Opposition Brief — E. & J. Gallo Winery, et al., Petitioners v. Refugio Arreguin

No. 18-319

================================================================

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

-----------------------------------------------------------------E. & J. GALLO WINERY, a California corporation;

STAR H-R, INC., a California corporation,

Petitioners,

v.

REFUGIO ARREGUIN,

Respondent.

-----------------------------------------------------------------On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The California Court Of Appeal,

First Appellate District

-----------------------------------------------------------------OPPOSITION TO PETITION

FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

-----------------------------------------------------------------RYAN H. WU

Counsel of Record

JOHN STOBART

CAPSTONE LAW APC

1875 Century Park East, Suite 1000

Los Angeles, CA 90067

(310) 556-4811

ryan.wu@capstonelawyers.com

Counsel for Respondent Refugio Arreguin

================================================================

COCKLE LEGAL BRIEFS (800) 225-6964

WWW.COCKLELEGALBRIEFS.COM

i

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Does this Court possess jurisdiction to review

a state court’s interlocutory appellate ruling that will

not result in class arbitration unless and until further

judicial proceedings occur and thus is not a “final judgment” under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a)?

2. Does the implied preemptive effect of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq., require California state courts to usurp the role of the arbitrator to

decide whether the agreement’s contractual language

indicates the parties’ intent to permit class or collective arbitration, when the arbitration agreement contains an express delegation clause that specifically

authorizes the American Arbitration Association to resolve all claims and disputes relating to the interpretation of the agreement?

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ................................

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................

iii

INTRODUCTION ................................................

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE..............................

5

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT .............. 10

I.

This Court Lacks Jurisdiction Because the

Judgment Below Is Not Final .................... 10

II.

A State-Court Decision Presents a Poor

Vehicle for Review of FAA Issues .............. 19

III.

The Issues Do Not Merit Review ............... 20

IV.

The Decision Below Is Correct .................. 29

CONCLUSION..................................................... 32

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Adv. Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 9 Cal. 4th

362 (1994) ................................................................12

Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S.

265 (1995) ................................................................19

Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare

Services, Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 83 (2000) ..........................7

AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333

(2011) .......................................................................29

Catamaran Corp. v. Towncrest Pharmacy, 864

F.3d 966 (8th Cir. 2017) ...........................................27

Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Scout Petroleum, LLC, 809 F.3d 746 (3d Cir. 2016) ..................25

Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469

(1975) ............................................................... passim

Del Webb Communities v. Carlson, 817 F.3d 867

(4th Cir. 2016)..........................................................27

DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015)

.................................................................................... 19

Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612

(2018) .......................................................................29

First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S.

938 (1995) .................................................... 20, 30, 31

Florida v. Thomas, 532 U.S. 774 (2001) ............... 13, 14

Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444

(2003) ................................................... 3, 5, 20, 21, 24

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued

Page

Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79

(2000) .......................................................................16

Gueyffier v. Ann Summers, Ltd., 43 Cal. 4th 1179

(2008) .......................................................................13

Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S.

79 (2002) ..................................................................20

Jefferson v. City of Tarrant, 522 U.S. 75 (1997) ... 11, 14, 15

Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137

S. Ct. 1421 (2017) ....................................................19

Lowry v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 522 Fed.

Appx. 281 (6th Cir. 2013) ........................................26

Market Street R. Co. v. Railroad Comm’n of Cal.,

324 U.S. 548 (1945) ........................................... 10, 13

Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 514

U.S. 52 (1995) ..........................................................29

Mitsubushi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) ................................20

Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) ......... 15, 17, 18

O’Dell v. Espinoza, 456 U.S. 430 (1982) .....................13

Opalinski v. Robert Half Int’l, Inc., 761 F.3d 326

(3d Cir. 2014) ............................................... 24, 25, 27

Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564

(2013) ........................................................... 10, 22, 23

Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987) .........................15

Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S.

120 (1945) ................................................................11

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued

Page

Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Crockett, 734 F.3d 594 (6th

Cir. 2013) ........................................................... 26, 27

Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63

(2010) ..................................................... 22, 23, 24, 28

Robinson v. J&K Administrative Management

Services, 817 F.3d 193 (5th Cir. 2016)............... 28, 30

Sandquist v. Lebo Automotive, Inc., 1 Cal. 5th

233 (2016) ........................................................ passim

Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) ..... 15, 19

Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Maizes, 899 F.3d 1230

(11th Cir. 2018).................................................. 30, 31

Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559

U.S. 662 (2010) .................................................. 21, 31

Trope v. Katz, 11 Cal. 4th 274 (1995) .........................15

United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 396

F.3d 1190 (D.C. Cir. 2005) .......................................23

Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.

478 (1989) ................................................................20

Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC v. Sappington, 884

F.3d 392 (2d Cir. 2018) ...................................... 30, 31

STATUTES

9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. ............................... 3, 16, 17, 19, 20

28 U.S.C. § 1257 .................................................. passim

28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) ............................................ 2, 10, 12

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued

Page

Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1285 .........................................12

Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1286.2 ......................................12

Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1286.6 ......................................12

Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1294(c) ................................. 2, 12

Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1294(d) ................................. 2, 13

OTHER AUTHORITIES

AAA’s Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitration ................................................................... passim

1

INTRODUCTION

Petitioners E. & J. Gallo Winery and Star H-R, Inc.

ask this Court to use this case to settle any disagreement among lower courts about whether determining

if an arbitration agreement permits class arbitration

is a “gateway issue” presumptively for a court to decide. But whether class arbitration is a gateway issue

does not by itself determine who decides it, as all the

federal appellate courts agree that an arbitration

agreement can delegate the issue to the arbitrator.

