Amicus Curiae Brief — James L. Kisor, Petitioner v. Robert Wilkie, Secretary of Veterans Affairs
Supreme Court briefJan 31, 2019
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No. 18-15
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
————
JAMES L. KISOR,
Petitioner,
v.
ROBERT WILKIE, SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
————
Respondent.
On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
————
BRIEF OF PROFESSORS—
DEAN RONALD A. CASS,
CHRISTOPHER C. DEMUTH, SR., AND
JAMES L. HUFFMAN—AS AMICI CURIAE
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER
————
RONALD A. CASS
Counsel of Record
CASS & ASSOCIATES, PC
10560 Fox Forest Drive
Great Falls, VA 22066-1743
(703) 438-7590
roncass@cassassociates.net
Counsel for Amici Curiae
January 31, 2019
WILSON-EPES PRINTING CO., INC. – (202) 789-0096 – WASHINGTON, D. C. 20002
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................
iii
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ........................
1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .............................
2
ARGUMENT ........................................................
10
I. Deference to Agency Decisions Depends
on Legal Commitment of Discretionary
Authority ...................................................
10
A. Both the APA and Chevron Make
Judicial Review Standards Dependent
on Statutorily-Granted Discretion ......
10
1. The Administrative Procedure Act
Mandates Judicial Decision on
Interpretation of Law Unless
Review Is Precluded or Committed
to Agency Discretion by Law .........
11
2. The Chevron Decision Does Not
Change Scope-of-Review Requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act and Related Law ..........
13
B. Chevron Deference Has Been Denied
Where Indicia of Discretionary
Authority Are Absent ..........................
15
II. A General Rule of Deference to Agency
Interpretation of Rule Ambiguity Is Contrary to Law, Pre-Auer Precedent, and
Constitutional Structure ..........................
17
(i)
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
Page
A. Deference to Agency Rule Interpretation Is Appropriate Only for Decisions
Clearly Committed to Agency Discretion by Law; It Should Not Be
Predicated on Rule Ambiguity.............
17
1. Deference Follows Legally Authorized Discretion Both for Rules and
for Specific Decisions .....................
17
2. An Agency Action Cannot Expand
the Scope of Legally Sanctioned
Discretionary Authority for the
Agency and Cannot Limit the
Scope of Judicial Review ................
19
3. A Broad Rule of Deference Is Not
Supported by this Court’s Decision
in Seminole Rock ............................
20
4. Auer’s Deference Unlawfully Expands the Deference Previously
Accorded to Agency Rule Interpretations .......................................
23
B. Auer Deference Risks Violation of Due
Process Guarantees through Unfair
Surprise in Rule Application and
Strategic Behavior in Rule Design .....
24
C. Auer Deference Undermines Constitutional Separation of Powers.............
27
CONCLUSION ....................................................
33
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Page(s)
Auer v. Robbins,
519 U.S. 452 (1997) ..................................passim
Barnhart v. Walton,
535 U.S. 212 (2002) ............................... 4, 14, 16
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.,
325 U.S. 410 (1945) ..................................passim
Bowsher v. Synar,
478 U.S. 714 (1986) ...................................
20
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984) ..................................passim
Christensen v. Harris County,
529 U.S. 576 (2000) ...................................
17
Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.,
132 S.Ct. 2156 (2012) ........................ 2, 8, 24, 25
City of Arlington v. Federal
Communications Commission,
133 S.Ct. 1863 (2013) ................................
30
Clinton v. City of New York,
524 U.S. 417 (1998) ....................................
28
Connally v. General Construction Co.,
269 U.S. 385 (1926) ...................................
25
Constance v. Secretary of Health &
Human Services,
672 F.2d 990 (1st Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 461 U.S. 905 (1983) .............. 15-16
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
Federal Communications Commission v.
Fox Television Stations, Inc.,
132 S.Ct. 2307 (2012) ................................
25
Federal Communications Commission v.
Fox Television Stations, Inc.,
556 U.S. 502 (2009) .................................... 29, 30
Food and Drug Administration v. Brown &
Williamson,
529 U.S. 120 (2000) ......................... 9, 16, 31, 32
Gray v. Powell,
314 U.S. 402 (1941) ...................................
12
Heckler v. Chaney,
470 U.S. 821 (1985) ..................................passim
Household Credit Services, Inc. v. Pfennig,
541 U.S. 232 (2004) ............................... 4, 14, 16
Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v.
Cardoza-Fonseca,
480 U.S. 421 (1987) ...................................
16
Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v.
Chadha,
462 U.S. 919 (1983) ...................................
28
Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke,
551 U.S. 158 (2007) ................................... 8, 25
King v. Burwell,
135 S.Ct. 2480 (2015) ...................... 9, 16, 31, 32
Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger
Corp., 513 U.S. 374 (1995) ........................
20
v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
Loving v. United States,
517 U.S. 748 (1996) ...................................
12
Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) .................... 3, 14
Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health
Review Commission,
499 U.S. 144 (1991) ........................... 5, 8, 18, 25
MCI Telecommunications Corp. v.
American Telephone & Telegraph Co.,
512 U.S. 218 (1994) ............................... 9, 16, 32
Mistretta v. United States,
488 U.S. 361 (1989) ...................................
29
National Broadcasting Co. v. United
States,
319 U.S. 190 (1943) ...................................
12
National Cable & Telecommunications
Association v. Brand X Internet Services,
545 U.S. 967 (2005) ................................ 9-10, 32
National Labor Relations Bd. v. Hearst
Publications, Inc.,
322 U.S. 111 (1943) ...................................
12
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v.
Marathon Pipeline Co.,
458 U.S. 50 (1982) .....................................
28
Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v.
United States,
288 U.S. 294 (1933) ...................................
12
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc.,
501 U.S. 680 (1991) ................................... 5, 18
Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association,
135 S.Ct. 1199 (2015) ................................ 29, 30
Process Gas Consumers Group v. United
States Department of Agriculture,
694 F.2d 778 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ...................
15
Robertson v. Methow,
490 U.S. 332 (1989) ...................................
21
Securities & Exchange Commission v.
Chenery, 332 U.S. 194 (1947) ...................
27
Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A.,
517 U.S. 735 (1995) ................................... 4, 13
Stern v. Marshall,
564 U.S. 462 (2011) ...................................
28
Talk America, Inc. v. Michigan
Bell Tel. Co.,
564 U.S. 50 (2011) ................................. 8, 25, 26
Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala,
512 U.S. 504 (1994) ................................... 8, 25
United States v. Mead Corp.,
533 U.S. 218 (2001) ................................... 16-17
Wayman v. Southard,
23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825) .................... 12, 20
Webster v. Doe,
486 U.S. 592 (1988) ..................................passim
vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
Whitman v. American Trucking
Associations, Inc.,
531 U.S. 457 (2001) ................................ 9, 16, 32
Yakus v. United States,
321 U.S. 414 (1944) ...................................
29
CONSTITUTION
U.S. Const., art. I, § 1 ...................................
28
U.S. Const., art. I, § 7 ...................................
28
U.S. Const., art. III, § 1 ................................
28
U.S. Const. amend. XIV ...............................
26
STATUTES
Administrative Procedure Act,
60 Stat. 237, 5 U.S.C. §§701–706 ............passim
5 U.S.C. § 701 ............................................ 10, 11
5 U.S.C. § 706 ...........................................passim
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) ..................................
