Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Caleigh Wood, Petitioner v. Evelyn Arnold, et al.

Supreme Court briefMay 13, 2019

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APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Appendix A Opinion in the United States Court of

Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

(February 11, 2019) . . . . . . . . . . . App. 1

Appendix B Memorandum Opinion and Order in

the United States District Court for

the District of Maryland

(March 27, 2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . App. 20

Appendix C Declaration of John Kevin Wood in the

United States District Court for the

District of Maryland

(February 17, 2016) . . . . . . . . . . App. 54

Appendix D Homework Assignment . . . . . . . App. 63

Appendix E Muhammad Speaks of Allah: “There is

no God but He...”. . . . . . . . . . . . . App. 65

Appendix F PowerPoint Slides, Islam, Outcome:

Islam Today. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . App. 67

App. 1

APPENDIX A

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-1430

[Filed February 11, 2019]

___________________________________

CALEIGH WOOD,

)

Plaintiff - Appellant,

)

and

)

JOHN WOOD; MELISSA WOOD,

)

on behalf of her minor child, C.W.,

)

Plaintiffs,

)

EVELYN ARNOLD; SHANNON

)

MORRIS,

)

Defendants - Appellees,

)

and

)

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF

)

CHARLES COUNTY; CHARLES

)

App. 2

COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS,

)

Defendants,

)

__________________________________ )

CHRISTIAN ACTION NETWORK,

)

Amicus Supporting Appellant. )

___________________________________ )

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.

George Jarrod Hazel, District Judge. (8:16-cv-00239GJH)

_____________

Argued: December 11, 2018 Decided: February 11, 2019

_____________

Before KEENAN, WYNN, and HARRIS, Circuit

Judges.

_____________

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Keenan wrote

the opinion, in which Judge Wynn and Judge Harris

joined.

_____________

ARGUED: Kate Oliveri, THOMAS MORE LAW

CENTER, Ann Arbor, Michigan, for Appellant. Andrew

G. Scott, PESSIN KATZ LAW, P.A., Towson, Maryland,

for Appellees. ON BRIEF: B. Tyler Brooks, Richard

Thompson, THOMAS MORE LAW CENTER, Ann

Arbor, Michigan, for Appellant. Edmund J. O’Meally,

Lisa Y. Settles, PESSIN KATZ LAW, P.A., Towson,

Maryland, for Appellees. David W.T. Carroll,

App. 3

CARROLL, UCKER & HEMMER LLC, Columbus,

Ohio, for Amicus Curiae.

_____________

BARBARA MILANO KEENAN, Circuit Judge:

In this case, we consider whether two statements

concerning Islamic beliefs, presented as part of a high

school world history class, violated a student’s First

Amendment rights under either the Establishment

Clause or the Free Speech Clause. The student, Caleigh

Wood, contends that school officials Evelyn Arnold and

Shannon Morris (the defendants) used the statements

about Islam to endorse that religion over Christianity,

and compelled Wood against her will to profess a belief

in Islam.

Upon our review, we conclude that the challenged

coursework materials, viewed in the context in which

they were presented, did not violate Wood’s First

Amendment rights, because they did not impermissibly

endorse any religion and did not compel Wood to

profess any belief. We therefore affirm the district

court’s judgment awarding summary judgment in favor

of the defendants.

During the 2014-2015 school year, Wood was an

eleventh-grade student at La Plata High School, a

public high school in Charles County, Maryland.

Arnold was La Plata’s principal, and Morris was

employed as one of the school’s vice-principals.

As an eleventh-grade student, Wood was required to

take a world history course, which was part of the

App. 4

school’s social studies curriculum. The year-long course

covered time periods from the year “1500 to the

[p]resent.” Among the topics covered in the course were

the Renaissance and Reformation, the Enlightenment

period, the Industrial Revolution, and World Wars I

and II. The topics were divided into separate units,

with each unit generally being taught over a period of

between ten and twenty days.

The smallest unit of the world history course,

encompassing five days, was entitled “The Muslim

World.” The unit was “designed to explore, among other

things, formation of Middle Eastern empires including

the basic concepts of the Islamic faith and how it along

with politics, culture, economics, and geography

contributed to the development of those empires.”

As part of the “Muslim World” unit, Wood’s teacher

presented the students with a PowerPoint slide entitled

“Islam Today,” which contrasted “peaceful Islam” with

“radical fundamental Islam.” The slide contained the

statement that “Most Muslim’s [sic] faith is stronger

than the average Christian” (the comparative faith

statement) (underlining in original). The school’s

content specialist, Jack Tuttle, testified that use of the

comparative faith statement was inappropriate, and

that he would have advised a teacher who was

considering teaching this statement “[n]ot to do that.”

Wood also was required to complete a worksheet

summarizing the lesson on Islam. The worksheet

addressed topics such as the growth and expansion of

Islam, the “beliefs and practices” of Islam, and the

links between Islam, Judaism, and Christianity. Part

of the worksheet required the students to “fill in the

App. 5

blanks” to complete certain information comprising the

“Five Pillars” of Islam. Included in that assignment

was the statement: “There is no god but Allah and

Muhammad is the messenger of Allah[,]” a portion of a

declaration known as the shahada (the shahada

assignment).1 For ease of reference, we collectively

refer to the comparative faith statement and the

shahada assignment as the “challenged materials.”

Wood’s father objected to the use of the challenged

materials. He asserted to the defendants that Islam

should not be taught in the public school and

demanded that his daughter be given alternative

assignments. He directed his daughter to refuse to

complete any assignment associated with Islam on the

ground that she was not required to “do anything that

violated [her] Christian beliefs.” Wood’s failure to

complete the assignments that, in her view,

“promot[ed] Islam,” resulted in Wood receiving a lower

percentage grade for the course but did not affect her

final letter grade.

Wood later sued the defendants,2 alleging that they

violated the Establishment Clause by “impermissibly

endors[ing] and advanc[ing] the Islamic religion.” Wood

further alleged that the defendants violated the Free

Speech Clause of the First Amendment by requiring

The underlined words reflect the parts of the statement that the

students were required to complete.

At the time the complaint was filed, Wood was a minor.

Therefore, the suit was initially brought on Wood’s behalf by her

parents. The complaint later was amended to name Wood as a

plaintiff once she reached the age of majority.

App. 6

her to complete the shahada assignment, thereby

“depriv[ing] [her] of her right to be free from

government compelled speech.”3 The district court

granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

Wood now appeals.

II.

We review the district court’s award of summary

judgment de novo. See Buxton v. Kurtinitis, 862 F.3d

423, 427 (4th Cir. 2017). Wood contends that the

district court erred in awarding summary judgment to

the defendants on both her Establishment Clause claim

and her Free Speech Clause claim. We address each

claim in turn.

We begin with Wood’s Establishment Clause claim.

Wood contends that through the comparative faith

statement, “Most Muslim’s [sic] faith is stronger than

the average Christian,” the defendants endorsed a view

of Islam over Christianity in violation of the

Establishment Clause. Wood also argues that the

assignment requiring students to write a portion of the

shahada impermissibly advanced the Islamic religion

and compelled Wood to “den[y] the very existence of her

God.” According to Wood, the challenged materials

lacked any secular purpose and had the “effect of

Wood’s father also asserted separate claims for retaliation under

the First Amendment and due process violations related to

Arnold’s decision to ban him from the La Plata High School

premises. Those claims were dismissed by the district court, and

have not been pursued on appeal.

App. 7

promoting and endorsing Islam.” We disagree with

Wood’s argument.

The Establishment Clause provides that “Congress

shall make no law respecting an establishment of

religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” U.S.

Const. amend. I, cl. 1. In evaluating an Establishment

Clause claim, we apply the three-prong test set forth in

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See Mellen v.

Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 370 (4th Cir. 2003) (“[W]e have

emphasized that the Lemon test guides our analysis of

Establishment Clause challenges.”); Koenick v. Felton,

190 F.3d 259, 264 (4th Cir. 1999) (“[T]his Court must

rely on Lemon in evaluating the constitutionality of

[government action] under the Establishment Clause.”

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

Under this test, to withstand First Amendment

scrutiny, “government conduct (1) must be driven in

part by a secular purpose; (2) must have a primary

effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and

(3) must not excessively entangle church and State.”

Moss v. Spartanburg Cty. Sch. Dist. 7, 683 F.3d 599,

608 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13).

The government violates the Establishment Clause if

the challenged action fails any one of the Lemon

factors. Buxton, 862 F.3d at 432 (quoting Edwards v.

Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583 (1987)).

Before applying the Lemon test, we must determine

the proper scope of our inquiry, namely, whether we

should examine the challenged materials in isolation or

in the broader context of the world history curriculum.

Wood asserts that we must analyze each statement on

App. 8

its own, apart from the subject matter of the class. We

disagree with Wood’s contention.

The Supreme Court has emphasized that for

purposes of an Establishment Clause analysis, context

is crucial. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater

Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 597 (1989) (“[T]he

effect of the government’s use of religious symbolism

depends on its context.”), abrogated on other grounds

by Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014). To

“[f]ocus exclusively on the religious component of any

activity would inevitably lead to [the activity’s]

invalidation under the Establishment Clause.” Lynch

v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679-80 (1984). Thus, when

determining the purpose or primary effect of

challenged religious content, courts, including this

Circuit, consistently have examined the entire context

surrounding the challenged practice, rather than only

reviewing the contested portion. See Lambeth v. Bd. of

Comm’rs of Davidson Cty., 407 F.3d 266, 271 (4th Cir.

2005); see also Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v.

City of Warren, 707 F.3d 686, 692-93 (6th Cir. 2013);

Croft v. Perry, 624 F.3d 157, 168 (5th Cir. 2010);

Fleischfresser v. Dirs. of Sch. Dist. 200, 15 F.3d 680,

688-89 (7th Cir. 1994); Cammack v. Waihee, 932 F.2d

765, 787 (9th Cir. 1991); Smith v. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs

of Mobile Cty., 827 F.2d 684, 692 (11th Cir. 1987).