Petitioners ignore that question even though there

are persuasive indications that the Agreement in this

case delegates the class arbitration issue to the arbitrator sufficiently clearly to require arbitration of that

issue even if it is a gateway issue otherwise reserved

for decision by a court. Because that issue was not fully

developed in the lower courts, and because whether the

specific Agreement in this case delegates the class arbitration issue to the arbitrator is a fact-bound issue

that Petitioners do not assert merits review by this

Court, the question whether the lower court in this

case erred by referring the class arbitration issue to

the arbitrator does not merit review in this case.

In the interlocutory decision below, the California

Court of Appeal enforced an arbitration agreement

(“Agreement”) over Respondent-Plaintiff Refugio Arreguin’s asserted contractual defenses. In so holding, the

intermediate state court reversed the trial court’s order invalidating the Agreement on state-law unconscionability grounds. The appellate court referred all

2

disputes between the parties, including the availability of class procedures, to arbitration.

The Agreement contains both a clause broadly delegating all contractual issues for the arbitrator’s decision and a choice-of-law designating that the parties

will be subject to employment rules provided by the

American Arbitration Association (“AAA”). Under

AAA’s Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitration

(“Supplementary Rules”), which are applicable to all

potential class proceedings under AAA rules, the arbitrator conducts a proceeding on “clause construction”

to determine whether there is a contractual basis for

Mr. Arreguin to proceed with his putative class claims

in arbitration. Supplementary Rule 3 provides that,

following the arbitrator’s interim award on clause construction, an automatic thirty-day stay will be triggered permitting any party to move the trial court to

vacate or confirm the interim award.

California law allows for an immediate appeal of

an order vacating an arbitration award or a judgment

following the confirmation of an arbitration award.

Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1294(c) & (d). Because additional

appellate proceedings are likely whichever way these

issues are resolved, the intermediate state court’s interlocutory decision is not a final judgment. This Court

therefore lacks jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).

Even if this Court had jurisdiction, this case would

not merit review. Because this case originates from a

state court, and disagreement continues on this Court

3

over whether the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) even

applies in state courts, a case from a state court provides a poor vehicle for resolving issues concerning the

proper interpretation of the FAA. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq.

In any event, resolving the FAA question Petitioners pose would not suffice to decide this case. Petitioners contend that the appellate court’s decision

referring all disputes to arbitration provides a convenient vehicle for this Court to review the California

Supreme Court’s decision in Sandquist v. Lebo Automotive, Inc., 1 Cal. 5th 233 (2016), which, in turn, provides this Court with the opportunity to revisit the

plurality opinion in Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539

U.S. 444 (2003). The asserted urgency of review is

brought on by what Petitioners characterize as a circuit split on the “who decides” issue.

Even assuming that a circuit split exists, the decision below does not present facts that would resolve it.

Importantly, the Agreement, translated from a Spanish-language agreement provided to Mr. Arreguin, contains a broad clause that clearly and unmistakably

delegates all issues regarding the Agreement, including its enforceability, to the arbitrator. And, by specifying that AAA rules apply, the Agreement further

delegates decisions regarding the availability of class

proceedings to the arbitrator. Having both a broad delegation clause and incorporation of the AAA rules is

what distinguishes this case from other cases that

have examined the “who decides” issue and makes it

inappropriate for certiorari.

4

While Petitioners assert that the decision below

conflicts with four federal circuits—the Third, Fourth,

Sixth and Eighth—that have held that the availability

of class procedures is presumptively a “gateway” issue

for the court, each of these courts of appeals also holds

that a valid delegation clause would be sufficient to

overcome that presumption, clearing the way for an arbitrator’s decision on the class issue. None of those

cases addressed the type of agreement at issue here,

which contains a broad provision sending all matters

of contract to arbitration. Moreover, the clause incorporating AAA rules, standing alone, would be sufficient

to delegate the availability of class procedures to the

arbitrator in three federal circuits.1 As this Agreement

contains a valid delegation clause, the decision sending

the class issue to arbitration is entirely consistent with

these circuits’ decisions.

Moreover, Petitioners’ claim that the decision below was decided incorrectly is wrong on the merits. Under this Court’s jurisprudence, the overarching

question is whether the parties agreed to submit the

matter for arbitration. Here, the delegation clause, together with the incorporation of AAA rules, evinces the

parties’ clear intent to have all matters, including all

1

The incorporation of AAA rules would be sufficient to delegate the issue to the arbitrator in the Second, Tenth and Eleventh

Circuits. To the extent there may be disagreement among the federal courts over exactly what language suffices to delegate the

class arbitration issue to the arbitrator, that question would be

better decided in a case that squarely presents that issue as well

as the threshold question of whether the class arbitration issue is

a gateway issue.

5

contractual issues such as arbitrability, to decision by

the arbitrator. The incorporation of AAA rules, standing alone, is sufficient to delegate the class issue to the

arbitrator.

In short, Petitioners overreach in seeking to have

this Court reach out to an unpublished state intermediate court decision, involving an express delegation

clause and designation of AAA rules, as the vehicle to

reconsider and abrogate the Bazzle plurality opinion

(that did not involve consideration of either clause).

The petition should be denied.

------------------------------------------------------------------

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. Star H-R, Inc. (“Star”) is the labor contractor

that handles the hiring of temporary and seasonal employees for E. & J. Gallo Winery (“Gallo”) (collectively

“Petitioners”). Petitioners’ Appendix (“Pet. App.”) 1a.

2. On August 5, 2013, Respondent Arreguin presented at a Star office and applied for a job. Pet. App.

2a, 26a-27a. Star handed him a packet, which he had

to complete on-site in order to get an interview. Id. In

the packet was an arbitration agreement (“Agreement”), written in Spanish, which provided “that all

disputes that may arise out, or be related to my employment, be arbitrated under the National Rules for

the Resolution of Employment Disputes of the American Arbitration Association [‘AAA’] in San Francisco.”

Pet. App. 31a.

