Amicus Curiae Brief — Kristina Box, Commissioner, Indiana Department of Health, et al., Petitioners v. Planned Parenthood of Indiana and Kentucky, Inc., et al.
Supreme Court briefNov 15, 2018
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No. 18-483
In the Supreme Court of the United States
COMMISSIONER OF THE INDIANA STATE
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF INDIANA AND
KENTUCKY, INC., et al.,
Respondents.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SEVENTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF AMICI CURIAE OF AMERICANS UNITED
FOR LIFE AND CHARLOTTE LOZIER INSTITUTE
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS
CATHERINE GLENN FOSTER
STEVEN H. ADEN
Counsel of Record
RACHEL N. BUSICK
NATALIE M. HEJRAN
AMERICANS UNITED FOR LIFE
2101 Wilson Blvd., Suite 525
Arlington, VA 22201
Steven.Aden@aul.org
(202) 741-4917
Counsel for Amici Curiae
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................iii
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ................................ 1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................................... 2
ARGUMENT ............................................................... 3
The Supreme Court should grant certiorari to
determine a nationally important question:
Whether the Constitution prohibits states
from requiring the humane and dignified
disposition of human fetal remains. ........................ 3
A. Human fetuses are human.................................. 3
1. Human fetuses are unborn human
beings, who are unique and separate
from their mother. ......................................... 3
2. Federal and state laws recognize the
humanity of unborn humans. ....................... 6
3. This Court and other courts have
recognized the humanity of unborn
humans. ....................................................... 11
4. The humanity of an unborn human is a
different question from “personhood”
under the Fourteenth Amendment. ........... 12
ii
B. It is constitutional and rational to require
the humane and dignified disposition of
human fetal remains. ....................................... 13
1. Although human fetal remains can be
disposed of humanely, they are often
treated inhumanely. .................................... 13
2. To avoid treating human fetal remains
inhumanely, Indiana and other states
require the humane disposition of
human fetal remains. .................................. 15
3. Unlike the Seventh Circuit, this Court
and the Eighth Circuit have recognized
that states have a legitimate interest in
the proper disposition of human fetal
remains. ....................................................... 17
4. A state’s legitimate interest in the
humane and dignified disposition of
human fetal remains does not conflict
with Roe or Casey. ....................................... 19
5. It is rational for Indiana to require the
humane and dignified disposition of
human fetal remains. .................................. 21
C. Without intervention by this Court,
Indiana and other states will be unable to
require the humane disposition of human
fetal remains. .................................................... 23
CONCLUSION .......................................................... 23
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Page(s)
Amadio v. Levin,
501 A.2d 1085 (Pa. 1985)..................................... 8
Baldwin v. Butcher,
184 S.E.2d 428 (W. Va. 1971).............................. 9
Barsky v. Bd. of Regents,
347 U.S. 442 (1954) ........................................... 20
Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg,
304 N.E.2d 88 (Ill. 1973) ..................................... 8
City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health,
462 U.S. 416 (1983) ..................................... 17, 18
Commonwealth v. Cass,
467 N.E.2d 1324 (Mass. 1984) ............................ 7
DiDonato v. Wortman,
358 S.E.2d 489 (N.C. 1987) ................................. 8
Espadero v. Feld,
649 F. Supp. 1480 (D. Colo. 1986) ...................... 7
Florence v. Town of Plainfield,
849 A.2d 7 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2004) .................... 7
Fowler v. Woodward,
138 S.E.2d 42 (S.C. 1964) .................................... 8
iv
Gonzales v. Carhart,
550 U.S. 124 (2007) ..................... 9, 11, 19, 20, 23
Graf v. Taggert,
204 A.2d 140 (N.J. 1964) ..................................... 8
Greater Se. Cmty. Hosp. v. Williams,
482 A.2d 394 (D.C. 1984)..................................... 7
Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co.,
148 N.W.2d 107 (Wis. 1967) ................................ 9
Libbee v. Permanente Clinic,
518 P.2d 636 (Or. 1974) ...................................... 8
Mack v. Carmack,
79 So.3d 597 (Ala. 2011) ...................................... 7
Milton v. Cary Med. Ctr.,
538 A.2d 252 (Me. 1988) ...................................... 8
Mitchell v. Couch,
285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1955) ................................. 8
Moen v. Hanson,
537 P.2d 266 (Wash. 1975) ................................. 9
Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.,
331 N.E.2d 916 (Mass. 1975) ............................. 8
Phillips v. State,
No. 1160403, slip op. (Ala. Oct. 19, 2018) .......... 9
v
Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v.
Rounds,
530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008) ....................... 11, 12
Planned Parenthood of Ind., Inc. v.
Comm’r, Ind. State Dep’t of Health,
794 F. Supp. 2d 892 (S.D. Ind. 2011) ................ 12
Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v.
Comm’r, Ind. State Dep’t of Health,
888 F.3d 300 (7th Cir. 2018) ..................... passim
Planned Parenthood of Minn. v.
