Amicus Curiae Brief — Parker Drilling Management Services, Ltd., Petitioner v. Brian Newton
Supreme Court briefOct 26, 2018
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No. 18-389
In the Supreme Court of the United States
__________________
PARKER DRILLING MANAGEMENT SERVICES, LTD.,
Petitioner,
v.
BRIAN NEWTON
___________________
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
___________________
BRIEF OF FREEPORT-MCMORAN OIL & GAS LLC,
AMPLIFY ENERGY CORP., BETA OPERATING
COMPANY, LLC, DCOR, LLC, ENSIGN UNITED
STATES DRILLING (CALIFORNIA), INC., ARDENT
COMPANIES, INC., AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, CALIFORNIA INDEPENDENT PETROLEUM ASSOCIATION, INDEPENDENT PETROLEUM ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS, NATIONAL
OCEAN INDUSTRIES ASSOCIATION, OFFSHORE
OPERATORS COMMITTEE, and WESTERN STATES
PETROLEUM ASSOCIATION AS AMICI CURIAE IN
SUPPORT OF PETITIONER
__________________
BALDWIN J. LEE
ALLEN MATKINS LECK GAMBLE MALLORY & NATSIS LLP
Three Embarcadero Ctr.
12th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94111
(415) 273-7446
JOHN P. ELWOOD
KEVIN A. GAYNOR
JEREMY C. MARWELL
Counsel of Record
VINSON & ELKINS LLP
2200 Pennsylvania Ave.,
NW, Suite 500W
Washington, DC 20037
(202) 639-6500
jmarwell@velaw.com
Counsel for Amici Curiae
[Additional counsel listed inside cover]
KEVIN W. BROOKS
VINSON & ELKINS LLP
2001 Ross Ave., Suite 3900
Dallas, TX 75201
(214) 220-7805
DAVID C. MCDERMOTT
DCOR, LLC
290 Maple Court
Suite 290
Ventura, CA 93003
(805) 535-2073
Counsel for Amici Curiae
Counsel for DCOR, LLC
GEORGE W. ABELE
PAUL HASTINGS LLP
515 South Flower St.,
25th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90071
(213) 683-6131
STACY R. LINDEN
MATTHEW A. HAYNIE
AMERICAN PETROLEUM
INSTITUTE
1220 L St., NW
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 828-8000
Counsel for Beta Operating
Company, LLC (dba BETA
OFFSHORE) and Amplify En- Counsel for American
ergy Corp.
Petroleum Institute
DAVID J. COOPER
CATHERINE E. BENNETT
VANESSA FRANCO CHAVEZ
KLEIN, DENATALE, GOLDNER,
COOPER, ROSENLIEB & KIMBALL, LLP
4550 California Ave.,
2nd Floor
Bakersfield, CA 93309
(661) 395-1000
Counsel for Ensign United
States Drilling (California),
Inc.
BENJAMIN G. SHATZ
MANATT, PHELPS &
PHILLIPS, LLP
11355 W. Olympic Blvd.
Los Angeles, CA 90064
(310) 312-4383
Counsel for California
Independent Petroleum
Association
JOSHUA D. KIENITZ
LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
1255 Treat Blvd, Suite 600
Walnut Creek, CA 94597
(415) 399-8451
Counsel for Ardent Companies, Inc.
BARRY RUSSELL
INDEPENDENT PETROLEUM
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA
1201 15th St., NW
Suite 300
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 857-4722
Counsel for Independent Petroleum Association of America
EVAN H. ZIMMERMAN
OFFSHORE OPERATORS
COMMITTEE
2400 Veterans Memorial
Blvd., Suite 206
Kenner, LA 70062
(504) 904-7966
Counsel for the Offshore Operators Committee
PETER C. TOLSDORF
MANUFACTURERS’ CENTER FOR LEGAL ACTION
733 10th Street, NW,
Suite 700
Washington, DC 20001
(202) 637-3133
Counsel for National Association of Manufacturers
RANDALL LUTHI
NATIONAL OCEAN INDUSTRIES ASSOCIATION
1120 G Street, NW, Suite
900
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 347-6900
Counsel for the National
Ocean Industries Association
OYANGO A. SNELL
WESTERN STATES PETROLEUM ASSOCIATION
1415 L Street, Suite 900
Sacramento, CA 95814
(916) 325-3115
Counsel for Western
States Petroleum Association
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Authorities ................................................. ii
Interest of Amici Curiae .......................................... 1
Introduction and Summary of Argument ............... 2
Argument.................................................................. 4
I.