6

3. The Agreement did not expressly forbid the arbitration of class or representative actions. According

to the AAA rules that were incorporated into the arbitration agreement, “[t]he arbitrator shall have the

power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including

any objections with respect to the existence, scope or

validity of the arbitration agreement.” AAA Employment Arbitration R. 6(a). The rules further provide

that “[t]he Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations

(“Supplementary Rules”) shall apply to any dispute

arising out of an agreement that provides for arbitration pursuant to any of the rules of the [AAA] where a

party submits a dispute to arbitration on behalf of or

against a class or purported class, and shall supplement any other applicable AAA rules.”2 See AAA Supp.

Rule 1. The Supplementary Rules in turn provide that

“the arbitrator shall determine as a threshold matter,

in a reasoned, partial final award on the construction

of the arbitration clause, whether the applicable arbitration class permits the arbitration to proceed on behalf of or against a class (the ‘Clause Construction

Award’).” Id.

4. Prior to signing the documents in the preemployment packet, Mr. Arreguin asked the Star employee about the arbitration agreement, but he was

told no one could answer his questions. Pet. App. 2a,

26a-27a. Indeed, nobody during the hiring process explained anything about arbitration to Mr. Arreguin, he

2

The Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitration can be

found on the AAA website: <https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/

Employment%20Rules.pdf>.

7

was never shown a copy of the AAA rules incorporated

into the arbitration agreement, nor was he allowed to

keep a copy of the arbitration agreement so that he

could have reviewed it or have someone explain the

terms to him later. Id. Petitioners’ arbitration agreement was the epitome of a take-it-or-leave-it preemployment contract of adhesion.

5. After Mr. Arreguin signed the arbitration

agreement, he was interviewed for a warehouse position at a Gallo facility in Healdsburg, Calif., and was

hired on the spot. Pet. App. 2a. He worked at Gallo for

a period of three months. Id.

6. On December 17, 2014, Mr. Arreguin filed this

employee class action in the Sonoma County Superior

Court, in California, on behalf of himself and other

hourly, non-exempt employees. The first amended complaint alleges that Petitioners violated California wage

and hour laws, including minimum wage, overtime,

and other sections of the California Labor Code. Pet.

App. 3a. Based on the Agreement, Petitioners moved to

compel the arbitration of individual claims, dismiss

class action claims, and stay the action pending the

completion of arbitration. Pet. App. 24a-25a. The trial

court denied the motion, finding that the arbitration

agreement was unconscionable. Pet. App. 29a. Under

California law, an arbitration agreement is unenforceable if it is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare

Services, Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 83, 114 (2000). As for procedural unconscionability, the court noted that the “parties were in extremely unequal positions” and that Mr.

8

Arreguin “has demonstrated not only adhesion or unequal bargaining power or a failure to provide the rules,

etc. but all of these combined.” Pet. App. 27a-28a. As for

substantive unconscionability, the trial court found the

Agreement was vague, equivocal, and, in general, sloppily worded to the point where it indicated that “the

entire purpose of this agreement is to bind only the

employee.” Pet. App. 29a.

7. Petitioners successfully appealed the trial

court’s finding that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable. The reviewing court found that the

Agreement was procedurally unconscionable, even noting an “element of duress in Star’s refusal to answer

questions that Mr. Arreguin had about the paperwork

while, at the same time, effectively obstructing steps

that Mr. Arreguin could have taken to get answers

elsewhere.” Pet. App. 7a-8a. However, it also found

that, “[b]ecause this agreement imposes mutual obligations on employer and employee, it is not substantively unconscionable.” Pet. App. 17a. The court

therefore reversed the trial court’s denial of Petitioners’ motion to compel arbitration.

8. The state appellate court directed the trial

court on remand to send the “entire case, including the

question of whether Mr. Arreguin may prosecute class

claim” to arbitration. Pet. App. 2a. In resolving the

question of “who decides” whether class arbitration is

permissible under the Agreement, the court followed

the California Supreme Court’s decision in Sandquist

v. Lebo Automotive, Inc., 1 Cal. 5th 233 (2016). Because

the Agreement neither expressly allows nor forbids

9

class arbitration, the court made the threshold finding

that the “broad language” of the Agreement includes

“all disputes that may arise out of ” or be “related to”

Mr. Arreguin’s employment, to “be arbitrated.” Pet.

App. 20a. Such broad language indicates that the parties agreed to have the arbitrator decide whether class

treatment was proper under the Agreement. Pet. App.

18a (citing Sandquist, 1 Cal. 5th at 251-60).

9. In addition to the broad language of the Agreement, the reviewing court looked at three other

Sandquist considerations: first, “the parties’ likely expectations about allocations of responsibility,” while

taking into consideration the “substantial additional

cost and delay” associated with a rule that would require class claims to begin with a judicial determination of their arbitrability; second, the preference under

state and federal law that “when the allocation of a

matter to arbitration or the courts is uncertain, we resolve all doubts in favor of arbitration”; and third, the

fact that when the plaintiff employee is seeking to have

the availability of class claims arbitrated, arbitration

of that question is consistent with the canon that “ambiguities in written agreements are to be construed

against their drafters,” a rule that “applies with peculiar force in the case of a contract of adhesion.” Pet.

App. 16a (citing Sandquist, 1 Cal. 5th at 246-48). By

“construing the arbitration agreement in favor of sending the procedural dispute to arbitration and against

the party that drafted the adhesion contract,” the appellate court found that “the arbitrator will decide

whether class claims can proceed, and that decision

10

will be subject only to limited judicial review.” Pet. App.

20a (citing Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S.

564 (2013)).

10. Petitioners unsuccessfully sought review

from the California Supreme Court on the “who decides” class arbitrability issue only, arguing that

“Sandquist conflicts with the decisions of at least five

U.S. courts of appeals.” Pet. App. 59a. Petitioners’ bid

to overrule Sandquist was denied on July 11, 2018.

