Amicus Curiae Brief — James L. Kisor, Petitioner v. Robert Wilkie, Secretary of Veterans Affairs

Supreme Court briefJan 31, 2019

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No. 18-15

IN THE

___________

JAMES L. KISOR,

Petitioner,

ROBERT L. WILKIE, SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Respondent.

___________

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

__________

BRIEF FOR THE CATO INSTITUTE,

PROFESSORS JONATHAN H. ADLER,

RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,

AND MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL,

AND CAUSE OF ACTION INSTITUTE

AS AMICI CURIAE SUPPORTING PETITIONER

__________

John J. Vecchione

CAUSE OF ACTION INSTITUTE

1875 Eye St., NW, Suite 800

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 499-2415

john.vecchione@causeofaction.org

January 31, 2019

Ilya Shapiro

Counsel of Record

Trevor Burrus

CATO INSTITUTE

1000 Mass. Ave. N.W.

Washington, DC 20001

(202) 842-0200

ishapiro@cato.org

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Supreme Court should overrule Auer

v. Robbins and Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.,

which direct courts to defer to an agency’s reasonable

interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED .......................................... i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................... iii

INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE ....................... 1

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF

ARGUMENT.......................................................... 2

ARGUMENT ............................................................... 6

I. AUER CONTRAVENES WELLESTABLISHED ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

NORMS .................................................................. 6

A. Auer Undermines the Separation of

Powers and Due Process............................. 6

B. Auer’s Distinct and Troubling

Infirmities Stand Out in Comparison to

Chevron ....................................................... 8

C. Recent Legal Controversies

Demonstrate Auer at Its Worst ................ 13

II. OVERTURNING AUER WOULD NOT

BURDEN COURTS OR AGENCIES .................. 15

A. If the Court Overturned Auer, Agencies

Would Retain Skidmore Deference .......... 15

B. Empirical Research Demonstrates the

Insignificant Administrative Burden of

Replacing Auer Deference with

Skidmore ................................................... 17

CONCLUSION ......................................................... 19

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638 (1990) ....... 9

Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203 (1984) ..................... 4

Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 492 (1997).................. 2, 3, 8

Bible v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc.,

807 F.3d 839 (7th Cir. 2015) .................................... 4

Bowles v. Seminole Rock,

325 U.S. 410 (1945) ....................................... 9, 16-17

Carter v. Welles-Bowen Realty, Inc.,

736 F.3d 722 (6th Cir. 2013) .................................... 8

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,

Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) .......................................... 8

Christensen v. Harris County,

529 U.S. 576 (2000) ................................................ 11

Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.,

567 U.S. 142 (2012) ..................................... 16, 17-18

City of Arlington, Tex. v. F.C.C.,

569 U.S. 290 (2013) ................................... 2, 9, 12-13

De Niz Robles v. Lynch,

803 F.3d 1165 (10th Cir. 2015) .............................. 12

Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr.,

568 U.S. 597 (2013) ................................... 3, 6, 11-12

Egan v. Del. River Port Auth.,

851 F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2017) ..................................... 4

F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.,

567 U.S. 239 (2012) .................................................. 6

FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,

529 U.S. 120 (2000) .................................................. 9

G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd.,

822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016) .................................. 14

Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G.,

137 S. Ct. 369 (2016) .............................................. 14

Goodson v. OS Rest. Servs., LLC,

No. 5:17-cv-10-Oc-37PRL,

2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71923 (M.D. Fla. 2017) ...... 4

Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 10 (1940) .................... 5

Johnson v. McDonald,

762 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ................................ 4

King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) ...................... 9

Kisor v. Shulkin, 869 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ..... 13

Kisor v. Shulkin, 880 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2018) .... 3-4

M.L. Johnson Family Props., LLC v. Jewell,

237 F. Supp. 3d 528 (E.D. Ky. 2017) ....................... 4

Michigan v. E.P.A., 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015) ............... 12

Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018) ............... 12

Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n,

135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015) ........................................ 3, 11

Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) .......... 16

Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A.,

517 U.S. 735 (1996) .................................................. 9

Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) ..................... 5

State Case Prokop v. Lower Loup Nat. Res. Dist.,

302 Neb. 10 (2019) ................................................... 4

Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co.,

564 U.S. 50 (2011) ............................................... 9-10

Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala,

512 U.S. 504 (1994) .............................................. 3, 7

United States v. Havis,

907 F.3d 439 (6th Cir. 2018) ................................... 3

United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) ... 10

Statutes and Regulations

20 U.S.C. § 1681 ......................................................... 14

34 C.F.R. § 106.33 ...................................................... 14

38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c)(1) ............................................... 13

5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c) ..................................................... 7

71 Fed. Reg. 52455 (Sept. 6, 2006) ............................ 14

Other Authorities

Aditya Bamzai, Henry Hart’s Brief, Frank

Murphy’s Draft, and the Seminole Rock

Opinion, Yale J. Reg.: Notice & Comment

(Sept. 12, 2006), https://bit.ly/2Rdgx2c ................. 17

Brett Kavanaugh, Keynote Address at the Center

for the Administrative State Public Policy

Conference: Rethinking Judicial Deference

(June 2, 2016) ........................................................... 3

Daniel E. Walters, The Self-Delegation False

Alarm: Analyzing Auer Deference’s Effect on

Agency Rules, 119 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (2018) ........... 18

Derek A. Woodman, Rethinking Auer Deference:

Agency Regulations and Due Process Notice,

82 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1721 (2014) ........................ 18

Erica L. Green, Katie Benner, & Robert Pear,

‘Transgender’ Could Be Defined Out of

Existence under Trump Administration,

N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 2018 ...................................... 19

Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Revisiting Seminole Rock,

16 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 87 (2018) ....................... 17

John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and

Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of

Agency Rules, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 612 (1996) ........... 7

Jonathan H. Adler, Auer Evasions,

16 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 1 (2018) ........................... 7

Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (1964) ................. 6

Matthew C. Stephenson & Miri Pogoriler,

Seminole Rock’s Domain,

79 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1449 (2011) ................... 10-11

Sanne H. Knudson & Amy J. Wildermuth,

Unearthing the Lost History of Seminole Rock,

65 Emory L.J. 47 (2015) ......................................... 17

U.S. Dep’t of Justice & U.S. Dep’t of Educ.,

Opinion Letter on Transgender Students

(May 13, 2016), https://bit.ly/2kQOcUa................. 15

William Yeatman, An Empirical Defense of Auer

Step Zero, 106 Geo. L. Rev. 515 (2018)............ 18, 19

Rules

Fed. R. Evid. 401(a)-(b) .............................................. 13

INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE1

The Cato Institute is a nonpartisan public-policy

research foundation dedicated to advancing the principles of individual liberty, free markets, and limited

government. Cato’s Robert A. Levy Center for Constitutional Studies was established to restore the principles of constitutional government that are the foundation of liberty. Toward those ends, Cato publishes

books and studies, conducts conferences, and produces

the annual Cato Supreme Court Review.

Jonathan H. Adler is the inaugural Johan Verheij Memorial Professor of Law and Director of the

Center for Business Law and Regulation at the Case

Western Reserve University School of Law, where he

teaches and writes on administrative and constitutional law, among other subjects.

Richard A. Epstein is the Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law at NYU School of Law. He also serves as

the Peter and Kirstin Bedford Senior Fellow at the

Hoover Institution, and the James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law Emeritus and senior

lecturer at the University of Chicago. He has written

numerous books and articles on a wide range of legal

and interdisciplinary subjects.

Michael W. McConnell is the Richard and

Frances Mallery Professor and director of the Constitutional Law Center at Stanford Law School, and Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution. He is a leading

1 Rule 37 statement: Both parties received timely notice of amici’s

intent to file this brief. Petitioner consented specifically, while Respondent lodged a blanket consent with the Clerk. Further, no

counsel for any party authored this brief in any part; no person

or entity other than amici funded its preparation or submission.

authority on the relation of individual rights to government structure, as well as constitutional law and

history. Before joining Stanford, he served as a judge

on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. He

has also argued 15 cases in this Court.

