Respondents Brief — County of Maui, Hawaii, Petitioner v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, et al.
Supreme Court briefJul 12, 2019
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No. 18-260
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
COUNTY OF MAUI,
Petitioner,
v.
HAWAI‘I WILDLIFE FUND; SIERRA CLUB –
MAUI GROUP; SURFRIDER FOUNDATION;
WEST MAUI PRESERVATION ASSOCIATION,
Respondents.
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS
SCOTT L. NELSON
PUBLIC CITIZEN
LITIGATION GROUP
1600 20th Street NW
Washington, DC 20009
(202) 588-1000
AMANDA C. LEITER
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY
WASHINGTON COLLEGE
OF LAW
4300 Nebraska Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20016
(202) 274-4187
July 12, 2019
DAVID L. HENKIN
Counsel of Record
EARTHJUSTICE
850 Richards Street
Suite 400
Honolulu, Hawai‘i 96813
(808) 599-2436
dhenkin@earthjustice.org
JANETTE K. BRIMMER
EARTHJUSTICE
705 2nd Avenue
Suite 203
Seattle, WA 98104
(206) 343-7340
Attorneys for Respondents
i
QUESTION PRESENTED
When a pollutant released from a point source
travels a short distance through groundwater before
foreseeably reaching navigable surface waters, does
that point-source discharge fall within the Clean Water Act’s prohibition of unpermitted additions of any
pollutant to navigable waters from any point source?
ii
RULE 29.6 STATEMENT
Respondents Hawai‘i Wildlife Fund, Surfrider
Foundation and West Maui Preservation Association
are nonprofit organizations that have no parent corporations, and no publicly held company has any ownership interest in them.
Respondent Sierra Club – Maui Group is part of
the Sierra Club, which is a nonprofit organization that
has no parent corporation, and no publicly held company has any ownership interest in it.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTION PRESENTED .......................................... i
RULE 29.6 STATEMENT .......................................... ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................... vi
INTRODUCTION ....................................................... 1
STATUTES INVOLVED ............................................ 3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................... 3
A. Statutory Background...................................... 3
B. Facts ................................................................. 6
C. Proceedings Below ......................................... 10
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................................. 12
ARGUMENT ............................................................. 15
I.
The CWA’s plain language prohibits the
County’s unpermitted addition of pollutants
from disposal wells to the Pacific. ..................... 15
A. The County’s “addition” of pollutants “to”
navigable waters comes “from” a point
source. ............................................................. 15
B. The Act’s terms apply to indirect discharges
from point sources that traceably and
foreseeably reach navigable waters. ............. 19
C. The CWA’s provisions concerning disposal of
pollutants in wells underscore the Act’s
application to the Lahaina Facility. .............. 22
D. The statute’s background and context support
its application to indirect discharges. ........... 25
II. The CWA’s language and structure contradict
the County’s and EPA’s readings. ..................... 27
iv
A. The County and EPA propose atextual
exceptions to the statute. ............................... 27
B. The County’s textual arguments are
erroneous. ....................................................... 29
1. “Conveyance”............................................. 29
2. “From” ....................................................... 31
3. “Any point source” .................................... 32
4. “Into” ......................................................... 33
C. The CWA’s structure and history do not
support the County’s and EPA’s limiting
constructions. ................................................. 35
1. Congress did not foreclose regulation of
indirect point-source pollution when it
declined to regulate nonpoint-source
pollution.. .................................................. 36
2. The CWA does not categorically exclude
discharges to navigable waters through
groundwater. ............................................. 41
III. CWA regulation of discharges to surface water
via groundwater complements groundwaterprotection statutes. ............................................ 49
IV. Applying the CWA to the County’s wells would
not transform the Act’s scope, but failing to
apply it would thwart its objectives and create
opportunities for evasion. .................................. 52
CONCLUSION.......................................................... 57
APPENDIX—Statutes Involved
1.
33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) ............................................ 1a
2.
33 U.S.C. § 1343 ................................................. 1a
v
3.
33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) ............................................ 3a
4.
33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) .......................................... 3a
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Page(s)
Alabama v. North Carolina,
560 U.S. 330 (2010) ............................................. 28
Ali v. Fed. Bur. of Prisons,
552 U.S. 214 (2008) ............................................. 17
Am. Wildlands v. Browner,
260 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2001) ........................... 37
Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co.,
446 U.S. 608 (1980) ............................................. 28
Arkansas v. Oklahoma,
503 U.S. 91 (1992) ........................................... 6, 34
Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer,
513 U.S. 179 (1995) ............................................. 18
Azar v. Allina Health Servs.,
139 S. Ct. 1804 (2019) ......................................... 45
Badaracco v. Comm’r of Internal Rev.,
464 U.S. 386 (1984) ............................................. 28
Brecht v. Abrahamson,
507 U.S. 619 (1993) ....................................... 31, 32
Ctr. for Native Ecosystems v. Cables,
509 F.3d 1310 (10th Cir. 2007) ........................... 37
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC,
467 U.S. 837 (1984) ............................................. 42
Citizens Bank of Md. v. Strumpf,
516 U.S. 16 (1995) ............................................... 57
Concerned Area Residents for the Envt.
v. Southview Farm,
34 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 1994) ............................. 19, 38
vii
Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain,
503 U.S. 249 (1992) ............................................. 28
Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc.,
447 U.S. 102 (1980) ............................................. 15
CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride,
564 U.S. 685 (2011) ............................................. 20
Dames & Moore v. Regan,
453 U.S. 654 (1981) ............................................. 34
Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr.,
568 U.S. 597 (2013) ............................................. 39
Dodd v. United States,
545 U.S. 353 (2005) ............................................. 28
EPA v. California ex rel. State Water
Res. Control Bd.,
426 U.S. 200 ........................................................... 3
Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co.,
505 U.S. 469 (1992) ............................................. 34
Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc.,
517 U.S. 830 (1996) ............................................. 22
Exxon Corp. v. Train,
554 F.3d 1310 (5th Cir. 1977) ....................... 46, 47
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
529 U.S. 120 (2000) ............................................. 44
Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Inst.,
138 S. Ct. 1833 (2018) ......................................... 24
Inland Steel Co. v. EPA,
901 F.2d 1419 (7th Cir. 1990) ....................... 23, 51
Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette,
479 U.S. 481 (1987) ............................................. 56
viii
Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini,
Kramer & Ulrich LPA,
559 U.S. 573 (2010) ............................................. 26
Lamie v. United States Trustee,
540 U.S. 526 (2004) ....................................... 15, 28
League of Wilderness Defenders/Blue Mts.
Biodiversity Project v. Forsgren,
309 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2002) ....................... 37, 40
Legal Envtl. Assistance Fdn., Inc. v. EPA,
118 F.3d 1467 (11th Cir. 1997) ........................... 50
Levin v. United States,
568 U.S. 503 (2013) ............................................. 34
Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist. v. NRDC,
568 U.S. 78 (2013) ............................................... 17
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555 (1992) ............................................. 20
Magwood v. Patterson,
561 U.S. 320 (2010) ............................................. 28
Massachusetts v. EPA,
549 U.S. 497 (2007) ............................................. 43
Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy,
460 U.S. 766 (1983) ............................................. 21
Milwaukee & St. P.R. Co. v. Kellogg,
94 U.S. 469 (1876) ............................................... 21
Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Defense,
138 S. Ct. 617 (2018) ................................... 4, 5, 17
Or. Nat. Desert Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv.,
550 F.3d 778 (9th Cir. 2008) ............................... 35
Or. Nat. Res. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv.,
834 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1987) ......................... 37, 38
ix
POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co.,
573 U.S. 102 (2014) ............................................. 49
Rapanos v. United States,
547 U.S. 715 (2006) ............. 2, 3, 11, 19, 20, 21, 45
Rice v. Harken Exploration Co.,
250 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 2001) ............................... 47
Rubin v. Islamic Repub. of Iran,
138 S. Ct. 816 (2018) ........................................... 23
S.D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. of Envtl. Prot.,
547 U.S. 370 (2006) ............................................. 17
Sierra Club v. Abston Constr. Co.,
620 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1980). ................................ 40
Sierra Club v. El Paso Gold Mines, Inc.,
421 F.3d 1133 (10th Cir. 2005) ..................... 37, 40
Simsbury-Avon Preservation Soc’y, LLC
v. Metacon Gun Club, Inc.,
575 F.3d 199 (2d Cir. 2009) ........................... 37, 38
Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v.
U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,
531 U.S. 159 (2001) ............................................. 45
S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe,
541 U.S. 95 (2004) ............17, 18, 31, 32, 41, 44, 56
Staub v. Proctor Hosp.,
562 U.S. 411 (2011) ............................................. 22
TRW Inc. v. Andrews,
534 U.S. 19 (2001) ......................................... 28, 29
United States v. Ballard Oil Co. of Hartford,
195 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1952) ................................. 25
x
United States v. Esso Standard Oil
Co. of Puerto Rico,
375 F.2d 621 (3rd Cir. 1967) ......................... 25, 26
United States v. Mead Corp.,
533 U.S. 218 (2001) ............................................. 42
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,
474 U.S. 121 (1985) ............................................... 3
United States v. Standard Oil Co.,
384 U.S. 224 (1966) ............................................. 25
United States v. Valley Camp Coal Co.,
480 F.2d 616 (4th Cir. 1973) ............................... 26
United States v. White Fuel Corp.,
498 F.2d 619 (1st Cir. 1974) ................................ 26
U.S. Steel Corp. v. Train,
556 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1977) ............................... 46
Util. Air Reg. Grp. v. EPA,
573 U.S. 302 (2014) ....................................... 52, 53
Village of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson Corp,
24 F.3d 962 (7th Cir. 1994) ................................. 46
Yates v. United States,
135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015) ......................................... 22
Federal Statutes:
Coastal Zone Management Act,
16 U.S.C. § 1451 et seq. ....................................... 52
§ 1455b(a)(1) ........................................................ 52
§ 1456(f) ............................................................... 52
xi
Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),
42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. ................................. 51, 52
§ 9601(10) ............................................................. 51
§ 9601(14) ............................................................. 51
§ 9603(a) ............................................................... 51
§ 9603(b) ............................................................... 51
§ 9604 ................................................................... 51
§ 9605 ................................................................... 51
§ 9606 ................................................................... 51
§ 9607(j)................................................................ 51
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972 (Clean Water Act), Pub. L. No. 92-500,
86 Stat. 816, codified as amended at
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq................................passim
§ 1251(a) ........................................................... 3, 56
§ 1251(a)(1) ................................................ 3, 34, 56
§ 1252(a) ............................................................... 43
§ 1254(a)(5) .......................................................... 43
§ 1288 ................................................................... 44
§ 1311 ............................................................. 23, 36
§ 1311(a) ........................................................passim
§ 1312 ............................................................. 23, 36
§ 1314(a)(1)(A) ..................................................... 43
§ 1314(a)(2)(A) ..................................................... 43
§ 1316 ............................................................. 23, 36
xii
§ 1317 ................................................................... 23
§ 1329(i)(1) .......................................................... 39
§ 1341(a)(1) ............................................................ 8
§ 1342 ............................................. 1, 17, 36, 43, 54
§ 1342(a) ......................................................... 15, 23
§ 1342(a)(1) ............................................................ 5
§ 1342(a)(3) ...................................................... 6, 48
§ 1342(a)(4) .................................................... 26, 35
§ 1342(a)(5) .......................................................... 26
§ 1342(b) ............................................... 6, 23, 34, 48
§ 1342(b)(1)(A) ..................................................... 23
§ 1342(b)(1)(D) ............................... 6, 13, 23, 47, 48
§ 1342(l)(1) ........................................................... 29
§ 1342(l)(2) ..................................................... 29, 39
§ 1342(l)(3) ..................................................... 29, 39
§ 1342(p)............................................................... 39
§ 1342(p)(1) .......................................................... 29
§ 1342(r) ............................................................... 29
§ 1342(s)(2)........................................................... 54
§ 1342(s)(3)(B)(ii) ................................................. 54
§ 1343 ......................................................... 3, 23, 49
§ 1343(a) ................................................................. 5
§ 1343(c) ................................................................. 5
§ 1343(c)(1)(A) ........................................................ 5
§ 1343(c)(1)(B) ........................................................ 5
xiii
§ 1343(c)(1)(C) ........................................................ 5
§ 1344 ................................................................... 36
§ 1362 ..................................................................... 4
§ 1362(6) ......................................... 1, 3, 4, 8, 16, 50
§ 1362(6)(B) .................................. 13, 24, 29, 47, 50
§ 1362(7) ....................................................... 1, 5, 16
§ 1362(8) ....................................................... 1, 5, 16
§ 1362(9) ................................................................. 5
§ 1362(10) ............................................................... 5
§ 1362(11) ............................................................. 34
§ 1362(12) ....................................................... 30, 32
§ 1362(12)(A) .................................................passim
§ 1362(12)(B) .......................................................... 5
§ 1362(14) ......................................................passim
§ 1362(27) ............................................................. 54
§ 1371(b) ............................................................... 34
§ 1377a(a) ............................................................. 54
Oil Pollution Act,
33 U.S.C. § 2701(20) ............................................ 52
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),
42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq. ................................. 50, 51
§ 6903(5) ............................................................... 50
§ 6903(27) ............................................................. 51
§ 6905(a) ............................................................... 51
§ 6905(b)(1) .......................................................... 51
xiv
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1879, § 13 (Refuse Act),
33 U.S.C. § 407 .................................. 25, 26, 27, 35
Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA),
42 U.S.C. § 300f et seq. .............................. 7, 49, 50
§ 300h(b)(1) .......................................................... 49
§ 300h(d)(2) .................................................... 49, 50
Water Infrastructure Improvement Act,
Pub. L. No. 115-436, 132 Stat. 5558 (2019) ........ 54
Federal Regulations & Regulatory Materials:
40 C.F.R. § 122.2 ....................................................... 39
40 C.F.R. pt. 125, subpt. M ......................................... 5
§ 125.122 .............................................................. 49
§ 125.122(a)(5 ........................................................ 6
§ 125.123 .............................................................. 49
§ 125.123(b) ............................................................ 5
§ 125.123(c)(2) ........................................................ 5
40 C.F.R. § 261.4(a)(2) cmt. ...................................... 51
EPA, Final National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) General
Permit for Stormwater Discharges from
Construction Activities,
82 Fed. Reg. 6,534 (Jan. 19, 2017) ...................... 55
EPA, Final National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) Pesticide General
Permit for Point Source Discharges from the
Application of Pesticides; Reissuance,
81 Fed. Reg. 75,816 (Nov. 1, 2016) ............... 55, 56
xv
EPA, HAWAII, Program for Control of Discharges
of Pollutants to Navigable Waters,
39 Fed. Reg. 43,759 (Dec. 18, 1974). ..................... 6
EPA, Interpretive Statement on Application of
the Clean Water Act National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System Program to
Releases of Pollutants from a Point Source to
Groundwater, 84 Fed. Reg. 16,810
(Apr. 23, 2019) ................... 1, 37, 41, 42, 44, 45, 53
EPA, National Management Measures to Control
Nonpoint Source Pollution from Urban Areas,
Management Measure 6: New and Existing OnSite Wastewater Treatment Systems (2005),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201509/documents/urban_ch06.pdf ............................ 55
EPA, NPDES Permit Application Regulations for
Storm Water Discharges, 55 Fed. Reg. 47,990
(Nov. 16, 1990) ............................................... 46, 53
EPA, NPDES State Program Information: State
Program Authority, https://www.epa.gov/npdes/
npdes-state-program-information. ...................... 56
EPA, Office of Water, Nonpoint Source Guidance
(1987), https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPURL.
