Respondents Brief — County of Maui, Hawaii, Petitioner v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, et al.

Supreme Court briefJul 12, 2019

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

No. 18-260

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

COUNTY OF MAUI,

Petitioner,

v.

HAWAI‘I WILDLIFE FUND; SIERRA CLUB –

MAUI GROUP; SURFRIDER FOUNDATION;

WEST MAUI PRESERVATION ASSOCIATION,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS

SCOTT L. NELSON

PUBLIC CITIZEN

LITIGATION GROUP

1600 20th Street NW

Washington, DC 20009

(202) 588-1000

AMANDA C. LEITER

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

WASHINGTON COLLEGE

OF LAW

4300 Nebraska Avenue NW

Washington, DC 20016

(202) 274-4187

July 12, 2019

DAVID L. HENKIN

Counsel of Record

EARTHJUSTICE

850 Richards Street

Suite 400

Honolulu, Hawai‘i 96813

(808) 599-2436

dhenkin@earthjustice.org

JANETTE K. BRIMMER

EARTHJUSTICE

705 2nd Avenue

Suite 203

Seattle, WA 98104

(206) 343-7340

Attorneys for Respondents

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

When a pollutant released from a point source

travels a short distance through groundwater before

foreseeably reaching navigable surface waters, does

that point-source discharge fall within the Clean Water Act’s prohibition of unpermitted additions of any

pollutant to navigable waters from any point source?

ii

RULE 29.6 STATEMENT

Respondents Hawai‘i Wildlife Fund, Surfrider

Foundation and West Maui Preservation Association

are nonprofit organizations that have no parent corporations, and no publicly held company has any ownership interest in them.

Respondent Sierra Club – Maui Group is part of

the Sierra Club, which is a nonprofit organization that

has no parent corporation, and no publicly held company has any ownership interest in it.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED .......................................... i

RULE 29.6 STATEMENT .......................................... ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................... vi

INTRODUCTION ....................................................... 1

STATUTES INVOLVED ............................................ 3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................... 3

A. Statutory Background...................................... 3

B. Facts ................................................................. 6

C. Proceedings Below ......................................... 10

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................................. 12

ARGUMENT ............................................................. 15

I.

The CWA’s plain language prohibits the

County’s unpermitted addition of pollutants

from disposal wells to the Pacific. ..................... 15

A. The County’s “addition” of pollutants “to”

navigable waters comes “from” a point

source. ............................................................. 15

B. The Act’s terms apply to indirect discharges

from point sources that traceably and

foreseeably reach navigable waters. ............. 19

C. The CWA’s provisions concerning disposal of

pollutants in wells underscore the Act’s

application to the Lahaina Facility. .............. 22

D. The statute’s background and context support

its application to indirect discharges. ........... 25

II. The CWA’s language and structure contradict

the County’s and EPA’s readings. ..................... 27

iv

A. The County and EPA propose atextual

exceptions to the statute. ............................... 27

B. The County’s textual arguments are

erroneous. ....................................................... 29

1. “Conveyance”............................................. 29

2. “From” ....................................................... 31

3. “Any point source” .................................... 32

4. “Into” ......................................................... 33

C. The CWA’s structure and history do not

support the County’s and EPA’s limiting

constructions. ................................................. 35

1. Congress did not foreclose regulation of

indirect point-source pollution when it

declined to regulate nonpoint-source

pollution.. .................................................. 36

2. The CWA does not categorically exclude

discharges to navigable waters through

groundwater. ............................................. 41

III. CWA regulation of discharges to surface water

via groundwater complements groundwaterprotection statutes. ............................................ 49

IV. Applying the CWA to the County’s wells would

not transform the Act’s scope, but failing to

apply it would thwart its objectives and create

opportunities for evasion. .................................. 52

CONCLUSION.......................................................... 57

APPENDIX—Statutes Involved

1.

33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) ............................................ 1a

2.

33 U.S.C. § 1343 ................................................. 1a

v

3.

33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) ............................................ 3a

4.

33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) .......................................... 3a

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Page(s)

Alabama v. North Carolina,

560 U.S. 330 (2010) ............................................. 28

Ali v. Fed. Bur. of Prisons,

552 U.S. 214 (2008) ............................................. 17

Am. Wildlands v. Browner,

260 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2001) ........................... 37

Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co.,

446 U.S. 608 (1980) ............................................. 28

Arkansas v. Oklahoma,

503 U.S. 91 (1992) ........................................... 6, 34

Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer,

513 U.S. 179 (1995) ............................................. 18

Azar v. Allina Health Servs.,

139 S. Ct. 1804 (2019) ......................................... 45

Badaracco v. Comm’r of Internal Rev.,

464 U.S. 386 (1984) ............................................. 28

Brecht v. Abrahamson,

507 U.S. 619 (1993) ....................................... 31, 32

Ctr. for Native Ecosystems v. Cables,

509 F.3d 1310 (10th Cir. 2007) ........................... 37

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC,

467 U.S. 837 (1984) ............................................. 42

Citizens Bank of Md. v. Strumpf,

516 U.S. 16 (1995) ............................................... 57

Concerned Area Residents for the Envt.

v. Southview Farm,

34 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 1994) ............................. 19, 38

vii

Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain,

503 U.S. 249 (1992) ............................................. 28

Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v.

GTE Sylvania, Inc.,

447 U.S. 102 (1980) ............................................. 15

CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride,

564 U.S. 685 (2011) ............................................. 20

Dames & Moore v. Regan,

453 U.S. 654 (1981) ............................................. 34

Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr.,

568 U.S. 597 (2013) ............................................. 39

Dodd v. United States,

545 U.S. 353 (2005) ............................................. 28

EPA v. California ex rel. State Water

Res. Control Bd.,

426 U.S. 200 ........................................................... 3

Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co.,

505 U.S. 469 (1992) ............................................. 34

Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc.,

517 U.S. 830 (1996) ............................................. 22

Exxon Corp. v. Train,

554 F.3d 1310 (5th Cir. 1977) ....................... 46, 47

FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,

529 U.S. 120 (2000) ............................................. 44

Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Inst.,

138 S. Ct. 1833 (2018) ......................................... 24

Inland Steel Co. v. EPA,

901 F.2d 1419 (7th Cir. 1990) ....................... 23, 51

Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette,

479 U.S. 481 (1987) ............................................. 56

viii

Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini,

Kramer & Ulrich LPA,

559 U.S. 573 (2010) ............................................. 26

Lamie v. United States Trustee,

540 U.S. 526 (2004) ....................................... 15, 28

League of Wilderness Defenders/Blue Mts.

Biodiversity Project v. Forsgren,

309 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2002) ....................... 37, 40

Legal Envtl. Assistance Fdn., Inc. v. EPA,

118 F.3d 1467 (11th Cir. 1997) ........................... 50

Levin v. United States,

568 U.S. 503 (2013) ............................................. 34

Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist. v. NRDC,

568 U.S. 78 (2013) ............................................... 17

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,

504 U.S. 555 (1992) ............................................. 20

Magwood v. Patterson,

561 U.S. 320 (2010) ............................................. 28

Massachusetts v. EPA,

549 U.S. 497 (2007) ............................................. 43

Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy,

460 U.S. 766 (1983) ............................................. 21

Milwaukee & St. P.R. Co. v. Kellogg,

94 U.S. 469 (1876) ............................................... 21

Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Defense,

138 S. Ct. 617 (2018) ................................... 4, 5, 17

Or. Nat. Desert Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv.,

550 F.3d 778 (9th Cir. 2008) ............................... 35

Or. Nat. Res. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv.,

834 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1987) ......................... 37, 38

ix

POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co.,

573 U.S. 102 (2014) ............................................. 49

Rapanos v. United States,

547 U.S. 715 (2006) ............. 2, 3, 11, 19, 20, 21, 45

Rice v. Harken Exploration Co.,

250 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 2001) ............................... 47

Rubin v. Islamic Repub. of Iran,

138 S. Ct. 816 (2018) ........................................... 23

S.D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. of Envtl. Prot.,

547 U.S. 370 (2006) ............................................. 17

Sierra Club v. Abston Constr. Co.,

620 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1980). ................................ 40

Sierra Club v. El Paso Gold Mines, Inc.,

421 F.3d 1133 (10th Cir. 2005) ..................... 37, 40

Simsbury-Avon Preservation Soc’y, LLC

v. Metacon Gun Club, Inc.,

575 F.3d 199 (2d Cir. 2009) ........................... 37, 38

Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v.

U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,

531 U.S. 159 (2001) ............................................. 45

S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe,

541 U.S. 95 (2004) ............17, 18, 31, 32, 41, 44, 56

Staub v. Proctor Hosp.,

562 U.S. 411 (2011) ............................................. 22

TRW Inc. v. Andrews,

534 U.S. 19 (2001) ......................................... 28, 29

United States v. Ballard Oil Co. of Hartford,

195 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1952) ................................. 25

x

United States v. Esso Standard Oil

Co. of Puerto Rico,

375 F.2d 621 (3rd Cir. 1967) ......................... 25, 26

United States v. Mead Corp.,

533 U.S. 218 (2001) ............................................. 42

United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,

474 U.S. 121 (1985) ............................................... 3

United States v. Standard Oil Co.,

384 U.S. 224 (1966) ............................................. 25

United States v. Valley Camp Coal Co.,

480 F.2d 616 (4th Cir. 1973) ............................... 26

United States v. White Fuel Corp.,

498 F.2d 619 (1st Cir. 1974) ................................ 26

U.S. Steel Corp. v. Train,

556 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1977) ............................... 46

Util. Air Reg. Grp. v. EPA,

573 U.S. 302 (2014) ....................................... 52, 53

Village of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson Corp,

24 F.3d 962 (7th Cir. 1994) ................................. 46

Yates v. United States,

135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015) ......................................... 22

Federal Statutes:

Coastal Zone Management Act,

16 U.S.C. § 1451 et seq. ....................................... 52

§ 1455b(a)(1) ........................................................ 52

§ 1456(f) ............................................................... 52

xi

Comprehensive Environmental Response,

Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),

42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. ................................. 51, 52

§ 9601(10) ............................................................. 51

§ 9601(14) ............................................................. 51

§ 9603(a) ............................................................... 51

§ 9603(b) ............................................................... 51

§ 9604 ................................................................... 51

§ 9605 ................................................................... 51

§ 9606 ................................................................... 51

§ 9607(j)................................................................ 51

Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of

1972 (Clean Water Act), Pub. L. No. 92-500,

86 Stat. 816, codified as amended at

33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq................................passim

§ 1251(a) ........................................................... 3, 56

§ 1251(a)(1) ................................................ 3, 34, 56

§ 1252(a) ............................................................... 43

§ 1254(a)(5) .......................................................... 43

§ 1288 ................................................................... 44

§ 1311 ............................................................. 23, 36

§ 1311(a) ........................................................passim

§ 1312 ............................................................. 23, 36

§ 1314(a)(1)(A) ..................................................... 43

§ 1314(a)(2)(A) ..................................................... 43

§ 1316 ............................................................. 23, 36

xii

§ 1317 ................................................................... 23

§ 1329(i)(1) .......................................................... 39

§ 1341(a)(1) ............................................................ 8

§ 1342 ............................................. 1, 17, 36, 43, 54

§ 1342(a) ......................................................... 15, 23

§ 1342(a)(1) ............................................................ 5

§ 1342(a)(3) ...................................................... 6, 48

§ 1342(a)(4) .................................................... 26, 35

§ 1342(a)(5) .......................................................... 26

§ 1342(b) ............................................... 6, 23, 34, 48

§ 1342(b)(1)(A) ..................................................... 23

§ 1342(b)(1)(D) ............................... 6, 13, 23, 47, 48

§ 1342(l)(1) ........................................................... 29

§ 1342(l)(2) ..................................................... 29, 39

§ 1342(l)(3) ..................................................... 29, 39

§ 1342(p)............................................................... 39

§ 1342(p)(1) .......................................................... 29

§ 1342(r) ............................................................... 29

§ 1342(s)(2)........................................................... 54

§ 1342(s)(3)(B)(ii) ................................................. 54

§ 1343 ......................................................... 3, 23, 49

§ 1343(a) ................................................................. 5

§ 1343(c) ................................................................. 5

§ 1343(c)(1)(A) ........................................................ 5

§ 1343(c)(1)(B) ........................................................ 5

xiii

§ 1343(c)(1)(C) ........................................................ 5

§ 1344 ................................................................... 36

§ 1362 ..................................................................... 4

§ 1362(6) ......................................... 1, 3, 4, 8, 16, 50

§ 1362(6)(B) .................................. 13, 24, 29, 47, 50

§ 1362(7) ....................................................... 1, 5, 16

§ 1362(8) ....................................................... 1, 5, 16

§ 1362(9) ................................................................. 5

§ 1362(10) ............................................................... 5

§ 1362(11) ............................................................. 34

§ 1362(12) ....................................................... 30, 32

§ 1362(12)(A) .................................................passim

§ 1362(12)(B) .......................................................... 5

§ 1362(14) ......................................................passim

§ 1362(27) ............................................................. 54

§ 1371(b) ............................................................... 34

§ 1377a(a) ............................................................. 54

Oil Pollution Act,

33 U.S.C. § 2701(20) ............................................ 52

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),

42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq. ................................. 50, 51