Cause of Action Institute (“CoA Institute”) is a

nonprofit, nonpartisan oversight organization that

uses investigative, legal, and communications tools to

educate the public on how government accountability,

transparency, and the rule of law work together to protect liberty and economic opportunity. As part of this

mission, CoA Institute works to expose and prevent

government misuse of power by appearing as amicus

curiae in federal courts. See, e.g., McCutcheon v. FEC,

134 S. Ct. 1434, 1460 (2014) (citing CoA brief).

This case interests amici because it concerns

courts’ ability to check the power of the administrative

state through meaningful judicial review. These amici

previously filed a brief together in Gloucester Cty. Sch.

Bd. v. G.G., 137 S. Ct. 369 (2016) (taking up question

of whether courts should defer to an unpublished

agency letter), vacated and remanded in light of new

guidance document, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017).

INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Overturning Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 492 (1997),

would be a modest but important check on the “the

danger posed by the growing power of the administrative state.” City of Arlington, Tex. v. F.C.C., 569 U.S.

290, 315 (2013) (Roberts, C.J. dissenting).

Criticisms of Auer deference are well-known and

have been ably aired by past and present members of

this Court. See, e.g., Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n,

135 S. Ct. 1199, 1211–13 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring)

(arguing that Auer deference undermines procedural

safeguards for administrative policymaking); id. at

1213–25 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (identifying “serious

constitutional questions lurking beneath” the Auer

doctrine); id. at 1210–11 (Alito, J., concurring in part

and in the judgment) (noting that Justices Scalia and

Thomas have offered “substantial reasons why the

Seminole Rock doctrine may be incorrect”); Decker v.

Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 616 (2013) (Roberts,

C.J., concurring) (noting “some interest in reconsidering” Auer deference); id. at 621 (Scalia, J., concurring

in part and dissenting in part) (by making agencies

both rule-drafter and rule-expositor, Auer “contravenes one of the great rules of separation of powers”);

Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 525

(1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (observing that Auer

gives agencies incentive to “maximiz[e] agency power”

by “issu[ing] vague regulations” that are then re-interpreted with retroactive effect); Brett Kavanaugh, Keynote Address at the Center for the Administrative

State Public Policy Conference: Rethinking Judicial

Deference (June 2, 2016) (“I believe that Justice

Scalia’s dissent in [Decker] will become the law of the

land.”).

Lower courts have echoed these serious reservations over Auer deference. See, e.g., United States v.

Havis, 907 F.3d 439, 451-52 (6th Cir. 2018) (Thapar,

J., concurring) (explaining that, in the criminal context “Auer not only threatens the separation of powers

but also endangers fundamental legal precepts as

well” and noting that Auer “deserve[s] renewed and

much-needed scrutiny”) (citations omitted); Kisor v.

Shulkin, 880 F.3d 1378, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (O’Malley, J., dissental) (“Whatever the logic behind continued adherence to the doctrine espoused in Auer—and

I see little—there is no logic to its application to regulations promulgated pursuant to statutory schemes

that are to be applied liberally for the very benefit of

those regulated.”); Egan v. Del. River Port Auth., 851

F.3d 263, 278 (3d Cir. 2017) (Jordan, J., concurring)

(“The doctrine of deference deserves another look.”);

Bible v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 807 F.3d 839,

841 (7th Cir. 2015) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (noting that “Auer may not be long for this world.”); Johnson v. McDonald, 762 F.3d 1362, 1366–68 (Fed. Cir.

2014) (O’Malley, J., concurring) (suggesting that in an

appropriate case the Supreme Court should revisit

Auer); Goodson v. OS Rest. Servs., LLC, No. 5:17-cv10-Oc-37PRL, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71923, at *13

n.20 (M.D. Fla. 2017) (endorsing criticisms of Auer);

M.L. Johnson Family Props., LLC v. Jewell, 237 F.

Supp. 3d 528, 543–44 (E.D. Ky. 2017) (denying Auer

deference in part due to separation of powers concerns); State Case Prokop v. Lower Loup Nat. Res.

Dist., 302 Neb. 10, 41–43 (2019) (Papik, J., concurring)

(describing Auer as a “dubious proposition of federal

law that itself may not stand the test of time.”).