11
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) ..................................
11
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(1)–(3).............................
15
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977
42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(9) ...............................
13
42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(9)(A)–(C) ...................
15
Communications Act of 1934
47 U.S.C. § 307 ..........................................
12
47 U.S.C. § 309 ..........................................
12
viii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, Pub.
L. 77-421, 56 Stat. 23 ................................
7
National Environmental Protection Act, 83
Stat. 852, 42 U.S.C. § 4231 et seq. ...........
21
National Security Act of 1947,
50 U.S.C. § 3036(e)(1) ...............................
18
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial
Deference to Executive Interpretation, 126
Yale L. J. 908 (2017) ................................. 6, 20
Aditya Bamzai, Henry Hart’s Brief, Frank
Murphy’s Draft, and the Seminole Rock
Opinion, Notice & Comment (Sept. 12,
2016), available at http://yalejreg.com/nc/
henry-harts-brief-frank-murphys-draftand-the-seminole-rock-opinion-byaditya-bamzai/ [https://perma.cc/CLR4DTWQ] ...................................................... 6, 21
Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash,
Delegation Really Running Riot, 93 Va.
L. Rev. 1035 (2007) ................................... 12, 28
Stephen G. Breyer, Judicial Review of
Questions of Law and Policy, 38 Admin.
L. Rev. 363 (1986) ..................................... 3, 15
Ronald A. Cass, Auer Deference: Doubling
Down on Delegation’s Defects, 87 Fordham
L. Rev. 531 (2018) ..................................... passim
ix
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
Ronald A. Cass, Delegation Reconsidered: A
Delegation Doctrine for the Modern
Administrative State, 40 Harv. J.L. &
Pub. Pol’y 147 (2016) ................................. 12, 28
Ronald A. Cass, Vive La Deference?:
Rethinking the Balance Between Administrative and Judicial Discretion, 83 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 1294 (2015) .......................passim
Ronald A. Cass, Colin S. Diver, Jack M.
Beermann & Jody Freeman, Administrative Law: Cases & Materials (7th ed.
2016) ..........................................................
12
Christopher DeMuth, Can the Administrative State Be Tamed?, 8 J. Legal Analysis
121 (2016) ...................................................
28
Michael P. Healy, The Past, Present and
Future of Auer Deference: Mead, Form
and Function in Judicial Review of
Agency Interpretations of Regulations, 62
Kansas L. Rev. 633 (2014) ................. 6-7, 21, 22
Sanne H. Knudsen & Amy J. Wildermuth,
Unearthing the Lost History of Seminole
Rock, 65 Emory L.J. 47 (2015) .................
22
Gary S. Lawson, Delegation and Original
Meaning, 88 Va. L. Rev. 327 (2002) ......... 12, 28
Gary S. Lawson, Reconceptualizing Chevron
and Discretion: A Comment on Levin and
Rubin, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1377 (1997) . 17, 31
x
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron:
Step Two Reconsidered, 72 Chi.-Kent L.
Rev. 1253 (1997)........................................ 17, 31
M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of
Policymaking Form, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1383 (2004) ................................................
27
John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure
and Judicial Deference to Agency
Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96
Colum. L. Rev. 612 (1996) .................... 9, 22, 26
Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to
Executive Precedent, 101 Yale L.J. 969
(1992) .........................................................
12
Thomas W. Merrill, Justice Stevens and the
Chevron Puzzle, 106 Nw. L. Rev. 551
(2012) ................................................... 14, 17, 31
Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman,
Chevron’s Domain, 89 Geo. L.J. 833
(2001) ......................................................... passim
Aaron L. Nielson, Beyond Seminole Rock,
105 Geo. L.J. 943 (2017) ................. 9, 18, 27, 31
Aaron L. Nielson, Sticky Regulations, 85 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 85 (2018) ................................
27
Neomi Rao, Administrative Collusion: How
Delegation Diminishes the Collective
Congress, 90 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1463 (2015) ... 12, 28
xi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
Glen O. Robinson, Another Look at
Rulemaking and Adjudication and
Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 485 (1970) ...............................
27
Glen O. Robinson, The Federal Communications Commission: An Essay on
Regulatory Watchdogs, 64 Va. L. Rev. 169
(1978) ..........................................................
27
Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to
Administrative Interpretations of Law,
1989 Duke L.J. 511 (1989) ........................ 3, 15
David Schoenbrod, Separation of Powers
and the Powers That Be: The Constitutional Purposes of the Delegation
Doctrine, 36 Am. U. L. Rev. 355 (1987) ....
28
Matthew Stephenson & Miri Pogoriler,
Seminole Rock’s Domain, 79 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 1449 (2011) ............................. 19, 22, 24
Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” Is Too
Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron
Space” and “Skidmore Weight,” 112 Colum.
L. Rev. 1143 (2012) ............................... 4, 14, 17
Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The
Unbearable Rightness of Auer, 84 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 297 (2017) .....................................
30
Christopher J. Walker, Attacking Auer and
Chevron Deference: A Literature Review,
16 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 103 (2018) .......passim
xii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
Christopher J. Walker, Inside Agency
Statutory Interpretation, 67 Stan. L. Rev.
999 (2015) ......................................................
27
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
————
No. 18-15
————
JAMES L. KISOR,
Petitioner,
v.
ROBERT WILKIE, SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
Respondent.
————
On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
————
BRIEF OF PROFESSORS—
DEAN RONALD A. CASS,
CHRISTOPHER C. DEMUTH, SR., AND JAMES
L. HUFFMAN—AS AMICI CURIAE
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER
————
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1
Amici are teachers, scholars, and former government officials who have served in a variety of positions
in the United States government, including positions
1
The parties have consented in writing to the filing of this
brief, and their letters of consent have been filed with the Clerk.
No party’s counsel authored this brief in whole or in part, and no
person or entity other than amici or their counsel made a monetary contribution intended to fund its preparation or submission.
2
in the Executive Office of the President, executive
departments, independent agencies, and the judicial
branch. Amici have been responsible for making
decisions similar to that at issue in this proceeding
and for reviewing agency decisions. They also, among
other things, have been deeply engaged with organizations devoted to administrative law and related subjects,
and have taught classes and written numerous articles and books on matters implicated in the question
presented in this case. This brief reflects amici’s longstanding interests in the subject of administrative
law and particularly standards for judicial review of
administrative action.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The rule of deference articulated first in Bowles v.
Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)
(Seminole Rock) and restated in Auer v. Robbins, 519
U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (Auer), contradicts governing law,
conflicts with the rationale for deference associated
with Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (Chevron), and generates serious potential problems with constitutional
structure and due process guarantees. Application of
the deference rule in Auer also differs significantly
from that in Seminole Rock, exacerbating problems
with the rule and further undermining any arguable
basis for its retention. Although this Court’s decision
in Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S.Ct.
2156, 2166–69 (2012) (Christopher), limits some of
the ill effects of Auer deference, it does not cure its
essential problems.
The basic understanding for statutory grants of
review authority and for the majority of this Court’s
decisions respecting review of administrative actions
is that courts interpret law (including the statutes
3
that authorize administrative action and legally meaningful rules adopted in implementing the law) but
defer to administrators to the extent that they are
acting pursuant to a legal commitment of discretionary authority. See, e.g., Stephen G. Breyer, Judicial
Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 Admin. L.