The Ninth Circuit’s Decision Rejects
Decades Of Settled Law ................................ 6
II. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision Disrupts
Employment Relationships Formed In
Reliance On Settled Law............................. 13
III. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision Gives States
Supremacy Over Federal Law, And Invites
Efforts To Frustrate Federal Policy............ 19
Conclusion .............................................................. 25
(i)
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Page(s)
Aera Energy LLC v. Salazar,
642 F.3d 212 (D.C. Cir. 2011) ............................ 18
Air Logistics of Alaska, Inc. v. Throop,
181 P.3d 1084 (Alaska 2008).............................. 12
Bonner v. City of Prichard,
661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) ............................ 9
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson,
404 U.S. 97 (1971) ................................ 7, 9, 12, 14
Cont’l Oil Co. v. London S.S. Owners’
Mut. Ins. Ass’n,
417 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1969) ..................... passim
EP Operating Ltd. P’ship v. Placid Oil Co.,
26 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 1994) ................................ 18
Espinoza v. Beta Operating Co.,
No. 15-cv-4659 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2015) ............. 9
Garcia v. Freeport-McMoRan Oil & Gas LLC,
No. 16-cv-4320 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2016) ........... 9
Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp.,
453 U.S. 473 (1981) ..................................... passim
Jefferson v. Beta Operating Co.,
No. 15-cv-4966 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2015) .............. 9
Leo Sheep Co. v. United States,
440 U.S. 668 (1979) ............................................ 22
Maryland v. Louisiana,
451 U.S. 725 (1981) .................................. 9, 21, 22
Meadows v. Latshaw Drilling Co.,
866 F.3d 307 (5th Cir. 2017) .............................. 14
iii
Cases—Continued:
Page(s)
Mendiola v. CPS Sec. Solutions, Inc.,
340 P.3d 355 (Cal. 2015) .................................... 12
Mersnick v. USProtect Corp.,
No. 06-cv-3993, 2006 WL 3734396
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2006) .................................... 24
Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Defense,
138 S. Ct. 617 (2018) .......................................... 23
Nations v. Morris,
483 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1973) ................................ 8
Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire,
477 U.S. 207 (1986) .............................................. 7
Pac. Operators Offshore, LLP v. Valladolid,
565 U.S. 207 (2012) ........................................ 4, 22
Reyna v. Venoco, Inc.,
No. 15-cv-4525 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2015) ............. 9
Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
395 U.S. 352 (1969) ..................................... passim
Shell Oil Co. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue,
488 U.S. 19 (1988) ....................................... passim
Sullivan v. Oracle Corp.,
254 P.3d 237 (Cal. 2011) .................................... 17
Tetra Techs., Inc. v. Cont’l Ins. Co.,
814 F.3d 733 (5th Cir. 2016) .......................... 8, 10
Texaco Expl. & Prod., Inc. v. AmClyde
Engineered Prods. Co.,
448 F.3d 760 (5th Cir. 2006) ................................ 8
Texaco Inc. v. Louisiana Land & Expl. Co.,
995 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1993) .................................. 9
iv
Cases—Continued:
Page(s)
Union Texas Petroleum Corp. v. PLT
Engineering, Inc.,
895 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1990) ........................ 9, 10
United States v. California,
332 U.S. 19 (1947) ........................................ 20, 21
United States v. Louisiana,
339 U.S. 699 (1950) ...................................... 20, 21
United States v. Maine,
420 U.S. 515 (1975) ............................ 4, 20, 21, 22
United States v. Texas,
339 U.S. 707 (1950) ...................................... 20, 21
Williams v. Brinderson Constructors, Inc.,
No. 15-cv-2474, 2015 WL 4747892
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2015) ...................................... 9
Statutes:
43 U.S.C. §§1301-1315 ........................................... 22
43 U.S.C. §1331 ........................................................ 4
43 U.S.C. §1331(a).................................................... 4
43 U.S.C. §1332(1).................................................... 4
43 U.S.C. §1333(a)(2)(A) ............................ 5, 6, 8, 23
43 U.S.C. §1337(a).................................................. 18
43 U.S.C. §1337(b).................................................. 18
Rules:
29 C.F.R. §785.23 ............................................. 12, 23
30 C.F.R. §560.202 ................................................. 18
v
Other Authorities:
Page(s)
Andre Stepankowsky, West Coast States Push
Back on Drilling Proposal, THE DAILY NEWS
(Jan. 5, 2018) ...................................................... 24
Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., Alaska OCS
Region ................................................................. 12
Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., Gulf of Mexico
OCS Region......................................................... 10
Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., Pacific OCS
Region ................................................................. 12
Eric N. Smith, Louisiana – The Status of the
State: A Report on the Impact of Energy
Activity on the State’s Economy, GREATER
NEW ORLEANS, INC. (2014) ................................. 15
H.R. Rep. No. 215 83rd Cong., 1st Sess.
(1953) .................................................................. 20
International Association of Drilling
Contractors, Life on a Drilling Rig .................... 15
Jeff Daniels, California Gov. Jerry Brown
Moves to Block Trump on Offshore Drilling:
‘Not Here, Not Now,’ ” CNBC (Sept. 8, 2018) ..... 24
Jim Nicholson, The Incredible Economic
Opportunities of Offshore Energy Exploration,
NAT’L REVIEW (Oct. 1, 2018) ............................... 15
The Economic Impacts of Allowing Access to the
Eastern Gulf of Mexico for Oil and Natural
Gas Exploration and Development (2018) ......... 18
U.S. Dep’t of the Interior and Bureau of Ocean
Energy Mgmt., 2019-2024 National Outer
Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Draft
Proposed Program (Jan. 2018) ..................... 11, 15
vi
Other Authorities—Continued:
Page(s)
Warren M. Christopher, The Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act: Key to a New Frontier, 6
STAN. L. REV. 23 (1953) ................................ 13, 21
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1
Amici curiae are companies with oil and gas operations on the Outer Continental Shelf (“OCS”) or
in the offshore industry, and trade associations
whose members operate in, serve, or have other interests in that industry.
Amici curiae Freeport-McMoRan Oil & Gas LLC, Amplify Energy
Corp. (partly through its subsidiary Beta Operating
Company, LLC), Ardent Companies, Inc., DCOR,
LLC, and Ensign United States Drilling (California),
Inc., are companies engaged in the acquisition, exploration, development, and production of oil and
gas properties on the OCS, and which employ individuals to work on offshore OCS platforms off the
California coast and in the Gulf of Mexico. Several
amici are defendants in pending litigation in which
OCS platform workers assert wage-and-hour claims
under California law. Because those cases will likely
be affected by the disposition of this case, those
amici have a direct and substantial interest in this
case.
Amici the American Petroleum Institute, California Independent Petroleum Association, Independent Petroleum Association of America, National
Association of Manufacturers, National Ocean Industries Association, Offshore Operators Committee, and Western States Petroleum Association are
trade associations representing business interests
1 No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in
part, and no person or entity other than the amici curiae or
their counsel made a monetary contribution intended to fund
the preparation of this brief. The parties were given timely
notice and have consented to this filing.
(1)
2
involved or supporting the offshore industry, including crude oil and natural gas producers and oil and
natural gas exploration and production companies
with operations on the OCS.
Collectively, amici participate regularly in legislative, regulatory, and judicial proceedings that
may affect their or their members’ interests. Amici
have an interest in ensuring a stable and predictable
legal framework governing the offshore industry, to
allow businesses and employees to know which labor
and employment practices (among other laws) apply
to U.S. offshore operations. All amici have a strong
and direct interest in the question presented here—
i.e., the circumstances in which state wage-and-hour
laws might apply to operations on the OCS.