Amici endorse these criticisms and believe that

they represent the kind of “special justification” that

warrants a departure from precedent. See Arizona v.

Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984).

To be clear, this case is important because process

matters. Those who hold the reins of political power

will not always be benevolent, self-restrained public

servants—and the procedural safeguards that seem

frustrating and counterproductive in one instance may

very well be necessary bulwarks in another. Auer undermines these safeguards by concentrating lawmaking and law-interpretation in regulatory agencies, in a

manner that both offends separation of powers principles and facilitates procedural shortcuts. Accordingly,

Auer deference deprives regulated entities of fair notice, which is fundamental to the integrity of the law.

Similarly, Auer deference robs administrative policymaking of legitimacy by allowing agencies to avoid

public participation in the formulation of their rules.

And overturning Auer would not unduly burden either courts or agencies. Absent Auer, a court is not required to ignore agency expertise, and this Court has

established nonbinding judicial respect for agency expertise as an alternative to Auer. Empirical studies

have shown that these two approaches don’t differ significantly with respect to administrative efficiency.

In sum, this Court’s precedents, while deserving respect, are not immutable. Stare decisis “is a principle

of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to

the latest decision.” Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106,

119 (1940) (cleaned up). Where earlier decisions are

badly reasoned or have proven unworkable, and altering the status quo isn’t disruptive, “this Court has

never felt constrained to follow precedent.” Smith v.

Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944). The Court accordingly should not hesitate to overturn Auer because of

that doctrine’s harm to principles of fair and inclusive

legislation and regulation, and the minimal administrative burden from disrupting underlying precedent.

ARGUMENT

I. AUER CONTRAVENES WELL-ESTABLISHED ADMINISTRATIVE LAW NORMS

A. Auer Undermines the Separation of Powers and Due Process

Auer deference “contravenes one of the great rules

of separation of powers [that he] who writes a law

must not adjudge its violation.” Decker, 568 U.S. at 621

(2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in

part). Affording controlling deference to agency interpretations of their own regulations gives executive

agencies the power both to write the regulations they

are charged with enforcing and later to declare just

what the ambiguous words of those regulations say—

a task traditionally left to courts. In effect, Auer deference allows for the concentration of legislative and judicial authority into the hands of relatively unaccountable administrative agencies. In this manner, the doctrine undermines the separation of powers at the center of our constitutional structure.

In addition to contravening separation of powers

principles, Auer deference undermines fair notice to

regulated parties by encouraging procedural

shortcuts. Of course, “[f]air notice” of what the law requires is a “fundamental principle” of “our legal system.” F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S.

239, 253 (2012). See also Lon L. Fuller, The Morality

of Law 33–38 (1964) (arguing that lack of public promulgation and reasonable intelligibility are two of the

“eight ways to fail to make law”). The Administrative

Procedure Act incorporates this “fundamental principle” into agency policymaking by requiring agencies,

before they make a rule, to notify the public of the proposal, invite them to comment on its shortcomings,

consider and respond to their arguments, and explain

its final decision of the rule’s basis and purpose. See 5

U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c). Through that process, those who

will be subject to the interpretation are made aware of

what agencies will require of them. Once an agency finalizes its interpretation, as when it promulgates a final rule, the regulated community is on notice of what

the law requires and, furthermore, is assured that

these requirements will not change without additional

notice. See Jonathan H. Adler, Auer Evasions, 16 Geo.

J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 1, 16 (2018) (explaining the interaction between APA procedures and principle of notice).

Auer deference violates this maxim by making it

possible for administrative agencies to make changes

to their regulations without abiding these procedural

rules. As the dissenting justices in Thomas Jefferson

v. Shalala warned, deferring to an agency’s interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation gives agencies

the opportunity to “transform by ‘interpretation’ what

self-evidently are mere generalized [regulations],” and

thereby deprive the regulated community of “adequate

notice concerning the agency’s understanding of the

law.” 512 U.S. at 519, 525 (Thomas, J., dissenting). See

also John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and

Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency

Rules, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 612, 669 (1996) (arguing that

such deference “disserves the due process objectives of

giving notice of the law to those who must comply with

it and of constraining those who enforce it”).