Rev. 363, 370 (1986); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
Duke L.J. 511, 516 (1989). The legal rule, in other
words, is that deference is the corollary of delegated
discretion. When laws grant agencies deference within
some space to articulate the policies that, in the agency’s
view, best implement a statutory directive—whether
the agency explains those policies in some measure in
terms of their fit with particular statutory language or
in terms of other rationales that by law are within the
agency’s purview—courts should defer to agency
decisions that are within that discretionary space.
Despite disagreements on the exact nature of and
terms for determining the scope of legally delegated
discretion, there is broad agreement that courts have
the authority and obligation “to say what the law is,”
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177
(1803), including the law’s parameters of delegated
discretion. That has been accepted doctrine for more
than two centuries; it is embodied, among other places,
in the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 237, 5
U.S.C. §§701–706 (APA), which clearly gives courts
reviewing agency actions the duty to interpret law—
including agency regulations—but limits review to the
extent precluded by law or committed to agency
discretion by law. Courts, not agencies, are plainly
empowered to determine how far that commitment of
discretion extends.
4
This understanding of the division of authority
between courts and agencies also was the predicate for
Chevron deference. See, e.g., Smiley v. Citibank (South
Dakota), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740–41 (1995). It is why
the opinion in Chevron observed that courts are “the
final authority on issues of statutory construction,”
and are expected to use “traditional tools of statutory
construction” to interpret statutory directives. Chevron,
467 U.S. at 843 n.9. At the same time, when a court
determines that, explicitly or implicitly, a law commits
a matter to agency discretion (including the exercise of
policy judgment on the best mode for implementation
of statutory terms), courts defer to the agency’s
decision.
Even though this understanding of the basic law of
judicial review often is characterized as mandating
deference on the interpretation of the governing law,
the better way to appreciate Chevron deference is as
judicial recognition of discretion to make decisions on
policy matters respecting implementation of law within
a statutorily-sanctioned range of discretionary decisions. See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, Vive La Deference?:
Rethinking the Balance Between Administrative and
Judicial Discretion, 83 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1294, 1314–
15 (2015) (Rethinking); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin
E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 Geo. L.J. 833, 836
(2001); Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing—
Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space” and “Skidmore Weight,”
112 Colum. L. Rev. 1143, 1145–50 (2012). That is why
deference generally does not preclude review to assure
reasonableness of agency action; deference extends to
agency decisions so far—but only so far—as the
governing law (interpreted by courts) commands. See,
e.g., Household Credit Services, Inc. v. Pfennig, 541
U.S. 232, 239, 242 (2004); Barnhart v. Walton, 535
U.S. 212, 218–20 (2002); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.
5
Agencies often articulate policy decisions in terms of
their consistency with governing law; but the agency’s
mandate is implementation, not interpretation, and
judicial deference only recognizes lawful exercises of
discretion within the parameters of courts’ reading of
the law.
In keeping with that understanding, if the law
grants an agency expansive discretion over both rule
articulation and rule interpretation in respect of a
given matter, courts should defer accordingly to the
agency’s exercises of both sorts of discretionary
authority. A law could, in other words, create a space
within which agencies are free to act without judicial
oversight, not merely in setting a general rule or policy
but also in subsequently elaborating the meaning of
the rule or policy in an interpretive document or in an
action applying the rule or policy. See, e.g., Pauley v.
BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696–98 (1991);
Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission, 499 U.S. 144, 151 (1991). Specific constitutional provisions set limits on congressional power
to grant such discretion, but so long as none of these
provisions is breached, agencies may enjoy freedom
from judicial review of some dimension over both
general policy-making and specific actions implementing agency policies and priorities. See, e.g., Webster v.
Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988) (Webster); Heckler v. Chaney,
470 U.S. 821 (1985) (Chaney).
However, there is no basis for according additional
discretion to an agency simply because the agency
adopts an ambiguous rule, as the test used in Auer
does. Deference recognizes discretionary authority
conferred by law. Unlike ambiguity in a statute—
which in some settings might indicate a legal commitment of discretion to an agency—there is no power in
6
an agency to confer additional authority on itself. That
is as true of the agency acting by indirect means as by
a clear statement asserting its additional authority.
A “matryoshka doll” (Russian nesting doll) approach
to delegation of power—allowing successive waves
of deference from unclear statutes and rules, one
after another—has no basis in law. The broad rule of
deference to agency self-interpretation embraced in
Auer is not found in the APA or in the law preceding
the APA. See, e.g., Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of
Judicial Deference to Executive Interpretation, 126
Yale L. J. 908, 924–27, 989–90 (2017) (Origins);
Ronald A. Cass, Auer Deference: Doubling Down on
Delegation’s Defects, 87 Fordham L. Rev. 531, 537–38,
566–79 (2018) (Auer Deference); Christopher J. Walker,
Attacking Auer and Chevron Deference: A Literature
Review, 16 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 103, 105–10 (2018)
(Review).
Further, Auer is not consistent with the approach to
rule analysis used by this Court in Seminole Rock
itself, the case principally relied on in Auer. In fact, the
contrast between Seminole Rock and Auer illustrates
why the rule announced in Auer should be clearly and
unambiguously renounced. In reaching its decision
in Seminole Rock, this Court gave ample indication
that it did not defer to the Administrator of the Office
of Price Administration (OPA) in determining the
meaning of the regulation at issue. See Aditya Bamzai,
Henry Hart’s Brief, Frank Murphy’s Draft, and the
Seminole Rock Opinion, Notice & Comment (Sept. 12,
2016), available at http://yalejreg.com/nc/henry-hartsbrief-frank-murphys-draft-and-the-seminole-rock-opin
ion-by-aditya-bamzai/ [https://perma.cc/CLR4-DTWQ]
(Hart’s Brief); Michael P. Healy, The Past, Present and
Future of Auer Deference: Mead, Form and Function
7
in Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Regulations, 62 Kansas L. Rev. 633, 637–40 (2014). The
Court’s opinion repeatedly emphasized ways in which
the Administrator’s interpretation matched the justices’
view of the proper reading of the rule, hardly the
hallmark of judicial deference. See Seminole Rock,
325 U.S. at 415–18.
Even if the justices in Seminole Rock did defer to
the Administrator, in keeping with the statement of
deference in the opinion of the Court, that deference
would have been defensible on the same grounds as
Chevron deference—not because deference based on
regulation is analogous to deference based on statutory
authorization but because the OPA’s interpretation
was articulated simultaneously with the adoption of
its rule and was published along with the rule at the
time. See Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 417. The agency
not only interpreted the rule consistently but essentially did everything that would have been done if the
interpretation were part of the rule itself. See Cass,
Auer Deference, supra at 549–50. So far as OPA had
discretion to adopt rules implementing relevant provisions of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, Pub.
L. 77-421, 56 Stat. 23, that discretion logically could
have extended to the interpretation at issue in
Seminole Rock.
