Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Cathy Cardillo, Petitioner v. Mark Neary, Clerk, Supreme Court of New Jersey, et al.

19-13)1

No.___

3u Tbe

upreme Court of the Ont0b tate

CATHY CARDILLO,

Petitioner,

V.

MARK NEARY, CLERK, SUPREME COURT OF

NEW JERSEY, BONNIE C. FROST, CHAIR,

DISCIPLINARY REVIEW BOARD, CHARLES

CENTIARO, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF ATTORNEY

ETHICS, MARVIN WALDEN JR., SECRETARY,

DISTRICT VI FEE ARBITRATION COMMITTEE,

AND AURELIO VINCITORE, ARBITRATOR, IN THEIR

PERSONAL CAPACITIES AND MEGAN BURNS,

Respondents.

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari And Or

Summary Reversal To The United States

Court Of Appeals For The Third Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

AND/OR SUMMARY REVERSAL

.4

CATHY C. CARDILLO, pro se

Bairro 25 Lote 92

Born Sucesso

2510-662 Vau

Portugal

(351) 262960116

advogadacc@grnail.com

EC

APR 162019

QUESTION PRESENTED

Can the Constitutional right to due process or "adequate notice and a hearing," as found by this

Court in Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 235 (2006)

that government notice should also be served by

be simply ignored by the

"regular mail"

Courts below?

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-

Can an attorney's right to access a State Supreme

Court, to raise the above "Constitutional due process notice failure," as held by this Court in Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Bar Assn., 457 U.S.

423, 431-432 (1982) be simply ignored by the

Courts below?

-

Can a Federal District Court simply ignore this

Court's holding in Exxon Mobil v. Saudi

Basic Industries Corp., 125 S. Ct. 1517, 152122 (2005), and rule that the Rooker-Feldman

Doctrine applied, when there was no "state

court judgment"?

Can the Third Circuit Court of Appeals try to ameliorate the District Court's decision by simply

ruling that State Disciplinary Review Board

was a "court of law"?

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11

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

The caption names all of the parties to the proceedings below; except, while Defendant, Megan

Burns, the "client," was served, she never answered

and/or appeared below.

111

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED .................................

i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING......................ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................iii

OPINIONS BELOW.............................................1

JURISDICTION...................................................1

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED...........................................2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE..............................2

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

6

CONCLUSION.....................................................7

APPENDIX

Opinion, United States Court of Appeals for the

Third Circuit (December 28, 2018)..................App. 1

Opinion, United States District Court, District

of New Jersey, (February 12, 2018) ...............App. 11

Order, United States District Court, District of

New Jersey, (February 23, 2018) ...................App. 32

1

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

AND/OR SUMMARY REVERSAL

I, Cathy C. Cardillo, respectfully petitions for a

writ of certiorari and/or a summary reversal of the

judgement and decision entered by the United States

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

OPINIONS BELOW

The decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals and the

U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey are

reproduced in the Appendix.

JURISDICTION

This Court's jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C.

Section 1254(1). The Court of Appeals issued its judgment on December 28, 2018. The Court found that the

New Jersey Disciplinary Review Board was a "court" of

law. Thereby, expanding upon and supporting the "irregular" decision of the District Court, which ruled

that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applied, when the

New Jersey Supreme Court had refused to entertain

and or even hear my U.S. Constitutional Complaint.

2

CONSTITUTIONAL AND

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

This Petition for Writ of Certiorari and/or Request

for Summary Reversal is founded on the Fourteenth

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which provides

that ". . . [n] o State shall. . . deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor

deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal

protection of the laws." Flyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 211

(1982) (emphasis added).

While this Petition/Request is seemingly based on

the circumstances of my case, it also has broad implications for all states, who attempt by "Rule," like New

Jersey, to limit access to their courts. See, e.g., Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Assn.,

457 U.S. 423, 431-432 (1982), finding, with emphasis

added, that "a federal court should abstain unless state

law clearly bars the interposition of constitutional

claims. The pertinent inquiry, here, then, is whether

the state proceedings afforded an adequate opportunity to raise the constitutional claims."

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

First, an "elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be

accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under

all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of

the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." Mullane v. Central

3

Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)

(emphasis added). This Court defined this notice requirement further in Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220,

235 (2006), holding, with emphasis added, that when a

state's forfeiture notice is returned by the post office,

"unclaimed," then the state should have taken additional reasonable steps, such as regular mail, as it

was practicable to do so."

The New Jersey State Court Rules governing

this matter, again, with emphasis added, in part, are:

R.1:20-7(h), "Service on the Respondent of any pleading, motion, or other document required by these Rules

maybe made by personal service, or by certified

mail (return receipt requested) and regular

mail"; R. 1:20A-2(b)(2), "All service on attorneys required by fee arbitration shall be made in accordance with R. 1:20-7(h)"; R. 1:20A-3(c)(2), "No

unless it failed to

appeal of the fee committee

substantially comply with the procedural requirements of R. 1:20A"; R. 1:20-16(d), "The [Disciplinary Review] Board's decision shall be final and

in all

not subject to further review by the Court

to R.

matters considered by the Board pursuant

1:20A-3c; and critically, R. 1:20A-16(f), "An aggrieved party may ifie with the Supreme Court

for leave to appeal to seek interlocutory review

of a constitutional challenge to the proceedings

• . . before the Board." Of note, the Disciplinary Review Board is defined by the State Court as an "independent branch of government," and is made up of

.

..

.

.

.

...

Eli

non-attorney-public members, along with attorney volunteers and one retired judge.

The relevant facts below: Several years after retiring from the practice of law and relocating to Portugal,

I learned from a District Ethics Committee that a

former client had requested a District Fee Arbitration

in regards to my fees and costs, wherein a hearing was

held and monies found due to the client. I immediately

contacted Defendant, Charles Centinaro, Director, Office of Attorney Ethics. He critically disclosed, in writing, that only three differently dated notices had

been sent to me by the District, and all were returned as "undeliverable," or hence, sent by certified mail. He did say, however, that I could raise a quick

response to the DRB. Limited by time and not knowing

the confines of this response, or the Court's Rules, as I

had never been found at fault in any previous Fee Arbitration Request and/or proceeding I focused on the

complicated process that the client's case had taken going to and from several State and Federal Courts,

along with the numerous motions and appeals filed by

the Defendants trying to eliminate its treble liability

under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act.

-

-

-

It was not until after the DRB declined my appeal

for not showing a R.1:20A-3(c) failure, that I reviewed the Rule itself which, as shown above, required notice by certified and regular mail. I then

tried to file a petition with the New Jersey Supreme

Court regarding the District's notice failure, citing the

above opinions of this Court, which was declined by the

Court Clerk, who asserted that the Court's Rules

-

barred this Constitutional review. Compare, however,

N.J. Ct. R. 1:20A-16(f) (cited above).

