Petition for Writ of Certiorari — David D. Peterson, Petitioner v. Linear Controls, Inc.
Supreme Court briefMay 7, 2019
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APPENDIX A
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
____________
No. 17-30790
____________
DAVID D. PETERSON,
Plaintiff - Appellant
United States
Court of Appeals
FILED
February 6, 2019
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
v.
LINEAR CONTROLS, INCORPORATED,
Defendant – Appellee
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
USDC. No. 6:16-CV-725
Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and SOUTHWICK
and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
David Peterson sued his former employer, Linear
Controls, alleging a hostile work environment and
discrimination based on race under Title VII. The
magistrate judge granted summary judgment to
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.
47.5.4.
*
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Linear Controls on each of Peterson’s claims. We
AFFIRM.
I.
Peterson worked at Linear Controls for six years,
primarily as an offshore electrician. During his last
job assignment with the company, Peterson worked
at Fieldwood Energy’s East Breaks 165 platform. His
assignment lasted six weeks, from July 16, 2015 to
August 22, 2015 (including a week-long break). In
September 2015, Peterson resigned from Linear
Controls via letter, explaining that he intended to
continue his education as an electrician.
A month later, Peterson filed an EEOC charge
against Linear Controls, alleging discrimination and
retaliation on the basis of race (black) and religion
(Muslim). Peterson reported that he was subjected to
“Muslim jokes and comments because of [his]
religious beliefs (not eating pork).” He also reported
“different terms and conditions of employment” in
two instances. First, he was one of four employees to
arrive late to a safety meeting, but only he––the sole
black employee––was written up. Second, he was on
a team of five white employees and five black
employees, and the black employees had to work
outside and were not permitted water breaks, while
the white employees worked inside with air
conditioning and were given water breaks. Peterson
also alleged that his managers would “judge [his]
appearance and overlook [his] work.” The EEOC
issued a right to sue letter on request, and Peterson
filed suit against Linear Controls.
After Peterson and Linear Controls submitted
sworn statements from various Linear Controls
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employees to support their positions, Linear Controls
moved for summary judgment. A magistrate judge,
ruling by the parties’ consent, granted summary
judgment to Linear Controls on all claims. Peterson
appeals the dismissal of two claims: hostile work
environment and discrimination based on race.
II.
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo.
Rayborn v. Bossier Par. Sch. Bd., 881 F.3d 409, 414
(5th Cir. 2018). Summary judgment is proper when
“the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
When deciding if there is a genuine issue of material
fact, “courts must view the facts and draw reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party.” Rayborn, 881 F.3d at 414
(quotation omitted).
III.
Peterson appeals the dismissal of his Title VII
racial discrimination claim. The magistrate judge
analyzed this claim as one relying on circumstantial
evidence of discrimination and subject to McDonnell
Douglas’s burden-shifting framework. See McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
McDonnell Douglas requires a plaintiff to
demonstrate that “(1) he is a member of a protected
class, (2) he was qualified for the position at issue, (3)
he was the subject of an adverse employment action,
and (4) he was treated less favorably because of his
membership in that protected class than were other
similarly situated employees who were not members
of the protected class, under nearly identical
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circumstances.” Paske v. Fitzgerald, 785 F.3d 977,
985 (5th Cir. 2015) (quotation omitted). The
magistrate judge held that Peterson did not allege an
adverse employment action and did not adequately
identify a similarly situated comparator. Peterson
contends that the magistrate judge improperly
excluded witness declarations that identified (1)
similarly situated comparators and (2) direct
evidence of discrimination sufficient to escape the
McDonnell Douglas framework and defeat summary
judgment.
Peterson’s arguments fail to revive his claim.
Assuming the declarations identify similarly situated
comparators, Peterson still cannot satisfy Title VII’s
adverse employment action requirement. Paske, 785
F.3d at 985.
Our court strictly construes adverse employment
actions to include only “ultimate employment
decisions,” such as “hiring, granting leave,
discharging, promoting, or compensating.” McCoy v.
City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 559, 560 (5th Cir.
2007). Peterson alleged that he and his black team
members had to work outside without access to
water, while his white team members worked inside
with air conditioning. Taking this as true, the
magistrate judge did not err in holding that these
working conditions are not adverse employment
actions because they do not concern ultimate
employment decisions. Id.; see also Aryain v. WalMart Stores Tex. LP, 534 F.3d 473, 485–86 (5th Cir.
2008).
Peterson also contends that the district court
ignored direct evidence of discrimination sufficient to
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defeat summary judgment. Peterson’s complaint
alleged that his supervisor denied him leave from
work to visit a sick family member and later, when
discussing Peterson’s request with another employee,
said “[f***] that [n*****].”
Racial slurs may “constitute[] direct evidence
that racial animus was a motivating factor” behind
an adverse employment action. Brown v. E. Miss.
Elec. Power Ass’n, 989 F.2d 858, 861 (5th Cir. 1993).
Such language must be (1) “proximate in time” to the
action, (2) “made by an individual with authority”
over the action, and (3) “related to the” action. Brown
v. CSC Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651, 655 (5th Cir. 1996),
abrogated on other grounds by Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 134 (2000). At
first glance, Peterson’s allegations appear to meet
this test. His complaint states that his supervisor
denied him leave, an adverse employment action, and
then in the context of that denial called Peterson the
n-word to another employee. But Peterson’s
deposition testimony belies the allegations in his
complaint. He acknowledges he was allowed to “go
in”––leave the offshore site––to visit his sick fiancée.
A supervisor warned Peterson he might not be
allowed to return to the same job if he left, but
Peterson admits that he was allowed to return.
Another Linear Controls employee’s declaration
confirms that Peterson was permitted to leave on this
occasion and others. As the magistrate judge
determined, there is no evidence that Peterson was
denied leave. Because Peterson was not subjected to
an adverse employment action, we affirm the
dismissal of his Title VII racial discrimination claim.
Peterson’s reliance on Reeves does not save his claim,
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because he cannot make out a prima facie case of
discrimination without an adverse employment
action. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142–43.
IV.
Peterson also appeals the dismissal of his hostile
work environment claim. A prima facie case of hostile
work environment requires a plaintiff show that: (1)
he “belongs to a protected group;” (2) he was “subject
to unwelcome [ ] harassment;” (3) the harassment
was based on a protected characteristic; and (4) the
harassment “affected a term, condition, or privilege of
[his] employment.” Watts v. Kroger Co., 170 F.3d
505, 509 (5th Cir. 1999) (quotation omitted).1
The magistrate judge granted Linear Controls’
motion for summary judgment on Peterson’s hostile
work environment claim, finding the alleged
harassment did not affect a term, condition, or
privilege of Peterson’s employment. Peterson alleged
that, for ten days in July 2015, the black members of
his team worked outside in the heat while the white
members of his team worked inside in the air
conditioning. He also alleged that black employees
were routinely denied water breaks, but in his
deposition admitted there was only one instance in
which he was denied a water break. The magistrate
judge held that Peterson’s allegations did not create a
hostile work environment because (1) Peterson’s job
description required working in an outdoor
A fifth element exists when a coworker, rather than a
supervisor, creates the hostile work environment. Peterson’s
allegations concern a supervisor, so we do not consider this
element. See Lauderdale v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, Inst.
Div., 512 F.3d 157, 162–63 (5th Cir. 2007).
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environment; (2) he worked at Linear Controls for
seven years, but his allegations only concerned a tenday period; and (3) the assignment did not cause him
physical injury or harm.
Whether harassing conduct is sufficiently severe
or pervasive to affect a term, condition, or privilege of
employment depends on the totality of the
circumstances, including “the frequency of the
discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is
physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere
offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably
interferes with an employee’s work performance” or
workplace competence. Harvill v. Westward
Commc’ns, LLC, 433 F.3d 428, 434 (5th Cir. 2005)
(quoting Harris v. Forklift, 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)).
Peterson did not allege sufficiently severe or
pervasive conduct. He worked for Linear Controls for
six years, but his allegations regarding harsher job
assignments concern only one ten-day period. More is
generally required to show pervasive harassment.