The facts of Auer, and the implications of extending
discretion to the agency’s position in that case, stand
in stark contrast. The Department of Labor rule at
issue in Auer, implementing a provision of the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA), became effective in 1973,
was amended in 1975, and was only interpreted by
the Secretary of Labor more than two decades later in
an amicus brief filed at this Court’s request in the
Auer case—the very case that gave deference to the
8
Department’s rule interpretation. This Court emphasized
that the Department’s interpretation was reasonable,
Auer, 519 U.S. at 461–62, certainly a basis for agreement with that interpretation, but there was no
finding respecting any matter that might have supported deference to it. The Court did not find that
the law granted expansive discretion to the Secretary
over interpretation of the provision at issue, that the
matter at issue was one traditionally within the prerogative of the Executive branch, or that the matter
was constitutionally assigned to Executive authority.
These factors might provide bases for finding a legal
commitment of expanded discretionary authority. See,
e.g., Chaney, 470 U.S. at 830–35.
However, permitting the exercise of such authority
over interpretation of legally binding rules carries
risks even in those contexts. Two risks in particular
have been emphasized.
First, permitting an agency expansive leeway to
interpret and apply an unclear rule risks unfair
surprise in its application of the rule to persons having
no reasonable opportunity to anticipate the agency’s
action. See, e.g., Christopher, 132 S.Ct. at 2167; Long
Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 170–
71 (2007); Martin, 499 U.S. at 157 (1991). Second,
deference to agency interpretations of unclear rules
may encourage strategic behavior, intentionally reducing rule clarity in some instances to preserve agency
flexibility. See, e.g., Christopher, 132 S.Ct. at 2168;
Talk America, Inc. v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S.
50, 69 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring); Thomas Jefferson
Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 525 (1994) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
9
Although some scholars have found these risks
sufficient to preclude deference to any agency rule
interpretation, see, e.g., John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency
Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 612,
659–60, 664–69 (1996), the risks are not demonstrably
present in all instances of agency rule interpretation.
Moreover, granting deference only to the extent of
actual delegated discretion both reduces those risks
and limits them to circumstances in which enacted
law conveys lawmakers’ determinations that the risks
in those specific settings are outweighed by benefits
from granting that discretion. See, e.g., Cass, Auer
Deference, supra at 567–80; Aaron L. Nielson, Beyond
Seminole Rock, 105 Geo. L.J. 943, 989–1000 (2017)
(Beyond); Walker, Review, supra at 1007–10. The
deference appropriate on this view is not a general
deference to interpretation of ambiguous rules, rooted
in the rule ambiguity itself, but deference to a
particular exercise of discretion committed by law.
The exact showing that is required to demonstrate
that commitment need not be encapsulated in a single
test. There are sound reasons for requiring relatively
explicit commitment of discretion in some cases, see,
e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S.Ct. 2480, 2488–89 (2015);
Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc.,
531 U.S. 457, 468–71 (2001) (American Trucking
Associations); Food and Drug Administration v.
Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. 120, 159–60 (2000)
(Brown & Williamson); MCI Telecommunications
Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 512
U.S. 218, 231 (1994) (MCI Telecommunications), and
in other instances for permitting that commitment to
be inferred from the nature of the authority granted to
an agency and the broader statutory structure containing the commitment of authority, see, e.g., National
10
Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand X
Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967, 981, 989 (2005);
Webster, 486 U.S. at 600–01; Chaney, 470 U.S. at 830–
35. At a minimum, however, similar evidence of
legislative commitment of discretionary authority
should be required for deference to the interpretation
and application of rules as for establishing the scope of
discretionary agency authority in adopting them. That
manifestly is not the rule announced in Auer.
We urge the Court to overrule the deference test
embraced in Auer and to limit deference associated
with Seminole Rock to instances in which applicable
law grants discretion to an agency over the interpretation of the agency’s regulation.
ARGUMENT
I. Deference to Agency Decisions Depends
on Legal Commitment of Discretionary
Authority.
A. Both the APA and Chevron Make
Judicial Review Standards Dependent
on Statutorily-Granted Discretion.
Although judicial deference to administrative determinations varies with the context and nature of the
determination, deference uniformly requires legal
commitment of discretionary authority to the agency
in respect of the decision at issue. The deference rule
announced in Auer, 519 U.S. at 461, mandating
acceptance of an agency interpretation of its rules
unless “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation,” should be evaluated in relation to the
underlying instructions in the APA’s provisions for
judicial review, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701, 706, as well as
concepts associated with Chevron.
11
1. The Administrative Procedure Act
Mandates Judicial Decision on Interpretation of Law Unless Review Is
Precluded or Committed to Agency
Discretion by Law.
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), setting
out the general rules governing judicial review of
administrative action, directs reviewing courts to “decide
all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional
and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning
or applicability of the terms of an agency action,”
5 U.S.C. § 701 (emphasis added), but excepts review
“to the extent that . . . agency action is committed to
agency discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706. It also
directs that courts are to “hold unlawful and set aside
agency actions . . . found to be . . . in excess of statutory
jurisdiction, authority, or limitations,” 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(C), as well as actions the court finds “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
Consistent with prior practice, the text plainly
assigns the law-interpreting function to reviewing
courts while directing the courts to respect the degree
of discretion given to agencies, checking exercises of
discretion for various forms of unreasonableness,
rather than of correctness (except for instances in
which law precludes review even of that limited sort).
See, e.g., Cass, Rethinking, supra at 1311–14.
The degree of discretion given to an agency is not
always expressly stated in the governing statutory
text. The understanding, both pre- and post-APA, has
been that some commitments of broad authority to an
agency embody grants of discretion and that the
breadth and ambiguity of the terms of a legal authorization for administrative action may evidence that
12
meaning. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Bd. v.
Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1943); Gray
v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941); Norwegian Nitrogen
Products Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294 (1933);
Ronald A. Cass, Colin S. Diver, Jack M. Beermann &
Jody Freeman, Administrative Law: Cases & Materials
154–58, 166–70 (7th ed. 2016); Thomas W. Merrill,
Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 Yale
L.J. 969 (1992). So, for example, the Communications
Act of 1934’s assignment to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) of authority to allocate and
license radio stations in ways that serve “the public
interest, convenience, and necessity,” 47 U.S.C. §§ 307,
309, necessarily conveys discretionary authority. See,
e.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319
U.S. 190 (1943). Having framed the agency’s authority
in obviously broad fashion, Congress did not need to
add “and the FCC has discretion to decide what ‘the
public interest, convenience, and necessity’ means” at
least within some domain. The law plainly lets the
Commission choose among a variety of criteria for
allocating broadcast licenses, but equally plainly
would not permit the Commissioners to give prefer2
2
The evidence of legislative commitment of discretion does not,
of course, resolve the question whether the degree and nature of
the discretion accorded violate strictures on delegation of
legislative power. See, e.g., Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748,
757–58 (1996); Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42–
43 (1825); Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Delegation
Really Running Riot, 93 Va. L. Rev. 1035, 1042–43 (2007); Ronald
A. Cass, Delegation Reconsidered: A Delegation Doctrine for the
Modern Administrative State, 40 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 147,
151–61, 177 (2016) (Delegation Reconsidered); Gary S. Lawson,
Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 Va. L. Rev. 327, 335–53
(2002) (Delegation); Neomi Rao, Administrative Collusion: How
Delegation Diminishes the Collective Congress, 90 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
1463 (2015).
