Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Havasupai Tribe, Petitioner v. Heather C. Provencio, et al.
Supreme Court briefMar 21, 2019
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APPENDIX
App. 1
FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
HAVASUPAI TRIBE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
and
GRAND CANYON TRUST; CENTER FOR
BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY; SIERRA CLUB,
Plaintiffs,
No. 15-15754
D.C. No.
3:13-cv-08045DGC
v.
HEATHER PROVENCIO, Forest
Supervisor, Kaibab National Forest;
UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE,
an agency in the U.S. Department
of Agriculture,
Defendants-Appellees,
ENERGY FUELS RESOURCES (USA),
INC.; EFR ARIZONA STRIP LLC,
Intervenor-DefendantsAppellees.
GRAND CANYON TRUST; CENTER
FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY; SIERRA
CLUB,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
and
D.C. No.
3:13-cv-08045DGC
ORDER AND
OPINION
HAVASUPAI TRIBE,
Plaintiff,
v.
No. 15-15857
App. 2
HEATHER PROVENCIO, Forest
Supervisor, Kaibab National Forest;
UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE,
an agency in the U.S. Department
of Agriculture,
Defendants-Appellees,
ENERGY FUELS RESOURCES (USA),
INC.; EFR ARIZONA STRIP LLC,
Intervenor-DefendantsAppellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
David G. Campbell, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 15, 2016
San Francisco, California
Filed October 25, 2018
Before: Marsha S. Berzon and Mary H. Murguia,
Circuit Judges, and Frederic Block, District Judge.
Order;
Opinion by Judge Block
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COUNSEL
Richard W. Hughes (argued) and Reed C. Bienvenu,
Rothstein Donatelli LLP, Santa Fe, New Mexico, for
Plaintiff-Appellant Havasupai Tribe.
Neil Levine (argued), Law Office of Neil Levine, Denver, Colorado; Aaron Paul, Grand Canyon Trust, Denver, Colorado; Marc Fink, Center for Biological
Diversity, Duluth, Minnesota; Roger Flynn, Western
App. 3
Mining Action Project, Lyons, Colorado; for PlaintiffsAppellants Grand Canyon Trust, Center for Biological
Diversity, and Sierra Club.
Thekla Hansen-Young (argued), Jared S. Pettinato, Michael T. Gray, and Andrew C. Mergen, Attorneys; Jeffrey H. Wood, Acting Assistant Attorney General;
Environment & Natural Resources Division, United
States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; Nicholas L. Pino and Pamela P. Henderson, Attorneys; Stephen Alexander Vaden, Principal Deputy General
Counsel; Office of General Counsel, United States Department of Agriculture; for Defendants-Appellees.
David J. DePippo (argued), Hunton & Williams LLP,
Richmond, Virginia; Michael K. Kennedy and Bradley
J. Glass, Gallagher & Kennedy P.A., Phoenix, Arizona;
for Intervenor-Defendants-Appellees.
Eric Biber, Professor of Law, Berkley [sic] Law, Berkeley, California, for Amici Curiae Environmental and
Natural Resource Law Professors.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ORDER
Judges Berzon and Murguia have voted to deny
the petitions for rehearing en banc, and Judge Block so
recommends. The full court has been advised of the petitions and no judge has requested a vote on whether
to rehear the matter en banc. Fed. R. App. P. 35. Accordingly, the petitions for rehearing en banc are DENIED.
App. 4
The Opinion filed December 12, 2017, appearing
at 876 F.3d 1242 (9th Cir. 2017), is withdrawn. It may
not be cited as precedent by or to this court or any district court of the Ninth Circuit. A new opinion is being
filed concurrently with this order. Further petitions for
rehearing or rehearing en banc may be filed.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
OPINION
BLOCK, District Judge.
In National Mining Association v. Zinke, 877 F.3d
845 (9th Cir. 2017), we upheld the decision of the Secretary of the Interior to withdraw, for twenty years,
more than one million acres of public lands around
Grand Canyon National Park from new mining claims.
That withdrawal did not extinguish “valid existing
rights.” In these consolidated appeals, we consider
challenges by the Havasupai Tribe (“the Tribe”) and
three environmental groups—Grand Canyon Trust,
Center for Biological Diversity and Sierra Club (collectively, “the Trust”)—to the determination of the United
States Forest Service (the “Forest Service”) that Energy Fuels Resources (USA), Inc., and EFR Arizona
Strip LLC (collectively, “Energy Fuels”) had a valid existing right to operate a uranium mine on land within
the withdrawal area. As elaborated below, we affirm,
with one exception, the district court’s order rejecting
those challenges.
App. 5
I
Much of what we said in National Mining Association concerning the history of uranium mining in the
area and the Secretary’s withdrawal decision is also
relevant here. To that we add some additional background regarding the particular mine at issue in this
case.
Grand Canyon National Park is bordered to the
north and south by the Kaibab National Forest. The
southern portion of the forest—which is included in the
withdrawal area—contains Red Butte, a site of religious and cultural significance to the Tribe.
In 1988, the Forest Service approved a plan to
build and operate what became known as Canyon
Mine, a 17.4-acre uranium mine in the area around
Red Butte. During the approval process, the Forest
Service prepared an Environmental Impact Statement
(“EIS”) pursuant to the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 (“NEPA”). NEPA requires an EIS for
any “major Federal action[ ] significantly affecting
the quality of the human environment.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332(2)(C).
At that time, the Forest Service also addressed the
mine’s impact under the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 (“NHPA”). Section 106 of the NHPA
requires federal agencies, prior to issuing a license for
any “undertaking,” to “take into account the effect of
the undertaking on any [historic property].” Pub. L. No.
89-665, § 106 (codified, as amended, at 54 U.S.C.
§ 306108). Historic property is defined as “any
App. 6
prehistoric or historic district, site, building, structure,
or object included on, or eligible for inclusion on, the
National Register.” 54 U.S.C. § 300308. Based on its review, the Forest Service required mitigation measures
to minimize the impact on possible relics buried on the
site of the mine. The review did not include nearby Red
Butte because that site was not eligible for inclusion
on the National Register until 1992. See National Historical Preservation Act Amendments of 1992, Pub. L.
No. 102-575, tit. XL, § 4006 (making “[p]roperties of
traditional religious and cultural importance to an Indian tribe” eligible for inclusion on the National Register). The EIS, however, did address the tribal religious
significance of Red Butte.
The Tribe sought judicial review, but both the district court and this Court rejected the challenge. See
Havasupai Tribe v. United States, 752 F. Supp. 1471 (D.
Ariz. 1990), aff ’d sub nom. Havasupai Tribe v. Robertson, 943 F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S.
959 (1992). The mine operator built surface facilities
and sank the first fifty feet of a 1,400-foot shaft, but
placed the mine on “standby” status in 1992 due to the
unfavorable conditions in the uranium market that we
described in National Mining Association.
As noted, the Secretary’s withdrawal decision was
“subject to valid existing rights.” 77 Fed. Reg. 2563
(Jan. 18, 2012). A few months before the decision became final, Energy Fuels—which had become Canyon
Mine’s owner—notified the Forest Service that it intended to return the mine to active operations. At the
Service’s request, Energy Fuels agreed not to resume
App. 7
sinking the mineshaft pending review of its claim of
existing rights.
On April 18, 2012, the Forest Service issued a
“Mineral Report.” It found that Energy Fuels’ predecessors-in-interest had “located” mining claims at the
site in 1978 and “discovered” uranium ore there between 1978 and 1982. It further found that there were
84,207 tons of uranium ore on the site, and that “under
present economic conditions, the uranium deposit on
the claims could be mined, removed, transported,
milled and marketed at a profit.” Based on those findings, the Forest Service concluded that Energy Fuel
had “valid existing rights that were established prior
to the mineral withdrawal.”
The Forest Service also reviewed its 1988 decision,
including its EIS and the mine’s approved plan of operations (“PoO”), “for any changes in laws, policies or
regulations that might require additional federal actions to be taken before operations resume.” In a “Mine
Review” dated June 25, 2012, it concluded that the existing PoO was “still in effect and no amendment or
modification to the PoO is required before Canyon
Mine resumes operations under the approved PoO.” It
further concluded that “[n]o new federal action subject
to further NEPA analysis is required for resumption of
operations of the Canyon Mine.”
With respect to historic preservation, the Mine Review concluded that “there will be no new federal undertakings subject to NHPA Section 106 compliance.”
It noted, however, that Red Butte had become eligible
App. 8
for inclusion on the National Register, and opined that
the site “could be considered a newly ‘discovered’ historic property.” Applying the regulation applicable to
such discoveries, 36 C.F.R. § 800.13(b)(3), the Forest
Service immediately contacted the Tribe to “enter into
government-to-government consultation” to “develop
‘actions’ to resolve or minimize the adverse effects” on
Red Butte. In response, the Tribe insisted on a revised
PoO, a supplemental EIS and a full consultation under
section 106 of the NHPA. The Forest Service and the
Tribe continued to correspond, but never settled on a
specific plan of action. The Mine Review alludes to the
likely reason: “Tribes have commented that most anticipated impacts, including the most serious impacts,
cannot be mitigated if uranium mining is conducted at
the Canyon Mine site.”
Consultation with the Tribe ended in March 2013,
when the Tribe and the Trust jointly filed suit against
the Forest Service in the district court. Energy Fuels
intervened as a defendant.
As amended, the complaint asserted four claims
under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”):
1.
the Forest Service’s determination that Energy
Fuels had valid existing rights to operate the Canyon Mine notwithstanding the January 2012 withdrawal was a “major federal action significantly
affecting the environment,” and, therefore, the service violated the NEPA by not preparing an EIS in
connection with its determination;
App. 9
2.
the Forest Service’s determination was an “undertaking,” and, therefore, the service violated the
NHPA by not conducting a full consultation under
section 106 in connection with its determination;
3.
alternatively, the Forest Service violated the
NHPA by not properly updating its original section 106 analysis to account for the impact on Red
Butte; and
4.
the Forest Service violated several federal laws by
failing to take various costs into account in its determination that Canyon Mine could be operated
at a profit.
As relief, the plaintiffs sought a declaration that the
Forest Service was acting in violation of the NEPA, the
NHPA and other laws; an order setting aside any “approvals or authorizations” for operations at Canyon
Mine; and an injunction prohibiting “any further uranium exploration or mining-related activities at the
Canyon Mine unless and until the Forest Service fully
complies with all applicable laws.”
The parties cross-moved for summary judgment.
In an order dated April 7, 2015, the district court held
(1) that the plaintiffs had Article III standing, (2) that
the plaintiffs lacked prudential standing with respect
to their fourth claim, and (3) that the Mineral Report—
which the district court referred to as the “VER [Valid
Existing Rights] Determination”—was a final agency
action subject to review under the APA. See Grand
Canyon Tr. v. Williams, 98 F. Supp. 3d 1044, 1055–61
(D. Ariz. 2015). Turning to the merits, the district court
held (1) that the Mineral Report was not a “major
App. 10
federal action” requiring an EIS under the NEPA; (2)
that the report was not an “undertaking” requiring a
full section 106 consultation under the NHPA; (3) that
the Forest Service’s decision to consider the effect on
Red Butte under 36 C.F.R. § 800.13(b)(3) was reasonable; and (4) that the Forest Service had complied with
that regulation. See id. at 1062–73.1
Both the Tribe and the Trust timely appealed.
II
The Forest Service argues that we lack jurisdiction because its determination that Energy Fuels has
valid existing rights was not a final agency action. See
Ukiah Valley Med. Ctr. v. FTC, 911 F.2d 261, 266 (9th
Cir. 1990) (“ ‘[F]inal agency action’ is a jurisdictional
requirement imposed by [5 U.S.C. § 704].”).2 We review
this threshold issue de novo. See Minard Run Oil Co. v.
U.S. Forest Serv., 670 F.3d 236, 247 (3d Cir. 2011).3
1
The district court also rejected the defendants’ argument
that two of the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by collateral estoppel. See Grand Canyon Tr., 98 F. Supp. 3d at 1061–62. That ruling has not been challenged on appeal.
2
The Supreme Court recently reminded courts that “[o]nly
Congress may determine a lower federal court’s subject-matter
jurisdiction.” Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chi., No. 16658, at 1 (U.S. Nov. 8, 2017) (quoting Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S.
443, 456 (2004)). Since the final agency action requirement is statutory, Hamer does not call into question its status as a jurisdictional limitation.
3
In the district court, the Forest Service further argued that
the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing. It has not pursued that
argument on appeal, but we are satisfied that the plaintiffs have
App. 11
“ ‘[A]gency action’ includes the whole or a part of
an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief or the
equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act[.]” 5 U.S.C.
§ 551(13). “[R]elief,” in turn, includes the “recognition
of a claim, right, immunity, privilege, exemption, or exception.” Id. § 551(11)(B).
The Forest Service claims that it has no authority
to recognize mining rights, and that the Mineral Report represents only the agency’s “opinion” as to their
validity. But whether or not the Mineral Report was
legally required, it was prepared. Its conclusion that
Energy Fuels had valid existing rights at the time of
the withdrawal falls within the plain meaning of
“recognition of a claim.”
We further conclude that the Mineral Report was
final. “As a general matter, two conditions must be satisfied for agency action to be ‘final[.]’ ” Bennett v. Spear,
520 U.S. 154, 177 (1997). “First, the action must mark
the consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking
suffered injuries in fact that are fairly traceable to the Service’s
actions and that could be redressed by a favorable judicial determination. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61
(1992). Continued uranium mining at Canyon Mine causes concrete injury to the Tribe’s religious and cultural interests and the
Trust’s aesthetic and recreational interests. While the parties dispute whether continued mining required the Forest Service’s approval, we must assume that it did in assessing standing. See
Equity Lifestyle Props., Inc. v. Cty. of San Luis Obispo, 548 F.3d
1184, 1189 n.10 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The jurisdictional question of
standing precedes, and does not require, analysis of the merits.”).
If the Tribe and Trust are correct that continued mining required
approval, then their injuries are fairly traceable to that approval
and could be redressed by setting it aside.
App. 12
process—it must not be of a merely tentative or interlocutory nature.” Id. at 177–78 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). It is true that the final decision to contest a claim of existing rights rests with the
Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”). See Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co.,
371 U.S. 334, 336 (1963). If, however, the Forest Service
finds a claim is valid, nothing else happens. The district court sensibly described that outcome as “the Forest Service’s ‘last word’ on the validity of the Canyon
Mine mineral rights,” Grand Canyon Tr. v. Williams, 38
F. Supp. 3d 1073, 1078 (D. Ariz. 2014), and we agree
with that description.
