Amicus Curiae Brief — James L. Kisor, Petitioner v. Robert Wilkie, Secretary of Veterans Affairs

Supreme Court briefJan 31, 2019

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

No. 18-15

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

————

JAMES L. KISOR,

Petitioner,

v.

ROBERT WILKIE, SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,

————

Respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

————

BRIEF OF PROFESSORS—

DEAN RONALD A. CASS,

CHRISTOPHER C. DEMUTH, SR., AND

JAMES L. HUFFMAN—AS AMICI CURIAE

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

————

RONALD A. CASS

Counsel of Record

CASS & ASSOCIATES, PC

10560 Fox Forest Drive

Great Falls, VA 22066-1743

(703) 438-7590

roncass@cassassociates.net

Counsel for Amici Curiae

January 31, 2019

WILSON-EPES PRINTING CO., INC. – (202) 789-0096 – WASHINGTON, D. C. 20002

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................

iii

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ........................

1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .............................

2

ARGUMENT ........................................................

10

I. Deference to Agency Decisions Depends

on Legal Commitment of Discretionary

Authority ...................................................

10

A. Both the APA and Chevron Make

Judicial Review Standards Dependent

on Statutorily-Granted Discretion ......

10

1. The Administrative Procedure Act

Mandates Judicial Decision on

Interpretation of Law Unless

Review Is Precluded or Committed

to Agency Discretion by Law .........

11

2. The Chevron Decision Does Not

Change Scope-of-Review Requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act and Related Law ..........

13

B. Chevron Deference Has Been Denied

Where Indicia of Discretionary

Authority Are Absent ..........................

15

II. A General Rule of Deference to Agency

Interpretation of Rule Ambiguity Is Contrary to Law, Pre-Auer Precedent, and

Constitutional Structure ..........................

17

(i)

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

Page

A. Deference to Agency Rule Interpretation Is Appropriate Only for Decisions

Clearly Committed to Agency Discretion by Law; It Should Not Be

Predicated on Rule Ambiguity.............

17

1. Deference Follows Legally Authorized Discretion Both for Rules and

for Specific Decisions .....................

17

2. An Agency Action Cannot Expand

the Scope of Legally Sanctioned

Discretionary Authority for the

Agency and Cannot Limit the

Scope of Judicial Review ................

19

3. A Broad Rule of Deference Is Not

Supported by this Court’s Decision

in Seminole Rock ............................

20

4. Auer’s Deference Unlawfully Expands the Deference Previously

Accorded to Agency Rule Interpretations .......................................

23

B. Auer Deference Risks Violation of Due

Process Guarantees through Unfair

Surprise in Rule Application and

Strategic Behavior in Rule Design .....

24

C. Auer Deference Undermines Constitutional Separation of Powers.............

27

CONCLUSION ....................................................

33

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Page(s)

Auer v. Robbins,

519 U.S. 452 (1997) ..................................passim

Barnhart v. Walton,

535 U.S. 212 (2002) ............................... 4, 14, 16

Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.,

325 U.S. 410 (1945) ..................................passim

Bowsher v. Synar,

478 U.S. 714 (1986) ...................................

20

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources

Defense Council, Inc.,

467 U.S. 837 (1984) ..................................passim

Christensen v. Harris County,

529 U.S. 576 (2000) ...................................

17

Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.,

132 S.Ct. 2156 (2012) ........................ 2, 8, 24, 25

City of Arlington v. Federal

Communications Commission,

133 S.Ct. 1863 (2013) ................................

30

Clinton v. City of New York,

524 U.S. 417 (1998) ....................................

28

Connally v. General Construction Co.,

269 U.S. 385 (1926) ...................................

25

Constance v. Secretary of Health &

Human Services,

672 F.2d 990 (1st Cir. 1982),

cert. denied, 461 U.S. 905 (1983) .............. 15-16

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Federal Communications Commission v.

Fox Television Stations, Inc.,

132 S.Ct. 2307 (2012) ................................

25

Federal Communications Commission v.

Fox Television Stations, Inc.,

556 U.S. 502 (2009) .................................... 29, 30

Food and Drug Administration v. Brown &

Williamson,

529 U.S. 120 (2000) ......................... 9, 16, 31, 32

Gray v. Powell,

314 U.S. 402 (1941) ...................................

12

Heckler v. Chaney,

470 U.S. 821 (1985) ..................................passim

Household Credit Services, Inc. v. Pfennig,

541 U.S. 232 (2004) ............................... 4, 14, 16

Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v.

Cardoza-Fonseca,

480 U.S. 421 (1987) ...................................

16

Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v.

Chadha,

462 U.S. 919 (1983) ...................................

28

Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke,

551 U.S. 158 (2007) ................................... 8, 25

King v. Burwell,

135 S.Ct. 2480 (2015) ...................... 9, 16, 31, 32

Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger

Corp., 513 U.S. 374 (1995) ........................

20

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Loving v. United States,

517 U.S. 748 (1996) ...................................

12

Marbury v. Madison,

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) .................... 3, 14

Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health

Review Commission,

499 U.S. 144 (1991) ........................... 5, 8, 18, 25

MCI Telecommunications Corp. v.

American Telephone & Telegraph Co.,

512 U.S. 218 (1994) ............................... 9, 16, 32

Mistretta v. United States,

488 U.S. 361 (1989) ...................................

29

National Broadcasting Co. v. United

States,

319 U.S. 190 (1943) ...................................

12

National Cable & Telecommunications

Association v. Brand X Internet Services,

545 U.S. 967 (2005) ................................ 9-10, 32

National Labor Relations Bd. v. Hearst

Publications, Inc.,

322 U.S. 111 (1943) ...................................

12

Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v.

Marathon Pipeline Co.,

458 U.S. 50 (1982) .....................................

28

Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v.

United States,

288 U.S. 294 (1933) ...................................

12

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc.,

501 U.S. 680 (1991) ................................... 5, 18

Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association,

135 S.Ct. 1199 (2015) ................................ 29, 30

Process Gas Consumers Group v. United

States Department of Agriculture,

694 F.2d 778 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ...................

15

Robertson v. Methow,

490 U.S. 332 (1989) ...................................

21

Securities & Exchange Commission v.

Chenery, 332 U.S. 194 (1947) ...................

27

Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A.,

517 U.S. 735 (1995) ................................... 4, 13

Stern v. Marshall,

564 U.S. 462 (2011) ...................................

28

Talk America, Inc. v. Michigan

Bell Tel. Co.,

564 U.S. 50 (2011) ................................. 8, 25, 26

Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala,

512 U.S. 504 (1994) ................................... 8, 25

United States v. Mead Corp.,

533 U.S. 218 (2001) ................................... 16-17

Wayman v. Southard,

23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825) .................... 12, 20

Webster v. Doe,

486 U.S. 592 (1988) ..................................passim

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Whitman v. American Trucking

Associations, Inc.,

531 U.S. 457 (2001) ................................ 9, 16, 32

Yakus v. United States,

321 U.S. 414 (1944) ...................................

29

CONSTITUTION

U.S. Const., art. I, § 1 ...................................

28

U.S. Const., art. I, § 7 ...................................

28

U.S. Const., art. III, § 1 ................................

28

U.S. Const. amend. XIV ...............................