13
ence first to their own relatives and friends. While the
FCC enjoys discretion to make policy choices implementing the broad statutory directive, decision on the
degree of discretion accorded and on the location of its
outer bounds remains a question of law for judicial
disposition.
2. The Chevron Decision Does Not
Change Scope-of-Review Requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act and Related Law.
That same understanding informed the Court’s
decision in Chevron. As this Court later explained:
We accord deference to agencies under
Chevron . . . because of a presumption that
Congress, when it left ambiguity in a statute
meant for implementation by an agency, understood that the ambiguity would be resolved,
first and foremost, by the agency, and desired
the agency (rather than the courts) to possess
whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity
allows.
Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 517 U.S. at
735, 740–41 (1995).
Chevron was not intended as a free-standing new
test but instead as a guide to interpreting the scope of
discretion granted to agencies and the legally appropriate deference that discretion conveyed.3 See, e.g.,
Thomas W. Merrill, Justice Stevens and the Chevron
Puzzle, 106 Nw. L. Rev. 551, 554 (2012) (Puzzle).
3
Although the relevant judicial review provision for Chevron
was contained in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 42
U.S.C. 7607(b)(9), rather than the APA, that provision restated
almost verbatim APA § 706.
14
Although Chevron often is characterized as demanding judicial deference on the interpretation of the
governing law, it is more accurate to say that Chevron
addresses the discretion for administrative officials to
make decisions on policy matters respecting implementation of law within a statutorily-sanctioned range
of discretionary decisions. See, e.g., Cass, Rethinking,
supra at 1314–15; Merrill & Hickman, supra at 836,
863–64, 870–72; Strauss, supra at 1145–50. That is
why the opinion in Chevron observed that courts are
“the final authority on issues of statutory construction,” and are expected to use “traditional tools of
statutory construction” to interpret statutory directives. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9. That also is why
deference generally does not preclude review to assure
reasonableness of agency action, as deference extends
to agency decisions so far—but only so far—as the
governing law (interpreted by courts) commands. See,
e.g., Household Credit Services, Inc. v. Pfennig, 541
U.S. at 239, 242; Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. at 218–
20; Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.
Hence, Chevron itself did not reverse the long-held
understanding that courts have the obligation, when
their jurisdiction is properly invoked, “to say what
the law is,” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. at 177.
Chevron did not contradict the general directive for
courts hearing challenges to agency action to “decide all
relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or
applicability of the terms of an agency action,” APA, at
5 U.S.C. § 706, and to reverse any action found by
a reviewing court to be “not in accordance with law;
contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege,
or immunity; in excess of statutory jurisdiction,
15
authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right.”
Id., at § 706(2)(1)–(3).4
B. Chevron Deference Has Been Denied
Where Indicia of Discretionary Authority Are Absent.
Judges and scholars have offered different explanations for the manner in which courts do and should
evaluate the scope of administrators’ discretion. Thenjudge Stephen Breyer, for example, said that courts
“have looked to practical features of the particular
circumstance to decide whether it ‘makes sense,’ in
terms of the need for fair and efficient administration
of that statute in light of its substantive purpose, to
imply a congressional intent that courts defer to the
agency’s interpretation.” Breyer, supra at 370. Justice
Scalia, quoting from two court of appeals decisions,
stated his approach this way:
The extent to which courts should defer to
agency interpretations of law is ultimately “‘a
function of Congress’ intent on the subject as
revealed in the particular statutory scheme at
issue.’”
Scalia, supra at 516 (quoting Process Gas Consumers
Group v. United States Department of Agriculture, 694
F.2d 778, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (en banc), quoting
Constance v. Secretary of Health & Human Services,
4
As relevant to Chevron, the same directive is codified at 42
U.S.C. 7607(b)(9)(A)–(C). Saying that the decision in Chevron is
based in a finding of legislative delegation of discretionary authority, of course, does not elide questions about the strength of the
evidence used by the Court to make that finding or the manner
in which the reasonableness of an agency’s exercise of that authority is addressed. See, e.g., Merrill & Hickman, supra at 833–34.
16
672 F.2d 990, 995 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S.
905 (1983)).
Despite differences in approach, the common ground
for granting deference is a conclusion that the law,
explicitly or implicitly, grants discretion to a given
administrative official to make a particular determination within bounds set by the relevant statute.
Consistent with that understanding, Chevron’s
“Step One” determines the room for discretion under
law, see, e.g., Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987); Chevron,
467 U.S. at 843 n.9, while its second step assesses
whether the agency has reasonably exercised that
discretion, see, e.g., Household Credit Services., Inc. v.
Pfennig, 541 U.S. at 239, 242; Barnhart v. Walton, 535
U.S. at 218–20; Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.
The Court has made clear that decision on the scope
of discretion left to an agency, as well as the terms of
commitment of authority to an agency more generally,
depends on evidence respecting statutory meaning in
particular settings. See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135
S.Ct. at 2488–89; Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at
159. At times, the judgment respecting the scope of
authority left to an agency has turned on the consistency of a commitment of discretion to the broader
statutory framework. See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135
S.Ct. at 2488–89; American Trucking Associations,
531 U.S. at 468–71; Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at
159–60; MCI Telecommunications, 512 U.S. at 231. In
other cases, this Court has looked to additional factors
to determine the degree of discretion granted to
particular agency decisions and, consequently, the
deference due to them. See, e.g., United States v. Mead
17
Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229–31, 236 (2001); Christensen
v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
Although the cases do not uniformly find a single
controlling factor for determining the scope of agency
authority, the linchpin for Chevron analysis, as for the
APA and prior law, remains determining the scope of
legally conferred discretion, either expressly committed by statute or fairly inferred from the law—as
scholars across the spectrum of views on administrative law have explained. See, e.g., Cass, Rethinking,
supra at 1313; Gary S. Lawson, Reconceptualizing
Chevron and Discretion: A Comment on Levin and
Rubin, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1377, 1379 (1997)
(Reconceptualizing); Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of
Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev.
1253, 1257 (1997); Merrill & Hickman, supra at 872;
Merrill, Puzzle, supra at 554; Strauss, supra at 1145,
1147, 1158–61, 1163.
II. A General Rule of Deference to Agency
Interpretation of Rule Ambiguity Is Contrary to Law, Pre-Auer Precedent, and
Constitutional Structure.
A. Deference to Agency Rule Interpretation Is Appropriate Only for Decisions
Clearly Committed to Agency Discretion by Law; It Should Not Be Predicated
on Rule Ambiguity.
1. Deference Follows Legally Authorized Discretion Both for Rules and
for Specific Decisions.
The law on standards of judicial review makes clear
that deference is the corollary of legally committed
discretion. In keeping with that understanding, if
the law grants an agency expansive discretion over
18
both rule articulation and rule interpretation on a
particular matter, courts should defer to the agency’s
exercises of both types of discretionary authority. That
has been the path followed by this Court when it has
found that laws granted an agency discretion to act
without judicial oversight to some extent in setting a
general rule or policy and also in elaborating the
meaning of the rule or policy. See, e.g., Pauley v.
BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. at 696–98; Martin v.