cgi?Dockey=910217GL.TXT ................................ 38
EPA, Septic Systems Overview,
https://www.epa.gov/septic/septic-systemsoverview ......................................................... 54, 55
State Statutes:
Haw. Rev. Stat. ch. 340E ............................................ 7
xvi
State Regulations & Regulatory Materials:
Haw. Admin. R. § 11-54-6(b)(3) .............................. 8, 9
Haw. Admin. R. § 11-62-26 ......................................... 8
Hawai‘i’s Nonpoint Source Management Plan (20152020), http://health.hawaii.gov/cwb/files/2013/05/
2015-Hawaii-NPS-Management-Plan.pdf .......... 52
Legislative History:
118 Cong. Rec. 33,758 (1972).................................... 26
S. Rep. No. 92-414 (1971), reprinted in
1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668 ...............................passim
Other:
Prouty, et al., Vulnerability of coral reefs to
bioerosion from land-based sources of pollution,
122 J. of Geophysical Res.: Oceans 9319 (2017),
https://darchive.mblwhoilibrary.org/handle/
1912/9534 ............................................................... 9
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary
(2002 ed.)............................................ 17, 18, 22, 35
INTRODUCTION
The keystone provision of the Clean Water Act
(CWA) is its prohibition of “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source” without a permit. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A); see id.
§§ 1311(a), 1342. The County of Maui (County) and
the United States Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) seek to avoid application of this prohibition to
the County’s Lahaina Wastewater Reclamation Facility (Lahaina Facility) by asserting that all additions
of pollutants “to navigable waters from [a] point
source” via groundwater are exempt. The CWA’s text,
and its structure and purposes, foreclose such an exemption.
The County designed the Lahaina injection wells
to dispose of millions of gallons of treated sewage daily
into the groundwater beneath the Facility, and it did
so knowing these pollutants would flow into the Pacific Ocean. The wells undisputedly achieve this purpose: Large quantities of effluent injected at the wells
flow into the ocean near the Facility. Likewise, there
is no dispute that the wells are “point source[s]” under
the CWA, id. § 1362(14), that the effluent from them
is a “pollutant,” id. § 1362(6), and that the Pacific immediately off the Maui coastline is a “navigable water[],” id. § 1362(7); see also id. § 1362(8). A straightforward reading of the CWA’s core prohibition, therefore, bars the County’s unpermitted “addition of [a]
pollutant”—the Facility’s effluent—“to navigable waters”—the Pacific—“from [a] point source”—the wells.
The County and EPA—which reversed its position
in an “interpretive statement” issued after this Court
granted certiorari, 84 Fed. Reg. 16,810 (Apr. 23,
2019)—offer competing rationales for exempting the
2
County’s discharges from the Act’s requirements. The
County urges a “means-of-delivery test” that would
limit the CWA’s prohibition to unpermitted discharges that directly reach navigable waters through
an unbroken chain of point sources. EPA rejects the
County’s test but proffers a newly minted reading of
the Act that would exclude from its prohibition any
addition of pollutants to navigable waters from a point
source through groundwater.
The CWA’s text contradicts these cramped readings. EPA does not even attempt to square its reading
with the Act’s operative provisions. Both the County
and EPA rely on unsupported inferences drawn from
inapplicable provisions of the Act, and on the implausible theory that Congress, in focusing the CWA on
point-source pollution of surface waters, intended to
exempt any such pollution that ever travels through
groundwater, over any distance, for any amount of
time. The Act’s terms, however, express Congress’s intent to prohibit the unpermitted discharge from disposal wells of pollutants that actually and foreseeably
reach navigable surface waters.
Requiring a permit for such point-source discharges serves the Act’s purpose of eliminating pollution of navigable waters, and does so without imposing undue regulatory burdens. Either the County’s or
EPA’s view, by contrast, would open a substantial
loophole in the CWA, allowing polluters to achieve indirectly what they cannot do directly: discharge pollutants from point sources into navigable waters without a permit. As Justice Scalia pointed out in his plurality opinion in Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S.
715 (2006), the CWA does not permit that result. “The
Act does not forbid the ‘addition of any pollutant directly to navigable waters from any point source,’ but
3
rather the ‘addition of any pollutant to navigable waters.’” Id. at 743 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A)). On
that natural reading of the CWA, the County’s unpermitted discharges violate the Act.
STATUTES INVOLVED
Statutes involved in this case are reproduced in
the County’s brief and the appendix to the brief of the
United States, except for 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a), 1343,
1362(6), and 1362(14), which are reproduced in the
appendix to this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Statutory Background
The relevant statutory text originated in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816, commonly
known as the Clean Water Act. The Act “constituted a
comprehensive legislative attempt ‘to restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters,’” United States v. Riverside
Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 132 (1985) (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)), and established “the national
goal” of eliminating “the discharge of pollutants into
the navigable waters,” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1).
In enacting the CWA, Congress recognized that existing federal legislation was inadequate to achieve
the ambitious goal of protecting the Nation’s waters,
in part because that legislation attempted to define
and maintain standards of water quality rather than
directly regulate polluters. See S. Rep. No. 92-414, at
7-8 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 367475; EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Res. Control
Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 202-04 (1976). By contrast, the
4
CWA recognizes that “[w]ater moves in hydrologic cycles and it is essential that discharge of pollutants be
controlled at the source.” S. Rep. No. 92-414 at 77, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3742.
Congress implemented this new approach in a series of interlocking statutory provisions that prohibit
unpermitted discharges of pollutants from point
sources to navigable waters. This prohibition, “[o]ne of
the Act’s principal tools,” Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t
of Defense, 138 S. Ct. 617, 624 (2018) (“NAM”), is set
forth in 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a), which provides that “the
discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful,” except in compliance with provisions regarding effluent limitations, performance standards, and
discharge permits.
Another provision, 33 U.S.C. § 1362, supplies the
definitions that establish section 1311(a)’s meaning.
Section 1362 defines “discharge of a pollutant” to
mean “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source.” Id. § 1362(12)(A). A “pollutant” is “dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions,
chemical wastes, biological materials, radioactive materials, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock,
sand, cellar dirt and industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into water.” Id. § 1362(6). A
“point source” is “any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any
pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal
feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft,
from which pollutants are or may be discharged.” Id.
§ 1362(14). And “navigable waters” are “the waters of
5
the United States, including the territorial seas.” Id.
§ 1362(7).1
Section 1311(a) contains “exceptions to the prohibition on discharge of pollutants,” including “two permitting schemes that authorize certain entities to discharge pollutants into navigable waters.” NAM, 138
S. Ct. at 625. The scheme relevant here, the National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES),
provides that EPA may “issue a permit for the discharge of any pollutant, or combination of pollutants,
notwithstanding section 1311(a),” if the discharge
meets applicable effluent limits, performance standards, and other requirements of the Act. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342(a)(1).
The Act requires that permits for discharges to the
territorial seas ensure compliance with criteria promulgated by EPA to protect the marine environment. 33
U.S.C. § 1343(a), (c); see also 40 C.F.R. pt. 125, subpt.
M (establishing such criteria). The Act and implementing criteria specify that a permit may not issue if
the discharge will “cause unreasonable degradation of
the marine environment,” 40 C.F.R. § 125.123(b), taking into account impacts on “human health or welfare,” “marine life,” and “esthetic, recreation, and economic values,” 33 U.S.C. § 1343(c)(1)(A)-(C). If the
possible extent of degradation cannot be determined,
a permit may issue only if “[t]here are no reasonable
alternatives” to the proposed discharge. 40 C.F.R.
§ 125.123(c)(2). EPA’s criteria highlight the need to
––––––––––––––––––––––––
1 The “territorial seas” are the “belt of the seas” extending
three miles beyond the coast. Id. § 1362(8). The CWA also prohibits discharges from point sources other than vessels to the
“contiguous zone” and the “ocean,” id. § 1362(12)(B), marine waters that that lie beyond the territorial seas. Id. § 1362(9)-(10).
6
protect “special aquatic sites,” including “coral reefs”
such as those near the Lahaina discharge wells. Id.
§ 125.122(a)(5).
Section 1342(b) provides that EPA may authorize
a state to administer the NPDES permit program “for
discharges into navigable waters within its jurisdiction,” provided the state’s permitting program is adequate to meet the Act’s requirements. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342(b). EPA delegated permitting authority to the
State of Hawai‘i in 1974. 39 Fed. Reg. 43,759 (Dec. 18,
1974).
The statute expressly provides that disposal wells
may be subject to NPDES permitting. To administer
its own NPDES program, a state must have “adequate
authority” to issue NPDES permits that “control the
disposal of pollutants into wells.” 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342(b)(1)(D). This requirement also applies to
EPA’s own permitting authority because, to ensure
parity between federal and state permitting regimes,
the CWA explicitly provides that the federal permit
program “shall be subject to the same terms, conditions, and requirements as apply to a State permit
program … under subsection (b) of this section.” Id.
§ 1342(a)(3); see Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91,
103 (1992).
B. Facts
Since the 1980s, the County has operated four injection wells at the Lahaina Facility to dispose of
treated sewage. Pet. App. 7; JA 74, 78-80. The wells
inject treated sewage directly into groundwater below
the Facility, which is located less than half a mile from
the Pacific shoreline. Pet. App. 7; JA 74, 79-80, 85. The
County’s wells inject three to five million gallons of
treated sewage daily. Pet. App. 7-8.
7
As the County admits, and a tracer-dye study conclusively established, wastewater from the wells flows
with the groundwater into the ocean. Pet. App. 8-10,
24, 67; JA 85.2 The State and EPA have “long known
that effluent from the Lahaina wells reaches the
ocean.” Pet. Br. 13. The County understood as long ago
as 1973, during the planning process for the wells,
that the wells’ discharges would “reach the ocean.”
Pet. App. 159. That was, in fact, the point of the wells.
The County designed them to convey treated sewage
to the ocean to avoid having to pipe it directly to an
ocean outfall, Pet. App. 8, and the impacts on the receiving waters are comparable to those of a direct outfall. The massive influx of treated sewage from the
wells makes up “[a]bout one out of every seven gallons
of groundwater entering the ocean near the [Lahaina
Facility].” Pet. App. 9.
The County has never secured an NPDES permit
for the discharges from its wells to the Pacific. See Pet.