------------------------------------------------------------------

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

I.

This Court Lacks Jurisdiction Because the

Judgment Below Is Not Final.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a), this Court has certiorari jurisdiction only over “[f ]inal judgments or decrees” of state courts. As this Court has explained, this

limitation is no mere formality to be observed in the

breach:

This provision establishes a firm final judgment rule. To be reviewable by this Court, a

state-court judgment must be final “in two

senses: it must be subject to no further review

or correction in any other state tribunal; it

must also be final as an effective determination of the litigation and not of merely interlocutory or intermediate steps therein. It

must be the final word of a final court.” Market Street R. Co. v. Railroad Comm’n of Cal.,

324 U.S. 548, 551 (1945). As we have recognized, the finality rule “is not one of those

11

technicalities to be easily scorned. It is an important factor in the smooth working of our

federal system.” Radio Station WOW, Inc. v.

Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 124 (1945).

Jefferson v. City of Tarrant, 522 U.S. 75, 81 (1997).

However, the order below is far from final. It is

therefore not an “effective determination of the litigation,” but is “merely interlocutory or intermediate.” Id.

The case came to the California Court of Appeal on an

interlocutory appeal from a decision declining to compel arbitration of Mr. Arreguin’s wage and hour claims

under state law. The appellate court reversed the trial

court’s determination that the arbitration agreement

was unenforceable because several terms were unconscionable under state contract law and could not be

severed from the Agreement. The appellate court instead found the Agreement fully enforceable. The intermediate court then considered whether the court or

the arbitrator should decide whether the parties intended to permit arbitration on a classwide basis—

meaning only whether Mr. Arreguin could assert putative class claims in arbitration, not whether this case

would proceed as a certified class action in arbitration.

Pet. App. 18a-20a. The court considered the “broad”

language of the arbitration clause delegating all “disputes that may arise out of ” or be “related to” Mr. Arreguin’s employment to “be arbitrated,” as well as the

state contract principles set forth in Sandquist, in

sending the entire matter to arbitration. Id. at 20a.

The case is far from over.

12

Moreover, the decision is not one that is “subject to

no further review or correction in any state tribunal.”

28 U.S.C. § 1257(a). The court ordered Mr. Arreguin’s

claims to be arbitrated. Pet. App. 20a-21a. The first significant event in arbitration would be a “threshold”

clause construction hearing, following briefing from

both parties. See AAA Supp. Rule 3. Upon an issuance

of an interim award on clause construction, the arbitration would automatically be stayed for thirty days

so that the aggrieved party could petition to vacate or

correct the interim award in court. Id.

Thus, even if the arbitrator were to find that the

agreement authorizes putative class proceedings in arbitration, Petitioners could immediately seek to vacate

that award on the ground that the arbitrator exceed

his or her powers. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 1285,

1286.2(4); Adv. Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 9 Cal.

4th 362, 375 (1994) (“The powers of an arbitrator derive from, and are limited by, the agreement to arbitrate. [Citation omitted.] Awards in excess of those

powers may, under sections 1286.2 and 1286.6, be corrected or vacated by the court.”). Alternatively, if the

arbitrator ruled that class claims could not be asserted,

Mr. Arreguin likewise could petition to vacate the interim award. The court’s order vacating the award

would be subject to appeal as a matter of right. See Cal.

Code Civ. Proc. § 1294(c). Moreover, if Mr. Arreguin

were to obtain a final award in arbitration, Petitioners

could again seek to vacate the arbitration award based

on the arbitrator’s exceeding his or her powers or other

grounds, and could appeal the judgment up through

13

the California court system, seeking review by the California Supreme Court and ultimately by this Court if

its appeal were unsuccessful. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc.

§ 1294(d) (appeal of judgment); Gueyffier v. Ann Summers, Ltd., 43 Cal. 4th 1179, 1184 (2008) (judgment after confirming arbitration award appealed to through

the California court system).

Thus, the decision does not terminate the litigation or is subject to no further review by the California

state court system. It is not the “final word of a final

court.” Market St., 324 U.S. at 551.

This Court has exercised its certiorari jurisdiction

over state-court judgments that do not terminate a

case in only a “limited set of situations in which we

have found finality as to the federal issue despite the

ordering of further proceedings in the lower state

courts.” O’Dell v. Espinoza, 456 U.S. 430 (1982) (per curiam). In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469

(1975), the Court identified “four categories” of such

cases. Florida v. Thomas, 532 U.S. 774, 777 (2001). This

case fits none of those narrow categories.

The first Cox category covers cases in which “there

are further proceedings—even entire trials—yet to occur in the state courts but where for one reason or another the federal issue is conclusive or the outcome of

further proceedings preordained,” and “the judgment

of the state court on the federal issue is deemed final”

because “the case is for all practical purposes concluded.” Cox, 420 U.S. at 479. Here, it is by no means

“preordained” that Mr. Arreguin will not only be

14

allowed to pursue his class claims, but also prevail on

his claim on a classwide basis. See Thomas, 532 U.S. at

778.

Cox’s second category is confined to cases where

“the federal issue, finally decided by the highest court

in the State, will survive and require decision regardless of the outcome of future state-court proceedings.”

Cox, 420 U.S. at 480. That exception is also not applicable here. If Mr. Arreguin does not prevail on his class

claims in arbitration, either at clause construction

stage, certification, or on the merits, the question regarding whether the FAA dictates that the court, rather than the arbitrator, decide the class issue will be

moot. Jefferson, 522 U.S. at 82.