§ 6903(5) ............................................................... 50

§ 6903(27) ............................................................. 51

§ 6905(a) ............................................................... 51

§ 6905(b)(1) .......................................................... 51

xiv

Rivers and Harbors Act of 1879, § 13 (Refuse Act),

33 U.S.C. § 407 .................................. 25, 26, 27, 35

Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA),

42 U.S.C. § 300f et seq. .............................. 7, 49, 50

§ 300h(b)(1) .......................................................... 49

§ 300h(d)(2) .................................................... 49, 50

Water Infrastructure Improvement Act,

Pub. L. No. 115-436, 132 Stat. 5558 (2019) ........ 54

Federal Regulations & Regulatory Materials:

40 C.F.R. § 122.2 ....................................................... 39

40 C.F.R. pt. 125, subpt. M ......................................... 5

§ 125.122 .............................................................. 49

§ 125.122(a)(5 ........................................................ 6

§ 125.123 .............................................................. 49

§ 125.123(b) ............................................................ 5

§ 125.123(c)(2) ........................................................ 5

40 C.F.R. § 261.4(a)(2) cmt. ...................................... 51

EPA, Final National Pollutant Discharge

Elimination System (NPDES) General

Permit for Stormwater Discharges from

Construction Activities,

82 Fed. Reg. 6,534 (Jan. 19, 2017) ...................... 55

EPA, Final National Pollutant Discharge

Elimination System (NPDES) Pesticide General

Permit for Point Source Discharges from the

Application of Pesticides; Reissuance,

81 Fed. Reg. 75,816 (Nov. 1, 2016) ............... 55, 56

xv

EPA, HAWAII, Program for Control of Discharges

of Pollutants to Navigable Waters,

39 Fed. Reg. 43,759 (Dec. 18, 1974). ..................... 6

EPA, Interpretive Statement on Application of

the Clean Water Act National Pollutant

Discharge Elimination System Program to

Releases of Pollutants from a Point Source to

Groundwater, 84 Fed. Reg. 16,810

(Apr. 23, 2019) ................... 1, 37, 41, 42, 44, 45, 53

EPA, National Management Measures to Control

Nonpoint Source Pollution from Urban Areas,

Management Measure 6: New and Existing OnSite Wastewater Treatment Systems (2005),

https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201509/documents/urban_ch06.pdf ............................ 55

EPA, NPDES Permit Application Regulations for

Storm Water Discharges, 55 Fed. Reg. 47,990

(Nov. 16, 1990) ............................................... 46, 53

EPA, NPDES State Program Information: State

Program Authority, https://www.epa.gov/npdes/

npdes-state-program-information. ...................... 56

EPA, Office of Water, Nonpoint Source Guidance

(1987), https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPURL.

cgi?Dockey=910217GL.TXT ................................ 38

EPA, Septic Systems Overview,

https://www.epa.gov/septic/septic-systemsoverview ......................................................... 54, 55

State Statutes:

Haw. Rev. Stat. ch. 340E ............................................ 7

xvi

State Regulations & Regulatory Materials:

Haw. Admin. R. § 11-54-6(b)(3) .............................. 8, 9

Haw. Admin. R. § 11-62-26 ......................................... 8

Hawai‘i’s Nonpoint Source Management Plan (20152020), http://health.hawaii.gov/cwb/files/2013/05/

2015-Hawaii-NPS-Management-Plan.pdf .......... 52

Legislative History:

118 Cong. Rec. 33,758 (1972).................................... 26

S. Rep. No. 92-414 (1971), reprinted in

1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668 ...............................passim

Other:

Prouty, et al., Vulnerability of coral reefs to

bioerosion from land-based sources of pollution,

122 J. of Geophysical Res.: Oceans 9319 (2017),

https://darchive.mblwhoilibrary.org/handle/

1912/9534 ............................................................... 9

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary

(2002 ed.)............................................ 17, 18, 22, 35

INTRODUCTION

The keystone provision of the Clean Water Act

(CWA) is its prohibition of “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source” without a permit. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A); see id.

§§ 1311(a), 1342. The County of Maui (County) and

the United States Environmental Protection Agency

(EPA) seek to avoid application of this prohibition to

the County’s Lahaina Wastewater Reclamation Facility (Lahaina Facility) by asserting that all additions

of pollutants “to navigable waters from [a] point

source” via groundwater are exempt. The CWA’s text,

and its structure and purposes, foreclose such an exemption.

The County designed the Lahaina injection wells

to dispose of millions of gallons of treated sewage daily

into the groundwater beneath the Facility, and it did

so knowing these pollutants would flow into the Pacific Ocean. The wells undisputedly achieve this purpose: Large quantities of effluent injected at the wells

flow into the ocean near the Facility. Likewise, there

is no dispute that the wells are “point source[s]” under

the CWA, id. § 1362(14), that the effluent from them

is a “pollutant,” id. § 1362(6), and that the Pacific immediately off the Maui coastline is a “navigable water[],” id. § 1362(7); see also id. § 1362(8). A straightforward reading of the CWA’s core prohibition, therefore, bars the County’s unpermitted “addition of [a]

pollutant”—the Facility’s effluent—“to navigable waters”—the Pacific—“from [a] point source”—the wells.

The County and EPA—which reversed its position

in an “interpretive statement” issued after this Court

granted certiorari, 84 Fed. Reg. 16,810 (Apr. 23,

2019)—offer competing rationales for exempting the

2

County’s discharges from the Act’s requirements. The

County urges a “means-of-delivery test” that would

limit the CWA’s prohibition to unpermitted discharges that directly reach navigable waters through

an unbroken chain of point sources. EPA rejects the

County’s test but proffers a newly minted reading of

the Act that would exclude from its prohibition any

addition of pollutants to navigable waters from a point

source through groundwater.

The CWA’s text contradicts these cramped readings. EPA does not even attempt to square its reading

with the Act’s operative provisions. Both the County

and EPA rely on unsupported inferences drawn from

inapplicable provisions of the Act, and on the implausible theory that Congress, in focusing the CWA on

point-source pollution of surface waters, intended to

exempt any such pollution that ever travels through

groundwater, over any distance, for any amount of

time. The Act’s terms, however, express Congress’s intent to prohibit the unpermitted discharge from disposal wells of pollutants that actually and foreseeably

reach navigable surface waters.

Requiring a permit for such point-source discharges serves the Act’s purpose of eliminating pollution of navigable waters, and does so without imposing undue regulatory burdens. Either the County’s or

EPA’s view, by contrast, would open a substantial

loophole in the CWA, allowing polluters to achieve indirectly what they cannot do directly: discharge pollutants from point sources into navigable waters without a permit. As Justice Scalia pointed out in his plurality opinion in Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S.

715 (2006), the CWA does not permit that result. “The

Act does not forbid the ‘addition of any pollutant directly to navigable waters from any point source,’ but

3

rather the ‘addition of any pollutant to navigable waters.’” Id. at 743 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A)). On

that natural reading of the CWA, the County’s unpermitted discharges violate the Act.

STATUTES INVOLVED

Statutes involved in this case are reproduced in

the County’s brief and the appendix to the brief of the

United States, except for 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a), 1343,

1362(6), and 1362(14), which are reproduced in the

appendix to this brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Statutory Background

The relevant statutory text originated in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of

1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816, commonly

known as the Clean Water Act. The Act “constituted a

comprehensive legislative attempt ‘to restore and

maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters,’” United States v. Riverside

Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 132 (1985) (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)), and established “the national

goal” of eliminating “the discharge of pollutants into

the navigable waters,” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1).

In enacting the CWA, Congress recognized that existing federal legislation was inadequate to achieve

the ambitious goal of protecting the Nation’s waters,

in part because that legislation attempted to define

and maintain standards of water quality rather than

directly regulate polluters. See S. Rep. No. 92-414, at

7-8 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 367475; EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Res. Control

Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 202-04 (1976). By contrast, the

4

CWA recognizes that “[w]ater moves in hydrologic cycles and it is essential that discharge of pollutants be

controlled at the source.” S. Rep. No. 92-414 at 77, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3742.

Congress implemented this new approach in a series of interlocking statutory provisions that prohibit

unpermitted discharges of pollutants from point

sources to navigable waters. This prohibition, “[o]ne of

the Act’s principal tools,” Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t

of Defense, 138 S. Ct. 617, 624 (2018) (“NAM”), is set

forth in 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a), which provides that “the

discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful,” except in compliance with provisions regarding effluent limitations, performance standards, and

discharge permits.

Another provision, 33 U.S.C. § 1362, supplies the

definitions that establish section 1311(a)’s meaning.

Section 1362 defines “discharge of a pollutant” to

mean “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source.” Id. § 1362(12)(A). A “pollutant” is “dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions,

chemical wastes, biological materials, radioactive materials, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock,

sand, cellar dirt and industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into water.” Id. § 1362(6). A

“point source” is “any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any

pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal

feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft,

from which pollutants are or may be discharged.” Id.

§ 1362(14). And “navigable waters” are “the waters of

5

the United States, including the territorial seas.” Id.

§ 1362(7).1

Section 1311(a) contains “exceptions to the prohibition on discharge of pollutants,” including “two permitting schemes that authorize certain entities to discharge pollutants into navigable waters.” NAM, 138

S. Ct. at 625. The scheme relevant here, the National

Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES),

provides that EPA may “issue a permit for the discharge of any pollutant, or combination of pollutants,

notwithstanding section 1311(a),” if the discharge

meets applicable effluent limits, performance standards, and other requirements of the Act. 33 U.S.C.

§ 1342(a)(1).

The Act requires that permits for discharges to the

territorial seas ensure compliance with criteria promulgated by EPA to protect the marine environment. 33

U.S.C. § 1343(a), (c); see also 40 C.F.R. pt. 125, subpt.

M (establishing such criteria). The Act and implementing criteria specify that a permit may not issue if

the discharge will “cause unreasonable degradation of

the marine environment,” 40 C.F.R. § 125.123(b), taking into account impacts on “human health or welfare,” “marine life,” and “esthetic, recreation, and economic values,” 33 U.S.C. § 1343(c)(1)(A)-(C). If the

possible extent of degradation cannot be determined,

a permit may issue only if “[t]here are no reasonable

alternatives” to the proposed discharge. 40 C.F.R.

§ 125.123(c)(2). EPA’s criteria highlight the need to

––––––––––––––––––––––––

1 The “territorial seas” are the “belt of the seas” extending

three miles beyond the coast. Id. § 1362(8). The CWA also prohibits discharges from point sources other than vessels to the

“contiguous zone” and the “ocean,” id. § 1362(12)(B), marine waters that that lie beyond the territorial seas. Id. § 1362(9)-(10).

6

protect “special aquatic sites,” including “coral reefs”

such as those near the Lahaina discharge wells. Id.

§ 125.122(a)(5).

Section 1342(b) provides that EPA may authorize

a state to administer the NPDES permit program “for

discharges into navigable waters within its jurisdiction,” provided the state’s permitting program is adequate to meet the Act’s requirements. 33 U.S.C.

§ 1342(b). EPA delegated permitting authority to the

State of Hawai‘i in 1974. 39 Fed. Reg. 43,759 (Dec. 18,

1974).

The statute expressly provides that disposal wells

may be subject to NPDES permitting. To administer

its own NPDES program, a state must have “adequate

authority” to issue NPDES permits that “control the

disposal of pollutants into wells.” 33 U.S.C.

§ 1342(b)(1)(D). This requirement also applies to

EPA’s own permitting authority because, to ensure

parity between federal and state permitting regimes,

the CWA explicitly provides that the federal permit

program “shall be subject to the same terms, conditions, and requirements as apply to a State permit

program … under subsection (b) of this section.” Id.

§ 1342(a)(3); see Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91,

103 (1992).

B. Facts

Since the 1980s, the County has operated four injection wells at the Lahaina Facility to dispose of

treated sewage. Pet. App. 7; JA 74, 78-80. The wells

inject treated sewage directly into groundwater below

the Facility, which is located less than half a mile from

the Pacific shoreline. Pet. App. 7; JA 74, 79-80, 85. The

County’s wells inject three to five million gallons of

treated sewage daily. Pet. App. 7-8.

7

As the County admits, and a tracer-dye study conclusively established, wastewater from the wells flows

with the groundwater into the ocean. Pet. App. 8-10,

24, 67; JA 85.2 The State and EPA have “long known

that effluent from the Lahaina wells reaches the

ocean.” Pet. Br. 13. The County understood as long ago

as 1973, during the planning process for the wells,

that the wells’ discharges would “reach the ocean.”

Pet. App. 159. That was, in fact, the point of the wells.

The County designed them to convey treated sewage

to the ocean to avoid having to pipe it directly to an

ocean outfall, Pet. App. 8, and the impacts on the receiving waters are comparable to those of a direct outfall. The massive influx of treated sewage from the

wells makes up “[a]bout one out of every seven gallons

of groundwater entering the ocean near the [Lahaina

Facility].” Pet. App. 9.