In briefing the Constitutional claim to the U.S.

District Court of New Jersey, I remembered and

showed "confirming evidence" of the Fee Committee's

"notice failure" my regular mail had been forwarded

to a friend and colleague in New Jersey, during this

time period, and no "regular" mailings from the Fee

Committee had been received. Thus, the Committee

had, in fact, violated Rule 1:20-7(h); and consequently, my Constitutional due process right to

notice and be heard.

-

The District Court, though, in ruling, did not

even mention or decide this Constitutional due

process failure. Rather, it limited it's findings,

wrongly stating that the State Court Rules provide

that the Disciplinary Review Board cannot be appealed. See, again, N.J. Ct. R. 1:20A-16(f). Interestingly, in doing so, the District Court also cited In Re

LiVolsi, 85 N.J. 576 (1981), but ignored this Court's important "companion decision" in Middlesex County

Ethics Comm., 457 U.S. at 423, Fn.15, that: "[t]he fact

that Committee determinations are not appealable does not, of course, mean that the parties to

a Committee adjudication have no recourse if

the Committee violates their constitutional

rights." Emphasis added.

The District Court then held that the Rookerand even cited to this

Feldman Doctrine applied

Court's decision in Exxon Mobil v. Saudi Basic

-

Industries Corp., 125 S. Ct. 1517, 1521-22 (2005),

wherein this Court observed that the Doctrine "has

sometimes been construed to extend far beyond the

contours of the Rooker and Feldman cases." And declared, with emphasis added:

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, we hold today,

is confined to cases of the kind from which

the doctrine acquired its name: cases

brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court

judgments rendered before the district

court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those

judgments.

Despite the above factual showings of improper

notice under the N.J. Court Rules, and the wrongfully

denied right to appeal to the N.J. Supreme Court, the

Third Circuit simply denied my appeal on December

28, 2018 holding the Disciplinary Review Board was

a "court." I respectfully submit that these plain errors

warrant this Court's review and, in the interests ofjustice a Summary Reversal.

-

-

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The central issue here is not just the State's failure to follow its own Court Rules, but the denial of the

Constitutional right to raise and challenge this failure.

For this is exactly what happened in this matter. If the

State and Federal Courts can cast a blind eye to the

basic principles established by the Constitution, and

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7

this Court's opinions on the same then where does

the common man, or in this case, common woman, go?

-

I am now 73 years old, tired and extremely frustrated but I cannot give up, and not just to "save"

myself— but to free all like myself, who struggle to comply and do the right thing, and are simply thwarted by

a bureaucracy that just will not listen. Constitutional

due process has to be affirmed, any where and any

time, especially when, States choose to ignore it.

-

CONCLUSION

While I have filed and requested a Writ for Certiorari I believe the blatant errors identified could also

prompt this Court to summarily reverse the decisions

below sending it back to the Supreme Court of New

Jersey, to follow its own Rules and properly notice and

grant me a hearing on the alleged fee violations.

-

-

Respectfully submitted,

CATHY C. CARDILLO,

Plaintiff-Appellant

Bairro 25 Lote 92

Born Sucesso

2510-662 Vau

Portugal

App. 1

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

CATHY C. CARDILLO,

Appellant

V.

MARK NEARY, In his Personal Capacity as Clerk

of the Supreme Court of New Jersey; BONNIE C.

FROST, In her Personal Capacity as Chair of the Disciplinary Review Board; CHARLES CENTINARO,

In his Personal Capacity as Director of the Office of

Attorney Ethics; MARVIN WALDEN, JR., Esq., In his

Personal Capacity as Secretary of the District VI Fee

Arbitration Committee; AURELIO VINCITORI, In his

Personal Capacity as Fee Arbitrator of the District VI

Fee Arbitration Committee; MEGAN BURNS

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civ. No. 3-16-cv-02347)

District Judge: Honorable Freda L. Wolfson

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

September 11, 2018

gem

Before: JORDAN, VANASKIE, and NYGAARD,

Circuit Judges

(Filed: December 28, 2018)

OPINION*

VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.

Cathy Cardillo appeals the District Court's order

dismissing for her civil rights action brought pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The District Court sua sponte applied the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and determined

that jurisdiction over her claim was lacking. See generally Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923);

District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460

U.S. 462 (1983). On appeal, Cardillo argues that her

constitutional claims were never properly before the

state court. As a result, she contends that the District

Court's application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

was incorrect. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court's order.

I.

Cardillo practiced law in New Jersey for a number

of years before retiring and moving to Portugal. After

her retirement and relocation, a former client, Megan

Burns, submitted a claim with New Jersey's District

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pur-

suant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.

App.3

VI Fee Arbitration Committee (the "Committee"), contesting Cardillo's fee for past representation. The Committee attempted to serve Cardillo with notice of the

hearing concerning the dispute on three separate occasions by way of certified mail sent to Cardillo's former

New Jersey address. Because Cardillo no longer resided at that address, the certified mailings were returned to the Committee as undeliverable. The dispute

proceeded before the Committee without Cardillo's

participation, and the Committee ultimately entered a

decision adverse to Cardillo.

When Cardillo became aware of the Committee's

decision, she sent an email to the Office of Attorney

Ethics ("OAE"), which oversees the Committee, seeking to reopen the fee arbitration proceeding on the basis that she did not receive proper notice. The

gravamen of Cardillo's argument is that the notice was

insufficient because, pursuant to N.J.R. 1:20-7(h), notice of Committee hearings must be provided either "by

personal service, or by certified mail (return receipt reCardillo argues that

quested) and regular mail.

the Committee only sent certified letters, which are unable to be forwarded and were therefore returned as

undeliverable. Because she had her regular mail forwarded to a friend in New Jersey, Cardillo alleges she

would have been notified of the Committee proceedings

had the notices also been sent by way of regular mail.

.

.

."

Defendant Charles Centinaro, the acting Director

of the OAE, denied Cardillo's request in a response

email. Cardillo then appealed both the Committee's decision and the OAE's denial to the New Jersey

App. 4

Disciplinary Review Board ("DRB"). Cardillo alleged in

her appeal to the DRB that she had not received proper

notice of the proceeding before the Committee, that the

Committee knew she did not receive proper notice, and

that the proceeding should therefore be reopened.

The DRB determined that notice was proper, dismissed her appeal, and affirmed the Committee's decision. Cardillo next sought reversal of the DRB's

decision by filing a notice and petition for review with

the New Jersey Supreme Court. Defendant Mark

Neary, the Clerk of the New Jersey Supreme Court, informed Plaintiff by letter that her Petition would not

be considered because decisions rendered by the DRB

are final and not appealable to the New Jersey Supreme Court.'