App. 93. Instead, the County obtained only underground injection control (UIC) permits issued under
the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300f et seq.,
and state law, Haw. Rev. Stat. ch. 340E. Those laws
provide for the protection of drinking water sources,
not surface water bodies, and the permits expressly
state that the County must separately comply with
any applicable NPDES permit requirements. See, e.g.,
SER 20, 40.
––––––––––––––––––––––––
2 The County’s observation that the tracer-dye study did not
detect dye from its Well 2 in the ocean does not suggest any doubt
that effluents from Well 2 discharge into the Pacific: The County
specifically admitted that fact, Pet. App. 93, and it is consistent
with modeling by the study’s authors. JA 75-76; Ninth Circuit
Supplemental Excerpts of Record (SER) 241-42, 255-57.
8
Neither EPA nor the Hawai‘i Department of
Health ever determined that the County was not required to obtain an NPDES permit. Pet. App. 30. Rather, EPA advised the County in January 2010 that it
was investigating whether the County was violating
the CWA and ordered a tracer-dye study to determine
whether the wells were adding pollutants to the
ocean. SER 5-11. In March 2010, EPA followed up
with an order requiring the County to secure a water
quality certification under 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1),
based on EPA’s determination that the wells “may result in a discharge into navigable waters.” Ninth Circuit Excerpts of Record (ER) 122. In 2015, EPA stated
that the wells’ discharges require an NPDES permit.
ER 357-58.
The County touts the quality of the wastewater its
wells discharge but does not dispute that the
wastewater meets the CWA’s definition of “pollutant[s],” which includes “sewage” and “municipal …
waste.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6). Further, the Hawai‘i recycled-water standard the County cites, see Pet. Br. 7,
contains no limits on nutrients like nitrogen and phosphorus, see Haw. Admin. R. § 11-62-26, which are present in high concentrations in treated sewage and
pose a significant threat to the marine environment,
including coral reefs, see infra pp. 9-10.
The County’s UIC permits are similarly lax with
respect to those nutrients: The permits impose no limits on phosphorus and set limits for total nitrogen that
are almost two orders of magnitude higher than the
State’s water quality standards for the coastal waters
just offshore of the wells. Compare ER 367 with Haw.
Admin. R. § 11-54-6(b)(3) (10 mg/liter in UIC permit
9
versus 0.15 mg/liter in applicable water quality standard).3 As a result, at the submarine springs where the
majority of the County’s wastewater enters the ocean,
measurements of phosphorus and nitrogen substantially exceed CWA regulatory limits. See Haw. Admin.
R. § 11-54-6(b)(3); SER 126-42.
The County’s assertion that these discharges are
harmless is both immaterial to the legal issues and
disputed. The district court concluded that “the discharge at the [Lahaina Facility] significantly affects
the physical, chemical, and biological integrity of the
ocean water.” Pet. App. 80; see also Pet. App. 78-79.
The discharges occur immediately off Kahekili Beach,
site of a formerly pristine coral reef. Although the
County’s paid expert denied any impact to the reef,
independent, peer-reviewed studies and government
reports have reached the opposite conclusion. See, e.g.,
Prouty, et al., Vulnerability of coral reefs to bioerosion
from land-based sources of pollution, 122 J. of Geophysical Res.: Oceans 9319 (2017) (concluding that
nutrients from the Lahaina Facility are accelerating
bioerosion of Kahekili reef).4 In the decades since the
Lahaina Facility opened, nutrients and other pollutants from injected sewage have devastated the oncepristine reef, stimulating algal growth that smothers
––––––––––––––––––––––––
3 While the County cites early EPA statements that the UIC
permit can protect ocean quality, Pet. Br. 13, EPA later clarified
that the nitrogen level in the County’s injection permit is “as
stringent as the UIC regulations allow,” though insufficient to
protect marine waters. ER 367; see also ER 366 (“The UIC permit
is designed to protect groundwater, not surface water. Surface
water impacts must be handled with a different authority.”).
4 https://darchive.mblwhoilibrary.org/handle/1912/9534 (last
visited July 9, 2019).
10
the coral. ER 274-84. Hawai‘i’s Division of Aquatic Resources reported a 40% decline in coral cover at Kahekili from 1994 to 2006. SER 273.
Like its claim that the wastewater discharges are
harmless, the County’s assertions about the pathways
by which its wells’ effluent reaches the ocean are disputed. The record contradicts the County’s claim that
“more than 90%” of the injected wastewater “enters
the ocean through diffuse flow, with no identifiable
entry point.” Pet. Br. 7. The tracer-dye study concluded that 64% of the wastewater from Wells 3 and 4
(which at the time of the study constituted over 80%
of the County’s discharges) entered the ocean in two
submarine spring areas only several meters wide. Pet.
App. 67; SER 156-57, 316-18; JA 68-71. Thus, the
study identified precise and discrete locations where
over half of the injected effluent enters the ocean.
C. Proceedings Below
Respondents are Maui-based organizations that
filed a CWA citizen suit seeking remedies for the
County’s unpermitted discharges of pollutants to the
Pacific Ocean from its disposal wells. The district
court granted summary judgment, holding on three
alternative bases that the County’s unpermitted
point-source discharges to navigable waters through
groundwater violate the CWA. First, the court held
that the CWA applies to discharges to navigable waters from a point source even if the point source itself
does not convey pollutants directly to the navigable
waters. Second, the court concluded that, under the
facts here, the groundwater that conveys the
wastewater to the ocean is itself a point source. The
court highlighted the tracer-dye study’s finding “that
more than 50% of the effluent originating at the
11
[wells] is finding its way into the ocean.” Pet. App. 69.
In the court’s view, “[a]ny conveyance that transmits
such a high proportion of a pollutant from one place to
another” meets the “confined and discrete” aspects of
the CWA’s point-source definition, “irrespective of …
other geologic properties.” Id.5 Third, the court held
that the groundwater here is itself a part of the navigable waters because of its “significant nexus” to the
ocean. Pet. App. 82.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding of CWA liability on the first of these grounds, without reaching the other two. The court concluded that
operating the wells without an NPDES permit constituted the unlawful “addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source.” 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(12)(A).6
Relying in part on Justice Scalia’s observation that
the CWA does not forbid the unpermitted “‘addition of
any pollutant directly to navigable waters from any
point source,’ but rather the ‘addition of any pollutant
to navigable waters,’” Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 743 (plurality) (citation omitted), the court rejected the
County’s argument that the Act applies only to direct
pollution additions. That argument, the Court pointed
out, “read[s] into the statute at least one critical term
that does not appear on its face—that the pollutants
––––––––––––––––––––––––
5 The court accordingly did not resolve issues of fact regard-
ing the existence of subsurface features establishing preferential
flow pathways. See SER 116-17, 183, 185-88, 191-93; JA 75-76.
6 The Ninth Circuit did not resolve whether the subsurface
flow is through fissures or other rock openings that would themselves satisfy the point-source definition. Pet. App. 16 n.2. That
issue should remain open for consideration on remand if necessary in light of this Court’s resolution of the question presented.
12
must be discharged ‘directly’ to navigable waters from
a point source.” Pet. App. 23. The Act’s plain meaning,
the court held, renders it applicable where “pollutants
are fairly traceable from the point source to a navigable water such that the discharge is the functional
equivalent of a discharge into the navigable water.”
Pet. App. 24. Because the CWA would forbid the
County to “build an ocean outfall to dispose of pollutants directly into the Pacific Ocean without an
NPDES permit,” allowing the County knowingly to
achieve the same result via coastal injection wells
would “make a mockery of the CWA’s prohibitions.”
Pet. App. 31.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The CWA’s plain terms prohibit “any addition of
any pollutant to navigable waters from any point
source,” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A), without a permit.
See id. § 1311(a). The CWA expressly defines the
County’s wells as point sources, the effluent they discharge as a pollutant, and the Pacific Ocean off the
Maui coastline as navigable waters. The introduction
of the effluent to the Pacific is an “addition” of pollutants “to” those waters. And that addition comes
“from” the County’s point-source wells: The wells are
both the pollutants’ point of departure and a factual
cause of their addition to navigable waters.
The CWA’s coverage is not limited to pollutants
that come to navigable waters directly from point
sources, without any intermediate means of transmission. Pollutants added to navigable waters come
“from” a point source if the point-source discharge was
both a factual and a proximate cause of the pollutants’
reaching those waters. A point-source discharge to
navigable waters through groundwater satisfies these
13
criteria if, as in this case, pollutants are fairly traceable to the point source (establishing factual causation), and their addition to navigable waters is the
foreseeable, natural consequence of their release from
that source (establishing proximate causation).
The Act’s express inclusion of “well[s]” in its definition of “point source,” id. § 1362(14), confirms its application to such releases. Other provisions of the Act
further illustrate that it covers subterranean movement of pollutants from wells to navigable waters. For
example, the Act expressly requires that the NPDES
permit program control disposal of pollutants in wells.
Id. § 1342(b)(1)(D). Further, the definition of “pollutant” provides that, under specified circumstances,
the Act covers releases from underground wells of materials related to oil and gas production. Id.
§ 1362(6)(B). Finally, the statutory background
against which the CWA was enacted included a prohibition against unpermitted, indirect discharges of pollutants to navigable waters, and Congress explicitly
crafted the CWA’s NPDES permitting program to continue to regulate those indirect discharges.
To avoid the CWA’s application to the County’s disposal wells, the County and EPA propose mutually inconsistent, atextual limits on its terms. The County
seeks to rewrite the Act to apply only when a point
source or series of point sources conveys pollutants directly to navigable waters. EPA asks the Court to tack
the words “except through groundwater” onto the
Act’s definition of covered discharges. Either approach
would contravene the statute’s plain language.
The County’s attempt to justify its reading rests in
part on an unnatural and cramped reading of the term
“from,” supplemented by equally strained readings of
14
other terms in (or not in) the relevant statutory provisions. The County’s principal argument, however, is
not textual, but structural: It claims that Congress’s
decision not to use the CWA to regulate nonpointsource pollution implies a decision not to regulate indirect point-source discharges. On the contrary, the
Act’s language, purpose, structure, and history all establish that Congress intended to regulate any pollution of navigable waters that is fairly traceable to, and
the foreseeable result of, point-source discharges.
EPA properly rejects the County’s reliance on the
point-source/nonpoint-source dichotomy but then proceeds down a different interpretive blind alley in an
effort to reverse its own longstanding view that discharges to navigable waters through groundwater fall
within the Act’s scope. EPA’s starting point is that the
Act does not regulate discharges to groundwater
alone, as groundwater does not fall within the Act’s
definition of “navigable waters.” EPA jumps from that
premise to the conclusion that the Act excludes discharges to navigable waters through groundwater.
Nothing in the Act’s language or structure supports
that illogical leap.
EPA and the County seek to justify limiting the
CWA by asserting that other statutes regulate
groundwater contamination. But none of those statutes addresses the task at hand: regulating pointsource discharges of pollutants to navigable waters.
And none of them purports to displace the CWA’s application to such discharges.
Giving effect to the CWA’s plain terms, within the
constraints imposed by the requirements of factual
and proximate causation, neither expands the Act’s
scope nor imposes unreasonable regulatory burdens.
15
Limiting its application to “direct” discharges to navigable waters, however, would thwart its goal of eliminating pollution of navigable waters, by exempting
polluters whose waste outfalls stop just short of navigable waters but inevitably add pollutants to them.
ARGUMENT
I.
The CWA’s plain language prohibits the
County’s
unpermitted
addition
of
pollutants from disposal wells to the
Pacific.
A. The County’s “addition” of pollutants
“to” navigable waters comes “from” a
point source.
The “starting point for interpreting a statute is the
language of the statute itself.” Consumer Prod. Safety
Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108
(1980). “It is well established that ‘when the statute’s
language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at
least where the disposition required by the text is not
absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.’” Lamie
v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (citation omitted).
The CWA’s plain terms provide that, with exceptions not relevant here, it is illegal to add a pollutant
from a point source to a navigable water without an
NPDES permit. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1342(a),
1362(12)(A). This prohibition squarely covers the
County’s activity: the wastewater is a pollutant; the
disposal wells are point sources; and, finally,
wastewater from the wells flows to the Pacific, a navigable water. Thus, the statutory text conclusively establishes the illegality of the County’s unpermitted
discharges of wastewater from its disposal wells.
16
Taking each term in turn, the effluent originating
in the County’s wells consists of “sewage” and “municipal … waste” and therefore undisputedly meets the
CWA definition of “pollutant.” Id. §1362(6). Likewise,
there is no dispute that the County’s disposal wells
are point sources: The statutory definition of “point
source” explicitly includes “any … well … from which
pollutants are or may be discharged.” Id. § 1362(14)
(emphasis added). Although the County’s brief barely
acknowledges that part of the “point source” definition, the disposal wells fall squarely within it. Pet.
