Petition for Writ of Certiorari — David D. Peterson, Petitioner v. Linear Controls, Inc.

Supreme Court briefMay 7, 2019

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APPENDIX A

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

____________

No. 17-30790

____________

DAVID D. PETERSON,

Plaintiff - Appellant

United States

Court of Appeals

FILED

February 6, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

v.

LINEAR CONTROLS, INCORPORATED,

Defendant – Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC. No. 6:16-CV-725

Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and SOUTHWICK

and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

David Peterson sued his former employer, Linear

Controls, alleging a hostile work environment and

discrimination based on race under Title VII. The

magistrate judge granted summary judgment to

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.

47.5.4.

*

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Linear Controls on each of Peterson’s claims. We

AFFIRM.

I.

Peterson worked at Linear Controls for six years,

primarily as an offshore electrician. During his last

job assignment with the company, Peterson worked

at Fieldwood Energy’s East Breaks 165 platform. His

assignment lasted six weeks, from July 16, 2015 to

August 22, 2015 (including a week-long break). In

September 2015, Peterson resigned from Linear

Controls via letter, explaining that he intended to

continue his education as an electrician.

A month later, Peterson filed an EEOC charge

against Linear Controls, alleging discrimination and

retaliation on the basis of race (black) and religion

(Muslim). Peterson reported that he was subjected to

“Muslim jokes and comments because of [his]

religious beliefs (not eating pork).” He also reported

“different terms and conditions of employment” in

two instances. First, he was one of four employees to

arrive late to a safety meeting, but only he––the sole

black employee––was written up. Second, he was on

a team of five white employees and five black

employees, and the black employees had to work

outside and were not permitted water breaks, while

the white employees worked inside with air

conditioning and were given water breaks. Peterson

also alleged that his managers would “judge [his]

appearance and overlook [his] work.” The EEOC

issued a right to sue letter on request, and Peterson

filed suit against Linear Controls.

After Peterson and Linear Controls submitted

sworn statements from various Linear Controls

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employees to support their positions, Linear Controls

moved for summary judgment. A magistrate judge,

ruling by the parties’ consent, granted summary

judgment to Linear Controls on all claims. Peterson

appeals the dismissal of two claims: hostile work

environment and discrimination based on race.

II.

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo.

Rayborn v. Bossier Par. Sch. Bd., 881 F.3d 409, 414

(5th Cir. 2018). Summary judgment is proper when

“the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute

as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

When deciding if there is a genuine issue of material

fact, “courts must view the facts and draw reasonable

inferences in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party.” Rayborn, 881 F.3d at 414

(quotation omitted).

III.

Peterson appeals the dismissal of his Title VII

racial discrimination claim. The magistrate judge

analyzed this claim as one relying on circumstantial

evidence of discrimination and subject to McDonnell

Douglas’s burden-shifting framework. See McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).

McDonnell Douglas requires a plaintiff to

demonstrate that “(1) he is a member of a protected

class, (2) he was qualified for the position at issue, (3)

he was the subject of an adverse employment action,

and (4) he was treated less favorably because of his

membership in that protected class than were other

similarly situated employees who were not members

of the protected class, under nearly identical

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circumstances.” Paske v. Fitzgerald, 785 F.3d 977,

985 (5th Cir. 2015) (quotation omitted). The

magistrate judge held that Peterson did not allege an

adverse employment action and did not adequately

identify a similarly situated comparator. Peterson

contends that the magistrate judge improperly

excluded witness declarations that identified (1)

similarly situated comparators and (2) direct

evidence of discrimination sufficient to escape the

McDonnell Douglas framework and defeat summary

judgment.

Peterson’s arguments fail to revive his claim.

Assuming the declarations identify similarly situated

comparators, Peterson still cannot satisfy Title VII’s

adverse employment action requirement. Paske, 785

F.3d at 985.

Our court strictly construes adverse employment

actions to include only “ultimate employment

decisions,” such as “hiring, granting leave,

discharging, promoting, or compensating.” McCoy v.

City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 559, 560 (5th Cir.

2007). Peterson alleged that he and his black team

members had to work outside without access to

water, while his white team members worked inside

with air conditioning. Taking this as true, the

magistrate judge did not err in holding that these

working conditions are not adverse employment

actions because they do not concern ultimate

employment decisions. Id.; see also Aryain v. WalMart Stores Tex. LP, 534 F.3d 473, 485–86 (5th Cir.

2008).

Peterson also contends that the district court

ignored direct evidence of discrimination sufficient to

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defeat summary judgment. Peterson’s complaint

alleged that his supervisor denied him leave from

work to visit a sick family member and later, when

discussing Peterson’s request with another employee,

said “[f***] that [n*****].”

Racial slurs may “constitute[] direct evidence

that racial animus was a motivating factor” behind

an adverse employment action. Brown v. E. Miss.

Elec. Power Ass’n, 989 F.2d 858, 861 (5th Cir. 1993).

Such language must be (1) “proximate in time” to the

action, (2) “made by an individual with authority”

over the action, and (3) “related to the” action. Brown

v. CSC Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651, 655 (5th Cir. 1996),

abrogated on other grounds by Reeves v. Sanderson

Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 134 (2000). At

first glance, Peterson’s allegations appear to meet

this test. His complaint states that his supervisor

denied him leave, an adverse employment action, and

then in the context of that denial called Peterson the

n-word to another employee. But Peterson’s

deposition testimony belies the allegations in his

complaint. He acknowledges he was allowed to “go

in”––leave the offshore site––to visit his sick fiancée.

A supervisor warned Peterson he might not be

allowed to return to the same job if he left, but

Peterson admits that he was allowed to return.

Another Linear Controls employee’s declaration

confirms that Peterson was permitted to leave on this

occasion and others. As the magistrate judge

determined, there is no evidence that Peterson was

denied leave. Because Peterson was not subjected to

an adverse employment action, we affirm the

dismissal of his Title VII racial discrimination claim.

Peterson’s reliance on Reeves does not save his claim,

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because he cannot make out a prima facie case of

discrimination without an adverse employment

action. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142–43.

IV.

Peterson also appeals the dismissal of his hostile

work environment claim. A prima facie case of hostile

work environment requires a plaintiff show that: (1)

he “belongs to a protected group;” (2) he was “subject

to unwelcome [ ] harassment;” (3) the harassment

was based on a protected characteristic; and (4) the

harassment “affected a term, condition, or privilege of

[his] employment.” Watts v. Kroger Co., 170 F.3d

505, 509 (5th Cir. 1999) (quotation omitted).1

The magistrate judge granted Linear Controls’

motion for summary judgment on Peterson’s hostile

work environment claim, finding the alleged

harassment did not affect a term, condition, or

privilege of Peterson’s employment. Peterson alleged

that, for ten days in July 2015, the black members of

his team worked outside in the heat while the white

members of his team worked inside in the air

conditioning. He also alleged that black employees

were routinely denied water breaks, but in his

deposition admitted there was only one instance in

which he was denied a water break. The magistrate

judge held that Peterson’s allegations did not create a

hostile work environment because (1) Peterson’s job

description required working in an outdoor

A fifth element exists when a coworker, rather than a

supervisor, creates the hostile work environment. Peterson’s

allegations concern a supervisor, so we do not consider this

element. See Lauderdale v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, Inst.

Div., 512 F.3d 157, 162–63 (5th Cir. 2007).

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environment; (2) he worked at Linear Controls for

seven years, but his allegations only concerned a tenday period; and (3) the assignment did not cause him

physical injury or harm.

Whether harassing conduct is sufficiently severe

or pervasive to affect a term, condition, or privilege of

employment depends on the totality of the

circumstances, including “the frequency of the

discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is

physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere

offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably

interferes with an employee’s work performance” or

workplace competence. Harvill v. Westward

Commc’ns, LLC, 433 F.3d 428, 434 (5th Cir. 2005)

(quoting Harris v. Forklift, 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)).

Peterson did not allege sufficiently severe or

pervasive conduct. He worked for Linear Controls for

six years, but his allegations regarding harsher job

assignments concern only one ten-day period. More is

generally required to show pervasive harassment.