Indeed, common sense dictates a context-driven

approach. Viewing the challenged statements in

isolation would violate the analysis mandated by the

Supreme Court in Lemon. As we have stated, Lemon

first requires us to consider whether teaching the

challenged materials had some secular purpose. Moss,

App. 9

683 F.3d at 608. Such a determination can only be

made by considering the academic framework in which

those materials were presented. See McCreary County

v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 862 (2005); Adland v. Russ, 307

F.3d 471, 481 (6th Cir. 2002) (“[C]ontext is critically

important in evaluating a state’s proffered secular

purpose.”). And in requiring us to determine whether

the primary effect of the challenged materials was to

advance or inhibit religion, Moss, 683 F.3d at 608,

Lemon necessarily requires consideration of the

contextual setting in which those materials were used,

see Lambeth, 407 F.3d at 271 (explaining that the

“proper analysis” of Lemon’s second prong requires

examining the effect of a religious display “in its

particular setting”). Thus, any attempt on our part to

strip statements from their context invariably would

lead to confusion and misinterpretation when applying

the Lemon test.

Manifestly, if courts were to find an Establishment

Clause violation every time that a student or parent

thought that a single statement by a teacher either

advanced or disapproved of a religion, instruction in

our public schools “would be reduced to the lowest

common denominator.” Brown v. Woodland Joint

Unified Sch. Dist., 27 F.3d 1373, 1379 (9th Cir. 1994).

Such a focus on isolated statements effectively would

transform each student, parent, and by extension, the

courts, into de facto “curriculum review committee[s],”

monitoring every sentence for a constitutional

violation. Id.

School authorities, not the courts, are charged with

the responsibility of deciding what speech is

App. 10

appropriate in the classroom. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist.

v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267 (1988) (citing Bethel

Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986)).

Although schools are not “immune from the sweep of

the First Amendment,” academic freedom is itself a

concern of that amendment. Healy v. James, 408 U.S.

169, 180-81 (1972); see also Regents of the Univ. of

Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 (1985); Keyishian v.

Bd. of Regents of Univ. of the State of N.Y., 385 U.S.

589, 603 (1967). Such academic freedom would not long

survive in an environment in which courts

micromanage school curricula and parse singular

statements made by teachers. Because the challenged

materials were presented as part of Wood’s world

history curriculum, it is in that context that we

examine them.

The first prong of the Lemon test asks whether the

government’s conduct has an “adequate secular object.”

McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 865. This directive

requires an “inquiry into the subjective intentions of the

government.” Mellen, 327 F.3d at 372 (emphasis

added). This part of the Lemon test imposes a “fairly

low hurdle,” requiring the government to show that it

had a “plausible secular purpose” for its action.

Glassman v. Arlington County, 628 F.3d 140, 146 (4th

Cir. 2010). Notably, the government’s purpose need not

be “exclusively secular.” Brown v. Gilmore, 258 F.3d

265, 276 (4th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). Rather, it

is only “[w]hen the government acts with the ostensible

and predominant purpose of advancing religion” that it

violates the Establishment Clause’s “touchstone”

App. 11

principle of religious neutrality. McCreary County, 545

U.S. at 860 (emphasis added). So long as the proffered

secular purpose is “genuine, not a sham, and not

merely secondary to a religious objective,” that purpose

will satisfy Lemon’s first prong. Id. at 864; see

Lambeth, 407 F.3d at 270 (“A legitimate secular

purpose is . . . sufficient to pass muster under the first

prong of the Lemon test, unless the alleged secular

purpose is in fact pretextual.”).

The Supreme Court has recognized the secular

value of studying religion on a comparative basis. See,

e.g., Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.

203, 255 (1963) (“[I]t might well be said that one’s

education is not complete without a study of

comparative religion or the history of religion and its

relationship to the advancement of civilization.”). In

this case, the comparative faith statement was part of

an academic unit in which students studied Middle

Eastern empires and the role of Islam. The unit did not

focus exclusively on Islam’s core principles, but

explored “among other things, formation of Middle

Eastern empires including the basic concepts of the

Islamic faith and how it along with politics, culture,

economics, and geography contributed to the

development of those empires.” Nothing in the record

indicates that the comparative faith statement was

made with a subjective purpose of advancing Islam

over Christianity, or for any other predominately

religious purpose. Nor does the record show that the

proffered secular purpose of teaching about Muslim

empires in the context of world history was pretextual.

See Lambeth, 407 F.3d at 270. Thus, on its face, the

App. 12

comparative faith statement was introduced for a

genuine secular purpose.

Similarly, the shahada assignment was a tool

designed to assess the students’ understanding of the

lesson on Islam. In total, the worksheet included 17

questions with 27 blank entries to be completed by the

students on the history of Islam, “beliefs and practices”

of Muslims, and links between Islam, Judaism, and

Christianity. The students were not required to

memorize the shahada, to recite it, or even to write the

complete statement of faith. Instead, the worksheet

included a variety of factual information related to

Islam and merely asked the students to demonstrate

their understanding of the material by completing the

partial sentences. This is precisely the sort of academic

exercise that the Supreme Court has indicated would

not run afoul of the Establishment Clause. See

Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225 (“Nothing we have said here

indicates that such study . . . of religion, when

presented objectively as part of a secular program of

education, may not be effected consistently with the

First Amendment.” (emphasis added)). Because the

school had a predominately secular purpose in teaching

world history, we conclude that both the comparative

faith statement and the shahada assignment satisfy

the first prong of Lemon.

To meet the second prong of Lemon, the challenged

government action “must have a primary effect that

neither advances nor inhibits religion.” Moss, 683 F.3d

at 608. This requirement sets an objective standard,

which “measure[s] whether the principal effect of

App. 13

government action is to suggest government preference

for a particular religious view or for religion in

general.” Mellen, 327 F.3d at 374 (citation omitted). We

have “refine[d]” this analysis by incorporating the

Supreme Court’s “endorsement test,” which asks

whether a reasonable, informed observer would

conclude that government, by its action, has endorsed

a particular religion or religion generally. See id.; see

also County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 592-94 (adopting

the endorsement test in the Establishment Clause

context). Thus, in this Circuit, the primary effect prong

asks whether, “irrespective of government’s actual

purpose,” a reasonable, informed observer would

understand that “the practice under review in fact

conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval” of a

religion. Mellen, 327 F.3d at 374 (citation omitted). We

presume that a “reasonable observer in the

endorsement inquiry” is “aware of the history and

context of the . . . forum in which the religious speech

takes place.” Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch.,

533 U.S. 98, 119 (2001) (quoting Capitol Square Review

& Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 779-80 (1995)

(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the

judgment)).

The use of both the comparative faith statement

and the shahada assignment in Wood’s world history

class involved no more than having the class read,

discuss, and think about Islam. The comparative faith

statement appeared on a slide under the heading

“Peaceful Islam v. Radical Fundamental Islam.” The

slide itself did not advocate any belief system but

instead focused on the development of Islamic

fundamentalism as a political force. And the shahada

App. 14

assignment appeared on the student worksheet under

the heading “Beliefs and Practices: The Five Pillars.”

Thus, the assignment asked the students to identify

the tenets of Islam, but did not suggest that a student

should adopt those beliefs as her own.

This is not a case in which students were being

asked to participate in a daily religious exercise, see Lee

v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 598-99 (1992) (holding that

requiring students to stand for graduation prayer

constituted compelled participation in religious ritual);

Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424-25 (1962) (striking

down state-sponsored prayer due to the inherently

religious nature of prayer), or a case in which Islamic

beliefs were posted on a classroom wall without

explanation, see Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41-42

(1980) (holding that posting the Ten Commandments

on a public school classroom wall violated the

Establishment Clause). Rather, the challenged

materials were “integrated into the school curriculum”

and were directly relevant to the secular lessons being

taught. Stone, 449 U.S. at 41-42. These types of

educational materials, which identify the views of a

particular religion,4 do not amount to an endorsement

Although scholars could debate endlessly the content of the

comparative faith statement and its suitability for use in an

educational context, the “primary effect” prong of the Lemon test

“must be assessed objectively.” Mellen, 327 F.3d at 374. Thus,

Wood’s argument that the comparative faith statement is a

“subjective, biased statement” about Islam is outside the bounds

of our consideration whether use of the statement was

constitutional. For the same reason, Wood’s contention that she

viewed the comparative faith statement as offensive, and that

some school officials thought the statement was inappropriate, is

App. 15

of religion. See id.; see also Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d

87, 106 (1st Cir. 2008) (“Public schools are not obliged

to shield individual students from ideas which

potentially are religiously offensive, particularly when

the school imposes no requirement that the student

agree with or affirm those ideas.”). A reasonable

observer, aware of the world history curriculum being

taught, would not view the challenged materials as

communicating a message of endorsement.

Additionally, we note that the challenged materials

constituted only a very small part of the school’s world

history curriculum. As we have explained, we must

view the effect of the challenged materials within the

context in which they were used. See Lambeth, 407

F.3d at 271 (examining the primary effect of a religious

display “in its particular setting”). Wood does not argue

that the world history class itself advanced any

religion. Indeed, she readily admits that it is

permissible to teach “how the Islamic faith contributed

to the development of politics, culture, and geography.”

As a matter of common sense, an objective observer

would not perceive a singular statement such as the

comparative faith statement, or a lone question about

a religion’s core principle on a fill-in-the-blank

assignment, as an endorsement or disapproval of

religion. Therefore, we conclude that the primary effect

unavailing. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 597 (“We do not hold that every

state action implicating religion is invalid if one or a few citizens

find it offensive.”); Brown, 27 F.3d at 1383 (“[A] child’s subjective

perception that a state action disapproves of or is hostile toward

his or her religion is not, by itself, sufficient to establish an

Establishment Clause violation.”).

App. 16

of both the comparative faith statement and the

shahada assignment was to teach comparative religion,

not to endorse any religious belief. Accordingly, the use

of the challenged materials satisfies Lemon’s second

prong.

The final prong of the Lemon test asks whether the

government’s action created “an excessive

entanglement between government and religion,”

Lambeth, 407 F.3d at 272-73 (internal quotation marks

omitted), which “is a question of kind and degree,”

Lynch, 465 U.S. at 684. Excessive entanglement

“typically” involves “the government’s ‘invasive

monitoring’ of certain activities in order to prevent

religious speech,” or the funding of religious schools or

instruction. Buxton, 862 F.3d at 433; Comm. for Pub.