Minnesota,
910 F.2d 479 (8th Cir. 1990) ........... 17, 18, 20, 21
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992) ..................................... 17, 19
Poliquin v. MacDonald,
135 A.2d 249 (N.H. 1957) .................................... 8
Porter v. Lassiter,
87 S.E.2d 100 (Ga. Ct. App. 1955) .................. 7, 8
Presley v. Newport Hosp.,
365 A.2d 748 (R.I. 1976) ...................................... 8
Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973) ........................... 1, 11, 19, 20
Salazar v. St. Vincent Hosp.,
619 P.2d 826 (N.M. 1980) .................................... 8
vi
State ex. rel. Odham v. Sherman,
198 A.2d 71 (Md. 1964) ....................................... 8
Stenberg v. Carhart,
530 U.S. 914 (2000) ..................................... 19, 20
Stern v. Miller,
348 So.2d 303 (Fla. 1977) .................................... 7
Strzelczyk v. Jett,
870 P.2d 730 (Mont. 1994) .................................. 8
Summerfield v. Superior Court,
698 P.2d 712 (Ariz. 1985) ................................... 7
Vaillancourt v. Med. Ctr. Hosp. of Vt., Inc.,
425 A.2d 92 (Vt. 1980) ......................................... 8
Verkennes v. Corniea,
38 N.W.2d 838 (Minn. 1949) ............................... 8
Volk v. Baldazo,
651 P.2d 11 (Idaho 1982)..................................... 8
Wade v. United States,
745 F. Supp. 1573 (Dist. Haw. 1990) .................. 8
Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702 (1997) ........................................... 20
Werling v. Sandy,
476 N.E.2d 1053 (Ohio 1985) .............................. 8
vii
White v. Yup,
485 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1969) .................................... 8
Worgan v. Greggo & Ferrara, Inc.,
128 A.2d 557 (Del. Super. Ct. 1956) ................... 7
Statutes
1 U.S.C. § 8 ................................................................ 9
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 106 ............................................ 7
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3216 ........................................ 10
18 U.S.C. § 1531 ........................................................ 9
18 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) ............................................... 6
18 U.S.C. § 1841(d) ................................................... 6
410 Ill. Comp. Stat. 110/45 ..................................... 10
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8301 .......................................... 8
42 U.S.C. § 289g-2 ................................................... 10
720 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/9-1.2 .................................... 7
720 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/9-2.1(d) ............................... 6
740 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 180/2 ...................................... 8
Ala. Code § 13A-6-1................................................... 7
viii
Ala. Code § 26-23F-4 ............................................... 10
Ala. Code § 26-23F-5 ............................................... 10
Ala. Code § 6-5-410 ................................................... 7
Alaska Stat. § 09.55.585 ........................................... 7
Alaska Stat. § 11.41.150 ........................................... 7
Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(64) ................................ 6
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-611 .................................. 7
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1102 ................................ 7
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-2302 .............................. 10
Ark. Code Ann. § 16-62-102...................................... 7
Ark. Code Ann. § 20-17-801.................................... 10
Ark. Code Ann. § 20-17-802.................................... 10
Ark. Code Ann. § 5-1-102(13) ............................. 6, 13
Cal. Penal Code § 187(a) ........................................... 7
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-202 ..................................... 7
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 25-2-111.5 .................................. 10
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-555 ......................................... 7
ix
D.C. Code § 12-101 .................................................... 7
Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 3724 ................................... 7
Fla. Stat. § 768.19 ..................................................... 7
Fla. Stat. § 775.021(5)........................................... 6, 7
Fla. Stat. § 873.05 ................................................... 10
Ga. Code Ann. § 16-5-80 ........................................... 7
Ga. Code Ann. § 19-7-1 ............................................. 7
Ga. Code Ann. § 52-7-12.3(a) .................................... 6
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 663-3 ............................................ 8
Idaho Code Ann. § 18-4001....................................... 7
Idaho Code Ann. § 39-9304..................................... 10
Idaho Code Ann. § 39-9306..................................... 10
Idaho Code Ann. § 5-310........................................... 8
Ind. Code § 16-18-2-128.7 ......................................... 4
Ind. Code § 16-21-11-4 ............................................ 16
Ind. Code § 16-21-11-6 ............................................ 16
Ind. Code § 16-34-2-1.1 ........................................... 10
x
Ind. Code § 16-34-3-2(a).......................................... 16
Ind. Code § 16-34-3-4 .............................................. 16
Ind. Code § 16-41-16-4 ............................................ 16
Ind. Code § 16-41-16-5 ............................................ 16
Ind. Code § 34-23-2-1 ................................................ 8
Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1 ................................................ 7
Ind. Code § 35-46-5-1.5 ........................................... 10
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-5419 .................................... 6, 7
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-1901 ........................................ 8
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65-6709 ...................................... 10
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65-67a06 .................................... 10
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 411.130 .................................. 8
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 436.026 ................................ 10
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 507A.010 ................................ 6
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 507A.020 ................................ 7
La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 26 ........................................ 8
La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2315.2 ................................. 8
xi
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:2(11) .................................. 6
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:2(7) .................................... 6
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:32.5 .................................... 7
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:87.3 .................................. 10
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:1191.2 .............................. 10
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 112, § 12J ............................. 10
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 229, § 2 ................................... 8
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 24G................................. 7
Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 2-103 .......................... 7
Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-904 ............... 8
Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 18-A, § 2-804 ............................... 8
Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 22, § 1593 .................................. 10
Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2922a ................................ 8
Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.322 .................................... 7
Minn. Stat. § 145.4241.............................................. 6
Minn. Stat. § 573.02.................................................. 8
Minn. Stat. § 609.2114.............................................. 7
xii
Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-13 ........................................ 8
Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-19 ........................................ 8
Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-37 ........................................ 6
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.205 ............................................... 7
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.205.2 ............................................ 8
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.027 ......................................... 10
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.036 ......................................... 10
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.080 ........................................... 8
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.020 ........................................... 7
Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-102 ..................................... 7
Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-513 .................................... 8
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 130A-131.10 ......................... 10, 11
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-23 ............................................. 6
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-23.2 .......................................... 7
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-46.1 ........................................ 10
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 28A-18-2 ....................................... 8
N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-17.1-02 ................................ 7
xiii
N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02.1-02 ................................. 10
N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02.1-09 ................................. 11
N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02.2-02 ................................. 10
N.D. Cent. Code § 14-10-15 ...................................... 8
N.D. Cent. Code § 32-21-01 ...................................... 8
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 556:7 .................................... 8
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 630:1-a ................................. 7
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:31-1 .......................................... 8
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 24-9A-5 ...................................... 10
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-2-1 ........................................... 8
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-342 ......................................... 10
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-389 ........................................... 7
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-809 ........................................... 8
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.210.......................................... 7
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.085............................................ 8
Ohio Admin. Code § 3701-47-05 ............................. 11
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2125.01 ................................ 8
xiv
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2903.01 ................................ 7
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2919.14 .............................. 10
Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 1053.......................................... 8
Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 691........................................ 6, 7
Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 1-301(10) ................................ 11
Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 1-735 ...................................... 10
Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 1-738.3 ................................... 10
Or. Rev. Stat. § 30.020 .............................................. 8
R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-7-1 ............................................ 8
R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-23-5 .......................................... 7
R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-54-1 ........................................ 10
S.C. Code Ann. § 15-51-10 ........................................ 8
S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-1083 .................................. 6, 7
S.D. Codified Laws § 21-5-1 ..................................... 8
S.D. Codified Laws § 22-16-1.1 ................................ 7
S.D. Codified Laws § 34-23A-1(4) .......................... 12
S.D. Codified Laws § 34-23A-10.1 .......................... 10
xv
S.D. Codified Laws § 34-23A-10.1(1)(b)–(d)..... 11, 12
S.D. Codified Laws § 34-23A-17 ............................. 10
Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-106 ..................................... 8
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-214 ................................... 7
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-15-208 ................................. 10
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 71.001 ............ 8
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 71.002 ............ 8
Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 697.004 ........... 11
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07 ..................................... 7
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.02 ................................... 7
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 48.03 ................................. 10
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-201 ...................................... 7
Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-311 .................................... 10
Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-32.2......................................... 7
Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-50............................................ 9
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 1491..................................... 8
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 1492..................................... 8
xvi
W. Va. Code § 55-7-5 ................................................. 9
W. Va. Code § 61-2-30 ............................................... 7
Wash. Rev. Code § 4.24.010...................................... 9
Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.32.060 ................................... 7
Wis. Stat. § 895.03 .................................................... 9
Wis. Stat. § 939.75(1) ................................................ 6
Wis. Stat. § 940.04 .................................................... 7
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-6-115 ..................................... 10
Other Authorities
Agreed Order, Comm’r Dep’t of Ind. Envtl.