In addition, to be final, “the action must be one by
which rights or obligations have been determined, or
from which legal consequences will flow.” Bennett, 520
U.S. at 178 (internal quotation marks omitted). Rights
to a mineral deposit on public land are not conferred
by agency action; they are acquired by the miner’s own
actions of location and discovery. See American Law of
Mining § 4.11 (2d ed. 1997) (“[The prospector] may
seek ‘valuable minerals’ and, if he finds them, may initiate a vested right without the approval of anyone
else, including representatives of the government that
owns the land.”). Nevertheless, the Mineral Report determined that such rights existed with respect to Canyon Mine, and that is all Bennett requires.
We have observed that “courts consider whether
the practical effects of an agency’s decision make it a
final agency action, regardless of how it is labeled.” Columbia Riverkeeper v. U.S. Coast Guard, 761 F.3d 1084,
App. 13
1094–95 (9th Cir. 2014). We therefore focus on both the
“practical and legal effects of the agency action,” and
define the finality requirement “in a pragmatic and
flexible manner.” Or. Nat. Desert Ass’n v. U.S. Forest
Serv., 465 F.3d 977, 982 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). We agree with the district court’s assessment that
the Mineral Report was a practical requirement to the
continued operation of Canyon Mine because “the Forest Service, Energy Fuels, and interested tribes all understood that mine operations would not resume until
the VER Determination was completed.” Grand Canyon Tr., 38 F. Supp. 3d at 1079.
III
The challenges to the merits of the district court’s
judgment raise three issues: (A) Was the Mineral Report a “major federal action” under the NEPA? (B) Did
the Mineral Report approve an “undertaking” under
the NHPA? (C) Did the Trust fall within the zone of
interests of either the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (“FLPMA”) or the General Mining
Act of 1872 (“Mining Act”)? Our review of each question is de novo. See N. Cheyenne Tribe v. Norton, 503
F.3d 836, 845 (9th Cir. 2007) (compliance with NEPA
and NHPA on summary judgment); Mills v. United
States, 742 F.3d 400, 406 (9th Cir. 2014) (zone of interests).
App. 14
A. NEPA
We have held that “where a proposed federal action would not change the status quo, an EIS is not
necessary.” Upper Snake River Chapter of Trout Unlimited v. Hodel, 921 F.2d 232, 235 (9th Cir. 1990). Nor
is an EIS necessary to “discuss the environmental effects of mere continued operation of a facility.” Burbank Anti-Noise Grp. v. Goldschmidt, 623 F.2d 115, 116
(9th Cir. 1980). We applied those general principles in
Center for Biological Diversity v. Salazar, 706 F.3d
1085 (9th Cir. 2013) (“CBD”).
At issue in CBD was the resumption of mining at
a uranium mine, “after a seventeen-year hiatus, under
a plan of operations that BLM approved in 1988.” 706
F.3d at 1088. We held that “no regulation requires approval of a new plan of operations before regular mining activities may recommence following a temporary
closure.” Id. at 1093. We further held that the original
approval of the plan was a major federal action, but
that “that action [wa]s completed when the plan [wa]s
approved.” Id. at 1095 (quoting, with alterations, Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 73 (2004)).
By contrast, in Pit River Tribe v. United States Forest
Service, 469 F.3d 768 (9th Cir. 2006), we held that a
lease extension was a major federal action that altered
the status quo because without it, the lessee would not
have been able to continue operating a power plant on
the leased property. See id. at 784.
The district court correctly held that CBD, not Pit
River, governs this case. As in CBD, the original
App. 15
approval of the plan of operations was a major federal
action. And as in CBD, that action was complete when
the plan was approved. Unlike Pit River, resumed operation of Canyon Mine did not require any additional
government action. Therefore, the EIS prepared in
1988 satisfied the NEPA.
B. NHPA
As we explained, the NHPA requires consultation
pursuant to section 106 prior to any “undertaking.” 54
U.S.C. § 306108. As pertinent here, “ ‘undertaking’
means a project, activity, or program funded in whole
or in part under the direct or indirect jurisdiction of a
Federal agency, including . . . those requiring a Federal
permit, license, or approval[.]” Id. § 300320(3). Here,
too, we agree with the district court that the Mineral
Report did not “permit, license, or approv[e]” resumed
operations at Canyon Mine; it simply acknowledged
the continued vitality of the original approval of the
PoO. Just as that approval was the only “major federal
action” requiring an EIS under the NEPA, it was the
only “undertaking” requiring consultation under the
NHPA.
The Tribe concedes that the approval process in
1986 included the necessary consultation, and that the
cultural and religious impacts on Red Butte were not
included because they were not required to be at that
time. It argues, however, that the NHPA imposes a continuing obligation on federal agencies to address the
App. 16
impact on historic property at any stage of an undertaking.
The statutory definition of “undertaking” dates
from 1992. Prior to that, it was defined by the Advisory
Council on Historic Preservation (“ACHP”), the agency
charged with implementing the NHPA, to include “continuing projects, activities, or programs and any of
their elements not previously considered under section
106.” 36 C.F.R. § 800.2(o) (1991). But that definition
was superseded by 54 U.S.C. § 300320(3), which omits
the reference to continuing projects. The regulatory
definition now conforms to the statutory definition. See
36 C.F.R. § 800.16(y). We therefore disagree with the
Tribe that the current definition of “undertaking” encompasses a continuing obligation to evaluate previously approved projects.
Although continuing obligations have been removed from the definition of “undertaking,” they remain in 36 C.F.R. § 800.13(b):
If historic properties are discovered or unanticipated effects on historic properties found
after the agency official has completed the section 106 process . . . , the agency official shall
make reasonable efforts to avoid, minimize or
mitigate adverse effects to such properties
and:
(1) If the agency official has not approved
the undertaking or if construction on an approved undertaking has not commenced, consult to resolve adverse effects pursuant to
§ 800.6; or . . .
App. 17
(3) If the agency official has approved the
undertaking and construction has commenced, determine actions that the agency official can take to resolve adverse effects, and
notify the [state or tribal historical office], any
Indian tribe . . . that might attach religious
and cultural significance to the affected property, and the [Advisory Council on Historic
Preservation] within 48 hours of the discovery. The notification shall describe the agency
official’s assessment of National Register eligibility of the property and proposed actions
to resolve the adverse effects. The . . . Indian
tribe . . . and the Council shall respond within
48 hours of the notification. The agency official shall take into account their recommendations
regarding
National
Register
eligibility and proposed actions, and then
carry out appropriate actions. The agency official shall provide the . . . Indian tribe . . . and
the Council a report of the actions when they
are completed.
As noted, the Forest Service concluded that this regulation applied to Canyon Mine. It further concluded
that subsection (3) applied because construction had
begun in the early 1990s, although it acknowledged
that the 20-year hiatus presented a “somewhat unusual situation.”
The Tribe objects that Red Butte was not a newly
discovered historic property—and that the effect of operating a uranium mine near it was not unanticipated—because it had informed the Forest Service of
the religious and cultural significance of this site
App. 18
decades earlier. While that is true, the Tribe does not
dispute that Red Butte was not a “historic property”
eligible for inclusion on the National Register until
2010. As a result, the NHPA did not obligate the Forest
Service to take the site into account when it conducted
a full section 106 consultation in 1986. And while we
agree that eligibility for inclusion on the National Register is not exactly a “discovery,” there is no other regulation requiring an agency to consider the impact on
newly eligible sites after an undertaking is approved.
In other words, by invoking § 800.13(b), the Forest Service may have given the Tribe more than it was entitled to demand.
The Tribe further argues that if § 800.13(b) applies, the Forest Service should have proceeded under
§ 800.13(b)(1), instead of § 800.13(b)(3). In sum, the
agency must engage in a full section 106 consultation
if it “has not [yet] approved the undertaking or if construction on an approved undertaking has not [yet]
commenced.” 36 C.F.R. § 800.13(b)(1). If, however, the
agency “has approved the undertaking and construction has commenced,” it can engage in a simplified process to “determine actions that the agency official can
take to resolve adverse effects.” Id. § 800.13(b)(3).
Canyon Mine fits squarely within the scope of subsection (3). The mine was approved in 1988, and construction of the surface facilities began shortly
thereafter. The Tribe argues that subsection (3) was
App. 19
intended to address emergency situations, but there is
no express limitation to such situations.4
Finally, the Tribe briefly argues that the Forest
Service did not comply with § 800.13(b)(3). Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the Forest Service
made a good-faith effort to ascertain steps it could take
to resolve the possible adverse effects of mining on Red
Butte. If that effort was not successful, it is because the
Tribe insisted on a full consultation under section 106,
which was not legally required, and a complete ban on
mining around Red Butte, which the Forest Service
lacks the authority to impose.
C. FLPMA and Mining Act
The plaintiffs’ fourth claim, advanced by the
Trust, challenged the merits of the Forest Service’s
conclusion that Energy Fuels had valid existing rights
4
In a letter to the Forest Service, the ACHP opined that subsection (3) applies “where construction activities have begun and
would be ongoing, and thus, the agency had limited time and opportunity for consultation.” Normally, an agency’s interpretation
of its own ambiguous regulation is “controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” Auer v. Robbins, 519
U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). Subsection (3) is not ambiguous. Moreover, the letter was motivated by
a concern that proceeding under subsection (3) “would continue
the unproductive conflict between the Forest Service and the Indian tribes that consider Red Butte a sacred place.” We agree with
the district court that the letter “appears to be more tactical advice than an interpretation of the regulation.” Grand Canyon Tr.,
98 F. Supp. 3d at 1070.
App. 20
predating the withdrawal because its predecessors-ininterest had discovered a deposit of uranium ore that
could be “mined, removed, transported, milled and
marketed at a profit.” The district court did not address this claim, instead holding that the Trust lacked
prudential standing to make it. See Grand Canyon Tr.,
98 F. Supp. 3d at 1058–60.
“[A] person suing under the APA must satisfy not
only Article III’s standing requirements, but an additional test: The interest he asserts must be arguably
within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute that he says was violated.” MatchE-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v.
Patchak, 567 U.S. 209, 224 (2012) (internal quotation
marks omitted).5 We agree with the district court that
the Trust’s fourth claim falls outside the Mining Act’s
zone of interests. See Grand Canyon Tr., 98 F. Supp. 3d
at 1059 (explaining that the Mining Act’s obvious
5
As the district court’s language reflects, the additional test
was, until recently, described as a matter of “prudential standing.” See Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish, 567 U.S. at 224–28. But in
Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.,
572 U.S. 118 (2014), the Supreme Court called that description
“misleading,” id. at 125, and “in some tension with . . . the principle that a federal court’s obligation to hear and decide cases
within its jurisdiction is virtually unflagging,” id. at 126 (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). It held that the zone-ofinterests inquiry instead asks “whether a legislatively conferred
cause of action encompasses a particular plaintiff ’s claim,” id. at
127, or, in the APA context, whether a plaintiff ’s interests “are so
marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit
in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress
authorized that plaintiff to sue,” id. at 130 (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
App. 21
intent was “to reward and encourage the discovery of
minerals that are valuable in an economic sense,” and
that the Trust’s interests are environmental and historical, but not economic).
However, the Trust also argued that the Forest
Service’s VER determination violated the FLPMA. The
district court did not address the FLPMA’s zone of interests in its analysis, concluding that “the sections of
the [FLPMA] to which Plaintiffs cite do not relate to
validity determinations or mineral examinations. . . .
and do not provide the Court with any relevant law to
apply in deciding claim four.” Id. at 1059 n.8. It is true,
of course, that the plaintiff must fall within the zone of
interests of the “statutory provision whose violation
forms the legal basis of his complaint.” Lujan v. Nat’l
Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 883 (1990). However, we
conclude that the FLPMA, and not the Mining Act,
forms the legal basis of the Trust’s fourth claim.
We described the FLPMA at length in National
Mining Association. See 877 F.3d at 845. Relevant here,
the FLPMA confers on the Secretary authority to withdraw federal lands for specified purposes, 43 U.S.C.
§ 1701(a)(4), but makes that authority “subject to valid
existing rights.” Pub. L. 94-579, § 701(h), 90 Stat. 2743,
2786 (1976). Thus, the VER determination that the
Trust challenges in this case was made to decide
whether Canyon Mine would be subject to a withdrawal made pursuant to the FLPMA.
Here, the Forest Service looked to the Mining Act
to make its VER determination. However, that does not
App. 22
conclusively establish that the Mining Act, and not the
FLPMA, forms the “legal basis” of the Trust’s fourth
claim. Had Energy Fuels claimed rights of a different
nature, the Forest Service would have consulted a different statutory scheme, but it still would have made a
VER determination. Regardless of the statute consulted, a VER determination affects whether activities
on federal land can be limited under the FLPMA. See
43 U.S.C. § 1703(j) (stating that the purpose of a withdrawal is to “limit[ ] activities . . . in order to maintain
other public values”). That question implicates the
Trust’s asserted environmental concerns.
In sum, the Forest Service applied the relevant
standards from the Mining Act to make its VER determination, but the Trust’s claim that Canyon Mine
should not be exempt from the withdrawal because the
VER determination was in error remains a claim under the FLPMA. And since the Trust’s claim seeks to
vindicate some of the same concerns that underlie the
Secretary’s withdrawal authority, it falls within the
statute’s zone of interests. See W. Watersheds Project v.
Kraayenbrink, 632 F.3d 472, 485–86 (9th Cir. 2011)
(plaintiffs’ environmental interests fell within the
NEPA and the FLPMA’s zone of interests); Desert Citizens Against Pollution v. Bisson, 231 F.3d 1172, 1179
(9th Cir. 2000) (plaintiffs’ aesthetic and recreational
interests fell within the FLPMA’s zone of interests).
App. 23
IV
With respect to the claims under the NEPA and
NHPA, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. With respect to the claim under the
FLPMA, the judgment is VACATED and the case is
REMANDED for consideration of the claim on the
merits.
App. 24
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Grand Canyon Trust,
et al.,
Plaintiffs,
No. CV-13-08045-PCT-DGC
ORDER
(Filed Apr. 7, 2015)
v.
Michael Williams, et al.,
Defendants.
The parties have filed cross-motions for summary
judgment. Docs. 140, 146, 147. The motions are fully
briefed and the Court heard oral argument on March
18, 2015. For the reasons stated below, Defendants’ and
Defendant-Intervenors’ motions for summary judgment will be granted and Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment will be denied.
I.
Background.
Plaintiffs include the Havasupai Tribe and various environmental groups: Grand Canyon Trust, Center
for Biological Diversity, and the Sierra Club. Defendants are the United States Forest Service; Michael Williams, Supervisor of the Kaibab National Forest; and
Intervenors Energy Fuels Resources (USA), Inc. and
EFR Arizona Strip, LLC.
