Amicus Curiae Brief — County of Maui, Hawaii, Petitioner v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, et al.

No. 18-260

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

————

COUNTY OF MAUI,

Petitioner,

v.

HAWAI’I WILDLIFE FUND, ET AL.,

Respondents.

————

On Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

————

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE CHAMBER OF

COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

SUPPORTING PETITIONER

————

STEVEN P. LEHOTSKY

AARON M. STREETT

MICHAEL B. SCHON

Counsel of Record

U.S. CHAMBER LITIGATION J. MARK LITTLE

CENTER

BAKER BOTTS L.L.P.

1615 H St., NW

910 Louisiana St.

Washington, D.C. 20062

Houston, TX 77002

(202) 659-6000

(713) 229-1234

aaron.streett@bakerbotts.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae Chamber of

Commerce of the United States of America

WILSON-EPES PRINTING CO., INC. – (202) 789-0096 – WASHINGTON, D.C. 20002

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the CWA requires a permit when pollutants

originate from a point source but are conveyed to

navigable waters by a nonpoint source, such as

groundwater.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Question Presented ............................................................... i

Interest Of Amicus Curiae ................................................. 1

Summary Of Argument ....................................................... 2

Argument .............................................................................. 3

I.

The Decision Below Overlooks Congressional

Limits On Federal CWA Authority And The

Existing State And Federal Regulatory

Regimes Governing Groundwater ............................ 3

II. The Ninth Circuit’s Expansion Of The Clean

Water Act Creates Significant Uncertainty ............ 8

III. The Court’s Rejection Of A Similar NonLegislative Expansion Of Regulatory Authority

In UARG Compels The Same Result Here ........... 13

Conclusion ........................................................................... 14

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco

Corp.,

529 U.S. 120 (2000) ............................................13, 14

Sackett v. EPA,

566 U.S. 120 (2012) ................................................... 8

U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes

Co.,

136 S. Ct. 1807 (2016) .................................... 9, 10, 11

Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA,

573 U.S. 302 (2014) ............................................13, 14

FEDERAL STATUTES

33 U.S.C. § 1252(a) ......................................................... 3

33 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(5) ..................................................... 3

33 U.S.C. § 1311 .........................................................3, 10

33 U.S.C. § 1362 .....................................................3, 8, 10

33 U.S.C. § 2701 .............................................................. 7

42 U.S.C. §§ 300h-300h-8 ............................................... 7

42 U.S.C. § 6902 .............................................................. 6

42 U.S.C. § 6911 .............................................................. 6

42 U.S.C. § 6944 .............................................................. 6

42 U.S.C. § 9601 ...........................................................6, 7

42 U.S.C. § 9604 .............................................................. 6

FEDERAL REGULATIONS

40 C.F.R. § 122.44(i) ..................................................... 10

40 C.F.R. pt. 144 ............................................................. 7

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

40 C.F.R. §§ 257.90-.98................................................... 7

40 C.F.R. §§ 258.50-.58................................................... 7

40 C.F.R. § 261.4(b)(5) ................................................... 7

40 C.F.R. § 300.430(a)(iii)(F) ......................................... 6

84 Fed. Reg. 16,810 (Apr. 23, 2019) ........................4, 14

STATE STATUTES

Ala. Code § 22-22-9(I)(3) ................................................ 5

Alaska Stat. Ann. § 46.03.710 ........................................ 5

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 49-221 ....................................... 5

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 49-241 ....................................... 5

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 49-263 ....................................... 5

Ark. Code Ann. § 8-4-217 ............................................... 5

Cal. Water Code § 13260(a)(1) ...................................... 5

Cal. Water Code § 13304(a) ........................................... 5

Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 22a-427 ................................... 5

Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 22a-430 ................................... 5

D.C. Code Ann. § 8-103.02 ............................................. 5

Del. Code Ann. tit. 7, § 6003(a)...................................... 5

Fla. Stat. Ann. § 403.088(1) ........................................... 5

Fla. Stat. Ann. § 403.161(1) ........................................... 5

Ga. Code Ann. § 12-5-30 ................................................. 5

Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 340E-2 ..................................... 7

Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 342D-50.................................... 5

Idaho Code Ann. § 39-3618 ............................................ 5

Idaho Code Ann. § 39-3620 ............................................ 5

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

415 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/12........................................ 5

