from the factors of the Charterer a full and

complete cargo of petroleum and/or its products in

bulk,not exceeding what she can reasonably stow and

carry over and above her bunker fuel, consumable

stores, boiler feed, culinary and drinking water, and

complement and their effects (sufficient space to be

left in the tanks to provide for the expansion of the

cargo), and being so loaded shall forthwith proceed, as

ordered on signing Bills of Lading, direct to the

Discharging Port(s), or so near thereunto as she may

safely get (always afloat), and deliver said cargo. If

heating of the cargo is requested by the Charterer, the

Owner shall exercise due diligence to maintain the

temperatures requested.

5a

2. FREIGHT. Freight shall be at the rate stipulated in Part I and shall be computed on intake

quantity (except deadfreight as per Clause 3) as shown

on the Inspector’s Certificate of Inspection. Payment

of freight shall be made by Charterer without

discount upon delivery of cargo at destination, less any

disbursements or advances made to the Master or

Owner’s agents at ports of loading and/or discharge

and cost of insurance thereon. No deduction of freight

shall be made for water and/or sediment contained in

the cargo. The services of the Petroleum Inspector

shall be arranged and paid for by the Charterer who

shall furnish the Owner with a copy of the Inspector’s

Certificate.

3. DEADFREIGHT. Should the Charterer fail to

supply a full cargo, the Vessel may, at the Master’s

option, and shall, upon request of the Charterer,

proceed on her voyage, provided that the tanks in

which cargo is loaded are sufficiently filled to put her

in seaworthy condition. In that event, however,

deadfreight shall be paid at the rate specified in Part

I hereof on the difference between the intake quantity

and the quantity the Vessel would have carried if

loaded to her minimum permissible freeboard for the

voyage.

4.

NAMING LOADING AND DISCHARGE PORTS.

(a) The Charterer shall name the loading port or

ports at least twenty-four (24) hours prior to the

Vessel’s readiness to sail from the last previous port

of discharge, or from bunkering port for the voyage,

or upon signing this Charter if the Vessel has

already sailed. However, Charterer shall have the

option of ordering the Vessel to the following

destinations for wireless orders:

6a

On a voyage to a port or ports in:

ST.KITTS

Carribean or U.S. Gulf loading

port(s)

PORT SAID Eastern Mediterranean or Persian

Gulf loading port(s)

(from ports west of Port Said.)

(b) If lawful and consistent with Part I and with

the Bills of Lading, the Charterer shall have the

option of nominating a discharging port or ports by

radio to the Master on or before the Vessel’s arrival

at or off the following places:

Place

On a voyage to a port or ports in:

LAND’S END United Kingdom/Continent

(Bordeaux/Hamburg range) or

Scandinavia (including Denmark)

SUEZ

Mediterranean (from Persian Gulf)

GIBRALTAR Mediterranean (from Western

Hemisphere).

(c) Any extra expense incurred in connection with

any change in loading or discharging ports (so

named) shall be paid for by the Charterer and any

time thereby lost to the Vessel shall count as used

Laytime.

5. LAYDAYS. Laytime shall not commence before

the date stipulated in Part I, except with the

Charterer’s sanction. Should the Vessel not be ready

to load by 4:00 o’clock P.M. (local time) on the

cancelling date stipulated in Part I, the Charterer

shall have the option of cancelling this Charter by

giving Owner notice of such cancellation within

twenty-four (24) hours after such cancellation date;

7a

otherwise this Charter to remain in full force and

effect.

6. NOTICE OF READINESS. Upon arrival at

customary anchorage at each port of loading or

discharge, the Master or his agent shall give the

Charterer or his agent notice by letter, telegraph,

wireless or telephone that the Vessel is ready to load

or discharge cargo, berth or no berth, and laytime, as

hereinafter provided, shall commence upon the expiration of six (6) hours after receipt of such notice, or upon

the Vessel’s arrival in berth (i.e., finished mooring

when at a sealoading or discharging terminal and all

fast when loading or discharging alongside a wharf),

whichever first occurs. However, where delay is

caused to Vessel getting into berth after giving notice

or readiness for any reason over which Charterer has

no control, such delay shall not count as used laytime.

7. HOURS FOR LOADING AND DISCHARGING.

The number of running hours specified as laytime in

Part I shall be permitted the Charterer as laytime for

loading and discharging cargo but any delay due to the

Vessel’s condition or breakdown or inability of the

Vessel’s facilities to load or discharge cargo within the

time allowed shall not count as used laytime. If

regulations of the Owner or port authorities prohibit

loading or discharging of the cargo at night, time so

lost shall not count as used laytime; if the Charterer,

shipper or consignee prohibits loading or discharging

at night, time so lost shall count as used laytime. Time

consumed by the vessel in moving from loading or

discharge port anchorage to her loading or discharge

berth, discharging ballast water or slops, will not

count as used laytime.

8. DEMURRAGE. Charterer shall pay demurrage

per running hour and pro rata for a part thereof at the

8a

rate specified in Part I for all time that loading and

discharging and used laytime as elsewhere herein

provided exceeds the allowed laytime elsewhere

herein specified. If, however, demurrage shall be

incurred at ports of loading and/or discharge by reason

of fire, explosion, storm or by a strike, lockout,

stoppage or restraint of labor or by breakdown of

machinery or equipment in or about the plant of the

Charterer, supplier, shipper or consignee of the cargo,

the rate of demurrage shall be reduced one-half of the

amount stated in Part I per running hour or pro rata

for part of an hour for demurrage so incurred. The

Charterer shall not be liable for any demurrage for

delay caused by strike, lockout, stoppage or restraint

of labor for Master, officers and crew of the Vessel or

tugboat or pilots.

9.

SAFE BERTHING - SHIFTING. The vessel

shall load and discharge at any safe place or wharf, or

alongside vessels or lighters reachable on her arrival,

which shall be designated and procured by the

Charterer, provided the Vessel can proceed thereto, lie

at, and depart therefrom always safely afloat, any

lighterage being at the expense, risk and peril of the

Charterer. The Charterer shall have the right of

shifting the Vessel at ports of loading and/or discharge

from one safe berth to another on payment of all

towage and pilotage shifting to next berth, charges for

running lines on arrival at and leaving that berth,

additional agency charges and expense, customs

overtime and fees, and any other extra port charges or

port expenses incurred by reason of using more than

one berth. Time consumed on account of shifting shall

count as used laytime except as otherwise provided in

Clause 15.

9a

10. PUMPING IN AND OUT. The cargo shall be

pumped into the Vessel at the expense, risk and peril

of the Charterer, and shall be pumped out of the Vessel

at the expense of the Vessel, but at the risk and peril

of the Vessel only so far as the Vessel’s permanent

hose connections, where delivery of the cargo shall be

taken by the Charterer or its consignee. If required

by Charterer, Vessel after discharging is to clear

shore pipe lines of cargo by pumping water through

them and time consumed for this purpose shall apply

against allowed laytime. The Vessel shall supply her

pumps and the necessary power for discharging in all

ports, as well as necessary hands. However, should the

Vessel be prevented from supplying such power by

reason of regulations prohibiting fires on board, the

Charterer or consignee shall supply, at its expense, all

power necessary for discharging as well as loading, but

the Owner shall pay for power supplied to the Vessel

for other purposes. If cargo is loaded from lighters, the

Vessel shall furnish steam at Charterer’s expense for

pumping cargo into its Vessel, if requested by the

Charterer, providing the Vessel has facilities for

generating steam and is permitted to have fires on

board. All overtime of officers and crew incurred in

loading and/or discharging shall be for account of the

Vessel.