Ed. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 770

(1973) (“Primary among those evils [targeted by the

Establishment Clause] have been sponsorship,

financial support, and active involvement of the

sovereign in religious activity.” (citation omitted)).

Excessive entanglement may also be shown when the

government’s entanglement has “the effect of

advancing or inhibiting religion.” See Agostini v. Felton,

521 U.S. 203, 232-33 (1997).

We need not dwell long on the entanglement prong.

As already discussed, neither the comparative faith

statement nor the shahada assignment advanced or

inhibited any religion. And there is no evidence in the

record that these materials were obtained from a

religious institution or benefited any such institution.

Finally, there is no evidence that use of the challenged

App. 17

materials resulted in “invasive monitoring” of activities

to prevent or advance religious speech. See, e.g., Bd. of

Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226,

253 (1990). Under the world history curriculum, it

appears that lessons on the Muslim world constituted,

at most, five days of a year-long course. Thus, we

conclude that neither the comparative faith statement

nor the shahada assignment resulted in an excessive

entanglement with religion. Because the challenged

materials satisfy all three prongs of the Lemon test, we

hold that the district court properly granted summary

judgment to the defendants on Wood’s Establishment

Clause claim.5

We next consider Wood’s Free Speech Clause

challenge. Wood argues that the defendants violated

her free speech rights by requiring her to complete in

writing two missing words of a portion of the shahada,

namely, that “[t]here is no god but Allah and

Muhammad is the messenger of Allah.” In her view,

“the curriculum implemented and supervised by

[d]efendants compelled [Wood] to confess by written

In Wood’s amended complaint, she objects to other portions of the

world history curriculum, such as the fact that that Wood was

“instructed from the text of the Qur’an,” that Wood was “instructed

. . . that [r]ighteous women are . . . obedient” to men, and that the

course devoted only a single day to the study of Christianity while

multiple days were spent studying Islam. Wood waived these

arguments by failing to raise them in her opening brief. Grayson

O Co. v. Agadir Int’l LLC, 856 F.3d 307, 316 (4th Cir. 2017) (“A

party waives an argument by failing to present it in its opening

brief.”).

App. 18

word and deed her faith in Allah.” We disagree with

Wood’s position.

Generally, when a governmental entity requires a

person “to utter or distribute speech bearing a

particular message,” we subject that requirement to

“rigorous scrutiny.” Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy

Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 879

F.3d 101, 107 (4th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). In the

public school setting, students do not “shed their

constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression

at the schoolhouse gate,” but retain their First

Amendment rights “applied in light of the special

characteristics of the school environment.” Tinker v.

Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506

(1969). However, the Supreme Court has emphasized

that students’ First Amendment rights in public

schools “are not automatically coextensive with the

rights of adults in other settings.” Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S.

at 266.

In considering the right against compelled speech in

the public school context, the Third Circuit has

explained:

First Amendment jurisprudence recognizes that

the educational process itself may sometimes

require a state actor to force a student to speak

when the student would rather refrain. A

student may also be forced to speak or write on

a particular topic even though the student might

prefer a different topic. And while a public

educational institution may not demand that a

student profess beliefs or views with which the

student does not agree, a school may in some

App. 19

circumstances require a student to state the

arguments that could be made in support of such

beliefs or views.

C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 187 (3d

Cir. 2005). We agree with the Third Circuit’s reasoning.

Although a student’s right against compelled speech in

a public school may be asserted under various

circumstances, that right has limited application in a

classroom setting in which a student is asked to study

and discuss materials with which she disagrees.

In the present case, the record is clear that the

shahada assignment did not require Wood to profess or

accept the tenets of Islam. The students were not asked

to recite the shahada, nor were they required to engage

in any devotional practice related to Islam. Cf. W. Va.

Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 631-32 (1943)

(distinguishing between compelling students to declare

a belief through mandatory recital of the pledge of

allegiance, and “merely . . . acquaint[ing students] with

the flag salute so that they may be informed as to what

it is or even what it means”). Instead, the shahada

assignment required Wood to write only two words of

the shahada as an academic exercise to demonstrate

her understanding of the world history curriculum. On

these facts, we conclude that Wood’s First Amendment

right against compelled speech was not violated.

III.

For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s

judgment.

AFFIRMED

App. 20

APPENDIX B

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

Southern District

Case No.: GJH-16-239

[Filed March 27, 2018]

__________________________

CALEIGH WOOD, et al.,

)

Plaintiffs,

)

EVELYN ARNOLD, et al., )

)

Defendants.

)

__________________________ )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment

to the United States Constitution prohibits the

“sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement

of the sovereign in religious activity.” Lemon v.

Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (citing Walz v. Tax

Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)). This principle

Following Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, ECF No. 39, the docket

will be updated to reflect the current Plaintiffs as John Wood and

Caleigh Wood.

App. 21

exists because “religious beliefs and religious

expression are too precious to be either proscribed or

prescribed by the State.” Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,

589 (1992). Additionally, the First Amendment

prevents the government from prohibiting speech or

compelling individuals to express certain views. United

States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 410 (2001).

But the First Amendment does not afford the right to

build impenetrable silos, completely separating

adherents of one religion from ever learning of beliefs

contrary to their own. Nor, in this Court’s view, does it

prohibit a high school teacher from leading a purely

academic study of a religion that may differ from the

religious beliefs of some of his students.

In this action, Plaintiffs Caleigh Wood and John

Kevin Wood allege that Defendants Evelyn Arnold

(“Principal Arnold”) and Shannon Morris (“Vice

Principal Morris”) violated Ms. Wood’s First

Amendment rights by requiring her to study Islam as

part or a World History course, and retaliated against

Mr. Wood by banning him from school grounds after he

exercised his First Amendment rights by complaining

about the course. The following motions are presently

pending before the Court: Plaintiffs’ Second Motion to

Alter or Amend the Complaint. ECF No. 47,

Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No.

54, and Plaintiffs’ Cross Motion for Summary

Judgment, ECF No. 55. A hearing was held on

November 6, 2017, Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2016). For the

reasons stated below, the Court will grant Defendants’

Motion for Summary Judgment and deny Plaintiffs’

motions.

App. 22

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background2

Caleigh Wood attended La Plata High School during

the 2014-2015 school year (“Relevant Period”), during

which she was an 11th grade student. ECF No. 54-13 at

2.3 Principal Arnold was the school principal at La

Plata during the Relevant Period. ECF Nos. 54-13 at 23; 54-2 at 2-3. 10; 54-4 at 2. One of Principal Arnold’s

primary responsibilities was to maintain the safe and

orderly operation of the school environment. ECF No.

54-4 at 2. During the Relevant Period, Sgt. Mark

Kaylor was employed by the Charles County Sheriff’s

Department and was assigned to La Plata as a School

Resource Officer. ECF Nos. 54-8 at 2-3; 54-2 at 2-3.

World History is a required course mandated by the

Maryland State Department of Education, is part of the

social studies curriculum, and is taught in the 11th

grade at La Plata. ECF No. 54-2 at 3. During the

“Relevant Period, Ms. Wood was enrolled in a World

History class taught by social studies teacher Trevor

Bryden and received a passing grade. ECF No. 54-2 at

11; ECF No. 54-13 at 6, 7. The topic “Muslim World

(including Islam)” was introduced in the World I

history class as part of the course unit on Middle

Eastern empires. ECF Nos. 54-5 at 6; 54-2 at 14.

Unless otherwise noted, the facts relied on are undisputed by the

parties.

Pin cites to documents filed on the Court’s electronic filing system

(CM/ECF) refer to the page numbers generated by that system.

App. 23

During the class, Ms. Wood was taught, inter alia,

that “Most Muslim’s [sic] faith is stronger than the

average Christian [sic]”4 (emphasis in original) and

that “Islam, at heart, is a peaceful religion.” ECF Nos.

55-2 at 3; 55-4 at 3. Additionally, one of Ms. Wood’s

assignments was to complete a worksheet where she

had to provide missing words within the statements

that comprise the “Five Pillars of Islam.” ECF No. 56-3.

This included a sentence stating that “There is no god

but Allah and Muhammad is the messenger of Allah,”

which is also known as the Shahada. Id. When Ms.

Wood refused to complete assignments, she received no

credit for those assignments; but the parties dispute

the impact, if any, that any uncompleted assignments

had on her final grade. ECF No. 55-2 at 3; 56-1.

Principal Arnold had the authority to grant Ms. Wood

an opt-out or alternate assignments. ECF No. 55-7 at

2-3. Jack Tuttle, the curriculum specialist for the

Defendants, agreed that it is not appropriate for a

public school teacher to tell his class that “Most

Muslim’s [sic] faith is stronger than the average

Christian [sic].” ECF No. 55-9 at 1-2.

This statement appears on a PowerPoint slide attached to the

original complaint, ECF No. 1-1, and Ms. Wood declares that this

statement was included in an assignment she received. ECF No.

55-2 ¶ 8. However, Mr. Bryden states that while he provided all

the material he had related to his World History course, including

the slide, he does not recall if the statement was actually

presented to the class. ECF No. 56-5; ECF No. 56 at 7 n.4. As this

is a disputed fact, the Court will construe this in favor of Plaintiff,

for the purpose of resolving Defendants’ motion, and assume the

statement was in fact taught co Ms. Wood.

App. 24

Neither Principal Arnold nor Vice Principal Morris

ever spoke with Ms. Wood about their religious beliefs

during the Relevant Period or at any other time, nor

did they suggest Ms. Wood practice the Islamic faith.

ECF No. 54-13 at 8-9. Additionally, neither Principal

Arnold nor Vice Principal Morris ever directed Ms.

Wood to recite the five pillars of the Islamic faith,

pledge allegiance to Allah, profess the Shahada or

direct Ms. Wood to profess or write out faith

statements concerning Islam. ECF Nos. 54-2 at 5-6; 543 at 2.