Cardillo then filed suit in federal court pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a deprivation of her procedural due process rights predicated upon the insufficiency of the notice. Cardillo moved for summary

judgment, and Defendants moved to dismiss. The District Court administratively terminated these motions

1 Pursuant to New Jersey Court Rule 1:20A, a fee arbitration

decision rendered by the Committee is final and binding upon the

parties, with no right to appeal the merits of the decision and a

very limited right to appeal procedural defects in the proceedings.

Rule 1:20A-3 permits Committee decisions to be appealed to the

DRB where "the [Committee] failed substantially to comply with

the procedural requirements of [N.J.R. 1:20A], or there was substantial procedural unfairness that led to an unjust result.

N.J.R. 1:20A-3(c)(2). Decisions rendered by the DRB are final and

not appealable to the New Jersey Supreme Court. See N.J.R. 1:2016(d).

. .

App. 5

by letter and, sua sponte, directed the parties to brief

the question of the court's subject matter jurisdiction

over Cardillo's claims.

The District Court subsequently concluded that it

lacked subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine and dismissed Cardillo's

amended complaint. In finding as much, the court

stated that:

[Cardillo's] fundamental argument remains

the same[:] the letter-only manner of service

selected by the Committee was deficient in

that it resulted in her deprivation of her right

to participate in the fee arbitration hearing.

In other words, the harm that [Cardillo]

claims in this Court, deprivation of her alleged due process right to adequate notice under the United States Constitution, is

coextensive with the basis of her appeal to the

DRB, and her attempted petition to the New

Jersey Supreme Court.

(Appellee Appx. 23-24). Cardillo timely appealed.

II.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and

we exercise plenary review "where the District Court

dismisses for lack of subject matter jurisdiction."

Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d

Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). We "may affirm the District Court's judgment on any basis supported by the

App. 6

record." Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir.

2011) (per curiam) (citation omitted).

III.

The sole issue before this Court on appeal is

whether the District Court properly applied the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine. On this issue, Cardillo argues that her procedural due process claim was never

properly before the DRB or the New Jersey Supreme

Court. [Pet. R. Br. At 61. As such, she asserts that reliance upon Rooker-Feldman is inappropriate because

she has raised a discrete federal claim.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine strips federal courts

of jurisdiction over controversies "that are essentially

appeals from state-court judgments." Williams v.

BASF Catalysts LLC, 765 F.3d 306, 315 (3d Cir. 2014)

(quoting Great W Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 2010)). Federal

district courts have "no authority to review final judgments of a state court in judicial proceedings." Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482. However, the Supreme Court has

held that the applicability of the doctrine is "narrow"

and "is confined to cases of the kind from which the

doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by

state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by

state-court judgments rendered before district court

proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments." Exxon Mobile

Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284

(2005).

App. 7

We note as an initial matter that the RookerFeldman doctrine only applies to state judicial proceedings and not to administrative or legislative

proceedings. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Pa. Pub. Util.

Comm'n, 342 F.3d 242, 257 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing

Feldman, 460 U.S. at 476. The threshold question,

therefore, is whether the New Jersey fee arbitration

proceeding is judicial or administrative. The New Jersey Supreme Court established the fee arbitration system pursuant to that Court's constitutional power to

regulate the practice of law and the discipline of practitioners. Guralnick v. Supreme Court of NJ., 747

F.Supp. 1109, 1111 (1990) aff'd 961 F.2d 209 (3d Cir.

1992). The New Jersey Supreme Court appoints members of both the Committee and the DRB. N.J.R. 1:20A1 and 1:20-15. As such, we agree with the District

Court's determination that, as "arms and agents" of

the New Jersey Supreme Court that have been delegated portions of that Court's constitutional powers,

adjudicative proceedings before the Committee and

the DRB are properly considered judicial, as opposed

to administrative, proceedings. (Appellee Appx. 24 n.5

(citing Application of LiVolsi, 85 N.J. 576, 597 n.22

(1981))).

In determining whether a proceeding is properly

characterized as judicial in nature, the Supreme Court

has held that "[a] judicial inquiry investigates, declares, and enforces liabilities as they stand on present

or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist.

That is its purpose and end." Prentis v. Atl. Coast Line,

211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908). "The proper characterization

of an agency's actions depends not upon the character

of the body, but upon the character of the proceeding... ." New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New

Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 371 (1989) (internal quotation

and bracketing omitted). Fee arbitration proceedings

before the Committee contain many of the hallmarks

of judicial proceedings, including: initial and responsive pleadings; the right to a hearing with the opportunity for all parties to be heard; the ability to compel

the attendance of witnesses sworn under oath; the production of documents; the use of subpoenas; interpleader; and the ability to appeal. See N.J.R. 1:20A-3.

The Committee collects facts and issues a declaration

based upon the current law. Id. Here both the nature

of the body, which possesses the delegated authority of

the New Jersey Supreme Court, and the nature of the

proceedings lead to the conclusion that the fee arbitration system establishes a judicial proceeding.

The next question is whether the requirements of

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine are satisfied here. Interpreting the holding in Exxon Mobile, we have concluded that four requirements must be met in order for

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to preclude federal court

jurisdiction: "(1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court;

(2) the plaintiff complains of injuries caused by the

state court [judgment]; (3) [that judgment was] rendered before the federal suit was filed; and (4) the

plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and reject the state [judgment] ." Great W. Mining, 615 F.3d at

166 (citation omitted). "The second and fourth

use M

requirements are the key to determining whether a

federal suit presents an independent, non-barred

claim." Id.

We find that all four requirements are present

here and that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes

federal jurisdiction. First, Cardillo lost in state court

when the Committee rendered an adverse decision and

the DRB denied her appeal. Second, the injury of which

Cardillo complains—namely the putative deprivation

of her procedural due process right to adequate notice—resulted from the DRB's determination that the

Committee's notice was proper. Third, there is no dispute that Cardillo instituted her federal action after

she received notice from the New Jersey Supreme

Court that her appeal of the DRB decision would not

be considered. Finally, we need not look any further

than the prayer for relief in Cardillo's Amended Complaint (Appellee Appx. 4 at ¶ 6) or her request to this

Court in her briefing (Pet. R. Br. 7) to determine that

she seeks our review and rejection of the New Jersey

judgment.

Cardillo's argument that her constitutional claim

was not properly before the DRB or the New Jersey

Supreme Court, and therefore beyond the ambit of the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine, is without merit. As the District Court concluded, the procedural defect of which

Cardillo complains—the insufficiency of the notice—is

co-extensive with her constitutional claim, and she has

already availed herself of the opportunity to raise

these claims before the DRB. [Appellee Appx. 25-261.