The County has never secured an NPDES permit

for the discharges from its wells to the Pacific. See Pet.

App. 93. Instead, the County obtained only underground injection control (UIC) permits issued under

the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300f et seq.,

and state law, Haw. Rev. Stat. ch. 340E. Those laws

provide for the protection of drinking water sources,

not surface water bodies, and the permits expressly

state that the County must separately comply with

any applicable NPDES permit requirements. See, e.g.,

SER 20, 40.

––––––––––––––––––––––––

2 The County’s observation that the tracer-dye study did not

detect dye from its Well 2 in the ocean does not suggest any doubt

that effluents from Well 2 discharge into the Pacific: The County

specifically admitted that fact, Pet. App. 93, and it is consistent

with modeling by the study’s authors. JA 75-76; Ninth Circuit

Supplemental Excerpts of Record (SER) 241-42, 255-57.

8

Neither EPA nor the Hawai‘i Department of

Health ever determined that the County was not required to obtain an NPDES permit. Pet. App. 30. Rather, EPA advised the County in January 2010 that it

was investigating whether the County was violating

the CWA and ordered a tracer-dye study to determine

whether the wells were adding pollutants to the

ocean. SER 5-11. In March 2010, EPA followed up

with an order requiring the County to secure a water

quality certification under 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1),

based on EPA’s determination that the wells “may result in a discharge into navigable waters.” Ninth Circuit Excerpts of Record (ER) 122. In 2015, EPA stated

that the wells’ discharges require an NPDES permit.

ER 357-58.

The County touts the quality of the wastewater its

wells discharge but does not dispute that the

wastewater meets the CWA’s definition of “pollutant[s],” which includes “sewage” and “municipal …

waste.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6). Further, the Hawai‘i recycled-water standard the County cites, see Pet. Br. 7,

contains no limits on nutrients like nitrogen and phosphorus, see Haw. Admin. R. § 11-62-26, which are present in high concentrations in treated sewage and

pose a significant threat to the marine environment,

including coral reefs, see infra pp. 9-10.

The County’s UIC permits are similarly lax with

respect to those nutrients: The permits impose no limits on phosphorus and set limits for total nitrogen that

are almost two orders of magnitude higher than the

State’s water quality standards for the coastal waters

just offshore of the wells. Compare ER 367 with Haw.

Admin. R. § 11-54-6(b)(3) (10 mg/liter in UIC permit

9

versus 0.15 mg/liter in applicable water quality standard).3 As a result, at the submarine springs where the

majority of the County’s wastewater enters the ocean,

measurements of phosphorus and nitrogen substantially exceed CWA regulatory limits. See Haw. Admin.

R. § 11-54-6(b)(3); SER 126-42.

The County’s assertion that these discharges are

harmless is both immaterial to the legal issues and

disputed. The district court concluded that “the discharge at the [Lahaina Facility] significantly affects

the physical, chemical, and biological integrity of the

ocean water.” Pet. App. 80; see also Pet. App. 78-79.

The discharges occur immediately off Kahekili Beach,

site of a formerly pristine coral reef. Although the

County’s paid expert denied any impact to the reef,

independent, peer-reviewed studies and government

reports have reached the opposite conclusion. See, e.g.,

Prouty, et al., Vulnerability of coral reefs to bioerosion

from land-based sources of pollution, 122 J. of Geophysical Res.: Oceans 9319 (2017) (concluding that

nutrients from the Lahaina Facility are accelerating

bioerosion of Kahekili reef).4 In the decades since the

Lahaina Facility opened, nutrients and other pollutants from injected sewage have devastated the oncepristine reef, stimulating algal growth that smothers

––––––––––––––––––––––––

3 While the County cites early EPA statements that the UIC

permit can protect ocean quality, Pet. Br. 13, EPA later clarified

that the nitrogen level in the County’s injection permit is “as

stringent as the UIC regulations allow,” though insufficient to

protect marine waters. ER 367; see also ER 366 (“The UIC permit

is designed to protect groundwater, not surface water. Surface

water impacts must be handled with a different authority.”).

4 https://darchive.mblwhoilibrary.org/handle/1912/9534 (last

visited July 9, 2019).

10

the coral. ER 274-84. Hawai‘i’s Division of Aquatic Resources reported a 40% decline in coral cover at Kahekili from 1994 to 2006. SER 273.

Like its claim that the wastewater discharges are

harmless, the County’s assertions about the pathways

by which its wells’ effluent reaches the ocean are disputed. The record contradicts the County’s claim that

“more than 90%” of the injected wastewater “enters

the ocean through diffuse flow, with no identifiable

entry point.” Pet. Br. 7. The tracer-dye study concluded that 64% of the wastewater from Wells 3 and 4

(which at the time of the study constituted over 80%

of the County’s discharges) entered the ocean in two

submarine spring areas only several meters wide. Pet.

App. 67; SER 156-57, 316-18; JA 68-71. Thus, the

study identified precise and discrete locations where

over half of the injected effluent enters the ocean.

C. Proceedings Below

Respondents are Maui-based organizations that

filed a CWA citizen suit seeking remedies for the

County’s unpermitted discharges of pollutants to the

Pacific Ocean from its disposal wells. The district

court granted summary judgment, holding on three

alternative bases that the County’s unpermitted

point-source discharges to navigable waters through

groundwater violate the CWA. First, the court held

that the CWA applies to discharges to navigable waters from a point source even if the point source itself

does not convey pollutants directly to the navigable

waters. Second, the court concluded that, under the

facts here, the groundwater that conveys the

wastewater to the ocean is itself a point source. The

court highlighted the tracer-dye study’s finding “that

more than 50% of the effluent originating at the

11

[wells] is finding its way into the ocean.” Pet. App. 69.

In the court’s view, “[a]ny conveyance that transmits

such a high proportion of a pollutant from one place to

another” meets the “confined and discrete” aspects of

the CWA’s point-source definition, “irrespective of …

other geologic properties.” Id.5 Third, the court held

that the groundwater here is itself a part of the navigable waters because of its “significant nexus” to the

ocean. Pet. App. 82.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding of CWA liability on the first of these grounds, without reaching the other two. The court concluded that

operating the wells without an NPDES permit constituted the unlawful “addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source.” 33 U.S.C.

§ 1362(12)(A).6

Relying in part on Justice Scalia’s observation that

the CWA does not forbid the unpermitted “‘addition of

any pollutant directly to navigable waters from any

point source,’ but rather the ‘addition of any pollutant

to navigable waters,’” Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 743 (plurality) (citation omitted), the court rejected the

County’s argument that the Act applies only to direct

pollution additions. That argument, the Court pointed

out, “read[s] into the statute at least one critical term

that does not appear on its face—that the pollutants

––––––––––––––––––––––––

5 The court accordingly did not resolve issues of fact regard-

ing the existence of subsurface features establishing preferential

flow pathways. See SER 116-17, 183, 185-88, 191-93; JA 75-76.

6 The Ninth Circuit did not resolve whether the subsurface

flow is through fissures or other rock openings that would themselves satisfy the point-source definition. Pet. App. 16 n.2. That

issue should remain open for consideration on remand if necessary in light of this Court’s resolution of the question presented.

12

must be discharged ‘directly’ to navigable waters from

a point source.” Pet. App. 23. The Act’s plain meaning,

the court held, renders it applicable where “pollutants

are fairly traceable from the point source to a navigable water such that the discharge is the functional

equivalent of a discharge into the navigable water.”

Pet. App. 24. Because the CWA would forbid the

County to “build an ocean outfall to dispose of pollutants directly into the Pacific Ocean without an

NPDES permit,” allowing the County knowingly to

achieve the same result via coastal injection wells

would “make a mockery of the CWA’s prohibitions.”

Pet. App. 31.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The CWA’s plain terms prohibit “any addition of

any pollutant to navigable waters from any point

source,” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A), without a permit.

See id. § 1311(a). The CWA expressly defines the

County’s wells as point sources, the effluent they discharge as a pollutant, and the Pacific Ocean off the

Maui coastline as navigable waters. The introduction

of the effluent to the Pacific is an “addition” of pollutants “to” those waters. And that addition comes

“from” the County’s point-source wells: The wells are

both the pollutants’ point of departure and a factual

cause of their addition to navigable waters.

The CWA’s coverage is not limited to pollutants

that come to navigable waters directly from point

sources, without any intermediate means of transmission. Pollutants added to navigable waters come

“from” a point source if the point-source discharge was

both a factual and a proximate cause of the pollutants’

reaching those waters. A point-source discharge to

navigable waters through groundwater satisfies these

13

criteria if, as in this case, pollutants are fairly traceable to the point source (establishing factual causation), and their addition to navigable waters is the

foreseeable, natural consequence of their release from

that source (establishing proximate causation).

The Act’s express inclusion of “well[s]” in its definition of “point source,” id. § 1362(14), confirms its application to such releases. Other provisions of the Act

further illustrate that it covers subterranean movement of pollutants from wells to navigable waters. For

example, the Act expressly requires that the NPDES

permit program control disposal of pollutants in wells.

Id. § 1342(b)(1)(D). Further, the definition of “pollutant” provides that, under specified circumstances,

the Act covers releases from underground wells of materials related to oil and gas production. Id.

§ 1362(6)(B). Finally, the statutory background

against which the CWA was enacted included a prohibition against unpermitted, indirect discharges of pollutants to navigable waters, and Congress explicitly

crafted the CWA’s NPDES permitting program to continue to regulate those indirect discharges.

To avoid the CWA’s application to the County’s disposal wells, the County and EPA propose mutually inconsistent, atextual limits on its terms. The County

seeks to rewrite the Act to apply only when a point

source or series of point sources conveys pollutants directly to navigable waters. EPA asks the Court to tack

the words “except through groundwater” onto the

Act’s definition of covered discharges. Either approach

would contravene the statute’s plain language.

The County’s attempt to justify its reading rests in

part on an unnatural and cramped reading of the term

“from,” supplemented by equally strained readings of

14

other terms in (or not in) the relevant statutory provisions. The County’s principal argument, however, is

not textual, but structural: It claims that Congress’s

decision not to use the CWA to regulate nonpointsource pollution implies a decision not to regulate indirect point-source discharges. On the contrary, the

Act’s language, purpose, structure, and history all establish that Congress intended to regulate any pollution of navigable waters that is fairly traceable to, and

the foreseeable result of, point-source discharges.

EPA properly rejects the County’s reliance on the

point-source/nonpoint-source dichotomy but then proceeds down a different interpretive blind alley in an

effort to reverse its own longstanding view that discharges to navigable waters through groundwater fall

within the Act’s scope. EPA’s starting point is that the

Act does not regulate discharges to groundwater

alone, as groundwater does not fall within the Act’s

definition of “navigable waters.” EPA jumps from that

premise to the conclusion that the Act excludes discharges to navigable waters through groundwater.

Nothing in the Act’s language or structure supports

that illogical leap.

EPA and the County seek to justify limiting the

CWA by asserting that other statutes regulate

groundwater contamination. But none of those statutes addresses the task at hand: regulating pointsource discharges of pollutants to navigable waters.

And none of them purports to displace the CWA’s application to such discharges.

Giving effect to the CWA’s plain terms, within the

constraints imposed by the requirements of factual

and proximate causation, neither expands the Act’s

scope nor imposes unreasonable regulatory burdens.

15

Limiting its application to “direct” discharges to navigable waters, however, would thwart its goal of eliminating pollution of navigable waters, by exempting

polluters whose waste outfalls stop just short of navigable waters but inevitably add pollutants to them.

ARGUMENT

I.

The CWA’s plain language prohibits the

County’s

unpermitted

addition

of

pollutants from disposal wells to the

Pacific.

A. The County’s “addition” of pollutants

“to” navigable waters comes “from” a

point source.

The “starting point for interpreting a statute is the

language of the statute itself.” Consumer Prod. Safety

Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108

(1980). “It is well established that ‘when the statute’s

language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at

least where the disposition required by the text is not

absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.’” Lamie

v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (citation omitted).

The CWA’s plain terms provide that, with exceptions not relevant here, it is illegal to add a pollutant

from a point source to a navigable water without an

NPDES permit. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1342(a),

1362(12)(A). This prohibition squarely covers the

County’s activity: the wastewater is a pollutant; the

disposal wells are point sources; and, finally,

wastewater from the wells flows to the Pacific, a navigable water. Thus, the statutory text conclusively establishes the illegality of the County’s unpermitted

discharges of wastewater from its disposal wells.

16

Taking each term in turn, the effluent originating

in the County’s wells consists of “sewage” and “municipal … waste” and therefore undisputedly meets the

CWA definition of “pollutant.” Id. §1362(6). Likewise,

there is no dispute that the County’s disposal wells

are point sources: The statutory definition of “point

source” explicitly includes “any … well … from which

pollutants are or may be discharged.” Id. § 1362(14)

(emphasis added). Although the County’s brief barely

acknowledges that part of the “point source” definition, the disposal wells fall squarely within it. Pet.