Mgmt. v. MedAssure of Ind. LLC, No. 201623569-S (Ind. Dep’t of Envtl. Mgmt. Feb. 2,
2016), http://www.irtl.org/wp-content/up
loads/2010/06/MedAssure-PAO-2-9-16.pdf....... 15
Ams. United for Life, DEFENDING LIFE (2018
ed.) ........................................................................ 1
AP, Texas Abortion Clinics Fined for Fetus
Disposal, My San Antonio (Feb. 11, 2012,
8:35 PM), http://www.mysanantonio.com/
news/local_news/article/2-Texas-abortionclinics-fined-for-fetus-disposal-3305551.php ... 14
xvii
Clarke D. Forsythe, Legal Perspectives on
Cloning: Human Cloning and the
Constitution, 32 Val. U. L. Rev. 469
(1998)...................................................... 3, 4, 5, 13
Jeremy Pelzer, Aborted Fetal Remains from
Ohio Planned Parenthood Ended Up in
Landfills, Incinerators, Attorney General
Says, Cleveland.com (Dec. 11, 2015),
http://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/20
15/12/aborted_fetal_remains_from_ohi.html ... 14
Katie Pavlich, Horrifying: Bodies of Aborted
Babies Burned to Power Homes in Oregon,
Townhall (Apr. 24, 2014, 8:21 AM), http://
townhall.com/tipsheet/katiepavlich/2014/04/
24/horrifying-bodies-of-aborted-babies-burn
ed-to-power-homes-in-oregon-n1828680 .......... 14
MOSBY’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY (10th ed.
2017) ........................................................... 3, 4, 14
Rachel K. Jones & Jenna Jerman, Abortion
Incidence and Service Availability in the
United States, 2014, 49 Perspectives on
Sexual & Reprod. Health 17, (2017),
https://doi.org/10.1363/psrh.12015 ............. 13, 14
Senate Chamber Session Video, 2016 Archived
Video, Ind. General Assembly (Mar. 1,
2018), http://iga.in.gov/information/
archives/2016/video/senate/ .............................. 15
xviii
TABER’S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY
(23d ed. 2017) ......................................... 3, 4, 5, 14
Tara C. Jatlaoui et al., Abortion
Surveillance—United States, 2014, CDC
(Nov. 24, 2017), https://www.cdc.gov/
mmwr/volumes/66/ss/ss6624a1.htm?s_cid=s
s6624a1_w .......................................................... 14
1
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1
Americans United for Life (AUL) is the nation’s
oldest and most active pro-life non-profit advocacy
organization. Founded in 1971, before the Supreme
Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973),
AUL has dedicated nearly 50 years to advocating for
comprehensive legal protections for human life from
conception to natural death. AUL attorneys are
highly-regarded experts on the Constitution and prolife policy, and are often consulted on various bills and
amendments across the country. AUL has created
comprehensive model legislation and works
extensively with state legislators to enact
constitutional pro-life laws, including a human fetal
remains model bill that ensures a proper and
respectful final disposition. See Ams. United for Life,
DEFENDING LIFE 290–301 (2018 ed.) (state policy
guide providing model bill that requires unborn
humans to be treated with dignity and respect).
Charlotte Lozier Institute (CLI) is the
education and research arm of the Susan B. Anthony
List. Named after a nineteenth century feminist
physician who, like Susan B. Anthony, championed
women’s rights without sacrificing either equal
opportunity or the lives of the unborn, CLI studies
federal and state policies and their impact on women’s
health and on child and family well-being. CLI is
1 No party’s counsel authored any part of this brief. No person
other than Amici and their counsel contributed money intended
to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. Counsel for
all parties received timely notice and have consented to the filing
of this brief.
2
committed to bringing the power of science, medicine,
and research to law and public policy. It has continued
to provide scientific information on fetal research,
fetal disposition, and related bioethical issues to
members of Congress and their staff, state legislators,
and media entities. Since 2015, CLI scholars and staff
have published research and given legislative
testimony regarding the disposition of fetal remains
in Indiana and across the nation.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Without regulations, medical practitioners are free
to dispose of human fetal remains by incineration with
medical waste, by dumping in landfills, and even by
burning the remains to generate energy. In response
to reports that human fetal remains were being
disposed of in inhumane ways such as these, Indiana
passed House Enrolled Act 1337, which included a
fetal disposition provision requiring the humane and
dignified disposition of human fetal remains. This
provision recognized the simple biological fact that
human fetuses are human beings—a fact that is
consistently recognized in federal and state laws, as
well as by this Court and other courts.
Despite the rationality of treating human fetal
remains humanely and with dignity, the Seventh
Circuit—in conflict with the Eighth Circuit—found
that there was no rational reason for Indiana to do so.
Without intervention by this Court, Indiana will be
unable to stop the inhumane disposition of human
fetal remains within its borders. And without
clarification on whether or not these laws are
3
constitutional, other states that want to require the
humane and dignified disposition of human fetal
remains are left in limbo. As such, this Court should
grant Indiana’s petition.
ARGUMENT
The Supreme Court should grant certiorari to
determine a nationally important question:
Whether the Constitution prohibits states from
requiring the humane and dignified disposition
of human fetal remains.