Ind. Code Ann. § 13-18-4-5 ............................................ 5

Iowa Code Ann. § 455B.186 ........................................... 5

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65-164 ................................................ 5

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 224.70-.110 ................................ 5

La. Stat. Ann. § 30:2075 ................................................. 5

La. Stat. Ann. § 30:2076 ................................................. 5

Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 38, § 413 ............................................ 5

Md. Code Ann., Envir. § 9-322 ...................................... 5

Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 21, § 42 ................................ 5

Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 21, § 43 ................................ 5

Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 324.3109(1) ......................... 5

Minn. Stat. Ann. § 115.061 ............................................. 5

Miss. Code Ann. § 49-17-29(2)(a) .................................. 5

Mo. Ann. Stat. § 644.051 ................................................ 5

Mont. Code Ann. § 75-5-605 .......................................... 5

Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 81-1506 ..................................... 5

Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 445A.570 ................................... 5

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 485-A:12 ................................... 5

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 485-A:13 ................................... 5

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 58:10A-6 ............................................. 5

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 74-6-4 ................................................ 5

N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 17-0501 ............................ 5

N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 143-215.1(a)(6) ......................... 5

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 6111.04 ..................................... 5

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 27A, § 2-6-105................................ 5

Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 468B.025(1) ................................. 5

25 Pa. Code § 93.8a(a) .................................................... 5

46 R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 46-12-5 ................................. 5

S.C. Code Ann. § 48-1-90(A)(1) ..................................... 5

S.D. Codified Laws § 34A-2-21 ..................................... 5

S.D. Codified Laws § 34A-2-22 ..................................... 5

Tenn. Code Ann. § 69-3-108(b) ...................................... 5

Tex. Water Code Ann. § 26.001(5) ................................ 4

Tex. Water Code Ann. § 26.121(a) ................................ 4

Utah Code Ann. § 19-5-107(1) ....................................... 5

Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 1259 ........................................... 5

Va. Code Ann. § 62.1-44.5(A) ......................................... 5

Va. Code Ann. § 62.1-194.1 ............................................ 5

Wash. Rev. Code § 90.48.080 ......................................... 5

Wash. Rev. Code § 90.48.160 ......................................... 5

W. Va. Code Ann. § 22-11-8 ........................................... 5

Wis. Stat. Ann. § 281.19(1) ............................................. 5

Wis. Stat. Ann. § 281.20(1)(a) ........................................ 5

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-11-301 .......................................... 5

STATE REGULATIONS

5 Colo. Code Regs. § 1002-61:61.3 ................................ 5

Haw. Code R. § 11-23-06 ................................................ 7

Haw. Code R. § 11-23-07 ................................................ 7

Idaho Admin. Code r. 58.01.11.400 ............................... 5

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Mich. Admin. Code r. 323.2201(i) .................................. 5

Mich. Admin. Code r. 323.2204-05 ................................ 5

Minn. R. 7050.0210 ......................................................... 5

Nev. Admin. Code 445A.228 .......................................... 5

N.M. Admin. Code 20.6.2.1201 ...................................... 5

N.M. Admin. Code 20.6.2.3104 ...................................... 5

30 Tex. Admin. Code §§ 350.1-.135 ............................... 4

30 Tex. Admin. Code § 350.32 ....................................... 5

30 Tex. Admin. Code § 350.33 ....................................... 5

30 Tex. Admin. Code § 350.52 ....................................... 5

30 Tex. Admin. Code § 350.75(i) .................................... 5

OTHER AUTHORITIES

EPA, ICR Supporting Statement, Information Collection Request for National

Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Program (Renewal),

OMB Control No. 2040-0004, EPA ICR

No. 0229.22 (Sept. 2017) ........................................ 12

EPA, NPDES Permit Writer’s Manual,

EPA-833-K-10-001 (Sept. 2010)...................... 10, 11

EPA, Summary of Key Existing EPA

CERCLA Policies for Groundwater

Restoration, OSWER Directive 9283.133 (June 26, 2009) ..................................................... 6

EPA, Superfund Groundwater Guidance

and Reports .............................................................. 6

viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Legislative History of the Resource

Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976

P.L. 94-580, Report to Congress by the

EPA Pursuant to Section 212 of the

Solid Waste Disposal Act, As Amended

(June 1974) ................................................................ 6

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

————

NO. 18-260

————

COUNTY OF MAUI,

Petitioner,

v.

HAWAI’I WILDLIFE FUND, ET AL.,

Respondents.