App. 13. Finally, the term “navigable waters” expressly extends to the “territorial seas,” 33 U.S.C.

§ 1362(7)-(8), including the Pacific Ocean immediately

offshore of Maui.

Because there is no dispute that the pollutants

originate at point sources and reach navigable waters,

the CWA’s applicability turns largely on the words

“addition,” “to” and “from”: The question in this case

is whether there has been “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source,” id.

§ 1362(12)(A) (emphasis added), when pollutants discharged from a point source travel a short distance

through groundwater before reaching navigable waters.

The CWA answers that question in the affirmative. First, section 1311(a) repeatedly uses the expansive word “any”: The unpermitted “discharge of any

pollutant by any person shall be unlawful.” Id.

§ 1311(a) (emphasis added). Section 1362(12)(A) emphasizes the point, using “any” three more times:

“[t]he term ‘discharge of a pollutant’ … means … any

addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any

point source.” Id. § 1362(12)(A) (emphasis added). As

this Court has noted, use of “any” “suggests a broad

17

meaning,” Ali v. Fed. Bur. of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214,

219 (2008); see generally NAM, 138 S. Ct. at 624 (“‘discharge of a pollutant’ is defined broadly”). Thus, the

statute applies whenever a polluter makes some addition (of whatever kind) of pollutants (of whatever

kind) to navigable waters from point sources (of whatever kind).

The County’s discharges undoubtedly result in

some “addition” of pollutants “to” the Pacific. The relevant definitions of “addition” are “the result of adding: … INCREASE, AUGMENTATION” and “the act

or process of adding.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 24 (2002 ed.) (Webster’s). “Add,” in

turn, “means ‘to join, annex, or unite (as one thing to

another) so as to bring about an increase (as in number, size, or importance).’” Los Angeles County Flood

Control Dist. v. NRDC, 568 U.S. 78, 82 (2013) (quoting

Webster’s 24). As this Court has recognized, an “addition” of pollutants “to” a waterbody has taken place

whenever the waterbody contains more pollutants

than it did before. See id. at 82-83; S. Fla. Water

Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe, 541 U.S. 95, 109-112

(2004); see also S.D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. of Envtl.

Prot., 547 U.S. 370, 381 (2006) (“[S]omething must be

added in order to implicate § [1342].”). Here, the effluents from the County’s wells are an “addition” of pollutants to navigable waters because they increase the

amount of pollutants present in those waters.

The remaining textual question, then, is whether

the addition of pollutants comes “from any point

source.” Because the wells are undisputedly point

sources, the question boils down to whether the pollutants come “from” them.

18

The CWA does not define “from,” but, “[w]hen

terms used in a statute are undefined, [this Court]

give[s] them their ordinary meaning.” Asgrow Seed

Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 187 (1995). The ordinary meaning of “from” is “a function word to indicate

a starting point: as … a point or place where an actual

physical movement … has its beginning.” Webster’s

913. Its other most pertinent definition is “a function

word to indicate the source or original or moving force

of something: as (1) the source, cause, means, or ultimate agent of an action or condition …; [or] (4) the

place of origin, source, or derivation of a material or

immaterial thing.” Id.

Both these common meanings support the conclusion that the addition of the wastewater to the Pacific

comes “from” the point sources where the addition

originated—the County’s wells. The wells are the

“starting point” of the pollutants’ “movement” to the

navigable waters, and they are the “cause” as well as

the “source” and “place of origin” of the pollutants.

Thus, in ordinary parlance, the pollutants, and their

addition to navigable waters, come “from” the wells.

That the pollutants pass through groundwater does

not mean that their addition is not “from” the wells,

any more than the fact that a letter passes through

the mail means it is not “from” its sender.7

––––––––––––––––––––––––

7 This conclusion does not mean that the pollutants could not

also come “from” an intervening point source. As this Court

pointed out in Miccosukee, “a point source need not be the original source of the pollutant” if it is one of the means by which the

pollutant is “convey[ed]” to navigable waters. 541 U.S. at 105. A

point source does not have to originate the pollutant to be covered

but is plainly covered if it does.

19

B. The Act’s terms apply to indirect

discharges from point sources that

traceably

and

foreseeably

reach

navigable waters.

Nothing in the CWA limits the permitting requirement to pollution that reaches navigable waters directly, without passing through any other medium.

See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 743 (plurality). Thus, for example, the Act must cover outfall pipes that hang

above a river, so that their effluent falls a few feet

through the air before reaching navigable waters.

Likewise, it necessarily covers outfall pipes that drain

onto a beach just short of the tideline, so that their

effluent flows a few feet over the sand before reaching

the ocean. Reading the Act to exclude such discharges

would allow a polluter to avoid the permitting requirement just by cutting off the last few feet of its discharge pipe. Congress cannot have intended that result. Rather, as the Rapanos plurality noted and lower

courts have held, point-source discharges of pollutants that “naturally wash[]” into navigable waters

are covered “even if the pollutants discharged from a

point source do not emit ‘directly into’ covered waters.” Id.8 Any other reading would permit “water polluters … to evade the permitting requirement …

––––––––––––––––––––––––

8 The County inaccurately asserts that, in all the cases the

plurality cited, point sources delivered pollutants directly to navigable waters. As the plurality noted, however, the Second Circuit in Concerned Area Residents for the Env’t v. Southview

Farm, 34 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 1994), expressly relied on the “‘indirect discharge’ rationale” as an alternate basis for CWA liability.

547 U.S. at 744; see Southview Farm, 34 F.3d at 119. Regardless,

the context makes clear that the plurality’s point was not to characterize the type of source that must deliver pollutants to navigable waters, but to emphasize that the defendant’s point source

(Footnote continued)

20

simply by discharging their pollutants … upstream of

covered waters.” 547 U.S. at 742-43.

Of course, in order for CWA liability to attach, pollutants must come “from a point source.” The decision

below thus properly required that pollutants be “fairly

traceable” to the point source. Pet. App. 24. The

County insists the “fairly traceable” requirement

reads new language into the CWA, but that language

simply gives effect to the Act’s requirement of factual

causation: a defendant cannot be liable under the Act

unless pollutants come “from” the defendant’s point

source. Cf. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.

555, 560-61 (1992) (interchangeably using the terms

“fairly traceable to” and “resulting from” to describe

the Article III standing inquiry).

The CWA’s textual requirement that pollutants

come “from” a point source also implicates “[t]he legal

concept of ‘proximate cause,’” a “‘shorthand for the

policy-based judgment that not all factual causes contributing to an injury should be legally cognizable

causes.’” U.S. Br. 23 (quoting CSX Transp., Inc. v.

McBride, 564 U.S. 685, 701 (2011) (internal quotation

marks omitted)). It is therefore reasonable to read the

CWA’s triggering language as requiring not only that

pollutants be physically traceable to a point source,

but also that the point-source release be a proximate

cause of the addition of pollutants to navigable waters. In other words, in order for the CWA permitting

––––––––––––––––––––––––

need not accomplish that delivery, because the Act applies to direct or indirect additions of pollutants to navigable waters. See

547 U.S. at 742-45.

21

requirement to attach, the pollution of navigable waters must be a “foresee[able]” or “natural and probable” consequence, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469, 475 (1876), of the point-source discharge.9

This Court need not now determine the range of

circumstances that might render the connection between a point source and navigable waters too attenuated to satisfy this requirement.10 Nothing about the

groundwater flow in this case breaks the chain of

proximate causation between the County’s discharges

and the resulting contamination of the Pacific. On the

contrary, the County not only foresaw that the

wastewater would naturally and probably flow to the

ocean but intended that result. Groundwater flow

thus did not supersede the wells as the cause of the

discharge. “A cause can be thought ‘superseding’ only

––––––––––––––––––––––––

9 See also Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear En-

ergy, 460 U.S. 766, 774 (1983) (construing National Environmental Policy Act to incorporate proximate cause); cf. Rapanos, 547

U.S. at 743-45 & n. 11 (plurality) (positing that CWA does not

cover discharges that “normally” “stay[] put” and would not be

expected to reach navigable waters, but that discharges of “mobile” pollutants that “naturally” reach navigable waters are “addition[s] … to navigable waters.”).

10 The Ninth Circuit suggested that a discharge must be more

than “de minimis” to be covered. Pet. App. 24. The County critiques this proposed limit as atextual. This Court should not decide the issue, because the Ninth Circuit’s discussion of the “de

minimis” limit was unnecessary to its decision—the County’s discharges of millions of gallons of effluent daily are not even arguably “de minimis.” Regardless, the Ninth Circuit’s endorsement

of one atextual limiting principle is no reason to read into the Act

a “direct discharge” requirement that is likewise unsupported by

the text, particularly as the familiar “proximate cause” inquiry

offers a textually grounded and effective approach to limiting the

universe of legally cognizable causes.

22

if it is a ‘cause of independent origin that was not foreseeable.’” Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 420

(2011) (quoting Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517

U.S. 830, 837 (1996)).

C. The CWA’s provisions concerning

disposal

of

pollutants

in

wells

underscore the Act’s application to the

Lahaina Facility.

Other language in the CWA strongly reinforces its

application to pollutants added to navigable waters

from disposal wells by way of groundwater movement.

Congress included “any … well” in the definition of

“point source.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). A “well” is “a

shaft or pit dug or bored in the earth.” Webster’s 2594.

While a few wells may discharge directly into surface

waters, see Pet. Br. 55 (suggesting “off-shore wells

where backflow up through the well might spill into

the ocean”), the principal way a well acts as a “point

source” is by discharging into the subsurface. The only

plausible explanation for including wells in the definition of “point source,” therefore, is that Congress intended to cover discharges that move from wells

through the subsurface to navigable waters.

Several features of the CWA suggest that Congress

specifically intended to reference disposal wells, like

the Lahaina Facility wells, when it included the word

“well” in its list of point sources. First, in the definition of “point source,” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14), the word

“well” appears in a list of items “from which pollutants

are or may be discharged,” id., which suggests it

should be understood to refer to (or at least include)

disposal or injection wells that discharge pollutants.

Cf. Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1085 (2015)

(“[A] word is known by the company it keeps.”).

23

Section 1342(b) confirms this understanding. That

section, which sets forth requirements applicable to

state “permit program[s] for discharges into navigable

waters,” provides that EPA may not approve a state

NPDES program unless the program provides “adequate authority” “[t]o issue permits which … control

the disposal of pollutants into wells.” 33 U.S.C.

§ 1342(b)(1)(D) (emphasis added). Importantly, disposal wells discharge underground, and the “permits”

referenced in this requirement are permits for discharges of pollutants to navigable waters, id.

§ 1342(a)-(b), which comply with “applicable requirements of sections 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, and 1343 of

this title,” id. § 1342(b)(1)(A). Those applicable requirements, in turn, apply only to discharges that add

pollutants to navigable waters.11 Thus, section

1342(b) necessarily contemplates regulating discharges from wells through groundwater to navigable

waters. Reading the Act to exclude such discharges

would render the section “inoperative or superfluous,

void or insignificant,” Rubin v. Islamic Repub. of Iran,

138 S. Ct. 816, 824 (2018) (citation omitted), contrary

to fundamental principles of statutory construction.

Finally, an express exclusion from the CWA’s definition of “pollutant” further illustrates that Congress

understood section 1311(a)’s prohibition of unpermitted discharges to extend to underground discharges

from wells. Oil and gas production frequently involves

the injection of some other fluid (often vast quantities

––––––––––––––––––––––––

11 Section 1342(b)(1)(D) does not “authorize the regulation of

all wells used to dispose of pollutants, regardless of absence of

any effects on navigable waters.” Inland Steel Co. v. EPA, 901

F.2d 1419, 1422 (7th Cir. 1990). Only disposals that discharge to

navigable waters require NPDES permits. Id.

24

of water and additives) into an oil or gas well to displace hydrocarbons from spaces in underground rock.

Concerned that the unpermitted injection of this material would otherwise constitute a prohibited “discharge of a pollutant,” Congress narrowed the definition of “pollutant” to exclude “water, gas, or other material which is injected into a well to facilitate production of oil or gas, or water derived in association with

oil or gas production and disposed of in a well, if the

well … is approved by authority of the State in which

the well is located, and if such State determines that

such injection or disposal will not result in the degradation of ground or surface water resources.” 33

U.S.C. § 1362(6)(B).

If section 1311(a)’s prohibition of unpermitted discharges already excluded discharges from wells that

travel through groundwater before reaching navigable waters, this exclusion would be unnecessary, as

passage through the subsurface is the only way such

discharges could reach navigable waters. After all,

“[t]here is no reason to create an exception to a prohibition unless the prohibition would otherwise forbid

what the exception allows.” Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Inst., 138 S. Ct. 1833, 1844 (2018). Moreover,

the restriction of the exclusion to situations in which

a state “determines that such injection or disposal will

not result in the degradation of … surface water resources,” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6)(B), reveals Congress’s

awareness that subsurface disposal may threaten

navigable waters, and its intent to use the CWA’s prohibition of unpermitted discharges to mitigate that

threat.