A. Human fetuses are human.
1. Human fetuses are unborn human beings,
who are unique and separate from their
mother.
After conception and prior to birth, mammals go
through two major stages of development: embryo and
fetus. An “embryo” is the “young of any organism in
an early stage of development,” while a “fetus” is “an
unborn animal in its later stages of development.”
Embryo, TABER’S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY
783 (23d ed. 2017); Fetus, TABER’S CYCLOPEDIC
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 911.
For humans, “[t]he embryo and the fetus are the
two primary names given to the unborn human during
gestation.” Clarke D. Forsythe, Legal Perspectives on
Cloning: Human Cloning and the Constitution, 32 Val.
U. L. Rev. 469, 474 (1998). “Embryo” is “the stage of
prenatal development from the time of fertilization of
4
the ovum (conception) until the end of the eighth
week.” Embryo, MOSBY’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 605
(10th ed. 2017). The embryonic period is
“characterized by rapid growth, differentiation of the
major organ systems, and development of the main
external features.” Id. A “fetus” is “the human being
in utero after the embryonic period and the beginning
of the development of the major structural features,
from the ninth week after fertilization until birth.”
Fetus, MOSBY’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 690. The graphic
on the next page shows the stages of development of
an unborn human from embryo to fetus. See Stages of
Development of Human Embryo Including Mature
Fetus, TABER’S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 784.
Indiana’s fetal disposition provision uses “fetus” as
shorthand for all stages of development of an unborn
human (embryo and fetus), and defines “fetus” as “an
unborn child, irrespective of gestational age or the
duration of the pregnancy.” Ind. Code § 16-18-2-128.7.
For the remainder of this brief, all references to “fetus”
mirror Indiana’s broader statutory definition.
Fetuses by definition are not egg, sperm, or mere
tissue; they are unborn human beings. See Fetus,
TABER’S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 911
(defining “fetus” as “an unborn human”); Forsythe, 32
Val. U.L. Rev. at 477 (“[T]he one-celled human embryo
is not simply ‘human life’ but a human being.”). “A
human being is simply a member of the species homo
sapiens, and it is defined biologically, by species, not
developmentally.” Forsythe, 32 Val. U.L. Rev. at 478.
Although unborn humans develop in their mother’s
womb and are dependent on their mother for survival,
5
they are separate and unique human beings from
their mother. An unborn human has unique DNA that
is distinct from his or her mother (and father). See id.
at 475, 477. A male unborn human is a different sex
from his pregnant mother, a female. An unborn
6
human conceived by parents of different races is a
combination of his or her parents’ races and thus a
different racial composition from his or her mother
(and father). In sum, unborn humans are unique and
separate human beings from their mother.
2. Federal and state laws recognize the
humanity of unborn humans.
Federal and state laws, both inside and outside of
the abortion context, recognize the humanity of
unborn humans. For example, federal and state laws
define unborn humans as human beings. The federal
Unborn Victims of Violence Act defines “unborn child”
as a “child in utero,” which means “a member of the
species homo sapiens, at any stage of development,
who is carried in the womb.” 18 U.S.C. § 1841(d).
Many state laws either mirror this definition or adopt
a version of their own.2
Outside the context of a legal abortion, federal and
state laws criminalize and provide remedies for killing
an unborn human. The Unborn Victims of Violence
Act makes it a federal crime to kill or cause bodily
injury to an unborn human in utero. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1841(a)(1). Thirty-eight states currently treat the
killing of an unborn human as homicide, with at least
2 See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(b)(64); Ark. Code Ann. § 5-1102(13); Fl. Stat. § 775.021(5); Ga. Code Ann. § 52-7-12.3(a); 720
Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/9-2.1(d); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-5419; Ky. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 507A.010; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 14:2(7), (11); Minn.
Stat. § 145.4241; Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-37; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1423.1; Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 691; S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-1083; Wis.
Stat. § 939.75(1).
7
twenty-eight of those states criminalizing the act from
conception.3 Nearly all fifty states, as well as the
District of Columbia, have wrongful death statues,
allowing recovery for the death of an unborn human
or the subsequent death of an infant born alive who
was injured while in utero.4
3 See, e.g., Ala. Code § 13A-6-1; Alaska Stat. § 11.41.150; Ariz.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1102; Ark. Code Ann. § 5-1-102(13); Cal.
Penal Code § 187(a); Fla. Stat. § 775.021(5); Ga. Code Ann. § 165-80; Idaho Code Ann. § 18-4001; 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/9-1.2;
Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-5419; Ky. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 507A.020; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:32.5; Md. Code Ann.,
Crim. Law § 2-103; Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 24G (as interpreted
by Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324 (Mass. 1984)); Mich.
Comp. Laws § 750.322; Minn. Stat. § 609.2114; Miss. Code Ann.
§ 97-3-19; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.020 (as defined by id. § 1.205);
Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-102; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-389; Nev. Rev.
Stat. § 200.210; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 630:1-a; N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 14-23.2; N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-17.1-02; Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 2903.01; Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 691; 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 106; R.I.
Gen. Laws § 11-23-5; S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-1083; S.D. Codified
Laws § 22-16-1.1; Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-214; Tex. Penal Code
Ann. § 19.02 (as defined by id. § 1.07); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5201; Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-32.2; Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.32.060; W.
Va. Code § 61-2-30; Wis. Stat. § 940.04.
4 See, e.g., Ala. Code § 6-5-410 (as interpreted by Mack v.
Carmack, 79 So.3d 597 (Ala. 2011)); Alaska Stat. § 09.55.585;
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-611 (as interpreted by Summerfield v.
Superior Court, 698 P.2d 712 (Ariz. 1985)); Ark. Code Ann. § 1662-102; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-202 (as interpreted by Espadero
v. Feld, 649 F. Supp. 1480 (D. Colo. 1986)); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52555 (as interpreted by Florence v. Town of Plainfield, 849 A.2d 7
(Conn. Super. Ct. 2004)); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 3724 (as
interpreted by Worgan v. Greggo & Ferrara, Inc., 128 A.2d 557
(Del. Super. Ct. 1956)); D.C. Code § 12-101 (as interpreted by
Greater Se. Cmty. Hosp. v. Williams, 482 A.2d 394 (D.C. 1984));
Fla. Stat. § 768.19 (as interpreted by Stern v. Miller, 348 So.2d
303 (Fla. 1977)); Ga. Code Ann. § 19-7-1 (as interpreted by Porter
8
v. Lassiter, 87 S.E.2d 100 (Ga. Ct. App. 1955)); Haw. Rev. Stat.