See, e.g., Watkins v. Recreation and Park Comm’n for
the City of Baton Rouge, 594 F. App’x 838, 841 (5th
Cir. 2014) (rejecting claim premised on three
instances of racially charged language and symbols
over eight-year employment); Lauderdale, 512 F.3d
at 164 (reviving claim when a supervisor called his
employee “ten to fifteen times a night for almost four
months”).
Additionally, he does not allege that his job
performance or career outlook were affected.
Peterson’s job description required him to work
outside, and the work he completed was not
physically threatening or humiliating. Peterson does
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not allege that working outside interfered with his
job performance or competence. In fact, his
responsibilities demonstrably progressed over his
time at Linear Controls. He moved up the ranks from
helper to electrician and was offered a higher paying
position in maintenance, which he turned down. The
totality of the circumstances do not present a hostile
work environment. See, e.g., Jackson v. Honeywell
Int’l, Inc., 601 F. App’x 280, 287–88 (5th Cir. 2015)
(rejecting claim because plaintiff testified that racial
slurs did not unreasonably interfere with his work
performance or job satisfaction).
Peterson’s coworker’s statement that a supervisor
used the n-word to describe Peterson does not change
our analysis of this claim. The one-time use of that
despicable word does not comport with our court’s
conception of a hostile work environment. See, e.g.,
Howard v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 447 F. App’x
626, 632 (5th Cir. 2011) (rejecting claim grounded in
one “racially inappropriate” term directed toward
plaintiff and allegations that other employees
overheard racial slurs). This is particularly true here,
where Peterson did not hear the slur. See Johnson v.
TCB Constr. Co. Inc., 334 F. App’x 666, 671 (5th Cir.
2009) (rejecting claim when supervisor frequently
used n-word outside plaintiff’s presence but there
was no evidence it affected plaintiff’s job).
Peterson also argues that the ten-day period was
a particularly “egregious incident” creating a hostile
work environment. He admits that he did not present
this argument to the trial court. Generally, an
argument “not raised in the district court cannot be
asserted for the first time on appeal.” Horton v. Bank
One, N.A., 387 F.3d 426, 435 (5th Cir. 2004)
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(quotations omitted). There is an exception, however,
when the issues presented to the district court would
have permitted the district court to “rule on the
essential argument” advanced on appeal. Lifemark
Hosps., Inc. v. Liljeberg Enters., Inc., 304 F.3d 410,
427 n.29 (5th Cir. 2002). But even if Peterson
activated this exception by presenting a standard
hostile work environment claim to the district court,
his “egregious incident” argument cannot survive on
the merits.
Egregious, isolated incidents “can alter the terms
and conditions of employment.” Harvill, 433 F.3d at
435. An example of an egregious race-based incident
arose when a company’s supervisors brought in a
white woman in a gorilla suit who made sexually and
racially offensive comments about black employees on
Juneteenth. Henry v. Corpcar Servs. Hous., Ltd., 625
F. App’x 607, 608–09 (5th Cir. 2015). She also
touched them inappropriately and without consent.
Id. This single, egregious incident created a hostile
work environment considering the social context of
the gorilla costume and Juneteenth; the incident’s
physically humiliating nature; and the demonstrable
impact on black employees’ job performance and
outlook. Id. at 613.
The conduct Peterson alleged does not meet this
standard. Peterson’s claim that black employees were
given unfavorable working conditions is disturbing
given the racial makeup of Linear Controls’
workforce and the allegation that a supervisor
referred to Peterson as the n-word. But social context
is not the only factor we consider. See id. Peterson
was directed to perform tasks that fell within his job
description. See Hobbs v. City of Chicago, 573 F.3d
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454, 464 (7th Cir. 2009) (“No reasonable jury could
conclude that being assigned duties that were part of
one’s job description . . . amount[s] to a hostile work
environment.”). He does not claim he was physically
humiliated, see Paul v. Northrop Grumman Ship
Sys., 309 F. App’x 825, 829 (5th Cir. 2009) (listing the
physical harassment alleged in “egregious” cases of
harassment), or that his job performance was
affected, see Henry, 625 F. App’x at 613 (describing
how plaintiff “suffered from severe anxiety,
depression,
anger,
and
nervousness”
before
resigning). Under the totality of the circumstances
here, Peterson did not allege an egregious incident
creating a hostile work environment.
V.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the
dismissal of Peterson’s claims.
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APPENDIX B
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAFAYETTE DIVISION
Peterson
Civil Action No. 16-00725
versus
Magistrate Judge Carol B.
Whitehurst
Linear Controls Inc.
By Consent of the Parties
MEMORANDUM RULING
Before the Court is a Motion For Summary
Judgment filed by defendant, Linear Controls Inc.
(“Linear Controls”), [Rec. Doc. 29]. Plaintiff, David D.
Peterson, filed a Memorandum In Opposition [Rec.
Doc. 33] and Linear Controls filed a Reply thereto
[Rec. Doc. 39]. For the reasons that follow, the Court
will grant the Motion.
I.
Background
Plaintiff is a former employee of Linear Controls
who worked offshore as an electrician on a
construction crew and also periodically performed
maintenance work on offshore rigs. Plaintiff was
employed with Linear Controls for approximately
seven (7) years before he submitted a resignation
letter on September 23, 2015.
Plaintiff filed an EEOC Charge against Linear
Controls on October 21, 2015 alleging that for an
approximately six (6) week period in 2015, July 15–
August 22, 2015, while working for Linear Controls
on the Fieldwood Energy, LLC (“Fieldwood”) East
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Breaks 165 platform, he was discriminated against
on the basis of his race—African-American, and that
he was subjected to discrimination based on his
religion—Muslin [sic]. Plaintiff also claimed
“retaliation” in his EEOC charge because he was late
for a safety meeting along with two white employees,
but he was the only one written-up for the violation.1
R. 29-3, Exh. B. Plaintiff asserted claims under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e)
(“Title VII”). After conducting an investigation the
EEOC ruled in Linear Controls’ favor and found that
the evidence did not establish a violation of Title VII
on either the race or the religious discrimination
claims.
On May 25, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in
this
action
asserting
race
and
religious
discrimination claims under Title VII. Plaintiff also
asserted a claim of racial discrimination under
Louisiana’s Employment Discrimination Law and a
state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress.
On May 25, 2017, Linear Controls filed the
instant Motion for Summary Judgment seeking
dismissal on the merits of all of the Plaintiff's
asserted federal and state law claims. Plaintiff filed
an Opposition to Linear Control’s Motion for
Summary Judgment on June 29, 2017. R. 33.
The EEOC investigated the safety meeting incident as one
for disparate treatment rather than retaliation based on
Plaintiff’s racial discrimination charge. R. 29-3, Exh. G.
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II. Summary Judgment Standard
Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, summary judgment is mandated when the
movant shows there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. Am. Home Assurance Co. v.
United Space Alliance, LLC, 378 F.3d 482, 486 (5th
Cir. 2004). A fact is material if proof of its existence
or nonexistence might affect the outcome of the
lawsuit under the applicable law in the case. Minter
v. Great American Insurance Co. of New York, 423
F.3d 460, 465 (5th Cir. 2005). A genuine issue of
material fact exists if a reasonable jury could render
a verdict for the nonmoving party. Thorson v. Epps,
701 F.3d 444, 445 (5th Cir. 2012).
The party seeking summary judgment has the
initial responsibility of informing the court of the
basis for its motion, and identifying those parts of the
record that it believes demonstrate the absence of
genuine issue of material fact. Washburn v. Harvey,
504 F.3d 505, 508 (5th Cir. 2007). If the moving party
carries its initial burden, the burden shifts to the
nonmoving party to demonstrate the existence of a
genuine issue of a material fact. Id. In such a case,
the non-movant may not rest upon the allegations in
his pleadings, but rather must go beyond the
pleadings and designate specific facts demonstrating
that there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). All facts and
justifiable inferences are construed in the light most
favorable to the nonmovant. Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
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If the dispositive issue is one on which the
nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at
trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by
pointing out that there is insufficient proof
concerning an essential element of the nonmoving
party’s claim. Norwegian Bulk Transport A/S v.
International Marine Terminals Partnership, 520
F.3d 409, 412 (5th Cir. 2008). The motion should be
granted if the non-moving party cannot produce
sufficient competent evidence to support an essential
element of its claim. Condrey v. Suntrust Bank of
Ga., 431 F.3d 191, 197 (5th Cir. 2005). However,
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,
conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions
and those supported by only a scintilla of evidence
are insufficient. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d
1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994).