11. HOSES: MOORING AT SEA TERMINALS.

Hoses for loading and discharging shall be furnished

by the Charterer and shall be connected and disconnected by the Charterer, or, at the option of the Owner,

by the Owner at the Charterer’s risk and expense.

Laytime shall continue until the hoses have been

disconnected. When Vessel loads or discharges at a sea

terminal, the Vessel shall be properly equipped at

Owner’s expense for loading or discharging at such

10a

place, including suitable ground tackle, mooring lines

and equipment for handling submarine hoses.

12. DUES - TAXES - WHARFAGE. The Charterer

shall pay all taxes, dues and other charges on

the cargo, including but not limited to Customs

overtime on the cargo, Venezuelan Habilitation Tax,

C.I.M. Taxes at Le Havre and Portuguese Imposto de

Comercio Maritime. The Charterer shall also pay all

taxes on freight at loading or discharging ports and

any unusual taxes, assessments and governmental

charges which are not presently in effect but which

may be imposed in the future on the Vessel or freight.

The Owner shall pay all dues and other charges on

the Vessel (whether or not such dues or charges are

assessed on the basis of quantity of cargo), including

but not limited to French droits de quai and Spanish

derramas taxes. The Vessel shall be free of charges for

the use of any wharf, dock, place or mooring facility

arranged by the Charterer for the purpose of loading

or discharging cargo; however, the Owner shall be

responsible for charges for such berth when used

solely for Vessel’s purposes, such as awaiting Owner’s

orders, tank cleaning, repairs, etc. before, during or

after loading or discharging.

13. (a). CARGOES EXCLUDED VAPOR PRESSURE. Cargo shall not be shipped which has a vapor

pressure at one hundred degrees Fahrenheit (100 deg

F.) in excess of thirteen and one-half pounds (13.5 lbs.)

as determined by the current A.S.T.M. Method (Reid)

D-323.

(b)

FLASH POINT. Cargo having a flash point

under one hundred and fifteen degrees Fahrenheit

(115 deg F.) (closed cup) A.S.T.M. Method D-56 shall

not be loaded from lighters but this clause shall not

restrict the Charterer from loading or topping off

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Crude Oil from vessels or barges inside or outside the

bar at any port or place where bar conditions exist.

14. (a). ICE. In case port of loading or discharge

should be inaccessible owing to ice, the Vessel shall

direct her course according to Master’s judgment,

notifying by telegraph or radio, if available, the

Charterers, shipper or consignee, who is bound to

telegraph or radio orders for another port, which is

free from ice and where there are facilities for the

loading or reception of the cargo in bulk. The whole of

the time occupied from the time the Vessel is diverted

by reason of the ice until her arrival at an ice-free port

of loading or discharge, as the case may be, shall

be paid for by the Charterer at the demurrage rate

stipulated in Part I.

(b) If on account of ice the Master considers

it dangerous to enter or remain at any loading or

discharging place for fear of the Vessel being frozen

in or damaged, the Master shall communicate by

telegraph or radio, if available, with the Charterer,

shipper or consignee of the cargo, who shall telegraph

or radio him in reply, giving orders to proceed to

another port as per Clause 14 (a) where there is no

danger of ice and where there are the necessary

facilities for the loading or reception of the cargo in

bulk, or to remain at the original port at their risk, and

in either case Charterer to pay for the time that the

Vessel may be delayed, at the demurrage rate

stipulated in Part I.

15. TWO OR MORE PORTS COUNTING AS

ONE. To the extent that the freight rate standard of

reference specified in Part I F hereof provides for

special groupings or combinations of ports or

terminals, any two or more ports or terminals within

each such grouping or combination shall count as one

12a

port for purposes of calculating freight and demurrage

only, subject to the following conditions:

(a) Charterer shall pay freight at the highest rate

payable under Part I F hereof for a voyage

between the loading and discharge ports used by

Charterer.

(b) All charges normally incurred by reason of using

more than one berth shall be for Charterer’s

account as provided in Clause 9 hereof.

(c) Time consumed shifting between the ports

or terminals within the particular grouping or

combination shall not count as used laytime.

(d) Time consumed shifting between berths within

one of the ports or terminals of the particular

grouping or combination shall count as used

laytime.

16. GENERAL CARGO. The Charterer shall not be

permitted to ship any packaged goods or non-liquid

bulk cargo of any description; the cargo the Vessel is

to load under this Charter is to consist only of liquid

bulk cargo as specified in Clause I.

17. (a). QUARANTINE. Should the Charterer send

the Vessel to any port or place where a quarantine

exists, any delay thereby caused to the Vessel shall

count as used laytime; but should the quarantine not

be declared until the Vessel is on passage to such port,

the Charterer shall not be liable for any resulting

delay.

(b) FUMIGATION. If the Vessel, prior to or after

entering upon this Charter, has docked or docks at any

wharf which is not rat-free or stegomyia-free, she

shall, before proceeding to a rat-free or stegomyia-free

wharf, be fumigated by the Owner at his expense,

13a

except that if the Charterer ordered the Vessel to an

infected wharf the Charterer shall bear the expense of

fumigation.

18. CLEANING. The Owner shall clean the tanks,

pipes and pumps of the Vessel to the satisfaction of

the Charterer’s Inspector. The Vessel shall not be

responsible for any admixture if more than one quality

of oil is shipped, nor for leakage, contamination or

deterioration in quality of the cargo unless the

admixture, leakage, contamination or deterioration

results from (a) unseaworthiness existing at the time

of loading or at the inception of the voyage which was

discoverable by the exercise of due diligence, or

(b) error or fault of the servants of the Owner in the

loading, care or discharge of the cargo.

19. GENERAL EXCEPTIONS CLAUSE. The

Vessel, her Master and Owner shall not, unless

otherwise in this Charter expressly provided, be

responsible for any loss or damage, or delay or failure

in performing hereunder, arising or resulting from:any act, neglect, default or barratry of the Master,

pilots, mariners or other servants of the Owner in the

navigation or management of the Vessel; fire, unless

caused by the personal design or neglect of the Owner;

collision, stranding or peril, danger or accident of the

sea or other navigable waters; saving or attempting to

save life or property; wastage in weight or bulk, or any

other loss or damage arising from inherent defect,

quality or vice of the cargo; any act or omission of the

Charterer or Owner, shipper or consignee of the cargo,

their agents or representatives; insufficiency of packing; insufficiency or inadequacy or marks; explosion,

bursting of boilers, breakage of shafts, or any latent

defect in hull, equipment or machinery; unseaworthiness of the Vessel unless caused by want of due

14a

diligence on the part of the Owner to make the Vessel

seaworthy or to have her properly manned, equipped

and supplied; or from any other cause of whatsoever

kind arising without the actual fault of privity of the

Owner. And neither the Vessel nor Master or owner,

nor the Charterer, shall, unless otherwise in this

Charter expressly provided, be responsible for any loss

of damage or delay or failure in performing hereunder,

arising or resulting from:- Act of God; act of war; perils

of the seas; act of public enemies, pirates or assailing

thieves; arrest or restraint of princes, rulers or people;

or seizure under legal process provided bond is

promptly furnished to release the Vessel or cargo;

strike or lockout or stoppage or restraint of labor from

whatever cause, either partial or general; or riot or

civil commotion.

