Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Havasupai Tribe, Petitioner v. Heather C. Provencio, et al.

Supreme Court briefMar 21, 2019

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APPENDIX

App. 1

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

HAVASUPAI TRIBE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

and

GRAND CANYON TRUST; CENTER FOR

BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY; SIERRA CLUB,

Plaintiffs,

No. 15-15754

D.C. No.

3:13-cv-08045DGC

v.

HEATHER PROVENCIO, Forest

Supervisor, Kaibab National Forest;

UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE,

an agency in the U.S. Department

of Agriculture,

Defendants-Appellees,

ENERGY FUELS RESOURCES (USA),

INC.; EFR ARIZONA STRIP LLC,

Intervenor-DefendantsAppellees.

GRAND CANYON TRUST; CENTER

FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY; SIERRA

CLUB,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

and

D.C. No.

3:13-cv-08045DGC

ORDER AND

OPINION

HAVASUPAI TRIBE,

Plaintiff,

v.

No. 15-15857

App. 2

HEATHER PROVENCIO, Forest

Supervisor, Kaibab National Forest;

UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE,

an agency in the U.S. Department

of Agriculture,

Defendants-Appellees,

ENERGY FUELS RESOURCES (USA),

INC.; EFR ARIZONA STRIP LLC,

Intervenor-DefendantsAppellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

David G. Campbell, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted December 15, 2016

San Francisco, California

Filed October 25, 2018

Before: Marsha S. Berzon and Mary H. Murguia,

Circuit Judges, and Frederic Block, District Judge.

Order;

Opinion by Judge Block

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COUNSEL

Richard W. Hughes (argued) and Reed C. Bienvenu,

Rothstein Donatelli LLP, Santa Fe, New Mexico, for

Plaintiff-Appellant Havasupai Tribe.

Neil Levine (argued), Law Office of Neil Levine, Denver, Colorado; Aaron Paul, Grand Canyon Trust, Denver, Colorado; Marc Fink, Center for Biological

Diversity, Duluth, Minnesota; Roger Flynn, Western

App. 3

Mining Action Project, Lyons, Colorado; for PlaintiffsAppellants Grand Canyon Trust, Center for Biological

Diversity, and Sierra Club.

Thekla Hansen-Young (argued), Jared S. Pettinato, Michael T. Gray, and Andrew C. Mergen, Attorneys; Jeffrey H. Wood, Acting Assistant Attorney General;

Environment & Natural Resources Division, United

States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; Nicholas L. Pino and Pamela P. Henderson, Attorneys; Stephen Alexander Vaden, Principal Deputy General

Counsel; Office of General Counsel, United States Department of Agriculture; for Defendants-Appellees.

David J. DePippo (argued), Hunton & Williams LLP,

Richmond, Virginia; Michael K. Kennedy and Bradley

J. Glass, Gallagher & Kennedy P.A., Phoenix, Arizona;

for Intervenor-Defendants-Appellees.

Eric Biber, Professor of Law, Berkley [sic] Law, Berkeley, California, for Amici Curiae Environmental and

Natural Resource Law Professors.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

ORDER

Judges Berzon and Murguia have voted to deny

the petitions for rehearing en banc, and Judge Block so

recommends. The full court has been advised of the petitions and no judge has requested a vote on whether

to rehear the matter en banc. Fed. R. App. P. 35. Accordingly, the petitions for rehearing en banc are DENIED.

App. 4

The Opinion filed December 12, 2017, appearing

at 876 F.3d 1242 (9th Cir. 2017), is withdrawn. It may

not be cited as precedent by or to this court or any district court of the Ninth Circuit. A new opinion is being

filed concurrently with this order. Further petitions for

rehearing or rehearing en banc may be filed.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

OPINION

BLOCK, District Judge.

In National Mining Association v. Zinke, 877 F.3d

845 (9th Cir. 2017), we upheld the decision of the Secretary of the Interior to withdraw, for twenty years,

more than one million acres of public lands around

Grand Canyon National Park from new mining claims.

That withdrawal did not extinguish “valid existing

rights.” In these consolidated appeals, we consider

challenges by the Havasupai Tribe (“the Tribe”) and

three environmental groups—Grand Canyon Trust,

Center for Biological Diversity and Sierra Club (collectively, “the Trust”)—to the determination of the United

States Forest Service (the “Forest Service”) that Energy Fuels Resources (USA), Inc., and EFR Arizona

Strip LLC (collectively, “Energy Fuels”) had a valid existing right to operate a uranium mine on land within

the withdrawal area. As elaborated below, we affirm,

with one exception, the district court’s order rejecting

those challenges.

App. 5

I

Much of what we said in National Mining Association concerning the history of uranium mining in the

area and the Secretary’s withdrawal decision is also

relevant here. To that we add some additional background regarding the particular mine at issue in this

case.

Grand Canyon National Park is bordered to the

north and south by the Kaibab National Forest. The

southern portion of the forest—which is included in the

withdrawal area—contains Red Butte, a site of religious and cultural significance to the Tribe.

In 1988, the Forest Service approved a plan to

build and operate what became known as Canyon

Mine, a 17.4-acre uranium mine in the area around

Red Butte. During the approval process, the Forest

Service prepared an Environmental Impact Statement

(“EIS”) pursuant to the National Environmental

Policy Act of 1969 (“NEPA”). NEPA requires an EIS for

any “major Federal action[ ] significantly affecting

the quality of the human environment.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 4332(2)(C).

At that time, the Forest Service also addressed the

mine’s impact under the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 (“NHPA”). Section 106 of the NHPA

requires federal agencies, prior to issuing a license for

any “undertaking,” to “take into account the effect of

the undertaking on any [historic property].” Pub. L. No.

89-665, § 106 (codified, as amended, at 54 U.S.C.

§ 306108). Historic property is defined as “any

App. 6

prehistoric or historic district, site, building, structure,

or object included on, or eligible for inclusion on, the

National Register.” 54 U.S.C. § 300308. Based on its review, the Forest Service required mitigation measures

to minimize the impact on possible relics buried on the

site of the mine. The review did not include nearby Red

Butte because that site was not eligible for inclusion

on the National Register until 1992. See National Historical Preservation Act Amendments of 1992, Pub. L.