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission,
499 U.S. at 151.
Specific constitutional provisions set limits on congressional power to grant such discretion, but so long
as none of these provisions is breached, agencies may
enjoy broad or narrow freedom from judicial review of
both general policy-making and specific actions implementing agency policies and priorities. See, e.g.,
Webster, 486 U.S. at 600–01; Chaney, 470 U.S. 830–
35. Consider, for example, Section 102(c) of the
National Security Act of 1947, which states that “the
Director of Central Intelligence may, in the discretion
of the Director, terminate the employment of any
officer or employee of the Central Intelligence Agency
whenever the Director deems the termination of
employment of such officer or employee necessary or
advisable in the interests of the United States.” 50
U.S.C. § 3036(e)(1). The deference owed to such an
exercise of legally granted discretionary authority
follows from the APA’s limitation of review where a
matter is “committed to agency discretion by law.”
Webster, 486 U.S. at 600. The conclusion should be no
different if the Director acts through adopting a rule
and then implementing the rule or through making
relevant determinations on policy and application in a
particular decision. See, e.g., Nielson, Beyond, supra
at 964–79 (exploring relation of rulemaking and adju-
19
dication in effectuating agency policy); Matthew
Stephenson & Miri Pogoriler, Seminole Rock’s Domain,
79 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1449, 1470–71, 1491–94 (2011)
(same).
2. An Agency Action Cannot Expand
the Scope of Legally Sanctioned
Discretionary Authority for the
Agency and Cannot Limit the Scope
of Judicial Review.
However, there is no basis for according additional
deference to an agency simply because the agency
adopts an ambiguous rule, as the rule restated in Auer
does. Deference recognizes discretionary authority.
Unlike ambiguity in a statute—which in some settings
might indicate a commitment of discretion to an
agency—there is no power in an agency to confer
additional discretionary authority on itself and no
reason to infer such additional discretion from adoption of a rule that admits of various interpretations
that are not “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with
the regulation,” Auer, 519 U.S. at 461.
If such self-delegation were possible and were to be
found merely in a regulation’s ambiguity, what sort of
limiting principle would constrain that power? Would
an ambiguous agency interpretation of its own general
rule confer broader discretion over the rule’s application, beyond the discretion “created” by the rule’s own
ambiguity? A “matryoshka doll” (Russian nesting doll)
approach to delegation of power—allowing a cascade
of successive waves of deference (implying a cascade of
successive waves of delegated discretion) from unclear
statutes or rules—would open the door to empowering
agencies, not Congress, to dictate how much or how
little scrutiny courts can give to their decisions.
20
To test the logic of allowing that result, imagine an
agency declaring, in the context of adopting a rule,
that it would enjoy expansive authority to interpret
the rule in the future. It is inconceivable that this
Court would credit such a declaration. While an agency
may receive deference for exercising delegated discretion, the power to decide how much discretion to repose
in the agency rests strictly with the lawmaking branches
acting through constitutionally prescribed means.5
Nothing in this Court’s jurisprudence or in the law
supports a contrary result. Except for the one statement in Seminole Rock, the broad rule of deference to
agency self-interpretation embraced in Auer is not
found in the APA or in the law or decisions of this
Court preceding the APA. See, e.g., Bamzai, Origins,
supra at 908, 924–27, 989–90; Cass, Auer Deference,
supra at 537–38, 566–79; Walker, Review, supra at
105–10.
3. A Broad Rule of Deference Is Not
Supported by this Court’s Decision
in Seminole Rock.
Further, notwithstanding the statement of the
general rule of deference to agency interpretation of
rules in Seminole Rock, Auer is not consistent with the
approach to rule analysis in Seminole Rock itself, the
5
As already noted, this authority must be exercised within the
bounds of constitutional constraints on who can discharge the
powers and duties legally assigned, see, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar,
478 U.S. 714 (1986), how they can be carried out, see, e.g., Lebron
v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374 (1995), and
what duties can be assigned, see, e.g., Wayman v. Southard,
23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42–43 (1825).
21
case principally relied on in Auer.6 In fact, the contrast
between Seminole Rock and Auer illustrates why
the rule announced in Auer should be clearly and
unambiguously renounced.
In reaching its decision in Seminole Rock, this Court
gave ample indication that it did not defer to the
Administrator of the Office of Price Administration in
determining the meaning of the regulation at issue.
See Bamzai, Hart’s Brief, supra; Cass, Auer Deference,
supra at 548–49; Healy, supra at 637–40. The Court’s
opinion repeatedly emphasized ways in which the
OPA interpretation matched the justices’ view of the
proper reading of the rule, hardly the hallmark of
judicial deference. See Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at
415–18. The case turned on which of several methods
for determining the relevant price comparator, under
the rule for assessing consistency with the mandated
price freeze, applied to the particular contracts at
issue. The Court’s opinion declared, among other things,
that “[a]s we read the regulation . . . [the method chosen
by OPA] clearly applies to the facts of this case,” id. at
415 (emphasis added), and further stated “[o]ur reading
6
The only other citation supporting Auer’s conclusion that the
courts must defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own rule
unless “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation”
was Robertson v. Methow, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989) (Robertson),
which the Auer decision cited for its quotation of Seminole Rock.
See Auer, 519 U.S. at 461. Robertson, after dealing extensively
with questions relating to interpretation of the statutory requirements placed on agencies in respect of environmental evaluations
by the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA), 83 Stat.
852, 42 U.S.C. § 4231 et seq., briefly addresses the contention
that the Forest Service violated its own regulations. The Court
concluded that the agency had acted reasonably in choosing how
to implement its obligations under relevant statutory provisions
and its own rules. See Robertson, 490 U.S. at 357–59.
22
of the language . . . [at issue] . . . compel[s] the conclusion” reached by OPA respecting the meaning of the
rule, id. at 418 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
The contradiction between the opinion itself and the
rule for which Seminole Rock is known, quoted in
Auer, is captured in Professor Healy’s observation that
this “rule of deference did not determine the result in
the case. The Court itself construed the regulation and
found that it provided a clear answer to the legal
question.” Healy, supra at 639. See also Sanne H.
Knudsen & Amy J. Wildermuth, Unearthing the Lost
History of Seminole Rock, 65 Emory L.J. 47, 60 (2015);
Manning, supra at 619 (1996); Stephenson & Pogoriler,
supra at 1454.
Even if the justices in Seminole Rock did defer to
OPA, in keeping with the statement of deference in
the opinion of the Court, deference would have been
defensible on essentially the same grounds as those
supporting Chevron deference. If the law being implemented (the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942)
granted OPA discretion to select among possible
approaches to freezing prices during war-time, the
agency’s interpretation of its rule would stand on the
same ground because that interpretation was articulated simultaneously with the adoption of the rule and
was published along with the rule at the same time.
See Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 417. The agency not
only interpreted the rule consistently but essentially
did everything that would have been done if the
interpretation were part of the rule itself. See Cass,
Auer Deference, supra at 549–50. To the extent
deference should have been accorded to OPA policy
decisions on implementing the law (via regulation),
the same deference would apply in this context to the
OPA’s explanation of its regulation. Seminole Rock,
23
thus, cannot provide a precedent for a general canon
of deference to agency interpretation of its own rules.
4. Auer’s Deference Unlawfully Expands
the Deference Previously Accorded
to Agency Rule Interpretations.