Under Auer, agencies can thus significantly affect

regulated persons without even publishing regulatory

changes, let alone allowing the public to participate

through notice-and-comment rulemaking. The doctrine allows “[a]ny government lawyer with a laptop

[to] create a new federal crime by adding a footnote to

a friend-of-the-court brief.” Carter v. Welles-Bowen Realty, Inc., 736 F.3d 722, 733 (6th Cir. 2013) (Sutton, J.,

concurring). To appreciate how Auer deference vitiates

procedural safeguards, consider the case after which

the doctrine is named.

In Auer, the Labor Department set forth its regulatory interpretation in an amicus brief, decades after

the rule’s text had been promulgated. 519 U.S. at 457.

Because the agency’s interpretation was not offered

until the litigation was well underway, the regulated

parties could not have been afforded less notice or opportunity to lend input into a rule to which they were

beholden. Nevertheless, the Court accepted the Labor

Department’s interpretation of its own regulation as if

it were a disinterested party and accorded deference

that imparted the force of law to that novel interpretation. Id. at 461.

B. Auer’s Distinct and Troubling Infirmities

Stand Out in Comparison to Chevron

Auer deference is often treated as a close relative of

deference to an agency’s statutory interpretation. See

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,

467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). Indeed, the two doctrines

share similarities in form. They are both controlling

forms of judicial deference to agency constructions of

ambiguous legal texts. And the policy justifications

supporting Chevron deference—an agency’s expertise

and political accountability—apply with equal force to

Auer deference. Id. at 847.

Notwithstanding the facial similarities between

the two doctrines, they rest on distinct legal rationales,

and the difference starkly demonstrates the aforementioned problems with Auer deference.

Chevron, the Court has repeatedly explained, is

“rooted in a background presumption of congressional

intent.” City of Arlington, 569 U.S. at 296. The presumption is that, where Congress has delegated authority to an agency to administer a statute, Congress

understands and assumes “that the ambiguity would

be resolved, first and foremost, by the agency, and desired the agency (rather than the courts) to possess

whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows.”

Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740–41

(1996). As Chief Justice Roberts explained in King v.

Burwell, Chevron “is premised on the theory that a

statute’s ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation

from Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory

gaps.” 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488 (2015) (quoting FDA v.

Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159

(2000)). See also Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S.

638, 649 (1990) (“A precondition to deference under

Chevron is a congressional delegation of administrative authority.”).

Neither Auer nor the precedent on which it relied,

Bowles v. Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. 410 (1945), provides

an equivalent foundation for deference to agency interpretations of their own regulations. To the contrary,

Auer deference cannot be understood in terms of delegation. An agency that leaves an ambiguity in a promulgated regulation does not purposely cede control to

another branch. Instead, it “cedes control” to itself. See

Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 67

(2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) (observing that although

Auer “seems to be a natural corollary—indeed, an a

fortiori application—of the rule that we will defer to an

agency’s interpretation . . . it is not”). Moreover, no

statutory provision—in the APA or elsewhere—suggests that Congress intended to bind courts to agency

interpretations of their own regulations. Congress

may have the authority to delegate such power to federal agencies, but it has not done so.

In practice, the doctrines’ differences also highlight

the inherent problems with administering Auer deference. Because Chevron is based on a theory of delegation, agencies are not entitled to receive deference unless the Court is satisfied that a delegation exists. As

articulated in United States v. Mead Corp., statutory

ambiguity alone is an insufficient indication of congressional intent for agencies to exercise interpretive

policymaking authority. 533 U.S. 218, 227–29 (2001).

More is required. Specifically, courts must be able

identify “circumstances that Congress would expect

the agency to be able to speak with the force of law

when it addresses ambiguity in the statute or fills a

space in the enacted law.” Id. at 229. Administrative

process is central to that inquiry, such that Chevron is

presumptively reserved for interpretations resulting

from policymaking procedures like notice-and-comment rulemaking and adjudication.

Accordingly, if an agency wishes to obtain the benefits of Chevron deference, it must invest time and resources in developing and promulgating its interpretation. The agency must “pay now” by using agency resources to exercise delegated power to act with the

force of law, or it will “pay later” when faced with more

demanding judicial review. See Matthew C. Stephenson & Miri Pogoriler, Seminole Rock’s Domain, 79 Geo.