No. 102-575, tit. XL, § 4006 (making “[p]roperties of

traditional religious and cultural importance to an Indian tribe” eligible for inclusion on the National Register). The EIS, however, did address the tribal religious

significance of Red Butte.

The Tribe sought judicial review, but both the district court and this Court rejected the challenge. See

Havasupai Tribe v. United States, 752 F. Supp. 1471 (D.

Ariz. 1990), aff ’d sub nom. Havasupai Tribe v. Robertson, 943 F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S.

959 (1992). The mine operator built surface facilities

and sank the first fifty feet of a 1,400-foot shaft, but

placed the mine on “standby” status in 1992 due to the

unfavorable conditions in the uranium market that we

described in National Mining Association.

As noted, the Secretary’s withdrawal decision was

“subject to valid existing rights.” 77 Fed. Reg. 2563

(Jan. 18, 2012). A few months before the decision became final, Energy Fuels—which had become Canyon

Mine’s owner—notified the Forest Service that it intended to return the mine to active operations. At the

Service’s request, Energy Fuels agreed not to resume

App. 7

sinking the mineshaft pending review of its claim of

existing rights.

On April 18, 2012, the Forest Service issued a

“Mineral Report.” It found that Energy Fuels’ predecessors-in-interest had “located” mining claims at the

site in 1978 and “discovered” uranium ore there between 1978 and 1982. It further found that there were

84,207 tons of uranium ore on the site, and that “under

present economic conditions, the uranium deposit on

the claims could be mined, removed, transported,

milled and marketed at a profit.” Based on those findings, the Forest Service concluded that Energy Fuel

had “valid existing rights that were established prior

to the mineral withdrawal.”

The Forest Service also reviewed its 1988 decision,

including its EIS and the mine’s approved plan of operations (“PoO”), “for any changes in laws, policies or

regulations that might require additional federal actions to be taken before operations resume.” In a “Mine

Review” dated June 25, 2012, it concluded that the existing PoO was “still in effect and no amendment or

modification to the PoO is required before Canyon

Mine resumes operations under the approved PoO.” It

further concluded that “[n]o new federal action subject

to further NEPA analysis is required for resumption of

operations of the Canyon Mine.”

With respect to historic preservation, the Mine Review concluded that “there will be no new federal undertakings subject to NHPA Section 106 compliance.”

It noted, however, that Red Butte had become eligible

App. 8

for inclusion on the National Register, and opined that

the site “could be considered a newly ‘discovered’ historic property.” Applying the regulation applicable to

such discoveries, 36 C.F.R. § 800.13(b)(3), the Forest

Service immediately contacted the Tribe to “enter into

government-to-government consultation” to “develop

‘actions’ to resolve or minimize the adverse effects” on

Red Butte. In response, the Tribe insisted on a revised

PoO, a supplemental EIS and a full consultation under

section 106 of the NHPA. The Forest Service and the

Tribe continued to correspond, but never settled on a

specific plan of action. The Mine Review alludes to the

likely reason: “Tribes have commented that most anticipated impacts, including the most serious impacts,

cannot be mitigated if uranium mining is conducted at

the Canyon Mine site.”

Consultation with the Tribe ended in March 2013,

when the Tribe and the Trust jointly filed suit against

the Forest Service in the district court. Energy Fuels

intervened as a defendant.

As amended, the complaint asserted four claims

under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”):

1.

the Forest Service’s determination that Energy

Fuels had valid existing rights to operate the Canyon Mine notwithstanding the January 2012 withdrawal was a “major federal action significantly

affecting the environment,” and, therefore, the service violated the NEPA by not preparing an EIS in

connection with its determination;

App. 9

2.

the Forest Service’s determination was an “undertaking,” and, therefore, the service violated the

NHPA by not conducting a full consultation under

section 106 in connection with its determination;

3.

alternatively, the Forest Service violated the

NHPA by not properly updating its original section 106 analysis to account for the impact on Red

Butte; and

4.

the Forest Service violated several federal laws by

failing to take various costs into account in its determination that Canyon Mine could be operated

at a profit.

As relief, the plaintiffs sought a declaration that the

Forest Service was acting in violation of the NEPA, the

NHPA and other laws; an order setting aside any “approvals or authorizations” for operations at Canyon

Mine; and an injunction prohibiting “any further uranium exploration or mining-related activities at the

Canyon Mine unless and until the Forest Service fully

complies with all applicable laws.”

The parties cross-moved for summary judgment.

In an order dated April 7, 2015, the district court held

(1) that the plaintiffs had Article III standing, (2) that

the plaintiffs lacked prudential standing with respect

to their fourth claim, and (3) that the Mineral Report—

which the district court referred to as the “VER [Valid

Existing Rights] Determination”—was a final agency

action subject to review under the APA. See Grand

Canyon Tr. v. Williams, 98 F. Supp. 3d 1044, 1055–61

(D. Ariz. 2015). Turning to the merits, the district court

held (1) that the Mineral Report was not a “major

App. 10

federal action” requiring an EIS under the NEPA; (2)

that the report was not an “undertaking” requiring a

full section 106 consultation under the NHPA; (3) that

the Forest Service’s decision to consider the effect on

Red Butte under 36 C.F.R. § 800.13(b)(3) was reasonable; and (4) that the Forest Service had complied with

that regulation. See id. at 1062–73.1

Both the Tribe and the Trust timely appealed.

II

The Forest Service argues that we lack jurisdiction because its determination that Energy Fuels has

valid existing rights was not a final agency action. See

Ukiah Valley Med. Ctr. v. FTC, 911 F.2d 261, 266 (9th

Cir. 1990) (“ ‘[F]inal agency action’ is a jurisdictional

requirement imposed by [5 U.S.C. § 704].”).2 We review

this threshold issue de novo. See Minard Run Oil Co. v.