The facts of Auer, and the implications of extending
discretion to the agency’s position in that case, stand
in stark contrast to Seminole Rock. The Department of
Labor rule at issue in Auer, implementing a provision
of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)—exempting
executive, administrative, or professional employees
from overtime pay requirements under the Act—became
effective in 1973, was amended in 1975, and was only
interpreted by the Secretary of Labor more than two
decades later in an amicus brief filed at this Court’s
request in the Auer case—the very case that gave
deference to the Department’s rule interpretation.
This Court concluded that the Department’s interpretation of the rule at issue was reasonable after
comparing the Department’s construction of the
critical phrase being construed (“subject to”) with
dictionary definitions of that phrase and evaluating
the application of the Department’s interpretation.
Auer, 519 U.S. at 461–62. It is not clear whether,
without deference, the Court would have reached the
same conclusion respecting the regulation’s meaning,
but taking the opinion on its own terms, Auer accorded
deference without critical inquiry into the scope of
discretion conferred on the Department of Labor under
the FLSA. The opinion’s sole statement that the law
gave the Department broad discretion to decide how to
implement the law’s underlying provision, Auer, 519
U.S. at 456, did not explain why this constituted a
statutory commitment of discretionary authority over
both the initial articulation of a rule for assessing the
24
exemption’s operation and subsequent interpretation
of that rule. Nor did the Court find that the matter
at issue was traditionally within the prerogative of
the Executive branch, or that the matter was constitutionally assigned to Executive authority—questions
addressed in cases such as Webster and Chaney. See
Auer, 519 U.S. at 461–63. Notably, in a subsequent
case challenging the Department’s interpretation of
regulations under the FLSA, the Court unanimously
declined to accord the same deference granted in Auer.
See Christopher, 132 S.Ct. at 2167–73; id. at 2175
(Breyer, J., dissenting, on other grounds).
The Auer Court rejected objections that the interpretation was first advanced in a brief in the case in
which it was being applied, largely because the
Department was not a party to the case and, therefore,
could not be accused of unfairly surprising affected
parties to advance its own litigating interests. Auer,
519 U.S. at 462. Yet the decision did not recognize that
the interpretation of the rule, more than twenty years
after its adoption, could alter settled expectations even
if the Department’s reading of the rule did not advance
its own immediate litigation interests. In particular,
the Court did not acknowledge that adopting one
interpretation among a set of plausible possibilities
without employing procedures that accord greater notice
to those affected could work exactly the sort of unfair
surprise criticized elsewhere. See, e.g., Stephenson &
Pogoriler, supra at 1451–52, 1484–96.
B. Auer Deference Risks Violation of Due
Process Guarantees through Unfair
Surprise in Rule Application and
Strategic Behavior in Rule Design.
Although a legal commitment of expanded discretionary authority could command deference, administrative
25
discretion over interpretation of legally binding rules
carries risks even in settings where that authority exists.
Two risks in particular have been stressed. First,
permitting an agency expansive leeway to interpret
and apply an unclear rule risks unfair surprise in
application of the rule to persons having no reasonable
opportunity to anticipate the agency’s action. See, e.g.,
Christopher, 132 S.Ct. at 2167; Long Island Care at
Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. at 170–71; Martin v.
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission,
499 U.S. at 157. This risk is in tension with due
process requirements respecting notice of legally
binding rules. See, e.g., Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). While the demand
for rule clarity is most often articulated when criminal
punishment is involved, concerns for fairness, notice,
and legality are relevant in a far broader set of
contexts. See, e.g., Federal Communications Commission v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S.Ct. 2307,
2318 (2012).
A second risk of Auer deference is that crediting
agency interpretations of unclear rules may encourage
strategic behavior, reducing rule clarity in some
instances in order to preserve agency flexibility. See,
e.g., Christopher, 132 S.Ct. at 2168; Talk America, Inc.
v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. at 69 (Scalia, J.,
concurring); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512
U.S. at 525 (Thomas, J., dissenting). As Justice Scalia
put the point:
[D]eferring to an agency’s interpretation of its
own rule encourages the agency to enact
vague rules which give it the power, in future
adjudications, to do what it pleases. This
frustrates the notice and predictability pur-
26
poses of rulemaking and promotes arbitrary
government.
Talk America, Inc. v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S.
at 69 (Scalia, J., concurring). See also Walker, Review,
supra at 4–5.
Both of these are serious risks, although each may
be overstated. While some scholars have found these
risks sufficient to preclude deference to any agency
rule interpretation, see, e.g., Manning, supra at 659–
60, 664–69, the risks are not demonstrably present in
all instances of agency rule interpretation. Professor
(now Dean) Manning postulated that allowing a rule
writer to decide on the rule’s meaning inevitably
violates the imperative (embedded in the Due Process
Clauses) of an impartial adjudicator. See Manning,
supra at 631–54. He concludes that any deference in
that context is unconstitutional. Id. at 654–57.
So far as the concern is biased rule interpretation,
this conclusion is overbroad. See Cass, Auer Deference,
supra at 561–63. For example, the issues in Seminole
Rock—which among the alternative methods for
calculation of the price comparator was appropriate
for the crushed stone contracts being evaluated and
how the spacing of sales and delivery of the stone fit
OPA’s rule—were “narrow, technical, and affected by
experience associated with the work of the Office of
Price Administration.” Id. at 562. There “was no
reason to expect the administrative decision makers
to have a bias” on that question. Id. Similarly, the
Director of the CIA’s decisions on personnel matters
(the question presented in Webster) would not be more
likely to raise concerns of bias—and deference to his
determination, thus, would not be more problematic—
if the Director were interpreting his own rule on those
decisions than if he were acting in specific matters
27
without a rule. These alternative means of proceeding
are generally available to administrators. See, e.g.,
Securities & Exchange Commission v. Chenery, 332
U.S. 194, 203 (1947) (Chenery II); M. Elizabeth Magill,
Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1383, 1405 (2004); Nielson, Beyond, supra at 948;
Glen O. Robinson, Another Look at Rulemaking and
Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform,
118 U. Pa. L. Rev. 485, 485–86 (1970).
Strategic behavior is a general concern with all
decisions, but it is not universally a risk that seriously
compromises the exercise of delegated authority.
Professor Walker has found that administrators are
generally aware of Chevron deference and take it into
account to some degree in fashioning decisions, but
they are less aware of Auer deference and less likely to
consider it in rule design. See Christopher J. Walker,
Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, 67 Stan. L.
Rev. 999, 1059–66 (2015). Further, politically-responsive
officials may prefer to bind future decision-makers,
rather than to adopt rules that expand their discretion.
See, e.g., Cass, Auer Deference, supra at 564–65; Aaron
L. Nielson, Sticky Regulations, 85 U. Chi. L. Rev. 85,
138–39 (2018). This does not eliminate concerns with
strategic behavior, especially so far as long-term staff
have the laboring oar in rule design, see, e.g., Glen O.
Robinson, The Federal Communications Commission:
An Essay on Regulatory Watchdogs, 64 Va. L. Rev. 169,
185–87, 216–19 (1978), but it does temper the concerns.
C. Auer Deference Undermines Constitutional Separation of Powers.
The more trenchant problem of Auer deference is
that it grants a power to administrative agencies that
undermines the constitutional structure of separated
powers. The Constitution vests “all legislative powers”
28
granted in that document in the Congress and specifies the essential mechanisms for exercising the
lawmaking power. U.S. Const., Article I, sec. 1, sec. 7.