We agree with the District Court's conclusion that,

MT

O

I M

given the identical nature of the claims raised before

the OAE and DRB with those asserted here, any proceeding in federal court would "not so much offer an

opportunity to challenge the adequacy of the notice before the Committee, but rather [serve] to challenge the

decision of the DRB that notice was adequate." (Appellee Appx. 26). This type of review of final state court

determinations is exactly what Rooker-Feldman seeks

to preclude.

Iv.

Because all four prongs of the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine are satisfied, we will affirm the holding of the

District Court.

App. 11

**NOT FOR PUBLICATION**

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CATHY C. CARDILLO,

Plaintiff,

V.

Civil Action No.

: 16-2347

(FLW)(LHG)

OPINION

CLERK, SUPREME COURT

OF NEW JERSEY et al.,

Defendants.

WOLFSON. United States District Judge:

Before the Court is the Amended Complaint of

Plaintiff Cathy C. Cardillo, alleging, under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, that Defendants Mark Neary, the Clerk of the

Supreme Court of New Jersey; Bonnie C. Frost, Esq.,

the Chair of the Disciplinary Review Board of the Supreme Court of New Jersey; Charles Centinaro, the Director of the New Jersey Office of Attorney Ethics;

Marvin Walden, Jr., Esq., the Secretary of New Jersey's

District VI Fee Arbitration Committee; and Aurelio

Vincitore, Esq., the District VI Fee Arbitrator (collectively, "Defendants"); in their individual capacities, violated Plaintiff's procedural due process right to

adequate notice of the fee arbitration proceedings

against her. Plaintiff also names her former client, Megan Burns, as a defendant, alleging that she has an

"[i}nterest in this matter." The Court finds that subject

App. 12

-.

matter jurisdiction is lacking, pursuant to the RookerFeldman doctrine, and the Amended Complaint is

therefore dismissed.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL

HISTORY

Plaintiff filed the original Complaint in this matter on April 21, 2016, seeking relief under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 from an alleged deprivation of her constitutional due process rights in proceedings occurring as

part of New Jersey's statutory Fee Arbitration System

("FAS"). The original Complaint named as defendants

several New Jersey state government agencies and officers of those agencies acting in their official capacities. On July 22, 2016, therefore, those defendants

moved to dismiss the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction

on the grounds of Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Plaintiff cross-moved for leave to amend to name the

state-officer defendants in their individual capacities

and to remove the state-agency defendants. The Magistrate Judge granted Plaintiff leave to amend on November 18, 2016. Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint

on November 30, 2016.

In her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that

she is a retired attorney, now resident in Portugal, who

previously lived and practiced law in the State of New

Jersey. Amended Complaint, 11-2. At some point after

Plaintiff retired from the practice of law and relocated

to Portugal, a former client of Plaintiff, Defendant Megan Burns, submitted a claim with New Jersey's

App. 13

District VI' Fee Arbitration Committee (the "Committee"), contesting Plaintiff's attorney fee for a past representation. Id. at 1 4. The Committee attempted to

serve Plaintiff with notice of a hearing concerning the

dispute by certified mail to Plaintiff's former New Jersey address. Ibid. Because Plaintiff no longer resided

at her New Jersey address, the certified mailings were

returned to the Committee as undeliverable. Ibid. The

dispute initiated by Plaintiff's former client proceeded

before the Committee without Plaintiff's participation,

and the Committee entered a decision adverse to

Plaintiff. Ibid. When Plaintiff became aware of the

Committee's adverse decision, she sent an e-mail to the

Office of Attorney Ethics, which oversees the fee arbitration committees, seeking to reopen the fee arbitration proceeding on the grounds that she did not receive

adequate notice. Id. at 1 4. Defendant Charles Centinaro, the acting Director of the Office of Attorney

Ethics ("OAE"), denied Plaintiff's request to reopen in

a response e-mail. Ibid. Plaintiff appealed the Committee's decision and the OAE's refusal to reopen the matter to the Disciplinary Review Board ("DRB"), again

alleging that she had not received notice, and that the

Committee was aware that she had not received notice,

and arguing that proceedings should therefore be reopened. Ibid. The DRB summarily denied Plaintiff's appeal in a letter decision. Ibid. Under New Jersey

The Amended Complaint at some points refers to the "District VI" Arbitration Committee, but records for the proceeding

provided to the Court make clear that this is a typographical error, and that the proceedings which are the subject of the

Amended Complaint occurred in District VI.

1

App. 14

Supreme Court rules, there is no further appeal from

the DRB. Ibid. Plaintiff nevertheless filed a notice and

Petition for Review ("Petition") with the New Jersey

Supreme Court, seeking to overturn the DRB's decision. On April 4, 2016, Defendant Mark Neary, the

Clerk of the Supreme Court, informed Plaintiff by letter that her Petition would not be considered, pursuant

to the Court's rules. Ibid. In her Amended Complaint,

Plaintiff asks this Court, inter alia, "to reverse the decisions of the named State Actors [—identified in Am.

Compi., 13, as the Clerk of the Supreme Court of New

Jersey, the Chair of the DRB, the Director of the OAE,

the Secretary of the Committee, and the Fee Arbitrator

of the Committee—] and to permit [Plaintiff 's] participation in a new to be noticed District [VII Fee Arbitration Hearing." Id. at 16.

On March 6, 2017, Plaintiff moved for summary

judgment. On March 7, 2017, Defendants again moved

to dismiss. While these motions were being briefed,

this matter was reassigned to me. Although Defendants' motion to dismiss was styled both as a motion

challenging this Court's jurisdiction under Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and as a motion challenging the adequacy of Plaintiff's pleadings under Rule 12(b)(6), the

Court's review of the arguments revealed that Defendants' bases for dismissal were fundamentally nonjurisdictional in nature.2 Although Defendants failed

2

Although characterized as a motion under R. 12(b)(1), Defendants' argument in briefing was that "Plaintiff's Amended

Complaint does not assert a violation of a constitutional or federally protected right." ECF No. 34-3, p. 6. This argument did not

App. 15

to raise any true jurisdictional challenges in their motion to dismiss, I, mindful of my independent obligation

to ensure the Court's jurisdiction, administratively terminated the parties' motions by letter order on October

27, 2017, and directed the parties to brief the question

of this Court's jurisdiction over the claims in the

Amended Complaint. Specifically, none of the parties

had discussed whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

was implicated by Plaintiff's explicit request in the

prayer for relief of her Amended Complaint that this

Court reverse a final decision issued through New Jersey's statutorily-established FAS. The parties submitted supplementary briefing and exhibits to the Court,

and that issue, raised sua sponte, is now before me.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

As a federal court of limited jurisdiction, this

Court has a continuing obligation to determine

whether it possesses subject matter jurisdiction over

the cases before it. Desi's Pizza, Inc. v. City of WilkesBarre, 321 F.3d 411, 420 (3d Cir. 2003). This includes

raising all issues affecting jurisdiction, including the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine, sua sponte. Ibid.' "The

implicate the Court's subject matter jurisdiction and was funda-

mentally coextensive with Defendants' motion under R. 12(b)(6)

that the Amended Complaint failed to state a claim for a violation

of plaintiffs federal, procedural due process rights. Id. at 10-11.