U.S. Forest Serv., 670 F.3d 236, 247 (3d Cir. 2011).3

1

The district court also rejected the defendants’ argument

that two of the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by collateral estoppel. See Grand Canyon Tr., 98 F. Supp. 3d at 1061–62. That ruling has not been challenged on appeal.

2

The Supreme Court recently reminded courts that “[o]nly

Congress may determine a lower federal court’s subject-matter

jurisdiction.” Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chi., No. 16658, at 1 (U.S. Nov. 8, 2017) (quoting Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S.

443, 456 (2004)). Since the final agency action requirement is statutory, Hamer does not call into question its status as a jurisdictional limitation.

3

In the district court, the Forest Service further argued that

the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing. It has not pursued that

argument on appeal, but we are satisfied that the plaintiffs have

App. 11

“ ‘[A]gency action’ includes the whole or a part of

an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief or the

equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act[.]” 5 U.S.C.

§ 551(13). “[R]elief,” in turn, includes the “recognition

of a claim, right, immunity, privilege, exemption, or exception.” Id. § 551(11)(B).

The Forest Service claims that it has no authority

to recognize mining rights, and that the Mineral Report represents only the agency’s “opinion” as to their

validity. But whether or not the Mineral Report was

legally required, it was prepared. Its conclusion that

Energy Fuels had valid existing rights at the time of

the withdrawal falls within the plain meaning of

“recognition of a claim.”

We further conclude that the Mineral Report was

final. “As a general matter, two conditions must be satisfied for agency action to be ‘final[.]’ ” Bennett v. Spear,

520 U.S. 154, 177 (1997). “First, the action must mark

the consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking

suffered injuries in fact that are fairly traceable to the Service’s

actions and that could be redressed by a favorable judicial determination. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61

(1992). Continued uranium mining at Canyon Mine causes concrete injury to the Tribe’s religious and cultural interests and the

Trust’s aesthetic and recreational interests. While the parties dispute whether continued mining required the Forest Service’s approval, we must assume that it did in assessing standing. See

Equity Lifestyle Props., Inc. v. Cty. of San Luis Obispo, 548 F.3d

1184, 1189 n.10 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The jurisdictional question of

standing precedes, and does not require, analysis of the merits.”).

If the Tribe and Trust are correct that continued mining required

approval, then their injuries are fairly traceable to that approval

and could be redressed by setting it aside.

App. 12

process—it must not be of a merely tentative or interlocutory nature.” Id. at 177–78 (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). It is true that the final decision to contest a claim of existing rights rests with the

Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”). See Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co.,

371 U.S. 334, 336 (1963). If, however, the Forest Service

finds a claim is valid, nothing else happens. The district court sensibly described that outcome as “the Forest Service’s ‘last word’ on the validity of the Canyon

Mine mineral rights,” Grand Canyon Tr. v. Williams, 38

F. Supp. 3d 1073, 1078 (D. Ariz. 2014), and we agree

with that description.

In addition, to be final, “the action must be one by

which rights or obligations have been determined, or

from which legal consequences will flow.” Bennett, 520

U.S. at 178 (internal quotation marks omitted). Rights

to a mineral deposit on public land are not conferred

by agency action; they are acquired by the miner’s own

actions of location and discovery. See American Law of

Mining § 4.11 (2d ed. 1997) (“[The prospector] may

seek ‘valuable minerals’ and, if he finds them, may initiate a vested right without the approval of anyone

else, including representatives of the government that

owns the land.”). Nevertheless, the Mineral Report determined that such rights existed with respect to Canyon Mine, and that is all Bennett requires.

We have observed that “courts consider whether

the practical effects of an agency’s decision make it a

final agency action, regardless of how it is labeled.” Columbia Riverkeeper v. U.S. Coast Guard, 761 F.3d 1084,

App. 13

1094–95 (9th Cir. 2014). We therefore focus on both the

“practical and legal effects of the agency action,” and

define the finality requirement “in a pragmatic and

flexible manner.” Or. Nat. Desert Ass’n v. U.S. Forest

Serv., 465 F.3d 977, 982 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). We agree with the district court’s assessment that

the Mineral Report was a practical requirement to the

continued operation of Canyon Mine because “the Forest Service, Energy Fuels, and interested tribes all understood that mine operations would not resume until

the VER Determination was completed.” Grand Canyon Tr., 38 F. Supp. 3d at 1079.

III

The challenges to the merits of the district court’s

judgment raise three issues: (A) Was the Mineral Report a “major federal action” under the NEPA? (B) Did

the Mineral Report approve an “undertaking” under

the NHPA? (C) Did the Trust fall within the zone of

interests of either the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (“FLPMA”) or the General Mining

Act of 1872 (“Mining Act”)? Our review of each question is de novo. See N. Cheyenne Tribe v. Norton, 503

F.3d 836, 845 (9th Cir. 2007) (compliance with NEPA

and NHPA on summary judgment); Mills v. United

States, 742 F.3d 400, 406 (9th Cir. 2014) (zone of interests).

App. 14

A. NEPA

We have held that “where a proposed federal action would not change the status quo, an EIS is not

necessary.” Upper Snake River Chapter of Trout Unlimited v. Hodel, 921 F.2d 232, 235 (9th Cir. 1990). Nor

is an EIS necessary to “discuss the environmental effects of mere continued operation of a facility.” Burbank Anti-Noise Grp. v. Goldschmidt, 623 F.2d 115, 116

(9th Cir. 1980). We applied those general principles in

Center for Biological Diversity v. Salazar, 706 F.3d

1085 (9th Cir. 2013) (“CBD”).

At issue in CBD was the resumption of mining at

a uranium mine, “after a seventeen-year hiatus, under

a plan of operations that BLM approved in 1988.” 706

F.3d at 1088. We held that “no regulation requires approval of a new plan of operations before regular mining activities may recommence following a temporary

closure.” Id. at 1093. We further held that the original

approval of the plan was a major federal action, but

that “that action [wa]s completed when the plan [wa]s

approved.” Id. at 1095 (quoting, with alterations, Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 73 (2004)).