On Wednesday, October 22, 2014, Mr. Wood

telephoned La Plata and left a voicemail in which he

expressed his concern about the homework assignment

that Ms. Wood had been given in Mr. Bryden’s World

History class. ECF No. 54-12 at 2, 3. On Thursday,

October 23, 2014, Ms. Shanif Pearl, the administrative

assistant, returned Mr. Wood’s phone call in an

attempt to resolve Mr. Wood’s concerns. ECF Nos. 5410 at 5-6; 54-2 at 4, 17. On the same day, Vice Principal

Morris also telephoned Mr. Wood. At some point during

that conversation, Mr. Wood stated that he was “going

to create a shit storm like you have never seen.”5 ECF

No. 54-9 at 3-4. Additionally, Mr. Wood stated that

“you can take that fucking Islam and shove it up your

white fucking ass!” ECF Nos. 54-9 at 4; 54-2 at 16.

According to Principal Arnold, Vice Principal Morris

Mr. Wood states this was a reference to contacting lawyers and

the media regarding the incident. Indeed, in her real-time memo

regarding the call, Morris records that he said “I just want you to

know that lawyers have been contacted and I’m going to create a

shit storm like you have never seen.” ECF No. 54-2 at 16.

App. 25

was visibly shaken when later describing the

conversation with Mr. Wood. ECF No. 54-2 at 3-4.

Around the time she became aware of the

conversation with Vice Principal Morris, Principal

Arnold became aware of online posts by Mr. Wood on

Facebook® that caused her to be increasingly

concerned about the safe and orderly operation of La

Plata. ECF Nos. 54-2 at 19; 54-4 at 3. In one post, Mr.

Wood, while talking about his daughter studying Islam,

states: “I just about fucking lost it . . . My white ass is

going into school on Monday and letting my feelings be

known. Caleigh said her teacher was a Navy Seal. Can

you guess what I said to that! I’m fucking livid!!!!!!!.

ECF No. 54-2 at 19. In response to a comment from a

friend cautioning him not to get arrested, Mr. Wood

responded that he would “try.” Id. In response to a

suggestion that he study Islam because he could not

defeat what he could not understand. Mr. Wood stated

that a “556 doesn’t study Islam and it kills them

fuckers every day.”6 Id. In a subsequent post, Mr. Wood

states that he would use his daughter’s study sheet as

“confetti on Monday!” ECF No. 54-2 at 22. These

interactions took place during the school’s Homecoming

week. ECF No. 54-2 at 4.

Principal Arnold sought the assistance of Central

Office administrators regarding Mr. Wood’s demeanor,

his interactions with Vice Principal Morris, and

A “556” is a reference to 5.56 millimeter caliber ammunition used

in the U.S. Armed Forces’ standard-issue rifle. See

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M16_rifle (last visited March 26,

2018).

App. 26

Principal Arnold’s growing concern for the sate and

orderly operation of La Plata. ECF No. 54-2 at 4. In her

email to Central Office, Principal Arnold states “At this

point I am happy to call Mr. Wood myself but he

doesn’t appear to want to listen and instead wants to

curse and scream. His demeanor on the phone was so

extreme that I do have concerns about him coming up

to the school. Since he works at Ft. Belvoir and states

that he is a Marine, I am assuming that he has access

to weapons.” ECF No. 54-2 at 18. Principal Arnold also

discussed her concerns with Sgt. Kaylor, who prepared

a No Trespass Order for Principal Arnold’s signature

after reviewing the Facebook® posts. ECF No. 54-8 at

4-5, 8-9. Sgt. Kaylor informed Mr. Wood that a No

Trespass Order was being issued against him. ECF

Nos. 54-8 at 5; 54-4 at 8. Mr. Wood never contacted

Principal Arnold to meet about rescinding the No

Trespass Order. ECF No. 54-2 at 5.

B. Procedural Background

Plaintiffs filed the instant Complaint on January

27, 2016, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief,

damages, and attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

based on claims under the First and Fourteenth

Amendments, Title IX of the Education Amendments

of 1972, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and

Article 36 of the Declaration of Rights of the Maryland

Constitution. ECF No. 1. On September 30, 2016, the

Court denied Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary

Injunction and granted, in part, Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss. ECF No. 36. The Court dismissed all claims

against the Board of Education or Charles County, as

well as Principal Arnold and Vice Principal Morris in

App. 27

their official capacities. In addition, the Court

dismissed Plaintiffs’ retaliation claim asserted on

behalf of Ms. Wood, Plaintiffs’ procedural due process

claim asserted on behalf of Mr. Wood, and Plaintiffs’

Title IX and Title VI claims. Following this Order,

Plaintiffs’ filed an Amended Complaint. ECF No. 39,

removing Charles County as a named defendant and

substituting Ms. Wood as a named plaintiff, in place of

her mother Melissa Wood, as Ms. Wood is no longer a

minor child. Plaintiffs also removed their claims under

Title IX and Title VI. As a result of the Court’s Order

and Amended Complaint, the following claims remain:

First Amendment Establishment Clause violation on

behalf of Ms. Wood (Claim I): First Amended Freedom

of Speech violation on behalf of Ms. Wood (Claim II);

First Amendment Retaliation on behalf of Mr. Wood

(Claim III); and Violation of Article 36 of the Maryland

Declaration of Rights on behalf of Ms. Wood (Claim V).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A party may move for summary judgment under

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “The court shall grant summary

judgment if there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law . . . Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The movant

has the “initial responsibility of informing the district

court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those

portions of the pleadings . . . together with the

affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 466 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (internal

citation omitted). In considering the motion, “the

judge’s function is not . . . to weigh the evidence and

App. 28

determine the truth of the matter, but to determine

whether there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). To withstand

a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party

must do more than present a mere scintilla of evidence.

Phillips v. CSX Transport, Inc., 190 F.3d 285, 287 (4th

Cir. 1999). Rather, “the adverse party must set forth

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for

trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. Although the Court

should draw all justifiable inferences in the nonmoving

party’s favor, the nonmoving party cannot create a

genuine issue of material fact “through mere

speculation or the building of one inference upon

another.” Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214 (4th Cir.

1985).

Cross-motions for summary judgment require that

the Court consider “each motion separately on its own

merits to determine whether either of the parties

deserves judgment as a matter of law.” Rossignol v.

Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 523 (4th Cir. 2003) “The Court

must deny both motions if it finds there is a genuine

issue of material fact, but if there is no genuine issue

and one or the other party is entitled to prevail as a

matter of law, the court will render judgment.” Wallace

v. Poulos, No. DKC 2008-0251, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

89700, at *13 (D. Md. Sept. 29, 2009) (internal citation

omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs’ assert constitutional violations pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides that:

App. 29

Every person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any

State or Territory or the District of Columbia,

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of

the United States or other person within the

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the

party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,

or other proper proceeding . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Here, Plaintiffs’ remaining claims

assert that their rights under the first Amendment

were violated.7 Specifically, Plaintiffs claim that Ms.

Wood’s rights under the Establishment Clause were

violated through the teaching of Islam in her public

school. Ms. Wood’s right to free Speech was violated

when she was required to “confess” the Shahada and

that Mr. Wood was subjected to First Amendment

Retaliation when he was banned from school grounds

after he expressed his opposition to the school’s

teaching. Each claim will be addressed in turn.

A. M s .

Wood’s

First

Amendment

Establishment Clause Claim

Plaintiffs’ claim that Defendants violated the

Establishment Clause focuses primarily on a statement

made by a teacher during Ms. Wood’s World History

“[T]he First Amendment’s mandate that ‘Congress shall make no

law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free

exercise thereof’ has been made wholly applicable to the States by

the Fourteenth Amendment.” School District of Abington

Township, Pennsylvania v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 215 (1963).

App. 30

class that . . . Most Muslims [sic] forth is stronger than

the average Christian [sic] (the “comparative faith

statement”). ECF No. 55-1 at 10.8 And, indeed, as the

Court has mentioned during the motion hearings in

this matter, it is this statement that presents the most

significant difficulty for the Defendants’ case. The

Establishment Clause provides that “Congress shall

make no law respecting an establishment of religion,”

U.S. Const. amend. I. Generally, the constitutionality

of government action under the Establishment Clause

is determined by applying the three prong test outlined

in Lemon. Pursuant to Lemon, for the action to be

constitutional, (1) the government activity must have

a secular purpose, (2) the primary effect of the

government activity must neither advance nor inhibit

religion; and (3) the activity must not cause the

government to be excessively entangled in religion. 402

In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs list a litany of objections to

the study of Islam in the World History course, including the

length of the unit, id. ¶ 9, focus on Islam over Christianity or

Judaism, id. ¶ 55, omission of Islamic-related topics from the

syllabus and textbook sent home with students as compared to

that actually used in class, id. ¶ 5, reference to cultural practices

placing women as subservient to men, id. ¶ 56, and discussions

pertaining to “jihad,” id. ¶ 53. But the motions for summary

judgment focus almost entirely on the allegations that Ms. Wood

was instructed that “Most Muslim’s faith is stronger than the

average Christian,” id. ¶ 51 (citing ECF No. 1-1), and that Ms.

Wood “had to profess the Shahada, by claiming, ‘There is no god

but Allah and Muhammad is the messenger of Allah.’” ECF No. 39

¶ 52 (citing ECF No. 1-2).

App. 31

U.S. at 612-13.9 The three factors are addressed in

turn.

First, Plaintiffs argue that the comparative faith

statement has no secular purpose because it does not

teach any verifiable and objective facts about Islam.

ECF No. 55-1 at 12. “In applying the purpose test, it is

appropriate to ask ‘whether the government’s actual

purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion.” Mellen

v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 372 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting

Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S.Ct. 24 79 (1985)). “The secular

purpose requirement presents a fairly low hurdle for

the state” and “a state-sponsored practice violates this

prong or Lemon only ‘if it is entirely motivated by a

purpose to advance religion.’” Id. (emphasis in Mellen).

In considering the secular purpose of the

comparative faith statement, as well as in the analysis

of the second and third Lemon factors, it is important

to consider whether the Court should view the

statement in isolation or in the context of the

curriculum as a whole. Plaintiffs contend that the

Court should analyze this statement in isolation,

divorced from the context of the class as a whole.

During the hearing on the pending motions, Plaintiffs

directed the Court to C.F. v. Capistrano, 615 F. Supp.

2d 1137 (C.D. Ca. 2009) to support their position. In

Capistrano, an out-of-circuit case that was vacated on

appeal, a teacher stated that creationism is

As the Court recognized in its prior Memorandum Opinion,

Lemon’s three-part test provides a useful framework for evaluating

Establishment Clause claims but need not be rigidly applied. ECF

No. 35 at 14 n.7 (referencing other Establishment Clause tests,

such as the coercion test and endorsement test).