Cox category three comprises those unusual “situations where the federal claim has been finally decided, with further proceedings on the merits in the

state courts to come, but in which later review of the

federal issue cannot be had, whatever the ultimate outcome of the case.” Cox, 420 U.S. at 481 (emphasis

added). Cox explained that this category encompasses

cases in which state law offers no subsequent opportunity to obtain a court judgment over which this

Court could exercise jurisdiction. See id. at 481-82.

Petitioners do not face such a situation. As explained above, if the arbitrator rules against them on

clause construction, they can seek further appellate review upon a denial of their petition to vacate that interim award. Because the California Supreme Court’s

denial of review “is to be given no weight insofar as it

15

might be deemed that we have acquiesced in the law

as enunciated in a published opinion of a Court of Appeal,” Trope v. Katz, 11 Cal. 4th 274, 287 n.1 (1995), the

California Supreme Court could take up either the

“who decides” argument or the propriety of the arbitrator’s decision, including the clause construction award,

in such a later appeal. But even if that court were to

treat the Court of Appeal’s “interlocutory ruling as ‘law

of the case,’ that determination [would] in no way limit

[this Court’s] ability to review the issue on final judgment.” Jefferson, 522 U.S. at 83. The third exception is

thus inapplicable. See id.

Finally, “the fourth category of such cases identified in Cox . . . covers those cases in which ‘the federal

issue has been finally decided in the state courts with

further proceedings pending in which the party seeking review’ might prevail on nonfederal grounds, ‘reversal of the state court on the federal issue would be

preclusive of any further litigation on the relevant

cause of action,’ and ‘refusal immediately to review the

state-court decision might seriously erode federal policy.’ ” Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 658-59 (2003)

(opinion concurring in dismissal of writ) (quoting Cox,

420 U.S. at 482-83).

Here, the court of appeal’s order did not deny arbitration of any claim, and the scope of arbitration is

still to be decided on remand. This case is thus wholly

unlike Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1984),

and Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 n.7 (1987), where

this Court held that definitive state-court decisions

16

refusing to compel arbitration were “final” for purposes

of 28 U.S.C. § 1257 as construed in Cox.

A party invoking Cox category four must demonstrate not just that a state court’s decision may be

wrong from the standpoint of federal policy, but that

deferring review would seriously damage federal interests. Here, denial of immediate review would not “seriously erode federal policy.” If the arbitrator finds that

the Agreement permits assertion of class claims, federal policy would not be eroded by requiring Petitioners to first seek court vacatur, and then, if the court

denied the petition, seek further appellate review.

Thus, even assuming that an arbitrator’s decision allowing the assertions of class claims would alter the

attributes of arbitration in a way that conflicted with

federal policy, such an order would, at Petitioners’ election, be immediately appealable before class arbitration could occur and thus would pose no immediate

threat of eroding federal policy.

Alternatively, Petitioners can await the outcome of

the arbitration that would follow before seeking further review (if they lost in the arbitration) through a

petition to vacate the award that would cover the decisions on clause construction, certification, and the merits. Indeed, federal policy generally favors deferring

review until after arbitration, and thus the FAA generally does not provide for immediate appellate review

of an order compelling arbitration. See Green Tree Fin.

Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 85-86 (2000); 9 U.S.C.

§ 16.

17

Federal policy in favor of arbitration would be enhanced, not eroded, by empowering the arbitrator to

construe the Agreement in the first instance before further review. And Petitioners may well raise other issues under the FAA in the arbitration and/or in later

judicial proceedings. Thus, asserting jurisdiction over

the petition at this point might create the possibility of

piecemeal review of federal issues, which the Court has

generally sought to avoid in applying the Cox factors.

See Nike, 539 U.S. at 660.

And, as in Nike, multiple possibilities would ensue

even if this Court were to reverse the decision below.

To be sure, the issue of whether this Agreement permits class claims under state-law of contract interpretation is not properly before this Court, as the lower

court has not decided this issue. On the issue on which

certiorari is sought, if this Court were to conclude that

the class issue is a “gateway” issue for a trial court to

decide, several distinct possibilities remain. The trial

court may find that the agreement does not permit Mr.

Arreguin to assert class claims in arbitration, which

may be subject to further review by alternative writ.

And if the court goes the other direction, instructing

the arbitrator to allow for putative class claims to proceed, further review by alternative writ is likely. Alternatively, Petitioners may also strategically elect to

arbitrate first instead of seeking appellate review, if

they believe that class certification under Mr. Arreguin’s theories of liability is highly unlikely. “[B]ecause

an opinion on the merits in this case could take any

one of a number of different paths, it is not clear

18

whether reversal of the California [Court of Appeal]

would ‘be preclusive of any further litigation on the relevant cause of action [in] the state proceedings still to

come.’ ” Nike, 539 U.S. at 660. A thorough review of the

Cox categories thus confirms that this case does not in

any way present this Court with the opportunity to review the final word of a final court.

Finally, the prospect of serious injury to federal interests is also obviated by the likelihood that other appellate rulings, from federal courts, will provide

further opportunities for this Court to address the issue if necessary, and will better inform the Court’s

judgment about whether review is warranted. As set

forth below, the delegation clause at issue neutralizes

the purported conflict between the decision below and

the circuit court decisions holding that the court presumptively decides the class question. Moreover, because the issue of who decides whether an agreement

permits class arbitration (and what language suffices

to delegate that issue to an arbitrator even if it is presumptively for a court) appears to be frequently litigated in the federal court, the Court will have no

shortage of opportunities to step in if it appears that

federal policy is threatened. Immediate review of a

non-final state-court order is by no means essential to

the defense of federal policy.

In short, the Court of Appeal’s decision to reverse

the trial court and order all disputes to arbitration is

in no sense the state courts’ final word in this case. The

Court lacks jurisdiction under § 1257, and the petition

must be denied.

19

II.

A State-Court Decision Presents a Poor Vehicle for Review of FAA Issues.