In an employment discrimination case, the focus
is on whether a genuine issue exists as to whether
the defendant intentionally discriminated against the
plaintiff. Grimes v. Texas Department of Mental
Health and Mental Retardation, 102 F.3d 137, 139
(5th Cir. 1996) (and cases cited therein). As in any
case, unsubstantiated assertions and conclusory
allegations are not competent summary judgment
evidence. Hervey v. Mississippi Dept. of Educ., 404
Fed.Appx. 865, 869 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Ramsey v.
Henderson, 286 F.3d 264, 269 (5th Cir. 2002))
(“conclusory
allegations,
speculation,
and
unsubstantiated assertions are inadequate to satisfy
the nonmovant’s burden on a motion for summary
judgment”). In response to a motion for summary
judgment, it is therefore incumbent upon the nonmoving party to present evidence—not just
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conjecture and speculation—that the defendant
retaliated and discriminated against plaintiff on the
basis of his race. Grimes, 102 F.3d at 140.
III. Undisputed Facts
Linear Controls publishes and distributes
company policies addressing discrimination and
harassment in the workplace. Linear Controls’s
Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) Policy
stated in pertinent part:
Linear Controls, Inc. provides equal
employment opportunities without regard to
race, color, age, sex, national origin, religion,
disability or veteran status. Linear Controls,
Inc.’s commitment to equality extends to all
personnel actions including: recruitment,
advertising or soliciting for employment,
selection for employment, determining rates
of pay or other forms of compensation,
performance evaluation, upgrading, transfer,
promotion, demotion, selection for training or
education,
discipline,
suspension,
termination, treatment during employment,
and participation in social and recreational
programs.
R 29-2, Undisputed Fact No. 2, citing R. 29, Exh. R,
Declaration of Clemons; Exh. S, Employee Handbook.
Linear Controls also prominently displays at its
facilities EEO posters published by the U.S.
Department of Labor. These posters provide that
discrimination, harassment and retaliation are
prohibited. The posters also provide contact
information for the U.S. Department of Labor, Equal
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Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). In
addition, Linear Controls has a written grievance or
complaint policy. Linear Controls’ management also
maintains an open door policy under which employee
complaints or concerns can be raised. Employees may
raise complaints or concerns with supervisors or with
Human Resources. R. 29-2, Undisputed Fact No. 3,
citing Exh. R, Declaration of Clemons; Exh. S,
Employee Handbook.
Plaintiff acknowledged receipt of copies of the
above-referenced policies as shown by the signed
Receipt and Acknowledgment forms dated October
28, 2008 and March 28, 2012, copies of which are
marked as Exhibit T, in globo. R. 29-2, Undisputed
Fact No. 4, also citing Plaintiff’s Depo., Exh. D, pp.
175-179.
Linear Controls originally hired Plaintiff on
October 28, 2008 as a Helper earning $9.00/hr.
Plaintiff’s employment was separated in March of
2009 due to lack of work. R. 29-2, Undisputed Fact
No. 5 citing Exh. R, Declaration of Clemons.
During the time period relevant to this litigation,
Plaintiff worked offshore for Linear Controls as an
Electrician on a construction crew. R. 29-2,
Undisputed Fact No. 8 citing Exh. R, Declaration of
Clemons.
On July 13, 2015, while offshore in the Grand Isle
area on a job for Linear Controls’ customer,
Fieldwood Energy, LLC (“Fieldwood”), Plaintiff was
late for a safety meeting. R. 29-2, Undisputed Fact
No. 9 citing Exh. O,7/13/15 Employee Disciplinary
Report.
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Plaintiff admits he was late for the meeting. R.
29-2, Undisputed Fact No. 10 citing Exh. D,
Plaintiff’s Depo., pp. 152-159, 233-235, 246.
The next day, July 14, 2015, Plaintiff was sent in
from the Grand Isle job. R. 29-2, Undisputed Fact No.
11 citing Exh. P, 07/14/2015 Employee Disciplinary
Report.
Plaintiff became confrontational with Linear
Controls’ Maintenance Supervisor, Michael Book,
when Plaintiff learned that he was being sent in from
the job. R. 29-2, Undisputed Fact No. 14 citing Exh.
Q, Depo. of Davis, pp. 21-25; Exh. P, 07/14/2015
Employee Disciplinary Report. Michael Book and
Plaintiff were the only Linear Controls’ employees on
the job. Id. citing Exh. Q, pp. 21-25.
After being sent in from the Grand Isle job,
Plaintiff was put back to work immediately by Linear
Controls on another location. R. 29-2, Undisputed
Fact No. 15 citing Exh. R, Declaration of Clemons.
Plaintiff admits he was late for a safety meeting
in August 2015 on the East Breaks 165 project. R. 29-
2, Undisputed Fact No. 17 citing Exh. E, 8/13/2015
(p. 12/100) notes submitted by Plaintiff to EEOC.
No disciplinary action was incurred by any
employee, including Plaintiff, in August 2015 on the
East Breaks 165 project as Linear Controls did not
receive any reports from Fieldwood that either
Duhon, Hammett or Plaintiff were late for any safety
meeting in August 2015. R. 29-2, Undisputed Fact
No. 18 citing Declaration of Clemons.
On September 15, 2015, Plaintiff called Tim
Davis, Linear Controls’ Construction Project
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Manager, asking to have his employment terminated
by Linear Controls. Davis declined since the company
was not conducting layoffs at the time and had a
project coming up and needed Plaintiff to work. R. 29-
2, Undisputed Fact No. 21 citing Depo. of Davis, pp.
19-20; Plaintiff’s Depo., pp. 160-169.
On September 23, 2015, Plaintiff submitted a
letter to Linear Controls stating: “I will like to resign
from Linear Control’s, due to I am continuing my
education as an electrician to further my career.” R.
29, Exh. C, Plaintiff’s 09/3/2015 letter.
Plaintiff’s resignation letter makes no reference
to discrimination or harassment based upon race or
religion or to any other alleged unlawful
discriminatory acts or conduct. R. 29-2, Undisputed
Fact No. 25 citing Exh. C, Plaintiff’s 09/3/2015 letter.
After his resignation, Plaintiff did continue his
education, receiving additional training and/or
education through the International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers (“IB EW”) and otherwise. R. 29-2,
Undisputed Fact No. 26 citing Plaintiff’s Deposition,
pp. 10, 41-43, 174-175.
Plaintiff filed his Charge of Discrimination on
October 28, 2015, and the EEOC issued a Notice of
Right to Sue at Plaintiff’s request , due to the passage
of time, on February 22, 2016. R. 29-2, Undisputed
Fact No. 27 citing Exh. B, EEOC Charge, Exh. F,
EEOC Notice of Right to Sue.
Plaintiff worked for Linear Controls on
Fieldwood’s East Breaks 165 platform from July 16,
2015 to July 26, 2015 and from August 2, 2015 to
August 22, 2015. From July 27, 2015 to August 1,
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2015, Plaintiff was off. R. 29-2, Undisputed Fact No.
28 citing Declaration of Clemons.
Duhon denies making any comments to Plaintiff
about being a Muslin [sic]. R. 29-2, Undisputed Fact
No. 31 citing Exh. I, Depo of Duhon, pp 21-22.
The job description for an Electrician on a Linear
Controls’ construction crew, as was Plaintiff, called
for working outdoors including exposure to “a typical
offshore site” and the “ability to work in a work area
where work temperatures may be affected by outside
temperatures.” R. 29-2, Undisputed Fact No. 37
citing Plaintiff’s Depo., pp. 179-182; Exh. L, Job
Description, Bates Nos. L00720-L000721.
Working in an outdoor environment was part of
Plaintiff’s job description and regular job duties. R.
29-2, Undisputed Fact No. 38 citing Plaintiff’s Depo.,
pp. 179-182; Exh. L, Job Description, Bates Nos.
L00720-L000721; Declaration of Clemons.
Although he was an Electrician and a member of
Linear Control’s construction crew, Plaintiff was
given assignments on maintenance projects from
time to time if the work was within his capabilities.