Wash. L. Rev. 1449, 1464 (2011). As the Court has

made clear, interpretations offered in opinion letters,

guidance manuals, and amicus briefs are insufficient

to warrant Chevron deference because they “lack the

force of law,” and Congress has not delegated agencies

to bind the public in such instances. See Christensen v.

Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).

Auer, however, is not grounded in a theory of delegation, so it does not require courts to identify congressional intent for the agency to wield interpretative

lawmaking authority. As a result, this Court will apply

Auer deference to agencies’ informal interpretations

that do not carry the force of law. See Christensen, 529

U.S. at 587–88 (recognizing that Auer deference would

be afforded to a mere opinion letter).

Far from being an academic matter, this distinction

between the two doctrines demonstrates the practical

problems with Auer deference. Under Auer, an agency

can choose to avoid formal procedures that impart the

force of law and instead issue an advisory interpretation of its own regulation in the form of a memo. If the

agency wins controlling Auer deference in court, then

necessarily its interpretation becomes binding on the

public, even though the agency originally claimed that

its memo was only advisory. See Perez, 135 S. Ct. at

1212 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Interpretive rules that

command deference do have the force of law.”). The absurd result is that avowedly non-binding interpretations gain binding effect through judicial review. In

this manner, Auer deference gives agencies the perverse incentive to circumvent procedural safeguards.

See Decker, 568 U.S. at 620 (Scalia, J., concurring in

part and dissenting in part) (“Auer is not a logical corollary to Chevron but a dangerous permission slip for

the arrogation of power.”).

By affording agencies the opportunity to undermine procedural safeguards, Auer also undermines the

constitutional norms these safeguards were designed

to protect, such as fair notice. A comparison to Chevron

illustrates the point. As explained above, the Court

presumptively reserves Chevron deference only to

statutory interpretations resulting from administrative procedures that impart the force of law. Chevron

thus discourages procedural shortcuts. Whatever its

ills, Chevron simply does not present the same notice

concerns that Auer does.

The contrast between two doctrines further distinguishes the separation of powers concerns associated

with Auer. Under the Chevron framework, a court discharges its duty to say what the law is by first identifying a congressional intent to delegate interpretive

authority to the agency. But there is no corresponding

inquiry in the Auer framework, so Auer allows for the

troubling concentration of lawmaking and law-expositing powers in regulatory agencies.

To be sure, Chevron deference is also a controversial doctrine that past and present members of the

Court have scrutinized. See, e.g., Pereira v. Sessions,

138 S. Ct. 2105, 2121 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring)

(“[I]t seems necessary and appropriate to reconsider,

in an appropriate case, the premises that underlie

Chevron and how courts have implemented that decision.”); Michigan v. E.P.A., 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712

(2015) (Thomas, J., concurring); City of Arlington, 569

U.S. 290, 312 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that

Chevron is inappropriate where an agency interprets

the scope of its own statutory authority); De Niz Robles

v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1165, 1170–80 (10th Cir. 2015)

(Gorsuch, J.) (questioning premises of Chevron deference). But regardless of one’s views of Chevron, the

doctrine is a model of jurisprudential salubrity compared with Auer.

C. Recent Legal Controversies Demonstrate

Auer at Its Worst

This case is a typical example of how Auer deference subverts fair notice to regulated parties. At issue

is the word “relevant” in procedural rules governing

administrative adjudications before the Board of Veterans Appeals. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c)(1). The panel

below held that the regulation is not just ambiguous

on its face, but that the apparent ambiguity is insoluble by resort to standard interpretive principles. Kisor

v. Shulkin, 869 F.3d 1360, 1367–68 (Fed. Cir. 2017).

Quite sensibly, the petitioner Mr. Kisor takes “relevant” to have the same meaning as it does in the federal rules of evidence—as “any tendency to make a fact

more or less probable” when the “fact is of consequence

in determining the action.” See Fed. R. Evid. 401(a)(b). After all, “relevance” thus defined is a fundamental and well-known concept in civil procedure—and it

is unclear why a more stringent definition would apply

in an administrative adjudication.