————

On Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

————

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE CHAMBER OF

COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

SUPPORTING PETITIONER

————

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1

Amicus curiae the Chamber of Commerce of the

United States of America (the Chamber) is the world’s

largest business federation. It represents 300,000 direct

members and indirectly represents the interests of more

than three million companies and professional organizations of every size, in every industry sector, and from

every region of the country. An important function of the

Petitioner’s counsel of record consented to the filing of this brief.

Respondents’ counsel of record has filed a blanket consent to all amicus briefs. In accordance with this Court’s Rule 37.6, no counsel for

any party has authored this brief in whole or in part, and no person

or entity, other than amicus, its members, or its counsel, have made

a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this

brief.

1

2

Chamber is to represent the interests of its members in

matters before Congress, the Executive Branch, and the

courts. To that end, the Chamber regularly files amicus

curiae briefs in cases such as this one that raise issues of

concern to the Nation’s business community.

The Ninth Circuit’s breathtaking expansion of the

CWA’s National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System

(NPDES) permitting program to cover groundwater

threatens interests of great importance to the Chamber’s

members. The business community supports safe, effective, and efficient environmental regulation. The decision

below imperils these objectives. Indeed, applying the

CWA to point sources that convey pollutants to groundwater—an area already extensively regulated by other

state and federal programs—will create a morass of duplicative and potentially conflicting regulation. The regulatory uncertainty and vastly increased compliance costs

that will follow this sea change in CWA law will impose

substantial burdens on the regulated public that Congress never intended.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Congress drew a clear line limiting the scope of federal permitting and enforcement under the CWA’s point

source permitting program. The program covers discharges from point sources into navigable waters. Other

releases, including those that reach navigable waters

through nonpoint sources like groundwater, are already

covered by an array of other state and federal laws. The

court of appeals’ expansion of the CWA disrupts that established framework by adding groundwater regulation

into a statutory program that was never designed to regulate groundwater.

Forcing the square peg of groundwater regulation into

the round hole of the CWA’s point source permitting

program promises dire and far-reaching consequences.

3

It is a recipe for regulatory uncertainty, wasteful overlap,

and unpredictable compliance costs. Those effects will be

felt by myriad businesses, individuals, and the Nation as

a whole.

The Court has consistently rejected similarly transformative regulatory expansions without clear Congressional authorization. It has been rightly skeptical of

agencies’ efforts to uncover such authorization lying

dormant in long-extant statutes. The Ninth Circuit’s

strained application of the CWA’s point source provisions

to groundwater—which comes over four decades after

the statute’s enactment—merits the same treatment.

What is more, unlike in some of the Court’s previous decisions that refused similar expansions, no agency deference applies to the Ninth Circuit’s disruptive interpretation. To the contrary, the Environmental Protection

Agency (EPA) has expressly rejected the Ninth Circuit’s

expansion of the statute.

ARGUMENT

I.

THE DECISION BELOW OVERLOOKS CONGRESSIONAL LIMITS ON FEDERAL CWA AUTHORITY AND THE

EXISTING STATE AND FEDERAL REGULATORY REGIMES GOVERNING GROUNDWATER

A. Congress purposefully limited the federal government’s CWA NPDES authority to discharges to “navigable waters.” 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1362(12). Before the

law’s enactment, EPA asked Congress for authority to

regulate discharges to groundwater under the CWA

point source program in order to prevent polluted

groundwater from harming surface waters. See Pet. Br.

40-41. Congress rejected that request, id., and the CWA

plainly differentiates between jurisdictional “navigable

waters” and “ground waters.” 33 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a),

1254(a)(5).

4

The opinion below creates a new standard out of whole

cloth, applying NPDES point source permitting requirements to releases of pollutants into groundwater if

the “pollutants are fairly traceable from the point source

to a navigable water” and reach navigable water at “more

than de minimis” levels. Pet. App. 24. That test finds no

footing whatsoever in the statutory text. Indeed, it ignores the CWA’s considered statutory distinction by allowing—and indeed requiring—federal regulation of not

just “navigable waters,” but of groundwater as well.

Nor does the Ninth Circuit’s expansion of the CWA

plug some inadvertent regulatory gap. The point source

permitting program’s focus on “navigable waters” instead reflects Congress’s recognition that numerous other state and federal regulatory programs have been developed to protect groundwater. Thus, as EPA recently

observed, “[t]here is sufficient legal authority to address

releases of pollutants to groundwater that subsequently

reach jurisdictional surface waters at both the state and

federal level without expanding the CWA’s regulatory

reach beyond what Congress envisioned.” 84 Fed. Reg.