This case arises out of the proposed renewal of operations at the Canyon Mine in Northern Arizona. The
Canyon Mine is a breccia pipe uranium mine located
App. 25
six miles south of Grand Canyon National Park, in the
Kaibab National Forest, and four miles north of Red
Butte, a culturally and religiously significant site for
the Havasupai and other tribes. Doc. 115 ¶¶ 2, 49.
In October 1984, Energy Fuels Nuclear, Inc. (“EFN”)
submitted to the Forest Service a proposed Plan of
Operations for the Canyon Mine (the “Plan”). A.R. 193221. Pursuant to the National Environmental Policy
Act (“NEPA”), the Forest Service completed an Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) to address the
potential environmental impacts to the area and considered input from federally recognized Indian tribes.
A.R. 461-693. On September 26, 1986, the Forest Service issued a Record of Decision (“ROD”) approving a
modified version of the Plan. A.R. 915-29. Several administrative appeals followed (A.R. 3932), and the
Deputy Regional Forester and Chief of the Forest Service both affirmed the ROD.
The Havasupai Tribe filed a federal court lawsuit
challenging approval of the Canyon Mine. See Havasupai Tribe v. United States, 752 F. Supp. 1471 (D. Ariz.
1990). Among other arguments, the tribe claimed that
the EIS failed to comply with NEPA.1 Following a
1
The tribe’s specific NEPA arguments included the following: the EIS (1) failed to consider the “no-action alternative” of not
approving the Plan; (2) failed to give adequate consideration to the
tribe’s religious and cultural interests in the site; (3) was based
on incomplete hydrogeological information; (4) failed to adequately
consider the environmental impact of disposal of radioactive waste;
and (5) failed to adequately consider the environmental cumulative impacts of mining in the region. Havasupai Tribe, 752
F. Supp. at 1490.
App. 26
thorough analysis of the EIS, the ROD, and the administrative record, the District Court granted summary
judgment in favor of the Forest Service. Id. at 14891505. The Ninth Circuit affirmed in August of 1991.
See Havasupai Tribe v. United States, 943 F.2d 32 (9th
Cir. 1991).
Shortly thereafter, EFN began constructing the
mine. EFN built access roads, storage buildings, a
power line, a perimeter fence, diversion structures, a
holding pond, a head frame and hoist, and support
buildings. A.R. 10487; Doc. 146-1 at 17; Hangan Declaration, Doc. 53-4, ¶ 4.2 Work on the mine shaft was
started, and proceeded to a depth of 50 feet. A.R. 10487.
When uranium prices fell in 1992, EFN placed the
mine on stand-by status. For the next several years the
mine was maintained under the interim management
portions of the Plan. A.R. 10314.
In 2010, the Forest Service designated Red Butte
and the surrounding area, including the location of the
Canyon Mine, as a Traditional Cultural Property
(“TCP”), thereby making it eligible to be included in
the National Register of Historic Places due to its “ongoing, and historic cultural and religious significance
to multiple tribes.” A.R. 10616.
2
When the Court cites to page numbers in documents filed
in the docket (Doc.), the citation will be to numbers at the top of
the page assigned by the Court’s CM/ECF system, not to numbers
at the bottom of the page as assigned in the original document.
App. 27
In January 2012, the Secretary of the Department
of the Interior (“DOI”), pursuant to the Federal Land
Policy and Management Act (“FLPMA”), 42 U.S.C.
§ 1714(a), withdrew approximately 633,547 acres of
public lands and 360,002 acres of National Forest System lands for up to 20 years from location and entry
under the Mining Law of 1872 (the “Withdrawal”). 77
Fed. Reg. 2317-01 (Jan. 17, 2012); A.R. 10308-31. The
Withdrawal, which included the location of the Canyon
Mine, had been proposed by DOI in 2009. 74 Fed. Reg.
35,887-01 (July 21, 2009). The DOI undertook extensive study and preparation of an EIS before finalizing
the Withdrawal. The final EIS noted the existence of
the Canyon Mine and stated its assumption that the
mine would continue operations. A.R. 8657.
In August 2011, Energy Fuels Resources (USA),
Inc. (“Energy Fuels”), a successor owner of the Canyon
Mine, notified the Forest Service that it intended to resume operations under the Plan approved in 1986. A.R.
8547. In response, the Forest Service decided to complete a valid existing rights determination (“VER Determination”) with respect to the Canyon Mine. The
purpose of the VER Determination was to confirm that
the owner had valid rights to the uranium mineral deposits. Although Energy Fuels had asserted in its initial letter to the Forest Service that it did not believe
any additional government approvals were required
before the mine reopened (A.R. 443), Energy Fuels
agreed to withhold shaft sinking until the VER Determination was complete (Doc. 123-2 at 2-3). The VER
Determination was finished on April 18, 2012, and
App. 28
found that Energy Fuels had valid existing mineral
rights at the Canyon Mine. A.R. 10483-528.
The Forest Service also undertook a “Mine Review.”
A.R. 10592-637. The review was conducted by a 13person interdisciplinary team with expertise in minerals and geology, surface and groundwater, air quality,
transportation, tribal consultation, heritage resources,
vegetation, NEPA, and socioeconomic issues. A.R.
10597. Among other matters, the team evaluated the
sufficiency of the Plan and the original EIS and ROD;
historical and religious issues related to local tribes,
including tribal consultation in connection with the
EIS and ROD; sensitive tribal sites, including Red
Butte; the effect of resumed operations on the quality
of air, surface water, and groundwater; and the effect
of resumed mine operations on wildlife and any threatened, endangered, or sensitive species. A.R. 10592-637.
The Mine Review was completed on June 25, 2012,
and concluded that operations could resume at the
Canyon Mine under the original Plan. The Mine Review made this finding:
[T]he Forest [Service] undertook a review of
the 1986 Environmental Impact Statement
and Record of Decision, and associated documents. Resource specialists from the Kaibab
National Forest and Southwestern Regional
Office reviewed the documents to determine
if any modification or amendment of the existing Plan of Operations was required and
whether there was any new information or
changed circumstances indicating unforeseen
App. 29
significant disturbance of surface resources.
It was determined that no amendment or
modification of the Plan of Operation was required. . . . Therefore, [Energy Fuels] will resume operations under the existing Plan of
Operations.
A.R. 10594.3
Upon learning that the mine would be reopened,
the Arizona State Historic Preservation Office (“AZSHPO”)
advised the Forest Service that it should undertake a
full consultation under § 106 of the National Historic
Preservation Act (“NHPA”), 16 U.S.C. § 470f. A.R.
10139. Section 106 requires a federal agency charged
with issuing a federal license for an “undertaking” to
consult with various interested parties and evaluate
the potential effects on TCPs, including identification
of the affected properties, a determination of the potential adverse effects to the properties, and an identification of methods of mitigation. 36 C.F.R. §§ 800.2-800.7.
The Mine Review concluded that a full § 106 process was not necessary. A.R. 10593-637. Instead, the
Forest Service undertook a reduced consultation process under 36 C.F.R. § 800.13(b)(3). The Forest Service
sent letters to tribal leaders as well as the Advisory
Council on Historic Preservation (“ACHP”), notifying
them of renewed operations at the Canyon Mine and
3
The Mine Review also concluded that the Plan remained in
effect in 2012. “According to the regulations, the plan covers the
entire operation and is in effect from approval until the time that
final reclamation is completed. . . . The approved 1986 [Plan] is
currently in effect.” A.R. 10598.
App. 30
offering to meet and discuss potential adverse effects
to the environment and areas of religious and cultural
significance. A.R. 10690-91. The tribes and the ACHP
urged the Forest Service to undertake a full § 106 review, but the Forest Service declined. A two-day consultation meeting was held with the tribes in January
2013.
Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on March 7, 2013, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706.
Doc. 1. Plaintiffs’ amended complaint alleges four
claims: (1) the Forest Service violated NEPA by not
conducting an EIS in connection with the VER Determination; (2) the Forest Service violated the NHPA by
failing to complete a full § 106 review prior to approving resumed operations at the Canyon Mine; (3) the
Forest Service violated the NHPA by conducting a review under § 800.13(b)(3); and (4) the VER Determination failed to consider all relevant cost factors and
therefore is arbitrary, capricious, and not in accordance
with the law. All parties move for summary judgment.
II.
Standard of Review.
The APA allows a court to compel agency action
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed. 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(1). A claim to compel action may proceed “only
where a plaintiff asserts that an agency failed to take
a discrete agency action that it is required to take.” Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 64
(2004) (emphasis in original); see Hells Canyon
App. 31
Preservation Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 593 F.3d 923,
932 (9th Cir. 2010).
A court may set aside a final agency action under
the APA only if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). “This standard of review is ‘highly
deferential, presuming the agency action to be valid
and affirming the agency action if a reasonable basis
exists for its decision.’ ” Nw. Ecosystem Alliance v. U.S.
Fish & Wildlife Serv., 475 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir.
2007) (quoting Independent Acceptance Co. v. California, 204 F.3d 1247, 1251 (9th Cir. 2000)). The APA does
not allow a court to overturn an agency action simply
because the court disagrees with the action. See River
Runners for Wilderness v. Martin, 593 F.3d 1064, 1070
(9th Cir. 2010).
III. Was the VER Determination Required?
Plaintiffs argue that the VER Determination was
required by law because of the Withdrawal, and therefore constituted “agency action” reviewable under the
APA, a “major federal action” that triggered NEPA,
and an approval of a new “undertaking” that triggered
§ 106 review under the NHPA. Because the nature of
the VER Determination affects so many issues in this
case, the Court will address it before considering other
arguments made in the summary judgment briefing.
App. 32
A. Nature of the VER Determination.
The purpose of the VER Determination was to
evaluate whether the owners of the Canyon Mine had
valid legal rights to the uranium ore they would be
mining. As part of the Determination, certified mineral
examiners employed by the Forest Service visited the
mine site, reviewed mining claims records, evaluated
ore deposits, toured facilities operated by the owner,
and conducted an economic evaluation of the mine.
A.R. 10482-527. The examiners concluded that the
mining claims “were valid at the time of the [Withdrawal] and continue to be valid at the present time.”
A.R. 10482.
The Forest Service completed the VER Determination before approving renewed operations at the Canyon Mine, but the determination itself had no binding
legal effect. The Forest Service does not have responsibility for determining the validity of mining claims on
federal lands. That responsibility has been delegated
to the DOI, and specifically to the Bureau of Land
Management (“BLM”) within the DOI (the Forest Service is in the Department of Agriculture). The DOI, not
the Forest Service, has adjudicative authority to declare mining claims valid or invalid. Cameron v. United
States, 252 U.S. 450, 460 (1920) (Secretary of Interior
charged with determining validity of mining claims);
Forest Service Manual (“FSM”) § 2814.11 (A.R. 7284).
Because the Forest Service supervises vast stretches
of federal land that include mining operations, however, it can perform VER Determinations under an
App. 33
interagency agreement with BLM. FSM § 2814.11
(A.R. 7284); Linden Declaration, Doc. 53-2, ¶ 6. These
determinations are made for internal purposes. As the
First Service Manual explains, they enable the Forest
Service to make “a decision on whether or not to contest the claim.” FSM § 2819.1 (A.R. 7312). But the actual claim contest must be adjudicated by BLM and
the DOI. FSM §§ 2814.11, 2819.1 (A.R. 7284, 7312). As
the Forest Service Manual confirms: “No adjudicative
power has been given to the Forest Service. Thus,
statements about validity [of mining claims] are statements of belief and not formal determinations.” FSM
§ 2819 (A.R. 7311).
Plaintiffs do not dispute these basic facts. They argue, however, that things changed when the land on
which the Canyon Mine is located was withdrawn by
the Secretary of the Interior. They argue that the Withdrawal, not statutes or regulations governing mining
generally, required that a VER Determination be completed before the Canyon Mine could resume operations.
B. Legal Effect of the Withdrawal.
The Withdrawal affected more than one million
federally-owned acres north and south of the Grand
Canyon, closing them to mineral location and entry for
a period of 20 years. 77 Fed. Reg. 2317-01 (Jan. 17,
2012); A.R. 10308-31. The Withdrawal did not prohibit
all uranium mining on the withdrawn lands. Rather, it
prohibited “location and entry,” which is the process by
App. 34
which an individual enters public lands to find and establish a valid mining claim. Mount Royal Joint Venture v. Kempthorne, 477 F.3d 745, 750 n.3 (D.C. Cir.
2007).
Prior to the Withdrawal, the lands were open for
location and entry. The Mining Law of 1872 provides
that “all valuable mineral deposits in lands belonging
to the United States . . . shall be free and open to exploration and purchase[.]” 30 U.S.C. § 22. Individuals
can enter federal land, explore for minerals, and stake
their right to a claim by “[e]stablishing the exterior
lines of a mining claim or site” and “[r]ecording a notice
or certificate of location.” 43 C.F.R. § 3832.1. Such
claims can then become the subject of proposed plans
for the operation of a mine. The Withdrawal removed
the land from this open exploration and claim process
and thereby foreclosed the establishment of new mining claims in the future.
The Withdrawal did not extinguish mining rights
that already existed. To the contrary, it was “subject to
valid existing rights.” A.R. 10310. This means that existing mines like the Canyon Mine could continue to
operate. Indeed, the Withdrawal’s EIS specifically contemplated that four uranium mines, including the
Canyon Mine, would continue in operation. A.R. 10314
(“There are four mines within the withdrawal area
that have approved plans of operations that predate
the Secretary’s withdrawal proposal. The Pinenut,
Kanab North, and Canyon mines were approved in the
late 1980s and are operating under the interim management plans[.]”).
App. 35
The Withdrawal also contemplated that claim
owners with valid existing rights at the time of the
Withdrawal, but no operating mine, could submit a
plan of operation for a uranium mine for approval:
Withdrawals under section 204 of the FLPMA
must be made subject to valid existing rights,
which means that new mineral exploration
and development could still be authorized under the withdrawal on valid existing mining
claims. The . . . scenarios developed for the
EIS indicate that potentially 11 mines could
develop with a full withdrawal, including the
four mines currently approved[.]
A.R. 10314-15.
The Withdrawal also addressed when VER Determinations would be required. It stated that new plans
of operations would be approved only if BLM or the
Forest Service first determined that the parties submitting the plans had valid existing mineral rights at
the time of the Withdrawal:
On withdrawn lands, neither the BLM nor the
Forest Service will process a new . . . plan of
operations until the surface managing agency
conducts a mineral examination and determines that the mining claims on which the
surface disturbance would occur were valid as
of the date the lands were . . . withdrawn.
Id. (emphasis added).
This is consistent with relevant regulations and
guidance documents. BLM regulations specifically
App. 36
address the rules that apply to withdrawn lands. They
state that, after the date of a withdrawal, “BLM will
not approve a plan of operations . . . until BLM has
prepared a mineral examination report.” 43 C.F.R.