26

STATUTES

Administrative Procedure Act,

60 Stat. 237, 5 U.S.C. §§701–706 ............passim

5 U.S.C. § 701 ............................................ 10, 11

5 U.S.C. § 706 ...........................................passim

5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) ..................................

11

5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) ..................................

11

5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(1)–(3).............................

15

Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977

42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(9) ...............................

13

42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(9)(A)–(C) ...................

15

Communications Act of 1934

47 U.S.C. § 307 ..........................................

12

47 U.S.C. § 309 ..........................................

12

viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, Pub.

L. 77-421, 56 Stat. 23 ................................

7

National Environmental Protection Act, 83

Stat. 852, 42 U.S.C. § 4231 et seq. ...........

21

National Security Act of 1947,

50 U.S.C. § 3036(e)(1) ...............................

18

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial

Deference to Executive Interpretation, 126

Yale L. J. 908 (2017) ................................. 6, 20

Aditya Bamzai, Henry Hart’s Brief, Frank

Murphy’s Draft, and the Seminole Rock

Opinion, Notice & Comment (Sept. 12,

2016), available at http://yalejreg.com/nc/

henry-harts-brief-frank-murphys-draftand-the-seminole-rock-opinion-byaditya-bamzai/ [https://perma.cc/CLR4DTWQ] ...................................................... 6, 21

Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash,

Delegation Really Running Riot, 93 Va.

L. Rev. 1035 (2007) ................................... 12, 28

Stephen G. Breyer, Judicial Review of

Questions of Law and Policy, 38 Admin.

L. Rev. 363 (1986) ..................................... 3, 15

Ronald A. Cass, Auer Deference: Doubling

Down on Delegation’s Defects, 87 Fordham

L. Rev. 531 (2018) ..................................... passim

ix

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Ronald A. Cass, Delegation Reconsidered: A

Delegation Doctrine for the Modern

Administrative State, 40 Harv. J.L. &

Pub. Pol’y 147 (2016) ................................. 12, 28

Ronald A. Cass, Vive La Deference?:

Rethinking the Balance Between Administrative and Judicial Discretion, 83 Geo.

Wash. L. Rev. 1294 (2015) .......................passim

Ronald A. Cass, Colin S. Diver, Jack M.

Beermann & Jody Freeman, Administrative Law: Cases & Materials (7th ed.

2016) ..........................................................

12

Christopher DeMuth, Can the Administrative State Be Tamed?, 8 J. Legal Analysis

121 (2016) ...................................................

28

Michael P. Healy, The Past, Present and

Future of Auer Deference: Mead, Form

and Function in Judicial Review of

Agency Interpretations of Regulations, 62

Kansas L. Rev. 633 (2014) ................. 6-7, 21, 22

Sanne H. Knudsen & Amy J. Wildermuth,

Unearthing the Lost History of Seminole

Rock, 65 Emory L.J. 47 (2015) .................

22

Gary S. Lawson, Delegation and Original

Meaning, 88 Va. L. Rev. 327 (2002) ......... 12, 28

Gary S. Lawson, Reconceptualizing Chevron

and Discretion: A Comment on Levin and

Rubin, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1377 (1997) . 17, 31

x

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron:

Step Two Reconsidered, 72 Chi.-Kent L.

Rev. 1253 (1997)........................................ 17, 31

M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of

Policymaking Form, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev.

1383 (2004) ................................................

27

John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure

and Judicial Deference to Agency

Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96

Colum. L. Rev. 612 (1996) .................... 9, 22, 26

Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to

Executive Precedent, 101 Yale L.J. 969

(1992) .........................................................

12

Thomas W. Merrill, Justice Stevens and the

Chevron Puzzle, 106 Nw. L. Rev. 551

(2012) ................................................... 14, 17, 31

Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman,

Chevron’s Domain, 89 Geo. L.J. 833

(2001) ......................................................... passim

Aaron L. Nielson, Beyond Seminole Rock,

105 Geo. L.J. 943 (2017) ................. 9, 18, 27, 31

Aaron L. Nielson, Sticky Regulations, 85 U.

Chi. L. Rev. 85 (2018) ................................

27

Neomi Rao, Administrative Collusion: How

Delegation Diminishes the Collective

Congress, 90 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1463 (2015) ... 12, 28

xi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Glen O. Robinson, Another Look at

Rulemaking and Adjudication and

Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U.

Pa. L. Rev. 485 (1970) ...............................

27

Glen O. Robinson, The Federal Communications Commission: An Essay on

Regulatory Watchdogs, 64 Va. L. Rev. 169

(1978) ..........................................................

27

Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to

Administrative Interpretations of Law,

1989 Duke L.J. 511 (1989) ........................ 3, 15

David Schoenbrod, Separation of Powers

and the Powers That Be: The Constitutional Purposes of the Delegation

Doctrine, 36 Am. U. L. Rev. 355 (1987) ....

28

Matthew Stephenson & Miri Pogoriler,

Seminole Rock’s Domain, 79 Geo. Wash.

L. Rev. 1449 (2011) ............................. 19, 22, 24

Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” Is Too

Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron

Space” and “Skidmore Weight,” 112 Colum.

L. Rev. 1143 (2012) ............................... 4, 14, 17

Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The

Unbearable Rightness of Auer, 84 U. Chi.

L. Rev. 297 (2017) .....................................

30

Christopher J. Walker, Attacking Auer and

Chevron Deference: A Literature Review,

16 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 103 (2018) .......passim

xii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Christopher J. Walker, Inside Agency

Statutory Interpretation, 67 Stan. L. Rev.

999 (2015) ......................................................

27

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

————

No. 18-15

————

JAMES L. KISOR,

Petitioner,

v.

ROBERT WILKIE, SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Respondent.

————

On Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

————

BRIEF OF PROFESSORS—

DEAN RONALD A. CASS,

CHRISTOPHER C. DEMUTH, SR., AND JAMES

L. HUFFMAN—AS AMICI CURIAE

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

————

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1

Amici are teachers, scholars, and former government officials who have served in a variety of positions

in the United States government, including positions

1

The parties have consented in writing to the filing of this

brief, and their letters of consent have been filed with the Clerk.

No party’s counsel authored this brief in whole or in part, and no

person or entity other than amici or their counsel made a monetary contribution intended to fund its preparation or submission.

2

in the Executive Office of the President, executive

departments, independent agencies, and the judicial

branch. Amici have been responsible for making

decisions similar to that at issue in this proceeding

and for reviewing agency decisions. They also, among

other things, have been deeply engaged with organizations devoted to administrative law and related subjects,

and have taught classes and written numerous articles and books on matters implicated in the question

presented in this case. This brief reflects amici’s longstanding interests in the subject of administrative

law and particularly standards for judicial review of

administrative action.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The rule of deference articulated first in Bowles v.

Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)

(Seminole Rock) and restated in Auer v. Robbins, 519

U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (Auer), contradicts governing law,

conflicts with the rationale for deference associated

with Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (Chevron), and generates serious potential problems with constitutional

structure and due process guarantees. Application of

the deference rule in Auer also differs significantly

from that in Seminole Rock, exacerbating problems

with the rule and further undermining any arguable

basis for its retention. Although this Court’s decision

in Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S.Ct.

2156, 2166–69 (2012) (Christopher), limits some of

the ill effects of Auer deference, it does not cure its

essential problems.