App. 13. Finally, the term “navigable waters” expressly extends to the “territorial seas,” 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(7)-(8), including the Pacific Ocean immediately
offshore of Maui.
Because there is no dispute that the pollutants
originate at point sources and reach navigable waters,
the CWA’s applicability turns largely on the words
“addition,” “to” and “from”: The question in this case
is whether there has been “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source,” id.
§ 1362(12)(A) (emphasis added), when pollutants discharged from a point source travel a short distance
through groundwater before reaching navigable waters.
The CWA answers that question in the affirmative. First, section 1311(a) repeatedly uses the expansive word “any”: The unpermitted “discharge of any
pollutant by any person shall be unlawful.” Id.
§ 1311(a) (emphasis added). Section 1362(12)(A) emphasizes the point, using “any” three more times:
“[t]he term ‘discharge of a pollutant’ … means … any
addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any
point source.” Id. § 1362(12)(A) (emphasis added). As
this Court has noted, use of “any” “suggests a broad
17
meaning,” Ali v. Fed. Bur. of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214,
219 (2008); see generally NAM, 138 S. Ct. at 624 (“‘discharge of a pollutant’ is defined broadly”). Thus, the
statute applies whenever a polluter makes some addition (of whatever kind) of pollutants (of whatever
kind) to navigable waters from point sources (of whatever kind).
The County’s discharges undoubtedly result in
some “addition” of pollutants “to” the Pacific. The relevant definitions of “addition” are “the result of adding: … INCREASE, AUGMENTATION” and “the act
or process of adding.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 24 (2002 ed.) (Webster’s). “Add,” in
turn, “means ‘to join, annex, or unite (as one thing to
another) so as to bring about an increase (as in number, size, or importance).’” Los Angeles County Flood
Control Dist. v. NRDC, 568 U.S. 78, 82 (2013) (quoting
Webster’s 24). As this Court has recognized, an “addition” of pollutants “to” a waterbody has taken place
whenever the waterbody contains more pollutants
than it did before. See id. at 82-83; S. Fla. Water
Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe, 541 U.S. 95, 109-112
(2004); see also S.D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. of Envtl.
Prot., 547 U.S. 370, 381 (2006) (“[S]omething must be
added in order to implicate § [1342].”). Here, the effluents from the County’s wells are an “addition” of pollutants to navigable waters because they increase the
amount of pollutants present in those waters.
The remaining textual question, then, is whether
the addition of pollutants comes “from any point
source.” Because the wells are undisputedly point
sources, the question boils down to whether the pollutants come “from” them.
18
The CWA does not define “from,” but, “[w]hen
terms used in a statute are undefined, [this Court]
give[s] them their ordinary meaning.” Asgrow Seed
Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 187 (1995). The ordinary meaning of “from” is “a function word to indicate
a starting point: as … a point or place where an actual
physical movement … has its beginning.” Webster’s
913. Its other most pertinent definition is “a function
word to indicate the source or original or moving force
of something: as (1) the source, cause, means, or ultimate agent of an action or condition …; [or] (4) the
place of origin, source, or derivation of a material or
immaterial thing.” Id.
Both these common meanings support the conclusion that the addition of the wastewater to the Pacific
comes “from” the point sources where the addition
originated—the County’s wells. The wells are the
“starting point” of the pollutants’ “movement” to the
navigable waters, and they are the “cause” as well as
the “source” and “place of origin” of the pollutants.
Thus, in ordinary parlance, the pollutants, and their
addition to navigable waters, come “from” the wells.
That the pollutants pass through groundwater does
not mean that their addition is not “from” the wells,
any more than the fact that a letter passes through
the mail means it is not “from” its sender.7
––––––––––––––––––––––––
7 This conclusion does not mean that the pollutants could not
also come “from” an intervening point source. As this Court
pointed out in Miccosukee, “a point source need not be the original source of the pollutant” if it is one of the means by which the
pollutant is “convey[ed]” to navigable waters. 541 U.S. at 105. A
point source does not have to originate the pollutant to be covered
but is plainly covered if it does.
19
B. The Act’s terms apply to indirect
discharges from point sources that
traceably
and
foreseeably
reach
navigable waters.
Nothing in the CWA limits the permitting requirement to pollution that reaches navigable waters directly, without passing through any other medium.
See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 743 (plurality). Thus, for example, the Act must cover outfall pipes that hang
above a river, so that their effluent falls a few feet
through the air before reaching navigable waters.
Likewise, it necessarily covers outfall pipes that drain
onto a beach just short of the tideline, so that their
effluent flows a few feet over the sand before reaching
the ocean. Reading the Act to exclude such discharges
would allow a polluter to avoid the permitting requirement just by cutting off the last few feet of its discharge pipe. Congress cannot have intended that result. Rather, as the Rapanos plurality noted and lower
courts have held, point-source discharges of pollutants that “naturally wash[]” into navigable waters
are covered “even if the pollutants discharged from a
point source do not emit ‘directly into’ covered waters.” Id.8 Any other reading would permit “water polluters … to evade the permitting requirement …
––––––––––––––––––––––––
8 The County inaccurately asserts that, in all the cases the
plurality cited, point sources delivered pollutants directly to navigable waters. As the plurality noted, however, the Second Circuit in Concerned Area Residents for the Env’t v. Southview
Farm, 34 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 1994), expressly relied on the “‘indirect discharge’ rationale” as an alternate basis for CWA liability.
547 U.S. at 744; see Southview Farm, 34 F.3d at 119. Regardless,
the context makes clear that the plurality’s point was not to characterize the type of source that must deliver pollutants to navigable waters, but to emphasize that the defendant’s point source
(Footnote continued)
20
simply by discharging their pollutants … upstream of
covered waters.” 547 U.S. at 742-43.
Of course, in order for CWA liability to attach, pollutants must come “from a point source.” The decision
below thus properly required that pollutants be “fairly
traceable” to the point source. Pet. App. 24. The
County insists the “fairly traceable” requirement
reads new language into the CWA, but that language
simply gives effect to the Act’s requirement of factual
causation: a defendant cannot be liable under the Act
unless pollutants come “from” the defendant’s point
source. Cf. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 560-61 (1992) (interchangeably using the terms
“fairly traceable to” and “resulting from” to describe
the Article III standing inquiry).
The CWA’s textual requirement that pollutants
come “from” a point source also implicates “[t]he legal
concept of ‘proximate cause,’” a “‘shorthand for the
policy-based judgment that not all factual causes contributing to an injury should be legally cognizable
causes.’” U.S. Br. 23 (quoting CSX Transp., Inc. v.
McBride, 564 U.S. 685, 701 (2011) (internal quotation
marks omitted)). It is therefore reasonable to read the
CWA’s triggering language as requiring not only that
pollutants be physically traceable to a point source,
but also that the point-source release be a proximate
cause of the addition of pollutants to navigable waters. In other words, in order for the CWA permitting
––––––––––––––––––––––––
need not accomplish that delivery, because the Act applies to direct or indirect additions of pollutants to navigable waters. See
547 U.S. at 742-45.
21
requirement to attach, the pollution of navigable waters must be a “foresee[able]” or “natural and probable” consequence, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469, 475 (1876), of the point-source discharge.9
This Court need not now determine the range of
circumstances that might render the connection between a point source and navigable waters too attenuated to satisfy this requirement.10 Nothing about the
groundwater flow in this case breaks the chain of
proximate causation between the County’s discharges
and the resulting contamination of the Pacific. On the
contrary, the County not only foresaw that the
wastewater would naturally and probably flow to the
ocean but intended that result. Groundwater flow
thus did not supersede the wells as the cause of the
discharge. “A cause can be thought ‘superseding’ only
––––––––––––––––––––––––
9 See also Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear En-
ergy, 460 U.S. 766, 774 (1983) (construing National Environmental Policy Act to incorporate proximate cause); cf. Rapanos, 547
U.S. at 743-45 & n. 11 (plurality) (positing that CWA does not
cover discharges that “normally” “stay[] put” and would not be
expected to reach navigable waters, but that discharges of “mobile” pollutants that “naturally” reach navigable waters are “addition[s] … to navigable waters.”).
10 The Ninth Circuit suggested that a discharge must be more
than “de minimis” to be covered. Pet. App. 24. The County critiques this proposed limit as atextual. This Court should not decide the issue, because the Ninth Circuit’s discussion of the “de
minimis” limit was unnecessary to its decision—the County’s discharges of millions of gallons of effluent daily are not even arguably “de minimis.” Regardless, the Ninth Circuit’s endorsement
of one atextual limiting principle is no reason to read into the Act
a “direct discharge” requirement that is likewise unsupported by
the text, particularly as the familiar “proximate cause” inquiry
offers a textually grounded and effective approach to limiting the
universe of legally cognizable causes.
22
if it is a ‘cause of independent origin that was not foreseeable.’” Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 420
(2011) (quoting Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517
U.S. 830, 837 (1996)).
C. The CWA’s provisions concerning
disposal
of
pollutants
in
wells
underscore the Act’s application to the
Lahaina Facility.
Other language in the CWA strongly reinforces its
application to pollutants added to navigable waters
from disposal wells by way of groundwater movement.
Congress included “any … well” in the definition of
“point source.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). A “well” is “a
shaft or pit dug or bored in the earth.” Webster’s 2594.
While a few wells may discharge directly into surface
waters, see Pet. Br. 55 (suggesting “off-shore wells
where backflow up through the well might spill into
the ocean”), the principal way a well acts as a “point
source” is by discharging into the subsurface. The only
plausible explanation for including wells in the definition of “point source,” therefore, is that Congress intended to cover discharges that move from wells
through the subsurface to navigable waters.
Several features of the CWA suggest that Congress
specifically intended to reference disposal wells, like
the Lahaina Facility wells, when it included the word
“well” in its list of point sources. First, in the definition of “point source,” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14), the word
“well” appears in a list of items “from which pollutants
are or may be discharged,” id., which suggests it
should be understood to refer to (or at least include)
disposal or injection wells that discharge pollutants.
Cf. Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1085 (2015)
(“[A] word is known by the company it keeps.”).
23
Section 1342(b) confirms this understanding. That
section, which sets forth requirements applicable to
state “permit program[s] for discharges into navigable
waters,” provides that EPA may not approve a state
NPDES program unless the program provides “adequate authority” “[t]o issue permits which … control
the disposal of pollutants into wells.” 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342(b)(1)(D) (emphasis added). Importantly, disposal wells discharge underground, and the “permits”
referenced in this requirement are permits for discharges of pollutants to navigable waters, id.
§ 1342(a)-(b), which comply with “applicable requirements of sections 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, and 1343 of
this title,” id. § 1342(b)(1)(A). Those applicable requirements, in turn, apply only to discharges that add
pollutants to navigable waters.11 Thus, section
1342(b) necessarily contemplates regulating discharges from wells through groundwater to navigable
waters. Reading the Act to exclude such discharges
would render the section “inoperative or superfluous,
void or insignificant,” Rubin v. Islamic Repub. of Iran,
138 S. Ct. 816, 824 (2018) (citation omitted), contrary
to fundamental principles of statutory construction.
Finally, an express exclusion from the CWA’s definition of “pollutant” further illustrates that Congress
understood section 1311(a)’s prohibition of unpermitted discharges to extend to underground discharges
from wells. Oil and gas production frequently involves
the injection of some other fluid (often vast quantities
––––––––––––––––––––––––
11 Section 1342(b)(1)(D) does not “authorize the regulation of
all wells used to dispose of pollutants, regardless of absence of
any effects on navigable waters.” Inland Steel Co. v. EPA, 901
F.2d 1419, 1422 (7th Cir. 1990). Only disposals that discharge to
navigable waters require NPDES permits. Id.
24
of water and additives) into an oil or gas well to displace hydrocarbons from spaces in underground rock.
Concerned that the unpermitted injection of this material would otherwise constitute a prohibited “discharge of a pollutant,” Congress narrowed the definition of “pollutant” to exclude “water, gas, or other material which is injected into a well to facilitate production of oil or gas, or water derived in association with
oil or gas production and disposed of in a well, if the
well … is approved by authority of the State in which
the well is located, and if such State determines that
such injection or disposal will not result in the degradation of ground or surface water resources.” 33
U.S.C. § 1362(6)(B).
If section 1311(a)’s prohibition of unpermitted discharges already excluded discharges from wells that
travel through groundwater before reaching navigable waters, this exclusion would be unnecessary, as
passage through the subsurface is the only way such
discharges could reach navigable waters. After all,
“[t]here is no reason to create an exception to a prohibition unless the prohibition would otherwise forbid
what the exception allows.” Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Inst., 138 S. Ct. 1833, 1844 (2018). Moreover,
the restriction of the exclusion to situations in which
a state “determines that such injection or disposal will
not result in the degradation of … surface water resources,” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6)(B), reveals Congress’s
awareness that subsurface disposal may threaten
navigable waters, and its intent to use the CWA’s prohibition of unpermitted discharges to mitigate that
threat.
25
D. The statute’s background and context
support its application to indirect
discharges.