16,810, 16,823 (Apr. 23, 2019).

B. All fifty states exercise broad police powers to

protect their groundwater from pollution. To take one

representative example, Texas has implemented a permitting regime overseen by the Texas Commission on

Environmental Quality. Without a permit, it is illegal to

“discharge sewage, municipal waste, recreational waste,

agricultural waste, or industrial waste into or adjacent to

any water in the state,” including “groundwater.” Tex.

Water Code Ann. §§ 26.001(5), 26.121(a). The Texas Risk

Reduction Program further safeguards Texas groundwater. See 30 Tex. Admin. Code §§ 350.1-.135. That comprehensive program provides for investigation and remediation of contaminated sites within the state and includes measures specifically designed for groundwater

5

contamination. See, e.g., id. §§ 350.32-.33 (providing remedial standards for groundwater); id. § 350.52 (establishing a “groundwater resource classification system”);

id. § 350.75(i) (including groundwater-to-surface-water

pathway in remediation framework). The other fortynine states employ similar regulatory regimes to protect

their groundwater.2

C. While Congress did not apply the CWA’s strict liability permitting regime to releases into groundwater, it

did address specific groundwater concerns in other parts

See Ala. Code § 22-22-9(I)(3); Alaska Stat. Ann. § 46.03.710; Ariz.

Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 49-221, 49-241, 49-263; Ark. Code Ann. § 8-4-217;

Cal. Water Code §§ 13260(a)(1), 13304(a); 5 Colo. Code Regs. § 100261:61.3; Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 22a-427, 22a-430; Del. Code Ann.

tit. 7, § 6003(a); D.C. Code Ann. § 8-103.02; Fla. Stat. Ann.

§§ 403.088(1), 403.161(1); Ga. Code Ann. § 12-5-30; Haw. Rev. Stat.

Ann. § 342D-50; Idaho Code Ann. §§ 39-3618, 39-3620; Idaho Admin.

Code r. 58.01.11.400; 415 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/12; Ind. Code Ann.

§ 13-18-4-5; Iowa Code Ann. § 455B.186; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65-164;

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 224.70-.110; La. Stat. Ann. §§ 30:2075,

30:2076; Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 38, § 413; Md. Code Ann., Envir. § 9-322;

Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 21, §§ 42-43; Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.

§ 324.3109(1); Mich. Admin. Code r. 323.2201(i), 323.2204-05; Minn.

Stat. Ann. § 115.061; Minn. R. 7050.0210; Miss. Code Ann. § 49-1729(2)(a); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 644.051; Mont. Code Ann. § 75-5-605; Neb.

Rev. Stat. Ann. § 81-1506; Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 445A.570; Nev.

Admin. Code 445A.228; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 485-A:12, 485-A:13;

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 58:10A-6; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 74-6-4; N.M. Admin.

Code 20.6.2.1201, 20.6.2.3104; N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 17-0501;

N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 143-215.1(a)(6); N.D. Cent. Code Ann. § 61-2806; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 6111.04; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 27A, § 2-6105; Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 468B.025(1); 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 691.401; 25

Pa. Code § 93.8a(a); 46 R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 46-12-5; S.C. Code

Ann. § 48-1-90(A)(1); S.D. Codified Laws §§ 34A-2-21, 34A-2-22;

Tenn. Code Ann. § 69-3-108(b); Utah Code Ann. § 19-5-107(1); Vt.

Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 1259; Va. Code Ann. §§ 62.1-44.5(A), 62.1-194.1;

Wash. Rev. Code §§ 90.48.080, 90.48.160; W. Va. Code Ann. § 22-11-8;

Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 281.19(1), 281.20(1)(a); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-11301.

2

6

of the CWA and in other federal statutes. For example,

the

Comprehensive

Environmental

Response,

Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) empowers

EPA to remedy the “release” of any “hazardous substance” and certain other “pollutants” into the “environment,” a term that specifically includes “ground water.”