§ 663-3 (as interpreted by Wade v. United States, 745 F. Supp.
1573 (Dist. Haw. 1990)); Idaho Code Ann. § 5-310 (as interpreted
by Volk v. Baldazo, 651 P.2d 11 (Idaho 1982)); 740 Ill. Comp.
Stat. § 180/2 (as interpreted by Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg,
304 N.E.2d 88 (Ill. 1973)); Ind. Code § 34-23-2-1; Kan. Stat. Ann.
§ 60-1901; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 411.130 (as interpreted by
Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1955)); La. Civ. Code Ann.
art. 2315.2 (as defined by id. art. 26); Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 18-A, § 2804; (as interpreted by Milton v. Cary Med. Ctr., 538 A.2d 252
(Me. 1988)); Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-904 (as
interpreted by State ex. rel. Odham v. Sherman, 198 A.2d 71 (Md.
1964)); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 229, § 2 (as interpreted by Mone v.
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 331 N.E.2d 916 (Mass. 1975)); Mich.
Comp. Laws § 600.2922a; Minn. Stat. § 573.02 (as interpreted by
Verkennes v. Corniea, 38 N.W.2d 838 (Minn. 1949)); Miss. Code
Ann. § 11-7-13; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.080 (as defined by id.
§ 1.205.2); Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-513 (as interpreted by
Strzelczyk v. Jett, 870 P.2d 730 (Mont. 1994)); Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 30-809; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.085 (as interpreted by White v.
Yup, 485 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1969)); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 556:7 (as
interpreted by Poliquin v. MacDonald, 135 A.2d 249 (N.H.
1957)); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:31-1 (as interpreted by Graf v.
Taggert, 204 A.2d 140 (N.J. 1964)); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-2-1 (as
interpreted by Salazar v. St. Vincent Hosp., 619 P.2d 826 (N.M.
1980)); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 28A-18-2 (as interpreted by DiDonato v.
Wortman, 358 S.E.2d 489 (N.C. 1987)); N.D. Cent. Code § 32-2101 (as defined by id. § 14-10-15); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2125.01
(as interpreted by Werling v. Sandy, 476 N.E.2d 1053 (Ohio
1985)); Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 1053; Or. Rev. Stat. § 30.020 (as
interpreted by Libbee v. Permanente Clinic, 518 P.2d 636 (Or.
1974)); 42 Pa. Const. Stat. § 8301 (as interpreted by Amadio v.
Levin, 501 A.2d 1085 (Pa. 1985)); R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-7-1 (as
interpreted by Presley v. Newport Hosp., 365 A.2d 748 (R.I.
1976)); S.C. Code Ann. § 15-51-10 (as interpreted by Fowler v.
Woodward, 138 S.E.2d 42 (S.C. 1964)); S.D. Codified Laws § 215-1; Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-106; Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code
Ann. §§ 71.001, 71.002; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, §§ 1491, 1492 (as
interpreted by Vaillancourt v. Med. Ctr. Hosp. of Vt., Inc., 425
9
In addition to criminal laws, states have
increasingly afforded unborn humans the protections
of the law and recognized unborn humans as “persons”
with legally enforceable rights in the areas of tort law,
guardianship law, healthcare law, property law, and
family law. See Phillips v. State, No. 1160403, slip op.
at 149, 158–76 (Ala. Oct. 19, 2018) (Parker, J.,
concurring
specially)
(surveying
state
laws
demonstrating that “unborn children have numerous
rights that all people enjoy”).5
Even in the context of abortion, federal and state
laws still recognize the humanity of unborn humans.
In 2002, Congress passed the Born-Alive Infant
Protection Act, guaranteeing legal protections as a
“person” under federal law to all infants born alive,
including those who survive an abortion procedure. 1
U.S.C. § 8. In 2003, Congress passed the Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act, making it a federal crime to
perform the gruesome and inhumane partial-birth
abortion procedure. 18 U.S.C. § 1531; accord Gonzales
v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (upholding the PartialBirth Abortion Ban Act as constitutional). In addition,
several states, including Petitioner Indiana, have
informed consent laws for abortion that recognize the
A.2d 92 (Vt. 1980)); Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-50; Wash. Rev. Code
§ 4.24.010 (as interpreted by Moen v. Hanson, 537 P.2d 266
(Wash. 1975)); W. Va. Code § 55-7-5 (as interpreted by Baldwin
v. Butcher, 184 S.E.2d 428 (W. Va. 1971)); Wis. Stat. § 895.03 (as
interpreted by Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 148
N.W.2d 107 (Wis. 1967)).
5 Available at http://acis.alabama.gov/displaydocs.cfm?no=90616
1&event=5BM0OIZOW.
10
humanity of an unborn human.6 For example, several
states require the abortion provider to inform a
woman seeking an abortion that the abortion
“terminate[s] the life of a whole, separate, unique,
living human being.”7
Mirroring federal and state laws that prohibit the
selling of human organs and prevent the premeditated
commodification of human body parts, the federal
government and many states have laws specifically
prohibiting the sale and purchase of human fetal
remains.8 As further discussed in infra Section B.2,
many states also require the humane disposition of
aborted (and miscarried) human fetal remains.9
6 See Ind. Code § 16-34-2-1.1 (Women seeking an abortion must
be informed that “human physical life begins when a human
ovum is fertilized by a human sperm.”).
7 See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65-6709; N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02.1-02;
Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 1-738.3; S.D. Codified Laws § 34-23A-10.1;
see also Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.027 (Abortion “terminate[s] the life
of a separate, unique, living human being.”).
8 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 289g-2; Ala. Code § 26-23F-5; Ariz. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 36-2302; Ark. Code Ann. § 20-17-802; Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 25-2-111.5; Fla. Stat. § 873.05; Idaho Code Ann. § 399306; 410 Ill. Comp. Stat. 110/45; Ind. Code § 35-46-5-1.5; Kan.
Stat. Ann. § 65-67a06; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 436.026; La. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 14:87.3; Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 22, § 1593; Mass. Gen.