§ 3809.100(a) (emphasis added). They do not suggest
that a VER Determination is required for an alreadyapproved plan of operations.
Section 8.1.5 of the BLM Surface Management
Handbook addresses previously approved plans:
[A]pproved Plans of Operations that were in
place prior to the withdrawal or segregation
date are not subject to the mandatory valid existing rights determination procedures at 43
C.F.R. 3809.100(a). These operations may continue as accepted or approved and do not require a validity determination unless or until
there is a material change in the activity. . . .
A.R. 11602.
This guidance comes from BLM, not the Forest
Service. But as noted above, BLM is the primary
agency responsible for determining mining claim validity, and its parent, DOI, is the agency that withdrew
the lands at issue in this case. The guidance of BLM on
the effect of the Withdrawal is therefore highly relevant. In addition, when the Forest Service was asked
in a public forum whether it had regulations specifying
when a VER Determination would be required on withdrawn lands, it provided this answer:
The Department of Interior (BLM) is the adjudicator of mining claims for the federal
App. 37
mineral estate including minerals located on
National Forest System Lands. The BLM does
have regulations addressing when to require
a valid existing rights determination for lands
that have been segregated or withdrawn at 43
C.F.R. 3809.100(a). It is the policy of the Forest
Service to be consistent with BLM direction.
Once the lands have been segregated or withdrawn, the Forest Service will not approve a
plan of operation without first determining if
valid existing rights exist.
A.R. 7691 (emphasis added); see also Linden Declaration, Doc. 53-2, ¶¶ 6-7.
From these sources, the Court concludes that a
VER Determination was not legally required before operations at the Canyon Mine could resume. The Canyon Mine Plan of Operations had been approved in
1986. A resumption of operations at the mine did not
require approval of a new plan. Thus, the relevant regulations and policy statements did not require a VER
Determination.
Plaintiffs argue that the Withdrawal was “subject
to valid existing rights” (A.R. 10310) and that a VER
Determination was therefore required. But there is a
difference between valid existing rights and a valid existing rights determination, and neither the Withdrawal nor the FLPMA requires a determination. The
fact that the Withdrawal was “subject to valid existing
rights” meant that it did not extinguish valid rights in
existence at the time of the Withdrawal; it says nothing
about when or how a review of those rights must occur.
App. 38
When the Withdrawal did address the requirement of
VER Determinations, it said they would be required
only for “new” plans of operations. A.R. 10314-15.
Plaintiffs also cite to a statement from § 2803 of
the Forest Service Manual which directed the Service
to “[e]nsure that valid existing rights have been established before allowing mineral or energy activities in
congressionally designated or withdrawn areas.” Doc.
140-5 at 2. Plaintiffs argue that this sentence requires
the Forest Service to complete a VER Determination
before any mineral activity can occur on withdrawn
lands, even activity at an already-approved mine. The
Court does not read the sentence so broadly. In light of
the very specific guidance provided in the BLM regulations and Handbook, and the Forest Service’s publicly stated policy of following that guidance, the Court
reads the word “allowing” in this sentence to mean that
the Forest Service will not allow new mining activities
on withdrawn lands without first completing a VER
Determination. This reading comports with the Forest
Service’s own statement that “[o]nce the lands have
been segregated or withdrawn, the Forest Service will
not approve a plan of operation without first determining if valid existing rights exist.” A.R. 7691 (emphasis
added). It also squares with the Withdrawal’s requirement of a VER Determination only for a “new” plan of
operations. A.R. 10314-15.4
4
The Court reaches the same conclusion with respect to
§ 2813.3 of Forest Service Manual cited by Plaintiffs: “Otherwise
the use of validity determinations should be limited to situations
where valid existing rights must be verified where the lands in
App. 39
In summary, because no new plan was required for
the Canyon Mine after the Withdrawal, the relevant
regulations and guidance documents did not require a
VER Determination. Mining could have resumed without one.
C. The Practical Effect of the VER Determination.
Although not a legal requirement, the record suggests that completion of the VER Determination was
a practical requirement before the Canyon Mine resumed operations. On September 23, 2011, the Forest
Supervisor, Michael Williams, wrote a letter to the executive vice president of Energy Fuels. Mr. Williams
explained that “[a] mineral exam is scheduled to determine if your company has valid existing rights for the
Canyon Mine location. This is a requirement for any
public domain lands managed by the Forest Service
that have been withdrawn from mineral entry[.]” A.R.
12429; Doc. 126-12 at 1.
In a conference call with the Kaibab Paiute Tribe
on January 10, 2012, in which Mr. Williams participated, an employee of the Forest Service explained
that “the mineral exam will need to be completed before they start work at the Canyon Mine.” A.R. 10335;
Doc. 118-15 at 1. The next day, in a telephone
question have been withdrawn from mineral entry[.]” A.R. 7310.
The “situations” where such rights must be verified, as shown
above, are the approval of new mining operations on withdrawn
lands.
App. 40
conversation with the Hualapai Tribe, Mr. Williams
stated that Energy Fuels “would not be able to move
forward without VER under the mineral withdrawal.”
A.R. 10342; Doc. 118-18 at 1.
The VER Determination itself suggested that it
was required for renewed operation of the mine: “It is
Forest Service policy (FSM 2803.5) to only allow operations on mining claims within a withdrawal that have
valid existing rights (VER).” A.R. 10486; see also 10487,
10489. Although this statement is correct to the extent
it suggests that mining operations on withdrawn lands
must have valid existing rights, it is incorrect, for the
reasons explained above, to the extent it suggests that
a VER Determination was legally required before the
Canyon Mine could resume operations. The Forest Service concedes that the legal understanding of some of
its employees was incorrect, but this does not change
the fact that these employees took the position with
Energy Fuels and the tribes that a VER Determination
was required.
Other communications make clear that Energy
Fuels chose not to proceed with renewed operations
until the VER Determination was finished. A letter
from Energy Fuels’ executive vice president to Forest
Service employees concerning the process of the VER
Determination stated: “We would like to get the sample
analysis turned around as early as possible so that we
can hopefully close this out and proceed with our production plans.” Doc. 118-16 at 1. An email from a Forest
Service employee to representatives of the Kaibab
Paiute Tribe, sent the day after the January 10, 2012
App. 41
conference call mentioned above, contained this statement: “I called our geologist, and was told that [Energy
Fuels] will not be doing any ‘shaft sinking’ at the site
until the mineral exam is completed.” A.R. 10348; Doc.
126-13 at 1.
Thus, even though the law did not require the VER
Determination, these communications show that the
Forest Service, Energy Fuels, and interested tribes all
understood that mine operations would not resume until it was completed. It was a practical if not a legal
requirement.
IV. Threshold Matters.
Defendants raise four threshold matters: (1) Plaintiffs lack Article III standing on two claims, (2) Plaintiffs lack prudential standing on claim four, (3) the
VER Determination is not a final agency action subject
to judicial review, and (4) collateral estoppel bars two
claims.
A. Article III Standing.
“To satisfy Article III’s standing requirements, a
plaintiff must show (1) it has suffered an ‘injury in fact’
that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the
defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely
speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
App. 42
Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000)
(quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
560-61 (1992)).
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs lack standing to
bring claims one and four. Claim one asserts that the
Forest Service, in completing the VER Determination,
violated NEPA by not conducting an EIS. Claim four
asserts that the VER Determination failed to account
for several costs. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’
“concrete interests” stem not from the VER Determination, but from the Plan approved in 1986. Several of
the declarations submitted by Plaintiffs do not address
the VER Determination; rather, they appear to seek
modification of the Plan. Thus, Defendants argue,
Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate any injury traceable to the VER Determination.5
Plaintiffs argue that they suffered “concrete injuries to their environmental, cultural and procedural
interests [that] stem directly from the [VER Determination] and the agency’s failure to comply with NEPA
and the NHPA.” Doc. 151 at 6. They assert that the
VER Determination permitted mining to resume and
thus threatens their interests in the land surrounding
5
Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs lack standing to bring
claim two. Defendants characterize the claim as a direct challenge
to the VER Determination, but claim two asserts that the Forest
Service was required to conduct a consultation under § 106 of the
NHPA before allowing mining to continue. See Doc. 151 at 7. It
does not concern the VER Determination. Defendants’ arguments, which focus entirely on the VER Determination, are therefore insufficient to challenge Plaintiffs’ standing to bring claim
two.
App. 43
the Canyon Mine. Plaintiffs have submitted the declarations of Don Watahomigie and Rex Tilousi on behalf
of the Havasupai Tribe, Roger Clark on behalf [sic]
Grand Canyon Trust, Kim Crumbo on behalf of the Sierra Club, and Robin Silver on behalf of the Center for
Biological Diversity. Docs. 37-7, 37-8. They also submitted supplemental declarations of Clark and Silver.
Docs. 151-1, 151-2.
Declarations of the tribal representatives show
that they have historical and religious interests in the
lands surrounding the mine and on which the mine is
located. The Court concludes that federal action taken
without due consideration of environmental or historical impacts of the mine would constitute a concrete and
particularized injury to the tribes.
“[E]nvironmental plaintiffs adequately allege injury in fact when they aver that they use the affected
area and are persons ‘for whom the aesthetic and recreational values of the area will be lessened’ by the
challenged activity.” Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at
183 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735
(1972)). Plaintiffs have done just that. Roger Clark
states that resumption of mining “interfere[s] with my
enjoyment of the lands within and surrounding Grand
Canyon National Park[.]” Doc. 151-1, ¶ 20. He claims
he decided not to visit the park on several occasions
because of the “constant dust, noise, and traffic from
trucks constructing roads and developing the Canyon
Mine.” Id., ¶ 6. Robin Silver states that the mining activities “threaten to destroy my aesthetic enjoyment of
the Red Butte area due to dust, heavy truck traffic,
App. 44
light pollution and noise,” and also “limit and interfere
with my local photographic opportunities.” Doc. 151-2,
¶¶ 12, 13. Silver also notes the environmental impacts
caused by mining. Id., ¶¶ 13-17. In addition, several
declarants state they are harmed because the Forest
Service’s failure to comply with NEPA deprived them
of the opportunity to comment on and participate in
the Forest Service decision. See Doc. 37-8.
Plaintiffs’ declarations are sufficient to establish
injury in fact and are fairly traceable to the VER Determination, which they assert permitted mining to resume. See Cantrell v. City of Long Beach, 241 F.3d 674,
682 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Once a plaintiff has established
an injury in fact under NEPA, the causation and redressability requirements are relaxed.”). Therefore,
the first two elements of standing are met.
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to
demonstrate the third requirement – redressability.
They argue that the VER Determination did not create
any legal consequences and was not required. If the
Court were to invalidate it, they argue, a new VER Determination would not be required and mining would
resume.
This redressability position is essentially an argument on the merits. Defendants assert that Plaintiffs
will fail to prove that the VER Determination was necessary and therefore invoked NEPA and NHPA requirements, and thus will fail in obtaining relief for
their grievances. But the Court cannot consider the
merits when deciding standing. The Court must
App. 45
assume the truth of Plaintiffs’ claims and that Plaintiffs will succeed on the merits. See Friends of the
Earth, 528 U.S. at 180-81 (the plaintiff must show that
the injury will be redressed “by a favorable decision”);
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 503 (1975) (court must
take the allegations of the complaint as true); City of
Waukesha v. E.P.A., 320 F.3d 228, 235 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(“Indeed, in reviewing the standing question, the court
must be careful not to decide questions on the merits
. . . and must therefore assume that . . . the plaintiffs
would be successful in their claims.”). Thus, even
though the Court has concluded above, for convenience
in the organization of this order, that the VER Determination was not legally required, it must assume that
Plaintiffs will prevail when deciding whether they
have standing to pursue their claims.
If Plaintiffs succeed on their claim that Defendants violated NEPA and the NHPA, the Court will order NEPA and NHPA procedures to be followed. See Pit
River Tribe v. U.S. Forest Service, 469 F.3d 768, 779 (9th
Cir. 2006). This could certainly redress Plaintiffs’ procedural and aesthetic injuries. Thus, Plaintiffs have
satisfied the elements of standing on claims one and
four. See W. Watersheds Project v. Kraayenbrink, 632
F.3d 472, 482-83 (9th Cir. 2011) (an organization has
standing to bring suit on behalf of its members where
a member would have standing to sue in his own right,
the interests at stake are germane to the organization’s purpose, and neither the claim asserted nor the
App. 46
relief requested requires participation of the member
in the suit).6
B. Prudential Standing on Claim Four.
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs lack prudential
standing to bring claim four, which challenges the substance of the VER Determination. At oral argument,
Plaintiffs stated that claim four is tied to the Mining
Law of 1872, which sets forth the process by which
miners establish valid rights to mineral deposits.7 30
U.S.C. §§ 22-54.
To establish their alleged violation of the Mining
Law, Plaintiffs cite several cases articulating and applying tests for determining whether mining claims
are valid. See, e.g., Independence Min. Co. v. Babbitt,
6
The Court also notes that one who challenges the violation
of “a procedural right to protect his concrete interests can assert
that right without meeting all the normal standards” for traceability and redressability. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7. Such a litigant need only demonstrate that he has “a procedural right that,
if exercised, could protect [his] concrete interests and that those
interests fall within the zone of interests protected by the statute
at issue.” Defenders of Wildlife v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 420
F.3d 946, 957 (9th Cir. 2005), rev’d in part on other grounds by
Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644
(2007); see also Natural Res. Def. Council v. Jewell, 749 F.3d 776,
782-83 (9th Cir. 2014). Plaintiffs’ NEPA and NHPA claims satisfy
this requirement.
7
Alternatively, Plaintiffs assert that claim four is brought as
a stand-alone APA claim. Such a claim fails because “there is no
right to sue for a violation of the APA in the absence of a ‘relevant
statute’ whose violation ‘forms the legal basis for [the] complaint.’ ” El Rescate Legal Servs., Inc. v. Exec. Office of Immigration Review, 959 F.2d 742, 753 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Lujan v.
Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 883 (1990)).
App. 47
105 F.3d 502, 506-07 (9th Cir. 1997) (a validity determination requires the mineral examiner to do a “field
examination; collect and analyze samples; estimate the
value of the mineral deposit and the cost of extracting,
processing and marking the minerals, including the
costs of complying with any environmental and reclamation laws”); Lara v. Sec’y of Interior, 820 F.2d 1535,
1541 (9th Cir. 1987) (applying “prudent-man test”);
Hjelvik v. Babbitt, 198 F.3d 1072, 1074 (9th Cir. 1999)
(applying “marketability test”). They also cite Interior
Board of Land Appeals decisions on the nature of valid
claims. See, e.g., Great Basin Mine Watch, 146 IBLA
248 (1999); Moon Mining v. HECLA Mining, 161 IBLA
334 (2004). Plaintiffs argue that the Court should apply this law to the VER Determination and find it deficient.