See, e.g., Watkins v. Recreation and Park Comm’n for

the City of Baton Rouge, 594 F. App’x 838, 841 (5th

Cir. 2014) (rejecting claim premised on three

instances of racially charged language and symbols

over eight-year employment); Lauderdale, 512 F.3d

at 164 (reviving claim when a supervisor called his

employee “ten to fifteen times a night for almost four

months”).

Additionally, he does not allege that his job

performance or career outlook were affected.

Peterson’s job description required him to work

outside, and the work he completed was not

physically threatening or humiliating. Peterson does

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not allege that working outside interfered with his

job performance or competence. In fact, his

responsibilities demonstrably progressed over his

time at Linear Controls. He moved up the ranks from

helper to electrician and was offered a higher paying

position in maintenance, which he turned down. The

totality of the circumstances do not present a hostile

work environment. See, e.g., Jackson v. Honeywell

Int’l, Inc., 601 F. App’x 280, 287–88 (5th Cir. 2015)

(rejecting claim because plaintiff testified that racial

slurs did not unreasonably interfere with his work

performance or job satisfaction).

Peterson’s coworker’s statement that a supervisor

used the n-word to describe Peterson does not change

our analysis of this claim. The one-time use of that

despicable word does not comport with our court’s

conception of a hostile work environment. See, e.g.,

Howard v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 447 F. App’x

626, 632 (5th Cir. 2011) (rejecting claim grounded in

one “racially inappropriate” term directed toward

plaintiff and allegations that other employees

overheard racial slurs). This is particularly true here,

where Peterson did not hear the slur. See Johnson v.

TCB Constr. Co. Inc., 334 F. App’x 666, 671 (5th Cir.

2009) (rejecting claim when supervisor frequently

used n-word outside plaintiff’s presence but there

was no evidence it affected plaintiff’s job).

Peterson also argues that the ten-day period was

a particularly “egregious incident” creating a hostile

work environment. He admits that he did not present

this argument to the trial court. Generally, an

argument “not raised in the district court cannot be

asserted for the first time on appeal.” Horton v. Bank

One, N.A., 387 F.3d 426, 435 (5th Cir. 2004)

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(quotations omitted). There is an exception, however,

when the issues presented to the district court would

have permitted the district court to “rule on the

essential argument” advanced on appeal. Lifemark

Hosps., Inc. v. Liljeberg Enters., Inc., 304 F.3d 410,

427 n.29 (5th Cir. 2002). But even if Peterson

activated this exception by presenting a standard

hostile work environment claim to the district court,

his “egregious incident” argument cannot survive on

the merits.

Egregious, isolated incidents “can alter the terms

and conditions of employment.” Harvill, 433 F.3d at

435. An example of an egregious race-based incident

arose when a company’s supervisors brought in a

white woman in a gorilla suit who made sexually and

racially offensive comments about black employees on

Juneteenth. Henry v. Corpcar Servs. Hous., Ltd., 625

F. App’x 607, 608–09 (5th Cir. 2015). She also

touched them inappropriately and without consent.

Id. This single, egregious incident created a hostile

work environment considering the social context of

the gorilla costume and Juneteenth; the incident’s

physically humiliating nature; and the demonstrable

impact on black employees’ job performance and

outlook. Id. at 613.

The conduct Peterson alleged does not meet this

standard. Peterson’s claim that black employees were

given unfavorable working conditions is disturbing

given the racial makeup of Linear Controls’

workforce and the allegation that a supervisor

referred to Peterson as the n-word. But social context

is not the only factor we consider. See id. Peterson

was directed to perform tasks that fell within his job

description. See Hobbs v. City of Chicago, 573 F.3d

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454, 464 (7th Cir. 2009) (“No reasonable jury could

conclude that being assigned duties that were part of

one’s job description . . . amount[s] to a hostile work

environment.”). He does not claim he was physically

humiliated, see Paul v. Northrop Grumman Ship

Sys., 309 F. App’x 825, 829 (5th Cir. 2009) (listing the

physical harassment alleged in “egregious” cases of

harassment), or that his job performance was

affected, see Henry, 625 F. App’x at 613 (describing

how plaintiff “suffered from severe anxiety,

depression,

anger,

and

nervousness”

before

resigning). Under the totality of the circumstances

here, Peterson did not allege an egregious incident

creating a hostile work environment.

V.

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the

dismissal of Peterson’s claims.

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APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

LAFAYETTE DIVISION

Peterson

Civil Action No. 16-00725

versus

Magistrate Judge Carol B.

Whitehurst

Linear Controls Inc.

By Consent of the Parties

MEMORANDUM RULING

Before the Court is a Motion For Summary

Judgment filed by defendant, Linear Controls Inc.

(“Linear Controls”), [Rec. Doc. 29]. Plaintiff, David D.

Peterson, filed a Memorandum In Opposition [Rec.

Doc. 33] and Linear Controls filed a Reply thereto

[Rec. Doc. 39]. For the reasons that follow, the Court

will grant the Motion.

I.

Background

Plaintiff is a former employee of Linear Controls

who worked offshore as an electrician on a

construction crew and also periodically performed

maintenance work on offshore rigs. Plaintiff was

employed with Linear Controls for approximately

seven (7) years before he submitted a resignation

letter on September 23, 2015.

Plaintiff filed an EEOC Charge against Linear

Controls on October 21, 2015 alleging that for an

approximately six (6) week period in 2015, July 15–

August 22, 2015, while working for Linear Controls

on the Fieldwood Energy, LLC (“Fieldwood”) East

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Breaks 165 platform, he was discriminated against

on the basis of his race—African-American, and that

he was subjected to discrimination based on his

religion—Muslin [sic]. Plaintiff also claimed

“retaliation” in his EEOC charge because he was late

for a safety meeting along with two white employees,

but he was the only one written-up for the violation.1

R. 29-3, Exh. B. Plaintiff asserted claims under Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e)

(“Title VII”). After conducting an investigation the

EEOC ruled in Linear Controls’ favor and found that

the evidence did not establish a violation of Title VII

on either the race or the religious discrimination

claims.

On May 25, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in

this

action

asserting

race

and

religious

discrimination claims under Title VII. Plaintiff also

asserted a claim of racial discrimination under

Louisiana’s Employment Discrimination Law and a

state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional

distress.

On May 25, 2017, Linear Controls filed the

instant Motion for Summary Judgment seeking

dismissal on the merits of all of the Plaintiff's

asserted federal and state law claims. Plaintiff filed

an Opposition to Linear Control’s Motion for

Summary Judgment on June 29, 2017. R. 33.

The EEOC investigated the safety meeting incident as one

for disparate treatment rather than retaliation based on

Plaintiff’s racial discrimination charge. R. 29-3, Exh. G.

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II. Summary Judgment Standard

Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, summary judgment is mandated when the

movant shows there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law. Am. Home Assurance Co. v.

United Space Alliance, LLC, 378 F.3d 482, 486 (5th

Cir. 2004). A fact is material if proof of its existence

or nonexistence might affect the outcome of the

lawsuit under the applicable law in the case. Minter

v. Great American Insurance Co. of New York, 423

F.3d 460, 465 (5th Cir. 2005). A genuine issue of

material fact exists if a reasonable jury could render

a verdict for the nonmoving party. Thorson v. Epps,

701 F.3d 444, 445 (5th Cir. 2012).

The party seeking summary judgment has the

initial responsibility of informing the court of the

basis for its motion, and identifying those parts of the

record that it believes demonstrate the absence of

genuine issue of material fact. Washburn v. Harvey,

504 F.3d 505, 508 (5th Cir. 2007). If the moving party

carries its initial burden, the burden shifts to the

nonmoving party to demonstrate the existence of a

genuine issue of a material fact. Id. In such a case,

the non-movant may not rest upon the allegations in

his pleadings, but rather must go beyond the

pleadings and designate specific facts demonstrating

that there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). All facts and

justifiable inferences are construed in the light most

favorable to the nonmovant. Matsushita Elec. Indus.

Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

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If the dispositive issue is one on which the

nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at

trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by

pointing out that there is insufficient proof

concerning an essential element of the nonmoving

party’s claim. Norwegian Bulk Transport A/S v.