R. 29-2, Undisputed Fact No. 40 citing Exh. N,
Declaration of Macdonald.
Plaintiff was offered a maintenance position
within his capabilities and for which he was
qualified, pursuant to an inquiry from Plaintiff. R.
29-2, Undisputed Fact No. 41 citing Exh. N,
Declaration of Macdonald; Davis’ Depo., pp. 36-38.
Plaintiff declined the offer as he would
potentially make less money working in maintenance
even though the job paid $1.00 more per hour.
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Generally, Electricians on a construction crew work
longer shifts (more than 14 days) and more hours per
day than workers on a maintenance job. Also, in a
full-time maintenance position, Plaintiff would
generally not have the opportunity to work as an
Electrician, when not working on a maintenance job,
as Electricians are assigned to work on specific
projects. R. 29-2, Undisputed Fact No. 42 citing
Declaration of Macdonald; Davis’ Depo., pp. 36-38.
Calvin J. Broussard, Jr., an African-American
man, accepted the maintenance position that
Plaintiff declined. R. 29-2, Undisputed Fact No. 43
citing Declaration of Macdonald; Davis’ Depo., pp. 3638.
Plaintiff does not contend that his job
performance trailed off while working for Linear
Controls. Plaintiff testified that his overall
performance improved throughout the course of his
employment. R. 29-2, Undisputed Fact No. 45 citing
Plaintiff’s Depo., p. 147.
A year and three months after he resigned from
Linear Controls, while working for his second,
subsequent employer, and after this lawsuit was
filed, Plaintiff saw his family doctor for anxiety on
one (1) occasion, December 27, 2016. As Plaintiff
testified, no mention was made of Linear Controls to
the doctor. R. 29-2, Undisputed Fact No. 46 citing
Plaintiff’s Depo., pp. 212, 217-225.
Though offered prescription medication at that
time, Plaintiff testified that he did not feel that he
needed it and did not fill the prescription, nor does he
intend to do so. R. 29-2, Undisputed Fact No. 47
citing Plaintiff’s Depo. pp. 224-225.
21a
IV. Law And Analysis
A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
A Title VII plaintiff must file a timely charge
with the EEOC before he can commence a civil action
under Title VII in federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(e)(1), (f)(1)4; Nat’l RR Passenger Corp. v. Morgan,
536 U.S. 101, 109 (2002); Dao v. Auchan
Hypermarket, 96 F. 3d 787, 789 (5th Cir. 1996).
Although filing an EEOC charge is not a
jurisdictional prerequisite, it “is a precondition to
filing suit in district court.” Dao, 96 F.3d at 789. It is
equally well settled that a civil action may not be
commenced until after the charging party has
received a “right-to-sue” letter from the EEOC. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1); Nielsen v. City of Moss Point,
Miss., 621 F.2d 117, 120 (5th Cir. 1980).
The scope of the charging party’s subsequent
right to institute a civil suit is fixed such that the
EEOC charge may be enlarged only by such
investigation as reasonably proceeds therefrom.
National Association of Government Employees v.
City Public Service Board of San Antonio, TX, 40
F.3d 698, 711-712 (5th Cir. 1994). Thus, the suit
which is subsequently filed may encompass only “the
discrimination stated in the charge itself or
developed in the course of a reasonable [EEOC]
investigation of that charge.” Id. at 712. Stated
differently, the scope of a Title VII action “is limited
to the scope of the EEOC investigation which can
reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of
discrimination.” Young v. City of Houston, TX., 906
F.2d 177, 179 (5th Cir. 1990).
22a
On October 28, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Charge of
Discrimination with the EEOC (“the Charge”). R. 29,
Exh. B. Plaintiff defined the time period applicable to
his charge as “07-13-2015” to “07-14-2015.” The
Charge stated:
I began my employment with Linear Controls
on October 28, 2008 most recently as an
Electrician. I was subjected to Muslim jokes
and comments because of my religious beliefs
(not eating pork). On July 13, 2015, I was
subjected to different terms and conditions of
employment, in that, myself and three other
guys were late for a safety meeting but I was
the only person written up and the next day I
received another write-up for no reason.
There were five White and five Black guys.
The Black guys had to work in the heat but
the White guys did not, we were not allowed
to take water breaks but the White guys
were. The Managers would also judge my
appearance and overlook my work. The
company employs more than 500 employees.
No reason was given for the action taken
against me.
I believe I have been discriminated against
because of my religion, ___________[blank in
the original]; race, Black; and retaliated
against in violation of Title VII of Title VII
(sic) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended, in that Chad Duhon and Brandon
Hammett, both White males, were late for a
safety meeting but received no write ups.
23a
Thus, in his EEOC charge Plaintiff stated claims
for: (1) discrimination based on race and religion;
(2) harassment based on religion; (3) retaliation; and
(4) disparate treatment based on race.
Plaintiff’s allegations in his Complaint included
claims of (1) discrimination based on race and
religion; (2) harassment based on religion and race2;
(3) disparate
treatment
based
on
race;
(4) constructive discharge; and (5) retaliation.
Plaintiff’s Complaint filed on May 25, 2016, alleged:
1. From July 15 to July 26, 2015, Plaintiff was
working offshore as an electrician on a crew
on the Fieldwood Energy, LLC East Breaks
165 platform (“East Breaks 165”) and that,
during that time, black crew members were
required
by
Linear
Controls’
white
supervisors to work every day outside, in the
heat while white crew members worked
exclusively
inside,
in
air-conditioned
facilities;
2. During that time, if any black crew member,
including Plaintiff, took a water break inside,
the white supervisors would curse and yell
and order him back to work; and
3.
Despite alleged requests by the black
employees to their white supervisors, there
was no rotation from outside to inside among
white and black crew members. R.1, ¶ VIII.
In his Opposition Memorandum, Plaintiff contends that
the outdoor work he was required to perform and the outdoor
water breaks constituted harassment and hostile work
environment based on his race.
2
24a
The Complaint also alleged that white employees,
Chad Duhon, Plaintiff’s direct supervisor, and
Brandon Hammet, Plaintiff’s co-employee, were late
for safety meetings but not admonished. In his EEOC
charge, Plaintiff alleged that he was “retaliated
against” because Duhon and Hammett were not
written up. The Complaint further alleged that
Plaintiff was harassed by his white supervisors
without reason and that Duhon and Hammet made
jokes and derogatory comments about Plaintiff’s
religion. In addition, the Complaint alleged that
Plaintiff’s request to leave an offshore project due to a
family emergency illness was “denied” by his white
supervisor(s). The Complaint also alleged that
Plaintiff was “laid off . . . and never called to return
back to work.” Finally, the Complaint alleged
Plaintiff was “forced to and did voluntarily resign.”
1. Claims Not In The Charge Nor Alleged In
The Complaint
Plaintiff contended in his deposition that he
wanted a transfer or promotion from his position as
an Electrician on a construction crew to a foreman’s
position or a job on a maintenance crew, but was
denied a promotion. R. 29, Exh. D, Plaintiff’s Depo,
pp. 86-89. Plaintiff claimed that a Caucasian
employee was given a job on the maintenance crew
and he was not. Id. at pp. 93, 190. Plaintiff’s claim is
disputed by the record. Plaintiff was offered a
maintenance position which he declined because he
would potentially make less money working in
maintenance as Electricians on a construction crew
work longer shifts (more than 14 days) and more
hours per day than workers on a maintenance job. R.
29-2, Undisputed Fact Nos. 41 and 42. Moreover, the
25a
maintenance position that Plaintiff declined was
ultimately accepted by Calvin J. Broussard, Jr., an
African-American man. Id., Undisputed Fact No. 43.
Even assuming that Plaintiff had a viable claim,
which he does not, because Plaintiff did not assert
any such failure to promote claim in his EEOC
charge, he is precluded from including it in this
action.
2. Claims In The Charge Not Alleged In The
Complaint
Plaintiff’s EEOC charge alleged that unidentified
“Managers” judged Plaintiff’s appearance and
overlooked his work. However, there is no such
allegation in the Complaint; therefore, there is no
such claim presently before the Court. Any claim
premised on Plaintiff’s appearance allegedly being
judged and his work allegedly being overlooked must
be dismissed. See Cassimere v. Fastorq, LLC, 2017
WL 812468, at *12 (W. D. La. 2017) (Dismissing on
summary judgment claims not included in plaintiff’s
EEOC charge or Title VII complaint.)