Laws ch. 112, § 12J; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.036; Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 28-342; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 24-9A-5; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-46.1;
N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02.2-02; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2919.14;
Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 1-735; 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3216; R.I. Gen.
Laws § 11-54-1; S.D. Codified Laws § 34-23A-17; Tenn. Code
Ann. § 39-15-208; Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 48.03; Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-7-311; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-6-115.
9 See, e.g., Ala. Code § 26-23F-4; Ark. Code Ann. § 20-17-801;
Idaho Code Ann. § 39-9304; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:1191.2; N.C.
11
3. This Court and other courts have
recognized the humanity of unborn
humans.
In the context of abortion, this Court has
repeatedly recognized the humanity of the unborn. In
Roe v. Wade, this Court acknowledged that at the
point of viability, a human fetus “has the capability of
meaningful life outside the mother’s womb.” 410 U.S.
113, 163 (1973). And in Gonzales, this Court
acknowledged that the federal Partial-Birth Abortion
Ban Act “expresses respect for the dignity of human
life,” and affirmed Congress’ intent to protect “all
vulnerable and innocent human life.” 550 U.S. at 157.
As this Court explained, “by common understanding
and scientific terminology, a fetus is a living organism
while within the womb, whether or not it is viable
outside the womb.” id. at 147.
Many other courts have also recognized the
humanity of unborn humans. For instance, in Planned
Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota
v. Rounds, the en banc Eighth Circuit rejected
Planned Parenthood’s challenge to South Dakota’s
provision on informed consent for abortion, which
included a required disclosure that: (1) “the abortion
will terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique,
living human being”; (2) the mother “has an existing
relationship with that unborn human being and that
the relationship enjoys protection under the United
States Constitution and under the laws of South
Gen. Stat. § 130A-131.10; N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02.1-09; Ohio
Admin. Code § 3701-47-05; Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 1-301(10); Tex.
Health & Safety Code Ann. § 697.004.
12
Dakota”; and (3) “by having an abortion, her existing
relationship and her existing constitutional rights
with regards to that relationship will be terminated.”
S.D. Codified Laws § 34-23A-10.1(1)(b)–(d). A
separate section defined “human being” as “an
individual living member of the species of Homo
sapiens, including the unborn human being during
the entire embryonic and fetal ages from fertilization
to full gestation.” Id. § 34-23A-1(4). The en banc court
explained that the disclosure was not ideological,
“untruthful, misleading or [ir]relevant to the decision
to have an abortion.” Planned Parenthood Minn.,
N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 736 (8th Cir. 2008)
(en banc); accord Planned Parenthood of Ind., Inc. v.
Comm’r, Ind. State Dep’t of Health, 794 F. Supp. 2d
892, 914 (S.D. Ind. 2011) (finding that the phrase
“human physical life begins when a human ovum is
fertilized by a human sperm” is an accurate, nonmisleading biological fact).
4. The humanity of an unborn human is a
different question from “personhood”
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Seventh Circuit panel erroneously conflated
the humanity of a human fetus with its legal status as
a “person” for purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky.,
Inc. v. Comm’r, Ind. State Dep’t of Health (PPINK),
888 F.3d 300, 308 (7th Cir. 2018). The court of appeals
assumed that Indiana cannot have a legitimate
interest in the humane and dignified disposition of
human fetal remains unless the human fetus is legally
recognized as a “person” under the Fourteenth
13
Amendment. Id. But the Fourteenth Amendment is
not the arbiter of humanity, nor does it confer dignity.
Humanity and dignity are inherent in being human,
whether alive or dead. A human fetus is a human
being (and legally recognized as a “person” for many
purposes under state law), whether or not he or she is
legally considered a “person” for purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Forsythe, 32 Val. U.L.
Rev. at 478 (“Human being is an anthropological term
that is based on biology and species, whereas ‘person’
is a moral or philosophical term.”). Thus, this Court
need not reach the issue of “personhood” under the
Fourteenth Amendment to agree that human fetuses
are human beings and find that Indiana has a
legitimate state interest in the humane and dignified
disposition of human fetal remains.
B. It is constitutional and rational to require
the humane and dignified disposition of
human fetal remains.
1. Although human fetal remains can be
disposed of humanely, they are often
treated inhumanely.
How human fetal remains can and should be
disposed of is an important national question. With at
least 926,200 abortions each year in the United States
(not to mention fetal deaths from miscarriages),
medical practitioners need to dispose of the remains
of approximately 2,538 unborn humans every day.10
10 The most recent data available is for the year 2014. See Rachel
K. Jones & Jenna Jerman, Abortion Incidence and Service
14
There are three main ways to dispose of human
fetal remains: burial, cremation (or interment), and
incineration as medical waste. Cremation and
incineration are similar except the former means “[t]o
reduce a dead body to ash by burning,” Cremate,
TABER’S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 580, while
the latter means “the removal or reduction of waste
materials by burning.” Incineration, MOSBY’S
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 913. It is considered inhumane
to incinerate a human body, especially when
incinerated together with medical waste. Even more
inhumanely, human fetal remains have been dumped
in landfills and burned to generate electricity.11
Availability in the United States, 2014, 49 Perspectives on Sexual
& Reprod. Health 17, (2017), https://doi.org/10.1363/psrh.12015;
see also Tara C. Jatlaoui et al., Abortion Surveillance—United
States, 2014, CDC (Nov. 24, 2017), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/
volumes/66/ss/ss6624a1.htm?s_cid=ss6624a1_w
(Based
on
voluntary reporting by states, the U.S. Center for Disease
Control and Prevention reported that in 2014 there were at least
652,639 abortions.).
11 See, e.g., Jeremy Pelzer, Aborted Fetal Remains from Ohio
Planned Parenthood Ended Up in Landfills, Incinerators,
Attorney General Says, Cleveland.com (Dec. 11, 2015, 12:16 PM),
http://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2015/12/aborted_fetal_
remains_from_ohi.html; Katie Pavlich, Horrifying: Bodies of
Aborted Babies Burned to Power Homes in Oregon, Townhall
(Apr. 24, 2014, 8:21 AM), http://townhall.com/tipsheet/katie
pavlich/2014/04/24/horrifying-bodies-of-aborted-babies-bur nedto-power-homes-in-oregon-n1828680; AP, 2 Texas Abortion
Clinics Fined for Fetus Disposal, My San Antonio (Feb. 11, 2012,
8:35 PM), http://www.mysanantonio.com/news/local_news/artic
le/2-Texas-abortion-clinics-fined-for-fetus-disposal-3305551.php.