International Marine Terminals Partnership, 520

F.3d 409, 412 (5th Cir. 2008). The motion should be

granted if the non-moving party cannot produce

sufficient competent evidence to support an essential

element of its claim. Condrey v. Suntrust Bank of

Ga., 431 F.3d 191, 197 (5th Cir. 2005). However,

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,

conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions

and those supported by only a scintilla of evidence

are insufficient. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d

1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994).

In an employment discrimination case, the focus

is on whether a genuine issue exists as to whether

the defendant intentionally discriminated against the

plaintiff. Grimes v. Texas Department of Mental

Health and Mental Retardation, 102 F.3d 137, 139

(5th Cir. 1996) (and cases cited therein). As in any

case, unsubstantiated assertions and conclusory

allegations are not competent summary judgment

evidence. Hervey v. Mississippi Dept. of Educ., 404

Fed.Appx. 865, 869 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Ramsey v.

Henderson, 286 F.3d 264, 269 (5th Cir. 2002))

(“conclusory

allegations,

speculation,

and

unsubstantiated assertions are inadequate to satisfy

the nonmovant’s burden on a motion for summary

judgment”). In response to a motion for summary

judgment, it is therefore incumbent upon the nonmoving party to present evidence—not just

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conjecture and speculation—that the defendant

retaliated and discriminated against plaintiff on the

basis of his race. Grimes, 102 F.3d at 140.

III. Undisputed Facts

Linear Controls publishes and distributes

company policies addressing discrimination and

harassment in the workplace. Linear Controls’s

Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) Policy

stated in pertinent part:

Linear Controls, Inc. provides equal

employment opportunities without regard to

race, color, age, sex, national origin, religion,

disability or veteran status. Linear Controls,

Inc.’s commitment to equality extends to all

personnel actions including: recruitment,

advertising or soliciting for employment,

selection for employment, determining rates

of pay or other forms of compensation,

performance evaluation, upgrading, transfer,

promotion, demotion, selection for training or

education,

discipline,

suspension,

termination, treatment during employment,

and participation in social and recreational

programs.

R 29-2, Undisputed Fact No. 2, citing R. 29, Exh. R,

Declaration of Clemons; Exh. S, Employee Handbook.

Linear Controls also prominently displays at its

facilities EEO posters published by the U.S.

Department of Labor. These posters provide that

discrimination, harassment and retaliation are

prohibited. The posters also provide contact

information for the U.S. Department of Labor, Equal

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Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). In

addition, Linear Controls has a written grievance or

complaint policy. Linear Controls’ management also

maintains an open door policy under which employee

complaints or concerns can be raised. Employees may

raise complaints or concerns with supervisors or with

Human Resources. R. 29-2, Undisputed Fact No. 3,

citing Exh. R, Declaration of Clemons; Exh. S,

Employee Handbook.

Plaintiff acknowledged receipt of copies of the

above-referenced policies as shown by the signed

Receipt and Acknowledgment forms dated October

28, 2008 and March 28, 2012, copies of which are

marked as Exhibit T, in globo. R. 29-2, Undisputed

Fact No. 4, also citing Plaintiff’s Depo., Exh. D, pp.

175-179.

Linear Controls originally hired Plaintiff on

October 28, 2008 as a Helper earning $9.00/hr.

Plaintiff’s employment was separated in March of

2009 due to lack of work. R. 29-2, Undisputed Fact

No. 5 citing Exh. R, Declaration of Clemons.

During the time period relevant to this litigation,

Plaintiff worked offshore for Linear Controls as an

Electrician on a construction crew. R. 29-2,

Undisputed Fact No. 8 citing Exh. R, Declaration of

Clemons.

On July 13, 2015, while offshore in the Grand Isle

area on a job for Linear Controls’ customer,

Fieldwood Energy, LLC (“Fieldwood”), Plaintiff was

late for a safety meeting. R. 29-2, Undisputed Fact

No. 9 citing Exh. O,7/13/15 Employee Disciplinary

Report.

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Plaintiff admits he was late for the meeting. R.

29-2, Undisputed Fact No. 10 citing Exh. D,

Plaintiff’s Depo., pp. 152-159, 233-235, 246.

The next day, July 14, 2015, Plaintiff was sent in

from the Grand Isle job. R. 29-2, Undisputed Fact No.

11 citing Exh. P, 07/14/2015 Employee Disciplinary

Report.

Plaintiff became confrontational with Linear

Controls’ Maintenance Supervisor, Michael Book,

when Plaintiff learned that he was being sent in from

the job. R. 29-2, Undisputed Fact No. 14 citing Exh.

Q, Depo. of Davis, pp. 21-25; Exh. P, 07/14/2015

Employee Disciplinary Report. Michael Book and

Plaintiff were the only Linear Controls’ employees on

the job. Id. citing Exh. Q, pp. 21-25.

After being sent in from the Grand Isle job,

Plaintiff was put back to work immediately by Linear

Controls on another location. R. 29-2, Undisputed

Fact No. 15 citing Exh. R, Declaration of Clemons.

Plaintiff admits he was late for a safety meeting

in August 2015 on the East Breaks 165 project. R. 29-

2, Undisputed Fact No. 17 citing Exh. E, 8/13/2015

(p. 12/100) notes submitted by Plaintiff to EEOC.

No disciplinary action was incurred by any

employee, including Plaintiff, in August 2015 on the

East Breaks 165 project as Linear Controls did not

receive any reports from Fieldwood that either

Duhon, Hammett or Plaintiff were late for any safety

meeting in August 2015. R. 29-2, Undisputed Fact

No. 18 citing Declaration of Clemons.

On September 15, 2015, Plaintiff called Tim

Davis, Linear Controls’ Construction Project

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Manager, asking to have his employment terminated

by Linear Controls. Davis declined since the company

was not conducting layoffs at the time and had a

project coming up and needed Plaintiff to work. R. 29-

2, Undisputed Fact No. 21 citing Depo. of Davis, pp.

19-20; Plaintiff’s Depo., pp. 160-169.

On September 23, 2015, Plaintiff submitted a

letter to Linear Controls stating: “I will like to resign

from Linear Control’s, due to I am continuing my

education as an electrician to further my career.” R.

29, Exh. C, Plaintiff’s 09/3/2015 letter.

Plaintiff’s resignation letter makes no reference

to discrimination or harassment based upon race or

religion or to any other alleged unlawful

discriminatory acts or conduct. R. 29-2, Undisputed

Fact No. 25 citing Exh. C, Plaintiff’s 09/3/2015 letter.

After his resignation, Plaintiff did continue his

education, receiving additional training and/or

education through the International Brotherhood of

Electrical Workers (“IB EW”) and otherwise. R. 29-2,

Undisputed Fact No. 26 citing Plaintiff’s Deposition,

pp. 10, 41-43, 174-175.

Plaintiff filed his Charge of Discrimination on

October 28, 2015, and the EEOC issued a Notice of

Right to Sue at Plaintiff’s request , due to the passage

of time, on February 22, 2016. R. 29-2, Undisputed

Fact No. 27 citing Exh. B, EEOC Charge, Exh. F,

EEOC Notice of Right to Sue.

Plaintiff worked for Linear Controls on

Fieldwood’s East Breaks 165 platform from July 16,

2015 to July 26, 2015 and from August 2, 2015 to

August 22, 2015. From July 27, 2015 to August 1,

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2015, Plaintiff was off. R. 29-2, Undisputed Fact No.

28 citing Declaration of Clemons.

Duhon denies making any comments to Plaintiff

about being a Muslin [sic]. R. 29-2, Undisputed Fact

No. 31 citing Exh. I, Depo of Duhon, pp 21-22.

The job description for an Electrician on a Linear

Controls’ construction crew, as was Plaintiff, called

for working outdoors including exposure to “a typical

offshore site” and the “ability to work in a work area

where work temperatures may be affected by outside

temperatures.” R. 29-2, Undisputed Fact No. 37

citing Plaintiff’s Depo., pp. 179-182; Exh. L, Job

Description, Bates Nos. L00720-L000721.

Working in an outdoor environment was part of

Plaintiff’s job description and regular job duties. R.

29-2, Undisputed Fact No. 38 citing Plaintiff’s Depo.,

pp. 179-182; Exh. L, Job Description, Bates Nos.

L00720-L000721; Declaration of Clemons.

Although he was an Electrician and a member of

Linear Control’s construction crew, Plaintiff was

given assignments on maintenance projects from

time to time if the work was within his capabilities.