INTRODUCTION AND
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
As petitioner Parker Drilling Management Services, Ltd. (“Parker”) has demonstrated, this Court’s
review is urgently warranted. The decision below
departs from decades of settled law, opens a split
among the federal circuits having jurisdiction over
virtually all oil and gas activity on the OCS, and
misconstrues the text, history, and purpose of the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”). Pet.
3-4. Amici focus here on four particular reasons why
this Court should grant review.
First, in interpreting OCSLA to allow state law
to apply on the OCS even in the absence of a “gap”
in federal law, the Ninth Circuit expressly rejected
a rule that is settled law in the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits. In so doing, it created a square conflict
3
among the federal courts of appeals with territorial
jurisdiction over virtually all U.S. oil and gas operations on the OCS. This conflict undermines predictability and uniformity for those—like several amici
or their members—with operations in both the Gulf
of Mexico and offshore of the West Coast.
Second, by rejecting a legal standard that has
provided the choice-of-law framework on the OCS for
almost 50 years, the decision disrupted longstanding
and mutually beneficial employment relationships
carefully tailored to the unique circumstances of living and working offshore. It has replaced them with
uncertainty and confusion regarding compensation,
benefits and employment relations. And the Ninth
Circuit’s decision potentially subjects OCS employers to hundreds of millions of dollars in retroactive
damages, fines, and penalties—above and beyond
the already generous wages and benefits employees
have enjoyed under existing arrangements.
Third, the Ninth Circuit’s decision effectively
accords state law supremacy over federal law in an
area under exclusive federal jurisdiction and control,
contrary to Congress’s intent and this Court’s
longstanding precedent. This case asks whether
California state law requiring employees to be paid
for non-working (and even sleeping) hours displaces
federal regulations long providing the opposite. But
if the decision below stands, it will give rise to a host
of other conflicts and business uncertainties. For instance, federal law currently instructs an employer
to pay overtime wages only if an employee works
more than 40 hours in a week, while California law
4
requires overtime to be paid for every hour above 8
worked in a single day.
Finally, given the reality that some states will
have different—and even diametrically opposed—
policy preferences than the federal government regarding OCS activity, this decision invites strategic
behavior. It allows states to promulgate laws intended to increase the difficulty and cost of OCS operations that the federal government seeks to encourage. That result is particularly intolerable,
given Congress’s choice to make the OCS an area
within exclusive federal jurisdiction, subject exclusively to federal law.
ARGUMENT
When businesses decide whether and how to invest and operate on the OCS, a key threshold question is whether federal or state law applies. The
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §1331
et seq., defines the body of law applicable to the OCS
and the structures there, including drilling and production platforms. See Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352, 355 (1969).
By enacting OCSLA, which extended the jurisdiction of the United States and its laws to the OCS,
“Congress * * * affirm[ed] the Federal Government’s
authority and control over the [OCS].” Pac. Operators Offshore, LLP v. Valladolid, 565 U.S. 207, 212
(2012) (citing 43 U.S.C. §§1331(a), 1332(1)); see also
United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515, 522 (1975)
(discussing pre-OCSLA cases holding that the “control and disposition” of the OCS was “in the first instance * * * the business of the Federal Government
5
rather than the States”). The OCS, and the platforms attached to it, are “subject to the exclusive jurisdiction and control of the Federal Government.”
Shell Oil Co. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 488 U.S. 19,
27 (1988); accord Rodrigue, 395 U.S. at 355-357 (“[i]t
is evident * * * that federal law is ‘exclusive’ in its
regulation of ” the OCS and the structures fixed
thereon).
Recognizing that federal law might not address
the full range of legal issues potentially arising on
the OCS, Congress included a choice-of-law provision that this Court and every other court to consider
the question until now have understood to “supplement[] gaps in the federal law with state law.” Rodrigue, 395 U.S. at 357 (citing 43 U.S.C.
§1333(a)(2)(A)). Under this provision, “[a]ll law applicable to the [OCS] is federal law, but to fill the
substantial ‘gaps’ in the coverage of federal law,
OCSLA borrows the ‘applicable and not inconsistent’
laws of the adjacent States as surrogate federal law.”
Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473,
480-481 (1981) (citations omitted); see also Pet. 3334 (“state law never applies of its own force under
OCSLA,” because adopted state law becomes “ ‘the
law of the United States’ ” (quoting Rodrigue, 395
U.S. at 355-356)).
Contrary to long-settled precedent and widely
held expectations of employers and employees alike,
the Ninth Circuit held here that workers employed
on OCS platforms may bring claims under state
wage-and-hour laws. Pet. App. 1-2. The Ninth Circuit expressly “reject[ed] the proposition”—first es-
6
tablished in the Fifth Circuit and since accepted nationwide—that state law applies on the OCS only if
“necess[ary] to fill a significant void or gap” in federal law. Pet. App. 2 (citing Cont’l Oil Co. v. London
S.S. Owners’ Mut. Ins. Ass’n, 417 F.2d 1030, 1036
(5th Cir. 1969)).
The Ninth Circuit’s decision is already having—
and if allowed to stand, will continue to have—
far-reaching practical and financial consequences
not only for OCS employers, but also for thousands
of employees working offshore pursuant to generous
contractual and other arrangements predicated on a
legal framework the panel discarded. Under the decision below, the terms of those employment arrangements very likely will no longer be sustainable
or mutually beneficial.
I.
The Ninth Circuit’s Decision Rejects
Decades Of Settled Law
Half a century ago, the Fifth Circuit articulated
a clear and easily implemented standard for when
state law applies as surrogate federal law under
§1333(a)(2)(A).
That standard comports with
OCSLA’s text and purpose, this Court’s precedent,
longstanding industry practice, employee expectations, and common sense. The Ninth Circuit, however, explicitly rejected that settled understanding,
creating a square circuit split and introducing destabilizing uncertainty into OCSLA’s governing legal
framework.