Beyond the jurisdictional requirements of § 1257,

the state-court origin of this case provides another

strong reason for denying review: the lingering disagreement within this Court over whether the FAA applies in state-court actions. Petitioners’ question

presented, of course, presupposes that the FAA applies

to state courts. Although a majority of this Court so

held (over substantial dissents) in Southland Corp.,

465 U.S. 1, and Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson,

513 U.S. 265 (1995), one Justice of this Court has continued to adhere to the view that the FAA does not apply to actions in state courts. See Kindred Nursing

Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1429 (2017)

(Thomas, J., dissenting); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia,

136 S. Ct. 463, 471 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting). As

Kindred and Imburgia illustrate, that view will likely

determine the vote of at least one member of the Court

in any case originating in a state court that raises an

FAA issue.

The continuing disagreement on the Court over

this question makes a case coming from a state court a

very poor candidate for resolving any significant FAA

issue. Such issues have often closely divided the Court.

If this Court were to review this case on the merits, the

vote of at least one Justice would be to affirm on the

ground that the FAA does not apply to state courts, and

there would be a significant likelihood that no holding

on any other issue that might be presented by the case

would command a majority of the Court. See, e.g.,

20

Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 460 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Review

would thus threaten to waste the time and efforts of

the Court.

III. The Issues Do Not Merit Review.

A “fundamental principle” of the FAA is that “arbitration is a matter of contract.” First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995). Section 2

of the FAA embodies the policy that arbitration agreements, like other contracts, are “enforced according to

their terms.” Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of

Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 478

(1989). Any doubts about “the scope of arbitrable issues” should be resolved “in favor of arbitration.”

Mitsubushi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,

Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985).

Although issues in a case subject to an arbitration

agreement are, in cases of doubt, typically presumed to

fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement and

thus reserved for the arbitrator, there is a limited set

of “gateway” issues that courts, not arbitrators, are expected to decide in the first instance. Howsam v. Dean

Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002). These

gateway issues include whether the parties have a

valid arbitration agreement, or whether a certain controversy is covered by an arbitration clause. Id. However, because arbitration is a matter of contract,

parties can agree to arbitrate even gateway questions

of “arbitrability.” Id. at 83-85.

21

In Bazzle, a plurality of this Court, including Justice Scalia, held that the question of whether an agreement provides a contractual basis for assertion of

putative class claims is not a gateway issue, but rather

involves issues concerning “contract interpretation

and arbitration procedures” that “[a]rbitrators are well

suited to answer.” Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 453.

Petitioners seek reconsideration of the plurality

decision in Bazzle. According to Petitioners, Bazzle

failed to consider that the fundamental differences between bilateral and class arbitration make the matter

too important to be left to an arbitrator. Petitioners

seek a ruling cementing the class question as a gateway issue. Petitioners further argue that, at a minimum, five courts from four federal circuits have

concluded that Bazzle runs afoul of the reasoning of

more recent case law from this Court, including StoltNielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662,

686-87 (2010). See Pet. at 12. But whatever the merits

are of Petitioners’ criticisms of Bazzle, the decision below does not provide the proper vehicle for revisiting

that decision.

Unlike the circuits eschewing Bazzle’s plurality

holding, the court below did not directly address

Bazzle’s reasoning. More importantly, the arbitration

agreement in this case contains multiple provisions

that clearly and unmistakably leave the class issue for

the arbitrator to decide even assuming it is a gateway

issue. None of the circuits that have held the class arbitration question to be one for decision by a court have

addressed an agreement that provides both a general

22

delegation clause and a clause specifying AAA rules.

By contrast, this case falls within this Court’s holding

that when an agreement contains a “clear and unmistakable” provision that delegates gateway issues to be

resolved by arbitration, the arbitrator decides the issue. See Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S.

63, 67 (2010).

Here, as translated from the Spanish,3 the arbitration clause provides that “all disputes that may arise

or be related to [the employee’s] employment” be subject to arbitration, designating the National Rules for

the Resolution of Employment Disputes under AAA.

Pet. App. at 3a. It further states that “[t]he claim subject to arbitration shall include, but not limited to a

specific or implicit contract.” Id. at 4a.

In other words, the language in this Agreement

authorizes the arbitrator to resolve contractual disputes, including those involving “implicit” contractual

terms—a phrase broadly encompassing the intended

meaning of the arbitration contract itself (the only

written contract between the parties). See Oxford

Health Plans, 569 U.S. at 573 (“It is the arbitrator’s

construction [of the contract] which was bargained for;

and so far as the arbitrator’s decision concerns the construction of the contract, the courts have no business

3

Another reason why certiorari should be denied is that the

subject Agreement is translated from a Spanish-language version

furnished to Mr. Arreguin. While neither party disputes the integrity of the translation, a translated arbitration agreement is not

well-suited to a merits decision that would likely turn on the nuances of interpreting the language used by the parties.

23

overruling him because their interpretation of the contract was different from his.” (citation omitted; brackets in original)). The court below only briefly examined

the Agreement’s language, the Agreement’s designation of the arbitrator to decide contractual matters undoubtedly encompasses whether there is a contractual

basis for pursuing class claims, which is a matter of

contract construction. Id. at 570-71 (finding that the

arbitrator’s duty is to “construe the contract” to decide

whether class procedures are available). This broad

delegation of contract issues to be resolved by the arbitrator is arguably even broader than the language

found to be a “clear and unmistakable” delegation in

Rent-A-Center.4 See Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. at 71

(providing giving the arbitrator “exclusive authority to

resolve any dispute relating to the . . . enforceability

. . . of this Agreement.”).

This delegation clause, coupled with the Agreement’s designation of AAA employment rules, vests the

arbitrator with authority to determine the “scope” of

the arbitration clause. See AAA Employment Rule 6(a).