R. 29-2, Undisputed Fact No. 40 citing Exh. N,

Declaration of Macdonald.

Plaintiff was offered a maintenance position

within his capabilities and for which he was

qualified, pursuant to an inquiry from Plaintiff. R.

29-2, Undisputed Fact No. 41 citing Exh. N,

Declaration of Macdonald; Davis’ Depo., pp. 36-38.

Plaintiff declined the offer as he would

potentially make less money working in maintenance

even though the job paid $1.00 more per hour.

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Generally, Electricians on a construction crew work

longer shifts (more than 14 days) and more hours per

day than workers on a maintenance job. Also, in a

full-time maintenance position, Plaintiff would

generally not have the opportunity to work as an

Electrician, when not working on a maintenance job,

as Electricians are assigned to work on specific

projects. R. 29-2, Undisputed Fact No. 42 citing

Declaration of Macdonald; Davis’ Depo., pp. 36-38.

Calvin J. Broussard, Jr., an African-American

man, accepted the maintenance position that

Plaintiff declined. R. 29-2, Undisputed Fact No. 43

citing Declaration of Macdonald; Davis’ Depo., pp. 3638.

Plaintiff does not contend that his job

performance trailed off while working for Linear

Controls. Plaintiff testified that his overall

performance improved throughout the course of his

employment. R. 29-2, Undisputed Fact No. 45 citing

Plaintiff’s Depo., p. 147.

A year and three months after he resigned from

Linear Controls, while working for his second,

subsequent employer, and after this lawsuit was

filed, Plaintiff saw his family doctor for anxiety on

one (1) occasion, December 27, 2016. As Plaintiff

testified, no mention was made of Linear Controls to

the doctor. R. 29-2, Undisputed Fact No. 46 citing

Plaintiff’s Depo., pp. 212, 217-225.

Though offered prescription medication at that

time, Plaintiff testified that he did not feel that he

needed it and did not fill the prescription, nor does he

intend to do so. R. 29-2, Undisputed Fact No. 47

citing Plaintiff’s Depo. pp. 224-225.

21a

IV. Law And Analysis

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

A Title VII plaintiff must file a timely charge

with the EEOC before he can commence a civil action

under Title VII in federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(e)(1), (f)(1)4; Nat’l RR Passenger Corp. v. Morgan,

536 U.S. 101, 109 (2002); Dao v. Auchan

Hypermarket, 96 F. 3d 787, 789 (5th Cir. 1996).

Although filing an EEOC charge is not a

jurisdictional prerequisite, it “is a precondition to

filing suit in district court.” Dao, 96 F.3d at 789. It is

equally well settled that a civil action may not be

commenced until after the charging party has

received a “right-to-sue” letter from the EEOC. 42

U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1); Nielsen v. City of Moss Point,

Miss., 621 F.2d 117, 120 (5th Cir. 1980).

The scope of the charging party’s subsequent

right to institute a civil suit is fixed such that the

EEOC charge may be enlarged only by such

investigation as reasonably proceeds therefrom.

National Association of Government Employees v.

City Public Service Board of San Antonio, TX, 40

F.3d 698, 711-712 (5th Cir. 1994). Thus, the suit

which is subsequently filed may encompass only “the

discrimination stated in the charge itself or

developed in the course of a reasonable [EEOC]

investigation of that charge.” Id. at 712. Stated

differently, the scope of a Title VII action “is limited

to the scope of the EEOC investigation which can

reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of

discrimination.” Young v. City of Houston, TX., 906

F.2d 177, 179 (5th Cir. 1990).

22a

On October 28, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Charge of

Discrimination with the EEOC (“the Charge”). R. 29,

Exh. B. Plaintiff defined the time period applicable to

his charge as “07-13-2015” to “07-14-2015.” The

Charge stated:

I began my employment with Linear Controls

on October 28, 2008 most recently as an

Electrician. I was subjected to Muslim jokes

and comments because of my religious beliefs

(not eating pork). On July 13, 2015, I was

subjected to different terms and conditions of

employment, in that, myself and three other

guys were late for a safety meeting but I was

the only person written up and the next day I

received another write-up for no reason.

There were five White and five Black guys.

The Black guys had to work in the heat but

the White guys did not, we were not allowed

to take water breaks but the White guys

were. The Managers would also judge my

appearance and overlook my work. The

company employs more than 500 employees.

No reason was given for the action taken

against me.

I believe I have been discriminated against

because of my religion, ___________[blank in

the original]; race, Black; and retaliated

against in violation of Title VII of Title VII

(sic) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as

amended, in that Chad Duhon and Brandon

Hammett, both White males, were late for a

safety meeting but received no write ups.

23a

Thus, in his EEOC charge Plaintiff stated claims

for: (1) discrimination based on race and religion;

(2) harassment based on religion; (3) retaliation; and

(4) disparate treatment based on race.

Plaintiff’s allegations in his Complaint included

claims of (1) discrimination based on race and

religion; (2) harassment based on religion and race2;

(3) disparate

treatment

based

on

race;

(4) constructive discharge; and (5) retaliation.

Plaintiff’s Complaint filed on May 25, 2016, alleged:

1. From July 15 to July 26, 2015, Plaintiff was

working offshore as an electrician on a crew

on the Fieldwood Energy, LLC East Breaks

165 platform (“East Breaks 165”) and that,

during that time, black crew members were

required

by

Linear

Controls’

white

supervisors to work every day outside, in the

heat while white crew members worked

exclusively

inside,

in

air-conditioned

facilities;

2. During that time, if any black crew member,

including Plaintiff, took a water break inside,

the white supervisors would curse and yell

and order him back to work; and

3.

Despite alleged requests by the black

employees to their white supervisors, there

was no rotation from outside to inside among

white and black crew members. R.1, ¶ VIII.

In his Opposition Memorandum, Plaintiff contends that

the outdoor work he was required to perform and the outdoor

water breaks constituted harassment and hostile work

environment based on his race.

2

24a

The Complaint also alleged that white employees,

Chad Duhon, Plaintiff’s direct supervisor, and

Brandon Hammet, Plaintiff’s co-employee, were late

for safety meetings but not admonished. In his EEOC

charge, Plaintiff alleged that he was “retaliated

against” because Duhon and Hammett were not

written up. The Complaint further alleged that

Plaintiff was harassed by his white supervisors

without reason and that Duhon and Hammet made

jokes and derogatory comments about Plaintiff’s

religion. In addition, the Complaint alleged that

Plaintiff’s request to leave an offshore project due to a

family emergency illness was “denied” by his white

supervisor(s). The Complaint also alleged that

Plaintiff was “laid off . . . and never called to return

back to work.” Finally, the Complaint alleged

Plaintiff was “forced to and did voluntarily resign.”

1. Claims Not In The Charge Nor Alleged In

The Complaint

Plaintiff contended in his deposition that he

wanted a transfer or promotion from his position as

an Electrician on a construction crew to a foreman’s

position or a job on a maintenance crew, but was

denied a promotion. R. 29, Exh. D, Plaintiff’s Depo,

pp. 86-89. Plaintiff claimed that a Caucasian

employee was given a job on the maintenance crew

and he was not. Id. at pp. 93, 190. Plaintiff’s claim is

disputed by the record. Plaintiff was offered a

maintenance position which he declined because he

would potentially make less money working in

maintenance as Electricians on a construction crew

work longer shifts (more than 14 days) and more

hours per day than workers on a maintenance job. R.

29-2, Undisputed Fact Nos. 41 and 42. Moreover, the

25a

maintenance position that Plaintiff declined was

ultimately accepted by Calvin J. Broussard, Jr., an

African-American man. Id., Undisputed Fact No. 43.

Even assuming that Plaintiff had a viable claim,

which he does not, because Plaintiff did not assert

any such failure to promote claim in his EEOC

charge, he is precluded from including it in this

action.

2. Claims In The Charge Not Alleged In The

Complaint

Plaintiff’s EEOC charge alleged that unidentified

“Managers” judged Plaintiff’s appearance and

overlooked his work. However, there is no such

allegation in the Complaint; therefore, there is no

such claim presently before the Court. Any claim

premised on Plaintiff’s appearance allegedly being

judged and his work allegedly being overlooked must

be dismissed. See Cassimere v. Fastorq, LLC, 2017

WL 812468, at *12 (W. D. La. 2017) (Dismissing on

summary judgment claims not included in plaintiff’s

EEOC charge or Title VII complaint.)