In 2006, when the Department of Veterans Affairs

promulgated amendments to its rules of procedure, it

had the opportunity define or otherwise elaborate the

term “relevant,” but it failed to do so. See 71 Fed. Reg.

52455 (Sept. 6, 2006). Only on denying Mr. Kisor’s

claim did the Board announce its interpretation of this

ambiguous term. Plainly, the agency’s method of interpretive policymaking offends principles of fair notice.

The Court was recently presented with another

egregious example of how Auer deference encourages

and facilitates the evasion of longstanding administrative law norms. See Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G.,

137 S. Ct. 369 (2016) (granting cert. on question of

whether courts should extend deference to an unpublished agency letter), vacated and remanded in

light of new guidance, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017). Gloucester County featured an abrupt change in longstanding

agency and public understanding of what constitutes

discrimination “on the basis of sex” under Title IX of

the Education Amendments of 1972. See 20 U.S.C. §

1681; 34 C.F.R. § 106.33. Specifically, the Department

of Education decided that this language should be applied to an individual’s gender identity, as opposed to

that individual’s biological sex. See G.G. v. Gloucester

Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 715 (4th Cir. 2016) (explaining regulatory background). Had the agency

taken the usual step of proposing this change through

notice-and-comment rulemaking, it would have been

forced to explain the reasons for the change—and the

resulting rule would have been eligible for Chevron

deference. Instead, it declared its new interpretation

in letters and informal guidance documents.

Whatever the merits of the interpretation the

agency sought to adopt in Gloucester County, it put forward its interpretation in the least responsible and

transparent fashion imaginable, and then sought binding deference to its interpretation in federal court. The

agency’s interpretation of Title IX neither went

through notice-and-comment rulemaking nor was published before the agency sought deference. It was an

informal opinion written by a relatively low-level employee and was not considered binding on the agency

itself. Yet under Auer, the Fourth Circuit gave this unpublished, non-binding letter from a minor bureaucrat

the full force of a federal statute.

Following the Fourth Circuit’s ruling, federal officials in the Department of Education and the Department of Justice issued a “Dear Colleague” letter to

every Title IX recipient in the country, affirming and

expanding on the context of the prior letter. See U.S.

Dep’t of Justice & U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Opinion Letter

on Transgender Students (May 13, 2016),

https://bit.ly/2kQOcUa. Again, the agencies refused to

undergo any sort of rulemaking.

To be clear, amici continue not to take a position on

the question of statutory interpretation underlying

Gloucester County. Instead, the crucial point is that by

leveraging Auer to avoid participatory administrative

procedures, agencies achieved a major shift in policy—

redefining sex discrimination—while evading their obligation to engage with the regulated community and

respond to critiques and comments on the proposed interpretation. Similarly, this procedural shortcut allowed agencies to evade the political accountability

that results from openly and deliberately proposing an

interpretive change of such magnitude.

II. OVERTURNING AUER WOULD NOT BURDEN COURTS OR AGENCIES

A. If the Court Overturned Auer, Agencies

Would Retain Skidmore Deference

In practice, rejecting Auer deference wouldn’t require courts to blind themselves to agency expertise.

In Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S.

142 (2012), for example, the Court didn’t turn to de

novo review after it denied binding Auer deference to

a Labor Department regulatory interpretation due to

insufficient notice. Instead, it granted the agency “a

measure of deference proportional to the . . . power to

persuade.” Id. at 159 (cleaned up).

This alternative to Auer deference, known as Skidmore deference, is based on the recognition that “[t]he

rulings, interpretations and opinions of [the agency],

while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their

authority, do constitute a body of evidence and informed judgement to which courts and litigants may

properly resort for guidance.” Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,

323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). In determining the appropriate “weight” to accord the agency’s interpretation, the

court will consider “the thoroughness evident in its

consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and

all those factors which give it power to persuade, if

lacking power to control.” Id.

Unlike Auer, Skidmore is not controlling. Instead,

courts look to the context of the agency’s interpretation

to determine its persuasive “weight.” Whereas Auer is

binary—either agencies get deference or they don’t—

Skidmore is akin to a spectrum of judicial respect between the poles of binding deference and de novo review. It is dynamic.