As even the Ninth Circuit acknowledged, see
Pet. App. 11-14, any understanding of OCSLA must
begin with Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,
7
395 U.S. 352 (1969). After exhaustively considering
the statutory text, history, and purpose, Rodrigue
concluded that OCSLA “makes it clear that federal
law, supplemented by state law of the adjacent
State, is to be applied to * * * artificial islands [affixed on the OCS] as though they were federal enclaves in an upland State.” Id. at 355.
Turning first to the statutory text, this Court
found it “evident * * * that federal law is ‘exclusive’
in its regulation of [the OCS],” and that state law is
adopted as surrogate federal law only when necessary to “supplement[] gaps in the federal law.” Id.
at 357. The statute’s history, this Court concluded,
also “makes it clear that state law could be used to
fill federal voids” but that ultimately “federal law
should prevail.” See id. at 357-359. However, “for
federal law to oust adopted state law[,] federal law
must first apply.” Id. at 359. On the facts of that
case, this Court concluded that federal law did not
apply, see id. at 359-366, thus “remov[ing] any obstacle to the application of state law,” see id. at 355,
366. In other words, because federal law did not apply at all, “a substantial ‘gap’ in federal law” existed,
to be “filled with the applicable body of state law.”
See Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 101
(1971) (discussing Rodrigue, 395 U.S. 352); see also
Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207,
217-218 (1986) (explaining that in Rodrigue, federal
law did not apply, and thus did not “preclude the application of state law as adopted federal law through
OCSLA”).
8
Shortly after Rodrigue, the Fifth Circuit addressed whether state law is “applicable and not inconsistent” under §1333(a)(2)(A) when existing federal law does provide a comprehensive governing
scheme. Applying “the recurring theme of Rodrigue,” the Fifth Circuit concluded that “the deliberate choice of federal law, federally administered,
requires that ‘applicable’ [in §1333(a)(2)(A)] be read
in terms of necessity—necessity to fill a significant
void or gap” in federal law. Cont’l Oil, 417 F.2d at
1036. Otherwise put, when federal law provides
both a right and a remedy, the application of state
law is neither “needed [n]or permitted” under
OCSLA. Id. at 1035-1036; see also Nations v. Morris, 483 F.2d 577, 590 (5th Cir. 1973) (when a comprehensive federal statutory scheme applies on the
OCS, “[t]here is no need to bring aboard” state law
“to cause liability to be fixed where Congress never
intended it”).
Since 1969, the Fifth Circuit has consistently
held that “OCSLA adopts the law of the adjacent
state * * * as surrogate federal law” only “[w]hen
there are ‘gaps in the federal law[.]’ ” Tetra Techs.,
Inc. v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 814 F.3d 733, 738 (5th Cir.
2016) (quoting Rodrigue, 395 U.S. at 357); see also,
e.g., Texaco Expl. & Prod., Inc. v. AmClyde Engineered Prods. Co., 448 F.3d 760, 772 (5th Cir. 2006)
(“OCSLA extends federal law to the [OCS] and borrows adjacent state law as a gap-filler.”). This Court
also similarly reaffirmed Rodrigue’s central premise—namely, that the laws of the adjacent States apply under OCSLA only when necessary “to fill the
substantial ‘gaps’ in the coverage of federal law.”
Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at 480-481; see also, e.g.,
9
Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 752 n.26
(1981); Huson, 404 U.S. at 103-105. Continental Oil
itself is sufficiently longstanding that it also serves
as binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit. See
Pet. 11-12, 18; see also Bonner v. City of Prichard,
661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc). And
the decision had been consistently followed by district courts in the Ninth Circuit.2 In other words,
until this case, the Continental Oil standard governed virtually all offshore oil and gas operations on
the OCS.
Despite the panel’s suggestion that the Fifth
Circuit has departed from this settled framework,
Continental Oil remains good law today. See Pet.
18-20. Notably, the very case the Ninth Circuit cited
as creating uncertainty, Union Texas Petroleum
Corp. v. PLT Engineering, Inc., 895 F.2d 1043 (5th
Cir. 1990), acknowledged the central holding of both
Rodrigue and Continental Oil, emphasizing that
Congress intended for “the OCS [to] be treated as an
area of exclusive federal jurisdiction * * * where
state law will apply to fill in the gaps in the federal
law.”3 Id. at 1052 (emphasis added). PLT did not
2 See, e.g., Garcia v. Freeport-McMoRan Oil & Gas LLC, No.
16-cv-4320 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2016); Jefferson v. Beta Operating Co., No. 15-cv-4966 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2015); Espinoza v.
Beta Operating Co., No. 15-cv-4659 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2015);
Reyna v. Venoco, Inc., No. 15-cv-4525 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2015);
Williams v. Brinderson Constructors, Inc., No. 15-cv-2474,
2015 WL 4747892 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2015).
Even if PLT had purported to overrule Continental Oil,
which the opinion gave no hint of doing, see Pet. 18, Continental Oil would still control. See Texaco Inc. v. Louisiana Land
& Expl. Co., 995 F.2d 43, 44 (5th Cir. 1993) (“[i]n the event of
3
10
focus on whether a gap existed in federal law because—unlike in this case, in which the Fair Labor
Standards Act (“FLSA”) provides a comprehensive
scheme, see Pet. 8-9, 30-32—there was no federal
law to apply. See PLT, 895 F.2d at 1047 (“Rodrigue
made clear that ‘for federal law to oust adopted state
law, federal law must first apply’ ” (quoting Rodrigue, 395 U.S. at 359)). Moreover, as even the
panel below ultimately acknowledged, Continental
Oil and PLT can be reconciled in a way that preserves the full force of the Continental Oil rule, “such
that the PLT conditions come into play only if there
is a significant gap or void in federal law.” Pet. App.
19 (citing Tetra Techs., 814 F.3d at 738). The direct
conflict between the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, on
one hand, and the Ninth Circuit’s decision, on the
other, strongly supports this Court’s review.