But the Supreme Court has “interpreted [§ 702] of
the APA to impose a prudential standing requirement”
in addition to the requirements of Article III. Nat’l
Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co.,
522 U.S. 479, 488 (1998). “For a plaintiff to have prudential standing under the APA, ‘the interest sought to
be protected by the complainant [must be] arguably
within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute . . . in question.’ ” Id. (quoting Ass’n
of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,
153 (1970)). This test “is not meant to be especially demanding; in particular, there need be no indication of
congressional purpose to benefit the would-be plaintiff.” Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 399400 (1987). But APA claims cannot be asserted when
App. 48
“the plaintiff is not the subject of the contested regulatory action” and “the plaintiff ’s interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes
implicit in the statute that it cannot be reasonably assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit.” Ashley Creek Phosphate Co. v. Norton, 420 F.3d 934, 940
(9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399). Importantly, “whether a plaintiff ’s interest is within the
zone of interests protected by a statute ‘is to be determined not by reference to the overall purpose of the Act
in question . . . , but by reference to the particular provision of law upon which the plaintiff relies.’ ” Id. (quoting Bennett, 520 U.S. at 175-76).
The Court is not aware of any case applying the
“zone of interests” test to the Mining Law, and the parties have cited none. The Court must therefore look to
the “obvious purpose” of the “particular provision” to
which Plaintiffs tie their claim, Bennett, 520 U.S. at
176, and determine whether Plaintiffs’ interests “are
among the sorts of interests [the statute was] specifically designed to protect,” Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S.
at 886.
Section 22 of the Mining Law provides that “all
valuable mineral deposits in lands belonging to the
United States, both surveyed and unsurveyed, shall be
free and open to exploration and purchase[.]” 30 U.S.C.
§ 22. “[A] private citizen may enter federal lands to explore for mineral deposits” and, if a discovery is made,
“perfect[ ] the claim by properly staking it and complying with other statutory requirements.” California
Coastal Comm. v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 575
App. 49
(1987). The Mining Law’s “obvious intent was to reward and encourage the discovery of minerals that are
valuable in an economic sense.” United States v. Coleman, 390 U.S. 599, 602 (1968).
Plaintiffs do not fall within the zone of interests
protected or regulated by the Mining Law. That law
regulates mineral interests and provides procedures
by which mining claims may be discovered and protected. The purpose of a VER Determination, including
the determination in this case, is to confirm that valid
mineral rights have been acquired. Plaintiffs’ interests
are environmental and historical. They do not claim to
hold mineral rights at the Canyon Mine site, nor do
they assert economic interests in those mineral rights.
Claim four alleges that the VER Determination is
flawed – that it failed to consider and properly evaluate relevant information when it concluded that the
Canyon Mine had valid existing mineral rights. In essence, claim four challenges Energy Fuels’ rights in the
uranium at the Canyon Mine. But Plaintiffs do not assert competing interests in the uranium; they have not
engaged in the procedures established by the Mining
Law for acquiring mineral interests; and they did not
participate in the VER Determination. Nor does the
Mining Law protect the environmental and historical
interests Plaintiffs assert in this case. Other statutes
such as NEPA and NHPA protect such interests, but
the Mining Law does not.
Because Plaintiffs’ interests are not “marginally
related to . . . the purpose implicit” in the Mining Law,
App. 50
see Ashley Creek, 420 F.3d at 940, they lack prudential
standing to bring claim four. To hold otherwise would
give environmental groups and tribes the right to challenge every grant of private mineral rights under the
Mining Law. Mineral claimants would be forced into
the courts, the costs associated with validating rights
would increase, and the “obvious purpose” of the Mining Law – to reward and encourage mineral discovery
– would be undermined.
The Ninth Circuit has often held that purely economic interests are inconsistent with the environmental interests protected by NEPA. See, e.g., id. at 945;
Nevada Land Action Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Service, 8 F.3d
713, 716 (9th Cir. 1993); W. Radio Servs. Co. v. Espy, 79
F.3d 896, 903 (9th Cir. 1996); Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Fund United Stockgrowers of Am. v. U.S.
Dep’t Agric., 415 F.3d 1078, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 2005).
Thus, plaintiffs asserting economic injuries lack prudential standing under NEPA. “The purpose of NEPA
is to protect the environment, not the economic interests of those adversely affected by agency decisions.”
Nevada Land Action, 8 F.3d at 716. This case presents
the same situation in reverse – the “obvious purpose”
of the Mining Law is to protect economic interests in
mineral deposits, not the environmental or historical
interests held by Plaintiffs.8
8
Plaintiffs also argue their APA claim is tied to the FLPMA.
The Court rejects this argument because the sections of the statute to which Plaintiffs cite do not relate to validity determinations
or mineral examinations. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701(a)(4), 1702( j),
1714(a). These sections deal with the DOI’s authority to withdraw
App. 51
Plaintiffs’ [sic] argue that Match-E-Be-Nash-SheWish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 132
S. Ct. 2199 (2012), compels a different result. In
Patchak, the Supreme Court held that the owner of
property near the site of a proposed Indian casino had
prudential standing to challenge the decision of the
Secretary of the Interior to acquire nearby property
under the Indian Reorganization Act. Id. at 2211-12.
The government argued that the owner’s interests in
the land’s use were not within the zone of interests of
the Act, which focused on land acquisition. Id. at 2210.
The Court disagreed, finding that the Act dealt with
land use generally and required the Secretary to consider “potential conflicts of land use that may arise”
from acquisitions. Id. at 2211 (internal quotations and
citations omitted). Consequently, the owner’s interests
arguably fell within the zone of interests protected by
the Act, as “neighbors to the use . . . are reasonable –
indeed, predictable – challengers” to the agency decision. Id. at 2212.
Unlike Patchak, Plaintiffs’ interests do not arguably fall within the zone of interests protected by the
Mining Law. The statute in Patchak required the government to consider interests like those asserted by
the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have cited no provision of the
Mining Law that requires the government to consider
their environmental or historical interests when assessing the validity of mineral claims. And the specific
section of the Mining Law at issue here, which must be
land and do not provide the Court with any relevant law to apply
in deciding claim four. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).
App. 52
the focus of the Court’s prudential standing analysis,
is designed to open up federal land to mineral exploration and the establishment of valid mining claims. 30
U.S.C. § 22. It says nothing about the interests asserted by Plaintiffs. Nor can it be said that Plaintiffs
are foreseeable challengers of a BLM or Forest Service
decision validating mineral rights, especially when
they have not cited a single case involving such a challenge.
Plaintiffs also cite Thomas v. Morton, 408 F. Supp.
1361, 1370 (D. Ariz. 1976), for the proposition that the
general public has a “paramount interest” in protecting lands from the effects of invalid mining claims. But
Thomas involved a mineral claim contest between private parties, not a suit by environmental plaintiffs. It
does not support Plaintiffs’ argument that the Mining
Law protects Plaintiffs’ interests.
In sum, the Court finds that Plaintiffs do not fall
within the zone of interests protected by the Mining
Law, and thus do not have prudential standing to bring
claim four. The Court will grant Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment on that claim.
C. Final Agency Action.
In their motion to dismiss, Defendants argued
that several of Plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed
because the VER Determination did not constitute a
final agency action subject to judicial review. Doc. 71.
The Court disagreed, finding that the VER Determination “marked the consummation of the Forest Service’s
App. 53
validity determination” and was “a practical requirement before the Canyon Mine resumed operations”
under Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. at 154. Doc. 131 at 7.
The Court found, for reasons discussed above, that
the VER Determination was a practical if not a legal
requirement. Id. at 9. Relying on Supreme Court and
Ninth Circuit authority, the Court then concluded that
such a practical requirement could satisfy the second
prong of the Bennett test, which requires that the
agency action be “one by which rights or obligations
have been determined, or from which legal consequences will flow.” 520 U.S. at 178 (quotation marks
and citation omitted); Doc. 131 at 9-10.
Defendants now argue that the Court erred in concluding that practical effects can satisfy the second
prong of Bennett. Defendants rely primarily on Columbia Riverkeeper v. U.S. Coast Guard, 761 F.3d 1084 (9th
Cir. 2014), a case decided two days before the Court issued its order on the motion to dismiss. The Court has
reviewed Columbia Riverkeeper and does not find it
contrary to the Court’s previous decision. Columbia
Riverkeeper appears to confirm that practical effects
can satisfy the second prong of the Bennett test: “We
agree that an agency’s characterization of its action as
being provisional or advisory is not necessarily dispositive, and courts consider whether the practical effects
of an agency’s decision make it a final agency action,
regardless of how it is labeled.” 761 F.3d at 1094-95
(emphasis added).
The court in Columbia Riverkeeper was faced with
a very different set of facts. The Ninth Circuit found
App. 54
that the letter of recommendation in question did not,
as a practical matter, have the effect of permitting
shipment of liquefied natural gas. As the Ninth Circuit
explained: “Nor does the record support Riverkeeper’s
argument that, as a practical matter, FERC always
complies with the Coast Guard’s letter of recommendation, which effectively gives it the force of law.” Id.
The record is quite different in this case. The
Court finds that the VER Determination, as a practical
matter, had to be completed before the Canyon Mine
could reopen. The Court therefore continues to conclude that the VER Determination constituted final
agency action under the Bennett test.9
D. Collateral Estoppel.
Defendants argue that claims two and three are
barred by collateral estoppel because those claims were
litigated in Havasupai Tribe following the approval of
the Canyon Mine Plan. Doc. 147-1 at 7. Defendants
dedicate only one paragraph of their combined 66
9
The Court admits that it has serious doubts as to whether
a purely practical effect can satisfy the second prong of the Bennett test. Such a holding seems inconsistent with Bennett’s requirement of actions “by which rights or obligations have been
determined, or from which legal consequences will flow.” 520 U.S.
at 178. But the cases discussed in the Court’s ruling on the motion
to dismiss (Doc. 131 at 9-10) and the language quoted above from
Columbia Riverkeeper seem to indicate that practical results can
suffice. Were it not for these cases, the Court would find that the
VER Determination is not a reviewable agency action for the
same reasons as Fairbanks North Star Borough v. U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, 543 F.3d 586, 594 (9th Cir. 2008).
App. 55
pages of opening briefs to this issue, for good reason.
The Court previously rejected a similar argument
based on res judicata. Doc. 131 at 14-15. The Court
held that the claims brought by the Havasupai Tribe
and others in 1988, more than 20 years before the
Red Butte area was designated as a TCP, were not the
same as the claims asserted under the NHPA in the
amended complaint. Id. The Court continues to hold
that view. Although Defendants argue that the consultation procedures under NEPA and the NHPA are essentially the same, the authorities they cite do not
support this conclusion. Regulations do suggest that
such consultations can occur at the same time, but they
specifically identify matters that should be addressed
under the NHPA that are not addressed under NEPA.
See 36 C.F.R. § 800.8(a), (c). Collateral estoppel bars
“successive litigation of an issue of fact or law actually
litigated and resolved in a valid court determination
essential to the prior judgment.” Taylor v. Sturgell, 553
U.S. 880, 892 (2008). Because issues raised in the
amended complaint under the NHPA were not litigated in the earlier litigation, collateral estoppel does
not apply.
V.
NEPA Compliance – Claim One.
“NEPA is a procedural statute that does not ‘mandate particular results, but simply provides the necessary process to ensure that federal agencies take a
hard look at the environmental consequences of their
actions.’ ” Sierra Club v. Bosworth, 510 F.3d 1016, 1018
(9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). NEPA requires
App. 56
federal agencies to perform environmental analysis before taking “major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332(2)(C). Plaintiffs claim that the VER Determination was a major federal action and that the Forest Service therefore violated NEPA by failing to perform an
EIS in connection with the determination.
When the Forest Service received the proposed
plan of operations for the Canyon Mine in 1984, it complied with NEPA and prepared a full EIS. A.R. 461-693.
On the basis of the EIS, the Forest Service issued the
ROD and took the “major federal action” of approving
the Canyon Mine Plan on September 26, 1986. A.R.
915-29. The EIS and ROD were subsequently upheld
in two levels of appeal within the Forest Service, by
this Court, and by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Thus, there can be no doubt that full NEPA compliance
occurred before operation of the Canyon Mine was approved.
Plaintiffs allege that the VER Determination constituted a new major federal action that triggered the
need for another EIS of the Canyon Mine. The Court
does not agree. As explained above, the VER Determination was not required as a matter of law before the
Canyon Mine could resume operations. In addition, after completing the Mine Review, the Forest Service
concluded that no modification or amendment of the
existing Plan was necessary for mining activities to resume. A.R. 10594. Thus, the Plan approved in 1986
after a full EIS evaluation continued to govern operations at the Canyon Mine.
App. 57
The Ninth Circuit has held “that where a proposed
federal action would not change the status quo, an EIS
is not necessary.” San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water
Auth. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 581, 646 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Upper Snake River Chapter of Trout Unlimited v.
Hodel, 921 F.2d 232, 235 (9th Cir. 1990)). The Ninth
Circuit has also held that EIS requirements do not apply to mere continued operation of a facility. See Upper
Snake River, 921 F.2d at 234-35 (holding that agency
need not prepare an EIS before adjusting water flow
from a dam because continued operation of the dam
would have consequences “no different than those in
years past”); Burbank Anti-Noise Group v. Goldschmidt, 623 F.2d 115, 116 (9th Cir. 1980) (“An EIS
need not discuss the environmental effects of mere continued operation of a facility.”); City & Cnty. of San
Francisco v. United States, 615 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir.
1980) (finding EIS adequate where Navy evaluated
effects of shipyard lease only in comparison to the
decades-long prior use of the facility as a shipyard, rather than “as if the Navy were proposing to establish
this multi-million dollar industrial complex for the
first time”).
Like the above-cited authorities, a resumption of
mining activities under the Plan approved by the Forest Service after full NEPA review did not constitute a
new major federal action that required preparation of
another EIS. The major federal action was the same as
approved in 1986 – mining under the Plan of Operations.
App. 58
Plaintiffs argue that “[i]f a federal approval is
needed for a project, that approval action is a NEPA
‘major federal action.’ ” Doc. 140-1 at 21. They assert that
the VER Determination was an “approval” needed before
mining could resume, and that the VER Determination
therefore constituted a new major federal action requiring full NEPA compliance. The Court finds this argument unpersuasive for two reasons. First, as noted
above, the VER Determination was not a required approval for mining operations to continue. The premise
of Plaintiffs’ argument is therefore incorrect. Second,
the law does not provide that every federal approval
amounts to a major federal action. This point was
made clear in Center for Biological Diversity v. Salazar
(“CBD”), 791 F. Supp. 2d 687 (D. Ariz. 2011), and the
Ninth Circuit opinion affirming that decision.