The Court notes that, although Defendants have a pending

motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claims on potentially meritorious

grounds, the Court may not proceed to Defendants' nonjurisdictionally-based arguments before finding there is subject matter

jurisdiction over this case. "The United States Supreme Court has

App. 16

Rooker—Feldman doctrine strips federal courts ofjurisdiction over controversies 'that are essentially appeals

from state-court judgments." Williams v. BASF Catalysts LLC, 765 F.3d 306, 315 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting

Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP,

615 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 2010)). Specifically, it bars

from federal consideration "cases brought by statecourt losers complaining of injuries caused by statecourt judgments rendered before the district court

proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments." Exxon Mobil

Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284

(2005). The Rooker—Feldman doctrine is properly invoked when the following four factors are satisfied: "(1)

the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff

complain[s] of injuries caused by [thel state-court judgments; (3) those judgments were rendered before the

federal suit was filed; and (4) the plaintiff is inviting

the district court to review and reject the state judgments." Great W. Mining, 615 F.3d at 166 (quotations

omitted, alterations in original).

explained that 'a federal court generally may not rule on the merits of a case without first determining that it has jurisdiction."

Bolick v. Sacavage, 617 F. App'x 175, 177 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting

Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malay. Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422,

430-31 (2007)). And "[t}he Rooker-Feldman doctrine... [is] jurisdictional in nature." Id. at 177 (citing Taliaferro v. Darby Twp.

Zoning Bd., 458 F.3d 181, 192 (3d Cir. 2006)).

App. 17

III. ANALYSIS

In this matter, Plaintiff clearly complains of injuries caused by an adverse state decision rendered before her suit was filed and seeks to have this Court

review and reject that decision. Specifically, Plaintiff

had an adverse decision entered against her by the

Committee after a fee arbitration proceeding in which

she did not take part. Plaintiff then sought to have the

OAE reopen the fee arbitration proceeding on the

grounds that her procedural right to notice of the proceeding had been violated. The OAE rejected Plaintiff's request and invited her to appeal its decision on

the notice issue to the DRB. Plaintiff appealed the notice ruling to the DRB and lost; the DRB found that the

record did not support the finding of a procedural violation. She now seeks to have this Court reverse the

DRB's ruling that her right to notice was not violated.

The procedure governing New Jersey's FAS is set

forth in New Jersey Supreme Court Rule 1:20A. The

Rule provides that fee disputes between attorneys and

their former clients, may, at the client's election, be

tried to a panel of arbitrators drawn from the fee committee of the district in which the dispute is filed. R.

1:20A-3(b)(1). "A fee arbitration determination is final

and binding upon the parties[,}" with no right of appeal

on the merits, and only a limited right to appeal procedural deprivations during the committee proceedings.

R. 1:20A-2(a). As originally constituted, the FAS provided no right of appeal whatsoever. In the seminal

case of Application of LiVolsi, 85 N.J. 576 (1981), however, the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized

WGTM

O

certain limited circumstances in which an appeal of

procedural deprivations during the committee proceedings should be permitted, and recommended a rule

amendment to designate the DRB as the appellate

body to hear such challenges. The appellant attorney

in LiVolsi claimed that the absence of appeals from fee

arbitration committee decisions in the FAS was a deprivation of the attorney's constitutional rights. The

New Jersey Supreme Court rejected this argument,

noting that "[tihe fact that Committee determinations

are not appealable does not, of course, mean that the

parties to a Committee adjudication have no recourse

if the Committee violates their constitutional rights. If,

for example, in reaching a decision, the Committee violates a party's constitutional rights by discriminating

against a party on account of race, a collateral attack

against the Committee, in either state or federal court,

is always possible." Id. at 591 n. 15. Accordingly, even

though the FAS as then constituted, disallowed appeals of any kind, parties to the arbitration proceedings, who felt their constitutional rights had been

compromised by some deprivation of due process still

had a venue to vindicate those rights. Prospectively,

the New Jersey Supreme Court determined that while

the bar on merits appeals should remain in place, the

FAS should be restructured to permit appeals of procedural violations in the committee proceedings within

the administrative system itself. The court held:

In barring appeals on the merits, however, we

do recognize that both lawyers and clients

may need a limited right of appeal in order to

protect them from any egregious procedural

App. 19

deprivation before a Committee. We are,

therefore, requesting the Civil Practice Committee, after soliciting the views of all interested parties, to recommend an amendment

granting a limited right of appeal to the Disciplinary Review Board (DRB). That right

should be limited to the following or similar

grounds: that a Committee member failed to

disqualify himself or herself in a case where

he or she would appear evidently partial toward one of the parties; that the Committee

failed substantially to comply with the procedural requirements of R.1:20A, e.g., by denying a party the right to subpoena witnesses;

or that there was actual fraud on the part of

one or more Committee members.

Id. at 603-04. The Civil Practice Committee followed

the Court's instructions, and R. 1:20A3(c) now codifies

the grounds for appeal from fee arbitration committee

judgments. "Under subsection (c) there is generally no

appeal on the merits from the determination of a Fee

Committee. An appeal may be taken by the client or

the attorney to the DRB on four grounds: (1) failure of

a member to disqualify per R. 1:12-1, (2) failure to comply with the procedural requirements of R. 1:20A, (3)

actual fraud by a member of the committee, and (4)

palpable mistake of law by the committee." Linker v.

Co. Car Corp., 281 N.J. Super. 579, 586, 658 A. 2d 1321,

1324 (App. Div. 1995). Since the promulgation of R.

1:20A-3(c), and amendments to R. 1:20A-2(a) in 1995,

it has been clear under New Jersey law that the Supreme Court's jurisdictional grant of authority to the

DRB to hear these procedural challenges to fee

App. 20

arbitration committee proceedings is exclusive. R.

1:20A-2(a) reads "[a] fee arbitration determination is

final and binding upon the parties except as provided

by R. 1:20A-3(c)." The comment to the revised rule

1:20A-2 provides:

R. 1:20A-2 has been rewritten for clarity..

[T]he rule now makes clear that the decision

of the fee arbitration committee is final and

binding on the parties, and that, pursuant to

R. 1:20A-3(c), the Board, alone, has appellate

jurisdiction in these matters.