20. ISSUANCE AND TERMS OF BILLS OF

LADING.

(a) The Master shall, upon request, sign Bills of

Lading in the form appearing below for all cargo

shipped but without prejudice to the rights of the

Owner and Charterter under the terms of this

Charter. The Master shall not be required to sign Bills

of Lading for any port which, the Vessel cannot enter,

remain at and leave in safety and always afloat nor for

any blockaded port.

(b) The carriage of cargo under this Charter Party

and under all Bills of Lading issued for the cargo shall

be subject to the statutory provisions and other terms

set forth or specified in sub-paragraphs (i) through

(vii) of this clause and such terms shall be incorporated verbatim or be deemed incorporated by the

reference in any such Bill of Lading. In such subparagraphs and in any Act referred to therein, the

15a

word “carrier” shall include the Owner and the

Chartered Owner of the Vessel.

(i)

CLAUSE PARAMOUNT. This Bill of Lading

shall have effect subject to the provisions of the

Carriage of Goods by Sea Acts of the United States,

approved April 16, 1936, except that if this Bill of

Lading is issued at a place where any other Act,

ordinance or legislation gives statutory effect to

the International Convention for the Unification of

Certain Rules relating to Bills of Lading at Brussels,

August 1924, then this Bill of Lading shall have effect,

subject to the provisions of such Act, ordinance or

legislation. The applicable Act, ordinance or legislation (hereinafter called the “Act”) shall be deemed to

be incorporated herein and nothing herein contained

shall be deemed a surrender by the Owner of any of its

rights or immunities or an increase of any of its

responsibilities or liabilities under the Act. If any term

of this Bill of Lading be repugnant to the Act to any

extent, such term shall be void to the extent but no

further.

(ii) JASON CLAUSE. In the event of accident,

danger, damage or disaster before or after the

commencement of the voyage, resulting from any

cause whatsoever, whether due to negligence or not,

for which, or for the consequence of which, the Owner

is not responsible, by statute, contract or otherwise,

the cargo shippers, consignees or owners of the cargo

shall contribute with the Owner in General Average to

the payment of any sacrifices, losses or expenses of a

General Average nature that may be made or incurred

and shall pay salvage and special charges incurred in

respect of the cargo. If a salving ship is owned or

operated by the Owner, salvage shall be paid for as

fully as if the said salving ship or ships belonged to

16a

strangers. Such deposit as the Owner or his agents

may deem sufficient to cover the estimated contribution of the cargo and any salvage and special charges

thereon shall, if required, be made by the cargo,

shippers, consignees or owners of the cargo to the

carrier before delivery.

(iii) GENERAL AVERAGE. General Average shall

be adjusted, stated and sealed according to York/

Antwerp Rules l950 and, as to matters not provided

for by those rules, according to the laws and usages at

the port of New York or at the port of London,

whichever place is specified in Part I of this Charter.

If a General Average statement is required, it shall be

prepared at such port or place in the United States or

United Kingdom, whichever country is specified in

Part I of this Charter, as may be selected by the

Owner, unless otherwise mutually agreed, by an

Adjuster appointed by the Owner and approved by the

Charterer. Such Adjuster shall attend to the settlement and the collection of the General Average, subject

to customary charges. General Average Agreements

and/or security shall be furnished by Owner and/or

Charterer, and/or Owner and/or Consignee of cargo, if

requested. Any cash deposit being made as security to

pay General Average and/or salvage shall be remitted

to the Average Adjuster and shall be held by him at

his risk in a special account in a duly authorized and

licensed bank at the place where the General Average

statement is prepared.

(iv) BOTH TO BLAME. If the Vessel comes into

collision with another ship as a result of the negligence

of the other ship and any act, neglect or default of the

Master, maringer, pilot or the servants of the Owner

in the navigation or in the management of the Vessel,

the owners of the cargo carried hereunder shall

17a

indemnify the Owner against all loss or liability to the

other or non-carrying ship or her owners in so far as

such loss or liability represents loss of, or damage to,

or any claim whatsoever of the owners of said cargo,

paid or payable by the other or recovered by the

other or non-carrying ship or her owners as part of

their claim against the carrying ship or Owner. The

foregoing provisions shall also apply where the

owners, operators or those in charge of any ships or

objects other than, or in addition to, the colliding ships

or object are at fault in respect of a collision or contact.

(v) LIMITATION OF LIABILITY. Any provision

of this Charter to the contrary notwithstanding, the

Owner shall have the benefit of all limitations of, and

exemptions from, liability accorded to the owner or

chartered owner of vessels by any statute or rule of law

for the time being in force.

(vi) WAR RISKS. (a) If any port of loading or of

discharge named in this Charter Party or to which the

Vessel may properly be ordered pursuant to the terms

of the Bills of Lading be blockaded, or

(b) If owing to any war, hostilities, warlike operations, civil war, civil commotions, revolutions or the

operation of international law (a) entry to any such

port of loading or of discharge or the loading or

discharge of cargo at any such port be considered

by the Master or Owners in his or their discretion

dangerous or prohibited or (b) it be considered by the

Master or Owners in his or their discretion dangerous

or impossible for the Vessel to reach any such port of

loading or discharge - the Charterers shall have the

right to order the cargo or such part of it as may be

affected to be loaded or discharged at any other safe

port of loading or of discharge within the range of

loading or discharging ports respectively established

18a

under the provisions of the Charter Party (provided

such other port is not blockaded or that entry thereto

or loading or discharge of cargo thereat is not in

the Master’s or Owner’s discretion dangerous or

prohibited). If in respect of a port of discharge no

orders be received from the Charterers within 48

hours after they or their agents have received from the

Owners a request for the nomination of a substitute

port, the Owners shall then be at liberty to discharge

the cargo at any safe port which they or the Master

may in their or his discretion decide on (whether

within the range of discharging ports established

under the provisions of the Charter Party or not) and

such discharge shall be deemed to be due fulfillment

of the contract or contracts of affreightment so far as

cargo so discharged is concerned. In the event of the

cargo being loaded or discharged at any such other

port within the respective range of loading or

discharging ports established under the provisions of

the Charter Party, the Charter Party shall be read in

respect of freight and all other conditions whatsoever

as if the voyage performed were that originally

designated. In the event, however, that the Vessel

discharges the cargo at a port outside the range of

discharging ports established under the provisions of

the Charter Party, freight shall be paid as for the

voyage originally designated and all extra expenses

involved in reaching the actual port of discharge and

or discharging the cargo thereat shall be paid by the

Charterers or Cargo Owners. In the latter event the

Owners shall have a lien on the cargo for all such extra

expenses.

(c) The Vessel shall have liberty to comply with

any directions or recommendations as to departure,

arrival, routes, ports of call, stoppages, destinations,

zones, waters, delivery or in any otherwise whatsoever

19a

given by the government of the nations under whose

flag the Vessel sails or any other government or

local authority including any de facto government or

local authority or by any person or body acting or

purporting to act as or with the authority of any such

government or authority or by any committee or

person having under the terms of the war risks

insurance on the vessel the right to give any such

directions or recommendations. If by reason of or in

compliance with any such directions or recommendations, anything is done or is not done such shall not be

deemed a deviation.