25

D. The statute’s background and context

support its application to indirect

discharges.

The NPDES program replaced and expanded an

existing permit requirement under section 13 of the

Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, also known as the

“Refuse Act,” 33 U.S.C. § 407. See S. Rep. No. 92-414,

at 70-72, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3736-38.

Section 407 long prohibited any person from “discharg[ing] … or caus[ing] … to be … discharged” any

“refuse matter … into any navigable water” without a

permit from the Secretary of the Army. 33 U.S.C.

§ 407.

In the years immediately before the CWA’s enactment, this Court held that section 407 must be broadly

construed, see United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384

U.S. 224, 226 (1966), and lower courts held that it applies to “‘indirect’ deposits of refuse in navigable water.” United States v. Esso Standard Oil Co. of Puerto

Rico, 375 F.2d 621, 623 (3rd Cir. 1967); see also United

States v. Ballard Oil Co. of Hartford, 195 F.2d 369,

370 (2d Cir. 1952) (§ 407 violated where spilled oil

“found its way into the Connecticut River”). In Esso,

for example, the Third Circuit found a section 407 violation where, “though Esso did not run a pipe to the

water’s edge and discharge petroleum products directly into the sea, Esso’s discharge of the oil was in

such close proximity to the sea that the oil flowed

there by gravity alone.” 375 F.2d at 623.12

––––––––––––––––––––––––

12 Notably, the court did not rely on a clause in the statute

prohibiting depositing “material” on the banks of a navigable water if it might wash into the water and create a threat to navigation, but on the more general prohibition of discharges “into any

(Footnote continued)

26

Importantly, Congress did nothing to narrow Esso

and other cases’ broad reading of section 407 when it

used similar (indeed, broader) language to define the

CWA’s discharge prohibition. As in other instances

where Congress has acted against the backdrop of judicial interpretations of an existing statute, “there is

no reason to suppose that Congress disagreed with

those interpretations.” Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie,

Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S. 573, 590 (2010).

Indeed, the House floor manager, Representative

Dingell, explicitly invoked Esso in explaining that the

CWA, “in defining the term ‘discharge of a pollutant,’

does not in any way contemplate that the discharge be

directly from the point source to the waterway.” 118

Cong. Rec. 33,758 (1972).

Moreover, Congress expressly integrated the CWA

with section 407 by enacting 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(4),

which deems section 407 permits to be NPDES permits and vice versa, and 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(5), which

provides that, after October 18, 1972, NPDES permits

are the sole means to authorize discharges otherwise

prohibited by section 407. In ensuring continuity between section 407 permits and the new NPDES per––––––––––––––––––––––––

navigable water,” which the court construed to apply to discharges that “wash into navigable water” as well as “other ‘indirect’ deposits.” Id.

Other courts reached similar conclusions roughly contemporaneously with the CWA’s enactment. See, e.g., United States v.

Valley Camp Coal Co., 480 F.2d 616, 617 (4th Cir. 1973) (applying § 407 to discharge washed into tributary of a navigable water

by rain); United States v. White Fuel Corp., 498 F.2d 619, 622 (1st

Cir. 1974) (applying § 407 where oil “leached from [defendant’s]

property into adjacent navigable waters” through ““indirect percolation” rather than “direct flow”).

27

mits, Congress made clear that NPDES permits extend to indirect discharges just as section 407 permits

did. S. Rep. No. 92-414, at 72, reprinted in 1972

U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3738 (noting that, in “integrat[ing] …

the Refuse Act permit program into the [CWA],” Congress intended to “provide for the establishment of

conditions of effluent control for each source of discharge”). Any other reading would create a significant

anomaly: Because section 407’s discharge prohibition

remains in effect, limiting NPDES permits to point

sources that directly discharge to navigable waters

would leave dischargers with no way to obtain a permit for many indirect discharges that section 407 continues to prohibit.

II. The CWA’s language and structure

contradict the County’s and EPA’s

readings.

A. The County and EPA propose atextual

exceptions to the statute.

The County and EPA offer mutually inconsistent

alternative readings of the CWA, neither of which

rests on the language of the operative provisions. The

County invents a “means-of-delivery test,” Pet. Br. 19,

under which the Act would apply not to “any addition

of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point

source,” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A), but only to “an addition of a pollutant to navigable waters from a point

source or uninterrupted series of point sources that

delivers the pollutant directly to navigable waters.”

EPA rejects that interpretation as inconsistent with

the statute, which requires only that the pollutants

come “from” a point source. See U.S. Br. 7-8. EPA proceeds, however, to offer an equally unfounded reading,

which would cover “any addition of any pollutant to

28

navigable waters from any point source, except where

the pollutant reaches jurisdictional surface waters via

groundwater.”

Both the County’s and EPA’s constructions read

language into the CWA that is absent from the relevant provisions. As this Court has emphasized, courts

“must presume that [the] legislature says in a statute

what it means and means in a statute what it says

there.” Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 357

(2005) (quoting Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S.

249, 253-54 (1992)). Courts may not “rewrite the statute” to achieve a result its text does not support, Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320, 335 (2010), merely

because “they might deem its effects susceptible of improvement,” Badaracco v. Comm’r of Internal Rev.,

464 U.S. 386, 398 (1984). In particular, courts may

not, as both the County and EPA advocate, “read an

absent word”—or, here, phrase—“into the statute.”

Lamie, 540 U.S. at 538. Courts “do not—[and] cannot—add provisions to a federal statute.” Alabama v.

North Carolina, 560 U.S. 330, 352 (2010).

Efforts to create atextual exceptions to provisions

that already include express exceptions are particularly suspect. “Where Congress explicitly enumerates

certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional

exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent.” TRW Inc. v.

Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 28 (2001) (quoting Andrus v.

Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17 (1980)). Yet

both the County and EPA would read an exception (or,

as EPA expresses it, a “categorical[] exclu[sion],” U.S.

Br. 7) into the Act’s prohibition of “any addition of any

pollutant to navigable waters from any point source,”

33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A), which already expressly exempts oil-production-related discharges into disposal

29

wells, id. § 1362(6)(B); return flows from irrigated agriculture, id. § 1342(l)(1); certain stormwater runoff

from oil, gas, and mining operations, id. § 1342(l)(2);

certain runoff from silvicultural activities, id.

§ 1342(l)(3); certain stormwater discharges predating

October 1, 1994, id. § 1342(p)(1); and discharges incidental to normal operation of recreational vessels, id.

§ 1342(r).

An implied exception is especially disfavored when

it “would in practical effect render [an express] exception entirely superfluous in all but the most unusual

circumstances.” TRW, 534 U.S. at 29. EPA’s and the

County’s proposed exceptions would do just that. As

discussed above, see supra pp. 23-24, the existing narrow exclusion of certain oil-production wastes injected

into disposal wells from the category of “pollutant[s],”

33 U.S.C. 1362(6)(B), would serve little or no purpose

if those discharges were already categorically excluded from the Act because they move through the

subsurface before reaching navigable waters.

B. The County’s textual arguments are

erroneous.

While EPA makes no effort to square its proposed

exclusion with the CWA’s text, the County does attempt to ground its argument in the statute’s language. That effort fails to overcome the plain meaning

of the relevant terms, which cover the addition of pollutants to the ocean from the County’s wells and are

flatly incompatible with the County’s “means-of-delivery test.”

1. “Conveyance”

The County begins its textual argument by focusing on the point-source definition’s use of the word

“conveyance.” Id. § 1362(14). The County contends

30

that “conveyance”—a “means of carrying or transporting something,” Pet. Br. 29—denotes that, in order for

the permitting requirement to apply, a point source

must itself convey pollutants directly to the navigable

water that receives them.

The County’s argument distorts the CWA’s use of

the word “conveyance.” The term “conveyance” appears only once in the relevant statutory provisions,

in the definition of “point source,” 33 U.S.C.

§ 1362(14), whose applicability to the County’s wells

is uncontested. Section 1362(14) uses “conveyance” as

a noun, to define what a point source is: anything, including a well, that is “discernible, confined and discrete” and capable of discharging a pollutant. Id.

But section 1362(12), the operative language here,

does not use any form of the verb “convey” to describe

what a point source must do to bring about a “discharge of a pollutant.” That provision says merely that

the pollutants must come “from” a point source, not

that the point source must “convey” the pollutants all

the way to the receiving waters. Id. § 1362(12).13 Section 1362(12)’s definition of “discharge of a pollutant”

is “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters

from any point source.” The County would rewrite it

as “the conveyance of any pollutant to navigable waters by any point source.” That is not the statute Congress enacted.

––––––––––––––––––––––––

13 Notably, Congress also included in the point-source defini-

tion “any … container, rolling stock, [or] concentrated animal

feeding operation.” Id. § 1362(14). Like wells, none of these point

sources normally discharges directly into navigable waters.

31

2. “From”

The County next invokes “from,” arguing that

something comes “from” a “conveyance” only if the

conveyance delivers it to its ultimate destination. It

could equally be said, of course, that something comes

“from” a “conveyance” as long as that conveyance gets

it part of the way to its destination, and that it comes

“from” a “source” if it originates with the source. Thus,

although a pollutant may be said to come “from” whatever finally gets it to navigable waters, it also comes

“from” the source that started it on its journey, and

“from” any conveyances that carried it along the way.

To use the County’s own example, Americans learned

of the D-Day landings “from” the radio sets that ultimately delivered the news to their homes, see Pet. Br.

30, but they also learned of them “from” Edward R.

Murrow’s reporting and “from” the CBS network that

made his reports available for broadcast.

This Court’s decision in Miccosukee does not support the County’s view. Miccosukee recognized that

the CWA extends to point sources that are not the

“original source of the pollutant” but that merely “convey the pollutant to ‘navigable waters.’” 541 U.S. at

105. But saying the statute “includes within its reach

point sources that do not themselves generate pollutants,” id., does not suggest that it excludes those that

do. Rather, Miccosukee assumes that originating

sources of pollutants fall within the definition of point

sources, and emphasizes only that other conveyances

also meet that definition. Miccosukee does not hold or

even suggest that a point source must “convey” a pollutant all the way to navigable waters for the CWA to

cover a discharge. That question was not presented,

and the Court had no occasion to address or resolve it.

Cf. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 631 (1993)

32

(holding that decisions that do not “squarely address[]” an issue do not resolve it). Moreover, Miccosukee’s statement that a point source “need only convey the pollutant to ‘navigable waters,’” 541 U.S. at

105 (emphasis added), is a statement about what is

sufficient, not what is necessary. By quoting the

phrase without the key word “only,” Pet. Br. 30; see

also id. at 33, the County strips it of its intended

meaning and renders it ungrammatical.

The County’s assertion that the addition of a pollutant to navigable waters is not “from” a point source

unless it is “delivered by” the point source to the navigable waters, Pet. Br. 29, also contradicts the

County’s own articulation of its “means-of-delivery

test.” According to the County, a pollutant is from an

originating point source that does not deliver it to navigable waters, as long as all the conveyances that

come between the original source and the waters are

themselves point sources. But if the County’s reading

of the term “from” were correct, only the last in a series of point sources should qualify for permitting, because the pollutant is “delivered by” only that final

source. Conversely, if a pollutant can also be “from” a

more remote point source, the intervening media of

conveyance need not be point sources. Whether the

addition of the pollutant comes “from” the original

source, or another source along the way, has nothing

to do with whether all other conveyances along its

path are point sources.

3. “Any point source”

Next, the County argues that the uninterruptedchain aspect of its “means-of-delivery” test is supported by the statute’s use of the word “any” to modify

“point source” in section 1362(12). Because “any”

33

means “one or some indiscriminately of whatever

kind,” the County states, it follows “that an NPDES

permit is required whether pollutants are delivered to

navigable waters by a single point source or multiple

point sources together.” Pet. Br. 32. The County’s

point is true as far as it goes: When a discharge is

“from” multiple point sources, all of them are subject

to the Act. But the term “any point source” carries no

implication that a discharge must travel exclusively

through point sources. After all, “any” means one or

more indiscriminately. Accordingly, if a pollutant is

added to navigable waters from a point source, that

source falls within the permit requirement regardless

of whether the pollutant moves to navigable waters

directly from the point source, through other point

sources, or through other nonpoint-source media.

“Any” thus provides no support for a “means-of-delivery test”; rather, it establishes that the CWA reaches

any point source “from” which pollutants are added to

navigable waters, regardless of whether the source is

the immediate means by which the pollutants are delivered to the waters. 14

4. “Into”

The County invokes decisions of this Court using

the preposition “into” in characterizing the Act as

“prohibit[ing] the [unpermitted] discharge of any effluent into a navigable body of water.” Pet. Br. 30

––––––––––––––––––––––––

14 The County’s contrary view of the significance of “any” can-

not be squared with its limited view of “from.” If the County were

correct that an addition of a pollutant to navigable waters can

only be “from” a point source that “delivers” it to navigable waters, the word “any” could not bring within the Act a point source

that does not do so. “Any” does not expand the category to which

it applies.