The NPDES program replaced and expanded an
existing permit requirement under section 13 of the
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, also known as the
“Refuse Act,” 33 U.S.C. § 407. See S. Rep. No. 92-414,
at 70-72, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3736-38.
Section 407 long prohibited any person from “discharg[ing] … or caus[ing] … to be … discharged” any
“refuse matter … into any navigable water” without a
permit from the Secretary of the Army. 33 U.S.C.
§ 407.
In the years immediately before the CWA’s enactment, this Court held that section 407 must be broadly
construed, see United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384
U.S. 224, 226 (1966), and lower courts held that it applies to “‘indirect’ deposits of refuse in navigable water.” United States v. Esso Standard Oil Co. of Puerto
Rico, 375 F.2d 621, 623 (3rd Cir. 1967); see also United
States v. Ballard Oil Co. of Hartford, 195 F.2d 369,
370 (2d Cir. 1952) (§ 407 violated where spilled oil
“found its way into the Connecticut River”). In Esso,
for example, the Third Circuit found a section 407 violation where, “though Esso did not run a pipe to the
water’s edge and discharge petroleum products directly into the sea, Esso’s discharge of the oil was in
such close proximity to the sea that the oil flowed
there by gravity alone.” 375 F.2d at 623.12
––––––––––––––––––––––––
12 Notably, the court did not rely on a clause in the statute
prohibiting depositing “material” on the banks of a navigable water if it might wash into the water and create a threat to navigation, but on the more general prohibition of discharges “into any
(Footnote continued)
26
Importantly, Congress did nothing to narrow Esso
and other cases’ broad reading of section 407 when it
used similar (indeed, broader) language to define the
CWA’s discharge prohibition. As in other instances
where Congress has acted against the backdrop of judicial interpretations of an existing statute, “there is
no reason to suppose that Congress disagreed with
those interpretations.” Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie,
Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S. 573, 590 (2010).
Indeed, the House floor manager, Representative
Dingell, explicitly invoked Esso in explaining that the
CWA, “in defining the term ‘discharge of a pollutant,’
does not in any way contemplate that the discharge be
directly from the point source to the waterway.” 118
Cong. Rec. 33,758 (1972).
Moreover, Congress expressly integrated the CWA
with section 407 by enacting 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(4),
which deems section 407 permits to be NPDES permits and vice versa, and 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(5), which
provides that, after October 18, 1972, NPDES permits
are the sole means to authorize discharges otherwise
prohibited by section 407. In ensuring continuity between section 407 permits and the new NPDES per––––––––––––––––––––––––
navigable water,” which the court construed to apply to discharges that “wash into navigable water” as well as “other ‘indirect’ deposits.” Id.
Other courts reached similar conclusions roughly contemporaneously with the CWA’s enactment. See, e.g., United States v.
Valley Camp Coal Co., 480 F.2d 616, 617 (4th Cir. 1973) (applying § 407 to discharge washed into tributary of a navigable water
by rain); United States v. White Fuel Corp., 498 F.2d 619, 622 (1st
Cir. 1974) (applying § 407 where oil “leached from [defendant’s]
property into adjacent navigable waters” through ““indirect percolation” rather than “direct flow”).
27
mits, Congress made clear that NPDES permits extend to indirect discharges just as section 407 permits
did. S. Rep. No. 92-414, at 72, reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3738 (noting that, in “integrat[ing] …
the Refuse Act permit program into the [CWA],” Congress intended to “provide for the establishment of
conditions of effluent control for each source of discharge”). Any other reading would create a significant
anomaly: Because section 407’s discharge prohibition
remains in effect, limiting NPDES permits to point
sources that directly discharge to navigable waters
would leave dischargers with no way to obtain a permit for many indirect discharges that section 407 continues to prohibit.
II. The CWA’s language and structure
contradict the County’s and EPA’s
readings.
A. The County and EPA propose atextual
exceptions to the statute.
The County and EPA offer mutually inconsistent
alternative readings of the CWA, neither of which
rests on the language of the operative provisions. The
County invents a “means-of-delivery test,” Pet. Br. 19,
under which the Act would apply not to “any addition
of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point
source,” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A), but only to “an addition of a pollutant to navigable waters from a point
source or uninterrupted series of point sources that
delivers the pollutant directly to navigable waters.”
EPA rejects that interpretation as inconsistent with
the statute, which requires only that the pollutants
come “from” a point source. See U.S. Br. 7-8. EPA proceeds, however, to offer an equally unfounded reading,
which would cover “any addition of any pollutant to
28
navigable waters from any point source, except where
the pollutant reaches jurisdictional surface waters via
groundwater.”
Both the County’s and EPA’s constructions read
language into the CWA that is absent from the relevant provisions. As this Court has emphasized, courts
“must presume that [the] legislature says in a statute
what it means and means in a statute what it says
there.” Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 357
(2005) (quoting Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S.
249, 253-54 (1992)). Courts may not “rewrite the statute” to achieve a result its text does not support, Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320, 335 (2010), merely
because “they might deem its effects susceptible of improvement,” Badaracco v. Comm’r of Internal Rev.,
464 U.S. 386, 398 (1984). In particular, courts may
not, as both the County and EPA advocate, “read an
absent word”—or, here, phrase—“into the statute.”
Lamie, 540 U.S. at 538. Courts “do not—[and] cannot—add provisions to a federal statute.” Alabama v.
North Carolina, 560 U.S. 330, 352 (2010).
Efforts to create atextual exceptions to provisions
that already include express exceptions are particularly suspect. “Where Congress explicitly enumerates
certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional
exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent.” TRW Inc. v.
Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 28 (2001) (quoting Andrus v.
Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17 (1980)). Yet
both the County and EPA would read an exception (or,
as EPA expresses it, a “categorical[] exclu[sion],” U.S.
Br. 7) into the Act’s prohibition of “any addition of any
pollutant to navigable waters from any point source,”
33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A), which already expressly exempts oil-production-related discharges into disposal
29
wells, id. § 1362(6)(B); return flows from irrigated agriculture, id. § 1342(l)(1); certain stormwater runoff
from oil, gas, and mining operations, id. § 1342(l)(2);
certain runoff from silvicultural activities, id.
§ 1342(l)(3); certain stormwater discharges predating
October 1, 1994, id. § 1342(p)(1); and discharges incidental to normal operation of recreational vessels, id.
§ 1342(r).
An implied exception is especially disfavored when
it “would in practical effect render [an express] exception entirely superfluous in all but the most unusual
circumstances.” TRW, 534 U.S. at 29. EPA’s and the
County’s proposed exceptions would do just that. As
discussed above, see supra pp. 23-24, the existing narrow exclusion of certain oil-production wastes injected
into disposal wells from the category of “pollutant[s],”
33 U.S.C. 1362(6)(B), would serve little or no purpose
if those discharges were already categorically excluded from the Act because they move through the
subsurface before reaching navigable waters.
B. The County’s textual arguments are
erroneous.
While EPA makes no effort to square its proposed
exclusion with the CWA’s text, the County does attempt to ground its argument in the statute’s language. That effort fails to overcome the plain meaning
of the relevant terms, which cover the addition of pollutants to the ocean from the County’s wells and are
flatly incompatible with the County’s “means-of-delivery test.”
1. “Conveyance”
The County begins its textual argument by focusing on the point-source definition’s use of the word
“conveyance.” Id. § 1362(14). The County contends
30
that “conveyance”—a “means of carrying or transporting something,” Pet. Br. 29—denotes that, in order for
the permitting requirement to apply, a point source
must itself convey pollutants directly to the navigable
water that receives them.
The County’s argument distorts the CWA’s use of
the word “conveyance.” The term “conveyance” appears only once in the relevant statutory provisions,
in the definition of “point source,” 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(14), whose applicability to the County’s wells
is uncontested. Section 1362(14) uses “conveyance” as
a noun, to define what a point source is: anything, including a well, that is “discernible, confined and discrete” and capable of discharging a pollutant. Id.
But section 1362(12), the operative language here,
does not use any form of the verb “convey” to describe
what a point source must do to bring about a “discharge of a pollutant.” That provision says merely that
the pollutants must come “from” a point source, not
that the point source must “convey” the pollutants all
the way to the receiving waters. Id. § 1362(12).13 Section 1362(12)’s definition of “discharge of a pollutant”
is “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters
from any point source.” The County would rewrite it
as “the conveyance of any pollutant to navigable waters by any point source.” That is not the statute Congress enacted.
––––––––––––––––––––––––
13 Notably, Congress also included in the point-source defini-
tion “any … container, rolling stock, [or] concentrated animal
feeding operation.” Id. § 1362(14). Like wells, none of these point
sources normally discharges directly into navigable waters.
31
2. “From”
The County next invokes “from,” arguing that
something comes “from” a “conveyance” only if the
conveyance delivers it to its ultimate destination. It
could equally be said, of course, that something comes
“from” a “conveyance” as long as that conveyance gets
it part of the way to its destination, and that it comes
“from” a “source” if it originates with the source. Thus,
although a pollutant may be said to come “from” whatever finally gets it to navigable waters, it also comes
“from” the source that started it on its journey, and
“from” any conveyances that carried it along the way.
To use the County’s own example, Americans learned
of the D-Day landings “from” the radio sets that ultimately delivered the news to their homes, see Pet. Br.
30, but they also learned of them “from” Edward R.
Murrow’s reporting and “from” the CBS network that
made his reports available for broadcast.
This Court’s decision in Miccosukee does not support the County’s view. Miccosukee recognized that
the CWA extends to point sources that are not the
“original source of the pollutant” but that merely “convey the pollutant to ‘navigable waters.’” 541 U.S. at
105. But saying the statute “includes within its reach
point sources that do not themselves generate pollutants,” id., does not suggest that it excludes those that
do. Rather, Miccosukee assumes that originating
sources of pollutants fall within the definition of point
sources, and emphasizes only that other conveyances
also meet that definition. Miccosukee does not hold or
even suggest that a point source must “convey” a pollutant all the way to navigable waters for the CWA to
cover a discharge. That question was not presented,
and the Court had no occasion to address or resolve it.
Cf. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 631 (1993)
32
(holding that decisions that do not “squarely address[]” an issue do not resolve it). Moreover, Miccosukee’s statement that a point source “need only convey the pollutant to ‘navigable waters,’” 541 U.S. at
105 (emphasis added), is a statement about what is
sufficient, not what is necessary. By quoting the
phrase without the key word “only,” Pet. Br. 30; see
also id. at 33, the County strips it of its intended
meaning and renders it ungrammatical.
The County’s assertion that the addition of a pollutant to navigable waters is not “from” a point source
unless it is “delivered by” the point source to the navigable waters, Pet. Br. 29, also contradicts the
County’s own articulation of its “means-of-delivery
test.” According to the County, a pollutant is from an
originating point source that does not deliver it to navigable waters, as long as all the conveyances that
come between the original source and the waters are
themselves point sources. But if the County’s reading
of the term “from” were correct, only the last in a series of point sources should qualify for permitting, because the pollutant is “delivered by” only that final
source. Conversely, if a pollutant can also be “from” a
more remote point source, the intervening media of
conveyance need not be point sources. Whether the
addition of the pollutant comes “from” the original
source, or another source along the way, has nothing
to do with whether all other conveyances along its
path are point sources.
3. “Any point source”
Next, the County argues that the uninterruptedchain aspect of its “means-of-delivery” test is supported by the statute’s use of the word “any” to modify
“point source” in section 1362(12). Because “any”
33
means “one or some indiscriminately of whatever
kind,” the County states, it follows “that an NPDES
permit is required whether pollutants are delivered to
navigable waters by a single point source or multiple
point sources together.” Pet. Br. 32. The County’s
point is true as far as it goes: When a discharge is
“from” multiple point sources, all of them are subject
to the Act. But the term “any point source” carries no
implication that a discharge must travel exclusively
through point sources. After all, “any” means one or
more indiscriminately. Accordingly, if a pollutant is
added to navigable waters from a point source, that
source falls within the permit requirement regardless
of whether the pollutant moves to navigable waters
directly from the point source, through other point
sources, or through other nonpoint-source media.
“Any” thus provides no support for a “means-of-delivery test”; rather, it establishes that the CWA reaches
any point source “from” which pollutants are added to
navigable waters, regardless of whether the source is
the immediate means by which the pollutants are delivered to the waters. 14
4. “Into”
The County invokes decisions of this Court using
the preposition “into” in characterizing the Act as
“prohibit[ing] the [unpermitted] discharge of any effluent into a navigable body of water.” Pet. Br. 30
––––––––––––––––––––––––
14 The County’s contrary view of the significance of “any” can-
not be squared with its limited view of “from.” If the County were
correct that an addition of a pollutant to navigable waters can
only be “from” a point source that “delivers” it to navigable waters, the word “any” could not bring within the Act a point source
that does not do so. “Any” does not expand the category to which
it applies.