15
2. To avoid treating human fetal remains
inhumanely, Indiana and other states
require the humane disposition of human
fetal remains.
Indiana’s fetal disposition provision was proposed
in the wake of and in response to reports of the
inhumane ways human fetal remains were being
disposed of. The legislator who sponsored the bill,
Indiana State Senator Todd Young, did so because an
Indiana waste company in his district accepted out-ofstate aborted human fetal remains in violation of its
permit. The waste company would treat infectious
waste, including human fetal remains, with
microwaves and steam before transporting it to its
final disposal facility where the company would grind
up the “waste” and dump it into a landfill. While that
waste company was ultimately fined $11,250 for
violating its permit, there was no law prohibiting four
other Indiana waste companies from disposing of
human fetal remains—from within the state or
outside of the state—in similar, inhumane manners.12
Indiana’s fetal disposition provision addressed the
health, safety, and moral concerns over how to
properly dispose of human fetal remains, regardless of
whether the death resulted from a miscarriage or an
12 See Agreed Order at 2, 3, Comm’r, Dep’t of Ind. Envtl. Mgmt.
v. MedAssure of Ind. LLC, No. 2016-23569-S (Ind. Dep’t of Envtl.
Mgmt. Feb. 2, 2016), http://www.irtl.org/wp-content/uploads/
2010/06/MedAssure-PAO-2-9-16.pdf; Senate Chamber Session
Video at 3:43:30–3:48:35, 2016 Archived Video, Ind. General
Assembly (Mar. 1, 2018), http://iga.in.gov/information/archives/
2016/video/senate/.
16
abortion. The Indiana legislature found that the
provision was necessary to ensure that human
beings—albeit unborn—are treated humanely and
with dignity.
Indiana specifies that both “infectious waste” and
“pathological waste” do “not include an aborted fetus
or a miscarried fetus.” Ind. Code §§ 16-41-16-4, 16-4116-5. An abortion clinic or health care facility that has
possession of an aborted or miscarried fetus “shall
provide for the final disposition” of the fetus. Id. §§ 1621-11-6, 16-34-3-4. In recognition of practical and
privacy concerns, Indiana clarifies that the mother of
an aborted fetus “has the right to determine the final
disposition of the aborted fetus,” id. § 16-34-3-2(a),
and allows aborted fetuses to be “cremated by
simultaneous cremation.” Id. § 16-34-3-4; see also id.
§ 16-21-11-4 (allowing the parent or parents of a
miscarried fetus to determine the final disposition of
the remains); id. § 16-21-11-6 (allowing the
simultaneous cremation of miscarried fetuses).
Indiana is not alone. Most states regulate the
disposition of human fetal remains, and many
explicitly require the humane disposition of human
fetal remains, including Alabama, Arkansas, Idaho,
Louisiana, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, and Texas. See supra note 9. However, the
constitutionality of these state laws, as well as any
future state fetal disposition laws, is now in limbo due
to the Seventh Circuit’s ruling below. Clear guidance
is needed from the Supreme Court to clarify whether
such laws are permissible health, safety, and moral
state regulations.
17
3. Unlike the Seventh Circuit, this Court and
the Eighth Circuit have recognized that
states have a legitimate interest in the
proper disposition of human fetal
remains.
This Court has recognized that the “proper
disposal of fetal remains” is a legitimate government
interest. See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod.
Health, 462 U.S. 416, 452 n.45 (1983) (“Akron remains
free, of course, to enact more carefully drawn
regulations that further its legitimate interest in
proper disposal of fetal remains.” (emphasis added)),
overruled on other grounds by Planned Parenthood of
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). In Akron, this
Court addressed whether Akron, Ohio could require
physicians performing abortions to ensure that fetal
remains were disposed of in a “humane and sanitary
manner.” Id. at 451–52. Ultimately, the Court found
that the law violated the Due Process Clause because
the undefined phrase “humane and sanitary,” coupled
with the imposition of criminal liability, failed to give
a physician “fair notice that his contemplated conduct
[wa]s forbidden.” Id.; but see id. at 474–75 (O’Connor,
White, Rehnquist, J.J., dissenting) (disagreeing that
the provision was vague).
After Akron, the Eighth Circuit addressed the
constitutionality of a Minnesota law regulating the
disposal of human fetal remains by hospitals, clinics,
and medical facilities within the state. See Planned
Parenthood of Minnesota v. Minnesota, 910 F.2d 479
(8th Cir. 1990). The court recognized that “Akron
makes clear that more carefully drawn regulations
18
might suffice to ‘further [the government’s] legitimate
interest in proper disposal of fetal remains.’” Id. at 482
(alteration in original) (quoting Akron, 462 U.S. at 452
n.45). And unlike Akron’s fetal disposition law,
Minnesota’s fetal disposition law was “sufficiently
clear to avoid vagueness concerns.” Id. at 484.
Since the Akron Court recognized “the legitimate
interest of states and municipalities in regulating the
disposal of fetal remains from abortions and
miscarriages,” id. at 481 (citing Akron, 462 U.S. at
451–52 nn.44–5), the Eighth Circuit concluded that
Minnesota’s law was reasonably related to the state’s
legitimate interest in protecting “public sensibilities.”
Id. at 488. The Minnesota legislature’s decision to
draw the line at regulating abortions and
miscarriages at home was not enough to invalidate
the state’s interest, especially given “the privacy
concerns implicit in activity in one’s home.” Id.
In contrast to both this Court and the Eighth
Circuit, the Seventh Circuit panel refused to find that
Indiana had a legitimate state interest in the proper
and humane disposition of human fetal remains. See
PPINK, 888 F.3d at 308–09. And unlike the Eighth
Circuit, the Seventh Circuit failed to recognize the
rational reasons for regulating medical practitioners,
but not women in their homes. See id. at 309 (finding
that, even if Indiana had a legitimate state interest,
Indiana’s fetal disposition provision was not
rationally related to its interest, in part, because the
provision allows a woman to dispose of her child’s fetal
remains in whatever manner she wishes). This
19
conflict between the Seventh and Eighth Circuits can
only be resolved by this Court.