If by reason of or in compliance with any such

direction or recommendation the Vessel does not

proceed to the port or ports of discharge originally

designated or to which she may have been ordered

pursuant to the terms of the Bills of Lading, the Vessel

may proceed to any safe port of discharge which the

Master or Owners in his or their discretion may decide

on and there discharge the cargo. Such discharge shall

be deemed to be due fulfillment of the contract or

contracts of affreightment and the Owners shall be

entitled to freight as if discharge has been effected at

the port or ports originally designated or to which the

vessel may have been ordered pursuant to the terms

of the Bills of Lading. All extra expenses involved in

reaching and discharging the cargo at any such other

port of discharge shall be paid by the Charterers

and/or Cargo Owners and the Owners shall have a lien

on the cargo for freight and all such expenses.

(vii) DEVIATION CLAUSE. The Vessel shall have

liberty to call at any ports in any order, to sail with or

without pilots, to tow or to be towed, to go to the

assistance of vessels in distress, to deviate for the

purpose of saving life or property or of landing any ill

20a

or injured person on board, and to call for fuel at any

port or ports in or out of the regular course of the

voyage. Any salvage shall be for the sole benefit of the

Owner.

21. LIEN. The Owner shall have an absolute lien

on the cargo for all freight, deadfreight, demurrage

and costs, including attorney fees, of recovering the

same, which lien shall continue after delivery of the

cargo into the possession of the Charterer, or of the

holders of any Bills of Lading covering the same or of

any storageman.

22. AGENTS. The Owner shall appoint Vessel’s

agents at all ports.

23. BREACH. Damages for breach of this Charter

shall include all provable damages, and all costs of suit

and attorney fees incurred in any action hereunder.

24. ARBITRATION. Any and all differences and

disputes of whatsoever nature arising out of this

Charter shall be put to arbitration in the City of New

York or in the City of London whichever place is

specified in Part I of this charter pursuant to the laws

relating to arbitration there in force, before a board

of three persons, consisting of one arbitrator to be

appointed by the Owner, one by the Charterer, and one

by the two so chosen. The decision of any two of the

three on any point or points shall be final. Either party

hereto may call for such arbitration by service upon

any officer of the other, wherever he may be found, of

a written notice specifying the name and address of

the arbitrator chosen by the first moving party and a

brief description of the disputes or differences which

such party desires to put to arbitration. If the other

party shall not, by notice served upon an officer of the

first moving party within twenty days of the service of

21a

such first notice, appoint its arbitrator to arbitrate the

dispute or differences specified, then the first moving

party shall have the right without further notice to

appoint a second arbitrator, who shall be a disinterested person with precisely the same force and effect

as if said second arbitrator has been appointed by the

other party. In the event that the two arbitrators fail

to appoint a third arbitrator within twenty days of the

appointment of the second arbitrator, either arbitrator

may apply to a Judge of any court of maritime jurisdiction in the city abovementioned for the appointment of

a third arbitrator, and the appointment of such

arbitrator by such Judge on such application shall

have precisely the same force and effect as if such

arbitrator had been appointed by the two arbitrators.

Until such time as the arbitrators finally close the

hearings either party shall have the right by written

notice served on the arbitrators and on an officer of the

other party to specify further disputes or differences

under this Charter for hearing and determination.

Awards made in pursuance to this clause may include

costs, including a reasonable allowance for attorney’s

fees, and judgement may be entered upon any award

made hereunder in any Court having jurisdiction in

the premises.

25. SUBLET. Charterer shall have the right to

sublet the Vessel. However, Charterer shall always

remain responsible for the fulfillment of this Charter

in all its terms and conditions.

26. OIL POLLUTION CLAUSE. Owner agrees

to participate in Charterer’s program covering oil

pollution avoidance. Such program prohibits discharge

overboard of all oily water, oily ballast or oil in any

form of a persistent nature, except under extreme

22a

circumstances whereby the safety of the vessel, cargo

or life at sea would be imperiled.

Upon notice being given to the Owner that Oil

Pollution Avoidance controls are required, the Owner

will instruct the Master to retain on board the vessel

all oily residues from consolidated tank washings,

dirty ballast, etc., in one compartment, after separation of all possible water has taken place. All water

separated to be discharged overboard.

If the Charterer requires that demulsifiers shall be

used for the separation of oil/water, such demulsifiers

shall be obtained by the Owner and paid for by

Charterer.

The oil residues will be pumped ashore at the

loading or discharging terminal, either as segregated

oil, dirty ballast or co-mingled with cargo as it is

possible for Charterers to arrange. If it is necessary to

retain the residue on board co-mingled with or

segregated from the cargo to be loaded, Charterers

shall pay for any deadfreight so incurred.

The Charterer agrees to pay freight as per the

terms of the Charter Party on any consolidated tank

washings, dirty ballast, etc., retained on board under

Charterer’s instructions during the loaded portion of

the voyage up to a maximum of 1% of the total

deadweight of the vessel that could be legally carried

for such voyage. Any extra expenses incurred by the

vessel at loading or discharging port in pumping

ashore oil residues shall be for Charterer’s account,

and extra time, if any, consumed for this operation

shall count as used laytime.

23a

BILL OF LADING

Shipped in apparent good order and condition by

on board the

Steamship/Motorship

whereof

is Master, at the port of

to be delivered at the port of

or so near thereto as the Vessel can safely get, always

afloat, unto

or order on payment of freight at the rate of

This shipment is carried under and pursuant to the

terms of the contract/charter dated New York/London

between

and

, as Charterer, and

all the terms whatsoever of the said contract/charter

except the rate and payment of freight specified

therein apply to and govern the rights of the parties

concerned in this shipment.

In witness whereof the Master has signed______ Bills

of Lading of this tenor and date, one of which being

accomplished, the others will be void.

Dated at_______this_______day of

_____________

___________________________________________Master

This Charter Party is a computer generated copy of the

ASBATANKVOY form, printed under licence from the

Association of Ship Brokers & Agents (U.S.A.), Inc.,

using software which is the copyright of Strategic

Software Limited.

It is a precise copy of the original document which can

be modified, amended or added to only by striking

24a

out of original characters, or the insertion of new

characters, such characters clearly highlighted by

underlining or use of colour or use of a larger font and

marked as having been made by the licensee or end

user as appropriate and not by the author.

SPECIAL PROVISIONS NOS. 1 - 19

to M/T “ATHOS I” CHARTER PARTY

DATED November 12, 2004

1. LOADING PORT(S): One (1) or two (2) safe

port(s) Caribbean Sea excluding Cuba, Orinoco River,

Haiti and Caripito.

2. DISCHARGE PORT(S): One (1) or two (2) safe

port(s) United States Atlantic Coast if New York not

North of George Washington Bridge excluding Florida

or Charterer’s option one (1) or two (2) safe port(s) U.S.

Gulf excluding Florida or Charterer’s option one (1) or

two (2) safe port(s) Caribbean Sea excluding Cuba,

Orinoco River, Haiti and Caripito / Martinique.

3. CARGO DESCRIPTION: Part cargo minimum

50,000 metric tons Charterer’s option up to full cargo,

with no deadfreight for Charterer’s account provided

minimum quantity supplied. Crude and/or Dirty

Petroleum Products, excluding Low Sulphur Waxy

Residue and Carbon Black Feedstock but including

Vacuum Gas Oil. Maximum two (2) grades within

Vessel’s natural segregation.