34
(quoting Arkansas, 503 U.S. at 102; emphasis added
by the County); see also id. at 30 n.6 (citing other opinions). The statute, however, covers additions of pollutants “to” navigable waters, not discharges “into”
them. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A). This Court’s general
descriptions of the CWA do not alter the controlling
statutory language. As this Court has explicitly
acknowledged, its “shorthand description” of a statute
is not always “entirely accurate.” Levin v. United
States, 568 U.S. 503, 507 n.1 (2013). The Court must
“focus on the language of [the statute], not any shorthand description of it.” Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453
U.S. 654, 675 n.7 (1981).
The County also notes the use of “into” in other
CWA sections that “describe[] a point source discharge.” Pet. Br. 36. For example, the County cites 33
U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1), which describes the CWA’s overall goal as eliminating “the discharge of pollutants
into the navigable waters.” In addition, the County
flags references to discharges “into” navigable waters
in provisions describing state applications to operate
NPDES permit programs, id. § 1342(b), defining the
term “effluent limitation,” id. § 1362(11), and describing authorities under other statutes that the CWA
supplanted, id. § 1371(b). That the statute elsewhere
refers to discharges of pollutants “into” navigable waters does not change the operative language of section
1362(12)(A)’s precisely worded definition of “discharge
of a pollutant.” As this Court has observed, “[t]he
plain meaning of [a statutory provision] cannot be altered by the use of a somewhat different term in another part of the statute.” Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos
Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 480 (1992).
In any event, “into” cannot bear the weight the
County places on it. Rewriting section 1362(12)(A) to
35
refer to “any addition of any pollutant into navigable
waters from any point source” would not alter its
meaning. When used in such a phrase, “into” indicates
“something in which a literal or figurative insertion or
introduction is made.” Webster’s 1185. More generally, the word denotes “motion so directed as to terminate, if continued, when the position denoted by in has
been reached.” Id. at 1184. Thus, substituting “into”
for “to” would by no means suggest that the introduction of pollutants “into” navigable waters must be directly from a point source, with no intervening medium of transport. On the contrary, in another CWA
provision where it used the term “into,” Congress
deemed discharges regulated by the Refuse Act—
which include discharges of “refuse matter” that indirectly “washe[s] into … navigable water,” 33 U.S.C.
§ 407—to constitute “discharges into the navigable
waters,” id. § 1342(a)(4).
C. The CWA’s structure and history do not
support the County’s and EPA’s limiting
constructions.
Because the statutory language supports neither
the “means-of-delivery test” nor the “categorical exclusion” of discharges via groundwater, the County and
EPA rely heavily on assertions about the statute’s
structure and purpose to support their mutually inconsistent limitations on its text. The County focuses
on what it calls the Act’s “organizational paradigm” of
“disparate treatment of discharges from point sources
and nonpoint sources,” Pet. Br. 25 (quoting Or. Nat.
Desert Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 550 F.3d 778, 780
(9th Cir. 2008)), to support its view that the Act completely exempts pollution from point sources that
reaches navigable waters indirectly. EPA rejects the
County’s view “that any spatial gap between a point
36
source and jurisdictional surface waters renders the
NPDES program inapplicable,” U.S. Br. 8, but posits
a special exception for point-source discharges that
reach navigable waters through groundwater, because of what EPA sees as the Act’s “purpose not to
regulate groundwater.” U.S. Br. 7.
Neither argument is persuasive. Applying the
CWA’s permitting requirement to the County’s wells
is fully consistent with the Act’s basic structural
choice to focus federal regulation on point-source discharges that foreseeably add pollutants to jurisdictional navigable waters.
1. Congress did not foreclose regulation
of indirect point-source pollution
when
it
declined
to
regulate
nonpoint-source pollution.
The County’s argument rests on an undisputed
generalization—that the CWA regulates nonpointsource pollution differently from point-source pollution. That generalization, however, does not answer
the statutory interpretation question here. The CWA
aims its more stringent regulatory provisions—its
prohibition on “discharge of any pollutant,” 33 U.S.C.
§ 1311(a), and its permit requirements, effluent limitations, and performance standards, id. §§ 1342, 1344,
1311, 1312, 1316—at point-source pollution. By contrast, it largely leaves control of nonpoint-source pollution to the states. Nothing in this dichotomy suggests that the CWA should be read to place the
County’s point-source pollution outside the Act’s more
rigorous regulatory requirements.
The County turns the Act on its head by reading it
as if its central feature were non-regulation of nonpoint-source pollution rather than regulation of point-
37
source pollution. It further posits that the term “nonpoint-source pollution” has such a dominant role in
the Act that pollutants that move through groundwater become nonpoint-source pollution even if they originate from a point source. The CWA’s terms do not
substantiate those premises.
As courts have repeatedly pointed out, “the CWA
does not even define nonpoint-source pollution.” Ctr.
for Native Ecosystems v. Cables, 509 F.3d 1310, 1331
(10th Cir. 2007); see, e.g., Simsbury-Avon Preservation
Soc’y, LLC v. Metacon Gun Club, Inc., 575 F.3d 199,
220 (2d Cir. 2009); Or. Nat. Res. Council v. U.S. Forest
Serv., 834 F.2d 842, 849 n.9 (9th Cir. 1987). As a result, “nonpoint source” is a catchall term for sources
that do not fall within the point-source definition, and
“nonpoint-source pollution” means “nothing more
than a water pollution problem not involving a discharge from a point source.” Cables, 509 F.3d at 1331
(quoting Am. Wildlands v. Browner, 260 F.3d 1192,
1193 (10th Cir. 2001)); see also EPA Interpretive
Statement, 84 Fed. Reg. at 16,813 (“nonpoint source
pollution [is] the broad category of other forms of water pollution that do not fall within the point source
definition and [are] not defined under the Act”). Thus,
nonpoint-source pollution “is commonly understood to
be pollution arising from dispersed activities over
large areas that is not traceable to a single, identifiable source or conveyance.” Sierra Club v. El Paso Gold
Mines, Inc., 421 F.3d 1133, 1140 n.4 (10th Cir. 2005)
(emphasis added) (citing League of Wilderness Defenders/Blue Mts. Biodiversity Project v. Forsgren, 309
F.3d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir. 2002)).
In short, nonpoint-source pollution is defined not
by what it is, but by what it is not: It is “pollution that
38
does not result from the ‘discharge’ or ‘addition’ of pollutants from a point source.” Or. Nat. Res. Council,
834 F.2d at 849 n.9. An EPA guidance document supports this understanding: Nonpoint-source pollution
comes from “diffuse sources that are not regulated as
point sources”—it is pollution that “does not result
from a discharge at a specific, single location (such as
a single pipe).” EPA, Office of Water, Nonpoint Source
Guidance 3 (1987), https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPURL
.cgi?Dockey=910217GL.TXT (last visited July 9,
2019).
Thus, although nonpoint-source pollution “generally results from land runoff, precipitation, atmospheric deposition, or percolation,” id., not all pollution
involving such processes is nonpoint-source pollution.
The determining factor is whether the pollutants originate from, collect in, or pass through an identifiable
point source before foreseeably reaching a navigable
water. Compare Southview Farm, 34 F.3d at 118-19
(holding that flow of pollutants discharged from point
sources to navigable waters fell within the Act regardless of whether the pollutants ultimately reached the
waters through a point source), with Simsbury-Avon
Preservation Club, 575 F.3d at 223 (holding that runoff of pollutants from a berm to navigable waters was
not a point-source discharge because the berm was not
a “confined and discrete conveyance” meeting the
point-source definition). Here, the wastewater came
from identifiable point sources (the wells), and its subsequent movement does not transform it into nonpoint-source pollution.
Indeed, the Act, its implementing regulations, and
case law make clear that even “runoff,” often described as the quintessential example of nonpointsource pollution, can be point-source pollution if, at
39
some point, it comes from a point source. See 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.2; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p) (requiring
NPDES permits for point-source stormwater discharges); Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597,
602-05 (2013) (discussing regulation of point-source
stormwater discharges). The CWA contains exemptions to this general rule that would be unnecessary if
the Act broadly categorized all runoff as nonpointsource pollution regardless of its relationship to a
point source. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1342(l)(2)-(3) (exempting certain oil, gas, mining, and silvicultural runoff discharges).
Like runoff discharges, discharges that enter navigable waters through groundwater are not inherently
“nonpoint.” Nothing in the Act defines groundwater as
a “nonpoint source.” Indeed, the Act differentiates
“groundwater” from “nonpoint sources of pollution.”
See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1329(i)(1) (creating federal grant
program “to prevent contamination of groundwater
from nonpoint sources of pollution”). To be sure, the
Act recognizes that diffuse nonpoint pollution may
threaten groundwater, and it relegates such threats
primarily to state regulation (with federal support).
See id. But nothing in the Act’s language or structure
suggests that point sources that threaten surface water are exclusively subject to state regulation when
pollutants traceable to them actually and foreseeably
reach navigable waters via groundwater.
Thus, although pollutants that percolate into
groundwater from diffuse sources are nonpoint-source
pollution, it does not follow that point-source pollutants automatically become nonpoint-source pollution
whenever they travel through the subsurface. Rather,
pollution that might under other circumstances “be
nonpoint source pollution, which is not subject to
40
NPDES permitting” is regulable point-source pollution if it can be traced to a specific point source from
which it predictably flows to navigable waters. El
Paso Gold Mines, 421 F.3d at 1140 n.4. Just as “[g]ravity flow, resulting in a discharge into a navigable body
of water, may be part of a point source discharge”
when pollutants were “at least initially collected or
channeled,” so the “subsequent percolation” of
wastewater initially discharged from a point source is
within the Act if it reaches navigable waters. Sierra
Club v. Abston Constr. Co., 620 F.2d 41, 45 (5th Cir.
1980) (emphasis added).
Because the pollutants here come from pointsource wells, it is irrelevant that, as the County notes,
Congress declined to extend the Act’s prohibitions to
nonpoint-source pollution. See Pet. Br. 25. Moreover,
the County’s reliance on the point-source/nonpointsource dichotomy ignores the clearest lesson of the
legislative history the County invokes: Congress chose
to exclude nonpoint sources “because [nonpoint-source
pollution] arises in such a diffuse way,” making it
“very difficult to regulate through individual permits.”
League of Wilderness Defs., 309 F.3d at 1184; see S.
Rep. No. 92-414, at 39, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 3706. That concern does not apply when, as here,
there are readily identifiable and easily regulated
point sources—namely, the wells. Regulation of such
point sources falls squarely within the Act’s central
principle that “the most effective control mechanism
for point sources of discharge is one which will provide
for the establishment of conditions of effluent control
for each source of discharge.” S. Rep. No. 92-414, at
72, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3738.
41
This is not the first time this Court has been asked
to hold the CWA inapplicable to a point-source discharge on the theory that “Congress intended that
such pollution instead … be addressed through local
nonpoint source pollution programs.” Miccosukee, 541
U.S. at 106. In Miccosukee, the United States made a
similar argument for excluding transfers of pollutants
from one body of water to another from CWA regulation even if the pollutants were from a point source.
This Court declined, noting that the Act “does not …
exempt nonpoint pollution sources from the NPDES
program if they also fall within the ‘point source’ definition.” Id. The Court’s statement reflects the primacy of the Act’s definition of “point source,” and its
coverage of “any addition of any pollutant to navigable
waters from any point source,” 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(12)(A), regardless of whether the discharge
shares some characteristics with nonpoint-source discharges. In arguing that the Act’s “disparate treatment” of the residual nonpoint-source pollution category overrides the Act’s requirements concerning discharges meeting the point-source definition, Pet. Br.
25, the County has the matter backward.
2. The CWA does not categorically
exclude discharges to navigable
waters through groundwater.
EPA correctly recognizes that “the point and nonpoint source distinction” that is the County’s central
focus is “not relevant” to whether the Act covers discharges from point sources to navigable waters via
groundwater. 84 Fed. Reg. at 16,813. But EPA proffers an equally flawed construction of the CWA, based
not on the text of its relevant provisions, but on what
EPA describes as its structure and legislative history.
42
In EPA’s view, that structure and history “demonstrate Congress’s intent to leave the regulation of
groundwater wholly to the states under the Act.” Id.
Even if true, this assertion does not insulate the
County’s pollution of navigable waters from the
CWA’s permitting requirement. EPA’s contrary view
rests on an unsupported interpretive leap: that because Congress chose not to use the CWA’s pointsource permitting requirements to protect groundwater itself, it must also have chosen not to apply them
to protect surface water from pollution that arrives via
groundwater. EPA asserts that, because the CWA
“evinces a purpose not to regulate groundwater,” it follows that “all releases to groundwater are excluded
from the scope of the NPDES program, even where
pollutants are conveyed to jurisdictional surface waters via groundwater.” U.S. Br. 7 (quoting 84 Fed. Reg.
at 16,814). That claim contradicts the Act’s language,
renders key provisions nonsensical, and bears no relation to the purposes evident from the Act’s overall
structure.