For example, in the matter of Paul Linker et

al. v. The Car Corp., Sup. Court Law Div. Essex

Co. Docket No. L-8394-94, decided Aug. 15,

1994, the attorney filed a summary action

pursuant R. 4:67 to reduce a fee determination to judgment. The client, who elected not

to appeal the fee arbitration determination to

the Disciplinary Review Board, raised its procedural defenses for the first time in the Superior Court enforcement action. The trial

court permitted said collateral attack and remanded the matter back to the fee arbitration

panel to conduct a new hearing. Such collateral challenges to fee determinations would

be prohibited by the rule change.

Linker, 281 N.J. Super. at 587 (App. Div. 1995) (quoting

R. 1:20A-2 cmt. to 1995 am.) (emphasis added). The client-plaintiff in Linker had successfully sought in the

Law Division of the New Jersey Superior Court to challenge his deprivation by a fee arbitration committee of

App. 21

his right to compel witnesses to testify by subpoena.

The Superior Court therefore ordered that the client's

fee arbitration proceeding be reopened to permit the

subpoenaing of witnesses. The Appellate Division, considering the New Jersey Supreme Court's amendment

of R. 1:20A-2, and the accompanying comments, found

that "[t]he Law Division judge had no power to review

the panel's award in any respect under th[e revised]

administrative scheme." Linker, 281 N.J. Super. at 588

(emphasis added). Accordingly, after the 1995 amendments to R. 1:20A-2, it is clear that under New Jersey

law collateral attacks on fee arbitration committee decisions on the procedural bases set forth in R. 1:20A3(c) are in the exclusive province of the DRB.

As the final rule reform to implement its decision

in LiVolsi, the New Jersey Supreme Court promulgated R. 1:20-16(d), which states that "[tihe [DRB's]

decision shall be final and not subject to further review

by the Court, whether by appeal by leave or in any

other manner, in all matters considered by the Board

pursuant to R. 1:20-15(e)(1)(i) and R. 1:20A-3(c)." R.

1:20-16(d). Accordingly, not only is the DRB the exclusive forum in which a party to a fee arbitration proceeding can bring a procedural challenge under R.

1:20A-3(c), the DRB's decision on such procedural challenges is final by rule of New Jersey's highest court.

In the matter now before the Court, Plaintiff purports to bring a collateral attack on the Committee's

and OAE's refusal to reopen her fee arbitration proceeding on the basis of the same procedural violation

she raised in her appeal to the DRB, pursuant to

App. 22

R. 1:20A-3(c). In her appeal to the DRB, Plaintiff argued under R. 1:20A-3(c)(2) that the Committee "failed

to substantially comply with the procedural requirements of R. 1:20A." [ECF No. 51, p. 891 (Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court of New Jersey Disciplinary

Review Board from a District Fee Arbitration Committee Determination). Specifically, R. 1:20A-3(b)(2), provides that "[aill service on attorneys required by fee

arbitration rules shall be made in accordance with

Rule 1:20-7(h), except that service by mail may be

made by regular mail, unless the letter will result in

barring an attorney from further participation or unless the attorney updates an address as stated above

in which event service will be made at that address."

R. 1:20A-3(b)(2). Rule 1:20-7(h), in turn, provides that

"[s]ervice on the respondent of any pleading, motion, or

other document required by these rules to be served in

a disciplinary or disability proceeding may be made by

personal service, or by certified mail (return receipt requested) and regular mail, at the address listed in the

New Jersey Lawyers' Diary and Manual or the address

shown on the records of the Lawyers' Fund for Client

Protection. Service on a respondent may also be made

by serving respondent's counsel, if any, by regular mail

or by facsimile transmission." R. 1:20-7(h). Plaintiff argued that she had attempted to update her address

with the Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection and did

not discover that her submission had been lost in the

mail or misfiled until after a decision was entered

against her in the fee arbitration proceeding. [ECF No.

51, p. 941. Plaintiff also argued that her mail could not

have been forwarded to a foreign address, that her

App. 23

former clients had up-to-date contact information with

which to reach her, and that she never in fact received

notice of the hearing before the Committee, depriving

her of the ability to participate and to dispute critical

facts. Ibid. The record reflects that Plaintiff's failure to

file a responsive pleading with the Committee resulted

in her being barred from participation in her hearing,

regardless of whether she received notice. [ECF No. 33,

P. 311 ("at the time the file was received by the Panel,

it was noted that the Appellant attorney was barred

from the proceedings.... The Panel was not aware

that the attorney may not have received notice of the

Fee Arbitration, which may have led to the attorney

being barred for failure to respond in accordance with

the Rules of Court."); R. 1:20A-3(b)(2) ("If the attorney

fails to timely file an attorney fee response, the secretary shall inform the attorney that unless an attorney

fee response is filed, and the filing fee paid, within 20

days of the date that the attorney is notified in writing,

the attorney shall be barred from further participation,

and the matter will proceed uncontested."). Plaintiff

attached and incorporated in her appeal before the

DRB, her correspondence with the OAE, in which she

sought to have her proceeding reopened on the grounds

that she had not received the notice required under the

Court's rules, and in which the Director of the OAE informed Plaintiff that service by mail had been attempted three times, all of which mailings had been

returned to the OAE as undeliverable. Plaintiff argued

before the DRB that the Committee was not permitted

to make service solely by letter because doing so "result[ed] in barring an attorney from further

App. 24

participation" in the proceedings. R. 1:20A-3(b)(2). After reviewing Plaintiff's submissions, the DRB nevertheless denied her challenge to the adequacy of notice

under R. 1:20A. [ECF No. 51, p. 1391 ("The Disciplinary

Review Board has considered your appeal from the decision of the District VI Fee Arbitration Committee.

Upon full review and consideration of the matter, the

Board did not find sufficient proof of the R. 1:20A-3(c)

violation(s) alleged in your appeal. The Board, therefore, has affirmed the Committee's decision and dismissed your appeal."). Plaintiff then sought to appeal

the DRB's decision to the New Jersey Supreme Court

and was informed by letter of the Clerk of Court that

no petition for review would be considered because, under the Supreme Court's rules, the DRB's judgments

on procedural challenges to fee arbitration proceedings

are final.4

Plaintiff now seeks to raise substantially the same

arguments before this Court as grounds for reversing

The Clerk of the Supreme Court wrote:

I am in receipt of your submission dated March 3, 2016,

which you have captioned as a "Petition for Review."