3. Allegations In The Complaint Not Stated In

The Charge

a. Denial of Leave

Plaintiff alleged in his Complaint that he was

denied the opportunity to go home for a family illness

emergency while working on the subject platform.

While Plaintiff did not include this claim in the

Charge and the EEOC did not investigate this claim,

he did mention it in the handwritten notes in the

EEOC Questionnaire. R. 29-3, p. 99. Because this

claim is not in the Charge and was not developed in

26a

the ensuing EEOC investigation, it may not be

pursued in this action.

Regardless, Plaintiff’s claim is without merit. In a

June 27, 2015 handwritten note and in his

deposition, Plaintiff conceded he was allowed to leave

the platform with the understanding that he might

not be able to return to the same project. R. 29-3,

Exh. E, p. 104; Exh. D, pp. 119-125, 132-133. In fact,

Plaintiff returned to the same project. Also, Tim

Davis, Linear Controls’ Construction Project

Manager, testified that Plaintiff had requested

personal leave on numerous occasions—his requests

were never denied and he was allowed to return to

the project, rig or worksite. Thus, this claim lacks

merit.

b. Safety Meeting Write-ups

In his EEOC charge Plaintiff claimed that his

direct supervisor, Chad Duhon, and Brandon

Hammett, his co-employee, both Caucasian, were late

for safety meetings but not admonished. Plaintiff

contended that he was “retaliated against” because

Duhon and Hammett were not written up. In his

Charge, Plaintiff specifically stated that on July 13,

2015, while he was working on the Grand Isle

platform, he, Duhon and Hammett were late, but he

was the only one written up. R. 29-3, p. 7. In the

notes in the EEOC Questionnaire, Plaintiff further

stated that he received another write-up the next

day, July 14, for the July 13, 2015 incident which was

a “final warning.” Id., p. 99, No. 5, A & B.

Plaintiff admits that he overslept and was late for

the July 13, 2015 meeting. Contrary to his claim,

Plaintiff’s own deposition testimony establishes that

27a

Duhon and Hammett did not work on the Grand Isle

platform on July 13, 2015. R. 29-3, Exh. D, p. 235.

Also, the testimony of Davis, the Project Manager,

provided that Plaintiff was sent in from the Grand

Isle job because Linear Controls’ customer did not

want to use Plaintiff on the job any longer. Id., Exh.

Q, pp. 20-35. Thus, Linear Controls has established a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the July 13,

2015 and July 14, 2015 write-ups.

In his Complaint and EEOC Questionnaire notes,

Plaintiff claimed that he was late for a safety meeting

in August, 2015 while on the East Breaks 165

platform and was chastised “unprofessionally” by his

Caucasian supervisors. The Declaration of Dawn

Clemons, Linear Controls’ Chief Financial Officer,

states that “[a]fter being sent in on July 14, 2015

from the Grand Isle job, Plaintiff was put back to

work immediately [on the East Breaks 165

platform].” R. 29-4, p. 32. Clemons further states that

Linear Controls received no reports that Plaintiff,

Duhon or Hammett were late for any safety meeting

in August 2015 and no disciplinary action was

incurred by any employee, including Plaintiff. Id.

But assuming arguendo that a disciplinary writeup was issued, in order to establish a prima facie case

of discrimination as well as for retaliation under Title

VII, a plaintiff must demonstrate an adverse

employment action. A disciplinary write-up does not

constitute an adverse employment action. Cassimere,

2017 WL 812468, at *9 (citing King v. Louisiana, 294

Fed. Appx. 77, 85 (5th Cir. 2008) (Allegations of

unpleasant work meetings and verbal reprimands do

not constitute actionable adverse employment

actions.)). Plaintiff has supplied no competent

28a

summary judgment evidence which constitutes an

adverse employment action with regard to the writeup claims. The Court will grant Defendant’s motion

to dismiss this claim.

c.

Constructive Discharge

The allegations in the Complaint that Plaintiff

was “laid off . . . and never called back to return to

work ” and “forced to and did voluntarily resign” are

not in included in his Charge and therefore must be

dismissed. As previously stated, it is well-established

that the failure to assert a claim in an EEOC charge

precludes an employee from including that claim in a

later civil action. As stated in Calmes v. JP Morgan

Chase Bank, 943 F. Supp. 2d 666, 681-682 (E. D. La.

2013), “If a plaintiff fails to state a particular claim in

his EEOC charge or if that charge is not developed in

the ensuing EEOC investigation, the plaintiff is

precluded from bringing that claim in his civil suit.”

In Calmes, the plaintiff submitted a letter of

resignation stating that he was resigning to look for

other employment. Id. at 682. The plaintiff then filed

an EEOC charge and later filed a Title VII complaint

alleging harassment, retaliatory discharge and

constructive discharge. Id. The charge, however, did

not allege retaliatory or constructive discharge. Id.

The court dismissed the retaliatory and constructive

discharge claims on summary judgment, stating in

pertinent part:

[T]he Court notes that despite the fact that

Plaintiff’s charge was filed with the EEOC on

June 15, 2010, a mere three days after his

resignation took effect, Plaintiff failed to

inform the EEOC that he had resigned/felt

29a

that he had to resign as a result of

Defendant’s conduct. The charge itself

contains allegations of harassment by Mr.

Ritchel and details the subsequent behavior

by Defendant; however, it fails to assert that

such behavior caused Plaintiff to terminate

his employment. As such, Plaintiff is

precluded from bringing a claim for

constructive discharge in the instant

action . . . .

[A]t no point in the EEOC charge does

Plaintiff state that the alleged harassment

has resulted in any definitive termination of

his employment. Rather, Plaintiff explains

that he has been suspended with pay and

that Defendant is attempting to force him to

take disability leave, not terminate him.

Plaintiff does not contend [in the EEOC

charge] that he has left and/or has been

forced to leave. Accordingly, Plaintiff is also

precluded from bringing a claim of retaliatory

discharge . . . .

Id. at 682. See also, Harris, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 690

(W. D. La. 2001) (Employee’s Title VII claims

including the denial of various promotions and

opportunities, hostile work environment, and

retaliation were not properly before the Court as

employee’s charge referred only to her employer’s

failure to promote her for specific positions); Stone v.

Louisiana Dept. of Revenue, 590 Fed. Appx. 332, 338

(5th Cir. 2014) (dismissing constructive discharge

and other claims since plaintiff’s EEOC charge did

not allege facts reasonably encompassing such

claims).

30a

An EEOC charge must state facts sufficient to

trigger an EEOC investigation and put the employer

on notice of the existence and nature of the claim.

Stone at 338. Here, Plaintiff’s Charge does not

mention Plaintiff’s separation of employment at all.

The Charge was signed by Plaintiff on October 21,

2015 and filed on October 27, 2015, approximately a

month after Plaintiff submitted his letter of

resignation on September 23, 2015. While Plaintiff’s

resignation letter states that he was resigning to seek

additional education to further his career3, the

Charge makes no reference to being laid off or forced

to resign. Likewise, Plaintiff’s resignation letter

states nothing about harassment or discrimination.

Plaintiff’s Charge did not specifically contain, or

reasonably encompass, any claim regarding his

separation from employment and was never amended

or supplemented to include one. Thus, the EEOC did

not inquire into Plaintiff’s separation of employment

at any time prior to closing the case. R. 29, Exhs. G,

H. The EEOC closed its investigation and issued a

“Notice of Right to Sue (Issued on Request)” on

February 22, 2016. “[I]f an EEOC investigation has

actually been conducted, most courts hold that the

scope of the complaint is limited to the actual scope of

the

investigation.”

National

Association

of

Government Employees v. City Public Service Board

of San Antonio, Tx, 40 F.3d 698, 712 (5th Cir. 1994)

(citing 2 Larson, Employment Discrimination

§ 49.11(c)(1) at 9B–16). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims

of constructive, retaliatory or other allegedly

3

Plaintiff testified he did in fact seek additional education.

31a

unlawful discharge must be dismissed for failure to

include them in the EEOC Charge.