CBD involves facts nearly identical to this case.
The uranium mine at issue in CBD, known as the Arizona 1 Mine, is located on the north side of Grand Canyon National Park and is owned and operated by
Energy Fuels. CBD, 791 F. Supp. 2d at 690. A plan of
operations for the Arizona 1 Mine was approved by
BLM in 1988 after completion of a full EIS. Id. When
uranium prices fell in the 1990s, the Arizona 1 Mine
was placed on stand-by status. Id. Several years later,
in 2007, the owner provided notice that it intended to
resume mining under the original plan of operations.
BLM required the mine owner to update its reclamation bond and obtain a clean air permit, and then approved the renewed operations. Id. The plaintiffs,
which included some Plaintiffs in this case, brought an
App. 59
APA action claiming that BLM’s approval of the renewed mining operations constituted a major federal
action that required a supplemental EIS. Id. The plaintiffs pointed to the update of the reclamation bond and
the clean air permit as new steps that made the renewed mine operation a major federal action under
NEPA.
The Court disagreed. It found that a supplemental
EIS was not required because BLM had complied with
NEPA in 1988 when it approved the original plan of
operations for the Arizona 1 Mine. Id. at 698. The
Court found that BLM’s approval of the updated bond
and the requirement of an air permit did not amount
to a major federal action because they were “not an
approval of a specific project by permit or regulatory
decision.” Id. at 704 (internal quotations omitted). Instead, the Court found that the “major federal action
was taken more than 20 years ago” when BLM approved the mine’s plan of operations after a full NEPA
review. Id.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Center for Biological
Diversity v. Salazar, 706 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2013). The
Ninth Circuit noted that approval of the mine’s plan of
operations in 1988 undoubtedly was a major federal
action, but that it was completed when the plan was
approved. Id. at 1095. “Before that action was complete, BLM performed the requisite environmental
analysis.” Id. “Accordingly, as far as the 1988 plan of
operations is concerned, appropriate NEPA review
took place and there is no ongoing ‘major Federal action’ that could require [EIS] supplementation.” Id.
App. 60
(quotation marks and citation omitted). The fact that
BLM required additional steps to be completed before
mining could resume did not alter this conclusion.
Those additional steps – updating of the bond and obtaining of the air permit – did not approve any new
specific project and constituted mere ministerial tasks.
Id. at 1095-96.
These holdings apply to the Canyon Mine. A full
NEPA analysis was performed by the Forest Service
when the Plan was approved in 1986. The major federal action – plan approval – was completed at that
time. The fact that the Forest Service elected to conduct a VER Determination before the mine resumed
operations, and that the owner agreed to wait until the
determination was finished, did not constitute a new
major federal action. The VER Determination was not
a legal requirement. Nor were the resumed mine operations going to vary from the previously approved
Plan. Like the bond update and the air permit required
in CBD, the VER Determination was not an approval
of a new project.10
Plaintiffs argue that this conclusion conflicts with
Pit River Tribe, which involved BLM’s extension of expired leases on federal land for development of a geothermal plant. 469 F.3d at 768. The Ninth Circuit, in
an opinion by the same judge who authored the Ninth
10
The Forest Service’s Mine Review reached the same conclusion: “No new federal action subject to further NEPA analysis
is required for resumption of operations of the Canyon Mine. The
existing [Plan] remains in place and in effect, and there is no need
for any amendment or modification of the [Plan].” A.R. 10629.
App. 61
Circuit opinion in CBD, held that extending the leases
required preparation of an EIS because, without the
extension, the lessee would have retained no rights on
the leased property. Id. at 784. Extension of the leases
thus constituted an affirmative grant of the right to
build a geothermal plant. Id. (“Without the affirmative
re-extension of the 1988 leases, Calpine would have retained no rights at all to the leased property and would
not have been able to go forward with the Fourmile Hill
Plant.”).
Unlike the leases in Pit River Tribe, which would
have expired without affirmative action by the government, the approved Plan for the Canyon Mine had no
time limit. The interim management provisions of the
Plan continued to govern the mine while on standby
status. Energy Fuels’ rights under the Plan were never
terminated and did not require affirmative renewal.
See Center for Biological Diversity, 706 F.3d at 1091-94
(holding that approved plan of operation for uranium
mine remained in effect through periods when mine
was inactive); 43 C.F.R. § 3809.423 (plan of operation
remains in effect unless terminated by agency); A.R.
10598 (Mine Review determination that the Plan for
the Canyon Mine had no time limit and remained in
effect in 2012). The expiration of the leases in Pit River
Tribe stripped the developer of all rights on the land.
Here, the Withdrawal had no such effect, and the
App. 62
Court’s decision does not conflict with the holding in
Pit River Tribe.11
In sum, the Withdrawal had no effect on the operations at Canyon Mine, the VER Determination was
not legally required, mining was to continue under the
Plan that had been subjected to full NEPA review in
1986, and the VER Determination did not alter or
amend the Plan. As noted above, EIS requirements
do not apply to mere continued operation of a NEPAapproved facility. As in CBD, the major federal action
in this case occurred more than twenty years ago and
remains unchanged. Because issuance of the VER Determination did not trigger NEPA or require a new
EIS, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on
claim one.
VI. NHPA Compliance – Claims Two and Three.
Before a federal agency implements, assists, or
licenses an “undertaking,” the NHPA requires the
agency to “take into account the effect of the undertaking on any district, site, building, structure, or object
that is included in or eligible for inclusion in the National Register” of Historic Places. 16 U.S.C. § 470f. For
purposes of this case, an “ ‘undertaking’ means a
11
Plaintiffs claim that another company, VANE Minerals
LLC, recognized that the Withdrawal changed its legal rights to
mine. VANE’s activities, however, involved exploratory drilling
and a request for approval of a new plan of operations. Doc. 1409. As noted above, the Withdrawal specifically required that new
plans of operations be approved only after a VER Determination
was completed.
App. 63
project, activity, or program . . . requiring a Federal
permit, license, or approval[.]” 16 U.S.C. § 470w(7)(C).
NHPA regulations are promulgated by the ACHP.
The regulations guide federal agencies in implementing the § 106 consultation process, which requires the
agency to identify the affected historical properties,
determine potential adverse effects, and identify
methods of mitigation. 36 C.F.R. §§ 800.2-800.7. The
regulations also require consultation with the public,
the ACHP, the AZSHPO, and Indian tribes that “attach
religious and cultural significance to historic properties that may be affected by an undertaking.” Id.,
§ 800.2(c)(2)(ii).
Plaintiffs allege in claim two that the Forest Service was obligated to complete a full NHPA § 106 consultation because resumed operation of the Canyon
Mine was an “undertaking” within the meaning of the
NHPA. They allege in claim three that the Forest Service erred in applying the NHPA process set forth in
§ 800.13(b)(3), rather than (b)(1), and did not comply
with (b)(3) in any event. The Court will address these
claims separately.12
12
As Defendants note, claims two and three as described in
Plaintiffs’ summary judgment briefing go well beyond the claims
laid out in the amended complaint, which simply allege that the
Forest Service failed to initiate and complete a § 106 process. Doc.
115 at 25-27. The Court nonetheless will address the claims as
described in the summary judgment briefing.
App. 64
A. Was There an Undertaking?
An undertaking is a “project, activity, or program
funded in whole or in part under the direct or indirect
jurisdiction of a Federal agency, including . . . those requiring a Federal permit license, or approval[.]” 16
U.S.C. § 470w(7)(C). The standards for the existence of
a federal undertaking are similar to those for a major
federal action under NEPA. See Dugong v. Rumsfeld,
2005 WL 522106, at *12 (N.D. Cal. March 2, 2005)
(citing cases from the Ninth, D.C., Fourth, and Fifth
Circuits which noted the similar standards). Plaintiffs
claim that the VER Determination constituted a permit, license, or approval, and that the resumption of
mining at the Canyon Mine was therefore an undertaking requiring full NHPA compliance. The Court disagrees for two reasons.13
First, for the resumed mining operations to constitute an undertaking, the VER Determination must
have been “a Federal permit license, or approval[.]” 16
U.S.C. § 470w(7)(C). As explained above, however, the
VER Determination was not legally required before
Energy Fuels could resume operations of the Canyon
Mine. The Court cannot conclude that it constituted a
13
Plaintiffs alleged in their amended complaint that the
VER Determination, not the resumed operation of the mine, constituted the “undertaking” for NHPA purposes. Doc. 115, ¶ 79. In
their summary judgment briefing and during oral argument,
Plaintiffs clarified their position. They claim that the undertaking
is the resumed operation of the mine and that the VER Determination is the license, permit, or approval for that undertaking. See
Docs. 140-1 at 34; 151 at 28.
App. 65
federal permit, license, or approval when mining operations could have resumed without it.
Second, operations at the Canyon Mine are to resume under the original Plan. There is no new plan. If
mining is the “undertaking” for purposes of the NHPA,
that undertaking was approved in 1986. With no modification to the Plan and no requirement of a VER Determination, there is no new undertaking subject to
NHPA compliance.
Plaintiffs admit in their amended complaint that
a § 106 process was completed in 1986. Doc. 115, ¶ 85
(“The Forest Service conducted a Section 106 Process
in connection with approving the 1986 Plan of Operation for Canyon Mine.”). As described in the Mine Review, the 1986 process included consultation with
AZSHPO and ACHP to develop a plan for archeological
tests; archeological review of the proposed mine site
and access roads; a cultural resources survey of the
proposed power line location; notice to and responses
from the Havasupai, Hopi, Hualapai, and Navajo
tribes; consultation with these tribes; and meetings
with the Havasupai and Hopi tribes. A.R. 10601-11.
The Mine Review concluded that “[a] review of the
NHPA Section 106 compliance analysis and the ROD
for the Canyon Mine indicates that the agency did adequately address all the effects to historic properties
that had been identified in the ROD.” A.R. 10602; see
also A.R. 10611 (“it appears that the [Forest Service]
was diligent and thorough in its efforts to solicit tribal
input and understand tribal concerns”); A.R. 10612
(“All of the Tribal comments were responded to and the
App. 66
EIS was substantially revised to reflect the information provided by the Havasupai and Hopi.”).14
With the “undertaking” of mining having been approved in 1986 after compliance with § 106, the Court
cannot conclude that resumed mining under the same
Plan constitutes a new undertaking. The Court agrees
with the conclusion in the Mine Review: “Since [Energy Fuels] has not proposed any new activities which
would require modification of the existing [Plan] or a
new [Plan], there will be no new federal undertakings
subject to NHPA Section 106 compliance.” A.R. 10601.
Of course, one significant change has occurred
since the 1986 approval – Red Butte and surrounding
land, including the location of the mine, have been designated a TCP and added to the National Register of
Historic Places. Recognizing this change, the Forest
Service chose to treat Red Butte’s TCP status as a new
discovery and to apply the NHPA regulations for new
discoveries. The Forest Service followed the procedures
in 36 C.F.R. § 800.13(b)(3). Plaintiffs claim this was error.
14
In its decision on the sufficiency of the 1986 EIS and ROD,
this Court noted that the Forest Service distributed more than
100 copies of the proposed Plan for the Canyon Mine to interested
parties; received over 200 letters in response; and, following the
decision to do a full EIS, distributed more than 2,000 scoping letters to federal, state, and local government agencies, Indian
tribes, news media and other interested parties. Havasupai Tribe,
752 F. Supp. at 1476-77.
App. 67
B. The Forest Service’s Decision to Apply
(b)(3) Was Reasonable.
Section 800.13 of the applicable regulations sets
forth the NHPA’s consultation process for “[p]ost-review
discoveries.” 36 C.F.R. § 800.13. These are discoveries
of historic properties, or effects on historic properties,
made after a § 106 process has been completed. Paragraph (a) states that agreements made during the
§ 106 process can anticipate such discoveries and lay
out procedures for dealing with them. Paragraph (b)
applies when no such procedures are in place. It states
that “[i]f historic properties are discovered or unanticipated effects on historic properties found after the
agency official has completed the section 106 process
. . . , the agency official shall make reasonable efforts
to avoid, minimize or mitigate adverse effects to such
properties” and shall comply with subparagraphs
(b)(1) through (b)(3). Id., § 800.13(b).
Subparagraph (b)(1) applies when the § 106 process
is finished but “the agency official has not approved the
undertaking or . . . construction on an approved undertaking has not commenced[.]” Id., § 800.13(b)(1). It
requires the agency to comply with § 800.6, which
sets forth detailed procedures for resolving adverse effects during a full § 106 process. Id. Among other requirements, § 800.6 requires that the agency adopt a
memorandum of agreement evidencing the agency’s
“compliance with section 106” and governing “the undertaking and all of its parts.” 36 C.F.R. § 800.6. The
agency must “ensure that the undertaking is carried
App. 68
out in accordance with the memorandum of agreement.” Id.
Subparagraph (b)(2) applies when the newly discovered site is relevant only for data collection purposes. § 800.13(b)(2). It is not at issue in this case.
Subparagraph (b)(3) applies “[i]f the agency official has approved the undertaking and construction
has commenced[.]” Id., § 800.13(b)(3). It requires the
agency to “determine actions that the agency official
can take to resolve adverse effects” and to notify interested parties, including Indian tribes, “within 48 hours
of the discovery.” Id. Interested parties must respond
within 48 hours of receiving notice, and the agency
then must take into account their recommendations
and “carry out appropriate actions.” Id. By merely requiring that the agency “carry out appropriate actions,” (b)(3) is less demanding than (b)(1) and its
requirement of a detailed consultations process resulting in a memorandum of agreement that governs the
undertaking in the future.
In conducting the Mine Review, the Forest Service
recognized that Red Butte had not been listed on the
National Register at the time of the previous § 106 process.15 A.R. 10602. Therefore, the Forest Service decided to treat Red Butte as a newly discovered historic
property and looked to § 800.13 of the regulations:
15
In 1986, the NHPA did not allow tribal religious sites to be
listed. A.R. 10602-03.
App. 69
Because the earlier definition [of historic
property] did not include properties of traditional religious and cultural importance, Red
Butte was only recorded as a TCP and evaluated as eligible on the NR after the [1986]
ROD but before the project has been completed. Therefore, it could be considered a
newly “discovered” historic property, and section 36 C.F.R. § 800.13(b) of the regulations
would apply.
A.R. 10603.
The question, then, was whether the Forest Service should proceed under subparagraph (b)(1) or (b)(3).
Because the Canyon Mine had been approved in 1986
and construction of the mine had commenced, the Forest Service decided that subparagraph (b)(3) applied.