App. 32

“superstitious nonsense,” and the district court held

that it could not “discern a legitimate secular purpose

in this statement, even when considered in context.” Id.

at 1146 (emphasis added). Thus, this case does not

suggest that the Court must review the comparative

faith statement in complete isolation and ignore the

context in which it was presented. Here, the Court

finds it necessary to place the statement in the context

of the class in which it was made to discern both

purpose and effect.

Generally, the study of religious texts and concepts

can be secular in purpose. School District of Abington

Township, Pennsylvania v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225

(1963). According to Defendants, the Muslim World

curriculum was “designed to explore, among other

things, formation of Middle Eastern empires including

the basic concepts of the Islamic faith and how it along

with politics, culture, economics, and geography

contributed to the development of those empires.” ECF

No. 54-1 at 24. The record provides no suggestion that

anyone from the school board down through the

individual teacher held any bias for or against any

religion, or that Defendants’ explanation of the

curriculum served as cover for a religiously-motivated

purpose. Cf. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 587

(1987) (finding that legislation requiring the teaching

of creationism along with evolution did not have a

secular purpose because the legislative history

suggested that the purpose “was to narrow the science

curriculum”).

The Supreme Court’s decision in Abington is

instructive here. There, in two companion cases, state

App. 33

laws required the Holy Bible to be read at the opening

of each public school day. Abington, 374 U.S. at 205.

The readings were broadcast to each classroom and

were followed by the Lord’s Prayer, during which

students were asked to stand and join in repeating the

prayer in unison. Id. at 207. Participation in these

exercises was voluntary. Id. Given the religious

character of the exercises, the Supreme Court rejected

the notion that the purpose of the use of the Bible was

for “nonreligious moral inspiration or as reference for

the teaching of secular subjects.” Id. at 224. Concluding

that the laws in both cases required “religious

exercises,” the Supreme Court found that they violated

the Establishment Clause. Id. But, of significance here,

the Court also stated that “[n]othing we have said here

indicates that such study of the Bible or of religion,

when presented objectively as part of a secular

program of education, may not be effected consistently

with the First Amendment.” Id. at 225.

Relying on Abington, the crux of Plaintiffs’

argument is that because the comparative faith

statement is not “objective,” it cannot have a secular

purpose. ECF No. 55-1 at 12. But notwithstanding the

single comparative faith statement in the PowerPoint

slide, the material was presented as part of an

academic exercise and not a religious one. This is also

true of the assignment that required the students to

fill-in-the-blanks for the Shahada. The students were

not being required to recite the Shahada daily, which

would make it analogous to Abington, or to recite it at

all. Nor were they required to memorize only that

specific statement of faith, which could serve to

highlight it. Rather, they were required to fill in

App. 34

statements to complete the Shahada along with a

variety of factual statements related to Islam,

including, but not limited to, the relevant continents,

biographical information about the Prophet

Muhammad, and the fact that Muslims, Christians and

Jews all trace their ancestry to Abraham. ECF No. 1-2.

Thus, it is clear that this was the sort of academic

exercise Abington said would not run afoul of the

Establishment Clause. The subjectivity of the single

comparative statement does not strip away any and all

secular purpose of the curriculum, and the curriculum

as a whole did not violate the first Lemon prong.10

Certainly the comparative faith statement, if taken

literally in isolation, is not purely objective. As

Defendants acknowledge, the statement “may have

been wanting in accuracy or tact.” ECF No. 25.

However, even if the comparative faith statement was

inartful or, to some, offensive, even in isolation, it is not

entirely motivated by a purpose to advance religion.

First, the statement does not serve as a direct attack

on any particular religion or belief. The statement

Plaintiffs provide deposition testimony from Amy Hollstein,

former assistant superintendent of instruction, and Jack Tuttle,

curriculum specialist, to suggest that the comparative faith

statement was not factual and should not have been used in the

classroom. See ECF No. 55-7 at 28:21-29:2 (Hollstein Answer: “I

think faith is spiritual, and I think I have my own relationship

with God, and I don’t think you can calculate my own

spirituality”); ECF No. 55-9 at 3 (Question: “If the teacher came up

to you and said, I want to teach [the comparative faith statement],

what would you advise the teacher?” Tuttle Answer: “Not to do

that”). But whether or not school officials, in their own judgment,

consider the subject material appropriate is immaterial to the

Court’s constitutional inquiry.

App. 35

merely opines on the degree to which Muslims adhere

to their own faith as compared to Christians. Second,

the comparative faith statement was delivered by Mr.

Bryden, who is a Christian.11 As Plaintiffs

acknowledged in the hearing, the fact that the

statement was made by a Christian would seem to

negate the possibility that the statement was made for

the purpose of advancing the Islamic faith. Again,

however, even using just the immediate context of the

statement demonstrates it was not entirely devoid of

secular purpose. According to the PowerPoint slide, the

statement was provided within a discussion on the rise

of radical Islamic fundamentalists, contrasting

fundamentalists with other Muslims. ECF No. 1-1 at 23. In the relevant PowerPoint slide, the comparative

faith statement is listed under the heading. “Peaceful

Islam v. Radical Fundamental Islam”12 and the focus

appears to be on teaching that fundamentalists

represent a “small percentage of the population of

Islam,” and not on advocating that students should

adhere to the faith. Id.

Second, the Court must consider whether the

primary effect of the comparative faith statement, in

the context of the class, was to advance or endorse

religion. See Mellen, 327 F.3d at 347 (“the effect prong

asks whether, irrespective of government’s actual

During the hearing, Defendants stated, and Plaintiffs did not

dispute, that Mr. Bryden identities as Christian.

While not explicitly stated, it would appear the slide seems

designed to address Islamophobia, which the Court would view as

a secular purpose.

App. 36

purpose, the practice under review in fact conveys a

message of endorsement or disapproval of religion”)

(citation and internal quotations omitted); see also

County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union

Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 597 (1989)

(“[w]hen evaluating, the effect of government conduct

under the Establishment Clause, we must ascertain

whether the challenged governmental action is

sufficiently likely to be perceived by adherents of the

controlling denominations as an endorsement, and by

the nonadherents as a disapproval, of their individual

religious choices.”) (citation and internal quotations

omitted). According to Plaintiffs, subjectively opining

that Muslims are stronger in their faith than

Christians has the effect of promoting Islam because “it

is sufficiently likely to be perceived by adherents of the

controlling denomination [,] [Islam,] as an

endorsement, and by nonadherents [Christians] as a

disapproval, of their individual religious choices.” ECF

No. 55-1 at 13 (citing Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 597).

Here, it is not “sufficiently likely” that a singular

reference to a Muslim’s strength of faith, or the class as

a whole, suggests that Defendants have endorsed

Islam. As stated above, the statement is made in the

context of an academic study and placed in a

PowerPoint slide addressing the issue of “Radical

Fundamental Islam,” making the point that

fundamentalists represent a small portion of Islam.

ECF No. 1-1 at 2-3. The record does not show that

Defendants, or anyone else, drew any conclusions from

this statement or interred that because Muslims’

purportedly haven stronger faith, Islam was seen by

the school os a superior religion. Plaintiffs argue that

App. 37

because they are devout Christians, and the statement

offended their beliefs as Christians, Defendants have

endorsed Islam. But even if such a statement is deeply

offensive to Plaintiffs, its offensive nature alone does

not cause it to run afoul of the Establishment Clause.

See Lee, 505 U.S. at 597 (“We do not hold that every

slate action implicating religion is invalid if one or a

few citizens find it offensive.”); see also Mellen, 327

F.3d at 374 (citing Barghout v. Bureau of Kosher Meat

and Food Control, 66 F.3d 1337, 1345) (4th Cir. 1995)

(“This ‘primary effect’ prong must be assessed

objectively, in order to measure whether the principal

effect of government action ‘is to suggest government

preference for a particular religious view or for religion

in general.’”)).

Third, the Court must consider whether the

comparative faith statement, or the curriculum itself,

created an excessive entanglement between

government and religion. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615

(entanglement is determined by “the character and

purposes of the institutions that are benefited, the

nature of the aid that the State provides, and the

resulting relationship between the government and the

religious authority”). While Defendants did not rely on

any Muslim clergy to deliver the subject material, see

Contra People of State of Ill. ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of

Ed. of Sch Dist. No. 71, Champaign Cty., Ill., 333 U.S.

203 (1948) (holding that religious studies classes

taught on school grounds by religious clergy violated

the Establishment Clause), Plaintiffs argue that the

comparative faith statement fosters an excessive

entanglement in religion because the Defendants

utilized “evangelist’s mission statements.” See ECF No.

App. 38

55-1 at 13 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of

the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 867 (1995)). However, in

support of their position, Plaintiffs quote a passage

from Justice Souter’s dissent in Rosenberger, which

merely suggests that topics cross the line from

scholarly study to entanglement when “facially secular

topics become platforms from which to call readers to

fulfill the tenets of Christianity in their lives.” Id. at

866-68 (Souter, J., dissenting). Far from encouraging

students to fulfill the tenants of Islam, Defendants did

not provide any direct benefit to Muslims, did not aide

Muslims, and did not infer or suggest any relationship

between the school and any Islamic organization.

Therefore, the Court has no basis to find an excessive

entanglement between government and religion. Thus,

the curriculum survives all three prongs of the Lemon

test.13

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is

granted as to Plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause claim.

In Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 370 (4th Cir. 2003), the

Fourth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court, in addition to the

Lemon test, has also applied the “endorsement test” and the

“coercion test” in various Establishment Clause challenges. “Under

the endorsement test, the government may not engage in a

practice that suggests to the reasonable, informed observer that it

is endorsing religion.” Id. (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,

690 (1984)). Pursuant to the coercion test, “government may not

coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise.”

Id. (citing Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992)). For the same

reason the curriculum survives the Lemon test, it would survive

these as well. The material was taught as part of an academic

endeavor and neither the school administrators or the teacher

endorsed a religion or coerced Ms. Wood to participate in religious

exercises.