Your petition seeks review of the decision of the Disciplinary Review Board (DRB) that affirmed a determination of a Fee Arbitration Committee and dismissed

your appeal. The rules of Court expressly provide that

a decision by the DRB on an appeal from a Fee Arbitration Committee is "final and not subject to further review by the Court, whether by appeal, by leave or in

any other manner." R. 1:20-16(d). As a result, this matter is closed and the Court will be taking no action on

your submission.

ECF No. 51, p. 161.

'

App. 25

the decisions of the DRB and the Committee. Plaintiff

argues that the Committee in her case failed to comply

with R. 1:20-7(h), and thereby R. 1:20A-3(b)(2), by attempting to make service upon her by certified mail

only, when the rules require personal service or service

by both certified and regular mail. Plaintiff contends

that she was having her mail forwarded from the address listed with the New Jersey Lawyers' Diary and

New Jersey Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection to a

friend in the United States from whom should would

then receive notice of the mail. Because certified mail

may not be forwarded, and because no mail may be forwarded to a foreign address, the Committee's certified

mailings were returned as undeliverable, and Plaintiff

never received notice of the hearing in her case, thus

allegedly depriving her of due process. Plaintiff also argues, as in her appeal to the DRB, that letter-only service was not permissible in this case because it

"result[ed] in barring an attorney from further participation" in the proceedings. R. 1:20A-3(b)(2). Although

Plaintiff adds the additional gloss of further explaining

the significance of the certified mailings in this case,

her fundamental argument remains the same; the letter-only manner of service selected by the Committee

was deficient in that it resulted in her not being served

with notice of the proceedings, resulting in the deprivation of her right to participate in the fee arbitration

hearing. In other words, the harm that Plaintiff claims

in this Court, deprivation of her alleged due process

right to adequate notice under the United States Constitution, is coextensive with the basis of her appeal to

the DRB, and her attempted petition to the New Jersey

App. 26

Supreme Court. Furthermore, in her prayer for relief,

Plaintiff explicitly seeks to have this Court overturn

the adverse decisions of state government actors, including, the Committee, OAE, DRB, and the Clerk of

the Supreme Court. Am. Compi., 1 6. Because the DRB

has already considered and rejected Plaintiff's procedural challenge to her fee arbitration proceeding concerning the adequacy of notice, and, under New Jersey

Supreme Court Rule 1:20-16(d), the decisions of the

DRB are final on such matters, this case is effectively

an appeal of the DRB's ruling. The Rooker-Feldman

doctrine does not permit the federal courts to sit in

judgment of final state rulings, and so this Court lacks

jurisdiction over the subject matter of Plaintiff's

Amended Complaint.5

Although not raised by the parties, the Court notes that

"the Rooker—Feldman doctrine only applies to state judicial proceedings, not administrative or legislative proceedings." Nat'l

R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 342

F.3d 242, 257 (3d Cir. 2003). See also Verizon Maryland, Inc. v.

Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Maryland, 535 U.S. 635, 644 n. 3 (2002)

("The [Rooker—Feldman] doctrine has no application to judicial

review of executive action, including determinations made by a

state administrative agency."). There is no state "court" judgment

in this matter; the relevant documents in the record now before

the Court, reflecting decisions adverse to the Plaintiff, are: (i) an

August 6, 2015 e-mail to Plaintiff from Barbara Cristofaro on behalf of Defendant Charles Centinaro, denying Plaintiffs request

to reopen her fee arbitration hearing due to inadequate notice,

[ECF No. 33, p. 271; (ii) the February 2, 2016 letter decision of the

DRB, finding insufficient proof of a procedural process violation

after considering Plaintiffs allegations of deficient notice, affirming the Committee's decision, and dismissing Plaintiffs appeal,

[ECF No. 51, p. 1391; and (iii) the April 4, 2016 letter of Mark

Neary, Clerk of the Supreme Court, rejecting Plaintiffs Petition

App. 27

for Review of the DRB's decision, and closing the matter, [ECF

No. 51, p. 1611. The Court finds, however, that the final decision

of the DRB on Plaintiffs procedural due process challenge was

reached as the result of a judicial proceeding.

The Supreme Court has opined at length on the distinction

between judicial and administrative or ministerial proceedings.

See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476-79

(1983) (collecting and discussing cases). Under Supreme Court

precedents, "[t]he proper characterization of an agency's actions

'depends not upon the character of the body but upon the character of the proceedings." New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council

of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 370 (1989) ("NOPSI") (quoting

Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226-27 (1908)).

Judicial proceedings are "designed to adjudicate disputed facts in

particular cases." United States v. Florida E. Coast R.R., 410 U.S.

224, 245 (1973). "A judicial inquiry investigates, declares and enforces liabilities as they stand on present or past facts and under

laws supposed already to exist. That is its purpose and end."

NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 370-71 (quoting Prentis, 211 U.S. at 226).

The fee arbitration committees and the DRB are arms and

agents of the New Jersey Supreme Court and have been delegated

a portion of that Court's equitable powers. Application of LiVolsi,

85 N.J. 576, 597 n. 22 (1981) (citing In re Logan, 70 N.J. 222, 225,

358 A.2d 787 (1976)) ("The inappropriateness of having Committee or Disciplinary Review Board decisions appealed to the Superior Court is further demonstrated by the fact that this Court has

labeled these committees 'agents' of the Supreme Court."); id. at

590 n. 13 (explaining that the New Jersey Supreme Court vested

the fee arbitration committees with authority previously belonging to the New Jersey state courts of equity). Together, as part of

the FAS, these bodies clearly are designed to adjudicate disputed

facts in particular cases and investigate, declare, and enforce liabilities as they stand on present or past facts and under extant

laws. Moreover, New Jersey Court Rules provide in FAS proceedings the kind of procedural due process protections characteristic

of judicial proceedings, including (i) the initiation of fee arbitration proceedings through an initial pleading, R. 1:20A-3(a)(1); (ii)

the right to a hearing with the opportunity for all parties to be

present and participate, to compel the attendance of witnesses to

rz1

In her supplementary submission, Plaintiff argues

that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine should not apply in

this case because she has yet to have the opportunity

to bring before a state or federal court of law or equity

her collateral attack on the Committee's decision

based upon the alleged constitutional inadequacy of

notice. Cf. Grey v. New Jersey, 91 F. App'x 747, 751 (3d

Cir. 2003) (affirming the district court's finding that

plaintiff's constitutional due process claims were

barred by Rooker—Feldman, where plaintiff had previously brought an action challenging the DRB's determination in New Jersey Superior Court, which was

dismissed under the court's rules for lack of jurisdiction over the DRB's non-reviewable determination).