34

(quoting Arkansas, 503 U.S. at 102; emphasis added

by the County); see also id. at 30 n.6 (citing other opinions). The statute, however, covers additions of pollutants “to” navigable waters, not discharges “into”

them. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A). This Court’s general

descriptions of the CWA do not alter the controlling

statutory language. As this Court has explicitly

acknowledged, its “shorthand description” of a statute

is not always “entirely accurate.” Levin v. United

States, 568 U.S. 503, 507 n.1 (2013). The Court must

“focus on the language of [the statute], not any shorthand description of it.” Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453

U.S. 654, 675 n.7 (1981).

The County also notes the use of “into” in other

CWA sections that “describe[] a point source discharge.” Pet. Br. 36. For example, the County cites 33

U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1), which describes the CWA’s overall goal as eliminating “the discharge of pollutants

into the navigable waters.” In addition, the County

flags references to discharges “into” navigable waters

in provisions describing state applications to operate

NPDES permit programs, id. § 1342(b), defining the

term “effluent limitation,” id. § 1362(11), and describing authorities under other statutes that the CWA

supplanted, id. § 1371(b). That the statute elsewhere

refers to discharges of pollutants “into” navigable waters does not change the operative language of section

1362(12)(A)’s precisely worded definition of “discharge

of a pollutant.” As this Court has observed, “[t]he

plain meaning of [a statutory provision] cannot be altered by the use of a somewhat different term in another part of the statute.” Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos

Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 480 (1992).

In any event, “into” cannot bear the weight the

County places on it. Rewriting section 1362(12)(A) to

35

refer to “any addition of any pollutant into navigable

waters from any point source” would not alter its

meaning. When used in such a phrase, “into” indicates

“something in which a literal or figurative insertion or

introduction is made.” Webster’s 1185. More generally, the word denotes “motion so directed as to terminate, if continued, when the position denoted by in has

been reached.” Id. at 1184. Thus, substituting “into”

for “to” would by no means suggest that the introduction of pollutants “into” navigable waters must be directly from a point source, with no intervening medium of transport. On the contrary, in another CWA

provision where it used the term “into,” Congress

deemed discharges regulated by the Refuse Act—

which include discharges of “refuse matter” that indirectly “washe[s] into … navigable water,” 33 U.S.C.

§ 407—to constitute “discharges into the navigable

waters,” id. § 1342(a)(4).

C. The CWA’s structure and history do not

support the County’s and EPA’s limiting

constructions.

Because the statutory language supports neither

the “means-of-delivery test” nor the “categorical exclusion” of discharges via groundwater, the County and

EPA rely heavily on assertions about the statute’s

structure and purpose to support their mutually inconsistent limitations on its text. The County focuses

on what it calls the Act’s “organizational paradigm” of

“disparate treatment of discharges from point sources

and nonpoint sources,” Pet. Br. 25 (quoting Or. Nat.

Desert Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 550 F.3d 778, 780

(9th Cir. 2008)), to support its view that the Act completely exempts pollution from point sources that

reaches navigable waters indirectly. EPA rejects the

County’s view “that any spatial gap between a point

36

source and jurisdictional surface waters renders the

NPDES program inapplicable,” U.S. Br. 8, but posits

a special exception for point-source discharges that

reach navigable waters through groundwater, because of what EPA sees as the Act’s “purpose not to

regulate groundwater.” U.S. Br. 7.

Neither argument is persuasive. Applying the

CWA’s permitting requirement to the County’s wells

is fully consistent with the Act’s basic structural

choice to focus federal regulation on point-source discharges that foreseeably add pollutants to jurisdictional navigable waters.

1. Congress did not foreclose regulation

of indirect point-source pollution

when

it

declined

to

regulate

nonpoint-source pollution.

The County’s argument rests on an undisputed

generalization—that the CWA regulates nonpointsource pollution differently from point-source pollution. That generalization, however, does not answer

the statutory interpretation question here. The CWA

aims its more stringent regulatory provisions—its

prohibition on “discharge of any pollutant,” 33 U.S.C.

§ 1311(a), and its permit requirements, effluent limitations, and performance standards, id. §§ 1342, 1344,

1311, 1312, 1316—at point-source pollution. By contrast, it largely leaves control of nonpoint-source pollution to the states. Nothing in this dichotomy suggests that the CWA should be read to place the

County’s point-source pollution outside the Act’s more

rigorous regulatory requirements.

The County turns the Act on its head by reading it

as if its central feature were non-regulation of nonpoint-source pollution rather than regulation of point-

37

source pollution. It further posits that the term “nonpoint-source pollution” has such a dominant role in

the Act that pollutants that move through groundwater become nonpoint-source pollution even if they originate from a point source. The CWA’s terms do not

substantiate those premises.

As courts have repeatedly pointed out, “the CWA

does not even define nonpoint-source pollution.” Ctr.

for Native Ecosystems v. Cables, 509 F.3d 1310, 1331

(10th Cir. 2007); see, e.g., Simsbury-Avon Preservation

Soc’y, LLC v. Metacon Gun Club, Inc., 575 F.3d 199,

220 (2d Cir. 2009); Or. Nat. Res. Council v. U.S. Forest

Serv., 834 F.2d 842, 849 n.9 (9th Cir. 1987). As a result, “nonpoint source” is a catchall term for sources

that do not fall within the point-source definition, and

“nonpoint-source pollution” means “nothing more

than a water pollution problem not involving a discharge from a point source.” Cables, 509 F.3d at 1331

(quoting Am. Wildlands v. Browner, 260 F.3d 1192,

1193 (10th Cir. 2001)); see also EPA Interpretive

Statement, 84 Fed. Reg. at 16,813 (“nonpoint source

pollution [is] the broad category of other forms of water pollution that do not fall within the point source

definition and [are] not defined under the Act”). Thus,

nonpoint-source pollution “is commonly understood to

be pollution arising from dispersed activities over

large areas that is not traceable to a single, identifiable source or conveyance.” Sierra Club v. El Paso Gold

Mines, Inc., 421 F.3d 1133, 1140 n.4 (10th Cir. 2005)

(emphasis added) (citing League of Wilderness Defenders/Blue Mts. Biodiversity Project v. Forsgren, 309

F.3d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir. 2002)).

In short, nonpoint-source pollution is defined not

by what it is, but by what it is not: It is “pollution that

38

does not result from the ‘discharge’ or ‘addition’ of pollutants from a point source.” Or. Nat. Res. Council,

834 F.2d at 849 n.9. An EPA guidance document supports this understanding: Nonpoint-source pollution

comes from “diffuse sources that are not regulated as

point sources”—it is pollution that “does not result

from a discharge at a specific, single location (such as

a single pipe).” EPA, Office of Water, Nonpoint Source

Guidance 3 (1987), https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPURL

.cgi?Dockey=910217GL.TXT (last visited July 9,

2019).

Thus, although nonpoint-source pollution “generally results from land runoff, precipitation, atmospheric deposition, or percolation,” id., not all pollution

involving such processes is nonpoint-source pollution.

The determining factor is whether the pollutants originate from, collect in, or pass through an identifiable

point source before foreseeably reaching a navigable

water. Compare Southview Farm, 34 F.3d at 118-19

(holding that flow of pollutants discharged from point

sources to navigable waters fell within the Act regardless of whether the pollutants ultimately reached the

waters through a point source), with Simsbury-Avon

Preservation Club, 575 F.3d at 223 (holding that runoff of pollutants from a berm to navigable waters was

not a point-source discharge because the berm was not

a “confined and discrete conveyance” meeting the

point-source definition). Here, the wastewater came

from identifiable point sources (the wells), and its subsequent movement does not transform it into nonpoint-source pollution.

Indeed, the Act, its implementing regulations, and

case law make clear that even “runoff,” often described as the quintessential example of nonpointsource pollution, can be point-source pollution if, at

39

some point, it comes from a point source. See 40 C.F.R.

§ 122.2; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p) (requiring

NPDES permits for point-source stormwater discharges); Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597,

602-05 (2013) (discussing regulation of point-source

stormwater discharges). The CWA contains exemptions to this general rule that would be unnecessary if

the Act broadly categorized all runoff as nonpointsource pollution regardless of its relationship to a

point source. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1342(l)(2)-(3) (exempting certain oil, gas, mining, and silvicultural runoff discharges).

Like runoff discharges, discharges that enter navigable waters through groundwater are not inherently

“nonpoint.” Nothing in the Act defines groundwater as

a “nonpoint source.” Indeed, the Act differentiates

“groundwater” from “nonpoint sources of pollution.”

See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1329(i)(1) (creating federal grant

program “to prevent contamination of groundwater

from nonpoint sources of pollution”). To be sure, the

Act recognizes that diffuse nonpoint pollution may

threaten groundwater, and it relegates such threats

primarily to state regulation (with federal support).

See id. But nothing in the Act’s language or structure

suggests that point sources that threaten surface water are exclusively subject to state regulation when

pollutants traceable to them actually and foreseeably

reach navigable waters via groundwater.

Thus, although pollutants that percolate into

groundwater from diffuse sources are nonpoint-source

pollution, it does not follow that point-source pollutants automatically become nonpoint-source pollution

whenever they travel through the subsurface. Rather,

pollution that might under other circumstances “be

nonpoint source pollution, which is not subject to

40

NPDES permitting” is regulable point-source pollution if it can be traced to a specific point source from

which it predictably flows to navigable waters. El

Paso Gold Mines, 421 F.3d at 1140 n.4. Just as “[g]ravity flow, resulting in a discharge into a navigable body

of water, may be part of a point source discharge”

when pollutants were “at least initially collected or

channeled,” so the “subsequent percolation” of

wastewater initially discharged from a point source is

within the Act if it reaches navigable waters. Sierra

Club v. Abston Constr. Co., 620 F.2d 41, 45 (5th Cir.

1980) (emphasis added).

Because the pollutants here come from pointsource wells, it is irrelevant that, as the County notes,

Congress declined to extend the Act’s prohibitions to

nonpoint-source pollution. See Pet. Br. 25. Moreover,

the County’s reliance on the point-source/nonpointsource dichotomy ignores the clearest lesson of the

legislative history the County invokes: Congress chose

to exclude nonpoint sources “because [nonpoint-source

pollution] arises in such a diffuse way,” making it

“very difficult to regulate through individual permits.”

League of Wilderness Defs., 309 F.3d at 1184; see S.

Rep. No. 92-414, at 39, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.

at 3706. That concern does not apply when, as here,

there are readily identifiable and easily regulated

point sources—namely, the wells. Regulation of such

point sources falls squarely within the Act’s central

principle that “the most effective control mechanism

for point sources of discharge is one which will provide

for the establishment of conditions of effluent control

for each source of discharge.” S. Rep. No. 92-414, at

72, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3738.

41

This is not the first time this Court has been asked

to hold the CWA inapplicable to a point-source discharge on the theory that “Congress intended that

such pollution instead … be addressed through local

nonpoint source pollution programs.” Miccosukee, 541

U.S. at 106. In Miccosukee, the United States made a

similar argument for excluding transfers of pollutants

from one body of water to another from CWA regulation even if the pollutants were from a point source.

This Court declined, noting that the Act “does not …

exempt nonpoint pollution sources from the NPDES

program if they also fall within the ‘point source’ definition.” Id. The Court’s statement reflects the primacy of the Act’s definition of “point source,” and its

coverage of “any addition of any pollutant to navigable

waters from any point source,” 33 U.S.C.

§ 1362(12)(A), regardless of whether the discharge

shares some characteristics with nonpoint-source discharges. In arguing that the Act’s “disparate treatment” of the residual nonpoint-source pollution category overrides the Act’s requirements concerning discharges meeting the point-source definition, Pet. Br.

25, the County has the matter backward.

2. The CWA does not categorically

exclude discharges to navigable

waters through groundwater.

EPA correctly recognizes that “the point and nonpoint source distinction” that is the County’s central

focus is “not relevant” to whether the Act covers discharges from point sources to navigable waters via

groundwater. 84 Fed. Reg. at 16,813. But EPA proffers an equally flawed construction of the CWA, based

not on the text of its relevant provisions, but on what

EPA describes as its structure and legislative history.

42

In EPA’s view, that structure and history “demonstrate Congress’s intent to leave the regulation of

groundwater wholly to the states under the Act.” Id.

Even if true, this assertion does not insulate the

County’s pollution of navigable waters from the

CWA’s permitting requirement. EPA’s contrary view

rests on an unsupported interpretive leap: that because Congress chose not to use the CWA’s pointsource permitting requirements to protect groundwater itself, it must also have chosen not to apply them

to protect surface water from pollution that arrives via

groundwater. EPA asserts that, because the CWA

“evinces a purpose not to regulate groundwater,” it follows that “all releases to groundwater are excluded

from the scope of the NPDES program, even where

pollutants are conveyed to jurisdictional surface waters via groundwater.” U.S. Br. 7 (quoting 84 Fed. Reg.

at 16,814). That claim contradicts the Act’s language,

renders key provisions nonsensical, and bears no relation to the purposes evident from the Act’s overall

structure.