The basic understanding for statutory grants of

review authority and for the majority of this Court’s

decisions respecting review of administrative actions

is that courts interpret law (including the statutes

3

that authorize administrative action and legally meaningful rules adopted in implementing the law) but

defer to administrators to the extent that they are

acting pursuant to a legal commitment of discretionary authority. See, e.g., Stephen G. Breyer, Judicial

Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 Admin. L.

Rev. 363, 370 (1986); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989

Duke L.J. 511, 516 (1989). The legal rule, in other

words, is that deference is the corollary of delegated

discretion. When laws grant agencies deference within

some space to articulate the policies that, in the agency’s

view, best implement a statutory directive—whether

the agency explains those policies in some measure in

terms of their fit with particular statutory language or

in terms of other rationales that by law are within the

agency’s purview—courts should defer to agency

decisions that are within that discretionary space.

Despite disagreements on the exact nature of and

terms for determining the scope of legally delegated

discretion, there is broad agreement that courts have

the authority and obligation “to say what the law is,”

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177

(1803), including the law’s parameters of delegated

discretion. That has been accepted doctrine for more

than two centuries; it is embodied, among other places,

in the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 237, 5

U.S.C. §§701–706 (APA), which clearly gives courts

reviewing agency actions the duty to interpret law—

including agency regulations—but limits review to the

extent precluded by law or committed to agency

discretion by law. Courts, not agencies, are plainly

empowered to determine how far that commitment of

discretion extends.

4

This understanding of the division of authority

between courts and agencies also was the predicate for

Chevron deference. See, e.g., Smiley v. Citibank (South

Dakota), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740–41 (1995). It is why

the opinion in Chevron observed that courts are “the

final authority on issues of statutory construction,”

and are expected to use “traditional tools of statutory

construction” to interpret statutory directives. Chevron,

467 U.S. at 843 n.9. At the same time, when a court

determines that, explicitly or implicitly, a law commits

a matter to agency discretion (including the exercise of

policy judgment on the best mode for implementation

of statutory terms), courts defer to the agency’s

decision.

Even though this understanding of the basic law of

judicial review often is characterized as mandating

deference on the interpretation of the governing law,

the better way to appreciate Chevron deference is as

judicial recognition of discretion to make decisions on

policy matters respecting implementation of law within

a statutorily-sanctioned range of discretionary decisions. See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, Vive La Deference?:

Rethinking the Balance Between Administrative and

Judicial Discretion, 83 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1294, 1314–

15 (2015) (Rethinking); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin

E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 Geo. L.J. 833, 836

(2001); Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing—

Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space” and “Skidmore Weight,”

112 Colum. L. Rev. 1143, 1145–50 (2012). That is why

deference generally does not preclude review to assure

reasonableness of agency action; deference extends to

agency decisions so far—but only so far—as the

governing law (interpreted by courts) commands. See,

e.g., Household Credit Services, Inc. v. Pfennig, 541

U.S. 232, 239, 242 (2004); Barnhart v. Walton, 535

U.S. 212, 218–20 (2002); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.

5

Agencies often articulate policy decisions in terms of

their consistency with governing law; but the agency’s

mandate is implementation, not interpretation, and

judicial deference only recognizes lawful exercises of

discretion within the parameters of courts’ reading of

the law.

In keeping with that understanding, if the law

grants an agency expansive discretion over both rule

articulation and rule interpretation in respect of a

given matter, courts should defer accordingly to the

agency’s exercises of both sorts of discretionary

authority. A law could, in other words, create a space

within which agencies are free to act without judicial

oversight, not merely in setting a general rule or policy

but also in subsequently elaborating the meaning of

the rule or policy in an interpretive document or in an

action applying the rule or policy. See, e.g., Pauley v.

BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696–98 (1991);

Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review

Commission, 499 U.S. 144, 151 (1991). Specific constitutional provisions set limits on congressional power

to grant such discretion, but so long as none of these

provisions is breached, agencies may enjoy freedom

from judicial review of some dimension over both

general policy-making and specific actions implementing agency policies and priorities. See, e.g., Webster v.

Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988) (Webster); Heckler v. Chaney,

470 U.S. 821 (1985) (Chaney).

However, there is no basis for according additional

discretion to an agency simply because the agency

adopts an ambiguous rule, as the test used in Auer

does. Deference recognizes discretionary authority

conferred by law. Unlike ambiguity in a statute—

which in some settings might indicate a legal commitment of discretion to an agency—there is no power in

6

an agency to confer additional authority on itself. That

is as true of the agency acting by indirect means as by

a clear statement asserting its additional authority.

A “matryoshka doll” (Russian nesting doll) approach

to delegation of power—allowing successive waves

of deference from unclear statutes and rules, one

after another—has no basis in law. The broad rule of

deference to agency self-interpretation embraced in

Auer is not found in the APA or in the law preceding

the APA. See, e.g., Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of

Judicial Deference to Executive Interpretation, 126

Yale L. J. 908, 924–27, 989–90 (2017) (Origins);

Ronald A. Cass, Auer Deference: Doubling Down on

Delegation’s Defects, 87 Fordham L. Rev. 531, 537–38,

566–79 (2018) (Auer Deference); Christopher J. Walker,

Attacking Auer and Chevron Deference: A Literature

Review, 16 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 103, 105–10 (2018)

(Review).

Further, Auer is not consistent with the approach to

rule analysis used by this Court in Seminole Rock

itself, the case principally relied on in Auer. In fact, the

contrast between Seminole Rock and Auer illustrates

why the rule announced in Auer should be clearly and

unambiguously renounced. In reaching its decision

in Seminole Rock, this Court gave ample indication

that it did not defer to the Administrator of the Office

of Price Administration (OPA) in determining the

meaning of the regulation at issue. See Aditya Bamzai,

Henry Hart’s Brief, Frank Murphy’s Draft, and the

Seminole Rock Opinion, Notice & Comment (Sept. 12,

2016), available at http://yalejreg.com/nc/henry-hartsbrief-frank-murphys-draft-and-the-seminole-rock-opin

ion-by-aditya-bamzai/ [https://perma.cc/CLR4-DTWQ]

(Hart’s Brief); Michael P. Healy, The Past, Present and

Future of Auer Deference: Mead, Form and Function

7

in Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Regulations, 62 Kansas L. Rev. 633, 637–40 (2014). The

Court’s opinion repeatedly emphasized ways in which

the Administrator’s interpretation matched the justices’

view of the proper reading of the rule, hardly the

hallmark of judicial deference. See Seminole Rock,

325 U.S. at 415–18.

Even if the justices in Seminole Rock did defer to

the Administrator, in keeping with the statement of

deference in the opinion of the Court, that deference

would have been defensible on the same grounds as

Chevron deference—not because deference based on

regulation is analogous to deference based on statutory

authorization but because the OPA’s interpretation

was articulated simultaneously with the adoption of

its rule and was published along with the rule at the

time. See Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 417. The agency

not only interpreted the rule consistently but essentially did everything that would have been done if the

interpretation were part of the rule itself. See Cass,

Auer Deference, supra at 549–50. So far as OPA had

discretion to adopt rules implementing relevant provisions of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, Pub.

L. 77-421, 56 Stat. 23, that discretion logically could

have extended to the interpretation at issue in

Seminole Rock.