EPA does not seek deference to its newly altered
view of “the best, if not the only, reading of the statute.” U.S. Br. 7. EPA’s Interpretive Statement is not
a regulation, but “guidance” that “neither alters legal
rights or obligations nor changes or creates law.” 84
Fed. Reg. at 16,811. The statement is not entitled to
deference under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467
U.S. 837 (1984), because it is not an exercise of congressionally delegated authority to fill an interpretive
gap in the statute. See United States v. Mead Corp.,
533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001).
43
EPA’s argument rests on the propositions that (1)
the addition of pollutants to groundwater is not in itself a “discharge of a pollutant,” and (2) the Act delegates protection of groundwater quality to states, with
federal assistance and supervision. EPA’s premises,
however, lead only to the conclusion that the discharge prohibition of section 1311(a) and the permit
program under section 1342 do not apply to discharges that add pollutants to groundwater alone.
Nothing in the Act supports EPA’s further conclusion
that these provisions do not apply to point sources
that discharge to navigable waters through groundwater. None of the provisions on which EPA relies either
limits the CWA’s provisions concerning discharges to
navigable waters, or conflicts with the assertion of
federal permitting authority over such discharges.
Most of the provisions EPA cites, U.S. Br. 16-17, authorize assistance for states to address pollution of
both “navigable waters” and “ground waters.” 33
U.S.C. §§ 1252(a), 1254(a)(5), 1314(a)(2)(A); see also
id. §1314(a)(1)(A) (addressing “pollutants in any body
of water”). The inclusion of “navigable waters” in programs that assist states does not limit CWA authority
over discharges to those waters. Why then should the
inclusion of “ground waters” preclude federal control
over discharges that reach navigable waters through
groundwater?
In short, EPA identifies nothing in the Act to suggest that Congress meant to curtail EPA’s power to
regulate discharges to navigable waters. Cf. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528-30 (2007) (reaching
a similar conclusion in analyzing parallel issues under
the Clean Air Act). Regulating the addition of pollutants to navigable waters from point sources through
groundwater is in no way inconsistent with Congress’s
44
various efforts to promote state action to address
groundwater pollution. EPA thus fails to demonstrate
that regulating such discharges in accordance with
the CWA’s terms would be “incompatible” with “the
substance of Congress’ regulatory scheme.” FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 156
(2000).
EPA asserts that the Act treats “groundwater pollution in the same manner as nonpoint source pollution,” citing a provision requiring states to develop
waste management plans to “protect ground and surface water quality.” U.S. Br. 18 (citing 33 U.S.C.
§ 1288). That provision demonstrates only that the
Act treats groundwater and surface water pollution in
the same way insofar as they are caused by nonpoint
sources. That proposition, however, says nothing
about how the Act regulates pollution caused by point
sources that reaches navigable waters through
groundwater, as is the case here.
Even if EPA’s analogy were valid, it would point in
the opposite direction: Just as the CWA’s approach to
nonpoint-source pollution becomes irrelevant when a
point source enters the picture, see Miccosukee, 541
U.S. at 106, so, too, its treatment of discharges to
groundwater is irrelevant once pollutants are added
to navigable waters.
Moreover, EPA’s arguments prove too much. EPA
disavows any categorical exclusion from the Act for
point-source discharges that reach navigable waters
by indirect means other than groundwater. U.S. Br. 8.
EPA says it will continue to evaluate such discharges
on a “case-by-case” basis. Id. (quoting 84 Fed. Reg. at
16,814). But EPA fails to explain why it distinguishes
indirect discharges through groundwater from other
45
indirect discharges. EPA’s assertion that the CWA
embodies a “purpose not to regulate groundwater,”
U.S. Br. 7 (quoting 84 Fed. Reg. at 16,814), applies
equally to everything other than jurisdictional waters.
See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 731 (plurality) (“[T]he CWA
authorizes federal jurisdiction only over ‘waters.’”).
The CWA no more regulates solid ground than it does
groundwater, but, if the County were to discharge its
wastes from pipes onto the ground, over which they
flowed to the ocean, EPA would not view the discharge
as categorically excluded. See U.S. Br. 34. Why the
distinction? EPA does not explain.
EPA seeks to bolster its argument by appealing to
legislative history, pointing to unsuccessful proposals
to regulate all discharges to groundwater. See U.S. Br.
26-28. But “legislative history is not the law,” and this
Court does not “allow ‘ambiguous legislative history to
muddy clear statutory language.’” Azar v. Allina
Health Servs., 139 S. Ct. 1804, 1814 (2019) (citation
omitted). “[F]ailed legislative proposals” are a particularly tenuous basis for construing legislation. Solid
Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 169-70 (2001) (citation omitted).
Further, the legislative history EPA invokes adds
nothing to what is evident from the face of the statute:
Congress chose not to regulate discharges of pollutants to groundwater as such. The legislative history
does not, however, suggest that this choice reflected
an intent to exclude from the Act’s coverage all discharges to navigable waters through groundwater. At
most, the history EPA cites suggests that Congress
did not intend to cover all discharges to groundwater
on the theory they necessarily affect surface waters.
46
See U.S. Br. 27 (quoting statements of Rep. Aspin).15
That history hardly suggests that Congress meant to
create a blanket exemption for traceable point-source
discharges that foreseeably reach navigable waters
through groundwater.
The judicial decisions EPA invokes to support its
legislative-history argument expressly recognize this
distinction. In Village of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton
Hudson Corp, 24 F.3d 962 (7th Cir. 1994), Judge
Easterbrook relied in part on the same history to conclude that the mere “possibility” of a “connection between ground waters and surface waters” was not
enough to require an NPDES permit for a discharge
to groundwater. Id. at 965. At the same time, the court
recognized that, as EPA then maintained, an actual
“hydrological connection between the ground water
and a nearby surface water body” could trigger the
need for an NPDES permit, id. at 966 (quoting EPA,
NPDES Permit Application Regulations for Storm
Water Discharges (“Storm Water Regulations”), 55
Fed. Reg. 47,990, 47,977 (Nov. 16, 1990)).
Likewise, Exxon Corp. v. Train, 554 F.3d 1310 (5th
Cir. 1977)—on which EPA relies heavily—concluded
that the CWA’s language and history did not support
requiring an NPDES permit for deep-well injection of
wastes that had not reached, and had no potential to
reach, navigable waters. See id. at 1322-30. But even
as it concluded that the Act did not allow “direct federal control over groundwater pollution,” id. at 1322,
––––––––––––––––––––––––
Representative Aspin’s amendment may have been rejected because of another of its provisions, which would have
eliminated the statutory exemption for “oil-and-gas-related injections.” U.S. Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 853 n.66 (7th
Cir. 1977).
15
47
the court expressly disclaimed any limitation on
EPA’s authority to regulate discharges to navigable
waters through groundwater. See id. at 1312 n.1 (reserving opinion on result if “the wastes disposed of
into wells here do, or might, ‘migrate’ from groundwaters back into surface waters that concededly are
within [EPA’s] regulatory jurisdiction”).
The Fifth Circuit reaffirmed this view in Rice v.
Harken Exploration Co., 250 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 2001).
Rice recognized that, although the CWA excludes coverage of a discharge based only on “a generalized assertion that covered surface waters will eventually be
affected by remote, gradual, natural seepage from the
contaminated groundwater,” proof of an actual connection between a discharge and resulting subsurface
movement of contaminants into a jurisdictional water
presents a different question. Id. at 272. The legislative-history discussion in EPA’s brief ignores this key
distinction.
EPA not only muddies the waters by focusing on
the legislative history of provisions Congress did not
enact, but also fails to offer a coherent account of provisions Congress did enact. For example, EPA never
discusses the Act’s express inclusion of “well[s]” in its
definition of “point source.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). Nor
does EPA address the Act’s recognition that some oil
and gas wastes are pollutants when injected into disposal wells. Id. § 1362(6)(B). As explained above,
these provisions would have little or no meaning if the
Act categorically excluded pollutants from point
sources that reach navigable waters via groundwater.
Similarly, EPA’s short discussion of section
1342(b)(1)(D), which expressly requires state NPDES
permit programs to provide for permits that “control
48
the disposal of pollutants into wells,” see U.S. Br. 16,
28, entirely ignores the inconvenient fact that NPDES
permits by definition cover only discharges to navigable waters. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b). Section
1342(b)(1)(D) would be meaningless under EPA’s view
of the statute, because pollutants disposed of into
wells can reach a jurisdictional water only by moving
through the subsurface, and EPA posits that such discharges are “categorically excluded” from NPDES permitting requirements.
EPA also overlooks that the section 1342(b)(1)(D)
requirement applies to federal as well as state permits, because of section 1342(a)(3)’s provision that
EPA’s permit program “shall be subject to the same
terms, conditions, and requirements as apply to a
State permit program and permits issued thereunder.” Thus, EPA’s assertion that, in enacting section
1342(b)(1)(D), Congress “declined … to include” pointsource discharges that reach navigable waters
through groundwater “in the NPDES program,” U.S.
Br. 29, is flatly wrong.
In sum, the best reading of the statute is that,
while Congress did not require permits for all discharges to groundwater, it recognized the “essential
link between ground and surface waters,” S. Rep. No.
92-414, at 73, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3739,
and chose to require permits for those discharges to
navigable waters through groundwater that (1) come
from identifiable point sources, and (2) foreseeably
reach navigable waters.
49
III. CWA regulation of discharges to surface
water via groundwater complements
groundwater-protection statutes.
EPA and the County insist that it is not necessary
to apply the CWA to discharges that reach navigable
waters through groundwater because other statutory
regimes address groundwater contamination. But the
statutes they cite cannot substitute for the CWA’s protections of navigable waters from point-source pollution. Where statutes have their “own scope and purpose,” imposing “different requirements and protections” that “complement each other,” the Court gives
effect to each rather than reading one to displace another. POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 573 U.S.
102, 115 (2014).
Take, for example, the Safe Drinking Water Act
(SDWA), 42 U.S.C. § 300f et seq. The SDWA aims to
prevent underground injection from endangering
“drinking water sources,” id. § 300h(b)(1), defined as
“underground water which supplies or can reasonably
be expected to supply any public water system,” id.
§ 300h(d)(2). The statute addresses “contaminant[s]”
that may result in noncompliance with “any national
primary drinking water regulation” or “otherwise adversely affect the health of persons.” Id.
These protections are important, but they do not
address situations like this one, where point-source
pollution harms marine life or otherwise adversely affects navigable waters without threatening a drinking
water source. Unlike the CWA, the SDWA does not
protect sensitive marine ecosystems, let alone the esthetic, recreational, and economic values of the territorial seas. See 33 U.S.C. § 1343; 40 C.F.R. §§ 125.122,
125.123; S. Rep. No. 92-414, at 7, reprinted in 1972
50
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3674 (using the “ocean as a waste
treatment system is unacceptable”). The two statutes
have complementary and distinct objectives; neither
creates an excuse to curtail the other.
Indeed, the express terms of the CWA and the
SDWA leave no doubt that they sometimes both apply
to the same discharge, depending on its environmental impact. For example, both the CWA and the SDWA
regulate injection wells used to facilitate oil or gas production. The CWA states that such wells may be subject to CWA regulation if they will result in “degradation of ground or surface water resources.” 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(6)(B). The SDWA states that such wells may
be subject to SDWA regulation if they inject a “contaminant” that may endanger a public drinking water
source. 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(2); see Legal Envtl. Assistance Fdn., Inc. v. EPA, 118 F.3d 1467, 1473-78 (11th
Cir. 1997). Whether either, neither, or both statutes
apply to a particular well depends on the circumstances.
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq., is likewise aimed at
a specific problem—disposal of “hazardous” waste and
“solid” waste—that overlaps only partially with the
CWA’s central concern. RCRA’s definition of “hazardous waste” is considerably narrower than the CWA’s
definition of “pollutant.” The former applies only to
wastes that have characteristics rendering them substantially dangerous to human health or the environment, 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5), while the latter includes a
much broader list of things, including “heat,” “rock,”
and “sand,” that need not have health or environmental impacts, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6). No party contends
that the wastewater from the County’s wells contains
hazardous waste subject to RCRA or that RCRA
51
meaningfully protects the Pacific from the County’s
effluents.
Moreover, RCRA’s express terms contradict the assertion that it displaces the CWA. RCRA states that
it is to be “integrate[d]” with the CWA and other environmental statutes, 42 U.S.C. § 6905(b)(1), and provides that “[n]othing in [RCRA] shall be construed to
apply to … any activity or substance which is subject
to the [CWA] … except to the extent that such application (or regulation) is not inconsistent with the requirements of such Act[],” Id. § 6905(a). RCRA also
defines “solid waste” not to include certain pointsource discharges subject to NPDES permitting. Id.
§ 6903(27); see Inland Steel, 901 F.2d at 1421-22.
Reading RCRA to displace the CWA in this context
would turn the statutes upside down. And reading the
two statutes together would hardly “nullify” RCRA.