App. 39

B. Ms. Wood’s First Amendment Free Speech

Claim

The requirement that Ms. Wood complete the fill-inthe blank assignment containing the Five Pillars of

Islam, including the Shahada, implicates First

Amendment protections against compelled speech. The

Supreme Court has long held that the government may

not compel the speech of private actors. See United

States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 413-15

(2001); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714-15

(1977); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.

624, 642 ( 1943). Moreover, it is well-settled that public

school students do not “shed their constitutional rights

to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse

gate.” Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393

U.S. 503, 506 (1969). But “the First Amendment rights

of students in the public schools are not automatically

coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings,

and must be applied in light of the special

characteristics of the school environment.” Hazelwood

Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988)

(citation and internal quotations omitted). As the Third

Circuit has recognized, a student may be forced to

speak or write on a particular topic but may not be

forced to “profess beliefs or views with which the

student does not agree.” C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of

Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 186-87 (3d Cir. 2005).

As alleged in the Complaint. “Defendants require

that students write out and confess the Shahada, the

Islamic Profession of Faith.” ECF No. 35 at 15 (citing

ECF No. 1 ¶ 7) (emphasis in original). Thus, at the

Motion to Dismiss stage, the Court found that “while

App. 40

discovery and trial may or may not prove otherwise,” as

alleged, the activity crossed the line from learning

about Islam to compelling Ms. Wood’s belief in Islam.

ECF No. 35 at 15-16 (comparing Barnette, 319 U.S. at

642 (“[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional

constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can

prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,

nationalism, religion, or other matter of opinion or

force citizens to confess by word or act their faith

therein) with Brinsdon v. McAllen, No. 15-40160, 2016

WL 4204797 at *6-7 (5th Cir. Aug. 9, 2016) (requiring

student to recite Mexican pledge of allegiance in

Spanish class did not violate First Amendment because

there was no evidence that the required speech

involved an attempt to compel the speaker’s affirmative

belief) and Mozert v. Hawkins Cty. Bd. of Educ., 827

F.2d 1058, 1069 (6th Cir. 1987) (no constitutional

violation for required reading of texts offensive to some

parents because the school did not require students to

believe or say they believe the contents)).

Following discovery, the record is clear that Ms.

Wood was not compelled to confess the Shahada;

rather, she was simply asked to understand the

significance of the statement to Muslims. ECF No. 1-2

(under “Beliefs and Practices: The Five Pillars,” Ms.

Wood was asked to fill in the following blanks: “There

is no god but __ and Muhammad is the __ of Allah”). In

the hearing, Plaintiffs conceded that there is no

evidence that Ms. Wood was required to recite the

Shahada aloud or listen to other students recite the

Shahada in the classroom—the only exercise was the

fill-in-the-blank assignment. which did not present the

Shahada in a way that suggested the students should

App. 41

believe in the words of the Shahada itself. Cf. Lee, 505

U.S. at 593 (asking adolescent students to stand in

silence as an alternative to reciting prayers during

graduation ceremonies creates “subtle and indirect”

peer pressure that “can be as real as any overt

compulsion”). The fill-in-the-blank question was

provided alongside other questions that served to test

students’ knowledge of the geographic and cultural

origins of Islam. As a result, the “confession” alleged in

the Amended Complaint was in actuality nothing

beyond an academic exercise. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S.

at 273 (“educators do not offend the First Amendment

. . . so long as their actions are reasonably related to

legitimate pedagogical concerns”). Therefore,

Defendants’ did not violate Ms. Wood’s First

Amendment protections when teaching about the

Shahada within the contexts of its World History

course.

C. Mr. Wood’s First Amendment Claim

1. Retaliation

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants banned Mr. Wood

from school grounds because “they disagreed with his

viewpoint that his daughter should receive alternative

assignments to Defendants’ unconstitutional promotion

of Islam . . .” and their disagreement was “the sole

reason for the no-trespass order.” ECF No. 55-1 at 18.

A plaintiff claiming First Amendment retaliation must

demonstrate that “(1) [he] engaged in protected First

Amendment activity, (2) the defendants took some

action that adversely affected [his] First Amendment

rights, and (3) there was a causal relationship between

[his] protected activity and the defendants’ conduct.”

App. 42

See Constantine v. Rectors and Visitors of George

Mason University, 411 F.3d 474, 499 (4th Cir. 2005);

see also Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554 (9th Cir. 2009)

(clarifying that the third prong requires that the

protected activity was a substantial or motivating

factor in the defendant’s conduct.”).

Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary

judgment on Mr. Wood’s retaliation claim because Mr.

Wood did not engage in protected speech under the

First Amendment. ECF No. 54-1 at 36. Not all speech

is protected speech, and the narrowly limited classes of

speech that remain unprotected include true threats.

United States v. Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d 574, 583

(citing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969)); see

also United States v. White, 610 F.3d 498, 507 (4th Cir.

2012) (true threats are words that by their very

utterance inflict injury, and the prevention of such

speech has never been thought to raise any

Constitutional problem) (internal citations omitted). In

support of their motion, Defendants cite Lovern v.

Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 655-56 (4th Cir. 1999) for the

proposition that school officials have the authority and

responsibility to control parents in order to prevent

disruptions to the school environment. ECF No. 54-1 at

36. But Lovern is factually and procedurally

distinguishable from this case. In Lovern, the Fourth

Circuit recognized that the plaintiff was banned from

school grounds following a “continuing pattern of

verbal abuse and threatening behavior towards school

officials” that took place after he was permitted to air

his concerns numerous times while on school property.

190 F.3d at 656 n. 13. Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit

determined that the plaintiff’s desire to have

App. 43

“boundless access to school property” was clearly

frivolous. Id. at 656.

Here, Mr. Wood never made it to school grounds.

Further, the record shows that Mr. Wood was

attempting to speak out against his daughter’s

participation in the subject curriculum, and parents

criticizing school officials are clearly protected by the

First Amendment. Jenkins v. Rock Hill Local School

Dist., 513 F.3d 580, 588 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Chiu

v. Plano Independent School Dist., 260 F.3d 330, 343-44

(5th Cir. 2001) (speaking against a change in public

school curriculum is an issue of public concern for

parents of students enrolled in the school district and

is protected under the First Amendment). Defendants

fail to point to any cases suggesting that Mr. Wood’s

legitimate objection, even if presented in a threating

and hostile manner, falls within the limited category of

threatening speech not protected by the First

Amendment. Cf. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505

U.S. 377, 384-85 (1992) (“It is not true that fighting

words have a de minimis expressive content or that

their content is in all respects worthless and

undeserving of constitutional protection; sometimes

they are quite expressive indeed.”) (internal citation

and quotations omitted).

However, even if Mr. Wood engaged in protected

speech, and the No Trespass Order inhibited his

continued ability to do so, Plaintiffs cannot show a

causal relationship between his protected speech and

Defendants’ decision to issue the No Trespass Order.

The record indicates that Defendants issued the No

Trespass Order based on its perception of the threats

App. 44

of disruption following notification of Mr. Wood’s

Facebook® posts, not in objection to Mr. Wood’s

protected speech.14 While Mr. Wood voiced his

opposition to Defendants’ curriculum in these posts, he

also suggested that he would come to school and cause

a disruption. The following passages from Mr. Wood

himself are particularly telling:

• “My white ass is going into school on Monday

and letting my feelings be known.”

• “[a] 556 [type of ammunition] doesn’t study

Islam and it kills them fuckers every day.”

• “I plan on using the paper [Ms. Wood’s shredded

homework assignment] as confetti on Monday!”

ECF No. 54-2 at 19, 20, 22.

Plaintiffs attempt to mitigate the confrontational

nature of some of these posts. See ECF No. 55-1 at 16

(“Although oddly and amusingly, Defendants attempt

to manufacture a threat out of confetti.”). However,

beyond voicing his opposition to the curriculum

through, as Plaintiffs acknowledge, use of “coarse

language,” Mr. Wood suggested that he was going to

cause a disturbance at La Plata High School.

While Plaintiffs allege that Defendants issued the No Trespass

Order based on Mr. Wood’s belief that the school was engaging in

the unconstitutional promotion of Islam. ECF No. 55-1 (citing ECF

No. 55-4 (declaration of J. Wood)). Mr. Wood’s unsupported

speculation to this point cannot create a genuine issue of material

fact necessary to survive a motion for summary judgment. See

Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214 (4th Cir. 1985).

App. 45

Further, Principal Arnold’s deposition testimony

indicates that she perceived Mr. Wood’s Facebook®

posts as threatening and issued the No Trespass Order

within an hour of discussing her specific concerns with

her Central Office superiors. ECF No. 54-4 at 6-8; see

also ECF No. 54-2 ¶ 15 (“I [Principal Arnold] regarded

Mr. Wood’s Facebook® posts as threatening, and I grew

increasingly concerned about his potential disturbance

at La Plata, particularly in light of the [flurry] of

Homecoming activities and increased number of

visitors during that time.”). Her email to Central Office

further demonstrates her safety concern as she

expressed concerns about Mr. Wood’s demeanor and

the possibility he might have access to weapons. ECF

No. 54-2 at 18.15 In addition, Sgt. Kaylor’s deposition

testimony indicates that he wrote the No Trespass

Order as a result of Mr. Wood making what he

perceived to be verbal threats against the school

through his Facebook® posts. ECF No. 54-8 at 9.

Accordingly, even if Plaintiffs might believe it was an

overreaction, the record is clear that Defendants issued

the No Trespass Order in response to perceived threats

of a disruption on school grounds, not in retaliation

against Mr. Wood’s protected speech.16 See, e.g.,

While Plaintiffs contend there is a dispute regarding the tone

and demeanor of Mr. Wood’s communications, there is no dispute

that the nature of the communication caused Principal Arnold

serious concern as it is reflected in the email she sent at that time.

In the hearing, Plaintiffs suggested that Defendants’ assertion

of a perceived threat was a pretext for retaliation because if

Defendants truly perceived that Mr. Wood was a threat, they

would have taken more drastic action such as requesting

additional police presence or social services intervention. However,

App. 46

Francis v. Booz, Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 452 F.3d 299,

309 (4th Cir. 2006) (noting that temporal proximity

between protected activity and adverse action is not

dispositive of a retaliation claim when the adverse

action is otherwise justified).