4. A state’s legitimate interest in the humane
and dignified disposition of human fetal
remains does not conflict with Roe or
Casey.
This Court has consistently recognized a state’s
interest in unborn human fetal life. In Roe, this Court
recognized that states have an “important and
legitimate interest in potential life.” 410 U.S. at 163.
In Casey, this Court rejected Roe’s trimester
framework because it “undervalue[d] the State’s
interest in potential life.” 505 U.S. at 873. In Stenberg
v. Carhart, this Court again recognized the state’s
interest “to ensure respect for all human life and its
potential.” 530 U.S. 914, 957 (2000) (citing Casey, 505
U.S. at 871). The Stenberg Court explained that
“Casey’s assurance that the State’s constitutional
position in the realm of promoting respect for life is
more than marginal.” Id. at 964. And in Gonzales, the
Court further emphasized:
The government may use its voice and its
regulatory authority to show its profound
respect for the life within the woman. . . .
Where it has a rational basis to act, and it does
not impose an undue burden, the State may use
its regulatory power . . . in furtherance of its
legitimate interests in regulating the medical
profession in order to promote respect for life,
including life of the unborn.
20
550 U.S. at 157–58 (emphasis added).
The state has “important interests in safeguarding
health, in maintaining medical standards, and in
protecting potential life.” Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
Regarding the regulation of medical practitioners,
states have a legitimate interest and play a significant
role in “protecting the integrity and ethics of the
medical profession.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 731 (1997); see also Barsky v. Bd. of Regents,
347 U.S. 442, 451 (1954) (indicating the state has
“legitimate concern for maintaining high standards of
professional conduct” in the practice of medicine). This
includes a medical practitioner’s disposition of human
fetal remains within his or her possession. Cf.
Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 961 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(“States also have an interest in forbidding medical
procedures which, in the State’s reasonable
determination, might cause the medical profession or
society as a whole to become insensitive, even
disdainful, to life, including life in the human fetus.”);
id. at 979 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (It is also
legitimate to affirm “that medical procedures must be
governed by moral principles having their foundation
in the intrinsic value of human life, including life of
the unborn.”).
Regulating the disposition of human fetal remains
does not conflict with Roe or Casey. As the Eighth
Circuit explained, Minnesota’s human fetal
disposition law “does not burden the abortion choice,”
because the regulation had “no significant impact” on
a woman’s exercise of her choice. Minnesota, 910 F.2d
at 486. “Rather than regulating abortion, [a human
21
fetal disposition] statute acknowledges the existence
of abortion and regulates an issue related to abortion.”
Id. at 487. While a human fetal disposition law
admittedly touches on abortion, it does not interfere
with or burden a woman’s abortion choice, which by
definition has already been made at the time of fetal
disposition. See id. The Eighth Circuit also rejected
Planned Parenthood’s arguments that the increased
cost from disposing of fetuses and the alleged
associated psychological trauma created an undue
burden on a woman’s abortion decision. Id. at 487.
Notably, in this case, Planned Parenthood conceded
that Indiana’s fetal disposition provision does not
interfere with a fundamental right. See PPINK, 888
F.3d at 307. In short, requiring the humane
disposition of human fetal remains does not conflict
with Roe or Casey because it does not burden a
woman’s abortion choice.
5. It is rational for Indiana to require the
humane and dignified disposition of
human fetal remains.
It was rational for the Indiana legislature to decide
that it wanted to ensure that human fetal remains are
disposed of humanely and with dignity. According to
scientific and medical definitions, and as recognized
by federal and state governments, as well as this
Court and other courts, human fetuses are human
beings—albeit unborn human beings in early stages
of development. As human beings, human fetuses are
worthy of being treated humanely and with dignity,
whether in life or in death. Laws requiring the
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humane and dignified disposition of human fetal
remains are a natural extension of this fact.
It is rational to treat the disposition of human fetal
remains consistently with other federal and state laws
that recognize the humanity (and even personhood) of
an unborn human. For instance, if a state can apply
the same penalty to the unlawful killing of an unborn
human that is applied to the killing of his or her
mother, then it is certainly rational for a state to
require that the unborn human’s remains receive the
same humane and dignified treatment as his or her
mother’s remains.
It is rational to regulate the proper disposition of
human fetal remains by medical practitioners as an
exercise of a state’s legitimate interests in the life of
the unborn and the regulation of the medical
profession, as recognized by this Court and other
courts.
It is rational to regulate fetal remains in the
possession of medical practitioners, but not in the
possession of the mother. It is rational to take into
consideration competing, and possibly contradicting,
practical and logistical concerns when crafting a law.
Indiana’s fetal disposition provision rationally
addresses the health, safety, and moral concerns over
how to properly dispose of human fetal remains by
medical practitioners—regardless of whether the
death is a result of a miscarriage or an abortion. The
Seventh Circuit panel incorrectly assumed that the
“exceptions” to Indiana’s fetal disposition provision
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disprove Indiana’s legitimate state interest. See
PPINK, 888 F.3d at 309. But the lines Indiana drew
are rational given the other competing, and
potentially conflicting, interests Indiana had to
balance. The constitutional standard is not whether
the law is comprehensive, but whether it is a rational
exercise of a legitimate state interest. See Gonzales,
550 U.S. at 157–58. Indiana’s fetal disposition
provision clearly is.
C. Without intervention by this Court, Indiana
and other states will be unable to require the
humane disposition of human fetal remains.
Without intervention by this Court, Indiana will be
unable to stop the inhumane disposition of human
fetal remains within its borders. With the existing
conflict in the circuit courts, some states, like
Minnesota in the Eighth Circuit, are able to enforce
fetal disposition laws while others, like Indiana in the
Seventh Circuit, are not. Without clarification by this
Court, other states will be left wondering whether or
not the Constitution allows them to ensure that the
disposition of human fetal remains is done humanely
and with dignity.
CONCLUSION
The petition should be granted.
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Respectfully submitted,
CATHERINE GLENN FOSTER
STEVEN H. ADEN
Counsel of Record
RACHEL N. BUSICK
NATALIE M. HEJRAN
AMERICANS UNITED FOR LIFE
2101 Wilson Blvd., Suite 525
Arlington, VA 22201
Steven.Aden@aul.org
(202) 741-4917
Counsel for Amici Curiae
NOVEMBER 15, 2018
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.