Several features of OCS oil and gas operations
and OCSLA litigation exacerbate the practical consequences of the circuit split. The Fifth, Eleventh,
and Ninth Circuits collectively have jurisdiction
over virtually all existing operations on the OCS in
the United States—i.e., the Pacific Coast (including
Alaska) and the Gulf Coast. The vast majority of
America’s coastal waters currently open to offshore
oil and gas production activity are located off the
coasts of States within the territorial jurisdiction of
the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits.4 To the extent drill-
conflicting panel opinions * * *, the earlier one controls” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
4 See Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., Gulf of Mexico OCS
Region, https://www.boem.gov/Gulf-of-Mexico-Region/ (areas
11
ing occurs elsewhere, it is located almost entirely offshore of States within the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction.5 As a result, OCSLA litigation occurs all but
exclusively in these circuits. Moreover, for companies with offshore operations in both regions, enterprise-wide policies and employer-employee relationships are subject to Fifth, Eleventh, and Ninth Circuit jurisdiction simultaneously. The Ninth Circuit’s decision means that such companies and their
employees will face inconsistent choice-of-law analysis—and ultimately inconsistent substantive obligations—depending on where operations are located, undermining uniformity in the implementation of OCSLA.
The Ninth Circuit’s decision could significantly
disrupt oil and gas operations on the OCS. Employers and employees associated with drilling and production platforms have structured employment relationships in reliance on the long-settled line of cases
including Rodrigue and Continental Oil. If the decision here stands, operations along the Pacific Coast
will be governed by different choice-of-law rules than
those in the Gulf, undermining expectations and disrupting contractual and other arrangements.
off the coasts of Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama
“generat[e] about 97% of all OCS oil and gas production”).
5 See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior and Bureau of Ocean
Energy Mgmt., 2019-2024 National Outer Continental Shelf
Oil and Gas Leasing Draft Proposed Program (Jan. 2018),
https://www.boem.gov/NP-Draft-Proposed-Program-20192024/.
12
Even within the Ninth Circuit, OCS operations
now face different legal rules, depending on their location. Four States within the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction—California, Oregon, Washington, and
Alaska—are adjacent to offshore OCS oil and gas activity.6 Stark differences exist in their laws. For example, courts of those states have reached diametrically opposing views about compensation for employees who reside on an employer’s premises for extended periods of time. Compare Mendiola v. CPS
Sec. Solutions, Inc., 340 P.3d 355, 362-363 (Cal.
2015) (under state law, on-call hours, including
“sleep time,” represent “hours worked” for overtime
purposes), with Air Logistics of Alaska, Inc. v.
Throop, 181 P.3d 1084, 1092-1094 (Alaska 2008)
(sleep and recreation time need not be compensated
as overtime work).7
To be sure, Congress recognized in OCSLA that
in some circumstances, an interest in “national uniformity” would give way to other considerations.
Pet. App. 38 (quoting Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at 487;
Huson, 404 U.S. at 104); Warren M. Christopher,
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act: Key to a New
6 See Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., Pacific OCS Region,
https://www.boem.gov/Pacific-Region/; Bureau of Ocean Energy
Mgmt.,
Alaska
OCS
Region,
https://www.boem.gov/Alaska-Region/.
7 Federal regulations addressing compensation for employees
who reside on their employers’ premises “for extended periods
of time” provide that employees are “not considered as working
all the time [they are] on the premises,” and give effect to “any
reasonable agreement of the parties” concerning wages for
overtime work. 29 C.F.R. §785.23.
13
Frontier, 6 STAN. L. REV. 23, 40-41 (1953). But Congress assured a minimum degree of uniformity by
“incorporati[ng] * * * the law of adjacent States to fill
gaps in federal law.” See Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at
479 n.7, 486-488 (emphasis added). This Court’s review is essential to ensure uniformity and predictability in the choice-of-law framework, in a manner
consistent with OCSLA’s text and intent.8
II.
The Ninth Circuit’s Decision Disrupts
Employment Relationships Formed In
Reliance On Settled Law
For decades, employers and employees on OCS
drilling and production platforms have implemented
compensation and benefit structures under a shared
understanding of substantive background law.
Whether by arms-length negotiated contracts, collective bargaining, or other arrangements, these policies have been tailored to the offshore industry, recognizing (among other things) that workers often
temporarily reside on premises. The terms of these
arrangements generally are far more favorable—including with respect to wages, overtime, and other
benefits—than those seen in non-OCS industries
typically covered by state wage-and-hour laws. By
rejecting the legal principles on which these relationships were based, and potentially exposing employers to massive retroactive liability for reasona-
8 The possibility of expanded OCS operations under current
U.S. policy will only heighten the need for uniformity and consistency in the governing legal framework. See supra n.5.
14
bly relying on longstanding law, the panel undermined the stability of those relationships, with tremendous practical and financial consequences.9
Oil and gas operations on the OCS present
unique opportunities and challenges. Production
platforms affixed to the OCS operate 24 hours a day
and are often in remote locations miles from the
coast. While some employees may have the option
to return home each night, in other instances, it may
be impractical or undesirable to commute. For example, employees may prefer not to commute given
travel time and logistics. Others may not reside
near enough to allow commuting, for instance choosing to live in a less expensive inland area rather
than in a California coastal city such as Santa Barbara. As a result, employees often work agreed-upon
shifts, or “hitches,” in which the employees work,
eat, sleep, and live on the platforms for a specified
number of days—typically followed by an equal
number of days off. See Pet. App. 3 (14-day shifts on
the platform with employees scheduled to work 12
hours during a 24-hour period, followed by 14 days
at home); see also Meadows v. Latshaw Drilling Co.,
866 F.3d 307, 309 (5th Cir. 2017).
In recognition of the particular circumstances of
work on OCS drilling platforms, employees receive
and enjoy above-market salaries, generous benefits,
9 The Ninth Circuit reserved for the district court to decide
in the first instance “whether [the] holding should be applied
retrospectively.” Pet. App. 43 (citing Huson, 404 U.S. at 106107).