3. Allegations In The Complaint Not Stated In
The Charge
a. Denial of Leave
Plaintiff alleged in his Complaint that he was
denied the opportunity to go home for a family illness
emergency while working on the subject platform.
While Plaintiff did not include this claim in the
Charge and the EEOC did not investigate this claim,
he did mention it in the handwritten notes in the
EEOC Questionnaire. R. 29-3, p. 99. Because this
claim is not in the Charge and was not developed in
26a
the ensuing EEOC investigation, it may not be
pursued in this action.
Regardless, Plaintiff’s claim is without merit. In a
June 27, 2015 handwritten note and in his
deposition, Plaintiff conceded he was allowed to leave
the platform with the understanding that he might
not be able to return to the same project. R. 29-3,
Exh. E, p. 104; Exh. D, pp. 119-125, 132-133. In fact,
Plaintiff returned to the same project. Also, Tim
Davis, Linear Controls’ Construction Project
Manager, testified that Plaintiff had requested
personal leave on numerous occasions—his requests
were never denied and he was allowed to return to
the project, rig or worksite. Thus, this claim lacks
merit.
b. Safety Meeting Write-ups
In his EEOC charge Plaintiff claimed that his
direct supervisor, Chad Duhon, and Brandon
Hammett, his co-employee, both Caucasian, were late
for safety meetings but not admonished. Plaintiff
contended that he was “retaliated against” because
Duhon and Hammett were not written up. In his
Charge, Plaintiff specifically stated that on July 13,
2015, while he was working on the Grand Isle
platform, he, Duhon and Hammett were late, but he
was the only one written up. R. 29-3, p. 7. In the
notes in the EEOC Questionnaire, Plaintiff further
stated that he received another write-up the next
day, July 14, for the July 13, 2015 incident which was
a “final warning.” Id., p. 99, No. 5, A & B.
Plaintiff admits that he overslept and was late for
the July 13, 2015 meeting. Contrary to his claim,
Plaintiff’s own deposition testimony establishes that
27a
Duhon and Hammett did not work on the Grand Isle
platform on July 13, 2015. R. 29-3, Exh. D, p. 235.
Also, the testimony of Davis, the Project Manager,
provided that Plaintiff was sent in from the Grand
Isle job because Linear Controls’ customer did not
want to use Plaintiff on the job any longer. Id., Exh.
Q, pp. 20-35. Thus, Linear Controls has established a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the July 13,
2015 and July 14, 2015 write-ups.
In his Complaint and EEOC Questionnaire notes,
Plaintiff claimed that he was late for a safety meeting
in August, 2015 while on the East Breaks 165
platform and was chastised “unprofessionally” by his
Caucasian supervisors. The Declaration of Dawn
Clemons, Linear Controls’ Chief Financial Officer,
states that “[a]fter being sent in on July 14, 2015
from the Grand Isle job, Plaintiff was put back to
work immediately [on the East Breaks 165
platform].” R. 29-4, p. 32. Clemons further states that
Linear Controls received no reports that Plaintiff,
Duhon or Hammett were late for any safety meeting
in August 2015 and no disciplinary action was
incurred by any employee, including Plaintiff. Id.
But assuming arguendo that a disciplinary writeup was issued, in order to establish a prima facie case
of discrimination as well as for retaliation under Title
VII, a plaintiff must demonstrate an adverse
employment action. A disciplinary write-up does not
constitute an adverse employment action. Cassimere,
2017 WL 812468, at *9 (citing King v. Louisiana, 294
Fed. Appx. 77, 85 (5th Cir. 2008) (Allegations of
unpleasant work meetings and verbal reprimands do
not constitute actionable adverse employment
actions.)). Plaintiff has supplied no competent
28a
summary judgment evidence which constitutes an
adverse employment action with regard to the writeup claims. The Court will grant Defendant’s motion
to dismiss this claim.
c.
Constructive Discharge
The allegations in the Complaint that Plaintiff
was “laid off . . . and never called back to return to
work ” and “forced to and did voluntarily resign” are
not in included in his Charge and therefore must be
dismissed. As previously stated, it is well-established
that the failure to assert a claim in an EEOC charge
precludes an employee from including that claim in a
later civil action. As stated in Calmes v. JP Morgan
Chase Bank, 943 F. Supp. 2d 666, 681-682 (E. D. La.
2013), “If a plaintiff fails to state a particular claim in
his EEOC charge or if that charge is not developed in
the ensuing EEOC investigation, the plaintiff is
precluded from bringing that claim in his civil suit.”
In Calmes, the plaintiff submitted a letter of
resignation stating that he was resigning to look for
other employment. Id. at 682. The plaintiff then filed
an EEOC charge and later filed a Title VII complaint
alleging harassment, retaliatory discharge and
constructive discharge. Id. The charge, however, did
not allege retaliatory or constructive discharge. Id.
The court dismissed the retaliatory and constructive
discharge claims on summary judgment, stating in
pertinent part:
[T]he Court notes that despite the fact that
Plaintiff’s charge was filed with the EEOC on
June 15, 2010, a mere three days after his
resignation took effect, Plaintiff failed to
inform the EEOC that he had resigned/felt
29a
that he had to resign as a result of
Defendant’s conduct. The charge itself
contains allegations of harassment by Mr.
Ritchel and details the subsequent behavior
by Defendant; however, it fails to assert that
such behavior caused Plaintiff to terminate
his employment. As such, Plaintiff is
precluded from bringing a claim for
constructive discharge in the instant
action . . . .
[A]t no point in the EEOC charge does
Plaintiff state that the alleged harassment
has resulted in any definitive termination of
his employment. Rather, Plaintiff explains
that he has been suspended with pay and
that Defendant is attempting to force him to
take disability leave, not terminate him.
Plaintiff does not contend [in the EEOC
charge] that he has left and/or has been
forced to leave. Accordingly, Plaintiff is also
precluded from bringing a claim of retaliatory
discharge . . . .
Id. at 682. See also, Harris, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 690
(W. D. La. 2001) (Employee’s Title VII claims
including the denial of various promotions and
opportunities, hostile work environment, and
retaliation were not properly before the Court as
employee’s charge referred only to her employer’s
failure to promote her for specific positions); Stone v.
Louisiana Dept. of Revenue, 590 Fed. Appx. 332, 338
(5th Cir. 2014) (dismissing constructive discharge
and other claims since plaintiff’s EEOC charge did
not allege facts reasonably encompassing such
claims).
30a
An EEOC charge must state facts sufficient to
trigger an EEOC investigation and put the employer
on notice of the existence and nature of the claim.
Stone at 338. Here, Plaintiff’s Charge does not
mention Plaintiff’s separation of employment at all.
The Charge was signed by Plaintiff on October 21,
2015 and filed on October 27, 2015, approximately a
month after Plaintiff submitted his letter of
resignation on September 23, 2015. While Plaintiff’s
resignation letter states that he was resigning to seek
additional education to further his career3, the
Charge makes no reference to being laid off or forced
to resign. Likewise, Plaintiff’s resignation letter
states nothing about harassment or discrimination.
Plaintiff’s Charge did not specifically contain, or
reasonably encompass, any claim regarding his
separation from employment and was never amended
or supplemented to include one. Thus, the EEOC did
not inquire into Plaintiff’s separation of employment
at any time prior to closing the case. R. 29, Exhs. G,
H. The EEOC closed its investigation and issued a
“Notice of Right to Sue (Issued on Request)” on
February 22, 2016. “[I]f an EEOC investigation has
actually been conducted, most courts hold that the
scope of the complaint is limited to the actual scope of
the
investigation.”
National
Association
of
Government Employees v. City Public Service Board
of San Antonio, Tx, 40 F.3d 698, 712 (5th Cir. 1994)
(citing 2 Larson, Employment Discrimination
§ 49.11(c)(1) at 9B–16). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims
of constructive, retaliatory or other allegedly
3
Plaintiff testified he did in fact seek additional education.
31a
unlawful discharge must be dismissed for failure to
include them in the EEOC Charge.