42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(8), 9604(a)(1). Indeed, EPA has developed principles to direct its efforts in this area and maintains a vast store of groundwater guidance, reports, and

tools for its Superfund Remedial Project Managers. See

EPA, Summary of Key Existing EPA CERCLA Policies

for Groundwater Restoration, OSWER Directive 9283.133 (June 26, 2009);3 EPA, Superfund Groundwater Guidance and Reports.4 For example, the National Oil and

Hazardous Substance Pollution Contingency Plan, which

provides the blueprint for CERCLA implementation,

states that “EPA expects to return usable ground waters

to their beneficial uses wherever practicable.” 40 C.F.R.

§ 300.430(a)(iii)(F).

The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

(RCRA), moreover, provides EPA with specific powers

over groundwater contamination that results from solid

waste disposal. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6902, 6911, 6944.

RCRA was motivated in part when EPA alerted Congress of the need to fill gaps in the CWA’s coverage regarding “pollutant discharges normally associated with

improperly managed hazardous waste disposal facilities”

and their “migration into groundwater supplies.”

Legislative History of the Resource Conservation and

Recovery Act of 1976 P.L. 94-580, Report to Congress by

the EPA Pursuant to Section 212 of the Solid Waste

Disposal Act, As Amended 19 (June 1974). Under

https://semspub.epa.gov/work/HQ/175202.pdf.

https://www.epa.gov/superfund/superfund-groundwater-guidanceand-reports.

3

4

7

RCRA, EPA has promulgated regulations protecting

groundwater, including a comprehensive program that

provides for monitoring and remediation of groundwater

affected by certain waste treatment and storage facilities.

See 40 C.F.R. §§ 257.90-.98, 258.50-.58.5

The Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) also includes

extensive provisions to ensure the safety of “underground sources of drinking water.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 300h300h-8. The SDWA specifically focuses on the dangers

posed by injection wells. It establishes a regulatory

structure to protect groundwater from that type of contamination. Ibid.

D. The injection wells at issue in this case fall within

the scope of both state and federal regulatory regimes

protecting groundwater. On the state side, the wells had

to comply with the requirements of Hawai’i’s safe drinking water program, see Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 340E-2,

which has regulations specifically designed for these

types of injection wells, see Haw. Code R. §§ 11-23-06,

11-23-07. Federally, EPA regulates these types of injection wells pursuant to its authority under the SDWA and

has promulgated regulations designed to prevent contamination from such wells. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 144. It is

undisputed that the County of Maui obtained all necessary permits under both state and federal programs.

CERCLA and RCRA both exclude certain types of petroleum and

drilling materials from their scope. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (CERCLA excluding “petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof which is not otherwise specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance”); 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(b)(5) (excluding from RCRA’s

definition of hazardous waste “[d]rilling fluids, produced waters, and

other wastes associated with the exploration, development, or production of crude oil, natural gas or geothermal energy”). But the

statutes nonetheless have broad coverage, and other state and federal regulatory programs, such as the one created by the Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq., ably fill any gaps.

5

8

In short, the states and the federal government are already extensively regulating groundwater—and even the

very injection wells at issue in this case. There was no

need for the Ninth Circuit to stretch the CWA NPDES

permit program to cover this area. And doing so promises duplicative and costly groundwater regulation.

II. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S EXPANSION OF THE CLEAN

WATER ACT CREATES SIGNIFICANT UNCERTAINTY

“[C]larity and predictability” are critical in the CWA

context because the combination of an “uncertain reach

of the Clean Water Act and the draconian penalties imposed for * * * violations” cannot be tolerated. Sackett v.

EPA, 566 U.S. 120, 132-133 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).

The regulatory chaos that would follow if the decision below is upheld would create uncertainty and impose exorbitant costs on the public.

A. Under the court of appeals’ decision, regulated individuals and entities will be forced to navigate a labyrinth of rules with pitfalls at every turn. The first question they face is whether a given activity that may affect

groundwater now requires a point source permit. The

potential reach of the decision below is sweeping. One

reason is that the CWA’s definition of “pollutant” is extremely broad. That term includes “dredged spoil, solid

waste, incinerator residue, sewage, garbage, sewage

sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biological materials,

radioactive materials, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and industrial, municipal,

and agricultural waste discharged into water.” 33 U.S.C.

§ 1362(6). Thus, any release of “rock,” “sand,” or even

“heat[ed]” water into groundwater could potentially fall

within the Ninth Circuit’s expanded point source program.