15
and abundant time off.10 Long before the decision at
issue here, OCS employees received hourly rates
“well above the state and federal minimum wage”
and “premium rates for overtime hours.” Pet. App.
20. By one recent estimate, offshore oil and gas
workers earn more than 150% of the average hourly
wage of other employees.11 Moreover, during the
non-working (e.g., sleeping and recreation) hours
within a hitch that form the basis for this lawsuit,
employees can use their time as they see fit. The
platforms are equipped with various amenities for
employees to use free of charge, including cable television, internet access, and fitness and recreation
facilities, allowing employees to engage cost-free in
many of the same personal and leisure activities
10 See, e.g., International Association of Drilling Contractors,
Life on a Drilling Rig, http://drillingmatters.iadc.org/life-on-adrilling-rig/.
11 U.S.
Dep’t of the Interior and Bureau of Ocean Energy
Mgmt., 2019-2024 National Outer Continental Shelf Oil and
Gas Leasing Draft Proposed Program (Jan. 2018),
https://www.boem.gov/NP-Draft-Proposed-Program-20192024/; see also Jim Nicholson, The Incredible Economic Opportunities of Offshore Energy Exploration, NAT’L REVIEW (Oct. 1,
2018),
https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/10/the-incredible-economic-opportunities-of-offshore-energy-exploration/
(stating that “natural gas and oil exploration jobs offer average
salaries of $116,000 a year, without necessarily requiring a college degree”). A study examining the economic impacts of energy activity in Louisiana estimated that the average wage
earned by employees in the oil and gas extraction area was
180% of the overall average. Eric N. Smith, Louisiana – The
Status of the State: A Report on the Impact of Energy Activity
on the State’s Economy at 46, GREATER NEW ORLEANS, INC.
(2014), http://www.noia.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Future_of_Energy_FINAL-GNO-INc.pdf.
16
they enjoy on land. Employees live and eat rent-free
during shifts, with employers providing lodging and
bathing facilities, meals, and cleaning services at no
cost to employees. And when the hitch is over, the
employee returns home to spend an equivalent number of days off.
Employers and employees in the offshore industry have crafted these mutually beneficial
wage-and-benefit policies based on a shared understanding of the governing legal framework, see supra § I, and the industry’s practical and financial realities. By altering the background legal framework,
the Ninth Circuit’s decision is all but certain to significantly disrupt those relationships. Overnight,
employers in the Ninth Circuit became subject to
state wage-and-hour laws designed for conventional
(e.g., 9-to-5) employment but ill-tailored to the OCS’s
unique working environment.
The disruptive effects are numerous. Offshore
employers are now faced with changing not only
base pay and overtime arrangements, but also a
range of other employment terms, such as benefit
packages. Some benefits provided to offshore workers—such as life insurance policies provided by
third-party financial institutions—are tied to a
worker’s base pay. Thus, reducing base pay to offset
the additional cost of paying for sleep time would
have cascading collateral consequences, often to the
employee’s detriment. The decision’s ripple effects
stretch beyond employees of platform operators; contractors providing food service, cleaning, and other
services on platforms now face uncertainty about
paying their own employees.
17
Moreover, if applied retroactively, the Ninth
Circuit’s decision could inflict hundreds of millions
of dollars of liability on employers who structured
operations in reliance on cases like Rodrigue and
Continental Oil. Such a result would give employees—already generously compensated under existing arrangements—a windfall of backpay, plus interest and penalties. Going forward, it is doubtful
that employers could offer such generous compensation and benefit terms, if relationships are subject to
state-law overtime and other requirements enacted
without regard for the unique circumstances of OCS
work. Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s decision not only
creates the potential for significant retroactive liability, it is disrupting employer-employee relationships, industry-wide.
Both sides would benefit from having a uniform
choice-of-law regime governing the OCS. Otherwise,
both employers and employees will face a different
legal regime depending on whether they are operating in the Gulf of Mexico or off the Pacific Coast—
and which neighboring state is closest to that location. Indeed, because individual employees may
move between the Gulf of Mexico and the Pacific
Coast on a short-term basis, they could be subject to
multiple pay structures in a given year or month.12
Increasing the cost of OCS operations could also
12 For instance, Pacific Coast platform operators may hire
specialist teams from the Gulf of Mexico to perform particular
tasks, such as plugging and abandonment of wells, on a shortterm or extended basis. Such workers could be subject to certain provisions of California employment law beginning with
their first full day of work. E.g., Sullivan v. Oracle Corp., 254
P.3d 237 (Cal. 2011).
18
shorten the economic life of some offshore facilities,
harming not only employees, but also the federal
government, and ultimately taxpayers.
The federal government has a substantial “proprietary interest in the OCS.” EP Operating Ltd.
P’ship v. Placid Oil Co., 26 F.3d 563, 566 (5th Cir.
1994) (citation omitted). OCSLA authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to offer and administer oil and
gas leases on the OCS. Aera Energy LLC v. Salazar,
642 F.3d 212, 214 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Under such
leases, private companies pay “an up-front bonus,
annual rentals, and royalties on oil and natural gas
actually produced” during the lease term. Ibid. (citing 43 U.S.C. §1337(a), (b)); see also 30 C.F.R.
§560.202 (describing bidding systems). Offshore activity generates billions in federal revenue. Increasing the costs and potential liability of offshore production activity could deprive the federal government of significant revenue, not only lowering the
government’s annual royalties from existing leases,
but also deterring operators from bidding on new
leases and slowing development on the OCS overall.13
13 One recent study estimated that expanding oil and gas
activity in the Eastern Gulf of Mexico alone could increase federal revenues from royalties, bonus bids, and rents by some
$41.5 billion. See The Economic Impacts of Allowing Access to
the Eastern Gulf of Mexico for Oil and Natural Gas Exploration
and Development at 5 (2018), http://www.noia.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/180309-Calash-Eastern-Gulf-Development-Economic-Impacts-Report-Final.pdf.
19
III.