By contrast, in Pit River Tribe v. United States Forest

Service, 469 F.3d 768 (9th Cir. 2006), we held that a

lease extension was a major federal action that altered

the status quo because without it, the lessee would not

have been able to continue operating a power plant on

the leased property. See id. at 784.

The district court correctly held that CBD, not Pit

River, governs this case. As in CBD, the original

App. 15

approval of the plan of operations was a major federal

action. And as in CBD, that action was complete when

the plan was approved. Unlike Pit River, resumed operation of Canyon Mine did not require any additional

government action. Therefore, the EIS prepared in

1988 satisfied the NEPA.

B. NHPA

As we explained, the NHPA requires consultation

pursuant to section 106 prior to any “undertaking.” 54

U.S.C. § 306108. As pertinent here, “ ‘undertaking’

means a project, activity, or program funded in whole

or in part under the direct or indirect jurisdiction of a

Federal agency, including . . . those requiring a Federal

permit, license, or approval[.]” Id. § 300320(3). Here,

too, we agree with the district court that the Mineral

Report did not “permit, license, or approv[e]” resumed

operations at Canyon Mine; it simply acknowledged

the continued vitality of the original approval of the

PoO. Just as that approval was the only “major federal

action” requiring an EIS under the NEPA, it was the

only “undertaking” requiring consultation under the

NHPA.

The Tribe concedes that the approval process in

1986 included the necessary consultation, and that the

cultural and religious impacts on Red Butte were not

included because they were not required to be at that

time. It argues, however, that the NHPA imposes a continuing obligation on federal agencies to address the

App. 16

impact on historic property at any stage of an undertaking.

The statutory definition of “undertaking” dates

from 1992. Prior to that, it was defined by the Advisory

Council on Historic Preservation (“ACHP”), the agency

charged with implementing the NHPA, to include “continuing projects, activities, or programs and any of

their elements not previously considered under section

106.” 36 C.F.R. § 800.2(o) (1991). But that definition

was superseded by 54 U.S.C. § 300320(3), which omits

the reference to continuing projects. The regulatory

definition now conforms to the statutory definition. See

36 C.F.R. § 800.16(y). We therefore disagree with the

Tribe that the current definition of “undertaking” encompasses a continuing obligation to evaluate previously approved projects.

Although continuing obligations have been removed from the definition of “undertaking,” they remain in 36 C.F.R. § 800.13(b):

If historic properties are discovered or unanticipated effects on historic properties found

after the agency official has completed the section 106 process . . . , the agency official shall

make reasonable efforts to avoid, minimize or

mitigate adverse effects to such properties

and:

(1) If the agency official has not approved

the undertaking or if construction on an approved undertaking has not commenced, consult to resolve adverse effects pursuant to

§ 800.6; or . . .

App. 17

(3) If the agency official has approved the

undertaking and construction has commenced, determine actions that the agency official can take to resolve adverse effects, and

notify the [state or tribal historical office], any

Indian tribe . . . that might attach religious

and cultural significance to the affected property, and the [Advisory Council on Historic

Preservation] within 48 hours of the discovery. The notification shall describe the agency

official’s assessment of National Register eligibility of the property and proposed actions

to resolve the adverse effects. The . . . Indian

tribe . . . and the Council shall respond within

48 hours of the notification. The agency official shall take into account their recommendations

regarding

National

Register

eligibility and proposed actions, and then

carry out appropriate actions. The agency official shall provide the . . . Indian tribe . . . and

the Council a report of the actions when they

are completed.

As noted, the Forest Service concluded that this regulation applied to Canyon Mine. It further concluded

that subsection (3) applied because construction had

begun in the early 1990s, although it acknowledged

that the 20-year hiatus presented a “somewhat unusual situation.”

The Tribe objects that Red Butte was not a newly

discovered historic property—and that the effect of operating a uranium mine near it was not unanticipated—because it had informed the Forest Service of

the religious and cultural significance of this site

App. 18

decades earlier. While that is true, the Tribe does not

dispute that Red Butte was not a “historic property”

eligible for inclusion on the National Register until

2010. As a result, the NHPA did not obligate the Forest

Service to take the site into account when it conducted

a full section 106 consultation in 1986. And while we

agree that eligibility for inclusion on the National Register is not exactly a “discovery,” there is no other regulation requiring an agency to consider the impact on

newly eligible sites after an undertaking is approved.

In other words, by invoking § 800.13(b), the Forest Service may have given the Tribe more than it was entitled to demand.

The Tribe further argues that if § 800.13(b) applies, the Forest Service should have proceeded under

§ 800.13(b)(1), instead of § 800.13(b)(3). In sum, the

agency must engage in a full section 106 consultation

if it “has not [yet] approved the undertaking or if construction on an approved undertaking has not [yet]

commenced.” 36 C.F.R. § 800.13(b)(1). If, however, the

agency “has approved the undertaking and construction has commenced,” it can engage in a simplified process to “determine actions that the agency official can

take to resolve adverse effects.” Id. § 800.13(b)(3).

Canyon Mine fits squarely within the scope of subsection (3). The mine was approved in 1988, and construction of the surface facilities began shortly

thereafter. The Tribe argues that subsection (3) was

App. 19

intended to address emergency situations, but there is

no express limitation to such situations.4

Finally, the Tribe briefly argues that the Forest

Service did not comply with § 800.13(b)(3). Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the Forest Service

made a good-faith effort to ascertain steps it could take

to resolve the possible adverse effects of mining on Red

Butte. If that effort was not successful, it is because the

Tribe insisted on a full consultation under section 106,

which was not legally required, and a complete ban on

mining around Red Butte, which the Forest Service

lacks the authority to impose.