The Agreement also incorporates the Supplementary

Rules that apply to all potential class proceedings under AAA rules in arbitration. AAA Supp. Rule 1(a). Under the Supplementary Rules, the arbitrator conducts

4

This language, including the use of “including, but not

limited to” indicates that the parties intended for all contractual

issues to be arbitrated, not just “implicit” or “specific” issues relating to the Agreement. See United States v. Philip Morris USA,

Inc., 396 F.3d 1190, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“The words ‘including,

but not limited to’ introduce a non-exhaustive list that sets out

specific examples of a general principle.”).

24

a clause construction hearing to determine whether

there is a contractual basis for permitting putative

class claims. The AAA Employment Rules and Supplementary Rules, in concert with the clause broadly delegating contractual disputes to arbitration, make it

clear and unmistakable that the Agreement provided

that the arbitrator decide all matters.5

Petitioners contend that decisions from the Third,

Fourth, Sixth and Eighth Circuits conflict with this decision. Upon closer examination, however, none do. In

each of these cases, the court reached its conclusion

based on the contractual language before it, and none

involved a “clear and unmistakable” delegation of the

matter to arbitration.

Petitioners identify two purportedly conflicting

decisions from the Third Circuit. The first, Opalinski v.

Robert Half Int’l, Inc., 761 F.3d 326, 335 (3d Cir. 2014),

held that, contrary to the Bazzle plurality, “the availability of class arbitration is a ‘question of arbitrability.’ ” The subject agreement in Opalinski contained a

common arbitration clause, and “[n]othing else in the

agreements or record suggests the parties agreed to

submit questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator.” Id.

Under Opalinski’s analysis, the availability of class

arbitration is presumptively a gateway issue for the

5

Because delegation pertains to the parties’ “manifestation

of intent” at the time of contract, that the parties tested the validity of the agreement in court does not in any way undermine the

force of the delegation clause. See Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. at 69

n.1.

25

court, subject to modification by the parties via a clear

delegation clause. Id.

In Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Scout Petroleum, LLC, 809 F.3d 746 (3d Cir. 2016), the Third Circuit considered a question left open by Opalinski,

whether an arbitration agreement, by specifically incorporating the AAA rules, would “clearly and unmistakably” delegate the class issue to the arbitrator. The

Chesapeake Appalachia panel held that it did not—

that incorporation of “common” arbitration rules did

not satisfy the burden, set by the Third Circuit, for establishing that the parties agreed to delegate the class

issue to the arbitrator.

Neither Third Circuit case addresses a clause, like

this one, that specifically authorizes the arbitrator to

resolve disputes under the arbitration contract itself.

Thus, even accepting the Third Circuit’s rule elevating

the burden for delegating the class issue, the Agreement here may very well meet that burden. Indeed, the

Third Circuit reaffirmed the principle that courts or

arbitrators cannot require the incantation of specific

magic words like “class” in the Agreement in order to

find that the arbitrator is authorized to resolve issues

as to the availability of class proceedings, even if the

absence of such words makes the burden more difficult

to satisfy as a practical matter. Chesapeake Appalachia, 809 F.3d at 759. Because the Third Circuit’s rule

would not require that the parties to this Agreement

submit the matter to court, there is no direct conflict

with the decision below.

26

The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Reed Elsevier, Inc.

v. Crockett, 734 F.3d 594 (6th Cir. 2013) similarly did

not have an express delegation clause. In Reed Elsevier, the arbitration clause at issue incorporated the

then-current Commercial Rules for AAA, but did not

contain any language finding that the arbitrator decides all contractual issues, such as arbitrability. Id. at

599. Instead, the language of the clause specifically

stated: “Issues of arbitrability will be determined in accordance and solely with the federal substantive and

procedural laws relating to arbitration.” Id.

The Reed Elsevier panel concluded that this “language does not clearly and unmistakably assign to an

arbitrator the question whether the agreement permits classwide arbitration.” Id. According to Reed Elsevier, the differences between class and bilateral

arbitration are sufficiently significant that, absent a

valid delegation clause, the class matter should be decided by the court. Id. at 598.

Again, the Agreement here contains an express

delegation provision, along with the incorporation of

AAA rules. There is no indication from Reed Elsevier

that the Sixth Circuit would rule differently from the

court below. To the contrary, the Sixth Circuit, when

evaluating an arbitration clause with a valid delegation clause, has held that the availability of class procedures should be decided by an arbitrator. See Lowry

v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 522 Fed. Appx. 281,

282 (6th Cir. 2013). Although Lowry is unpublished,

there is nothing in the Sixth Circuit’s jurisprudence

that is inconsistent with Lowry’s conclusions.

27

Likewise, Del Webb Communities v. Carlson, 817

F.3d 867, 876 (4th Cir. 2016) embraced the rationale of

Reed Elsevier and Opalinski in finding that, absent a

valid delegation clause, the court must decide whether

class procedures are available in arbitration. In reviewing the subject arbitration agreement, the Fourth

Circuit panel found that “the parties did not unmistakably provide that the arbitrator would decide whether

their agreement authorizes class arbitration. In fact,

the sales agreement says nothing at all about the subject.” Id. at 877. Thus, the Del Webb Communities court

held that the district court must decide the class issue.

The Fourth Circuit did not address a broad clause delegating all contractual enforceability questions to the

arbitrator, coupled with the incorporation of AAA

rules.

Lastly, the Eighth Circuit followed the reasoning

of the Third and Sixth Circuits, and rejected the position that an agreement’s incorporation of AAA rules,

by itself, demonstrates a clear and unmistakable delegation of the matter to the arbitrator. See Catamaran

Corp. v. Towncrest Pharmacy, 864 F.3d 966, 972-73 (8th

Cir. 2017). Like the decisions above, Catamaran agrees

that a valid delegation clause would send the class issue to decision by the arbitrator. As the Eighth Circuit

has not had the opportunity to evaluate the effect of a

clause similar to the one in the Agreement at issue

here, there is no reason to believe that Catamaran dictates a different outcome from the decision below.