B. Discrimination Claims

Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating

against employees on the basis of race, color, religion,

sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a). “The

Title VII inquiry is whether the defendant

intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff.”

Alvarado v. Texas Rangers, 492 F.3d 605, 611 (5th

Cir. 2007). A plaintiff can prove Title VII

discrimination through direct or circumstantial

evidence. Turner v. Baylor Richardson Medical

Center, 476 F.3d 337, 345 (5th Cir. 2007); Alvarado

at 611. Direct evidence of an employer’s

discriminatory intent is rare; therefore, Title VII

plaintiffs must ordinarily prove their claims through

circumstantial evidence. Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil

Tools, 75 F.3d 989, 993 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).

Where there is no direct evidence of

discrimination, Title VII claims are analyzed using

the framework established by the Supreme Court in

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973); Paske v. Fitzgerald, 785 F.3d 977, 984 (5th

Cir. 2015). A Title VII plaintiff bears the initial

burden to prove a prima facie case of discrimination

by a preponderance of the evidence. Shackelford v.

Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 190 F.3d 398, 404 (5th Cir.

1999) citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801-803.

Here, Plaintiff contends he suffered racial and

religious discrimination during his employment on

Fieldwood’s East Breaks 165 platform sometime

between July 15 and August 22, 2015, when he

terminated his employment. Plaintiff asserts a claim

32a

of disparate treatment based on his race and claims

of harassment creating a hostile work environment

based on his religion and his race. The Court will

consider Plaintiff’s claims as follows.

1. Disparate Treatment

To establish a prima facie case of disparate

treatment racial discrimination, the plaintiff must

provide evidence that: “(1) he is a member of a

protected class, (2) he was qualified for the position

at issue, (3) he was the subject of an adverse

employment action, and (4) he was treated less

favorably because of his membership in that

protected class than were other similarly situated

employees who were not members of the protected

class, under nearly identical circumstances.” Paske,

785 F.3d at 985 (quoting Lee v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co.,

574 F.3d 253, 259 (5th Cir. 2009)).

The Fifth Circuit defines “similarly situated”

narrowly. Silva v. Chertoff, 512 F. Supp. 2d 792, 803

n. 33 (W. D. Tex. 2007) (citing Wheeler v. BL Dev.

Corp., 415 F.3d 399, 405 (5 Cir. 2005)). Similarly

situated individuals must be “nearly identical” and

must fall outside the plaintiff’s protective class.

Wheeler at 405. To show that an employee outside

the protected class was “similarly situated” but

treated more favorably, a plaintiff must show that

the alleged misconduct of both employees was “nearly

identical.” Wallace v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 271 F.3d

212, 221 (5th Cir. 2001).

“The employment actions being compared will be

deemed to have been taken under nearly identical

circumstances when the employees being compared

held the same job or responsibilities, shared the same

33a

supervisor or had their employment status

determined by the same person, and have essentially

comparable violation histories.” Turner v. Kansas

City Southern Ry. Co., 675 F.3d 887, 893 (5th Cir.

2012).

The prima facie case, once established, raises a

presumption of discrimination, which the defendant

must

rebut

by

articulating

a

legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Shackelford,

190 F.3d at 404. If the defendant satisfies this

burden, the presumption of discrimination raised by

the prima facie case disappears, and the plaintiff is

left with the ultimate burden of proving

discrimination. Sandstad v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc.,

309 F.3d 893, 897 (5th Cir. 2002). The plaintiff may

satisfy this burden by producing “substantial

evidence” which proves that the proffered reasons are

pretextual. Id.; Shackelford, 190 F.3d at 404. The

plaintiff must put forward evidence rebutting each of

the nondiscriminatory reasons the employer

articulates. Wallace v. Methodist Hospital System,

271 F.3d 212, 220 (5th Cir. 2001). “Evidence that the

proffered reason is unworthy of credence must be

enough to support a reasonable inference that the

proffered reason is false; a mere shadow of doubt is

insufficient.” Auguster vs. Vermilion Parish School

Board, 249 F.3d 400, 403 (5th Cir 2001). The Fifth

Circuit has “consistently held that an employee’s

‘subjective belief of discrimination’ alone is not

sufficient to warrant judicial relief.” Auguster, 249

F.3d at 403 (citing Bauer v. Albemarle Corp., 169

F.3d 962, 967 (5th Cir. 1999)).

Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that “from July

15, 2015 to July 26, 2015 [he] was a member of

34a

Defendant’s work crew” on the East Breaks 165

platform. R. 1, ¶ VIII. While Plaintiff acknowledged

that his job description called for exposure to “a

typical offshore site” and the “ability to work in a

work area where temperatures may be affected by

outside temperatures,” R. 29, Exh. D, Plaintiff’s

Depo., pp. 179-182; R. 29-2, Undisputed Facts 37, 38,

he maintains that the African-American crew

members were required to work every day outside

while the Caucasian crew members worked

exclusively inside in air-conditioned facilities.

Plaintiff further contends that if an AfricanAmerican employee took a water break inside, the

white supervisors would curse and yell and order the

employee back to work. Id. In particular, Plaintiff

testified in his deposition that, after sitting inside the

safety man, Jimmy Cox’s, office drinking water for a

couple of minutes, his Caucasian supervisor, Robert

Walker, fussed at him and told him to get the “f” back

to work. R. 29, Exh. D, Plaintiff’s Depo., pp. 7583,100. Plaintiff got up and went back to work. Id.

In his Declaration, Broc Arnaud, Linear Control’s

employee since July 1, 2014, who personally worked

with Plaintiff, stated that Caucasian employees,

including Arnaud himself, worked both outside and

inside on the subject platform; and that Caucasian

and African-American employees worked together

outside on the platform. R. 29-2, Exh. K, Declar. Of

Arnaud, ¶ 3. In particular, Arnaud testified that he

personally observed African-American employees of

Linear Controls, namely Daniel Harris, Archie

Mouton, Aaron Boudreaux and Chris Lavergne,

working inside on the East Breaks 165 platform. Id.

Arnaud also stated that he personally observed

35a

Plaintiff working inside for a period of time. Id.

Moreover, Arnaud stated that he, Matthew Latiolais

and Brandon Hammett, worked outside. Id. Robert

Walker, one of Plaintiff’s direct supervisors, testified

that he himself had worked outside pulling cable and

that African-American employees worked inside on

the subject platform. R. 29-3, Exh. J, Walker Depo.,

pp. 22-23.

Arnaud also stated that all employees on the East

Breaks 165 platform were allowed to take water

breaks when needed and they were allowed to get

water and Gatorade from refrigerators or coolers at

any time. He further stated that Linear Controls’

managers would regularly and routinely hand out

water to their employees who were working outside

throughout the shift. R. 29-2, Declar. Of Arnaud, ¶5.

Also, Walker, Plaintiff’s supervisor testified that

neither he nor Duhon “got onto workers for stopping

to get a drink of water.” R. 29-3, Walker Depo., p. 23.

Rather, he stated, they would actually bring the

workers water. Id.

Plaintiff has identified no similarly situated

Caucasian employee who performed the same work

he performed and was allowed to work exclusively

indoors. Nor has Plaintiff identified a similarly

situated Caucasian co-worker performing his same

work who was allowed to take a water break like the

one Plaintiff was allegedly denied. Rather, Plaintiff’s

Complaint and his deposition offer nothing more than

general claims that Caucasian workers were treated

better than him.

In his opposition memorandum, Plaintiff submits

the Declaration of Archie J. Mouton, an Electrician

36a

on the East Breaks 165 platform who states he

worked “in July 2015” with Plaintiff on a crew of four

African Americans, including Plaintiff and himself.

R. 33-1, ¶ 1, 2. As to Plaintiff’s allegations of racial

disparity in the outdoor versus indoor working

environment, Mouton states, “[b]oth crews had the

same job, however, my crew was assigned to work

outside in the heat. The white crew worked inside in

the air conditioning.” Id., ¶ 3. Plaintiff also submits

the Declaration of Jimmy Cox, the Safety

Representative for United Fire Safety who “was

contracted to work at . . . East Breaks 165 platform.”