C. FLPMA and Mining Act

The plaintiffs’ fourth claim, advanced by the

Trust, challenged the merits of the Forest Service’s

conclusion that Energy Fuels had valid existing rights

4

In a letter to the Forest Service, the ACHP opined that subsection (3) applies “where construction activities have begun and

would be ongoing, and thus, the agency had limited time and opportunity for consultation.” Normally, an agency’s interpretation

of its own ambiguous regulation is “controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” Auer v. Robbins, 519

U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). Subsection (3) is not ambiguous. Moreover, the letter was motivated by

a concern that proceeding under subsection (3) “would continue

the unproductive conflict between the Forest Service and the Indian tribes that consider Red Butte a sacred place.” We agree with

the district court that the letter “appears to be more tactical advice than an interpretation of the regulation.” Grand Canyon Tr.,

98 F. Supp. 3d at 1070.

App. 20

predating the withdrawal because its predecessors-ininterest had discovered a deposit of uranium ore that

could be “mined, removed, transported, milled and

marketed at a profit.” The district court did not address this claim, instead holding that the Trust lacked

prudential standing to make it. See Grand Canyon Tr.,

98 F. Supp. 3d at 1058–60.

“[A] person suing under the APA must satisfy not

only Article III’s standing requirements, but an additional test: The interest he asserts must be arguably

within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute that he says was violated.” MatchE-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v.

Patchak, 567 U.S. 209, 224 (2012) (internal quotation

marks omitted).5 We agree with the district court that

the Trust’s fourth claim falls outside the Mining Act’s

zone of interests. See Grand Canyon Tr., 98 F. Supp. 3d

at 1059 (explaining that the Mining Act’s obvious

5

As the district court’s language reflects, the additional test

was, until recently, described as a matter of “prudential standing.” See Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish, 567 U.S. at 224–28. But in

Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.,

572 U.S. 118 (2014), the Supreme Court called that description

“misleading,” id. at 125, and “in some tension with . . . the principle that a federal court’s obligation to hear and decide cases

within its jurisdiction is virtually unflagging,” id. at 126 (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). It held that the zone-ofinterests inquiry instead asks “whether a legislatively conferred

cause of action encompasses a particular plaintiff ’s claim,” id. at

127, or, in the APA context, whether a plaintiff ’s interests “are so

marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit

in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress

authorized that plaintiff to sue,” id. at 130 (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted).

App. 21

intent was “to reward and encourage the discovery of

minerals that are valuable in an economic sense,” and

that the Trust’s interests are environmental and historical, but not economic).

However, the Trust also argued that the Forest

Service’s VER determination violated the FLPMA. The

district court did not address the FLPMA’s zone of interests in its analysis, concluding that “the sections of

the [FLPMA] to which Plaintiffs cite do not relate to

validity determinations or mineral examinations. . . .

and do not provide the Court with any relevant law to

apply in deciding claim four.” Id. at 1059 n.8. It is true,

of course, that the plaintiff must fall within the zone of

interests of the “statutory provision whose violation

forms the legal basis of his complaint.” Lujan v. Nat’l

Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 883 (1990). However, we

conclude that the FLPMA, and not the Mining Act,

forms the legal basis of the Trust’s fourth claim.

We described the FLPMA at length in National

Mining Association. See 877 F.3d at 845. Relevant here,

the FLPMA confers on the Secretary authority to withdraw federal lands for specified purposes, 43 U.S.C.

§ 1701(a)(4), but makes that authority “subject to valid

existing rights.” Pub. L. 94-579, § 701(h), 90 Stat. 2743,

2786 (1976). Thus, the VER determination that the

Trust challenges in this case was made to decide

whether Canyon Mine would be subject to a withdrawal made pursuant to the FLPMA.

Here, the Forest Service looked to the Mining Act

to make its VER determination. However, that does not

App. 22

conclusively establish that the Mining Act, and not the

FLPMA, forms the “legal basis” of the Trust’s fourth

claim. Had Energy Fuels claimed rights of a different

nature, the Forest Service would have consulted a different statutory scheme, but it still would have made a

VER determination. Regardless of the statute consulted, a VER determination affects whether activities

on federal land can be limited under the FLPMA. See

43 U.S.C. § 1703(j) (stating that the purpose of a withdrawal is to “limit[ ] activities . . . in order to maintain

other public values”). That question implicates the

Trust’s asserted environmental concerns.

In sum, the Forest Service applied the relevant

standards from the Mining Act to make its VER determination, but the Trust’s claim that Canyon Mine

should not be exempt from the withdrawal because the

VER determination was in error remains a claim under the FLPMA. And since the Trust’s claim seeks to

vindicate some of the same concerns that underlie the

Secretary’s withdrawal authority, it falls within the

statute’s zone of interests. See W. Watersheds Project v.

Kraayenbrink, 632 F.3d 472, 485–86 (9th Cir. 2011)

(plaintiffs’ environmental interests fell within the

NEPA and the FLPMA’s zone of interests); Desert Citizens Against Pollution v. Bisson, 231 F.3d 1172, 1179

(9th Cir. 2000) (plaintiffs’ aesthetic and recreational

interests fell within the FLPMA’s zone of interests).

App. 23

IV

With respect to the claims under the NEPA and

NHPA, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. With respect to the claim under the

FLPMA, the judgment is VACATED and the case is

REMANDED for consideration of the claim on the

merits.

App. 24

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Grand Canyon Trust,

et al.,

Plaintiffs,

No. CV-13-08045-PCT-DGC

ORDER

(Filed Apr. 7, 2015)

v.

Michael Williams, et al.,

Defendants.

The parties have filed cross-motions for summary

judgment. Docs. 140, 146, 147. The motions are fully

briefed and the Court heard oral argument on March

18, 2015. For the reasons stated below, Defendants’ and

Defendant-Intervenors’ motions for summary judgment will be granted and Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment will be denied.

I.

Background.

Plaintiffs include the Havasupai Tribe and various environmental groups: Grand Canyon Trust, Center

for Biological Diversity, and the Sierra Club. Defendants are the United States Forest Service; Michael Williams, Supervisor of the Kaibab National Forest; and

Intervenors Energy Fuels Resources (USA), Inc. and

EFR Arizona Strip, LLC.

This case arises out of the proposed renewal of operations at the Canyon Mine in Northern Arizona. The

Canyon Mine is a breccia pipe uranium mine located

App. 25

six miles south of Grand Canyon National Park, in the

Kaibab National Forest, and four miles north of Red

Butte, a culturally and religiously significant site for

the Havasupai and other tribes. Doc. 115 ¶¶ 2, 49.