EPA does not seek deference to its newly altered

view of “the best, if not the only, reading of the statute.” U.S. Br. 7. EPA’s Interpretive Statement is not

a regulation, but “guidance” that “neither alters legal

rights or obligations nor changes or creates law.” 84

Fed. Reg. at 16,811. The statement is not entitled to

deference under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467

U.S. 837 (1984), because it is not an exercise of congressionally delegated authority to fill an interpretive

gap in the statute. See United States v. Mead Corp.,

533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001).

43

EPA’s argument rests on the propositions that (1)

the addition of pollutants to groundwater is not in itself a “discharge of a pollutant,” and (2) the Act delegates protection of groundwater quality to states, with

federal assistance and supervision. EPA’s premises,

however, lead only to the conclusion that the discharge prohibition of section 1311(a) and the permit

program under section 1342 do not apply to discharges that add pollutants to groundwater alone.

Nothing in the Act supports EPA’s further conclusion

that these provisions do not apply to point sources

that discharge to navigable waters through groundwater. None of the provisions on which EPA relies either

limits the CWA’s provisions concerning discharges to

navigable waters, or conflicts with the assertion of

federal permitting authority over such discharges.

Most of the provisions EPA cites, U.S. Br. 16-17, authorize assistance for states to address pollution of

both “navigable waters” and “ground waters.” 33

U.S.C. §§ 1252(a), 1254(a)(5), 1314(a)(2)(A); see also

id. §1314(a)(1)(A) (addressing “pollutants in any body

of water”). The inclusion of “navigable waters” in programs that assist states does not limit CWA authority

over discharges to those waters. Why then should the

inclusion of “ground waters” preclude federal control

over discharges that reach navigable waters through

groundwater?

In short, EPA identifies nothing in the Act to suggest that Congress meant to curtail EPA’s power to

regulate discharges to navigable waters. Cf. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528-30 (2007) (reaching

a similar conclusion in analyzing parallel issues under

the Clean Air Act). Regulating the addition of pollutants to navigable waters from point sources through

groundwater is in no way inconsistent with Congress’s

44

various efforts to promote state action to address

groundwater pollution. EPA thus fails to demonstrate

that regulating such discharges in accordance with

the CWA’s terms would be “incompatible” with “the

substance of Congress’ regulatory scheme.” FDA v.

Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 156

(2000).

EPA asserts that the Act treats “groundwater pollution in the same manner as nonpoint source pollution,” citing a provision requiring states to develop

waste management plans to “protect ground and surface water quality.” U.S. Br. 18 (citing 33 U.S.C.

§ 1288). That provision demonstrates only that the

Act treats groundwater and surface water pollution in

the same way insofar as they are caused by nonpoint

sources. That proposition, however, says nothing

about how the Act regulates pollution caused by point

sources that reaches navigable waters through

groundwater, as is the case here.

Even if EPA’s analogy were valid, it would point in

the opposite direction: Just as the CWA’s approach to

nonpoint-source pollution becomes irrelevant when a

point source enters the picture, see Miccosukee, 541

U.S. at 106, so, too, its treatment of discharges to

groundwater is irrelevant once pollutants are added

to navigable waters.

Moreover, EPA’s arguments prove too much. EPA

disavows any categorical exclusion from the Act for

point-source discharges that reach navigable waters

by indirect means other than groundwater. U.S. Br. 8.

EPA says it will continue to evaluate such discharges

on a “case-by-case” basis. Id. (quoting 84 Fed. Reg. at

16,814). But EPA fails to explain why it distinguishes

indirect discharges through groundwater from other

45

indirect discharges. EPA’s assertion that the CWA

embodies a “purpose not to regulate groundwater,”

U.S. Br. 7 (quoting 84 Fed. Reg. at 16,814), applies

equally to everything other than jurisdictional waters.

See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 731 (plurality) (“[T]he CWA

authorizes federal jurisdiction only over ‘waters.’”).

The CWA no more regulates solid ground than it does

groundwater, but, if the County were to discharge its

wastes from pipes onto the ground, over which they

flowed to the ocean, EPA would not view the discharge

as categorically excluded. See U.S. Br. 34. Why the

distinction? EPA does not explain.

EPA seeks to bolster its argument by appealing to

legislative history, pointing to unsuccessful proposals

to regulate all discharges to groundwater. See U.S. Br.

26-28. But “legislative history is not the law,” and this

Court does not “allow ‘ambiguous legislative history to

muddy clear statutory language.’” Azar v. Allina

Health Servs., 139 S. Ct. 1804, 1814 (2019) (citation

omitted). “[F]ailed legislative proposals” are a particularly tenuous basis for construing legislation. Solid

Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of

Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 169-70 (2001) (citation omitted).

Further, the legislative history EPA invokes adds

nothing to what is evident from the face of the statute:

Congress chose not to regulate discharges of pollutants to groundwater as such. The legislative history

does not, however, suggest that this choice reflected

an intent to exclude from the Act’s coverage all discharges to navigable waters through groundwater. At

most, the history EPA cites suggests that Congress

did not intend to cover all discharges to groundwater

on the theory they necessarily affect surface waters.

46

See U.S. Br. 27 (quoting statements of Rep. Aspin).15

That history hardly suggests that Congress meant to

create a blanket exemption for traceable point-source

discharges that foreseeably reach navigable waters

through groundwater.

The judicial decisions EPA invokes to support its

legislative-history argument expressly recognize this

distinction. In Village of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton

Hudson Corp, 24 F.3d 962 (7th Cir. 1994), Judge

Easterbrook relied in part on the same history to conclude that the mere “possibility” of a “connection between ground waters and surface waters” was not

enough to require an NPDES permit for a discharge

to groundwater. Id. at 965. At the same time, the court

recognized that, as EPA then maintained, an actual

“hydrological connection between the ground water

and a nearby surface water body” could trigger the

need for an NPDES permit, id. at 966 (quoting EPA,

NPDES Permit Application Regulations for Storm

Water Discharges (“Storm Water Regulations”), 55

Fed. Reg. 47,990, 47,977 (Nov. 16, 1990)).

Likewise, Exxon Corp. v. Train, 554 F.3d 1310 (5th

Cir. 1977)—on which EPA relies heavily—concluded

that the CWA’s language and history did not support

requiring an NPDES permit for deep-well injection of

wastes that had not reached, and had no potential to

reach, navigable waters. See id. at 1322-30. But even

as it concluded that the Act did not allow “direct federal control over groundwater pollution,” id. at 1322,

––––––––––––––––––––––––

Representative Aspin’s amendment may have been rejected because of another of its provisions, which would have

eliminated the statutory exemption for “oil-and-gas-related injections.” U.S. Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 853 n.66 (7th

Cir. 1977).

15

47

the court expressly disclaimed any limitation on

EPA’s authority to regulate discharges to navigable

waters through groundwater. See id. at 1312 n.1 (reserving opinion on result if “the wastes disposed of

into wells here do, or might, ‘migrate’ from groundwaters back into surface waters that concededly are

within [EPA’s] regulatory jurisdiction”).

The Fifth Circuit reaffirmed this view in Rice v.

Harken Exploration Co., 250 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 2001).

Rice recognized that, although the CWA excludes coverage of a discharge based only on “a generalized assertion that covered surface waters will eventually be

affected by remote, gradual, natural seepage from the

contaminated groundwater,” proof of an actual connection between a discharge and resulting subsurface

movement of contaminants into a jurisdictional water

presents a different question. Id. at 272. The legislative-history discussion in EPA’s brief ignores this key

distinction.

EPA not only muddies the waters by focusing on

the legislative history of provisions Congress did not

enact, but also fails to offer a coherent account of provisions Congress did enact. For example, EPA never

discusses the Act’s express inclusion of “well[s]” in its

definition of “point source.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). Nor

does EPA address the Act’s recognition that some oil

and gas wastes are pollutants when injected into disposal wells. Id. § 1362(6)(B). As explained above,

these provisions would have little or no meaning if the

Act categorically excluded pollutants from point

sources that reach navigable waters via groundwater.

Similarly, EPA’s short discussion of section

1342(b)(1)(D), which expressly requires state NPDES

permit programs to provide for permits that “control

48

the disposal of pollutants into wells,” see U.S. Br. 16,

28, entirely ignores the inconvenient fact that NPDES

permits by definition cover only discharges to navigable waters. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b). Section

1342(b)(1)(D) would be meaningless under EPA’s view

of the statute, because pollutants disposed of into

wells can reach a jurisdictional water only by moving

through the subsurface, and EPA posits that such discharges are “categorically excluded” from NPDES permitting requirements.

EPA also overlooks that the section 1342(b)(1)(D)

requirement applies to federal as well as state permits, because of section 1342(a)(3)’s provision that

EPA’s permit program “shall be subject to the same

terms, conditions, and requirements as apply to a

State permit program and permits issued thereunder.” Thus, EPA’s assertion that, in enacting section

1342(b)(1)(D), Congress “declined … to include” pointsource discharges that reach navigable waters

through groundwater “in the NPDES program,” U.S.

Br. 29, is flatly wrong.

In sum, the best reading of the statute is that,

while Congress did not require permits for all discharges to groundwater, it recognized the “essential

link between ground and surface waters,” S. Rep. No.

92-414, at 73, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3739,

and chose to require permits for those discharges to

navigable waters through groundwater that (1) come

from identifiable point sources, and (2) foreseeably

reach navigable waters.

49

III. CWA regulation of discharges to surface

water via groundwater complements

groundwater-protection statutes.

EPA and the County insist that it is not necessary

to apply the CWA to discharges that reach navigable

waters through groundwater because other statutory

regimes address groundwater contamination. But the

statutes they cite cannot substitute for the CWA’s protections of navigable waters from point-source pollution. Where statutes have their “own scope and purpose,” imposing “different requirements and protections” that “complement each other,” the Court gives

effect to each rather than reading one to displace another. POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 573 U.S.

102, 115 (2014).

Take, for example, the Safe Drinking Water Act

(SDWA), 42 U.S.C. § 300f et seq. The SDWA aims to

prevent underground injection from endangering

“drinking water sources,” id. § 300h(b)(1), defined as

“underground water which supplies or can reasonably

be expected to supply any public water system,” id.

§ 300h(d)(2). The statute addresses “contaminant[s]”

that may result in noncompliance with “any national

primary drinking water regulation” or “otherwise adversely affect the health of persons.” Id.

These protections are important, but they do not

address situations like this one, where point-source

pollution harms marine life or otherwise adversely affects navigable waters without threatening a drinking

water source. Unlike the CWA, the SDWA does not

protect sensitive marine ecosystems, let alone the esthetic, recreational, and economic values of the territorial seas. See 33 U.S.C. § 1343; 40 C.F.R. §§ 125.122,

125.123; S. Rep. No. 92-414, at 7, reprinted in 1972

50

U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3674 (using the “ocean as a waste

treatment system is unacceptable”). The two statutes

have complementary and distinct objectives; neither

creates an excuse to curtail the other.

Indeed, the express terms of the CWA and the

SDWA leave no doubt that they sometimes both apply

to the same discharge, depending on its environmental impact. For example, both the CWA and the SDWA

regulate injection wells used to facilitate oil or gas production. The CWA states that such wells may be subject to CWA regulation if they will result in “degradation of ground or surface water resources.” 33 U.S.C.

§ 1362(6)(B). The SDWA states that such wells may

be subject to SDWA regulation if they inject a “contaminant” that may endanger a public drinking water

source. 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(2); see Legal Envtl. Assistance Fdn., Inc. v. EPA, 118 F.3d 1467, 1473-78 (11th

Cir. 1997). Whether either, neither, or both statutes

apply to a particular well depends on the circumstances.

The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

(RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq., is likewise aimed at

a specific problem—disposal of “hazardous” waste and

“solid” waste—that overlaps only partially with the

CWA’s central concern. RCRA’s definition of “hazardous waste” is considerably narrower than the CWA’s

definition of “pollutant.” The former applies only to

wastes that have characteristics rendering them substantially dangerous to human health or the environment, 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5), while the latter includes a

much broader list of things, including “heat,” “rock,”

and “sand,” that need not have health or environmental impacts, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6). No party contends

that the wastewater from the County’s wells contains

hazardous waste subject to RCRA or that RCRA

51

meaningfully protects the Pacific from the County’s

effluents.

Moreover, RCRA’s express terms contradict the assertion that it displaces the CWA. RCRA states that

it is to be “integrate[d]” with the CWA and other environmental statutes, 42 U.S.C. § 6905(b)(1), and provides that “[n]othing in [RCRA] shall be construed to

apply to … any activity or substance which is subject

to the [CWA] … except to the extent that such application (or regulation) is not inconsistent with the requirements of such Act[],” Id. § 6905(a). RCRA also

defines “solid waste” not to include certain pointsource discharges subject to NPDES permitting. Id.

§ 6903(27); see Inland Steel, 901 F.2d at 1421-22.

Reading RCRA to displace the CWA in this context

would turn the statutes upside down. And reading the

two statutes together would hardly “nullify” RCRA.