The Ninth Circuit’s Decision Gives
States Supremacy Over Federal Law,
And Invites Efforts To Frustrate Federal
Policy
The Ninth Circuit’s decision effectively gives
state law supremacy over federal law, contrary to
OCSLA’s text and intent. In OCSLA, “Congress emphatically implemented its view that the United
States has paramount rights to the seabed beyond
the three-mile limit.” Shell Oil, 488 U.S. at 27 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). And
because “the OCS [is] subject to the exclusive jurisdiction and control of the Federal Government,”
ibid., “federal law should prevail” over state law,
particularly where, as here, a federal statutory
scheme does apply. Rodrigue, 395 U.S. at 358.
Notwithstanding the panel’s attempt to downplay the issue, the Ninth Circuit’s decision effectively “accord[s] state law supremacy over federal
law” and “cede[s] the United States’ jurisdiction over
the OCS to state agencies.” Pet. App. 23. In the
Ninth Circuit’s mistaken view, even when a comprehensive federal scheme governs claims arising on
the OCS, state law will control so long as it “pertain[s] to the subject matter at hand,” Pet. App.
21-27, and is not “inconsistent with” existing federal
law (under the Ninth Circuit’s diluted reading of “inconsistent,” see Pet. App. 27-39). The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation, which blesses the wholesale
application of state law on the OCS, cannot be reconciled with OCSLA’s text and purpose.
Beginning in the 1930s, coastal States and the
federal government became locked in a dispute over
20
“territorial jurisdiction and ownership of the OCS.”
Shell Oil, 488 U.S. at 26-27. This Court settled that
debate in 1947, holding that the federal government,
and not the states, had “paramount rights in and
power over” the OCS. United States v. California,
332 U.S. 19, 38-39 (1947). Three years later, this
Court reaffirmed that the OCS
is a national, not a state concern. National
interests, national responsibilities, national
concerns are involved. The problems of
commerce, national defense, relations with
other powers, war and peace focus there.
National rights must therefore be paramount in that area.
United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699, 704 (1950);
see also United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707,
719-720 (1950). These cases established that, as a
matter of constitutional structure, “paramount
rights” to the OCS are “an incident to national sovereignty,” meaning that the control of the OCS is “in
the first instance * * * the business of the Federal
Government rather than the States.” Maine, 420
U.S. at 522.
Shortly thereafter, Congress enacted OCSLA in
an effort “to resolve the ‘interminable litigation’ arising over the controversy of the ownership of the
lands underlying the marginal sea.” Maine, 420
U.S. at 527 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 215 83rd Cong.,
1st Sess. 2 (1953)); see also Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S.
at 479 n.7. Perhaps “the most challenging question
of legal theory” Congress faced in drafting OCSLA
21
was what law should apply on the OCS. Christopher, The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 6
STAN. L. REV. at 37.14
Congress deliberately rejected a blanket application of either maritime law or state law to the
OCS. See Rodrigue, 395 U.S. at 355, 358-359,
361-366. Opponents of OCSLA, led by Louisiana
Senator Russell Long, had argued in favor of applying state law on the OCS, enforced by “the officials
of such State.” Id. at 358-359. But Congress rejected
“the notion of supremacy of state law administered
by state agencies,” Cont’l Oil, 417 F.2d at 1036 (citing Rodrigue, 395 U.S. at 358), opting instead for “a
unique combination of federal and state laws,”
Christopher, The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act,
6 STAN. L. REV. at 40-41. In adopting this approach,
Congress embraced “the constitutional underpinnings” of the Texas, Louisiana, and California cases.
See Maine, 420 U.S. at 524-527; see also Maryland,
451 U.S. at 730.
OCSLA must be understood in the context of
this Court’s decisions resolving “the clash between
national sovereignty and states’ rights” on the OCS.
Cont’l Oil, 417 F.2d at 1036. Indeed, this Court has
consistently and repeatedly interpreted OCSLA in
light of this historical background. See, e.g., Shell
Oil, 488 U.S. at 26-27; Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at 479
n.7; accord Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S.
The choice-of-law issue had “political ramifications” because “the law to be applied had a bearing on the question
whether the coastal states were to share in the revenues of the
outer Continental Shelf.” Christopher, The Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act, 6 STAN. L. REV. at 37, 40-41.
14
22
668, 669 (1979) (“[C]ourts, in construing a statute,
may with propriety recur to the history of the times
when it was passed; and this is frequently necessary,
in order to ascertain the reason as well as the meaning of particular provisions in it.” (citation omitted)).
Congress’s choice in OCSLA “to retain exclusive federal control of the administration of the [OCS],” Gulf
Offshore, 453 U.S. at 479 n.7, “affirm[s] the Federal
Government’s authority and control over the [OCS],”
Pac. Operators, 565 U.S. at 212.15 While Congress
recognized that offshore workers might in some circumstances have “tie[s]” to adjacent States, Rodrigue, 395 U.S. at 355, it struck a balance that
“manifested itself primarily in the incorporation of
the law of adjacent States to fill gaps in federal law.”
Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at 479 n.7 (citations omitted).
Despite the fact that Congress expressly rejected “the notion of supremacy of state law administered by state agencies” on the OCS, Cont’l Oil, 417
F.2d at 1036, the Ninth Circuit’s decision allows
state law, enforced by state officials, to control on the
OCS. The Ninth Circuit’s analysis “accords initially
a superiority to adjacent state law” because “the
question of federal law comes into play only after
this process excludes state law.” Id. at 1035-1036;
but cf. Rodrigue, 395 U.S. at 359 (state law applies
15 The same year Congress enacted OCSLA, it passed the
Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§1301-1315, which “confirm[ed] the Federal Government’s interest in the area seaward of the 3-mile limit.” Maryland, 451 U.S. at 730; see also
Maine, 420 U.S. at 524.