There is significant scholarship indicating that the

Skidmore principle exerted a strong influence on this

Court’s original understanding of deference to an

agency’s regulatory interpretations. In granting deference to the executive agency, Auer relied on a 1945 decision, Bowles v. Seminole Rock, in which the Court

upheld the Office of Price Administration’s interpretation of a price control regulation. See 325 U.S. at 414.

Tellingly, the government’s brief in Seminole Rock explicitly cited the Skidmore principle, which the Court

had set forth only months before. See Aditya Bamzai,

Henry Hart’s Brief, Frank Murphy’s Draft, and the

Seminole Rock Opinion, Yale J. Reg.: Notice & Comment (Sept. 12, 2006), https://bit.ly/2Rdgx2c. Instead

of establishing a novel deference doctrine, “[a] closer

look at Seminole Rock suggests an unremarkable application of the less-deferential standard of review of

Skidmore v. Swift & Co.” Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Revisiting Seminole Rock, 16 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 87, 88

(2018). Indeed, during the 1940s and 1950s, lower

courts frequently connected Seminole Rock with the

deference framework for an agency’s interpretations

under Skidmore. See, e.g., Sanne H. Knudson & Amy

J. Wildermuth, Unearthing the Lost History of Seminole Rock, 65 Emory L.J. 47, 52 (2015).

To the extent these scholars are correct—and Seminole Rock is rooted in the non-binding Skidmore principle—Auer deviated from this Court’s precedent by

moving away from a Skidmore approach and towards

a stronger form of deference. Ironically, it follows that

overturning Auer would affirm stare decisis by returning the Court to its original understanding of judicial

deference to agencies’ regulatory interpretations.

B. Empirical Research Demonstrates the Insignificant Administrative Burden of Replacing Auer Deference with Skidmore

Like other principles of deference to agency policymaking, the Auer doctrine necessarily engenders some

degree of administrative convenience. See, e.g., Chris-

topher, 567 U.S. at 159 n.17 (observing that Auer deference makes judicial review “easier” and also imparts

“certainty and predictability to the administrative process”). Due to this nexus between Auer deference and

administrative efficiency, some scholars have claimed

that overturning Auer could lead to chaos in courts and

agencies. See, e.g., Daniel E. Walters, The Self-Delegation False Alarm: Analyzing Auer Deference’s Effect on

Agency Rules, 119 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 29 (2018) (“overturning Auer might throw the validity of countless existing interpretations, many of which have induced

substantial reliance interests, into question”); Derek

A. Woodman, Rethinking Auer Deference: Agency Regulations and Due Process Notice, 82 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.

1721, 1736 (2014) (warning of the “disuniformity that

could result if courts were to substitute the agency’s

interpretation of the regulation with their own”).

Such criticisms far overstate the case. Far from

roiling the practice of administrative law, the shift

from Auer to Skidmore would represent a limited reform. According to a comparative study of the two doctrines before the federal courts of appeal, the government’s textual interpretations currently prevail about

71 percent of the time under the Auer framework and

about 60 percent under the Skidmore framework. See

William Yeatman, An Empirical Defense of Auer Step

Zero, 106 Geo. L. Rev. 515, 545 (2018).

From 1993 to 2013, the study estimates that replacing Auer with Skidmore deference would have resulted in merely 51 fewer agency regulatory interpretations surviving judicial review in the circuit courts,

or about one interpretation per circuit court every five

years. Id. at 551. These results belie claims that disrupting the doctrine would lead to chaos in regulatory

agencies and federal courts.

Over time, the effect would be even less disruptive,

as agencies would remain free to adopt interpretations

that would be eligible for Chevron in the interim. For

example, the Department of Education reportedly

plans to undergo a notice-and-comment rulemaking in

lieu of the guidance document that had been at issue

in Gloucester County School Board. See Erica L. Green,

Katie Benner, & Robert Pear, ‘Transgender’ Could Be

Defined Out of Existence under Trump Administration, N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 2018, at A1.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the decision below

should be reversed, and Auer overturned.

Respectfully submitted,