HEATING: Charterer’s option see Citgo Clauses

Number 31 and 37. Vessel maximum loaded temperature 165 degrees Fahrenheit.

ATHOS I warranted lift 47,000 metric tons basis

36 feet fresh water sailing draft at load port.

25a

Owners confirm Vessel(s) able to maintain

maximum 50 feet waterline to manifold during

discharge at Savannah, Georgia.

Owners confirm Vessel(s) complies with maximum air draft of 180 feet.

4. FREIGHT PAYABLE: In U.S. Dollars via

telegraphic transfer: Citibank, N.A., New York, New

York ABA No. 021000089, account number 30426088,

favor: Star Tankers Inc.

5. Any delays and/or costs, not normally incurred,

due to U.S.C.G. or other U.S. Government Inspections,

to be shared equally between Owners and Charterers.

6. At New York, if escort tugs required, then such

cost to be for Charterers’ account.

7. Notwithstanding any other clause in this

charter party to the contrary, a nomination of or

request or order to change port(s) in the U.S. must be

given to Owner verbally and confirmed in writing

latest 96 hours prior to estimated arrival in order to be

valid. Any delay expense or other consequence of

failing to give such timely request/order shall be for

Charterer’s account.

8. TAXES: Any taxes and or dues on cargo and/or

freight for Charterers account.

9. WORLDSCALE: Worldscale hours, terms and

conditions to apply.

10. EXXON EARLY LOADING CLAUSE: In the

event charterer agrees to load vessel prior to commencement of laydays all such time to be credited

against any time vessel is on demurrage. For purposes

of this clause, time to count when vessel is all fast at

the load port.

26a

11. CITGO COMPLIANCE WITH U.S. CUSTOMS

AND BORDER PROTECTION MANIFEST REGULATIONS CLAUSE: The Vessel Owner shall comply with

all applicable U.S. Customs and Border Protection

(“CBP”) regulations, including, but not limited to,

19 CFR §4.7 pertaining to electronically filing the

manifest for the cargo with CBP at least 24 hours prior

to arrival at a U.S. Port, to having a current International Carriers Bond, and to having a Standard

Carrier Alpha Code (“SCAC”) unique number.

12. HEIDMAR U.S. CUSTOMS CLAUSE: U.S.

Customs clearance for cargo discharging in, or transiting a U.S. Port or territory subject to control by

the bureau of U.S. Customs and Border Patrol

(CBP, Charterer’s warrant that all necessary details

required by CBP for clearance of the cargo, inclusive

of but not limited to, shipper, consignee and notify

party full name, address and phone number or telex

number, will be included on each Bill of Lading or

alternatively supplied to Owner in writing a minimum

of 36 hours prior to Vessel’s arrival at the first

designated U.S. Port of discharge. For voyages of less

than 24 hours in duration this information must be

supplied prior to departure from the load place or

port. Any delays, fines or penalties incurred due to

Charterer’s failure to comply with the above will be for

Charterer’s account.

13. Any delays incurred entering or departing ports

in Lake Maracaibo caused by awaiting tugs, pilots

and unlit buoys shall count as laytime or time on

demurrage if the vessel is already on demurrage.

14. VITOL ISPS (REV 06/08/04): ISPS CLAUSE

FOR VOYAGE CHARTER PARTIES (A)(i) It is a

condition of this charter party that, from the date of

coming into force of the International Code for the

27a

Security of Ships and of Port Facilities and the

relevant amendments to Chapter XI of SOLAS (ISPS

Code) in relation to the Vessel, both the Vessel and

“the Company” (as defined by the ISPS Code) shall

comply with the requirements of the ISPS Code

relating to the Vessel and “the Company”. Upon

request the Owners shall provide a copy of the

relevant International Ship Security Certificate (or

the Interim International Ship Security Certificate) to

the Charterers. The original of the ISSC, or interim

ISSC, and the original of the Continuous Synopsis

Record (mandatory after 1st July 2004) must be on

board the vessel at all times. The Owners shall provide

the Charterers with the full style contact details of the

Company Security Officer (CSO).

(ii) Except as otherwise provided in this Charter

Party, loss, damage, expense or delay (which shall not

count as laytime or, if the vessel is on demurrage, as

time on demurrage),” “excluding consequential loss,

caused by failure on the part of the Owners or “the

Company” or the Vessel and/or its crew to comply with

the requirements of the ISPS Code or this Clause shall

be for the Owners’ account.

(B) (i) Upon the specific request of Owner, the

Charterers shall provide the CSO and the Ship

Security Officer (SSO)/Master with their full style

contact details and any other available information

the Owners reasonably require to comply with the

ISPS Code.

(ii) Except as otherwise provided in this Charter

Party, loss, damage, expense, excluding consequential

loss, caused by failure on the part of the Charterers to

comply with this Clause shall be for the Charterers’

account and any delay caused by such failure shall

28a

count as laytime or, if the vessel is on demurrage, as

time on demurrage.

(B) Provided that the delay is not caused by the

Owners’ failure to comply with their obligations under

the ISPS Code, and that the measure imposed by the

port facility or by relevant authorities applies to all

vessels in that port and not specifically to Owners

vessel, the following shall apply:

(i) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary

provided in this Charter Party, the Vessel shall be

entitled to tender Notice of Readiness even if not

cleared due to applicable security regulations or

measures imposed by a port facility or any relevant

authority under the ISPS Code.

(ii) Any delay resulting from measures imposed by

a port facility or by any relevant authority under the

ISPS Code shall count as half laytime or half time on

demurrage if the Vessel is on demurrage. If the delay

occurs before laytime has started or after laytime or

time on demurrage has ceased to count as provided for

elsewhere within this charter party, it shall nevertheless count as half laytime or, if the vessel is on

demurrage, as half time on demurrage, and always

in accordance with A(ii) and except for any reason

directly attributable to the status/circumstances of the

Owners and/or Master and/or Crew and/or Vessel.

(iii) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary

provided in this Charter Party, any additional costs or

expenses whatsoever solely arising out of or related to

security regulations or measures required by the port

facility or any relevant authority in accordance with

the ISPS Code including, but not limited to, security

guards, launch services, tug escorts, port security fees

or taxes and inspections, unless such costs or expenses

29a

result solely from the Owners’ negligence shall be

shared equally between owner and Charterer.

(D) All measures required by the Owners to comply

with the Ship Security Plan shall be for the Owners’

account.

(E) If either party makes any payment, which is for

the other party’s account according to this Clause, the

other party shall reimburse the paying party all such

reasonable and proven expenses.

15. OWNER’S FULL ADDRESS: Heidenreich

Marine, Inc. As Agents For Star Tankers Inc., 320 Post

Road, Darien, Ct 06820.

16. APPROVALS: To the best of Owner’s knowledge the Vessel is approved by the following:

ConocoPhillips, El Paso, Star Tankers, USCG and

C.O.C.

17. QUALIFIED INDIVIDUALS: O’Brien’s Oil Pollution Services

18. OIL SPILL: Marine Spill Response Corp.

19. USCG COC EXPIRE: October 13, 2005

30a

CITGO PETROLEUM CORPORATION

(Or Nominee)CLAUSES

REVISED May 27, 1999

Charter Party Form: ASBATANKVOY

1.