In October 1984, Energy Fuels Nuclear, Inc. (“EFN”)

submitted to the Forest Service a proposed Plan of

Operations for the Canyon Mine (the “Plan”). A.R. 193221. Pursuant to the National Environmental Policy

Act (“NEPA”), the Forest Service completed an Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) to address the

potential environmental impacts to the area and considered input from federally recognized Indian tribes.

A.R. 461-693. On September 26, 1986, the Forest Service issued a Record of Decision (“ROD”) approving a

modified version of the Plan. A.R. 915-29. Several administrative appeals followed (A.R. 3932), and the

Deputy Regional Forester and Chief of the Forest Service both affirmed the ROD.

The Havasupai Tribe filed a federal court lawsuit

challenging approval of the Canyon Mine. See Havasupai Tribe v. United States, 752 F. Supp. 1471 (D. Ariz.

1990). Among other arguments, the tribe claimed that

the EIS failed to comply with NEPA.1 Following a

1

The tribe’s specific NEPA arguments included the following: the EIS (1) failed to consider the “no-action alternative” of not

approving the Plan; (2) failed to give adequate consideration to the

tribe’s religious and cultural interests in the site; (3) was based

on incomplete hydrogeological information; (4) failed to adequately

consider the environmental impact of disposal of radioactive waste;

and (5) failed to adequately consider the environmental cumulative impacts of mining in the region. Havasupai Tribe, 752

F. Supp. at 1490.

App. 26

thorough analysis of the EIS, the ROD, and the administrative record, the District Court granted summary

judgment in favor of the Forest Service. Id. at 14891505. The Ninth Circuit affirmed in August of 1991.

See Havasupai Tribe v. United States, 943 F.2d 32 (9th

Cir. 1991).

Shortly thereafter, EFN began constructing the

mine. EFN built access roads, storage buildings, a

power line, a perimeter fence, diversion structures, a

holding pond, a head frame and hoist, and support

buildings. A.R. 10487; Doc. 146-1 at 17; Hangan Declaration, Doc. 53-4, ¶ 4.2 Work on the mine shaft was

started, and proceeded to a depth of 50 feet. A.R. 10487.

When uranium prices fell in 1992, EFN placed the

mine on stand-by status. For the next several years the

mine was maintained under the interim management

portions of the Plan. A.R. 10314.

In 2010, the Forest Service designated Red Butte

and the surrounding area, including the location of the

Canyon Mine, as a Traditional Cultural Property

(“TCP”), thereby making it eligible to be included in

the National Register of Historic Places due to its “ongoing, and historic cultural and religious significance

to multiple tribes.” A.R. 10616.

2

When the Court cites to page numbers in documents filed

in the docket (Doc.), the citation will be to numbers at the top of

the page assigned by the Court’s CM/ECF system, not to numbers

at the bottom of the page as assigned in the original document.

App. 27

In January 2012, the Secretary of the Department

of the Interior (“DOI”), pursuant to the Federal Land

Policy and Management Act (“FLPMA”), 42 U.S.C.

§ 1714(a), withdrew approximately 633,547 acres of

public lands and 360,002 acres of National Forest System lands for up to 20 years from location and entry

under the Mining Law of 1872 (the “Withdrawal”). 77

Fed. Reg. 2317-01 (Jan. 17, 2012); A.R. 10308-31. The

Withdrawal, which included the location of the Canyon

Mine, had been proposed by DOI in 2009. 74 Fed. Reg.

35,887-01 (July 21, 2009). The DOI undertook extensive study and preparation of an EIS before finalizing

the Withdrawal. The final EIS noted the existence of

the Canyon Mine and stated its assumption that the

mine would continue operations. A.R. 8657.

In August 2011, Energy Fuels Resources (USA),

Inc. (“Energy Fuels”), a successor owner of the Canyon

Mine, notified the Forest Service that it intended to resume operations under the Plan approved in 1986. A.R.

8547. In response, the Forest Service decided to complete a valid existing rights determination (“VER Determination”) with respect to the Canyon Mine. The

purpose of the VER Determination was to confirm that

the owner had valid rights to the uranium mineral deposits. Although Energy Fuels had asserted in its initial letter to the Forest Service that it did not believe

any additional government approvals were required

before the mine reopened (A.R. 443), Energy Fuels

agreed to withhold shaft sinking until the VER Determination was complete (Doc. 123-2 at 2-3). The VER

Determination was finished on April 18, 2012, and

App. 28

found that Energy Fuels had valid existing mineral

rights at the Canyon Mine. A.R. 10483-528.

The Forest Service also undertook a “Mine Review.”

A.R. 10592-637. The review was conducted by a 13person interdisciplinary team with expertise in minerals and geology, surface and groundwater, air quality,

transportation, tribal consultation, heritage resources,

vegetation, NEPA, and socioeconomic issues. A.R.

10597. Among other matters, the team evaluated the

sufficiency of the Plan and the original EIS and ROD;

historical and religious issues related to local tribes,

including tribal consultation in connection with the

EIS and ROD; sensitive tribal sites, including Red

Butte; the effect of resumed operations on the quality

of air, surface water, and groundwater; and the effect

of resumed mine operations on wildlife and any threatened, endangered, or sensitive species. A.R. 10592-637.

The Mine Review was completed on June 25, 2012,

and concluded that operations could resume at the

Canyon Mine under the original Plan. The Mine Review made this finding:

[T]he Forest [Service] undertook a review of

the 1986 Environmental Impact Statement

and Record of Decision, and associated documents. Resource specialists from the Kaibab

National Forest and Southwestern Regional

Office reviewed the documents to determine

if any modification or amendment of the existing Plan of Operations was required and

whether there was any new information or

changed circumstances indicating unforeseen

App. 29

significant disturbance of surface resources.

It was determined that no amendment or

modification of the Plan of Operation was required. . . . Therefore, [Energy Fuels] will resume operations under the existing Plan of

Operations.