When there is a valid delegation clause, federal

appellate courts have not hesitated to order the class

28

issue to be decided by the arbitrator. See, e.g., Robinson

v. J&K Administrative Management Services, 817 F.3d

193, 197-98 (5th Cir. 2016). Robinson addressed different language, but also concluded that a delegation

clause similar to that in Rent-A-Center, addressing

matters related to contract, would be sufficient to delegate the class issue. Id. at 198.

The divergent outcomes between Robinson, and

the decisions of the Third, Fourth, Sixth and Eighth

Circuits appear to have more to do with the specific

delegation clause in Robinson, and the absence of similar language from the other cases, than from any differences in these courts’ legal approaches. Indeed, the

decisions illustrate that whether the availability of

class arbitration is a gateway issue is not sufficient to

determine the outcome of the who-decides issue;

whether the agreement contains a delegation clause,

and whether the delegation clause is sufficiently clear

to send the issue to the arbitrator, must also be considered. The fact-bound question whether the specific

Agreement in this case suffices does not merit review.6

Separately, in sending the entire matter to arbitration, the court below also followed Sandquist’s articulation of several unremarkable pro-arbitration

precepts. Pet. App. at 19a-20a. Sandquist instructed

courts to consider that the parties are presumed to desire speed and efficiency in bargaining for arbitration,

6

That the question whether the language of the Agreement

constitutes a delegation clause was not explicitly addressed in the

lower court’s opinion in this case, and is likewise not addressed in

the Petition, makes this case all the more unsuitable for review.

29

that matters of arbitrability are generally resolved in

favor of arbitration, and that ambiguities are to be construed against the drafting party, consistent with California contract law and the decision of this Court in

Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 514 U.S. 52,

63 (1995). See Sandquist, 1 Cal. 5th at 245. While Petitioners expressly seek to piggyback review of Sandquist into this petition, the Court of Appeal’s reliance

on these uncontroversial precepts do not make this

case a suitable vehicle for reviewing Sandquist even if

such review were otherwise necessary.

Granting certiorari is especially unwarranted in

light of the recent development in this Court’s jurisprudence on the enforceability of class action waivers.

Following this Court’s decisions in AT&T Mobility LLC

v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) and, more recently,

Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018), the

parties are empowered to use class action waivers if

they intend to forbid the use of class procedures in arbitration. The issues presented by agreements “silent”

on class procedure have less salience, reducing the urgency of intervention by this Court.

IV. The Decision Below Is Correct.

As set forth above, this Agreement contains a valid

delegation clause. Thus, the lower court’s order sending the class issue to the arbitrator is consistent with

the rulings of every federal appellate court that have

held that the class issue can be sent to arbitration pursuant to a valid delegation clause.

30

Moreover, the decision below is correct even if the

clause broadly delegating all contractual issues to the

arbitrator were not determined to be a valid delegation

clause. This is because the designation of AAA rules,

by itself, delegates the issue to the arbitrator. See Wells

Fargo Advisors, LLC v. Sappington, 884 F.3d 392 (2d

Cir. 2018); Robinson, 817 F.3d at 197-98.

As one federal appellate court recently concluded,

“Supplementary Rule 3 provides that an arbitrator

shall decide whether an arbitration clause permits

class arbitration[,]” which “is clear and unmistakable

evidence that the parties chose to have an arbitrator

decide whether their agreement provided for class arbitration.” Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Maizes, 899 F.3d 1230

(11th Cir. 2018).

The Second Circuit likewise found that an agreement’s selection of AAA Security Arbitration Rules

also incorporates the Supplementary Rules, and these

two rules together “clearly and unmistakably” delegates the class issue to the arbitrator. Wells Fargo

Advisors, 884 F.3d at 397. Wells Fargo Advisors emphasized that courts must construe agreements, including

the validity of the delegation clause, based on state law

under this Court’s precedents, and the Missouri law

applicable to the subject agreement does not require a

heightened standard for delegating the class issue to

arbitration. Id. at 395-96 (quoting First Options, 514

U.S. at 944).

31

The same is true here, where the parties’ designation of a specific AAA rule carries with it the designation of the Supplementary Rules. See Supp. Rule 1. By

giving effect to the Supplementary Rules, the Agreement necessarily delegates the class issue to the arbitrator. Since the delegation issue is determined by

state law under First Options and Wells Fargo Advisors, the applicable California law, as embodied in

Sandquist, does not require anything more than a

broad arbitration clause to delegate the class issue to

the arbitrator’s decision. See Sandquist, 1 Cal. 5th at

246-48 (rejecting a presumption in favor of having the

class issue decided by the court). Applying California

law, the court below rejected imposing additional hurdles to parties struggling with the “who decides” question.

Although several courts above concluded that the

differences between bilateral and class arbitration are

so stark that choice cannot be left to the arbitrator,

both Wells Fargo Advisors and Spirit Airlines, hold otherwise. Instead, these cases hold fast to their view that

the availability of class procedures is one of arbitrability, and that Stolt-Nielsen did not alter this understanding. See Wells Fargo Advisors, 884 F.3d at 399;

Spirit Airlines, 899 F.3d at 1234.

Because the decision below is consistent with this

Court’s precedents and that of well-reasoned federal

appellate court decisions, review is unnecessary.

------------------------------------------------------------------

32

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

RYAN H. WU

Counsel of Record

JOHN STOBART

CAPSTONE LAW APC

1875 Century Park East,

Suite 1000

Los Angeles, CA 90067

(310) 556-4811

ryan.wu@capstonelawyers.com

Counsel for Respondent

Refugio Arreguin