R. 33-2. Cox states that “all black workers that were

employed by Linear had to work outside and all the

white employees worked inside where there was air

conditioning. Plaintiff’s supervisor, Chad Duhon,

stayed inside and would yell at any of the black

employees who came inside to get water or took

breaks.” Id. at ¶ 4.

Defendant objects to the statements of Mouton

and Cox. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(4)

requires that a declaration used to support or oppose

a motion “must be [1] made on personal knowledge,

[2] set out facts that would be admissible in evidence,

and [3] show that the [] declarant is competent to

testify on the matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4).

Defendant objects to Mouton’s declaration for failure

to attest to personal knowledge as to any Caucasian

co-workers who “had the same job” and who “worked

inside in the air conditioning.” R. 35-3. Defendant

contends that Mouton does not provide the actual

time period which he worked on the platform, instead

simply states that he was on the project “six weeks”

“in July 2015,” and therefore has not laid the proper

37a

foundation to establish his personal knowledge.

Defendant also objects to Cox’s statements on the

basis of personal knowledge in that Cox merely

makes a reference to “July 2015” and does not specify

the dates he was actually on the platform or whether

he was there for the entirety of Plaintiff’s

employment. Nor does Cox testify as to the basis of

his personal knowledge of how he knows which

employees were Linear Controls’ employees, the race

of any particular employees and the job titles and

positions of any of the employees.4

In addition to its objections for failure to lay a

proper foundation/lack of personal knowledge as

required by FRE Rule 602, Defendant also objects to

both Declarations on the basis of relevance under

FRE 401, inadmissible hearsay offered to prove the

truth of the matters asserted, pursuant to FRE Rule

801, and argumentative, speculative and conclusory

statements which are not based on personal

knowledge, inadmissible under FRE Rule 701.

While a declaration need not specifically state

that it is based on personal knowledge, it must

include enough factual support for a court to

determine that its averments were based upon the

personal knowledge of the declarant. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c)(4); Gahagan v. United States Citizenship and

Immigration Services, 2016 WL 7187943, at *2 (E. D.

La., 2016) (citing Thomas v. Atmos Energy Corp., 223

The Court notes that throughout the Declaration, Cox’s

“statements” are referenced in the third person—“Declarant

states” or “Declarant says”— rather than the first person. Such

a reference questions whether the Declaration is actually Cox’s

own statement.

4

38a

Fed. Appx. 369, 374 (5th Cir. 2007)). When

considering a motion for summary judgment, a court

disregards any portion of a declaration that fails to

comply with Rule 56(c)(4). Akin v. Q–L Investments,

Inc., 959 F.2d 521, 531 (5th Cir. 1992).

The Court finds that Mouton and Cox’s

declarations as to Plaintiff’s claims at issue fail to

comply with the requirements of Rule 56(c)(4). The

declarants have not laid the proper foundation to

demonstrate their presence on the platform during

the relevant period of time or that they had personal

information in order to establish that the alleged

disparity between the crew members was based on a

comparison of similarly situated employees. “The

similarly situated prong requires a Title VII claimant

to identify at least one coworker outside of his

protected class who was treated more favorably

under nearly identical circumstances. This coworker,

known as a comparator, must hold the same job or

hold the same job responsibilities as the Title VII

claimant; must share the same supervisor or have his

employment status determined by the same person

as the Title VII claimant; and must have a history of

violations or infringements similar to that of the Title

VII claimant.” Alkhawaldeh v. Dow Chemical

Company, 851 F.3d 422, 426–27 (5th Cir. 2017).

Thus, as Plaintiff has failed to identify a similarly

situated Caucasian comparator, he cannot establish a

prima facie case.

Even if Plaintiff had identified a similarly

situated Caucasian comparator who was assigned to

work exclusively inside the platform facility and/or

allowed to take a water break inside, Plaintiff’s

claims still fail as a matter of law because he has not

39a

alleged or testified to any adverse employment

action. “Adverse employment actions include only

ultimate employment decisions such as hiring,

granting

leave,

discharging,

promoting,

or

compensating.” Green v. Adm’rs of Tulane Educ.

Fund, 284 F.3d 642, 657 (5th Cir. 2002).

Defendant directs the Court to Harris v. Attorney

General U.S.A., 2017 WL 1493692 (3rd Cir. 2017), a

case with facts similar to the instant one. In Harris

the Third Circuit stated:

[Plaintiff] has described the. . . discriminatory

action as forcing him “to work under

unhealthful environmental (excessive heat)

conditions,” or directing him “to perform

mowing activities on a day where the

temperature

and

heat

index

were

dangerously high”. . . The District Court

concluded that this single action did not

amount to an adverse employment action,

because it did not alter [plaintiff’s]

“compensation,

terms,

conditions,

or

privileges of employment,”. . . and it did not

reduce his opportunities for promotion or

professional growth . . . Rather, [plaintiff]

was assigned to complete one of his regular

job duties. Id. at *2.

Defendant argues that just as the court held in

Harris, working outside in the heat between July 15,

2015 and July 26, 2015, was part of Plaintiff’s job

description and his regular job duties, such action

does not meet the definition of “adverse employment

action”, i.e., a significant change in employment

status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote,

40a

reassignment

with

significantly

different

responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant

change in benefits. See also, Breaux v. City of

Garland, 205 F.3d 150, 157 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting

that the U.S. Fifth Circuit takes a narrow view of

what constitutes an adverse employment action.)

Similarly, Plaintiff’s allegations that he was not

allowed to go inside and take his water break do not

constitute an adverse employment action. Actions

such as assigning an employee more difficult work,

giving employees unequal break times, and giving

allegedly biased annual evaluations are not “adverse

actions” within the meaning of Title VII. Aryain v.

Wal-Mart Stores Tex. LP, 534 F.3d 473, 486 (5th Cir.

2008) (break requests); Shackelford v. Deloitte &

Touche, LLP, 190 F.3d 398, 407 (5th Cir. 1999)

(unfair employee evaluations); Benningfield v. City of

Houston, 157 F.3d 369, 376-77 (5th Cir. 1998)

(heavier work load). Neither the alleged assignment

of outdoor work nor the denial of an inside water

break is an adverse employment action within the

meaning of Title VII. Defendant’s Motion in this

regard will be granted.

2. Harassment Claims

Plaintiff asserts a purported hostile work

environment claim premised on allegations of

religious harassment. Plaintiff alleges he was subject

to Muslim jokes and comments made by his

supervisor, Duhon, and co-employee, Hammett, while

working on Fieldwood’s East Breaks 165 platform

sometime between July 15 and August 22, 2015. In

his Opposition, Plaintiff appears to raise a

harassment and hostile work environment claim

41a

based on the allegations that he was not allowed to

work inside and was denied a water break. While

Plaintiff’s EEOC Charge indicates these allegations

as to racial discrimination were based on disparate

treatment, the Court will also consider whether these

claims constitute racial harassment and hostile work

environment under Title VII.

To state a prima facie case of hostile work

environment based on harassment, an employee

must show that: (1) he belongs to a protected group;

(2) he was subjected to unwelcome harassment;

(3) the harassment complained of was based on a

protected characteristic; (4) the harassment

complained of affected a term, condition or privilege

of his employment; and (5) the employer knew or

should have known of the harassment and failed to

take prompt remedial action. Watts v. Kroger Co.,

170 F.3d 505, 509-510 (5th Cir. 1999); Faragher v.

City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998)

(Element five need not be established if the alleged

harassment is committed by employee’s supervisor.).

For harassment to affect a “term, condition or

privilege of employment,” it must be so “severe or

pervasive” as to alter the terms or conditions of

employment and create an abusive working

environment. Watts, 170 F.3d at 509. To determine

whether behavior qualifies as severe or pervasive

harassment, Federal Courts look to subjective and

objective components. Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan,

Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1276 (11th Cir. 2002). Thus, to be

actionable, the behavior alleged must result in a

work environment that the plaintiff subjectively

perceives as abusive and that a reasonable person

would deem abusive. Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510

42a

U.S. 17, 21–22 (1993). The following factors weigh on

whether a work environment is objectively abusive or

hostile: (I) the frequency of the discriminatory

conduct; (ii) its severity; (iii) whether it is physically

threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive

utterance; and (iv) whether it unreasonably

interferes with an employee’s work performance.

Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787-788; Ramsey v. Henderson,

286 F.3d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 2002).

It is well settled that the mere utterance of an

“epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an

employee” does not sufficiently alter the terms or

conditions of employment in a way that violates Title

VII. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787. Thus, simple teasing,

rudeness, offhand remarks, and isolated incidents of

derogatory overtures are insufficient to establish a

hostile working environment. Id. at 787-788; Baker v.

Starwood Hotel and Resort, 1999 WL 397405, at *3

(E.D. La. 1999).5

Defendant cites several unpublished opinions from the

Eleventh Circuit including Alansari v. Tropic Star Seafood Inc.,

388 Fed. Appx. 902, 905 (11th Cir. 2010), a case involving a

claim of religiously hostile work environment brought by a

Muslim. The circuit court affirmed summary judgment, noting

that behavior “including solicitations to go to church because

‘Jesus would save’ [him], other comments about his Muslim

religion, and the playing of Christian music on the radio ... may

have been unwanted and even derogatory . . . but it did not rise

to a threatening or humiliating level.” Defendant also cites Byrd

v. Postmaster Gen., 582 Fed. Appx.787 (11th Cir. 2014);

Richardson v. Dougherty County, Ga., 185 F. App’x 785, 791

(11th Cir. 2006).

5

43a

a. Religion

Regarding

Plaintiff’s

EEOC

charge

for

harassment based on his Muslin [sic] religion,

Plaintiff stated in his deposition that while working

for Linear Controls on the East Breaks 165 platform,

Duhon and Hammett would say to him “loo, loo, loo,

boom” or “do, do, do, boom,” which Plaintiff testified

sounded to him like “Muslims blowing up stuff.” R.

29, Exh. D, Plaintiff Depo. pp. 106–112. In his

deposition, Plaintiff interpreted this phrase as a

reference to “terrorists.” Plaintiff did not identify any

derogatory comments containing the words “religion,”

“Muslim” or “pork.” Id. Plaintiff did not allege or

testify to any physical harm or threats of harm, just

“jokes and comments.” Id.6

As to Plaintiff’s deposition testimony that the

statements, “loo, loo, loo, boom” or “do, do, do, boom,”

were religious harassment, Defendant contends that

these comments were insufficient to establish a

prima facie case of religious discrimination. See Lara

v. Raytheon Technical Service, 476 Fed. Appx. 218

(11th Cir. 2012) (Christian employee failed to

establish prima facie case of hostile work

environment based on religious harassment since,

among other reasons, many of the instances of

harassing behavior, which took place over a month

and a half, were not even related to religion). The

Court agrees. The alleged remarks attributed to

In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he was constantly

and continuously cursed and yelled at by his supervisors and coemployees, but sets forth no specific facts or evidence

establishing that the cursing and yelling had anything to do

with his religion, or race for that matter.

6

44a

Duhon and Hammett have nothing to do with

religion, thereby eliminating a required element of

Plaintiff’s prima facie case—harassment based on a

protected characteristic. Moreover, Duhon testified in

his deposition that he did not know Plaintiff was a

Muslim, R. 29, Exh. D, Plaintiff’s Depo, pp. 197-98,

and Plaintiff has produced no evidence showing that

Hammett knew Plaintiff was a Muslin [sic].

b. Race

As to Plaintiff’s contentions of “yelling and

cursing” as the basis for racial harassment. Plaintiff

sets forth no specific facts or evidence that the

cursing and yelling had anything to do with race.

Indeed, in his deposition Plaintiff denied being the

target of any racial slurs. Id. at pp. 197–198.

Plaintiff’s

own

conclusory

allegations

and

unsubstantiated assertions, without even a scintilla

of evidence, are insufficient to establish this claim for

hostile work environment.

In his Opposition Memorandum, Plaintiff also

contends that requiring him to work outside in the

heat and being denied water breaks inside constitute

a hostile work environment based on race.7 R. 33, p.

9. Considering the factors which weigh on whether a

work environment is objectively abusive or hostile:

(i) the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; (ii) its

severity; (iii) whether it is physically threatening or

humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and

While the Court finds that Plaintiff failed to raise an

harassment/hostile work environment claim based on his

outdoor work and water breaks in his EEOC Charge, the Court

will consider the claim for purposes of this motion for summary

judgment.

7

45a

(iv) whether it unreasonably interferes with an

employee’s work performance, Faragher, 524 U.S. at

787-788, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s hostile work

environment claims in this regard lack merit.

As provided in the foregoing analysis as to

disparate treatment, Plaintiff has admitted that

working in an outdoor environment was part of his

job description and regular job duties and that his

work performance improved while employed with

Linear Controls. The record provides that he worked

on the East Breaks 165 platform from July 16, 2015

to July 26, 2015, then was off for six days before

returning. R. 33-7, Plaintiff’s Stmt. Of Disp. Facts,

responding to ¶¶ 28, 38, 45 of Def. Stmt. Of Undisp.

Facts. According to the Complaint, it was during the

period from July 16th to July 26th that Plaintiff

alleges he was not allowed to work inside or take a

water break inside. R. 1, ¶ 8. Plaintiff does not set

forth facts showing that this occurred at other times

or on other jobs, nor does he set forth facts showing

that he suffered physical harm or injury as a result.

Plaintiff’s claims of hostile work environment are

belied by his complaint that he resigned because he

was not returned to work soon enough. The Court

will grant Defendant’s Motion as to hostile work

environment on the basis of race.

C. State Law Claims

1. The Louisiana Employment Discrimination

Claims

The Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law,

La. R.S. 23:301 (LEDL) prohibits an employer from

discriminating against an individual based on his

race, color, religion, sex, age, or national origin. The

46a

scope of the LEDL is the same as Title VII, and

therefore, claims under the LEDL are analyzed under

the Title VII framework and jurisprudential

precedent. DeCorte v. Jordan, 497 F.3d 433, 437 (5th

Cir. 2007). Because the outcome of the alleged

discrimination claims under Louisiana law are the

same as the outcome under Title VII, for the reasons

discussed above, the LEDL claims must also be

dismissed.

2. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

For the claim of intentional infliction of emotional

distress the plaintiff must prove 1) that the conduct

of the defendant was extreme and outrageous; 2) that

the emotional distress of the plaintiff was severe; and

3) that the defendant desired to inflict severe

emotional distress or knew that severe emotional

distress would be certain or substantially certain to

result from his conduct. White v. Monsanto Co., 585

So.2d 1205, 1209 (La. 1991). The conduct must be

“. . . so outrageous in character, and so extreme in

degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of

decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly

intolerable in a civilized community. Liability does

not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats,

annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.

Persons must necessarily be expected to be hardened

to a certain amount of rough language, and to

occasional acts that are definitely inconsiderate and

unkind.” Id. at 1209.

Based on the record before the Court, Plaintiff

cannot establish that he was subjected to the type of

deliberate and repeated harassment required to give

rise to a claim for intentional infliction of emotional

47a

distress. Further, he has not provided any evidence

that he suffered any emotional distress, much less

that the emotional distress he may have suffered was

severe. In fact, Plaintiff describes himself as a

“healthy, young man,” who does not feel mentally

unstable, who has never seen a psychiatrist or a

psychologist, and who does not feel like he needs

mental health counseling. R. 29-3, Exh. D, pp. 204208. While he was working for Linear Controls,

Plaintiff testified that his overall performance

improved throughout the course of time. Id. at p. 147.

It was not until one year and three months after he

resigned from Linear Controls, while working for his

second, subsequent employer and after Plaintiff filed

this lawsuit, that he saw his family doctor for anxiety

on one occasion, December 27, 2016. Id. at pp. 212,

217-225. He made no mention of Linear Controls to

the doctor. Id. Though the doctor offered prescription

medication at that time, Plaintiff testified that he did

not feel that he needed it and did not fill the

prescription, nor does he plan to do so. Id. at pp. 224-

225.

Plaintiff has failed to provide any evidence that

he suffered severe emotional distress as a result of

Defendant’s alleged actions. Accordingly, Defendant’s

motion for summary judgment related to Plaintiff’s

state law claim for emotional distress will be granted.

THUS DONE AND SIGNED this 5th day of

September, 2017, at Lafayette, Louisiana.

Carol B. Whitehurst

Carol B. Whitehurst

United States Magistrate Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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