ITOPF (NEW 2/97)

OWNERS WARRANT THAT VESSEL IS

ENTERED WITH THE INTERNATIONAL TANKER

OWNERS POLLUTION FEDERATION (ITOPF) AT

THE COMMENCEMENT OF THIS CHARTER AND

WILL SO REMAIN DURING ITS TERM.

2.

YORK/ANTWERP (REVISED 2/97)

YORK/ANTWERP RULES, 1974, AS AMENDED

1994, SHALL APPLY FOR ADJUSTMENT OF

GENERAL AVERAGE.

3. U. S. COAST GUARD COMPLIANCE (REVISED 4/96)

OWNER WARRANTS THAT DURING THE TERM

OF THIS CHARTER PARTY THE VESSEL WILL BE

IN FULL COMPLIANCE WITH ALL APPLICABLE

U.S. COAST GUARD REGULATIONS INCLUDING

POLLUTION PREVENTION REGULATIONS AS

SPECIFICALLY DESCRIBED AS 33 CFR PARTS

150, 151, 154, 156, 157 AND 164 OR WILL HOLD

NECESSARY WAIVERS IF NOT IN COMPLIANCE.

ANY DELAY AS A RESULT OF NON-COMPLIANCE

SHALL NOT COUNT AS USED LAYTIME OR

DEMURRAGE, IF ON DEMURRAGE.

FURTHER, OWNER AND THE VESSEL SHALL

COMPLY WITH ALL APPLICABLE STATE AND

LOCAL LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND ORDINANCE

PERTAINING TO MARINE TRANSFER OPERATIONS AND THE MOORING AND BOOMING OF

VESSELS.

4.

31a

FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (REVISED 2/97)

OWNER WARRANTS TO HAVE SECURED AND

CARRY ABOARD THE VESSEL A U.S. COAST

GUARD CERTIFICATE OF FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AS REQUIRED BY THE FEDERAL WATER

POLLUTION CONTROL ACT (33 U.S.C. 1321), AS

AMENDED BY THE CLEAN WATER ACT OF 1977

AND AS MAY BE AMENDED IN THE FUTURE.

IN NO CASE SHALL CHARTERERS BE LIABLE

FOR DEMURRAGE AS A RESULT OF OWNERS

FAILURE TO OBTAIN THE AFOREMENTIONED

CERTIFICATE.

5.

PUMPING (AMENDED)

OWNER WARRANTS THAT VESSEL WILL DISCHARGE THE ENTIRE CARGO WITHIN 33 HOURS

OR MAINTAIN 100 PSI AT THE VESSELS MANIFOLD EXCEPT WHEN PERFORMING STRIPPING MAXIMUM THREE (3) HOURS PROVIDING SHORE FACILITIES CAN ACCEPT. ANY

DELAYS DUE TO VESSELS INABILITY TO

DISCHARGE WITHIN 33 HOURS OR MAINTAIN

100 PSI AT THE VESSELS MANIFOLD WILL BE

FOR OWNERS ACCOUNT AND WILL NOT COUNT

AS LAYTIME OR DEMURRAGE. OWNER WILL

PROVIDE A COPY OF NOTE OF PROTEST, VESSELS PUMPING RECORD SIGNED BY A TERMINAL REPRESENTATIVE WITH THE DEMURRAGE

CLAIM. TIME SAVED IN PUMPING CANNOT BE

ADDED TO THE STRIPPING ALLOWANCE.

6.

BUNKER INSPECTION

OWNER TO ALLOW CHARTERERS INDEPENDENT INSPECTORS TO SURVEY BUNKERS ON

VESSELS LOADING AND DISCHARGING.

7.

32a

CARGO RETENTION

IN THE EVENT THAT ANY CARGO REMAINS

ON BOARD UPON COMPLETION OF DISCHARGE,

CHARTERER SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT TO

DEDUCT FROM FREIGHT AN AMOUNT EQUAL

TO THE FOB PORT OF LOADING VALUE OF SUCH

CARGO PLUS FREIGHT DUE WITH RESPECT

THERETO, PROVIDED THAT THE VOLUME OF

CARGO REMAINING ON BOARD IS PUMPABLE

BY VESSELS STRIPPING SYSTEM AS DETERMINED BY AN INDEPENDENT SURVEYOR. ANY

ACTION OR LACK OF ACTION IN ACCORDANCE

WITH THE PROVISION SHALL BE WITHOUT

PREJUDICE TO ANY RIGHTS OR OBLIGATIONS

OF THE PARTIES.

OWNER AGREES TO SHARE EQUALLY WITH

CHARTERER ALL EXPENSES INCURRED WITH

REGARD

TO

USING

AN

INDEPENDENT

SURVEYOR.

8.

INERT GAS SYSTEM (AMENDED)

OWNER WARRANTS THAT VESSEL HAS A

WORKING INERT GAS SYSTEM AND OFFICERS

AND CREW ARE EXPERIENCED IN THE OPERATION OF THE SYSTEM. OWNERS AGREE TO

DEPRESSURIZE THE TANKS OF INERT GAS

EQUIPPED VESSEL FOR ULLAGE MEASUREMENTS BY DESIGNATED INSPECTORS. TIME

FOR DE/RE-INERTING SHALL BE FOR CHARTERER’S ACCOUNT.

9.

CRUDE OIL WASHING (REVISED 4/96)

IF REQUESTED IN CHARTERER’S VOYAGE

INSTRUCTIONS, OWNER AGREES TO CONDUCT

CRUDE OIL WASHING OF CARGO TANKS AT

33a

DISCHARGE PORT(S) SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH

CARGO DISCHARGE OPERATIONS. COW OPERATIONS WILL BE PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE

WITH THE PROCEDURES OF ICS/OCIMF “GUIDELINES FOR TANKWASHING WITH CRUDE OIL”

IN, THE ABSENCE OF EXPRESS CONTRARY

INSTRUCTIONS OF THE CHARTERER. ANY

ADDITIONAL TIME CONSUMED AS A RESULT OF

CRUDE OIL WASHING UP TO A MAXIMUM OF

EIGHT (8) HOURS OR PRORATA ON THE BASIS

OF THE NUMBER OF TANKS CLEANED TO THE

NUMBER OF TANKS LOADED SHALL CONSTITUTE USED LAYTIME. OWNER AGREES TO COMPLY WITH APPLICABLE PORT AND TERMINAL

REGULATIONS AND IF NECESSARY TO SUBMIT

ANY ADVANCE INFORMATION OR TECHNICAL

DATA THAT MAY BE REQUIRED BY LOCAL

AUTHORITIES RELATIVE TO C.O.W. OPERATIONS. OWNER WILL INSTRUCT DISPORT

AGENTS TO RECORD COW DATE/TIMES ON

STATEMENT OF FACTS.

IN CHARTERER REQUESTS C.O.W., THE VESSEL FAILS TO C.O.W. ANY MEASURABLE CARGO

RETAINED ON BOARD SHALL BE DEEMED

LIQUID AND PUMPABLE, AND CHARTERER

SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT TO DEDUCT FROM

FREIGHT AN AMOUNT EQUAL TO THE FOB

PORT OF LOADING VALUE OF SUCH CARGO

PLUS FREIGHT DUE WITH RESPECT THERETO.