Id. The Forest Service acknowledged that “[t]he Canyon Mine project is a somewhat unusual situation in
that the Section 106 process was completed more than
20 years ago.” Id. But the Forest Service concluded that
it could provide the notice required by subparagraph
(b)(3), allow the tribes and other interested parties 30
days to respond because there was no timing emergency requiring a 48-hour response, and address ways
to avoid or minimize adverse effects on Red Butte from
the Canyon Mine operations. Id. Notices were mailed
on June 25, 2012, meetings were held with the tribes,
a memorandum of agreement was considered, but
this lawsuit intervened. See, e.g., A.R. 10540 (email to
SHPO regarding consultation for MOA); A.R. 10542
(email to ACHP regarding consultation for MOA); A.R.
10643-44 (consultation notice letters to chairman of
App. 70
Kaibab Paiute Tribes), 10690-91 (Havasupai Tribe),
10737-38 (Hopi Cultural Preservation Office), 1078485 (Hopi Tribe), 10831-32 (Hualapai Tribe), 10878-79
(Hualapai Tribe), 10925-26 (Navajo cultural specialist), 10972-73 (Navajo Nation), 11019-20 (Kaibab Band
of Paiute Indians), 11066-67 (Yavapai-Prescott Indian
Tribe), 11113-14 (Yavapai-Prescott Indian Tribe),
11160-61 (Pueblo of Zuni); A.R. 11380 (Aug. 15, 2012
emails discussing Havasupai MOA) A.R. 11390-91
(Hopi meeting agenda); A.R. 11411 (Sept. 6, 2012 meeting notes with Kaibab Band of Paiute Indians); A.R.
11790 (Sept. 19, 2012 meeting notes and agenda re:
Hopi Cultural Preservation Office); A.R. 11796 (Sept.
20, 2012 meeting notes and agenda re: Navajo Nation);
A.R. 11799 (Sept. 20, 2012 meeting notes and agenda
re: Pueblo of Zuni); A.R. 11809 (Oct. 4, 2012 meeting
notes re: Havasupai Tribal Council); A.R. 11832 (Oct.
19, 2012 meeting notes re: Hopi Cultural Resources
Task Team); A.R. 12238 (Jan. 7, 2013 intertribal meeting notes); A.R. 12387 (summary of communications
with tribes).
Because Plaintiffs’ claim is brought under the APA,
the Court can set aside the Forest Service’s decision to
follow the (b)(3) procedure only if it was arbitrary and
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). This is a
“highly deferential” standard of review. Nw. Ecosystem
Alliance, 475 F.3d at 1140. Plaintiffs make several arguments that do not satisfy this standard.
App. 71
1. The Undertaking Was Approved Previously.
Plaintiffs argue that the “undertaking” in this case
was the resumption of mining operations at the Canyon Mine, that the undertaking as so defined has never
been approved before, and that § 800.13(b)(3) therefore
did not apply. For reasons explained above, however,
the Court does not agree that the “undertaking” was
the resumption of mining activities. Operations were
to continue under the Plan approved in 1986, without
modification. The “undertaking” was mining at the
site, and that undertaking was approved by the Forest
Service in 1986. Plaintiffs do not argue that a new Plan
of Operations was required for mining activities to resume. Indeed, that argument was rejected by this Court
and the Ninth Circuit in CBD. CBD, 791 F. Supp. 2d
at 692-96, 706 F.3d at 1091-94. Thus, the Plan under
which mining would continue was fully approved by
the Forest Service in 1986 after a § 106 consultation
process, and no new undertaking required another approval.
2. The Language of (b)(3) Is Not Limited
to Emergencies.
Plaintiffs argue that § 800.13(b)(3) is an emergency measure that does not apply to the Canyon
Mine. They cite the history of the regulation and argue
that it was intended to apply when a historically significant property is uncovered in the midst of constructing an approved undertaking, which did not
App. 72
occur here. Doc. 140-1 at 41. The citations provided by
Plaintiffs, however, are not persuasive.
Plaintiffs cite prior titles in § 800.13(b)(3). In one,
the title refers to “[r]esources discovered during construction.” 44 Fed. Reg. 6068, 6077 (Jan. 30, 1979). In
the other, the title refers to “[p]roperties discovered
during implementation.” 51 Fed. Reg. 31115, 31123
(Sept. 2, 1986). Although these titles suggest that the
section applies when a discovery is made in the midst
of construction, the actual text of these earlier regulations is worded differently – it refers to discoveries that
occur “after beginning to carry out the undertaking,”
which accurately describes the Canyon Mine situation.
51 Fed. Reg. at 31123; see also 44 Fed. Reg. at 6077
(noting that section applies if “an Agency Official finds
or is notified after construction has started”) (emphasis
added). Text usually controls over titles in a statute or
regulation. See generally Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1947)
(recognizing that “the title of a statute and the heading
of a section cannot limit the plain meaning of the
text”). Thus, the Court cannot conclude from these earlier versions of the regulation that (b)(3) was limited to
emergency situations.
More importantly, the Court must apply the current regulation. The title of the current version is
“Post-review discoveries,” suggesting that it applies to
discoveries made after the § 106 review is completed
and is not necessarily limited to events occurring in
the midst of active, ongoing construction. 36 C.F.R.
§ 800.13(b). What is more, courts resort to statutory or
App. 73
regulatory history to construe statutes or regulations
only when those statutes or regulations are ambiguous. See United States v. Williams, 659 F.3d 1223, 1225
(9th Cir. 2011). Subparagraph (b)(3) is not ambiguous.
It applies when “the agency official has approved the
undertaking and construction has commenced[.]” 36
C.F.R. § 800.13(b)(3). No further limitation is imposed.
The undertaking in this case – operation of the Canyon
Mine – was approved by the Forest Service in 1986 and
construction commenced in 1991. As noted earlier, the
mine owner built access roads, storage buildings, a
power line, a perimeter fence, diversion structures, a
holding pond, a 100-foot tall head frame, a hoist, and
support buildings, and sunk the mine shaft to a depth
of 50 feet. A.R. 10487; Doc. 146-1 at 17; Hangan Declaration, Doc. 53-4, ¶ 4. The situation at the Canyon
Mine thus fell squarely within the plain language of
subparagraph (b)(3).
3. Deference to the ACHP Is Not Warranted.
The ACHP is the agency that promulgates NHPA
regulations, including § 800.13. 16 U.S.C. § 470s. In Auer
v. Robbins, the Supreme Court held that an agency’s
interpretation of its own regulation is controlling unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
language of the regulation. 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).
Plaintiffs argue that the ACHP interpreted subparagraph (b)(3) in this case and the Court must defer to
that interpretation. For several reasons, the Court
does not agree.
App. 74
The “interpretation” relied on by Plaintiffs is contained in a letter the ACHP wrote to the Forest Service
on August 1, 2012. The letter provides this explanation:
In this situation, we understand that the Plan
of Operations for the undertaking has been
approved, and that some construction has occurred. Based upon the information you provided, it appears this construction activity has
started and stopped over the years. The intent
of Section 800.13(b)(3) is to provide an expedited review process where construction activities have begun and would be ongoing, and
thus, the agency has limited time and opportunity for consultation. Should the Forest Service pursue this approach, we are concerned
that it would continue the unproductive conflict between the Forest Service and the Indian tribes that consider Red Butte a sacred
place. Further, because of the nature and timing of this undertaking and the current request to resume previously halted mining
operations, we believe consultation in accordance with Section 800.13(b)(1) to develop and
execute a Section 106 agreement is the appropriate way forward.
A.R. 11335.
The letter does describe the intent of (b)(3) as
applying to emergency situations, but its recommendation that the Forest Service proceed under (b)(1) appears to be more tactical advice than an interpretation
of the regulation. The ACHP suggests that the Forest
App. 75
Service use (b)(1) not because the language of that provision applies, but because the ACHP is concerned that
applying (b)(3) “would continue the unproductive conflict between the Forest Service and the Indian tribes
that consider Red Butte a sacred place.” Id. This reasoning is more a comment on the situation facing the
Forest Service than on the meaning of the regulation.
The Court therefore doubts that the letter constitutes
the kind of regulatory interpretation entitled to deference under Auer.
But even if the ACHP letter constituted an interpretation of (b)(1) and (b)(3), it is not entitled to deference. The Supreme Court has explained that “Auer
deference is warranted only when the language of the
regulation is ambiguous.” Christensen v. Harris Cnty.,
529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000). “To defer to the agency’s position [when a regulation is not ambiguous] would be
to permit the agency, under the guise of interpreting a
regulation, to create de facto a new regulation.” Id.; see
also Bassiri v. Xerox Corp., 463 F.3d 927, 931 (9th Cir.
2006) (“Under Auer, as amplified by Christensen, the
court must first determine whether the regulation was
ambiguous.”).
As noted above, § 800.13(b) is not ambiguous. Subparagraph (b)(1) applies when the agency “has not approved the undertaking” or “construction on an approved
undertaking has not commenced.” Subparagraph (b)(3)
applies when neither of the (b)(1) conditions is present
– when the agency “has approved the undertaking and
construction has commenced.” Subparagraphs (b)(1)
and (b)(3) thus cover all possible scenarios for
App. 76
discoveries of historical properties after a § 106 process is completed. If the undertaking is not yet approved, (b)(1) applies. If the undertaking is approved
but construction has not yet commenced, (b)(1) applies.
If the undertaking is approved and construction has
commenced, (b)(3) applies. The Court sees no ambiguity in these provisions. Every eventuality is addressed.
Plaintiffs argue that the scenario in this case – the
undertaking has been approved, construction has commenced, and construction has stopped – is not covered
by the regulations. The Court does not agree. This scenario falls within (b)(3) because the regulations do not
make work stoppage a factor in deciding which subparagraph applies. If an undertaking has been approved
and construction has commenced, the criteria for (b)(3)
are fully satisfied. Although undertakings where the
construction has subsequently stopped may be a subset of the scenarios covered by (b)(3), it is a subset that
is not assigned in the regulations to different treatment. It is fully covered by the (b)(3) criteria. Certainly
it is not assigned to (b)(1), which applies only if there
has been no undertaking approval or no start of construction.
Plaintiffs suggest that an ambiguity is created because the 48-hour provisions in (b)(3) clearly show that
it is designed for emergency situations, and restart of
the Canyon Mine is not an emergency situation. Although the 48-hour provisions do suggest that (b)(3)
was designed primarily for emergency situations,
nothing in (b)(3) states that it is limited to those situations. Subparagraph (b)(3) does not say that it applies
App. 77
when “the agency has approved the undertaking, construction has commenced, and 48-hour notice is necessary,” or comparable language.
Because the Court does not find § 800.13(b) ambiguous, Auer deference is not warranted. Christensen,
529 U.S. at 588; Bassiri, 463 F.3d at 931. And with no
deference being required for the ACHP interpretation,
the Court cannot say that the Forest Service’s reading of § 800.13(b) – applying its plain language – was
arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or not
in accordance with the law.
What is more, even if the Court were to find some
ambiguity in § 800.13(b), Auer deference would be warranted only if the ACHP’s interpretation is not “inconsistent with the regulation.” Auer, 519 U.S. at 461. The
Court finds that the ACHP interpretation is inconsistent with the plain language. Subparagraph (b)(1)
applies only when the agency “has not approved the
undertaking” or “construction on an approved undertaking has not commenced.” Under no reading could
this provision apply to the Canyon Mine, where the undertaking was approved in 1986 and construction commenced in 1991. ACHP’s advice that subparagraph
(b)(1) applies is simply contrary to the language of
(b)(1).
As noted, the ACHP letter appears to be based
more on the factual situation related to the Canyon
Mine than the meaning of (b)(1) and (b)(3). But if
viewed as an attempt to construe those provisions,
the letter appears to create a new category under
App. 78
§ 800.13(b) for undertakings approved, started, and
then stopped. That category does not exist in the current version of the regulations. Accepting it would, as
the Supreme Court warned, “permit the agency, under
the guise of interpreting a regulation, to create de facto
a new regulation.” Christensen, 529 U.S. at 588.
The cases cited by Plaintiffs do not require a different result. See Doc. 140-1 at 42. The decision in CTIAThe Wireless Ass’n v. FCC, 466 F.3d 105, 115-16 (D.C.
Cir. 2006), did not address Auer deference – deferring
to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation. It
addressed deferring to an agency’s interpretation of a
statute through promulgated regulations. Id. at 116.
That is a different kind of deference. See Go v. Holder,
744 F.3d 604, 612 (9th Cir. 2014) (Wallace, J., concurring) (noting the distinction recognized in Price v. Stevedoring Services of America, Inc., 697 F.3d 820, 829
(9th Cir. 2012), between “an agency’s informal interpretations of its own regulations [which are entitled to
Auer deference] and of its governing statute [which are
entitled to Chevron deference].”) (brackets in original).
Plaintiffs’ other cases, Stinson v. United States, 508
U.S. 36, 45 (1993), Karuk Tribe of California v. U.S. Forest Service, 681 F.3d 1006, 1017 (9th Cir. 2012), and
Sayler Park Village Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 2002 WL 32191511, at *6 n.5 (S.D. Ohio, Dec.
30, 2002), simply restate the rule established in Auer.
They do not detract from the fact that Auer deference
applies only when a regulation is ambiguous, nor from
the fact that an agency’s interpretation of an
App. 79
ambiguous regulation must, if deference is to be accorded, comport with the regulation’s language.
In summary, the Court does not find that the Forest Service’s decision to apply (b)(3) was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or not in accordance
with law.
C. Compliance with (b)(3).
Plaintiffs also argue that the Forest Service failed
to comply with (b)(3). Plaintiffs claim that (1) no notice
was sent out to interested parties within 48 hours,
(2) no actions were proposed to mitigate adverse effects, (3) the local tribes’ responses to the notice went
unaccounted for, and (4) no reports of any actions were
provided to interested parties. The Court disagrees
with Plaintiffs’ characterization of the Forest Service’s
efforts.
The same day that the Forest Service concluded
(b)(3) applied, it sent a consultation letter to Don Watahomigie, Chairman of the Havasupai Tribe (A.R.
10690), as well as to the Hopi Tribe, Hualapai Tribe,
the Kaibab Band of Paiute Indians, the Navajo Nation,
the Yavapai-Prescott Indian Tribe, and the Pueblo of
Zuni, to initiate consultation under § 800.13(b)(3). A.R.
12388. Plaintiffs argue that the notice was required
within 48 hours of Energy Fuels’ informing the Forest
Service of its intent to reopen the Canyon Mine. As the
Forest Service acknowledges, however, this was an unusual situation. A.R. 10603. It took some time for the
Forest Service to determine what kind of review was
App. 80
required. Once it determined – correctly, as explained
above – that the situation was governed by (b)(3), it
sent the notice required by that section within 48
hours. A.R. 10603-04.