2. Free Speech

In their Cross Motion for Summary Judgment,

Plaintiffs introduce arguments that Defendants’

issuance of the No Trespass Order was also an

unconstitutional restriction on Mr. Wood’s freedom of

speech. See ECF No. 55-1 at 20 (“not only did

Defendants ban Mr. Wood for exercising his First

Amendment right to free speech, but the no-trespass

order was also a prior restraint on his ability to

exercise his First Amendment rights on school grounds

in the future.”) (emphasis in original). This additional

First Amendment claim goes beyond the scope of the

claims currently before the Court. Specifically, Claim

III only alleges that the No Trespass Order was issued

in retaliation for Mr. Wood’s protected activity; it does

not suggest that the No Trespass Order subsequently

abridged Mr. Wood’s free speech rights. While Mr.

Wood’s Procedural Due Process Claim, Claim IV, could

be construed to include a claim under his First

Amendment right to free speech, see ECF No. 39 ¶ 121,

the Court previously dismissed this claim. Specifically,

the more reasonable inference to draw is that Defendants feared

a disruption if Mr. Wood came to school grounds, not that Mr.

Wood was coming to cause a disturbance or act of violence

irrespective of the No Trespass Order. As such, the No Trespass

Order was tailored to the perceived threat, as contemporaneously

documented by Defendants, and was not a pretext for retaliation.

App. 47

the Court found that Mr. Wood was provided with

sufficient process and simply chose not to avail himself

of procedures available to him. ECF No. 35 at 19-22.

Thus, whether the arguments in Plaintiffs’ Cross

Motion reflect an attempt to state a claim never

included in a Complaint or one that has already been

dismissed, they are not relevant to any claim currently

pending before the Court.

However, even if Mr. Wood’s First Amendment free

speech claim is properly before the Court at this time,

Plaintiffs are still not entitled to relief. In assessing a

First Amendment free speech claim, a court must

determine whether the plaintiff was engaged in

protected speech, identity the nature of the forum in

which the protected speech was raised, and assess

whether the justifications for exclusion from the

relevant forum satisfy the requisite standard. Goulart

v. Meadows, 345 F.3d 239, 246 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing

Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473

U.S. 788, 797 (1985)). The three recognized fora are the

traditional public forum, the nonpublic forum, and the

designated or limited public forum. Id. at 248 (citing

Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666,

677 (1998)).17

For the designated and limited public fora, a court

must apply either an “internal standard” to situations

where “the government excludes a speaker who falls

within the class to which a designated [limited] public

forum is made generally available,” or an “external

For the purpose of the analysis herein, the Court presumes that

Mr. Wood’s conduct was protected speech.

App. 48

standard” for all others. Goulart, 345 F.3d at 250

(citing Warren v. Fairfax County, 196 F.3d 186 (4th Cir.

1999) (en banc)). Under the internal standard, a

limited public forum is treated as a traditional public

forum, such that government exclusion of speech is

subject to strict scrutiny. Id. Under the external

standard, a limited public forum is treated as a

nonpublic forum, such that government control of

speech must be viewpoint neutral and reasonable in

light of the objective purposes served by the forum. Id.

“Once a limited forum has been created, entities of a

‘similar character’ to those allowed access may not be

excluded.” Id. Public school facilities are limited public

fora during a after-school hours. Id. Although

Defendants argue correctly that La Plata is a nonpublic

forum during school hours, the No Trespass Order

went beyond limiting Mr. Wood from coming to school

during school hours and instead limited all access to

school grounds. Therefore, Mr. Wood was banned from

La Plata at times when it was a limited public forum.

Plaintiffs argue that as a parent of a student at La

Plata, Mr. Wood is “undoubtedly within the class to

whom parent/teacher conferences, Parent Teacher

School Organization meetings and events, and

celebratory events honoring his daughter at the school

are made generally available,” and Defendants’

decision to issue the No Trespass Order is therefore

subject to strict scrutiny. ECF No. 55-1 at 22 (emphasis

in original); see also Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352,

377 (4th Cir. 2014) (under strict scrutiny, Defendants’

actions may be justified only if narrowly tailored to a

compelling state interest). However, Plaintiffs’

characterization of Mr. Wood as a parent of “similar

App. 49

character” to other parents ignores the simple fact that

in addition to voicing his objections to the curriculum,

Mr. Wood, unlike all other parents for which the forum

is open, caused school officials to be concerned about

safety at the school. As such, Defendants’ decision to

issue the No Trespass Order is not subject to strict

scrutiny under the limited public forum internal

standard. Rather, under the external standard, the No

Trespass Order must be viewpoint neutral and

reasonable in light of the objective purpose of the

limited public forum (i.e., allowing parents to

participate in school-related functions). As previously

discussed, the No Trespass Order was not based on Mr.

Wood’s objections to the curriculum, was limited in

duration,18 and was reasonable in order to ensure that

Mr. Wood did not disrupt school-related functions

reserved for other parents. See American Civil Liberties

Union v. Mote, 423 F .3d 438, 445 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing

Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 808) (a school’s decision to

restrict speech in a limited public forum under the

external standard “need only be reasonable; it need not

be the most reasonable or the only reasonable

limitation” ) (emphasis in original). As such, even if Mr.

Wood had a free speech claim pending before the Court,

it would fail.

While Plaintiffs argue that Mr. Wood was categorically banned

from all school-related activities for over a year, the record

indicates that the “No Trespass Order could be rescinded if Mr.

Wood calmly met with me [Principal Arnold] to discuss it.” ECF

No. 54-2 ¶ 17; see also ECF No. 54-8 at 7.

App. 50

D. Ms. Wood’s Article 36 Claim

Plaintiffs do not allege that Article 36 provides Ms.

Wood with more expansive protections than she is

entitled to under its federal corollary. Because the

Court finds that Defendants did not violate Ms. Wood’s

First Amendment protections, the Court must also

grant Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on

Ms. Wood’s Article 36 Claim and need not address

whether Article 36 gives rise to a private cause of

action for damages. See Booth v. Maryland Dept. of

Public Safety & Correctional Services, No. RDB 051972, 2008 WL 2484937, at *8 (D. Md. June 18, 2008)

(citing Supermarkets General Corp. v. State, 286 Md.

611 (1979) (“Maryland courts have repeatedly decided

cases on the assumption that the free exercise

provision of Article 36 is in pari materia with the First

Amendment.”)).

IV. Motion to Amend

Separately, Plaintiffs move to file a Second

Amended Complaint, ECF No. 47, in an attempt to add

Bryden, Tuttle, Superintendent Kimberly Hill, and

Assistant Superintendent Hollstein as named

defendants. Plaintiffs allege that they only learned of

these individuals’ involvement following depositions

taken on March 23 and 24, 2017, constituting good

cause to amend their complaint pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b). ECF No. 47-1 at 2.

However, the Court need not consider Plaintiffs’

arguments, as the Court evaluated the alleged

constitutional violations in their entirety, without

regard to which actions were taken by the named

App. 51

defendants as compared to the proposed defendants. As

such, Plaintiffs’ motion is denied as moot.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No.

54, deny Plaintiffs’ Cross Motion for Summary

Judgment, ECF No. 55, and deny Plaintiffs’ Second

Motion to Amend/Correct the Amended Complaint,

ECF No. 47. A separate Order follows.

Dated: March 26, 2018

/s/George J. Hazel

GEORGE J. HAZEL

United States District Judge

App. 52

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

Southern District

Case No.: GJH-16-239

[Filed March 27, 2018]

__________________________

CALEIGH WOOD, et al.,

)

Plaintiffs,

)

EVELYN ARNOLD, et al., )

)

Defendants.

)

__________________________ )

ORDER

In accordance with the foregoing Memorandum

Opinion, it is hereby ORDERED, by the United States

District Court for the District of Maryland, that:

1. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment,

ECF No. 54, is GRANTED;

2. Plaintiff’ Cross Motion for Summary Judgment,

ECF No. 55, is DENIED;

3. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend/Correct the

Amended Complaint, ECF No. 47, is DENIED

as moot;

App. 53

4. The Clerk SHALL UPDATE the docket to

reflect named plaintiffs as John Wood and

Caleigh Wood; and

5. The Clerk SHALL CLOSE the case.

Dated: March 26, 2018

/s/George J. Hazel

GEORGE J. HAZEL

United States District Judge

App. 54

APPENDIX C

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

Civil Case No. 8: 16-cv-239

Judge George J. Hazel

[Dated February 17, 2016]

___________________________________

MELISSA WOOD, on behalf of her

)

minor child, C.W., and JOHN

)

KEVIN WOOD, individually and

)

on behalf of his minor child, C.W.,

)

Plaintiffs,

)

-v.)

)

CHARLES COUNTY PUBLIC

)

SCHOOLS, BOARD OF

)

EDUCATION OF CHARLES

)

COUNTY, EVELYN ARNOLD,

)

individually and as the Principal

)

of La Plata High School, and

)

SHANNON MORRIS, individually

)

and as a Vice Principal of La Plata

)

High School,

)

Defendants.

)

___________________________________ )

App. 55

DECLARATION OF JOHN KEVIN WOOD

I, John Kevin Wood, make this declaration pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 based upon my personal knowledge

and, where stated, upon information and belief:

My name is John Kevin Wood.

I am an adult citizen of the State of

Maryland, residing in Charles County.

I am the father and legal guardian of C.W.,

my minor daughter.

During the fall of 2014 my daughter, C.W.,

was sixteen years old and enrolled in the 11th grade

World History class at La Plata High School in the

Charles County Public Schools system.

On October 22, 2014, I picked my daughter,

C.W., up from school. Later that day, we began

discussing the homework assigned to her in World

History class.

That day, I learned from C.W. that Charles

County Public Schools and its employees were

promoting the Islamic faith in my daughter’s 11th

grade World History class.

I also learned that the Charles County Public

Schools and its employees were criticizing, degrading,

and denigrating Christianity.

Christianity is an identifying part of who

both C.W. and I are. We identify ourselves culturally

and religiously as Christian.

App. 56

Our Christian faith and heritage calls us to

serve others because by serving others I am serving

Christ.

10.

I served my country in the United States

Marine Corps for eight years.

11.