The court of appeals’ standard, paired with this broad

definition of “pollutant,” could encompass a wide swath of

9

activities. Septic systems—both large commercial ones

and the ubiquitous personal ones that dot rural America—could qualify, requiring a federal permit and federal

oversight at countless private properties. Municipal

storm sewers, brownfield cleanup sites, and other locations already covered by other federal and state regulatory regimes could also enter the point source program’s

crosshairs. Various kinds of basins and impoundments,

like those employed in agricultural operations or for

stormwater control, could face CWA regulation under

this judicially expanded version of the statute as well, if

they employ infrastructure that qualifies as a point

source. And that is just the beginning of a much longer

list, for it takes little creativity to describe a host of personal and commercial activities as “fairly traceable” to

“more than de minimis” impacts on groundwater.

Moreover, to avoid the “crushing” penalties levied for

even “inadvertent” unpermitted discharges, U.S. Army

Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 1807, 1816

(2016) (Kennedy, J., concurring), every company and individual that is engaged in any of these activities must

determine: (1) whether their activities could qualify as a

point source; (2) if so, whether any pollutants that migrate through the groundwater to navigable waters are

“fairly traceable” to their releases; and (3) whether those

pollutants reach navigable waters at “more than de minimis” levels. Determining whether a particular release

into groundwater meets the latter two of those elements

will require hiring experts to conduct a complicated analysis to assess the level of hydrological connectivity between the particular body of groundwater and a specific

body of surface water. Both sophisticated commercial

enterprises and rural residents alike will have to bear the

steep financial cost of such an analysis because it is the

only way to determine whether activity that affects

groundwater comes within the CWA point source pro-

10

gram’s expanded scope. To make matters worse, because

the science is imperfect and the “fairly traceable” and

“more than de minimis” standards are imprecise, even

the most conscientious actor will not obtain anything approaching certainty regarding whether he is subject to a

strict liability permitting regime that carries civil and

criminal penalties for noncompliance.

The regulated individual or entity’s task becomes even

more onerous after that initial step. If, for example, a

septic-system operator decides that the results of its

analysis are concerning enough to justify seeking a CWA

permit, it faces a daunting road ahead. Obtaining permits under the CWA is “arduous, expensive, and long” at

the best of times. Id. at 1815. The challenges confronting a groundwater applicant would be even more severe.

That is because the point source permitting program

is designed for discrete discharges into navigable waters.

It imposes “effluent limitations” on “discernible, confined

and discrete conveyance[s],” 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1362(14),

and requires precise effluent measurement and monitoring. See generally EPA, NPDES Permit Writer’s Manual, EPA-833-K-10-001 (Sept. 2010) (“NPDES Permit

Writer’s Manual”).6 The types of measurements and

monitoring that the point source permitting program

demands are infeasible at best and impossible at worst in

the context of effluent that migrates through groundwater. For example, point source permittees are required

to measure the “mass * * * for each pollutant limited in

the permit” and the “volume of effluent discharged from

each outfall.” 40 C.F.R. § 122.44(i). Those requirements

make sense as applied to point sources that discharge into navigable waters. Sampling and monitoring of the effluent can occur at the pipe or channel that delivers it to

the body of surface water. See NPDES Permit Writer’s

6

https://www.epa.gov/npdes/npdes-permit-writers-manual.

11

Manual § 8.1.2 (providing guidelines for selecting a monitoring location). But that approach does not work for effluent that migrates through groundwater. There is no

pipe or channel from which to monitor and measure.

There is instead only a diffuse effluent flow from the

groundwater into navigable waters at some later point in

time. The measurement and monitoring regime that the

permitting program appropriately requires for point

sources simply does not fit the very different context

presented here. Consequently, the point source permitting program is poorly equipped to handle the flood of

groundwater permits that may soon inundate it.

Assuming our hypothetical operator somehow gets a

permit despite those difficulties, the cost of compliance

can also be prohibitive, particularly when viewed in conjunction with the compliance costs for the other federal,

state, and local regulatory programs that already protect

groundwater. And failure to obtain a permit could preclude land use or business operations and lead to “crushing” financial or even criminal penalties for unpermitted

discharges. Hawkes, 136 S. Ct. at 1816 (Kennedy, J.,

concurring).

Given the uncertainty inherent in this process and the

draconian penalties for releases that are later determined to have required a permit, risk-averse individuals

and businesses will often err on the side of caution and

seek a permit no matter the cost. The result will be a

wasteful allocation of significant resources into obtaining

thousands, if not millions, of NPDES permits that may

ultimately be unnecessary even under the Ninth Circuit’s

view.