Pet. Br. 44. EPA’s regulations provide that, where the

CWA applies to a point-source discharge, RCRA continues to have broad application to the upstream collection, storage and treatment of covered wastes. 40

C.F.R. § 261.4(a)(2) cmt.

The Comprehensive Environmental Response,

Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42

U.S.C. § 9601 et seq., is no more relevant. CERCLA

addresses remediation of sites contaminated by “hazardous substance[s].” Id. § 9601(14); see id. §§ 960406. The County’s wells are not a CERCLA site, and a

hazardous-waste remediation statute cannot substitute for one designed to prevent discharges of pollutants. Moreover, CERCLA expressly excludes “federally permitted release[s],” including releases under

NPDES permits, id. § 9601(10), from certain of its key

provisions, see id. §§ 9603(a)-(b), 9607(j). Those exclu-

52

sions reflect congressional recognition that even releases otherwise covered by CERCLA are subject to

the CWA if they are from point sources and reach navigable waters, and that NPDES permits are the primary means of regulating such releases.

EPA also cites the Oil Pollution Act’s imposition of

damages liability for harm to groundwater. U.S. Br.

33 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 2701(20)). That provision indicates no congressional intent to limit the CWA’s application to discharges to navigable waters. Nor does

the Coastal Zone Management Act’s provision for

state plans to address nonpoint-source pollution, 16

U.S.C. § 1455b(a)(1), say anything about the scope of

the CWA’s application to point sources. See id.

§ 1456(f) (Coastal Zone Management Act does not “in

any way affect any [CWA] requirement”). Hawai‘i’s

implementation of the Coastal Zone Management Act

proves the point: The state’s plan includes no

measures to control discharges to the ocean from the

County’s injection wells. See Hawai‘i’s Nonpoint

Source Management Plan (2015-2020), http://health.

hawaii.gov/cwb/files/2013/05/2015-Hawaii-NPS-Management-Plan.pdf (last visited July 9, 2019).

IV. Applying the CWA to the County’s wells

would not transform the Act’s scope, but

failing to apply it would thwart its

objectives and create opportunities for

evasion.

Recognizing that the CWA’s terms encompass the

County’s discharges would not, as EPA and the

County argue, trigger “an enormous and transformative expansion in EPA’s regulatory authority without

clear congressional authorization.” Util. Air Reg. Grp.

53

v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014). In Utility Air Regulatory Group, EPA had reversed a longstanding construction of the Clean Air Act while admitting that its

expansive new construction could have “calamitous

consequences” that would “overthrow” the Act’s design. Id. at 321. This case involves no similar claim to

“discover in a long-extant statute an unheralded

power to regulate.” Id. at 324. Rather, EPA’s reversal

of position here disclaims regulatory authority over

discharges the agency long said fell within the CWA.

See 84 Fed. Reg. at 16,818-19; see, e.g., Storm Water

Regulations, 55 Fed. Reg. at 47,997 (stating that

point-source discharges to groundwater may be discharges to navigable waters if “there is a hydrological

connection between the ground water and a nearby

surface water body”).

Although EPA now argues that its longstanding

position was erroneous and inconsistent with the statutory design, it does not assert that continued adherence to that position would “overthrow” the statute or

have “calamitous consequences.” Nor could it. Despite

decades of regulatory history, EPA has identified neither an overwhelming regulatory burden nor massive

unanticipated liabilities if point-source discharges of

pollutants to navigable waters through groundwater

remain covered by the CWA. No clear congressional

authorization is necessary to support continued application of a longstanding agency interpretation that

has stood the test of time.

The County, EPA, and their amici point to large

numbers of sources that could theoretically require a

permit if the CWA remains applicable to indirect

point-source discharges to navigable waters. But

those sources would need a permit only if they would

actually and foreseeably add traceable pollutants to

54

navigable waters. None of the parties suggests, for example, that properly designed disposal wells or green

infrastructure projects generally do so. Nor would it

stifle green infrastructure development to regulate

any green infrastructure projects that demonstrably

and predictably pollute navigable waters. To suggest

otherwise ignores not only the Act’s longstanding focus on preventing point-source pollution, but also recent changes to the CWA that explicitly contemplate

that many green infrastructure projects will be carried out in conjunction with discharges subject to

CWA regulation and addressed in NPDES permits applicable to those discharges.16

As for concerns about potential NPDES regulation

of septic tanks, properly constructed septic systems

are designed to ensure that “wastewater treatment

[occurs] in the soil” before effluent reaches groundwater. See EPA, Septic Systems Overview, https://www.

––––––––––––––––––––––––

In January 2019, Congress enacted, and the President

signed into law, the Water Infrastructure Improvement Act, Pub.

L. No. 115-436, 132 Stat. 5558 (2019), aimed at “promot[ing] the

use of green infrastructure,” id. § 5(b)(2), 132 Stat. at 5561 (adding 33 U.S.C. § 1377a(a)). The legislation defines “green infrastructure” as “measures that use plant or soil systems, permeable pavement or other permeable surfaces or substrates” to

“store, infiltrate, or evapotranspirate stormwater and reduce

flows to sewer systems or to surface waters,” id. § 5(a), 132 Stat.

at 5561 (adding 33 U.S.C. § 1362(27)), and it amends § 1342 to

enable such projects to “be incorporated into [an NPDES] permit,” id. § 3(a), 132 Stat. at 5588 (adding 33 U.S.C. § 1342(s)(2));

see also 33 U.S.C. § 1342(s)(3)(B)(ii). Congress thus expressly

contemplated that many green infrastructure projects will be

permitted in conjunction with NPDES regulation of discharges

to navigable waters.

16

55

epa.gov/septic/septic-systems-overview (last visited

July 9, 2019). Local regulations requiring “properly

planned, designed, sited, installed, operated and

maintained” septic systems “ensure that ground water resources will not be threatened” and that tanks

will be set back from “surface waters.” Id. As a result,

pollutants from properly designed septic tanks will

not foreseeably reach surface waters through groundwater. Moreover, the widely dispersed and small-scale

nature of septic tanks makes it unlikely that any pollutants that may reach navigable waters will be traceable to any individual tank. Thus, in most cases, any

pollution attributable to malfunctioning septic systems is properly treated as nonpoint-source pollution.17

Moreover, EPA and states have tools to ensure

that CWA regulation is not unduly burdensome. They

may, for example, issue general permits for low-risk

discharge activities conducted in accordance with

proper practices specified in the permits. Using this

authority, EPA has issued general permits covering

stormwater discharges from countless small construction projects, 82 Fed. Reg. 6,534 (Jan. 19, 2017), and

pesticide applications, 81 Fed. Reg. 75,816 (Nov. 1,

2016). Thus, if a state concluded that significant numbers of septic tanks are point sources that discharge

pollutants that foreseeably and traceably reach navigable waters, the state could greatly reduce compliance burdens by issuing a general permit for properly

––––––––––––––––––––––––

17 See EPA, National Management Measures to Control Non-

point Source Pollution from Urban Areas, Management Measure

6: New and Existing On-Site Wastewater Treatment Systems

(2005), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-09/documents/urban_ch06.pdf (last visited July 9, 2019).

56

constructed tanks that comply with other applicable

standards. See Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 108 (CWA general permits can “control regulatory costs”); see, e.g.,

81 Fed. Reg. at 75,819 (cost to comply with pesticide

general NPDES permit “minimal”).

The states’ central role in NPDES permitting obviates any concern that applying the CWA in accordance with its terms will usurp “state authority to address pollution,” Pet. Br. 42, or “upend the traditional

federal-state balance,” U.S. Br. 11. Nearly every state,

including Hawai‘i, administers the NPDES program

within its borders. See https://www.epa.gov/npdes/

npdes-state-program-information (last visited July 9,

2019). Moreover, applying the CWA to the County’s

point-source discharges in no way undermines state

authority to regulate nonpoint-source pollution.

Properly applied to the County’s wells and other point

sources that foreseeably and traceably add pollutants

to navigable waters via groundwater, the CWA will

remain, as this Court has long recognized, “a regulatory ‘partnership’ between the Federal Government

and the source State.” Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479

U.S. 481, 490 (1987).

In short, applying the CWA to the County’s wells

will not transform its scope, impose undue burdens, or

undermine state authority over water pollution. Failing to apply the Act according to its terms, by contrast,

would thwart the statute’s objectives “to restore and

maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters,” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a), and

to “eliminate[]” discharges of pollutants into navigable waters, id. § 1251(a)(1). As this case illustrates,

limiting the CWA would free polluters to release pollutants onto the ground or into groundwater even

when they know—even when they intend—that the

57

pull of gravity or the flow of groundwater will inevitably carry the pollutants to navigable waters.

Make no mistake: That is no imaginary risk. Under either the County’s or EPA’s approach, polluters

could exploit groundwater conduits to evade regulation of massive additions of pollutants to navigable

waters. And under the County’s approach, polluters

could also bypass the CWA by ending their sewer

pipes just short of the waterline, so that the sewage

flows through the sand before entering the navigable

waters.

This Court should not create such easy avenues for

evasion of the CWA’s terms. A statute should not be

interpreted “to destroy itself.” Citizens Bank of Md. v.

Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16, 20 (1995) (citation omitted). The

Act does not permit polluters to do indirectly what

they are prohibited from doing directly: add pollutants

to navigable waters from point sources without an

NPDES permit.

CONCLUSION

The Court should affirm the judgment of the court

of appeals.

58

Respectfully submitted,

SCOTT L. NELSON

PUBLIC CITIZEN

LITIGATION GROUP

1600 20th Street NW

Washington, DC 20009

(202) 588-1000

AMANDA C. LEITER

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

WASHINGTON COLLEGE

OF LAW

4300 Nebraska Ave. NW

Washington, DC 20016

(202) 274-4187

July 12, 2019

DAVID L. HENKIN

Counsel of Record

EARTHJUSTICE

850 Richards Street

Suite 400

Honolulu, Hawai‘i 96813

(808) 599-2436

dhenkin@earthjustice.org

JANETTE K. BRIMMER

EARTHJUSTICE

705 2nd Avenue

Suite 203

Seattle, WA 98104

(206) 343-7340

Attorneys for Respondents

1a

APPENDIX

STATUTES INVOLVED

1. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) provides, in pertinent part:

§ 1251. Congressional declaration of goals and

policy

(a) Restoration and maintenance of chemical,

physical and biological integrity of Nation’s

waters; national goals for achievement of objective

The objective of this chapter is to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of

the Nation’s waters.

2. 33 U.S.C. § 1343 provides:

§ 1343. Ocean discharge criteria

(a) Issuance of permits

No permit under section 1342 of this title for a discharge into the territorial sea, the waters of the contiguous zone, or the oceans shall be issued, after promulgation of guidelines established under subsection (c)

of this section, except in compliance with such guidelines. Prior to the promulgation of such guidelines, a

permit may be issued under such section 1342 of this

title if the Administrator determines it to be in the

public interest.

(b) Waiver

The requirements of subsection (d) of section 1342

of this title may not be waived in the case of permits

for discharges into the territorial sea.

(c) Guidelines for determining degradation of

waters

2a

(1) The Administrator shall, within one hundred

and eighty days after October 18, 1972 (and from time

to time thereafter), promulgate guidelines for determining the degradation of the waters of the territorial

seas, the contiguous zone, and the oceans, which shall

include:

(A) the effect of disposal of pollutants on human

health or welfare, including but not limited to

plankton, fish, shellfish, wildlife, shorelines, and

beaches;

(B) the effect of disposal of pollutants on marine

life including the transfer, concentration, and dispersal of pollutants or their byproducts through biological, physical, and chemical processes; changes

in marine ecosystem diversity, productivity, and

stability; and species and community population

changes;

(C) the effect of disposal, of pollutants on esthetic, recreation, and economic values;

(D) the persistence and permanence of the effects of disposal of pollutants;

(E) the effect of the disposal of varying rates, of

particular volumes and concentrations of pollutants;

(F) other possible locations and methods of disposal or recycling of pollutants including landbased alternatives; and

(G) the effect on alternate uses of the oceans,

such as mineral exploitation and scientific study.

(2) In any event where insufficient information exists on any proposed discharge to make a reasonable

judgment on any of the guidelines established

3a

pursuant to this subsection no permit shall be issued

under section 1342 of this title.

3. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) provides:

(6) The term “pollutant” means dredged spoil, solid

waste, incinerator residue, sewage, garbage, sewage

sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biological materials, radioactive materials, heat, wrecked or discarded

equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into water.

This term does not mean (A) “sewage from vessels or

a discharge incidental to the normal operation of a

vessel of the Armed Forces” within the meaning of section 1322 of this title; or (B) water, gas, or other material which is injected into a well to facilitate production of oil or gas, or water derived in association with

oil or gas production and disposed of in a well, if the

well used either to facilitate production or for disposal

purposes is approved by authority of the State in

which the well is located, and if such State determines

that such injection or disposal will not result in the

degradation of ground or surface water resources.

4. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) provides:

(14) The term “point source” means any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but

not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock,

concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or

other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may

be discharged. This term does not include agricultural

stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.