23
under OCSLA only if federal law does not “first apply”). This interpretation effectively reads the word
“applicable” out of the statute, “put[ting] almost
100% Emphasis on the not inconsistent with federal
laws element of [§1333(a)(2)(A)],” Cont’l Oil, 417
F.2d at 1035 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted), an approach this Court has long disfavored. See Pet. 27-29; but cf. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs.
v. Dep’t of Defense, 138 S. Ct. 617, 632 (2018) (“[T]he
Court is obliged to give effect, if possible, to every
word Congress used.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The practical consequences are real. The Ninth
Circuit’s decision allows California law to control
over a federal regulation explicitly providing that
employees residing on a worksite need not be paid
for time spent sleeping or otherwise off duty. See 29
C.F.R. §785.23. In effectively overruling federal law,
the panel invites workers (and creative plaintiff’s
lawyers) to retroactively claim a host of extra-contractual rights based in state employment or other
laws. And if allowed to stand, the decision will trigger new waves of litigation—and the threat of evermounting retroactive liability—every time a state
changes its interpretation of its wage, hour, and
other employment laws.
The federal-state conflict is stark, where (as
here) a federal scheme allows excluding non-working hours from overtime, see 29 C.F.R. §785.23, but
state law compels the opposite approach. The Ninth
Circuit’s decision departs from cases holding that
California state wage-and-hour laws could not apply
in other federal enclaves, because they conflict with
24
the FLSA. E.g., Mersnick v. USProtect Corp., No. 06cv-3993, 2006 WL 3734396, at *7-8 (N.D. Cal. Dec.
18, 2006); cf. Rodrigue, 395 U.S. at 355 (fixtures on
OCS treated as “federal enclaves in an upland
State”).
In practice, some states have—and likely will always have—different policy preferences than the
federal government regarding OCS activity. The
panel decision opens the door to strategic behavior,
inviting states to promulgate facially neutral but effectively targeted laws that increase the difficulty
and cost of OCS operations. The concern is not theoretical. E.g., Jeff Daniels, California Gov. Jerry
Brown Moves to Block Trump on Offshore Drilling:
‘Not Here, Not Now,’ ” CNBC (Sept. 8, 2018),
https://tinyurl.com/y9lrv8ml (discussing new California legislation intended “to thwart” federal government’s “efforts to expand offshore oil drilling
along the California coast”); Andre Stepankowsky,
West Coast States Push Back on Drilling Proposal,
THE DAILY NEWS (Jan. 5, 2018), https://tinyurl.com/y7e8flxq (quoting joint statement by Governors of California, Washington, and Oregon opposing federal proposal to expand OCS oil and gas operations).
In short, the Ninth Circuit’s decision transforms
a statute “intended to provide for the orderly development of offshore resources,” Shell Oil, 488 U.S. at
27 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted),
into a regime of jurisdictional chaos, inviting States
to assert ever-increasing authority over commercial
activities in an area Congress reserved for primary
25
federal jurisdiction and control. This Court’s review
is urgently warranted.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should
grant the petition for a writ of certiorari.
Respectfully submitted.
BALDWIN J. LEE
ALLEN MATKINS LECK GAMBLE MALLORY & NATSIS LLP
Three Embarcadero Ctr.
12th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94111
(415) 273-7446
KEVIN W. BROOKS
VINSON & ELKINS LLP
2001 Ross Ave., Ste. 3900
Dallas, TX 75201
(214) 220-7805
JOHN P. ELWOOD
KEVIN A. GAYNOR
JEREMY C. MARWELL
VINSON & ELKINS LLP
2200 Pennsylvania
Ave., NW, Suite 500W
Washington, DC 20037
(202) 639-6500
jmarwell@velaw.com
Counsel for Amici Curiae
26
GEORGE W. ABELE
PAUL HASTINGS LLP
515 South Flower St., 25th
Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90071
(213) 683-6131
DAVID C. MCDERMOTT
DCOR, LLC
290 Maple Court, Ste. 290
Ventura, CA 93003
(805) 535-2073
Counsel for DCOR, LLC
Counsel for Beta Operating
Company, LLC and
STACY R. LINDEN
Amplify Energy Corp.
MATTHEW A. HAYNIE
AMERICAN PETROLEUM
DAVID J. COOPER
INSTITUTE
CATHERINE E. BENNETT
1220 L St., NW
VANESSA FRANCO CHAVEZ
Washington, DC 20005
KLEIN, DENATALE, GOLD(202) 828-8000
NER, COOPER, ROSENLIEB &
KIMBALL, LLP
Counsel for American
4550 California Ave.,
Petroleum Institute
2nd Floor
Bakersfield, CA 93309
BENJAMIN G. SHATZ
(661) 395-1000
MANATT, PHELPS & PHILLIPS, LLP
Counsel for Ensign United 11355 W. Olympic Blvd.
States Drilling (CaliforLos Angeles, CA 90064
nia), Inc.
(310) 312-4383
JOSHUA D. KIENITZ
LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
1255 Treat Blvd, Ste. 600
Walnut Creek, CA 94597
(415) 399-8451
Counsel for Ardent Companies, Inc.
Counsel for California Independent Petroleum Association
27
BARRY RUSSELL
INDEPENDENT PETROLEUM
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA
1201 15th Street, NW
Suite 300
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 857-4722
Counsel for Independent
Petroleum Association of
America
EVAN H. ZIMMERMAN
OFFSHORE OPERATORS
COMMITTEE
2400 Veterans Memorial
Blvd., Suite 206
Kenner, LA 70062
(504) 904-7966
Counsel for the Offshore
Operators Committee
PETER C. TOLSDORF
MANUFACTURERS’ CENTER
FOR LEGAL ACTION
733 10th St., NW, Ste. 700
Washington, DC 20001
(202) 637-3133
Counsel for National Association of Manufacturers
RANDALL LUTHI
NATIONAL OCEAN
INDUSTRIES ASSOCIATION
1120 G Street, NW
Suite 900
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 347-6900
Counsel for the National
Ocean Industries Association
OYANGO A. SNELL
WESTERN STATES
PETROLEUM ASSOCIATION
1415 L Street, Suite 900
Sacramento, CA 95814
(916) 325-3115
Counsel for Western States
Petroleum Association
OCTOBER 2018
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.