The facts of Auer, and the implications of extending

discretion to the agency’s position in that case, stand

in stark contrast. The Department of Labor rule at

issue in Auer, implementing a provision of the Fair

Labor Standards Act (FLSA), became effective in 1973,

was amended in 1975, and was only interpreted by

the Secretary of Labor more than two decades later in

an amicus brief filed at this Court’s request in the

Auer case—the very case that gave deference to the

8

Department’s rule interpretation. This Court emphasized

that the Department’s interpretation was reasonable,

Auer, 519 U.S. at 461–62, certainly a basis for agreement with that interpretation, but there was no

finding respecting any matter that might have supported deference to it. The Court did not find that

the law granted expansive discretion to the Secretary

over interpretation of the provision at issue, that the

matter at issue was one traditionally within the prerogative of the Executive branch, or that the matter

was constitutionally assigned to Executive authority.

These factors might provide bases for finding a legal

commitment of expanded discretionary authority. See,

e.g., Chaney, 470 U.S. at 830–35.

However, permitting the exercise of such authority

over interpretation of legally binding rules carries

risks even in those contexts. Two risks in particular

have been emphasized.

First, permitting an agency expansive leeway to

interpret and apply an unclear rule risks unfair

surprise in its application of the rule to persons having

no reasonable opportunity to anticipate the agency’s

action. See, e.g., Christopher, 132 S.Ct. at 2167; Long

Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 170–

71 (2007); Martin, 499 U.S. at 157 (1991). Second,

deference to agency interpretations of unclear rules

may encourage strategic behavior, intentionally reducing rule clarity in some instances to preserve agency

flexibility. See, e.g., Christopher, 132 S.Ct. at 2168;

Talk America, Inc. v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S.

50, 69 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring); Thomas Jefferson

Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 525 (1994) (Thomas, J.,

dissenting).

9

Although some scholars have found these risks

sufficient to preclude deference to any agency rule

interpretation, see, e.g., John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency

Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 612,

659–60, 664–69 (1996), the risks are not demonstrably

present in all instances of agency rule interpretation.

Moreover, granting deference only to the extent of

actual delegated discretion both reduces those risks

and limits them to circumstances in which enacted

law conveys lawmakers’ determinations that the risks

in those specific settings are outweighed by benefits

from granting that discretion. See, e.g., Cass, Auer

Deference, supra at 567–80; Aaron L. Nielson, Beyond

Seminole Rock, 105 Geo. L.J. 943, 989–1000 (2017)

(Beyond); Walker, Review, supra at 1007–10. The

deference appropriate on this view is not a general

deference to interpretation of ambiguous rules, rooted

in the rule ambiguity itself, but deference to a

particular exercise of discretion committed by law.

The exact showing that is required to demonstrate

that commitment need not be encapsulated in a single

test. There are sound reasons for requiring relatively

explicit commitment of discretion in some cases, see,

e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S.Ct. 2480, 2488–89 (2015);

Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc.,

531 U.S. 457, 468–71 (2001) (American Trucking

Associations); Food and Drug Administration v.

Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. 120, 159–60 (2000)

(Brown & Williamson); MCI Telecommunications

Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 512

U.S. 218, 231 (1994) (MCI Telecommunications), and

in other instances for permitting that commitment to

be inferred from the nature of the authority granted to

an agency and the broader statutory structure containing the commitment of authority, see, e.g., National

10

Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand X

Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967, 981, 989 (2005);

Webster, 486 U.S. at 600–01; Chaney, 470 U.S. at 830–

35. At a minimum, however, similar evidence of

legislative commitment of discretionary authority

should be required for deference to the interpretation

and application of rules as for establishing the scope of

discretionary agency authority in adopting them. That

manifestly is not the rule announced in Auer.

We urge the Court to overrule the deference test

embraced in Auer and to limit deference associated

with Seminole Rock to instances in which applicable

law grants discretion to an agency over the interpretation of the agency’s regulation.

ARGUMENT

I. Deference to Agency Decisions Depends

on Legal Commitment of Discretionary

Authority.

A. Both the APA and Chevron Make

Judicial Review Standards Dependent

on Statutorily-Granted Discretion.

Although judicial deference to administrative determinations varies with the context and nature of the

determination, deference uniformly requires legal

commitment of discretionary authority to the agency

in respect of the decision at issue. The deference rule

announced in Auer, 519 U.S. at 461, mandating

acceptance of an agency interpretation of its rules

unless “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the

regulation,” should be evaluated in relation to the

underlying instructions in the APA’s provisions for

judicial review, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701, 706, as well as

concepts associated with Chevron.

11

1. The Administrative Procedure Act

Mandates Judicial Decision on Interpretation of Law Unless Review Is

Precluded or Committed to Agency

Discretion by Law.

The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), setting

out the general rules governing judicial review of

administrative action, directs reviewing courts to “decide

all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional

and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning

or applicability of the terms of an agency action,”

5 U.S.C. § 701 (emphasis added), but excepts review

“to the extent that . . . agency action is committed to

agency discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706. It also

directs that courts are to “hold unlawful and set aside

agency actions . . . found to be . . . in excess of statutory

jurisdiction, authority, or limitations,” 5 U.S.C.

§ 706(2)(C), as well as actions the court finds “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise

not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

Consistent with prior practice, the text plainly

assigns the law-interpreting function to reviewing

courts while directing the courts to respect the degree

of discretion given to agencies, checking exercises of

discretion for various forms of unreasonableness,

rather than of correctness (except for instances in

which law precludes review even of that limited sort).

See, e.g., Cass, Rethinking, supra at 1311–14.

The degree of discretion given to an agency is not

always expressly stated in the governing statutory

text. The understanding, both pre- and post-APA, has

been that some commitments of broad authority to an

agency embody grants of discretion and that the

breadth and ambiguity of the terms of a legal authorization for administrative action may evidence that

12

meaning. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Bd. v.

Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1943); Gray

v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941); Norwegian Nitrogen

Products Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294 (1933);

Ronald A. Cass, Colin S. Diver, Jack M. Beermann &

Jody Freeman, Administrative Law: Cases & Materials

154–58, 166–70 (7th ed. 2016); Thomas W. Merrill,

Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 Yale

L.J. 969 (1992). So, for example, the Communications

Act of 1934’s assignment to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) of authority to allocate and

license radio stations in ways that serve “the public

interest, convenience, and necessity,” 47 U.S.C. §§ 307,

309, necessarily conveys discretionary authority. See,

e.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319

U.S. 190 (1943). Having framed the agency’s authority

in obviously broad fashion, Congress did not need to

add “and the FCC has discretion to decide what ‘the

public interest, convenience, and necessity’ means” at

least within some domain. The law plainly lets the

Commission choose among a variety of criteria for

allocating broadcast licenses, but equally plainly

would not permit the Commissioners to give prefer2

2

The evidence of legislative commitment of discretion does not,

of course, resolve the question whether the degree and nature of

the discretion accorded violate strictures on delegation of

legislative power. See, e.g., Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748,

757–58 (1996); Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42–

43 (1825); Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Delegation

Really Running Riot, 93 Va. L. Rev. 1035, 1042–43 (2007); Ronald

A. Cass, Delegation Reconsidered: A Delegation Doctrine for the

Modern Administrative State, 40 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 147,

151–61, 177 (2016) (Delegation Reconsidered); Gary S. Lawson,

Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 Va. L. Rev. 327, 335–53

(2002) (Delegation); Neomi Rao, Administrative Collusion: How

Delegation Diminishes the Collective Congress, 90 N.Y.U. L. Rev.