A.R. 10594.3

Upon learning that the mine would be reopened,

the Arizona State Historic Preservation Office (“AZSHPO”)

advised the Forest Service that it should undertake a

full consultation under § 106 of the National Historic

Preservation Act (“NHPA”), 16 U.S.C. § 470f. A.R.

10139. Section 106 requires a federal agency charged

with issuing a federal license for an “undertaking” to

consult with various interested parties and evaluate

the potential effects on TCPs, including identification

of the affected properties, a determination of the potential adverse effects to the properties, and an identification of methods of mitigation. 36 C.F.R. §§ 800.2-800.7.

The Mine Review concluded that a full § 106 process was not necessary. A.R. 10593-637. Instead, the

Forest Service undertook a reduced consultation process under 36 C.F.R. § 800.13(b)(3). The Forest Service

sent letters to tribal leaders as well as the Advisory

Council on Historic Preservation (“ACHP”), notifying

them of renewed operations at the Canyon Mine and

3

The Mine Review also concluded that the Plan remained in

effect in 2012. “According to the regulations, the plan covers the

entire operation and is in effect from approval until the time that

final reclamation is completed. . . . The approved 1986 [Plan] is

currently in effect.” A.R. 10598.

App. 30

offering to meet and discuss potential adverse effects

to the environment and areas of religious and cultural

significance. A.R. 10690-91. The tribes and the ACHP

urged the Forest Service to undertake a full § 106 review, but the Forest Service declined. A two-day consultation meeting was held with the tribes in January

2013.

Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on March 7, 2013, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706.

Doc. 1. Plaintiffs’ amended complaint alleges four

claims: (1) the Forest Service violated NEPA by not

conducting an EIS in connection with the VER Determination; (2) the Forest Service violated the NHPA by

failing to complete a full § 106 review prior to approving resumed operations at the Canyon Mine; (3) the

Forest Service violated the NHPA by conducting a review under § 800.13(b)(3); and (4) the VER Determination failed to consider all relevant cost factors and

therefore is arbitrary, capricious, and not in accordance

with the law. All parties move for summary judgment.

II.

Standard of Review.

The APA allows a court to compel agency action

unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed. 5 U.S.C.

§ 706(1). A claim to compel action may proceed “only

where a plaintiff asserts that an agency failed to take

a discrete agency action that it is required to take.” Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 64

(2004) (emphasis in original); see Hells Canyon

App. 31

Preservation Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 593 F.3d 923,

932 (9th Cir. 2010).

A court may set aside a final agency action under

the APA only if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of

discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5

U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). “This standard of review is ‘highly

deferential, presuming the agency action to be valid

and affirming the agency action if a reasonable basis

exists for its decision.’ ” Nw. Ecosystem Alliance v. U.S.

Fish & Wildlife Serv., 475 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir.

2007) (quoting Independent Acceptance Co. v. California, 204 F.3d 1247, 1251 (9th Cir. 2000)). The APA does

not allow a court to overturn an agency action simply

because the court disagrees with the action. See River

Runners for Wilderness v. Martin, 593 F.3d 1064, 1070

(9th Cir. 2010).

III. Was the VER Determination Required?

Plaintiffs argue that the VER Determination was

required by law because of the Withdrawal, and therefore constituted “agency action” reviewable under the

APA, a “major federal action” that triggered NEPA,

and an approval of a new “undertaking” that triggered

§ 106 review under the NHPA. Because the nature of

the VER Determination affects so many issues in this

case, the Court will address it before considering other

arguments made in the summary judgment briefing.

App. 32

A. Nature of the VER Determination.

The purpose of the VER Determination was to

evaluate whether the owners of the Canyon Mine had

valid legal rights to the uranium ore they would be

mining. As part of the Determination, certified mineral

examiners employed by the Forest Service visited the

mine site, reviewed mining claims records, evaluated

ore deposits, toured facilities operated by the owner,

and conducted an economic evaluation of the mine.

A.R. 10482-527. The examiners concluded that the

mining claims “were valid at the time of the [Withdrawal] and continue to be valid at the present time.”

A.R. 10482.

The Forest Service completed the VER Determination before approving renewed operations at the Canyon Mine, but the determination itself had no binding

legal effect. The Forest Service does not have responsibility for determining the validity of mining claims on

federal lands. That responsibility has been delegated

to the DOI, and specifically to the Bureau of Land

Management (“BLM”) within the DOI (the Forest Service is in the Department of Agriculture). The DOI, not

the Forest Service, has adjudicative authority to declare mining claims valid or invalid. Cameron v. United

States, 252 U.S. 450, 460 (1920) (Secretary of Interior

charged with determining validity of mining claims);

Forest Service Manual (“FSM”) § 2814.11 (A.R. 7284).

Because the Forest Service supervises vast stretches

of federal land that include mining operations, however, it can perform VER Determinations under an

App. 33

interagency agreement with BLM. FSM § 2814.11

(A.R. 7284); Linden Declaration, Doc. 53-2, ¶ 6. These

determinations are made for internal purposes. As the

First Service Manual explains, they enable the Forest

Service to make “a decision on whether or not to contest the claim.” FSM § 2819.1 (A.R. 7312). But the actual claim contest must be adjudicated by BLM and

the DOI. FSM §§ 2814.11, 2819.1 (A.R. 7284, 7312). As

the Forest Service Manual confirms: “No adjudicative

power has been given to the Forest Service. Thus,

statements about validity [of mining claims] are statements of belief and not formal determinations.” FSM

§ 2819 (A.R. 7311).

Plaintiffs do not dispute these basic facts. They argue, however, that things changed when the land on

which the Canyon Mine is located was withdrawn by

the Secretary of the Interior. They argue that the Withdrawal, not statutes or regulations governing mining

generally, required that a VER Determination be completed before the Canyon Mine could resume operations.

B. Legal Effect of the Withdrawal.

The Withdrawal affected more than one million

federally-owned acres north and south of the Grand

Canyon, closing them to mineral location and entry for

a period of 20 years. 77 Fed. Reg. 2317-01 (Jan. 17,

2012); A.R. 10308-31. The Withdrawal did not prohibit

all uranium mining on the withdrawn lands. Rather, it

prohibited “location and entry,” which is the process by

App. 34

which an individual enters public lands to find and establish a valid mining claim. Mount Royal Joint Venture v. Kempthorne, 477 F.3d 745, 750 n.3 (D.C. Cir.