10. SHIP-TO-SHIP

(AMENDED)

TRANSFER

CLAUSE

CHARTERERS SHALL HAVE THE OPTION TO

LOAD OR DISCHARGE THE VESSEL VIA SHIP-TOSHIP TRANSFER, (WEATHER PERMITTING AND

SUBJECT TO MASTERS APPROVAL WHICH IS

34a

NOT TO BE UNREASONABLY WITHHELD), AT

ANCHOR, UNDERWAY OR ADRIFT. CHARTERER

WILL PROVIDE ADEQUATE FENDERS, HOSES

AND EQUIPMENT NECESSARY TO PERFORM

THE LIGHTERING OPERATION. OWNER AGREE

TO ALLOW CHARTERER’S SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL ON BOARD, INCLUDING MOORING

MASTER, TO ASSIST IN THE PERFORMANCE OF

THE LIGHTERING OPERATION.

ALL TIME CONSUMED FROM VESSEL’S

ARRIVAL AT THE TRANSFER LOCATION UNTIL

CARGO HOSES ARE DISCONNECTED SHALL

COUNT AS USED LAYTIME AS CALCULATED IN

PART II EXCEPT THOSE DELAYS CAUSED BY

WEATHER CONDITIONS WHICH SHALL COUNT

AS FULL LAYTIME OR IF ON DEMURRAGE AS

FULL DEMURRAGE. THE LIGHTERING LOCATION SHALL NOT COUNT AS ADDITIONAL DISCHARGE PORT OR DISCHARGE BERTH WHEN

COMPUTING FREIGHT BASED ON PUBLISHED

WORLDSCALE RATES.

11. IN-TRANSIT LOSS CLAUSE (AMENDED)

OWNER SHALL BE LIABLE FOR IN-TRANSIT

LOSS OF CARGO ABOVE .30% AND CHARTERER

SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT TO DEDUCT FROM

FREIGHT AN AMOUNT EQUAL TO THE FOB

PORT OF LOADING VALUE OF SUCH LOST

CARGO PLUS FREIGHT DUE WITH RESPECT

THERETO. IN-TRANSIT LOSS IS DEFINED AS

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE A.P.I. TOTAL

CALCULATED SHIP VOLUMES AFTER LOADING

AT THE LOADING PORT(S) AND BEFORE

UNLOADING AT THE DISCHARGING PORT(S).

CARGO QUANTITIES WILL BE DETERMINED BY

INDEPENDENT INSPECTORS ACCOMPANIED BY

35a

SHIP PERSONNEL AND QUANTITIES SO DETERMINED SHALL BE FINAL. OWNER SHALL HAVE

THE BURDEN OF PROVING, BY PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE, ANY OTHERWISE AVAILABLE DEFENSE RESPECTING A LOSS ABOVE

.30%. LIQUID PUMPABLE CARGO REMAINING

ON BOARD AFTER COMPLETION OF DISCHARGE

SHALL NOT BE DEFINED AS AN IN-TRANSIT

LOSS. ANY ACTION OR LACK OF ACTION IN

ACCORDANCE WITH THIS PROVISION SHALL

BE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO ANY RIGHTS OR

OBLIGATIONS OF THE PARTIES.

12. JURISDICTION CLAUSE

THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE OF THIS CHARTER PARTY NOTWITHSTANDING, DISPUTES

CONCERNING NON-DELIVERY OR DAMAGE TO

CARGO MAY, AT CHARTERER’S OPTION, BE

SUBMITTED FOR ADJUDICATION TO THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK AND BOTH

PARTIES HEREBY SUBMIT TO THE JURISDICTION OF THAT COURT FOR SUCH PURPOSES.

13. CITGO BILL OF LADING AND INDEMNITY

CLAUSE(DELETED) REPLACED WITH THE

FOLLOWING: CHEVRON BILL OF LADING

INDEMNITY (10-31-02) ALWAYS U.S. LAW TO

APPLY

THE DISCHARGE PORT(S) SHOWN IN THE

ORIGINAL BILL OF LADING SHALL NOT CONSTITUTE A DECLARATION OF DISCHARGE PORT(S)

AND CHARTERER SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT TO

ORDER VESSEL TO ANY PORT(S) WITHIN THE

TERMS OF THIS CHARTER PARTY. CHARTERER

HEREBY INDEMNIFIES OWNER AGAINST CLAIMS

36a

BROUGHT BY HOLDERS OF ORIGINAL BILLS

OF LADING AGAINST OWNER BY REASON OF

CHANGE OF DESTINATION ORDERED BY THE

CHARTERER.

IN THE EVENT THAT THE ORIGINAL BILLS OF

LADING ARE NOT AVAILABLE AT THE ACTUAL

DISCHARGE PORT ON VESSEL’S ARRIVAL,

OWNER AGREES TO DISCHARGE CARGO AT

FACILITY(IES)/PORT(S) TO RECEIVER(S) DESIGNATED BY CHARTERER IN THE VOYAGE

ORDERS WITHOUT PRESENTATION OF ORIGINAL BILLS OF LADING UPON RECEIPT OF

CHARTERER’S INVOCATION OF OWNER’S APPROVED P&I CLUB RECOMMENDED “LETTER OF

INDEMNITY” WORDING. OWNER’S APPROVED

P&I CLUB IS STANDARD STEAMSHIP OWNERS

P AND I ASSOCIATION (BERMUDA) LTD.. OWNER

AND CHARTERER AGREE THAT ANY REQUIREMENT CONTAINED IN THE ABOVE REFERENCED “LETTER OF INDEMNITY” WORDING FOR

A BANK GUARANTEE IS HEREBY WAIVED.

APPROVED P&I CLUBS:

STEAMSHIP MUTUAL UNDERWRITING ASSOCIATION (BERMUDA) LTD.

UNITED KINGDOM MUTUAL STEAM SHIP

ASSURANCE ASSOCIATION (BERMUDA)

LTD.

WEST OF ENGLAND SHIP OWNERS MUTUAL

INSURANCE ASSOCIATION (LUXEMBOURG)

JAPAN SHIP OWNERS’ MUTUAL PROTECTION & INDEMNITY ASSOCIATION

ASSURANCEFORENINGEN GARD

ASSURANCEFORENINGEN SKULD

37a

THE SWEDISH CLUB (SVERIGES ANGFARTYGS ASSURANS FORENING)

BRITANNIA STEAMSHIP INSURANCE ASSOCIATION LTD.

LONDON STEAMSHIP OWNER’S MUTUAL

INSURANCE ASSOCIATION LTD.

SHIPOWNERS’ MUTUAL INSURANCE (SEAMEN’S BENEFITS) ASSOCIATION

STANDARD STEAMSHIP OWNERS’ MUTUAL

WAR RISKS ASSOCIATION LTD.