1463 (2015).

13

ence first to their own relatives and friends. While the

FCC enjoys discretion to make policy choices implementing the broad statutory directive, decision on the

degree of discretion accorded and on the location of its

outer bounds remains a question of law for judicial

disposition.

2. The Chevron Decision Does Not

Change Scope-of-Review Requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act and Related Law.

That same understanding informed the Court’s

decision in Chevron. As this Court later explained:

We accord deference to agencies under

Chevron . . . because of a presumption that

Congress, when it left ambiguity in a statute

meant for implementation by an agency, understood that the ambiguity would be resolved,

first and foremost, by the agency, and desired

the agency (rather than the courts) to possess

whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity

allows.

Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 517 U.S. at

735, 740–41 (1995).

Chevron was not intended as a free-standing new

test but instead as a guide to interpreting the scope of

discretion granted to agencies and the legally appropriate deference that discretion conveyed.3 See, e.g.,

Thomas W. Merrill, Justice Stevens and the Chevron

Puzzle, 106 Nw. L. Rev. 551, 554 (2012) (Puzzle).

3

Although the relevant judicial review provision for Chevron

was contained in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 42

U.S.C. 7607(b)(9), rather than the APA, that provision restated

almost verbatim APA § 706.

14

Although Chevron often is characterized as demanding judicial deference on the interpretation of the

governing law, it is more accurate to say that Chevron

addresses the discretion for administrative officials to

make decisions on policy matters respecting implementation of law within a statutorily-sanctioned range

of discretionary decisions. See, e.g., Cass, Rethinking,

supra at 1314–15; Merrill & Hickman, supra at 836,

863–64, 870–72; Strauss, supra at 1145–50. That is

why the opinion in Chevron observed that courts are

“the final authority on issues of statutory construction,” and are expected to use “traditional tools of

statutory construction” to interpret statutory directives. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9. That also is why

deference generally does not preclude review to assure

reasonableness of agency action, as deference extends

to agency decisions so far—but only so far—as the

governing law (interpreted by courts) commands. See,

e.g., Household Credit Services, Inc. v. Pfennig, 541

U.S. at 239, 242; Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. at 218–

20; Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.

Hence, Chevron itself did not reverse the long-held

understanding that courts have the obligation, when

their jurisdiction is properly invoked, “to say what

the law is,” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. at 177.

Chevron did not contradict the general directive for

courts hearing challenges to agency action to “decide all

relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and

statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or

applicability of the terms of an agency action,” APA, at

5 U.S.C. § 706, and to reverse any action found by

a reviewing court to be “not in accordance with law;

contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege,

or immunity; in excess of statutory jurisdiction,

15

authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right.”

Id., at § 706(2)(1)–(3).4

B. Chevron Deference Has Been Denied

Where Indicia of Discretionary Authority Are Absent.

Judges and scholars have offered different explanations for the manner in which courts do and should

evaluate the scope of administrators’ discretion. Thenjudge Stephen Breyer, for example, said that courts

“have looked to practical features of the particular

circumstance to decide whether it ‘makes sense,’ in

terms of the need for fair and efficient administration

of that statute in light of its substantive purpose, to

imply a congressional intent that courts defer to the

agency’s interpretation.” Breyer, supra at 370. Justice

Scalia, quoting from two court of appeals decisions,

stated his approach this way:

The extent to which courts should defer to

agency interpretations of law is ultimately “‘a

function of Congress’ intent on the subject as

revealed in the particular statutory scheme at

issue.’”

Scalia, supra at 516 (quoting Process Gas Consumers

Group v. United States Department of Agriculture, 694

F.2d 778, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (en banc), quoting

Constance v. Secretary of Health & Human Services,

4

As relevant to Chevron, the same directive is codified at 42

U.S.C. 7607(b)(9)(A)–(C). Saying that the decision in Chevron is

based in a finding of legislative delegation of discretionary authority, of course, does not elide questions about the strength of the

evidence used by the Court to make that finding or the manner

in which the reasonableness of an agency’s exercise of that authority is addressed. See, e.g., Merrill & Hickman, supra at 833–34.

16

672 F.2d 990, 995 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S.

905 (1983)).

Despite differences in approach, the common ground

for granting deference is a conclusion that the law,

explicitly or implicitly, grants discretion to a given

administrative official to make a particular determination within bounds set by the relevant statute.

Consistent with that understanding, Chevron’s

“Step One” determines the room for discretion under

law, see, e.g., Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v.

Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987); Chevron,

467 U.S. at 843 n.9, while its second step assesses

whether the agency has reasonably exercised that

discretion, see, e.g., Household Credit Services., Inc. v.

Pfennig, 541 U.S. at 239, 242; Barnhart v. Walton, 535

U.S. at 218–20; Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.

The Court has made clear that decision on the scope

of discretion left to an agency, as well as the terms of

commitment of authority to an agency more generally,

depends on evidence respecting statutory meaning in

particular settings. See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135

S.Ct. at 2488–89; Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at

159. At times, the judgment respecting the scope of

authority left to an agency has turned on the consistency of a commitment of discretion to the broader

statutory framework. See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135

S.Ct. at 2488–89; American Trucking Associations,

531 U.S. at 468–71; Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at

159–60; MCI Telecommunications, 512 U.S. at 231. In

other cases, this Court has looked to additional factors

to determine the degree of discretion granted to

particular agency decisions and, consequently, the

deference due to them. See, e.g., United States v. Mead

17

Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229–31, 236 (2001); Christensen

v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).

Although the cases do not uniformly find a single

controlling factor for determining the scope of agency

authority, the linchpin for Chevron analysis, as for the

APA and prior law, remains determining the scope of

legally conferred discretion, either expressly committed by statute or fairly inferred from the law—as

scholars across the spectrum of views on administrative law have explained. See, e.g., Cass, Rethinking,

supra at 1313; Gary S. Lawson, Reconceptualizing

Chevron and Discretion: A Comment on Levin and

Rubin, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1377, 1379 (1997)

(Reconceptualizing); Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of

Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev.

1253, 1257 (1997); Merrill & Hickman, supra at 872;

Merrill, Puzzle, supra at 554; Strauss, supra at 1145,

1147, 1158–61, 1163.

II. A General Rule of Deference to Agency

Interpretation of Rule Ambiguity Is Contrary to Law, Pre-Auer Precedent, and

Constitutional Structure.

A. Deference to Agency Rule Interpretation Is Appropriate Only for Decisions

Clearly Committed to Agency Discretion by Law; It Should Not Be Predicated

on Rule Ambiguity.

1. Deference Follows Legally Authorized Discretion Both for Rules and

for Specific Decisions.

The law on standards of judicial review makes clear

that deference is the corollary of legally committed

discretion. In keeping with that understanding, if

the law grants an agency expansive discretion over

18

both rule articulation and rule interpretation on a

particular matter, courts should defer to the agency’s

exercises of both types of discretionary authority. That

has been the path followed by this Court when it has

found that laws granted an agency discretion to act

without judicial oversight to some extent in setting a

general rule or policy and also in elaborating the

meaning of the rule or policy. See, e.g., Pauley v.

BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. at 696–98; Martin v.

Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission,

499 U.S. at 151.

Specific constitutional provisions set limits on congressional power to grant such discretion, but so long

as none of these provisions is breached, agencies may

enjoy broad or narrow freedom from judicial review of

both general policy-making and specific actions implementing agency policies and priorities. See, e.g.,

Webster, 486 U.S. at 600–01; Chaney, 470 U.S. 830–

35. Consider, for example, Section 102(c) of the

National Security Act of 1947, which states that “the

Director of Central Intelligence may, in the discretion

of the Director, terminate the employment of any

officer or employee of the Central Intelligence Agency

whenever the Director deems the termination of

employment of such officer or employee necessary or

advisable in the interests of the United States.” 50

U.S.C. § 3036(e)(1). The deference owed to such an

exercise of legally granted discretionary authority

follows from the APA’s limitation of review where a

matter is “committed to agency discretion by law.”

Webster, 486 U.S. at 600. The conclusion should be no

different if the Director acts through adopting a rule

and then implementing the rule or through making

relevant determinations on policy and application in a

particular decision. See, e.g., Nielson, Beyond, supra

at 964–79 (exploring relation of rulemaking and adju-

19

dication in effectuating agency policy); Matthew

Stephenson & Miri Pogoriler, Seminole Rock’s Domain,

79 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1449, 1470–71, 1491–94 (2011)

(same).

2. An Agency Action Cannot Expand

the Scope of Legally Sanctioned

Discretionary Authority for the

Agency and Cannot Limit the Scope

of Judicial Review.

However, there is no basis for according additional

deference to an agency simply because the agency

adopts an ambiguous rule, as the rule restated in Auer

does. Deference recognizes discretionary authority.

Unlike ambiguity in a statute—which in some settings

might indicate a commitment of discretion to an

agency—there is no power in an agency to confer

additional discretionary authority on itself and no

reason to infer such additional discretion from adoption of a rule that admits of various interpretations

that are not “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with

the regulation,” Auer, 519 U.S. at 461.

If such self-delegation were possible and were to be

found merely in a regulation’s ambiguity, what sort of

limiting principle would constrain that power? Would

an ambiguous agency interpretation of its own general

rule confer broader discretion over the rule’s application, beyond the discretion “created” by the rule’s own

ambiguity? A “matryoshka doll” (Russian nesting doll)

approach to delegation of power—allowing a cascade

of successive waves of deference (implying a cascade of

successive waves of delegated discretion) from unclear

statutes or rules—would open the door to empowering

agencies, not Congress, to dictate how much or how

little scrutiny courts can give to their decisions.

20

To test the logic of allowing that result, imagine an

agency declaring, in the context of adopting a rule,

that it would enjoy expansive authority to interpret

the rule in the future. It is inconceivable that this

Court would credit such a declaration. While an agency

may receive deference for exercising delegated discretion, the power to decide how much discretion to repose

in the agency rests strictly with the lawmaking branches

acting through constitutionally prescribed means.5

Nothing in this Court’s jurisprudence or in the law

supports a contrary result. Except for the one statement in Seminole Rock, the broad rule of deference to

agency self-interpretation embraced in Auer is not

found in the APA or in the law or decisions of this

Court preceding the APA. See, e.g., Bamzai, Origins,

supra at 908, 924–27, 989–90; Cass, Auer Deference,

supra at 537–38, 566–79; Walker, Review, supra at

105–10.

3. A Broad Rule of Deference Is Not

Supported by this Court’s Decision

in Seminole Rock.

Further, notwithstanding the statement of the

general rule of deference to agency interpretation of

rules in Seminole Rock, Auer is not consistent with the

approach to rule analysis in Seminole Rock itself, the

5

As already noted, this authority must be exercised within the

bounds of constitutional constraints on who can discharge the

powers and duties legally assigned, see, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar,

478 U.S. 714 (1986), how they can be carried out, see, e.g., Lebron

v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374 (1995), and

what duties can be assigned, see, e.g., Wayman v. Southard,

23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42–43 (1825).

21

case principally relied on in Auer.6 In fact, the contrast

between Seminole Rock and Auer illustrates why

the rule announced in Auer should be clearly and

unambiguously renounced.

In reaching its decision in Seminole Rock, this Court

gave ample indication that it did not defer to the

Administrator of the Office of Price Administration in

determining the meaning of the regulation at issue.

See Bamzai, Hart’s Brief, supra; Cass, Auer Deference,

supra at 548–49; Healy, supra at 637–40. The Court’s

opinion repeatedly emphasized ways in which the

OPA interpretation matched the justices’ view of the

proper reading of the rule, hardly the hallmark of

judicial deference. See Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at

415–18. The case turned on which of several methods

for determining the relevant price comparator, under

the rule for assessing consistency with the mandated

price freeze, applied to the particular contracts at

issue. The Court’s opinion declared, among other things,

that “[a]s we read the regulation . . . [the method chosen

by OPA] clearly applies to the facts of this case,” id. at

415 (emphasis added), and further stated “[o]ur reading

6

The only other citation supporting Auer’s conclusion that the

courts must defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own rule

unless “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation”

was Robertson v. Methow, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989) (Robertson),

which the Auer decision cited for its quotation of Seminole Rock.

See Auer, 519 U.S. at 461. Robertson, after dealing extensively

with questions relating to interpretation of the statutory requirements placed on agencies in respect of environmental evaluations

by the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA), 83 Stat.

852, 42 U.S.C. § 4231 et seq., briefly addresses the contention

that the Forest Service violated its own regulations. The Court

concluded that the agency had acted reasonably in choosing how

to implement its obligations under relevant statutory provisions

and its own rules. See Robertson, 490 U.S. at 357–59.

22

of the language . . . [at issue] . . . compel[s] the conclusion” reached by OPA respecting the meaning of the

rule, id. at 418 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).

The contradiction between the opinion itself and the

rule for which Seminole Rock is known, quoted in

Auer, is captured in Professor Healy’s observation that

this “rule of deference did not determine the result in

the case. The Court itself construed the regulation and

found that it provided a clear answer to the legal

question.” Healy, supra at 639. See also Sanne H.

Knudsen & Amy J. Wildermuth, Unearthing the Lost

History of Seminole Rock, 65 Emory L.J. 47, 60 (2015);

Manning, supra at 619 (1996); Stephenson & Pogoriler,

supra at 1454.

Even if the justices in Seminole Rock did defer to

OPA, in keeping with the statement of deference in

the opinion of the Court, deference would have been

defensible on essentially the same grounds as those

supporting Chevron deference. If the law being implemented (the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942)

granted OPA discretion to select among possible

approaches to freezing prices during war-time, the

agency’s interpretation of its rule would stand on the

same ground because that interpretation was articulated simultaneously with the adoption of the rule and

was published along with the rule at the same time.

See Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 417. The agency not

only interpreted the rule consistently but essentially

did everything that would have been done if the

interpretation were part of the rule itself. See Cass,

Auer Deference, supra at 549–50. To the extent

deference should have been accorded to OPA policy

decisions on implementing the law (via regulation),

the same deference would apply in this context to the

OPA’s explanation of its regulation. Seminole Rock,

23

thus, cannot provide a precedent for a general canon

of deference to agency interpretation of its own rules.

4. Auer’s Deference Unlawfully Expands

the Deference Previously Accorded

to Agency Rule Interpretations.