Over the course of the next several months, the
Forest Service entertained objections and responses
from the various tribes, met with representatives from
various tribes, conducted field visits, and engaged in
discussions regarding the potential impacts of the
Canyon Mine. A.R. 12388-89. For example, in August
2012, the Forest Service conducted field visits with representatives from the Zuni Cultural Resource Advisory
Task Team at Red Butte. A.R. 12389. In September, the
Forest Service met with the Kaibab Band of Paiute
Indians in Pipe Springs, Arizona to discuss several projects, including the Canyon Mine. Id. Throughout September and October, Forest Service representatives
responded to letters sent by various tribes and met
multiple times with the Hopi Tribe in Kykotsmovi, Arizona; the Navajo Nation in Window Rock, Arizona;
and the Pueblo of Zuni in Zuni, New Mexico. Representatives also hiked eight miles to Supai, Arizona to
consult with the Havasupai Tribe. Id. In January 2013,
the Forest Service and Energy Fuels met with representatives from multiple tribes and conducted a field
visit to the Canyon Mine site. Id. The next day, a MOA
workshop was conducted with several tribes in Flagstaff, Arizona. Id. Two months later, Plaintiffs filed this
lawsuit, effectively ending the consultation process.
Notwithstanding the above, Plaintiffs assert that
the Forest Service failed to take unilateral action to
App. 81
avoid or mitigate effects to Red Butte and falsely informed the tribes that the only mitigation measures
that would occur would be voluntarily undertaken by
Energy Fuels. Doc. 140-1 at 23-25. But the procedures
set forth in (b)(3) do not direct the Forest Service to
undertake unilateral action or impose a memorandum
of agreement on the mine operator, and Plaintiffs’ arguments again fail to recognize the extensive efforts
the Forest Service did undertake to consult with the
tribes, efforts that were cut short when Plaintiffs filed
this lawsuit. The Forest Service engaged in discussions
with the tribes in order to address their concerns and
sought to memorialize their obligations in a MOA.
The Forest Service’s ongoing environmental analysis and tribal consultation over the past twenty years
evidences its efforts to comply with the NHPA. In 1985,
the Forest Service traveled to the Supai Village to meet
with representatives from the Havasupai Tribe for two
days. Havasupai Tribe, 752 F. Supp. at 1495. When Energy Fuels’ predecessor submitted its original plan in
1984, over 100 copies were sent to interested parties
and several meetings were held to address public and
tribal concern. Id. at 1476-77. More than 2,000 scoping
letters were sent to the media and interested parties
and a “public scoping session” was held in Flagstaff,
Arizona in May 1985. Id. at 1477. In 1994, the Forest
Service sent a letter to the Havasupai, Navajo, and
Hopi Tribes requesting permission to conduct water
sampling for ongoing monitoring of the site. A.R. 5955.
In February 2008, twenty letters were sent to representatives from the Navajo Nation, Havasupai Tribe,
App. 82
Hopi Tribe, and Hualapai Tribe regarding projects in
the Kaibab National Forest, including the Canyon
Mine. A.R. 7518-86. Follow-up letters were sent in May.
A.R. 7589-643. In August 2008, a Memorandum of Understanding was reached between the Forest Service
and the Havasupai Tribe to establish areas in which
the Forest Service would carry out tribal consultations.
A.R. 7646-54. In January 2011, the Forest Service sent
emails to representatives from the Sierra Club addressing further analysis of the Canyon Mine EIS. A.R.
8517. In October 2011, the Forest Service confirmed
dates and sent an agenda for a meeting with Havasupai tribal elders. A.R. 10140. Proposed meetings
were also negotiated with the Navajo Nation, the
Pueblo of Zuni, and the Hopi Tribe. A.R. 10239, 10240,
10263. Conference calls were scheduled and held regarding the Canyon Mine with the Kaibab Band of Paiute Indians, Hualapai Tribe, Navajo Nation, Yavapai
Prescott Indian Tribe, and Pueblo of Zuni. A.R. 10282;
10283; 10286; 10291; 10297; 10298. In fact, the Forest
Service reviewed all of the documents prepared in connection with the 1986 ROD when it was deciding
whether to apply (b)(1) or (b)(3) and noted that the “tribal
scoping process used during development of the EIS
probably exceed the standards of the time.” A.R. 10611.
In summary, for some twenty years the Forest Service has been engaging in environmental analyses and
consultation meetings with tribes and environmental
organizations regarding the Canyon Mine. Recognizing the unique situation it faced when mining was to
resume, the Forest Service reviewed the regulations,
App. 83
found that (b)(3) applied, and engaged in consultation
with the tribes to “seek reasonable ways to minimize
the effects” of mining at the site. A.R. 10604. It did
this by providing immediate notice of its decision,
initiating consultation with tribes and environmental
groups, and planning and attending meetings to discuss
cultural and environmental impacts over several
months. Had this lawsuit not intervened, the Forest
Service and the tribes might well have executed a
memorandum of agreement regarding appropriate
ways to minimize effects on Red Butte. The Court cannot conclude that the Forest Service’s application of
the (b)(3) process was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or not in accordance with law.
VII. Conclusion.
The Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to establish a NEPA violation in claim one or a NHPA violation in claims two and three, and that Plaintiffs lack
prudential standing to assert claim four. The Court accordingly will grant summary judgment in favor of Defendants.
IT IS ORDERED:
1.
Defendants’ and Defendant-Intervenors’ motions for summary judgment are granted on
all counts. Docs. 146, 147.
2.
Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is
denied. Doc. 140.
3.
The Clerk shall enter judgment and terminate this action.
App. 84
Dated this 7th day of April, 2015.
/s/
David G. Campbell
David G. Campbell
United States District Judge
App. 85
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Grand Canyon Trust, et al., No. CV-13-08045-PCT-DGC
Plaintiffs,
JUDGMENT IN A
CIVIL CASE
v.
Michael Williams, et al.,
Defendants.
Decision by Court. This action came for consideration before the Court. The issues have been considered and a decision has been rendered.
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that, pursuant to the Court’s Order filed April 7, 2015, which
granted the Motions for Summary Judgment, judgment is entered in favor of defendants and defendantintervenors and against plaintiffs. Plaintiffs to take
nothing, and the amended complaint and action are
hereby dismissed.
Brian D. Karth
District Court Executive/
Clerk of Court
April 7, 2015
s/ Leann Dixon
By Deputy Clerk
App. 86
54 U.S.C. § 306108
§ 306108. Effect of undertaking on historic property
The head of any Federal agency having direct or indirect jurisdiction over a proposed Federal or federally
assisted undertaking in any State and the head of any
Federal department or independent agency having authority to license any undertaking, prior to the approval of the expenditure of any Federal funds on the
undertaking or prior to the issuance of any license,
shall take into account the effect of the undertaking on
any historic property. The head of the Federal agency
shall afford the Council a reasonable opportunity to
comment with regard to the undertaking.
54 U.S.C. § 300320
§ 300320. Undertaking
In this division, the term “undertaking” means a project, activity, or program funded in whole or in part
under the direct or indirect jurisdiction of a Federal
agency, including –
(1) those carried out by or on behalf of the Federal agency;
(2) those carried out with Federal financial assistance;
(3) those requiring a Federal permit, license, or
approval; and
App. 87
(4) those subject to State or local regulation administered pursuant to a delegation or approval
by a Federal agency.
54 U.S.C. § 302706
§ 302706. Eligibility for inclusion on National Register
(a) In general. – Property of traditional religious and
cultural importance to an Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization may be determined to be eligible
for inclusion on the National Register.
(b) Consultation. – In carrying out its responsibilities
under section 306108 of this title, a Federal agency
shall consult with any Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian
organization that attaches religious and cultural significance to property described in subsection (a).
...
36 C.F.R. § 800.1
§ 800.1 Purposes.
(a) Purposes of the section 106 process. Section 106 of
the National Historic Preservation Act requires Federal agencies to take into account the effects of their
undertakings on historic properties and afford the
Council a reasonable opportunity to comment on such
undertakings. The procedures in this part define how
Federal agencies meet these statutory responsibilities.
The section 106 process seeks to accommodate historic preservation concerns with the needs of Federal
App. 88
undertakings through consultation among the agency
official and other parties with an interest in the effects
of the undertaking on historic properties, commencing
at the early stages of project planning. The goal of consultation is to identify historic properties potentially
affected by the undertaking, assess its effects and seek
ways to avoid, minimize or mitigate any adverse effects
on historic properties.
...
(c) Timing. The agency official must complete the section 106 process “prior to the approval of the expenditure of any Federal funds on the undertaking or prior
to the issuance of any license.” This does not prohibit
agency official from conducting or authorizing nondestructive project planning activities before completing
compliance with section 106, provided that such actions do not restrict the subsequent consideration of
alternatives to avoid, minimize or mitigate the undertaking’s adverse effects on historic properties. The
agency official shall ensure that the section 106 process is initiated early in the undertaking’s planning, so
that a broad range of alternatives may be considered
during the planning process for the undertaking.
App. 89
36 C.F.R. § 800.3
§ 800.3 Initiation of the section 106 process.
...
(f ) Identify other consulting parties. In consultation
with the SHPO/THPO, the agency official shall identify
any other parties entitled to be consulting parties and
invite them to participate as such in the section 106
process. The agency official may invite others to participate as consulting parties as the section 106 process
moves forward.
...
(2) Involving Indian tribes and Native Hawaiian
organizations. The agency official shall make a
reasonable and good faith effort to identify any Indian tribes or Native Hawaiian organizations that
might attach religious and cultural significance to
historic properties in the area of potential effects
and invite them to be consulting parties. Such Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization that
requests in writing to be a consulting party shall
be one.
...
App. 90
36 C.F.R. § 800.4
§ 800.4 Identification of historic properties.
...
(b) Identify historic properties. Based on the information gathered under paragraph (a) of this section,
and in consultation with the SHPO/THPO and any Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization that might
attach religious and cultural significance to properties
within the area of potential effects, the agency official
shall take the steps necessary to identify historic properties within the area of potential effects.
...
36 C.F.R. § 800.5
§ 800.5 Assessment of adverse effects.
(a) Apply criteria of adverse effect. In consultation
with the SHPO/THPO and any Indian tribe or Native
Hawaiian organization that attaches religious and cultural significance to identified historic properties, the
agency official shall apply the criteria of adverse effect
to historic properties within the area of potential effects. The agency official shall consider any views concerning such effects which have been provided by
consulting parties and the public.
(1) Criteria of adverse effect. An adverse effect is
found when an undertaking may alter, directly or
indirectly, any of the characteristics of a historic
property that qualify the property for inclusion in
App. 91
the National Register in a manner that would diminish the integrity of the property’s location, design, setting, materials, workmanship, feeling, or
association. Consideration shall be given to all
qualifying characteristics of a historic property, including those that may have been identified subsequent to the original evaluation of the property’s
eligibility for the National Register. Adverse effects may include reasonably foreseeable effects
caused by the undertaking that may occur later in
time, be farther removed in distance or be cumulative.
(2) Examples of adverse effects. Adverse effects
on historic properties include, but are not limited
to:
(i) Physical destruction of or damage to all
or part of the property;
(ii) Alteration of a property, including restoration, rehabilitation, repair, maintenance,
stabilization, hazardous material remediation, and provision of handicapped access,
that is not consistent with the Secretary’s
standards for the treatment of historic properties (36 CFR part 68) and applicable guidelines;
...
(iv) Change of the character of the property’s
use or of physical features within the property’s setting that contribute to its historic
significance;
App. 92
(v) Introduction of visual, atmospheric or
audible elements that diminish the integrity
of the property’s significant historic features;
...
36 C.F.R. § 800.6
§ 800.6 Resolution of adverse effects.
(a) Continue consultation. The agency official shall
consult with the SHPO/THPO and other consulting
parties, including Indian tribes and Native Hawaiian
organizations, to develop and evaluate alternatives or
modifications to the undertaking that could avoid,
minimize, or mitigate adverse effects on historic properties.
...
(c) Memorandum of agreement. A memorandum of
agreement executed and implemented pursuant to this
section evidences the agency official’s compliance with
section 106 and this part and shall govern the undertaking and all of its parts. The agency official shall ensure that the undertaking is carried out in accordance
with the memorandum of agreement.
...
App. 93
36 C.F.R. § 800.13
§ 800.13 Post-review discoveries.
...
(b) Discoveries without prior planning. If historic
properties are discovered or unanticipated effects on
historic properties found after the agency official has
completed the section 106 process without establishing a process under paragraph (a) of this section, the
agency official shall make reasonable efforts to avoid,
minimize or mitigate adverse effects to such properties
and:
(1) If the agency official has not approved the
undertaking or if construction on an approved undertaking has not commenced, consult to resolve
adverse effects pursuant to § 800.6; or
(2) If the agency official, the SHPO/THPO and
any Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization
that might attach religious and cultural significance to the affected property agree that such
property is of value solely for its scientific, prehistoric, historic or archeological data, the agency
official may comply with the Archeological and
Historic Preservation Act instead of the procedures in this part and provide the Council, the
SHPO/THPO, and the Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization with a report on the actions
within a reasonable time after they are completed;
or
(3) If the agency official has approved the undertaking and construction has commenced, determine actions that the agency official can take to
App. 94
resolve adverse effects, and notify the SHPO/THPO,
any Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization
that might attach religious and cultural significance to the affected property, and the Council
within 48 hours of the discovery. The notification
shall describe the agency official’s assessment of
National Register eligibility of the property and
proposed actions to resolve the adverse effects.
The SHPO/THPO, the Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization and the Council shall respond
within 48 hours of the notification. The agency official shall take into account their recommendations regarding National Register eligibility and
proposed actions, and then carry out appropriate
actions. The agency official shall provide the
SHPO/THPO, the Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian
organization and the Council a report of the actions when they are completed.
...
36 C.F.R. § 800.16
§ 800.16 Definitions.
...
(l)(1) Historic property means any prehistoric or historic district, site, building, structure, or object included in, or eligible for inclusion in, the National
Register of Historic Places maintained by the Secretary of the Interior. This term includes artifacts, records, and remains that are related to and located
within such properties. The term includes properties of
traditional religious and cultural importance to an
App. 95
Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization and that
meet the National Register criteria.
(2) The term eligible for inclusion in the National
Register includes both properties formally determined
as such in accordance with regulations of the Secretary
of the Interior and all other properties that meet the
National Register criteria.
...
(y) Undertaking means a project, activity, or program
funded in whole or in part under the direct or indirect
jurisdiction of a Federal agency, including those carried
out by or on behalf of a Federal agency; those carried
out with Federal financial assistance; and those requiring a Federal permit, license or approval.
...
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.