The judicial power is vested in a Supreme Court and
inferior courts established under Article III’s requirements for judges with life tenure and irreducible pay.
U.S. Const., Article III, sec. 1.
The division of powers does not prohibit statutory
grants of authority to executive agencies to make rules
to guide the exercise of their powers in implementing
the laws or to make adjudicative decisions in the
exercise of those powers. However, it does prohibit
exercises of lawmaking power—including exercises of
power not denominated as formal lawmaking—outside of the prescribed form of bicameral concurrence
and presentment, Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S.
417 (1998); Immigration & Naturalization Service v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), or of the judicial power
outside of Article III courts, Stern v. Marshall, 564
U.S. 462 (2011); Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v.
Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
While striking down those breaches of constitutional
structure, this Court has permitted statutory assignments of authority that in our (and many other
scholars’) view constitute the lawmaking power that
the Constitution commits exclusively to Congress.
See generally Alexander & Prakash, supra; Cass,
Delegation Reconsidered, supra; Christopher DeMuth,
Can the Administrative State Be Tamed?, 8 J. Legal
Analysis 121 (2016); Lawson, Delegation, supra; Rao,
supra; David Schoenbrod, Separation of Powers and
the Powers That Be: The Constitutional Purposes of the
Delegation Doctrine, 36 Am. U. L. Rev. 355 (1987).
29
These judicial decisions address authority that has
been clearly, if improperly, assigned to other bodies
through formally adopted law. See, e.g., Mistretta v.
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371–79 (1989); Yakus v.
United States, 321 U.S. 414, 420–23 (1944). In other
words, they represent acquiescence in the legislature’s
determination that a particular exercise of authority
is properly reposed in a given government agency.
Auer’s general directive for courts to give conclusive
effect to any administrative interpretation of a regulation that is not clearly erroneous or inconsistent differs
from the typical case rejecting an unconstitutionaldelegation complaint: Auer effectively grants power
for agencies to make legally binding rules (and to
give them conclusive effect) in contravention of the
general statutory rule for review of agency decisions
and without a finding that the discretion being
exercised was actually delegated by law. See Cass,
Auer Deference, supra at 579–80. While Auer formally
deals with interpretation, not adoption, of agency
rules, the process of interpreting rules that are ambiguous easily can become a vehicle for altering the
rules’ content. Appreciation of this problem supported
this Court’s decision that just as substantive rules
with the force of law must be adopted through noticeand-comment proceedings, so, too, must such rules be
amended through notice-and-comment proceedings.
See, e.g., Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association, 135
S.Ct. 1199, 1206 (2015) (Mortgage Bankers Association); Federal Communications Commission v. Fox
Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009) (Fox
Television Stations).
Auer’s acceptance of judicial deference without a
considered finding of legal commitment to the agency
of discretion over the matter being decided—over not
30
just one level of decision-making but over the second
level of follow-on interpretation and application—
stands in marked contrast to decisions like Mortgage
Bankers Association and Fox Television Stations.
Blurring the line between an initial grant of discretion
over a particular approach to decisions—over a policy
judgment—on the one hand, and decisions that construe the policy, on the other, makes it more difficult
to maintain constitutional divisions between lawmaking and law-implementing functions.
Academic arguments in support of Auer often re-cast
its rule to more closely accord with more focused
judicial findings of legislative authorization. For example,
Professors Sunstein and Vermeule defend a version of
Auer that is narrower than the strong deference
principle universally quoted from the case, borrowing
emphasis instead from the majority decision in City of
Arlington v. Federal Communications Commission,
133 S.Ct. 1863 (2013), on courts’ role in constraining
agency interpretations to fit the interpreted text. See
Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Unbearable
Rightness of Auer, 84 U. Chi. L. Rev. 297, 310–16
(2017). Certainly, to the extent courts exercise the sort
of critical judgment about the extent of discretion that
is permitted to an agency and assure that the agency
has not strayed outside the bounds of its delegated
discretion (as Professors Sunstein and Vermeule suppose), Auer deference would essentially collapse into
the inquiries required by Section 706 of the APA and
also would constrain the exercise of administrative
judgment more closely to fit constitutional structure.
Unfortunately, the tailored Auer rule that emerges
in such academic writings is not the actual rule
announced in the case.
31
The significant argument, both in cases and in
academic debates, is over how to decide the scope of
discretion an agency enjoys. Chevron states a general
canon of judicial construction that permits courts to
infer discretion from statutory ambiguity, with some
exceptions. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843; see also
King v. Burwell, 135 S.Ct. at 2488–89; Brown &
Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159. Auer, taken at face value,
states a general rule of deference to agency rule interpretations without requiring a clear statutory grant of
discretionary authority or even a strong basis for
inferring such a grant. See Auer, 519 U.S. at 461. As
already noted, that departs from appreciation for the
judicial role of independent determination on the
extent of administrative discretion, which is common
ground to a wide array of scholars. See, e.g., Cass,
Rethinking, supra at 1313; Lawson, Reconceptualizing, supra at 1379; Levin, supra at 1257; Merrill &
Hickman, supra at 872; Merrill, Puzzle, supra at 554.
Auer’s rule of deference should be replaced with an
insistence that law fairly clearly evidence the commitment to the agency of the particular sort and level of
discretion exercised. This would not wholly eliminate
risks of unfair surprise and strategic behavior, but it
would limit the exercises of discretion that are most
likely to create those risks to circumstances in which
enacted law conveys lawmakers’ determinations that,
in those specific settings, these risks are outweighed
by the benefits expected from granting that discretion.
See, e.g., Cass, Auer Deference, supra at 567–80;
Nielson, Beyond, supra at 989–1000; Walker, Review,
supra at 1007–10. Unlike Auer, the deference appropriate on this view is not a general deference to
interpretation of ambiguous rules, rooted in the rule
ambiguity itself, but deference to a particular exercise
of discretion committed by law.
32
The exact showing that is required to demonstrate
that commitment need not be encapsulated in a single
test. There are sound reasons for requiring relatively
explicit commitment of discretion in some cases,
see, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S.Ct. at 2488–89;
American Trucking Associations, 531 U.S. at 468–71;
Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159–60; MCI
Telecommunications, 512 U.S. at 231, and in other
instances for permitting that commitment to be
inferred from the nature of the authority granted to an
agency and the broader statutory structure setting the
terms of that authority, see, e.g., National Cable &
Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet
Services, 545 U.S. at 981, 989; Webster, 486 U.S. at
600–01; Chaney, 470 U.S. 830–35. At a minimum,
however, similar evidence of legislative commitment of
discretionary authority should be required for deference
to the interpretation and application of rules as to
agency authority to adopt them. That manifestly is not
the rule announced in Auer.
We urge the Court to overrule Auer, to reject the
test embraced in that case, and to limit deference
associated with Seminole Rock to instances in which
courts find that applicable law grants discretion to an
agency over interpretation of the agency’s regulation.
33
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the court of appeals should be
reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
RONALD A. CASS
Counsel of Record
CASS & ASSOCIATES, PC
10560 Fox Forest Drive
Great Falls, VA 22066-1743
(703) 438-7590
roncass@cassassociates.net
January 31, 2019
Counsel for Amici Curiae
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