The facts of Auer, and the implications of extending

discretion to the agency’s position in that case, stand

in stark contrast to Seminole Rock. The Department of

Labor rule at issue in Auer, implementing a provision

of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)—exempting

executive, administrative, or professional employees

from overtime pay requirements under the Act—became

effective in 1973, was amended in 1975, and was only

interpreted by the Secretary of Labor more than two

decades later in an amicus brief filed at this Court’s

request in the Auer case—the very case that gave

deference to the Department’s rule interpretation.

This Court concluded that the Department’s interpretation of the rule at issue was reasonable after

comparing the Department’s construction of the

critical phrase being construed (“subject to”) with

dictionary definitions of that phrase and evaluating

the application of the Department’s interpretation.

Auer, 519 U.S. at 461–62. It is not clear whether,

without deference, the Court would have reached the

same conclusion respecting the regulation’s meaning,

but taking the opinion on its own terms, Auer accorded

deference without critical inquiry into the scope of

discretion conferred on the Department of Labor under

the FLSA. The opinion’s sole statement that the law

gave the Department broad discretion to decide how to

implement the law’s underlying provision, Auer, 519

U.S. at 456, did not explain why this constituted a

statutory commitment of discretionary authority over

both the initial articulation of a rule for assessing the

24

exemption’s operation and subsequent interpretation

of that rule. Nor did the Court find that the matter

at issue was traditionally within the prerogative of

the Executive branch, or that the matter was constitutionally assigned to Executive authority—questions

addressed in cases such as Webster and Chaney. See

Auer, 519 U.S. at 461–63. Notably, in a subsequent

case challenging the Department’s interpretation of

regulations under the FLSA, the Court unanimously

declined to accord the same deference granted in Auer.

See Christopher, 132 S.Ct. at 2167–73; id. at 2175

(Breyer, J., dissenting, on other grounds).

The Auer Court rejected objections that the interpretation was first advanced in a brief in the case in

which it was being applied, largely because the

Department was not a party to the case and, therefore,

could not be accused of unfairly surprising affected

parties to advance its own litigating interests. Auer,

519 U.S. at 462. Yet the decision did not recognize that

the interpretation of the rule, more than twenty years

after its adoption, could alter settled expectations even

if the Department’s reading of the rule did not advance

its own immediate litigation interests. In particular,

the Court did not acknowledge that adopting one

interpretation among a set of plausible possibilities

without employing procedures that accord greater notice

to those affected could work exactly the sort of unfair

surprise criticized elsewhere. See, e.g., Stephenson &

Pogoriler, supra at 1451–52, 1484–96.

B. Auer Deference Risks Violation of Due

Process Guarantees through Unfair

Surprise in Rule Application and

Strategic Behavior in Rule Design.

Although a legal commitment of expanded discretionary authority could command deference, administrative

25

discretion over interpretation of legally binding rules

carries risks even in settings where that authority exists.

Two risks in particular have been stressed. First,

permitting an agency expansive leeway to interpret

and apply an unclear rule risks unfair surprise in

application of the rule to persons having no reasonable

opportunity to anticipate the agency’s action. See, e.g.,

Christopher, 132 S.Ct. at 2167; Long Island Care at

Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. at 170–71; Martin v.

Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission,

499 U.S. at 157. This risk is in tension with due

process requirements respecting notice of legally

binding rules. See, e.g., Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). While the demand

for rule clarity is most often articulated when criminal

punishment is involved, concerns for fairness, notice,

and legality are relevant in a far broader set of

contexts. See, e.g., Federal Communications Commission v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S.Ct. 2307,

2318 (2012).

A second risk of Auer deference is that crediting

agency interpretations of unclear rules may encourage

strategic behavior, reducing rule clarity in some

instances in order to preserve agency flexibility. See,

e.g., Christopher, 132 S.Ct. at 2168; Talk America, Inc.

v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. at 69 (Scalia, J.,

concurring); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512

U.S. at 525 (Thomas, J., dissenting). As Justice Scalia

put the point:

[D]eferring to an agency’s interpretation of its

own rule encourages the agency to enact

vague rules which give it the power, in future

adjudications, to do what it pleases. This

frustrates the notice and predictability pur-

26

poses of rulemaking and promotes arbitrary

government.

Talk America, Inc. v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S.

at 69 (Scalia, J., concurring). See also Walker, Review,

supra at 4–5.

Both of these are serious risks, although each may

be overstated. While some scholars have found these

risks sufficient to preclude deference to any agency

rule interpretation, see, e.g., Manning, supra at 659–

60, 664–69, the risks are not demonstrably present in

all instances of agency rule interpretation. Professor

(now Dean) Manning postulated that allowing a rule

writer to decide on the rule’s meaning inevitably

violates the imperative (embedded in the Due Process

Clauses) of an impartial adjudicator. See Manning,

supra at 631–54. He concludes that any deference in

that context is unconstitutional. Id. at 654–57.

So far as the concern is biased rule interpretation,

this conclusion is overbroad. See Cass, Auer Deference,

supra at 561–63. For example, the issues in Seminole

Rock—which among the alternative methods for

calculation of the price comparator was appropriate

for the crushed stone contracts being evaluated and

how the spacing of sales and delivery of the stone fit

OPA’s rule—were “narrow, technical, and affected by

experience associated with the work of the Office of

Price Administration.” Id. at 562. There “was no

reason to expect the administrative decision makers

to have a bias” on that question. Id. Similarly, the

Director of the CIA’s decisions on personnel matters

(the question presented in Webster) would not be more

likely to raise concerns of bias—and deference to his

determination, thus, would not be more problematic—

if the Director were interpreting his own rule on those

decisions than if he were acting in specific matters

27

without a rule. These alternative means of proceeding

are generally available to administrators. See, e.g.,

Securities & Exchange Commission v. Chenery, 332

U.S. 194, 203 (1947) (Chenery II); M. Elizabeth Magill,

Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. Chi. L.

Rev. 1383, 1405 (2004); Nielson, Beyond, supra at 948;

Glen O. Robinson, Another Look at Rulemaking and

Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform,

118 U. Pa. L. Rev. 485, 485–86 (1970).

Strategic behavior is a general concern with all

decisions, but it is not universally a risk that seriously

compromises the exercise of delegated authority.

Professor Walker has found that administrators are

generally aware of Chevron deference and take it into

account to some degree in fashioning decisions, but

they are less aware of Auer deference and less likely to

consider it in rule design. See Christopher J. Walker,

Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, 67 Stan. L.

Rev. 999, 1059–66 (2015). Further, politically-responsive

officials may prefer to bind future decision-makers,

rather than to adopt rules that expand their discretion.

See, e.g., Cass, Auer Deference, supra at 564–65; Aaron

L. Nielson, Sticky Regulations, 85 U. Chi. L. Rev. 85,

138–39 (2018). This does not eliminate concerns with

strategic behavior, especially so far as long-term staff

have the laboring oar in rule design, see, e.g., Glen O.

Robinson, The Federal Communications Commission:

An Essay on Regulatory Watchdogs, 64 Va. L. Rev. 169,

185–87, 216–19 (1978), but it does temper the concerns.

C. Auer Deference Undermines Constitutional Separation of Powers.

The more trenchant problem of Auer deference is

that it grants a power to administrative agencies that

undermines the constitutional structure of separated

powers. The Constitution vests “all legislative powers”

28

granted in that document in the Congress and specifies the essential mechanisms for exercising the

lawmaking power. U.S. Const., Article I, sec. 1, sec. 7.