During my service, I was deployed to fight on

behalf of the United States in Operation Desert

Shield/Desert Storm where two of my comrades were

killed in action.

12.

After being honorably discharged from the

Marine Corps, I began serving as a firefighter and first

responder.

13.

On September 11, 2001, I responded to the

Islamic terrorist attack on the Pentagon and witnessed

the destruction and carnage motivated by Islam.

14.

Through these tragedies and through all

difficult moments in my life, my family and I rely on

our Christian faith and heritage and on the strength

we receive from our Savior Jesus Christ.

15.

However, Charles County Public Schools and

its employees called upon my daughter, C.W., to

criticize, degrade, and denigrate our Christian faith

and heritage in their 11th grade World History class.

16.

Charles County Public Schools and its

employees required that C.W. assert in writing that

“Most Muslim’s faith is stronger than the average

Christian.”

17.

C.W. was required to write out the Five

Pillars of Islam and to profess the Shahada, accepting

App. 57

Muhammad as a profit of Allah in direct contradiction

to her Christian faith and heritage.

18.

C.W. was required to write that “There is no

god but Allah and Muhammad is the messenger of

Allah.” This statement is in direct contradiction to both

my and C.W.’s Christian belief that it is sinful to

express that there is any other god but the Christian

God.

19.

C.W. and her classmates in the 11th grade

World History class were instructed that the Islamic

religion is a fact while Christianity and Judaism are

just beliefs. For example, C.W. and her classmates

were instructed that the “Qur’an is the word of Allah as

revealed to Muhammad in the same way that Jews and

Christians believe the Torah and the Gospels were

revealed to Moses and the New Testament writers,”

and that Muhammad was visited by the Angel Gabriel

who proclaimed to him that there is only one true god.

20.

Charles County Public Schools and its

employees used pro-Islam instructional materials and

required that C.W. learn that “Islam, at heart, is a

peaceful religion.”

21.

On October 22, 2014 after my discussion with

C.W., I left a voicemail for the administration at La

Plata High School to express my disapproval of the

promotion of Islam over Christianity and to request

that C.W. be given an alternative assignment that

would not force her to violate her Christian beliefs.

22.

The following day on October 23, 2014 around

4pm, Vice Principal Morris called me on my cell phone.

App. 58

23.

When Vice Principal Morris called me, I was

at work at the Fire Station in the bunk room.

24.

Vice Principal Morris advised that she was

calling me due to my concerns about my daughter’s

World History course. The phone conversation started

out politely. I voiced my objections to the promotion of

Islam and requested that C.W. be given an alternative

assignment.

25.

During the phone call, Vice Principal Morris

became argumentative towards me. Vice Principal

Morris refused my request for an alternative

assignment and insisted that C.W. would be given a

zero for any assignments that C.W. could not complete,

even if the assignment forced my daughter to violate

her faith by professing her allegiance to a false god.

26.

I told Vice Principal Morris that C.W. would

not complete the assignments that promoted Islam and

would, therefore, accept zeros on the assignments if the

school insisted that C.W. violate her religious beliefs.

27.

I then told Vice Principal Morris that, if she

and the school insisted on retaliating against C.W. and

punishing C.W. for her adherence to her Christian faith

and heritage, I would inform the media and discuss my

options with lawyers.

28.

Vice Principal Morris hung the phone up on

me in an unprofessional manner and without saying

good-bye.

29.

On October 24, 2014 around 9am, I called La

Plata High School and my call was transferred to Vice

Principal Morris. I advised Vice Principal Morris of our

App. 59

phone call the previous day. Vice Principal Morris

stated that she remembered me. I explained that

C.W.’s First Amendment rights were being violated by

making her write out statements of the Islamic faith

that we do not practice or believe in. I also explained

that, because of the separation of church and state, the

school could not instruct my daughter in Islam or

disparage and denigrate our Christian faith.

30.

I reiterated that the school cannot force my

daughter, C.W., to write out Islamic faith statements

and that if Vice Principal Morris and the school

insisted that she do so then I would contact lawyers

and the media. Vice Principal Morris responded by

saying, “That’s fine.” I then said “You have a beautiful

American day,” and the phone call came to an end.

31.

I was very angry, as I have seen so much

death and destruction caused in the name of Islam and

I was simply asking for an alternative assignment for

my daughter.

32.

My comments to Vice Principal Morris were

only voiced over the phone. Despite being upset, I never

made any threats to the health or safety of anyone at

the school. I never made any threat to cause or actually

caused a disturbance at the school. In fact, I was at the

Fire House during the entirety of the two phone

conversations I had with Vice Principal Morris and

made no statements that I would be heading to the

school to meet with Vice Principal Morris.

33.

At approximately noon on October 24, 2016,

I received a telephone call from the school’s resource

App. 60

officer, Officer Mark Kaylor of the Charles County

Sheriff’s Office.

34.

Officer Kaylor informed me that Vice

Principal Morris filed a complaint against me based on

our telephone conversation and, as a result, Principal

Arnold issued a no-trespass order forbidding me from

entering the La Plata High School grounds.

35.

I informed Officer Kaylor that I never made

any physical threats against Vice Principal Morris or

the school but rather informed her, over the phone,

that I would contact the media and lawyers if she

forced my daughter to violate her faith by promoting

Islam.

36.

On October 27, 2014, I received a written

order in the mail prohibiting me from stepping foot on

the La Plata High School grounds signed by Principal

Arnold. (Exhibit A).

37.

I never was informed of or received any

opportunity to defend myself against Vice Principal

Morris’ false accusations prior to or subsequent to

receiving the no-trespass order.

38.

I was never afforded a hearing to dispute the

order prohibiting me from the La Plata High School

grounds.

39.

Because of the no-trespass order, I have been

forbidden to pick my daughter, C.W., up from school for

over a year. My wife and I have had to ask friends and

family members to pick up C.W. when no one was

available to do so, I had to drive to a location away

App. 61

from school grounds and my daughter, C.W., then had

to walk a distance to meet me.

40.

Because of the no-trespass order, I lost the

opportunity to participate in my daughter’s education.

41.

Because of the no-trespass order, I lost the

opportunity to attend and to speak at Parent Teacher

School Organization meetings, various other meetings

that affected C.W.’s curricular and extracurricular

activities, parent/teacher conferences, and events

honoring C.W. Attached as Exhibit B to this

declaration is a list of meetings and events that I have

been forced to miss or will miss due to Defendants’ notrespass order.

42.

I would have spoken at these meetings and

events to discuss school policy, the curriculum at La

Plata High School, and my daughter, C.W.’s, well

being, scholastic career, and future.

43.

Principal Arnold and Vice Principal Morris

took away my ability to speak about, contribute to, and

affect C.W.’s education.

44.

C.W. received zeros on several assignments

because the assignments promoted Islam and violated

C.W.’s Christian faith and heritage. C.W. was also

removed from the World History classroom due to our

objections to the promotion of the Islamic faith over all

other faiths, including Christianity.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of

the United States and the State of Maine that the

foregoing is true and correct.

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Executed this 17th day of February, 2016, in

Newburg, Maryland.

/s/ John Kevin Wood

John Kevin Wood

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APPENDIX D

EXHIBIT 2

2. Islam Grows and Expands

a. Muhammad didn’t name a successor or

instructed his followers on how to chose one

b. Tribal customs led to the election of Abu-Bakr,

a loyal friend of Muhumad to be the successor

c. Abu-Bakr became the first caliph or “successor”

or “deputy”

d. Later, disagreements over who should succeed

caused a split in Islam

i. Shi’a, or Shi’ites, believe that the caliph

needed to be a descendant of Muhammad

ii. Sunni Muslims acknowledge the first four

caliphs as rightful successors of Muhammad

even though they weren’t of same blood

3. Beliefs and Practices: The Five Pillars

a. Faith: There is no god but Allah and

Muhammad is the messenger of Allah

b. Prayer: Pray 5 times a day towards Mecca

c. Alms: Give alms (money for the poor)

d. Fasting: During holy month of Ramadan

Muslims fast between dawn and sunset

e. Pilgrimage: Must visit Mecca at one point in

lifetime if capable. Known as the hajj.

4. The Qur’an

a. Islamic holy text

b. Allah is the source of authority

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c. Written in Arabic, only true version

5. Links to Judaism and Christianity

a. Muslims, Christians, and Jews trace ancestry

back to Abraham

b. To Muslims, Allah is the same god that is

worshipped in Christianity and Judaism

c. Qur’an is the word of Allah as revealed to

Muhammad in the same way that Jews and

Christians believe the Torah and the Gospels

were revealed to Moses and the New Testament

writers.

d. All three are “people of the book” due to their

use of a holy book

Summary: Shehada- testimony/declaration of faith

Salah - prayer 5 times a day

Zakat - 2 ½ % charity to poor

Saum - fasting, month of Ramadan

Hajj - pilgrimage

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APPENDIX E

MUHAMMAD SPEAKS OF ALLAH:

‘THERE IS NO GOD BUT HE . . . ’

(‘Qur’an,’ II, 256-9; VI, 102-3)

God

there is no god but He, the Living, the Everlasting.

Slumber seizes Him not, neither sleep;

to Him belongs

all that is in the heavens and the earth

Who is there that shall intercede with Him save by

His leave?

He knows what lies before them

and what is after them,

and they comprehend not anything of His knowledge

save such as He wills.

His Throne comprises the heavens and earth;

the preserving of them oppresses Him not;

He is the All-high, the All-glorious.

No compulsion is there in religion.

Rectitude has become clear from error.

So whosoever disbelieves in idols

and believes in God, has laid hold of

the most firm handle, unbreaking; God is

All-hearing, All-knowing.

God is the protector of the believers;

He brings them forth from the shadows

into the light.

And the unbelievers-their protectors are

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idols, that bring them forth from the light

into the shadows;

those are the inhabitants of the Fire,

therein dwelling forever. (II, 256-9)

That then is God your Lord;

there is no god but He,

the Creator of everything.

So serve Him,

for He is Guardian over everything.

The eyes attain Him not, but He attains the eyes;

He is the All-subtle, the All-aware. (VI, 102-3)

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APPENDIX F

PowerPoint Slides

Islam

Outcome: Islam Today

[see next 11 images]

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.