AMERICAN STEAMSHIP OWNERS MUTUAL

P&I ASSOCIATION

NORTH OF ENGLAND P&I ASSOCIATION

LIMITED

14. LIGHTERING (REVISED 5/27/99) (AMENDED)

IF LIGHTERING IS REQUIRED AT A

CUSTOMARY LIGHTERING ANCHORAGE FOR

DESIGNATED PORT, TIME USED IN LIGHTERING

SHALL COUNT AS LAYTIME AND COMMENCE

SIX (6) HOURS AFTER ARRIVING AT THE

LIGHTERING POSITION OR WHENEVER THE

FIRST LIGHTERING CRAFT IS ALONGSIDE,

WHICHEVER OCCURS FIRST. LAYTIME SHALL

END WHEN HOSES ARE OFF FOLLOWING THE

LIGHTERING OPERATION. UNLESS OTHERWISE STIPULATED BY WORLDSCALE SUCH

ANCHORAGE SHALL NOT BE CONSIDERED AS A

SECOND DISCHARGE PORT OR SECOND DISCHARGE BERTH, IN THE COMPUTATION OF

FREIGHT RATE FROM PUBLISHED WORLDSCALE 100 RATES, WITH FREIGHT PAYMENT

BASED ON THE ENTIRE CARGO QUANTITY

38a

LOADED FROM ACTUAL LOAD PORT(S) TO

ACTUAL FINAL DISPORT(S). RUNNING TIME

FROM SUCH ANCHORAGE TO BERTH SHALL

NOT COUNT AS LAYTIME OR DEMURRAGE,

IF LAYTIME HAS EXPIRED. ALL COSTS IN

CONNECTION WITH SUCH LIGHTERAGE

OPERATION TO BE FOR CHARTERER’S

ACCOUNT.

USCG REGULATIONS, COVERING LIGHTERING OPERATIONS, REQUIRE THE OWNER OR

OPERATOR OF A VESSEL TO ENSURE THE

AVAILABILITY OF, THROUGH CONTRACT OR

OTHER APPROVED MEANS, RESPONSE RESOURCES THAT WILL RESPOND TO AN AVERAGE MOST PROBABLE DISCHARGE (AMPD)

CITGO PETROLEUM CORPORATION, AS CHARTERER AND/OR RECEIVER OF THE CARGO,

AT ITS EXPENSE, WILL PROVIDE SUCH AMPD

COVERAGE FOR THE VESSEL TO COMPLY

WITH THESE REGULATIONS. SHOULD A SPILL

OCCUR, THE VESSEL SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT

TO CALL OUT THE AMPD RESPONSE RESOURCES

AS PROVIDED THIS COVERAGE, CITGO PETROLEUM CORPORATION. BY PROVIDING THIS

COVERAGE, CITGO PETROLEUM CORPORATION

IS NOT AND SHALL NOT BE LIABLE OF THE

COSTS OF THE SPILL RESPONSE AND DEMURRAGE ARISING THEREFROM.

15. LAYTIME (REVISED 5/98) (AMENDED)

AT THE END OF NO.7 PART II, “HOURS

FOR LOADING AND DISCHARGING” ADD TIME

CONSUMED AWAITING PRATIQUE, CUSTOMS,

IMMIGRATION, DAYLIGHT, TIDE, OPENING OF

LOCKS, RAISINGOF BRIDGES, PILOT AND/OR

TUGS SHALL COUNT AS ONE HALF LAYTIME

39a

OR DEMURRAGE, IF LAYTIME HAS EXPIRED

OR ONE HALF DEMURRAGE IF VESSEL ON

DEMURRAGE.

IF FOR ANY REASON LAYTIME HAS EXPIRED,

CHARTERER TO BE ALLOWED THE BENEFITS

OF CLAUSE 6, 7, AND 8, PART II AT EACH

PORT OF LOADING OR DISCHARGE BEFORE

DEMURRAGE SHALL BE INCURRED WHETHER

PREVIOUSLY ON DEMURRAGE OR NOT.

16. WEATHER (AMENDED)

DELAYS DUE TO WEATHER CONDITIONS AND

THEIR EFFECT ON THE SEA AT LOAD OR

DISCHARGE PORTS IN BERTHING, LOADING,

DISCHARGING SHALL COUNT AS ONE HALF

LAYTIME OR IF ON DEMURRAGE ONE HALF

TIME ON DEMURRAGE.

17. AGENCY CLAUSE

OWNER AGREE TO APPOINT AGENTS AS

NOMINATED BY CHARTERERS AT LOAD AND

DISCHARGE PORTS. SUCH AGENTS SHALL BE

OWNER’S AGENT FOR ALL PURPOSES UNDER

THIS CHARTER.

18. BOARDING CLAUSE

OWNER AGREES TO ALLOW CHARTERER’S

REPRESENTATIVE(S) TO BOARD VESSEL AT

LOAD AND/OR DISCHARGE PORTS TO OBSERVE

CARGO LOADING/DISCHARGING OPERATION.

19. CITGO SHORE RELEASE (REVISED 5/98)

TIME SPENT WAITING VESSEL RELEASE BY

SHORE AUTHORITIES AND/OR CARGO INSPECTORS AFTER DISCONNECTION OF HOSES IN

EXCESS OF THREE HOURS SHALL COUNT AS

40a

USED LAYTIME OR DEMURRAGE IF VESSEL

IS ON DEMURRAGE. FOR PURPOSES OF THIS

CLAUSE, VESSEL RELEASE AT LOAD PORT

SHALL BE EFFECTED BY THE CARGO DOCUMENTS BEING PLACED ON BOARD.

20. LAYDAYS-NOTICE OF READINESS (REVISED 4/96)

AT THE END OF NO. 6, PART II “NOTICE OF

READINESS” ADD CHARTERER IS NOT OBLIGATED TO ACCEPT NOTICE OF READINESS

PRIOR TO COMMENCEMENT OF LAYDAYS AS

PROVIDED FOR IN PART I ARTICLE B.

IN THE EVENT THAT NOTICE OF READINESS

IS GIVEN PRIOR TO COMMENCEMENT OF LAYDAYS AS PROVIDED FOR IN PART I ARTICLE B,

LAYTIME SHALL NOT BEGIN UNTIL 0600 LOCAL

TIME ON THE FIRST DAY OF LAYDAYS OR UPON

VESSEL’S ARRIVAL IN BERTH WHICHEVER

OCCURS FIRST.

21. HOSES

OWNER AGREES TO CONNECT AND DISCONNECT HOSES IF SO REQUESTED BY CHARTERERS AT OWNER’S RISK AND EXPENSE.

22. CITGO DIVERSION CLAUSE

NOTWITHSTANDING ANYTHING TO THE CONTRARY IN THIS CHARTER PARTY AND NOTWITHSTANDING NOMINATION OF LOADING

AND/OR DISCHARGE PORTS AND ISSUANCE OF

BILL OF LADING, CHARTERERS SHALL HAVE

THE RIGHT TO CHANGE ITS NOMINATION OF

LOADING AND/OR DISPORT IN ACCORDANCE

WITH PART I C AND D OF THE CHARTER PARTY.

ANY EXTRA TIME AND EXPENSE INCURRED BY

41a

OWNERS IN COMPLYING WITH CHARTERERS

INSTRUCTIONS SHALL BE FOR CHARTERERS

ACCOUNT AND CALCULATED IN ACCORDANCE

WITH PART II CLAUSE 4 OF THIS CHARTER.

FREIGHT TO BE BASED ON THE VOYAGE

ACTUALLY PERFORMED. CHARTER SHALL

HAVE THE RIGHT TO MAKE AS MANY CHANGES

AS IT DEEMS NECESSARY.

23. FLORIDA STRAIT TRANSIT CLAUSE

VESSEL, WHEN TRANSITING THE FLORIDA

STRAITS AREA FROM KEY BISCAYNE SOUTH TO

THE DRY TORTUGAS S

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