B. Discrimination Claims
Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating
against employees on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a). “The
Title VII inquiry is whether the defendant
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff.”
Alvarado v. Texas Rangers, 492 F.3d 605, 611 (5th
Cir. 2007). A plaintiff can prove Title VII
discrimination through direct or circumstantial
evidence. Turner v. Baylor Richardson Medical
Center, 476 F.3d 337, 345 (5th Cir. 2007); Alvarado
at 611. Direct evidence of an employer’s
discriminatory intent is rare; therefore, Title VII
plaintiffs must ordinarily prove their claims through
circumstantial evidence. Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil
Tools, 75 F.3d 989, 993 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
Where there is no direct evidence of
discrimination, Title VII claims are analyzed using
the framework established by the Supreme Court in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973); Paske v. Fitzgerald, 785 F.3d 977, 984 (5th
Cir. 2015). A Title VII plaintiff bears the initial
burden to prove a prima facie case of discrimination
by a preponderance of the evidence. Shackelford v.
Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 190 F.3d 398, 404 (5th Cir.
1999) citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801-803.
Here, Plaintiff contends he suffered racial and
religious discrimination during his employment on
Fieldwood’s East Breaks 165 platform sometime
between July 15 and August 22, 2015, when he
terminated his employment. Plaintiff asserts a claim
32a
of disparate treatment based on his race and claims
of harassment creating a hostile work environment
based on his religion and his race. The Court will
consider Plaintiff’s claims as follows.
1. Disparate Treatment
To establish a prima facie case of disparate
treatment racial discrimination, the plaintiff must
provide evidence that: “(1) he is a member of a
protected class, (2) he was qualified for the position
at issue, (3) he was the subject of an adverse
employment action, and (4) he was treated less
favorably because of his membership in that
protected class than were other similarly situated
employees who were not members of the protected
class, under nearly identical circumstances.” Paske,
785 F.3d at 985 (quoting Lee v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co.,
574 F.3d 253, 259 (5th Cir. 2009)).
The Fifth Circuit defines “similarly situated”
narrowly. Silva v. Chertoff, 512 F. Supp. 2d 792, 803
n. 33 (W. D. Tex. 2007) (citing Wheeler v. BL Dev.
Corp., 415 F.3d 399, 405 (5 Cir. 2005)). Similarly
situated individuals must be “nearly identical” and
must fall outside the plaintiff’s protective class.
Wheeler at 405. To show that an employee outside
the protected class was “similarly situated” but
treated more favorably, a plaintiff must show that
the alleged misconduct of both employees was “nearly
identical.” Wallace v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 271 F.3d
212, 221 (5th Cir. 2001).
“The employment actions being compared will be
deemed to have been taken under nearly identical
circumstances when the employees being compared
held the same job or responsibilities, shared the same
33a
supervisor or had their employment status
determined by the same person, and have essentially
comparable violation histories.” Turner v. Kansas
City Southern Ry. Co., 675 F.3d 887, 893 (5th Cir.
2012).
The prima facie case, once established, raises a
presumption of discrimination, which the defendant
must
rebut
by
articulating
a
legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Shackelford,
190 F.3d at 404. If the defendant satisfies this
burden, the presumption of discrimination raised by
the prima facie case disappears, and the plaintiff is
left with the ultimate burden of proving
discrimination. Sandstad v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc.,
309 F.3d 893, 897 (5th Cir. 2002). The plaintiff may
satisfy this burden by producing “substantial
evidence” which proves that the proffered reasons are
pretextual. Id.; Shackelford, 190 F.3d at 404. The
plaintiff must put forward evidence rebutting each of
the nondiscriminatory reasons the employer
articulates. Wallace v. Methodist Hospital System,
271 F.3d 212, 220 (5th Cir. 2001). “Evidence that the
proffered reason is unworthy of credence must be
enough to support a reasonable inference that the
proffered reason is false; a mere shadow of doubt is
insufficient.” Auguster vs. Vermilion Parish School
Board, 249 F.3d 400, 403 (5th Cir 2001). The Fifth
Circuit has “consistently held that an employee’s
‘subjective belief of discrimination’ alone is not
sufficient to warrant judicial relief.” Auguster, 249
F.3d at 403 (citing Bauer v. Albemarle Corp., 169
F.3d 962, 967 (5th Cir. 1999)).
Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that “from July
15, 2015 to July 26, 2015 [he] was a member of
34a
Defendant’s work crew” on the East Breaks 165
platform. R. 1, ¶ VIII. While Plaintiff acknowledged
that his job description called for exposure to “a
typical offshore site” and the “ability to work in a
work area where temperatures may be affected by
outside temperatures,” R. 29, Exh. D, Plaintiff’s
Depo., pp. 179-182; R. 29-2, Undisputed Facts 37, 38,
he maintains that the African-American crew
members were required to work every day outside
while the Caucasian crew members worked
exclusively inside in air-conditioned facilities.
Plaintiff further contends that if an AfricanAmerican employee took a water break inside, the
white supervisors would curse and yell and order the
employee back to work. Id. In particular, Plaintiff
testified in his deposition that, after sitting inside the
safety man, Jimmy Cox’s, office drinking water for a
couple of minutes, his Caucasian supervisor, Robert
Walker, fussed at him and told him to get the “f” back
to work. R. 29, Exh. D, Plaintiff’s Depo., pp. 7583,100. Plaintiff got up and went back to work. Id.
In his Declaration, Broc Arnaud, Linear Control’s
employee since July 1, 2014, who personally worked
with Plaintiff, stated that Caucasian employees,
including Arnaud himself, worked both outside and
inside on the subject platform; and that Caucasian
and African-American employees worked together
outside on the platform. R. 29-2, Exh. K, Declar. Of
Arnaud, ¶ 3. In particular, Arnaud testified that he
personally observed African-American employees of
Linear Controls, namely Daniel Harris, Archie
Mouton, Aaron Boudreaux and Chris Lavergne,
working inside on the East Breaks 165 platform. Id.
Arnaud also stated that he personally observed
35a
Plaintiff working inside for a period of time. Id.
Moreover, Arnaud stated that he, Matthew Latiolais
and Brandon Hammett, worked outside. Id. Robert
Walker, one of Plaintiff’s direct supervisors, testified
that he himself had worked outside pulling cable and
that African-American employees worked inside on
the subject platform. R. 29-3, Exh. J, Walker Depo.,
pp. 22-23.
Arnaud also stated that all employees on the East
Breaks 165 platform were allowed to take water
breaks when needed and they were allowed to get
water and Gatorade from refrigerators or coolers at
any time. He further stated that Linear Controls’
managers would regularly and routinely hand out
water to their employees who were working outside
throughout the shift. R. 29-2, Declar. Of Arnaud, ¶5.
Also, Walker, Plaintiff’s supervisor testified that
neither he nor Duhon “got onto workers for stopping
to get a drink of water.” R. 29-3, Walker Depo., p. 23.
Rather, he stated, they would actually bring the
workers water. Id.
Plaintiff has identified no similarly situated
Caucasian employee who performed the same work
he performed and was allowed to work exclusively
indoors. Nor has Plaintiff identified a similarly
situated Caucasian co-worker performing his same
work who was allowed to take a water break like the
one Plaintiff was allegedly denied. Rather, Plaintiff’s
Complaint and his deposition offer nothing more than
general claims that Caucasian workers were treated
better than him.
In his opposition memorandum, Plaintiff submits
the Declaration of Archie J. Mouton, an Electrician
36a
on the East Breaks 165 platform who states he
worked “in July 2015” with Plaintiff on a crew of four
African Americans, including Plaintiff and himself.
R. 33-1, ¶ 1, 2. As to Plaintiff’s allegations of racial
disparity in the outdoor versus indoor working
environment, Mouton states, “[b]oth crews had the
same job, however, my crew was assigned to work
outside in the heat. The white crew worked inside in
the air conditioning.” Id., ¶ 3. Plaintiff also submits
the Declaration of Jimmy Cox, the Safety
Representative for United Fire Safety who “was
contracted to work at . . . East Breaks 165 platform.”