Pet. Br. 44. EPA’s regulations provide that, where the
CWA applies to a point-source discharge, RCRA continues to have broad application to the upstream collection, storage and treatment of covered wastes. 40
C.F.R. § 261.4(a)(2) cmt.
The Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42
U.S.C. § 9601 et seq., is no more relevant. CERCLA
addresses remediation of sites contaminated by “hazardous substance[s].” Id. § 9601(14); see id. §§ 960406. The County’s wells are not a CERCLA site, and a
hazardous-waste remediation statute cannot substitute for one designed to prevent discharges of pollutants. Moreover, CERCLA expressly excludes “federally permitted release[s],” including releases under
NPDES permits, id. § 9601(10), from certain of its key
provisions, see id. §§ 9603(a)-(b), 9607(j). Those exclu-
52
sions reflect congressional recognition that even releases otherwise covered by CERCLA are subject to
the CWA if they are from point sources and reach navigable waters, and that NPDES permits are the primary means of regulating such releases.
EPA also cites the Oil Pollution Act’s imposition of
damages liability for harm to groundwater. U.S. Br.
33 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 2701(20)). That provision indicates no congressional intent to limit the CWA’s application to discharges to navigable waters. Nor does
the Coastal Zone Management Act’s provision for
state plans to address nonpoint-source pollution, 16
U.S.C. § 1455b(a)(1), say anything about the scope of
the CWA’s application to point sources. See id.
§ 1456(f) (Coastal Zone Management Act does not “in
any way affect any [CWA] requirement”). Hawai‘i’s
implementation of the Coastal Zone Management Act
proves the point: The state’s plan includes no
measures to control discharges to the ocean from the
County’s injection wells. See Hawai‘i’s Nonpoint
Source Management Plan (2015-2020), http://health.
hawaii.gov/cwb/files/2013/05/2015-Hawaii-NPS-Management-Plan.pdf (last visited July 9, 2019).
IV. Applying the CWA to the County’s wells
would not transform the Act’s scope, but
failing to apply it would thwart its
objectives and create opportunities for
evasion.
Recognizing that the CWA’s terms encompass the
County’s discharges would not, as EPA and the
County argue, trigger “an enormous and transformative expansion in EPA’s regulatory authority without
clear congressional authorization.” Util. Air Reg. Grp.
53
v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014). In Utility Air Regulatory Group, EPA had reversed a longstanding construction of the Clean Air Act while admitting that its
expansive new construction could have “calamitous
consequences” that would “overthrow” the Act’s design. Id. at 321. This case involves no similar claim to
“discover in a long-extant statute an unheralded
power to regulate.” Id. at 324. Rather, EPA’s reversal
of position here disclaims regulatory authority over
discharges the agency long said fell within the CWA.
See 84 Fed. Reg. at 16,818-19; see, e.g., Storm Water
Regulations, 55 Fed. Reg. at 47,997 (stating that
point-source discharges to groundwater may be discharges to navigable waters if “there is a hydrological
connection between the ground water and a nearby
surface water body”).
Although EPA now argues that its longstanding
position was erroneous and inconsistent with the statutory design, it does not assert that continued adherence to that position would “overthrow” the statute or
have “calamitous consequences.” Nor could it. Despite
decades of regulatory history, EPA has identified neither an overwhelming regulatory burden nor massive
unanticipated liabilities if point-source discharges of
pollutants to navigable waters through groundwater
remain covered by the CWA. No clear congressional
authorization is necessary to support continued application of a longstanding agency interpretation that
has stood the test of time.
The County, EPA, and their amici point to large
numbers of sources that could theoretically require a
permit if the CWA remains applicable to indirect
point-source discharges to navigable waters. But
those sources would need a permit only if they would
actually and foreseeably add traceable pollutants to
54
navigable waters. None of the parties suggests, for example, that properly designed disposal wells or green
infrastructure projects generally do so. Nor would it
stifle green infrastructure development to regulate
any green infrastructure projects that demonstrably
and predictably pollute navigable waters. To suggest
otherwise ignores not only the Act’s longstanding focus on preventing point-source pollution, but also recent changes to the CWA that explicitly contemplate
that many green infrastructure projects will be carried out in conjunction with discharges subject to
CWA regulation and addressed in NPDES permits applicable to those discharges.16
As for concerns about potential NPDES regulation
of septic tanks, properly constructed septic systems
are designed to ensure that “wastewater treatment
[occurs] in the soil” before effluent reaches groundwater. See EPA, Septic Systems Overview, https://www.
––––––––––––––––––––––––
In January 2019, Congress enacted, and the President
signed into law, the Water Infrastructure Improvement Act, Pub.
L. No. 115-436, 132 Stat. 5558 (2019), aimed at “promot[ing] the
use of green infrastructure,” id. § 5(b)(2), 132 Stat. at 5561 (adding 33 U.S.C. § 1377a(a)). The legislation defines “green infrastructure” as “measures that use plant or soil systems, permeable pavement or other permeable surfaces or substrates” to
“store, infiltrate, or evapotranspirate stormwater and reduce
flows to sewer systems or to surface waters,” id. § 5(a), 132 Stat.
at 5561 (adding 33 U.S.C. § 1362(27)), and it amends § 1342 to
enable such projects to “be incorporated into [an NPDES] permit,” id. § 3(a), 132 Stat. at 5588 (adding 33 U.S.C. § 1342(s)(2));
see also 33 U.S.C. § 1342(s)(3)(B)(ii). Congress thus expressly
contemplated that many green infrastructure projects will be
permitted in conjunction with NPDES regulation of discharges
to navigable waters.
16
55
epa.gov/septic/septic-systems-overview (last visited
July 9, 2019). Local regulations requiring “properly
planned, designed, sited, installed, operated and
maintained” septic systems “ensure that ground water resources will not be threatened” and that tanks
will be set back from “surface waters.” Id. As a result,
pollutants from properly designed septic tanks will
not foreseeably reach surface waters through groundwater. Moreover, the widely dispersed and small-scale
nature of septic tanks makes it unlikely that any pollutants that may reach navigable waters will be traceable to any individual tank. Thus, in most cases, any
pollution attributable to malfunctioning septic systems is properly treated as nonpoint-source pollution.17
Moreover, EPA and states have tools to ensure
that CWA regulation is not unduly burdensome. They
may, for example, issue general permits for low-risk
discharge activities conducted in accordance with
proper practices specified in the permits. Using this
authority, EPA has issued general permits covering
stormwater discharges from countless small construction projects, 82 Fed. Reg. 6,534 (Jan. 19, 2017), and
pesticide applications, 81 Fed. Reg. 75,816 (Nov. 1,
2016). Thus, if a state concluded that significant numbers of septic tanks are point sources that discharge
pollutants that foreseeably and traceably reach navigable waters, the state could greatly reduce compliance burdens by issuing a general permit for properly
––––––––––––––––––––––––
17 See EPA, National Management Measures to Control Non-
point Source Pollution from Urban Areas, Management Measure
6: New and Existing On-Site Wastewater Treatment Systems
(2005), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-09/documents/urban_ch06.pdf (last visited July 9, 2019).
56
constructed tanks that comply with other applicable
standards. See Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 108 (CWA general permits can “control regulatory costs”); see, e.g.,
81 Fed. Reg. at 75,819 (cost to comply with pesticide
general NPDES permit “minimal”).
The states’ central role in NPDES permitting obviates any concern that applying the CWA in accordance with its terms will usurp “state authority to address pollution,” Pet. Br. 42, or “upend the traditional
federal-state balance,” U.S. Br. 11. Nearly every state,
including Hawai‘i, administers the NPDES program
within its borders. See https://www.epa.gov/npdes/
npdes-state-program-information (last visited July 9,
2019). Moreover, applying the CWA to the County’s
point-source discharges in no way undermines state
authority to regulate nonpoint-source pollution.
Properly applied to the County’s wells and other point
sources that foreseeably and traceably add pollutants
to navigable waters via groundwater, the CWA will
remain, as this Court has long recognized, “a regulatory ‘partnership’ between the Federal Government
and the source State.” Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479
U.S. 481, 490 (1987).
In short, applying the CWA to the County’s wells
will not transform its scope, impose undue burdens, or
undermine state authority over water pollution. Failing to apply the Act according to its terms, by contrast,
would thwart the statute’s objectives “to restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters,” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a), and
to “eliminate[]” discharges of pollutants into navigable waters, id. § 1251(a)(1). As this case illustrates,
limiting the CWA would free polluters to release pollutants onto the ground or into groundwater even
when they know—even when they intend—that the
57
pull of gravity or the flow of groundwater will inevitably carry the pollutants to navigable waters.
Make no mistake: That is no imaginary risk. Under either the County’s or EPA’s approach, polluters
could exploit groundwater conduits to evade regulation of massive additions of pollutants to navigable
waters. And under the County’s approach, polluters
could also bypass the CWA by ending their sewer
pipes just short of the waterline, so that the sewage
flows through the sand before entering the navigable
waters.
This Court should not create such easy avenues for
evasion of the CWA’s terms. A statute should not be
interpreted “to destroy itself.” Citizens Bank of Md. v.
Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16, 20 (1995) (citation omitted). The
Act does not permit polluters to do indirectly what
they are prohibited from doing directly: add pollutants
to navigable waters from point sources without an
NPDES permit.
CONCLUSION
The Court should affirm the judgment of the court
of appeals.
58
Respectfully submitted,
SCOTT L. NELSON
PUBLIC CITIZEN
LITIGATION GROUP
1600 20th Street NW
Washington, DC 20009
(202) 588-1000
AMANDA C. LEITER
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY
WASHINGTON COLLEGE
OF LAW
4300 Nebraska Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20016
(202) 274-4187
July 12, 2019
DAVID L. HENKIN
Counsel of Record
EARTHJUSTICE
850 Richards Street
Suite 400
Honolulu, Hawai‘i 96813
(808) 599-2436
dhenkin@earthjustice.org
JANETTE K. BRIMMER
EARTHJUSTICE
705 2nd Avenue
Suite 203
Seattle, WA 98104
(206) 343-7340
Attorneys for Respondents
1a
APPENDIX
STATUTES INVOLVED
1. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) provides, in pertinent part:
§ 1251. Congressional declaration of goals and
policy
(a) Restoration and maintenance of chemical,
physical and biological integrity of Nation’s
waters; national goals for achievement of objective
The objective of this chapter is to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of
the Nation’s waters.
2. 33 U.S.C. § 1343 provides:
§ 1343. Ocean discharge criteria
(a) Issuance of permits
No permit under section 1342 of this title for a discharge into the territorial sea, the waters of the contiguous zone, or the oceans shall be issued, after promulgation of guidelines established under subsection (c)
of this section, except in compliance with such guidelines. Prior to the promulgation of such guidelines, a
permit may be issued under such section 1342 of this
title if the Administrator determines it to be in the
public interest.
(b) Waiver
The requirements of subsection (d) of section 1342
of this title may not be waived in the case of permits
for discharges into the territorial sea.
(c) Guidelines for determining degradation of
waters
2a
(1) The Administrator shall, within one hundred
and eighty days after October 18, 1972 (and from time
to time thereafter), promulgate guidelines for determining the degradation of the waters of the territorial
seas, the contiguous zone, and the oceans, which shall
include:
(A) the effect of disposal of pollutants on human
health or welfare, including but not limited to
plankton, fish, shellfish, wildlife, shorelines, and
beaches;
(B) the effect of disposal of pollutants on marine
life including the transfer, concentration, and dispersal of pollutants or their byproducts through biological, physical, and chemical processes; changes
in marine ecosystem diversity, productivity, and
stability; and species and community population
changes;
(C) the effect of disposal, of pollutants on esthetic, recreation, and economic values;
(D) the persistence and permanence of the effects of disposal of pollutants;
(E) the effect of the disposal of varying rates, of
particular volumes and concentrations of pollutants;
(F) other possible locations and methods of disposal or recycling of pollutants including landbased alternatives; and
(G) the effect on alternate uses of the oceans,
such as mineral exploitation and scientific study.
(2) In any event where insufficient information exists on any proposed discharge to make a reasonable
judgment on any of the guidelines established
3a
pursuant to this subsection no permit shall be issued
under section 1342 of this title.
3. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) provides:
(6) The term “pollutant” means dredged spoil, solid
waste, incinerator residue, sewage, garbage, sewage
sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biological materials, radioactive materials, heat, wrecked or discarded
equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into water.
This term does not mean (A) “sewage from vessels or
a discharge incidental to the normal operation of a
vessel of the Armed Forces” within the meaning of section 1322 of this title; or (B) water, gas, or other material which is injected into a well to facilitate production of oil or gas, or water derived in association with
oil or gas production and disposed of in a well, if the
well used either to facilitate production or for disposal
purposes is approved by authority of the State in
which the well is located, and if such State determines
that such injection or disposal will not result in the
degradation of ground or surface water resources.
4. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) provides:
(14) The term “point source” means any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but
not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock,
concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or
other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may
be discharged. This term does not include agricultural
stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.