Thus, at best, the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation would

force a host of new individuals and businesses to protectively seek burdensome and possibly duplicative CWA

permits. At worst, it would discourage and restrict environmentally sound practices.

12

B. Even before the decision below, the point source

permitting program imposed staggering costs in the pursuit of its laudable goals. According to EPA estimates,

the public spends over 26 million labor hours and over $1

billion annually in applying for and complying with point

source permits. EPA, ICR Supporting Statement, Information Collection Request for National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Program (Renewal), OMB Control No. 2040-0004, EPA ICR No. 0229.22,

at 23, tbl. 12.1 (Sept. 2017).7 If the Ninth Circuit’s dramatically expanded version of the program stands, those

costs can be expected to rise exponentially. And that is

before factoring in the opportunity costs of businesses

rejecting otherwise profitable and economically efficient

endeavors because of the newly added compliance costs

or the risk of inadvertent violations of the court of appeals’ amorphous standard.

It is the province of Congress to weigh these significant costs against any perceived gains from extending

the CWA’s point source program to groundwater, taking

into account existing federal and state protections. Congress has thus far determined that the costs and benefits

weigh against extending the point source program in that

manner. It is not the role of federal courts to secondguess Congress on that distinctly legislative choice. The

Court should restore the longstanding limits on the reach

of the CWA and its point source permitting program that

the statute’s text, intent, and history demand.

https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OW-2008-071

9-0110.

7

13

III. THE COURT’S REJECTION OF A SIMILAR NONLEGISLATIVE EXPANSION OF REGULATORY AUTHORITY IN UARG COMPELS THE SAME RESULT

HERE

The Ninth Circuit’s extravagant extension of the CWA

also cannot stand because “it would bring about an enormous and transformative expansion in EPA’s regulatory

authority without clear congressional authorization.”

Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA (“UARG”), 573 U.S.

302, 324 (2014).

That is precisely the basis on which this Court rejected a similarly disruptive interpretation of the Clean Air

Act in UARG. At issue was EPA’s claim that it possessed the theretofore unrecognized “power to require

permits for the construction and modification of tens of

thousands, and the operation of millions, of small sources

nationwide” because they emitted greenhouse gases.

Ibid. Despite applying the deferential Chevron framework, the Court ultimately rejected EPA’s reading of the

statute as unreasonable. Id. at 321. The Court explained

that “[w]hen an agency claims to discover in a longextant statute an unheralded power to regulate ‘a significant portion of the American economy,’ we typically greet

its announcement with a measure of skepticism.” Id. at

324 (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco

Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000)). Instead, the Court “expect[s] Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign to

an agency decisions of vast ‘economic and political significance.’” Ibid. (quoting Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at

160). Because Congress had not amended the Clean Air

Act to provide such a clear regulatory authorization to

EPA, the Court rejected EPA’s interpretation as unreasonable. See id. at 321-324.

That reasoning applies here. Much as in UARG, the

Ninth Circuit’s massive expansion of the CWA would

14

“radically transform th[e] [NPDES] program[] and render [it] unworkable.” Id. at 320. And in another parallel

to UARG, the claimed source for that new power to regulate “‘a significant portion of the American economy’” is a

“long-extant statute” that no court of appeals had previously read to extend to groundwater. Id. at 324 (quoting

Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159).

In stark contrast to UARG, however, no deference of

any kind attends the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the

CWA. Indeed, EPA has explicitly rejected the court of

appeals’ view of the statute, “conclud[ing] that the Act is

best read as excluding all releases of pollutants from a

point source to groundwater from NPDES program coverage and liability under [the point source provisions] of

the CWA, regardless of a hydrologic connection between

the groundwater and a jurisdictional surface water.” 84

Fed. Reg. 16810, 16810 (Apr. 23, 2019). Without the

counterweight of Chevron deference, UARG’s reasoning

applies with even greater force here.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the court of appeals should be

reversed.

15

Respectfully submitted.

STEVEN P. LEHOTSKY

MICHAEL B. SCHON

U.S. CHAMBER LITIGATION

CENTER

1615 H St., NW

Washington, D.C. 20062

(202) 659-6000

AARON M. STREETT

Counsel of Record

J. MARK LITTLE

BAKER BOTTS L.L.P.

910 Louisiana St.

Houston, TX 77002

(713) 229-1234

aaron.streett@bakerbotts.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae Chamber of

Commerce of the United States of America

May 2019