The judicial power is vested in a Supreme Court and

inferior courts established under Article III’s requirements for judges with life tenure and irreducible pay.

U.S. Const., Article III, sec. 1.

The division of powers does not prohibit statutory

grants of authority to executive agencies to make rules

to guide the exercise of their powers in implementing

the laws or to make adjudicative decisions in the

exercise of those powers. However, it does prohibit

exercises of lawmaking power—including exercises of

power not denominated as formal lawmaking—outside of the prescribed form of bicameral concurrence

and presentment, Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S.

417 (1998); Immigration & Naturalization Service v.

Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), or of the judicial power

outside of Article III courts, Stern v. Marshall, 564

U.S. 462 (2011); Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v.

Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).

While striking down those breaches of constitutional

structure, this Court has permitted statutory assignments of authority that in our (and many other

scholars’) view constitute the lawmaking power that

the Constitution commits exclusively to Congress.

See generally Alexander & Prakash, supra; Cass,

Delegation Reconsidered, supra; Christopher DeMuth,

Can the Administrative State Be Tamed?, 8 J. Legal

Analysis 121 (2016); Lawson, Delegation, supra; Rao,

supra; David Schoenbrod, Separation of Powers and

the Powers That Be: The Constitutional Purposes of the

Delegation Doctrine, 36 Am. U. L. Rev. 355 (1987).

29

These judicial decisions address authority that has

been clearly, if improperly, assigned to other bodies

through formally adopted law. See, e.g., Mistretta v.

United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371–79 (1989); Yakus v.

United States, 321 U.S. 414, 420–23 (1944). In other

words, they represent acquiescence in the legislature’s

determination that a particular exercise of authority

is properly reposed in a given government agency.

Auer’s general directive for courts to give conclusive

effect to any administrative interpretation of a regulation that is not clearly erroneous or inconsistent differs

from the typical case rejecting an unconstitutionaldelegation complaint: Auer effectively grants power

for agencies to make legally binding rules (and to

give them conclusive effect) in contravention of the

general statutory rule for review of agency decisions

and without a finding that the discretion being

exercised was actually delegated by law. See Cass,

Auer Deference, supra at 579–80. While Auer formally

deals with interpretation, not adoption, of agency

rules, the process of interpreting rules that are ambiguous easily can become a vehicle for altering the

rules’ content. Appreciation of this problem supported

this Court’s decision that just as substantive rules

with the force of law must be adopted through noticeand-comment proceedings, so, too, must such rules be

amended through notice-and-comment proceedings.

See, e.g., Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association, 135

S.Ct. 1199, 1206 (2015) (Mortgage Bankers Association); Federal Communications Commission v. Fox

Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009) (Fox

Television Stations).

Auer’s acceptance of judicial deference without a

considered finding of legal commitment to the agency

of discretion over the matter being decided—over not

30

just one level of decision-making but over the second

level of follow-on interpretation and application—

stands in marked contrast to decisions like Mortgage

Bankers Association and Fox Television Stations.

Blurring the line between an initial grant of discretion

over a particular approach to decisions—over a policy

judgment—on the one hand, and decisions that construe the policy, on the other, makes it more difficult

to maintain constitutional divisions between lawmaking and law-implementing functions.

Academic arguments in support of Auer often re-cast

its rule to more closely accord with more focused

judicial findings of legislative authorization. For example,

Professors Sunstein and Vermeule defend a version of

Auer that is narrower than the strong deference

principle universally quoted from the case, borrowing

emphasis instead from the majority decision in City of

Arlington v. Federal Communications Commission,

133 S.Ct. 1863 (2013), on courts’ role in constraining

agency interpretations to fit the interpreted text. See

Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Unbearable

Rightness of Auer, 84 U. Chi. L. Rev. 297, 310–16

(2017). Certainly, to the extent courts exercise the sort

of critical judgment about the extent of discretion that

is permitted to an agency and assure that the agency

has not strayed outside the bounds of its delegated

discretion (as Professors Sunstein and Vermeule suppose), Auer deference would essentially collapse into

the inquiries required by Section 706 of the APA and

also would constrain the exercise of administrative

judgment more closely to fit constitutional structure.

Unfortunately, the tailored Auer rule that emerges

in such academic writings is not the actual rule

announced in the case.

31

The significant argument, both in cases and in

academic debates, is over how to decide the scope of

discretion an agency enjoys. Chevron states a general

canon of judicial construction that permits courts to

infer discretion from statutory ambiguity, with some

exceptions. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843; see also

King v. Burwell, 135 S.Ct. at 2488–89; Brown &

Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159. Auer, taken at face value,

states a general rule of deference to agency rule interpretations without requiring a clear statutory grant of

discretionary authority or even a strong basis for

inferring such a grant. See Auer, 519 U.S. at 461. As

already noted, that departs from appreciation for the

judicial role of independent determination on the

extent of administrative discretion, which is common

ground to a wide array of scholars. See, e.g., Cass,

Rethinking, supra at 1313; Lawson, Reconceptualizing, supra at 1379; Levin, supra at 1257; Merrill &

Hickman, supra at 872; Merrill, Puzzle, supra at 554.

Auer’s rule of deference should be replaced with an

insistence that law fairly clearly evidence the commitment to the agency of the particular sort and level of

discretion exercised. This would not wholly eliminate

risks of unfair surprise and strategic behavior, but it

would limit the exercises of discretion that are most

likely to create those risks to circumstances in which

enacted law conveys lawmakers’ determinations that,

in those specific settings, these risks are outweighed

by the benefits expected from granting that discretion.

See, e.g., Cass, Auer Deference, supra at 567–80;

Nielson, Beyond, supra at 989–1000; Walker, Review,

supra at 1007–10. Unlike Auer, the deference appropriate on this view is not a general deference to

interpretation of ambiguous rules, rooted in the rule

ambiguity itself, but deference to a particular exercise

of discretion committed by law.

32

The exact showing that is required to demonstrate

that commitment need not be encapsulated in a single

test. There are sound reasons for requiring relatively

explicit commitment of discretion in some cases,

see, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S.Ct. at 2488–89;

American Trucking Associations, 531 U.S. at 468–71;

Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159–60; MCI

Telecommunications, 512 U.S. at 231, and in other

instances for permitting that commitment to be

inferred from the nature of the authority granted to an

agency and the broader statutory structure setting the

terms of that authority, see, e.g., National Cable &

Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet

Services, 545 U.S. at 981, 989; Webster, 486 U.S. at

600–01; Chaney, 470 U.S. 830–35. At a minimum,

however, similar evidence of legislative commitment of

discretionary authority should be required for deference

to the interpretation and application of rules as to

agency authority to adopt them. That manifestly is not

the rule announced in Auer.

We urge the Court to overrule Auer, to reject the

test embraced in that case, and to limit deference

associated with Seminole Rock to instances in which

courts find that applicable law grants discretion to an

agency over interpretation of the agency’s regulation.

33

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the court of appeals should be

reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

RONALD A. CASS

Counsel of Record

CASS & ASSOCIATES, PC

10560 Fox Forest Drive

Great Falls, VA 22066-1743

(703) 438-7590

roncass@cassassociates.net

January 31, 2019

Counsel for Amici Curiae

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.