R. 33-2. Cox states that “all black workers that were
employed by Linear had to work outside and all the
white employees worked inside where there was air
conditioning. Plaintiff’s supervisor, Chad Duhon,
stayed inside and would yell at any of the black
employees who came inside to get water or took
breaks.” Id. at ¶ 4.
Defendant objects to the statements of Mouton
and Cox. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(4)
requires that a declaration used to support or oppose
a motion “must be [1] made on personal knowledge,
[2] set out facts that would be admissible in evidence,
and [3] show that the [] declarant is competent to
testify on the matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4).
Defendant objects to Mouton’s declaration for failure
to attest to personal knowledge as to any Caucasian
co-workers who “had the same job” and who “worked
inside in the air conditioning.” R. 35-3. Defendant
contends that Mouton does not provide the actual
time period which he worked on the platform, instead
simply states that he was on the project “six weeks”
“in July 2015,” and therefore has not laid the proper
37a
foundation to establish his personal knowledge.
Defendant also objects to Cox’s statements on the
basis of personal knowledge in that Cox merely
makes a reference to “July 2015” and does not specify
the dates he was actually on the platform or whether
he was there for the entirety of Plaintiff’s
employment. Nor does Cox testify as to the basis of
his personal knowledge of how he knows which
employees were Linear Controls’ employees, the race
of any particular employees and the job titles and
positions of any of the employees.4
In addition to its objections for failure to lay a
proper foundation/lack of personal knowledge as
required by FRE Rule 602, Defendant also objects to
both Declarations on the basis of relevance under
FRE 401, inadmissible hearsay offered to prove the
truth of the matters asserted, pursuant to FRE Rule
801, and argumentative, speculative and conclusory
statements which are not based on personal
knowledge, inadmissible under FRE Rule 701.
While a declaration need not specifically state
that it is based on personal knowledge, it must
include enough factual support for a court to
determine that its averments were based upon the
personal knowledge of the declarant. Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(4); Gahagan v. United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services, 2016 WL 7187943, at *2 (E. D.
La., 2016) (citing Thomas v. Atmos Energy Corp., 223
The Court notes that throughout the Declaration, Cox’s
“statements” are referenced in the third person—“Declarant
states” or “Declarant says”— rather than the first person. Such
a reference questions whether the Declaration is actually Cox’s
own statement.
4
38a
Fed. Appx. 369, 374 (5th Cir. 2007)). When
considering a motion for summary judgment, a court
disregards any portion of a declaration that fails to
comply with Rule 56(c)(4). Akin v. Q–L Investments,
Inc., 959 F.2d 521, 531 (5th Cir. 1992).
The Court finds that Mouton and Cox’s
declarations as to Plaintiff’s claims at issue fail to
comply with the requirements of Rule 56(c)(4). The
declarants have not laid the proper foundation to
demonstrate their presence on the platform during
the relevant period of time or that they had personal
information in order to establish that the alleged
disparity between the crew members was based on a
comparison of similarly situated employees. “The
similarly situated prong requires a Title VII claimant
to identify at least one coworker outside of his
protected class who was treated more favorably
under nearly identical circumstances. This coworker,
known as a comparator, must hold the same job or
hold the same job responsibilities as the Title VII
claimant; must share the same supervisor or have his
employment status determined by the same person
as the Title VII claimant; and must have a history of
violations or infringements similar to that of the Title
VII claimant.” Alkhawaldeh v. Dow Chemical
Company, 851 F.3d 422, 426–27 (5th Cir. 2017).
Thus, as Plaintiff has failed to identify a similarly
situated Caucasian comparator, he cannot establish a
prima facie case.
Even if Plaintiff had identified a similarly
situated Caucasian comparator who was assigned to
work exclusively inside the platform facility and/or
allowed to take a water break inside, Plaintiff’s
claims still fail as a matter of law because he has not
39a
alleged or testified to any adverse employment
action. “Adverse employment actions include only
ultimate employment decisions such as hiring,
granting
leave,
discharging,
promoting,
or
compensating.” Green v. Adm’rs of Tulane Educ.
Fund, 284 F.3d 642, 657 (5th Cir. 2002).
Defendant directs the Court to Harris v. Attorney
General U.S.A., 2017 WL 1493692 (3rd Cir. 2017), a
case with facts similar to the instant one. In Harris
the Third Circuit stated:
[Plaintiff] has described the. . . discriminatory
action as forcing him “to work under
unhealthful environmental (excessive heat)
conditions,” or directing him “to perform
mowing activities on a day where the
temperature
and
heat
index
were
dangerously high”. . . The District Court
concluded that this single action did not
amount to an adverse employment action,
because it did not alter [plaintiff’s]
“compensation,
terms,
conditions,
or
privileges of employment,”. . . and it did not
reduce his opportunities for promotion or
professional growth . . . Rather, [plaintiff]
was assigned to complete one of his regular
job duties. Id. at *2.
Defendant argues that just as the court held in
Harris, working outside in the heat between July 15,
2015 and July 26, 2015, was part of Plaintiff’s job
description and his regular job duties, such action
does not meet the definition of “adverse employment
action”, i.e., a significant change in employment
status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote,
40a
reassignment
with
significantly
different
responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant
change in benefits. See also, Breaux v. City of
Garland, 205 F.3d 150, 157 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting
that the U.S. Fifth Circuit takes a narrow view of
what constitutes an adverse employment action.)
Similarly, Plaintiff’s allegations that he was not
allowed to go inside and take his water break do not
constitute an adverse employment action. Actions
such as assigning an employee more difficult work,
giving employees unequal break times, and giving
allegedly biased annual evaluations are not “adverse
actions” within the meaning of Title VII. Aryain v.
Wal-Mart Stores Tex. LP, 534 F.3d 473, 486 (5th Cir.
2008) (break requests); Shackelford v. Deloitte &
Touche, LLP, 190 F.3d 398, 407 (5th Cir. 1999)
(unfair employee evaluations); Benningfield v. City of
Houston, 157 F.3d 369, 376-77 (5th Cir. 1998)
(heavier work load). Neither the alleged assignment
of outdoor work nor the denial of an inside water
break is an adverse employment action within the
meaning of Title VII. Defendant’s Motion in this
regard will be granted.
2. Harassment Claims
Plaintiff asserts a purported hostile work
environment claim premised on allegations of
religious harassment. Plaintiff alleges he was subject
to Muslim jokes and comments made by his
supervisor, Duhon, and co-employee, Hammett, while
working on Fieldwood’s East Breaks 165 platform
sometime between July 15 and August 22, 2015. In
his Opposition, Plaintiff appears to raise a
harassment and hostile work environment claim
41a
based on the allegations that he was not allowed to
work inside and was denied a water break. While
Plaintiff’s EEOC Charge indicates these allegations
as to racial discrimination were based on disparate
treatment, the Court will also consider whether these
claims constitute racial harassment and hostile work
environment under Title VII.
To state a prima facie case of hostile work
environment based on harassment, an employee
must show that: (1) he belongs to a protected group;
(2) he was subjected to unwelcome harassment;
(3) the harassment complained of was based on a
protected characteristic; (4) the harassment
complained of affected a term, condition or privilege
of his employment; and (5) the employer knew or
should have known of the harassment and failed to
take prompt remedial action. Watts v. Kroger Co.,
170 F.3d 505, 509-510 (5th Cir. 1999); Faragher v.
City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998)
(Element five need not be established if the alleged
harassment is committed by employee’s supervisor.).
For harassment to affect a “term, condition or
privilege of employment,” it must be so “severe or
pervasive” as to alter the terms or conditions of
employment and create an abusive working
environment. Watts, 170 F.3d at 509. To determine
whether behavior qualifies as severe or pervasive
harassment, Federal Courts look to subjective and
objective components. Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan,
Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1276 (11th Cir. 2002). Thus, to be
actionable, the behavior alleged must result in a
work environment that the plaintiff subjectively
perceives as abusive and that a reasonable person
would deem abusive. Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510
42a
U.S. 17, 21–22 (1993). The following factors weigh on
whether a work environment is objectively abusive or
hostile: (I) the frequency of the discriminatory
conduct; (ii) its severity; (iii) whether it is physically
threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive
utterance; and (iv) whether it unreasonably
interferes with an employee’s work performance.