Plaintiff, however, has already availed herself of the

opportunity to raise such a challenge in her appeal before the DRB, such that any proceeding in this Court

would not so much offer an opportunity to challenge

the adequacy of notice before the Committee, but rather to challenge the decision of the DRB that notice

was adequate. This is not the type of follow-on court

proceeding to vindicate constitutional rights considered by the New Jersey Supreme Court in LiVolsi or to

be sworn under oath, and to compel the production of documents

through the use of subpoenas, R. 1:20A-3(b)(1), (b)(4); (iii) notice

to the respondent and the opportunity to file responsive pleadings, R. 1:20A-3(b)(2); (iv) impleader, R. 1:20A-3(b)(3); and (v) appeal of process deprivations, R. 1:20A-3(c)-(d). Proceedings before

the Committee and DRB therefore meet the criteria for judicial

proceedings under federal law. See, e.g., Middlesex Cty. Ethics

Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432-34 (1982)

(finding, for similar reasons that New Jersey DRB ethics committee administrative proceedings are judicial in nature).

App. 29

which Plaintiff would otherwise be entitled under federal law. In LiVolsi, for example, the New Jersey Supreme Court observed that because the structure of

the FAS at that time allowed for no appeals of either

merits decisions or procedural deprivations, it was obvious that parties who believed their procedural due

process rights to have been violated by the committee

proceedings retained the right to seek redress in the

courts. LiVolsi, 85 N.J. at 591 n. 15. At the same time,

however, the LiVolsi Court laid the groundwork for a

restructuring of the FAS, whereby jurisdiction over

such procedural challenges would be vested in the

DRB. Id. at 603-04. Subsequent rule changes implemented that restructuring such that aggrieved parties

still have an opportunity for collateral attack on committee proceedings on the basis of procedural due process violations, but that opportunity is now before the

DRB, which the New Jersey Supreme Court has vested

with final decision-making authority in such matters.

R. 1:20A-2(a); 1:20A-3(c). The finality of DRB determinations does not mean that the proceedings before the

DRB are necessarily immune from collateral attack in

the courts for deprivations of due process. For example,

were a party to seek to collaterally attack the proceedings before the DRB, to contend that her appeal was

decided on the basis of racial animus or that she had

been denied her due process rights by the Board, the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine would present no obstacle.

Plaintiff, however, is not entitled to a second bite at the

apple on the DRB's determination concerning alleged

process deprivations before the Committee; that

App. 30

decision was final, with no further right of appeal. R.

1:20-16(d).

In sum, Plaintiff pursued an appeal of the Committee's actions in this case with the DRB on the

grounds that she was not provided with adequate notice. Indeed, once Plaintiff's client initiated proceedings before the Committee, any appeal from the

Committee's decision could be heard only by the DRB.

R. 1:20A-2(a). She now seeks an appeal of the DRB's

denial of that appeal on the same basis, albeit this time

couched in the language of constitutional procedural

due process. To accept Plaintiff's position that this

Court retains jurisdiction to act as an appellate body

for DRB determinations would run directly counter to

the letter and the spirit of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Williams, 765 F.3d at 315 ("The Rooker—Feldman

doctrine strips federal courts of jurisdiction over controversies 'that are essentially appeals from statecourt judgments." (quoting Great W. Mining, 615 F.3d

at 165)). To the extent that Plaintiff objects that the

removal of the federal forum by that doctrine works an

injustice in this matter, her disagreement is fundamentally with the structure of the FAS itself, which

provides no state court venue to hear appeals of the

proceedings conducted by the Committee and DRB in

fee arbitration cases. This Court, however, will not revisit the constitutionality of the FAS itself, which the

Third Circuit has already affirmed. Guralnick v. Supreme Court of New Jersey, 747 F. Supp. 1109, 1114118 (D.N.J. 1990), aff'd, 961 F.2d 209 (3d Cir. 1992)

("the New Jersey Fee Arbitration System comports

App. 31

with the mandates of due process. There is no fundamental right to have a trial under the fourteenth

amendment, and sufficient procedural safeguards exist to ensure that plaintiffs' rights are protected.

Consequently, the New Jersey Fee Arbitration System

infringe upon the rights granted to the

does not

plaintiffs under the fourteenth, seventh and thirteenth

amendments and article 1, section 1, of the United

States Constitution."). The relief requested in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint may not be granted without

a finding by this Court that the DRB erred in concluding that the notice provided to Plaintiff of her fee arbitration hearing was statutorily adequate. That is

precisely what Rooker-Feldman does not allow. This

Court therefore cannot exercise jurisdiction over

Plaintiff's claims.

...

W

CONCLUSION.

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the Court,

evaluating its subject matter jurisdiction, sua sponte,

finds that consideration of Plaintiff's claims in the

Amended Complaint is barred by the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine. This matter is therefore dismissed for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction. An appropriate Order will

follow.

Dated: 2/12/2018

Is! Freda L. Wolfson

The Honorable

Freda L. Wolfson

United States District Judge

App. 32

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CATHY C. CARDILLO,

Plaintiff,

V.

Civil Action No.

16-2347 (FLW)(LHG)

OPINION

CLERK, SUPREME COURT Filed Feb. 23, 2018

OF NEW JERSEY et al.,

Defendants.

THIS MATTTER having been opened by the

Court, sua sponte, pursuant to its continuing obligation to ensure federal subject matter jurisdiction over

the claims brought, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in the

Amended Complaint of Plaintiff Cathy C. Cardillo

("Plaintiff"); it appearing that, on October 27, 2017, the

Court directed the parties to submit supplementary

briefing concerning the Court's subject matter jurisdiction; it further appearing that Plaintiff, an attorney

proceeding pro Se, submitted letter briefs arguing for

the Court's continued jurisdiction over her Amended

Complaint and that Defendants Mark Neary, Clerk of

the Supreme Court of New Jersey; Bonnie C. Frost,

Esq., Chair of the Disciplinary Review Board of the Supreme Court of New Jersey; Charles Centinaro, Director of the Office of Attorney Ethics; Marvin Walden, Jr.,

Esq., Secretary of the District VT Fee Arbitration Committee; and Aurelio Vincitore, Esq., Fee Arbitrator of

the District VI Fee Arbitration Committee; through

counsel, the New Jersey Office of the Attorney General

App. 33

(Ashley L. Costello, DAJ, appearing), submitted a letter brief arguing that the Court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction over Plaintiff's Amended Complaint; the

Court having reviewed the submissions of the parties,

along with the undisputed documentary evidence in

the record, and having found that the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine deprives the Court of subject matter jurisdiction; for the reasons set forth in the Opinion filed on

even date; and for good cause shown;

IT IS this 23rd day of February, 2018,

ORDERED that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint

is DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Is! Freda L. Wolfson

The Honorable Freda L. Wolfson

United States District Judge