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787-788; Ramsey v. Henderson,
286 F.3d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 2002).
It is well settled that the mere utterance of an
“epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an
employee” does not sufficiently alter the terms or
conditions of employment in a way that violates Title
VII. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787. Thus, simple teasing,
rudeness, offhand remarks, and isolated incidents of
derogatory overtures are insufficient to establish a
hostile working environment. Id. at 787-788; Baker v.
Starwood Hotel and Resort, 1999 WL 397405, at *3
(E.D. La. 1999).5
Defendant cites several unpublished opinions from the
Eleventh Circuit including Alansari v. Tropic Star Seafood Inc.,
388 Fed. Appx. 902, 905 (11th Cir. 2010), a case involving a
claim of religiously hostile work environment brought by a
Muslim. The circuit court affirmed summary judgment, noting
that behavior “including solicitations to go to church because
‘Jesus would save’ [him], other comments about his Muslim
religion, and the playing of Christian music on the radio ... may
have been unwanted and even derogatory . . . but it did not rise
to a threatening or humiliating level.” Defendant also cites Byrd
v. Postmaster Gen., 582 Fed. Appx.787 (11th Cir. 2014);
Richardson v. Dougherty County, Ga., 185 F. App’x 785, 791
(11th Cir. 2006).
5
43a
a. Religion
Regarding
Plaintiff’s
EEOC
charge
for
harassment based on his Muslin [sic] religion,
Plaintiff stated in his deposition that while working
for Linear Controls on the East Breaks 165 platform,
Duhon and Hammett would say to him “loo, loo, loo,
boom” or “do, do, do, boom,” which Plaintiff testified
sounded to him like “Muslims blowing up stuff.” R.
29, Exh. D, Plaintiff Depo. pp. 106–112. In his
deposition, Plaintiff interpreted this phrase as a
reference to “terrorists.” Plaintiff did not identify any
derogatory comments containing the words “religion,”
“Muslim” or “pork.” Id. Plaintiff did not allege or
testify to any physical harm or threats of harm, just
“jokes and comments.” Id.6
As to Plaintiff’s deposition testimony that the
statements, “loo, loo, loo, boom” or “do, do, do, boom,”
were religious harassment, Defendant contends that
these comments were insufficient to establish a
prima facie case of religious discrimination. See Lara
v. Raytheon Technical Service, 476 Fed. Appx. 218
(11th Cir. 2012) (Christian employee failed to
establish prima facie case of hostile work
environment based on religious harassment since,
among other reasons, many of the instances of
harassing behavior, which took place over a month
and a half, were not even related to religion). The
Court agrees. The alleged remarks attributed to
In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he was constantly
and continuously cursed and yelled at by his supervisors and coemployees, but sets forth no specific facts or evidence
establishing that the cursing and yelling had anything to do
with his religion, or race for that matter.
6
44a
Duhon and Hammett have nothing to do with
religion, thereby eliminating a required element of
Plaintiff’s prima facie case—harassment based on a
protected characteristic. Moreover, Duhon testified in
his deposition that he did not know Plaintiff was a
Muslim, R. 29, Exh. D, Plaintiff’s Depo, pp. 197-98,
and Plaintiff has produced no evidence showing that
Hammett knew Plaintiff was a Muslin [sic].
b. Race
As to Plaintiff’s contentions of “yelling and
cursing” as the basis for racial harassment. Plaintiff
sets forth no specific facts or evidence that the
cursing and yelling had anything to do with race.
Indeed, in his deposition Plaintiff denied being the
target of any racial slurs. Id. at pp. 197–198.
Plaintiff’s
own
conclusory
allegations
and
unsubstantiated assertions, without even a scintilla
of evidence, are insufficient to establish this claim for
hostile work environment.
In his Opposition Memorandum, Plaintiff also
contends that requiring him to work outside in the
heat and being denied water breaks inside constitute
a hostile work environment based on race.7 R. 33, p.
9. Considering the factors which weigh on whether a
work environment is objectively abusive or hostile:
(i) the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; (ii) its
severity; (iii) whether it is physically threatening or
humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and
While the Court finds that Plaintiff failed to raise an
harassment/hostile work environment claim based on his
outdoor work and water breaks in his EEOC Charge, the Court
will consider the claim for purposes of this motion for summary
judgment.
7
45a
(iv) whether it unreasonably interferes with an
employee’s work performance, Faragher, 524 U.S. at
787-788, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s hostile work
environment claims in this regard lack merit.
As provided in the foregoing analysis as to
disparate treatment, Plaintiff has admitted that
working in an outdoor environment was part of his
job description and regular job duties and that his
work performance improved while employed with
Linear Controls. The record provides that he worked
on the East Breaks 165 platform from July 16, 2015
to July 26, 2015, then was off for six days before
returning. R. 33-7, Plaintiff’s Stmt. Of Disp. Facts,
responding to ¶¶ 28, 38, 45 of Def. Stmt. Of Undisp.
Facts. According to the Complaint, it was during the
period from July 16th to July 26th that Plaintiff
alleges he was not allowed to work inside or take a
water break inside. R. 1, ¶ 8. Plaintiff does not set
forth facts showing that this occurred at other times
or on other jobs, nor does he set forth facts showing
that he suffered physical harm or injury as a result.
Plaintiff’s claims of hostile work environment are
belied by his complaint that he resigned because he
was not returned to work soon enough. The Court
will grant Defendant’s Motion as to hostile work
environment on the basis of race.
C. State Law Claims
1. The Louisiana Employment Discrimination
Claims
The Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law,
La. R.S. 23:301 (LEDL) prohibits an employer from
discriminating against an individual based on his
race, color, religion, sex, age, or national origin. The
46a
scope of the LEDL is the same as Title VII, and
therefore, claims under the LEDL are analyzed under
the Title VII framework and jurisprudential
precedent. DeCorte v. Jordan, 497 F.3d 433, 437 (5th
Cir. 2007). Because the outcome of the alleged
discrimination claims under Louisiana law are the
same as the outcome under Title VII, for the reasons
discussed above, the LEDL claims must also be
dismissed.
2. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
For the claim of intentional infliction of emotional
distress the plaintiff must prove 1) that the conduct
of the defendant was extreme and outrageous; 2) that
the emotional distress of the plaintiff was severe; and
3) that the defendant desired to inflict severe
emotional distress or knew that severe emotional
distress would be certain or substantially certain to
result from his conduct. White v. Monsanto Co., 585
So.2d 1205, 1209 (La. 1991). The conduct must be
“. . . so outrageous in character, and so extreme in
degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of
decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly
intolerable in a civilized community. Liability does
not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats,
annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.
Persons must necessarily be expected to be hardened
to a certain amount of rough language, and to
occasional acts that are definitely inconsiderate and
unkind.” Id. at 1209.
Based on the record before the Court, Plaintiff
cannot establish that he was subjected to the type of
deliberate and repeated harassment required to give
rise to a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
47a
distress. Further, he has not provided any evidence
that he suffered any emotional distress, much less
that the emotional distress he may have suffered was
severe. In fact, Plaintiff describes himself as a
“healthy, young man,” who does not feel mentally
unstable, who has never seen a psychiatrist or a
psychologist, and who does not feel like he needs
mental health counseling. R. 29-3, Exh. D, pp. 204208. While he was working for Linear Controls,
Plaintiff testified that his overall performance
improved throughout the course of time. Id. at p. 147.
It was not until one year and three months after he
resigned from Linear Controls, while working for his
second, subsequent employer and after Plaintiff filed
this lawsuit, that he saw his family doctor for anxiety
on one occasion, December 27, 2016. Id. at pp. 212,
217-225. He made no mention of Linear Controls to
the doctor. Id. Though the doctor offered prescription
medication at that time, Plaintiff testified that he did
not feel that he needed it and did not fill the
prescription, nor does he plan to do so. Id. at pp. 224-
225.
Plaintiff has failed to provide any evidence that
he suffered severe emotional distress as a result of
Defendant’s alleged actions. Accordingly, Defendant’s
motion for summary judgment related to Plaintiff’s
state law claim for emotional distress will be granted.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED this 5th day of
September, 2017, at Lafayette, Louisiana.
Carol B. Whitehurst
Carol B. Whitehurst
United States Magistrate Judge
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.