2007).

Prior to the Withdrawal, the lands were open for

location and entry. The Mining Law of 1872 provides

that “all valuable mineral deposits in lands belonging

to the United States . . . shall be free and open to exploration and purchase[.]” 30 U.S.C. § 22. Individuals

can enter federal land, explore for minerals, and stake

their right to a claim by “[e]stablishing the exterior

lines of a mining claim or site” and “[r]ecording a notice

or certificate of location.” 43 C.F.R. § 3832.1. Such

claims can then become the subject of proposed plans

for the operation of a mine. The Withdrawal removed

the land from this open exploration and claim process

and thereby foreclosed the establishment of new mining claims in the future.

The Withdrawal did not extinguish mining rights

that already existed. To the contrary, it was “subject to

valid existing rights.” A.R. 10310. This means that existing mines like the Canyon Mine could continue to

operate. Indeed, the Withdrawal’s EIS specifically contemplated that four uranium mines, including the

Canyon Mine, would continue in operation. A.R. 10314

(“There are four mines within the withdrawal area

that have approved plans of operations that predate

the Secretary’s withdrawal proposal. The Pinenut,

Kanab North, and Canyon mines were approved in the

late 1980s and are operating under the interim management plans[.]”).

App. 35

The Withdrawal also contemplated that claim

owners with valid existing rights at the time of the

Withdrawal, but no operating mine, could submit a

plan of operation for a uranium mine for approval:

Withdrawals under section 204 of the FLPMA

must be made subject to valid existing rights,

which means that new mineral exploration

and development could still be authorized under the withdrawal on valid existing mining

claims. The . . . scenarios developed for the

EIS indicate that potentially 11 mines could

develop with a full withdrawal, including the

four mines currently approved[.]

A.R. 10314-15.

The Withdrawal also addressed when VER Determinations would be required. It stated that new plans

of operations would be approved only if BLM or the

Forest Service first determined that the parties submitting the plans had valid existing mineral rights at

the time of the Withdrawal:

On withdrawn lands, neither the BLM nor the

Forest Service will process a new . . . plan of

operations until the surface managing agency

conducts a mineral examination and determines that the mining claims on which the

surface disturbance would occur were valid as

of the date the lands were . . . withdrawn.

Id. (emphasis added).

This is consistent with relevant regulations and

guidance documents. BLM regulations specifically

App. 36

address the rules that apply to withdrawn lands. They

state that, after the date of a withdrawal, “BLM will

not approve a plan of operations . . . until BLM has

prepared a mineral examination report.” 43 C.F.R.

§ 3809.100(a) (emphasis added). They do not suggest

that a VER Determination is required for an alreadyapproved plan of operations.

Section 8.1.5 of the BLM Surface Management

Handbook addresses previously approved plans:

[A]pproved Plans of Operations that were in

place prior to the withdrawal or segregation

date are not subject to the mandatory valid existing rights determination procedures at 43

C.F.R. 3809.100(a). These operations may continue as accepted or approved and do not require a validity determination unless or until

there is a material change in the activity. . . .

A.R. 11602.

This guidance comes from BLM, not the Forest

Service. But as noted above, BLM is the primary

agency responsible for determining mining claim validity, and its parent, DOI, is the agency that withdrew

the lands at issue in this case. The guidance of BLM on

the effect of the Withdrawal is therefore highly relevant. In addition, when the Forest Service was asked

in a public forum whether it had regulations specifying

when a VER Determination would be required on withdrawn lands, it provided this answer:

The Department of Interior (BLM) is the adjudicator of mining claims for the federal

App. 37

mineral estate including minerals located on

National Forest System Lands. The BLM does

have regulations addressing when to require

a valid existing rights determination for lands

that have been segregated or withdrawn at 43

C.F.R. 3809.100(a). It is the policy of the Forest

Service to be consistent with BLM direction.

Once the lands have been segregated or withdrawn, the Forest Service will not approve a

plan of operation without first determining if

valid existing rights exist.

A.R. 7691 (emphasis added); see also Linden Declaration, Doc. 53-2, ¶¶ 6-7.

From these sources, the Court concludes that a

VER Determination was not legally required before operations at the Canyon Mine could resume. The Canyon Mine Plan of Operations had been approved in

1986. A resumption of operations at the mine did not

require approval of a new plan. Thus, the relevant regulations and policy statements did not require a VER

Determination.

Plaintiffs argue that the Withdrawal was “subject

to valid existing rights” (A.R. 10310) and that a VER

Determination was therefore required. But there is a

difference between valid existing rights and a valid existing rights determination, and neither the Withdrawal nor the FLPMA requires a determination. The

fact that the Withdrawal was “subject to valid existing

rights” meant that it did not extinguish valid rights in

existence at the time of the Withdrawal; it says nothing

about when or how a review of those rights must occur.

App. 38

When the Withdrawal did address the requirement of

VER Determinations, it said they would be required

only for “new” plans of operations. A.R. 10314-15.

Plaintiffs also cite to a statement from § 2803 of

the Forest Service Manual which directed the Service

to “[e]nsure that valid existing rights have been established before allowing mineral or energy activities in

congressionally designated or withdrawn areas.” Doc.

140-5 at 2. Plaintiffs argue that this sentence requires

the Forest Service to complete a VER Determination

before any mineral activity can occur on withdrawn

lands, even activity at an already-approved mine. The

Court does not read the sentence so broadly. In light of

the very specific guidance provided in the BLM regulations and Handbook, and the Forest Service’s publicly stated policy of following that guidance, the Court

reads the word “allowing” in this sentence to mean that

the Forest Service will not allow new mining activities

on withdrawn lands without first completing a VER

Determination. This reading comports with the Forest

Service’s own statement that “[o]nce the lands have

been segregated or withdrawn, the Forest Service will

not approve a plan of operation without first determining if valid existing rights exist.” A.R. 7691 (emphasis

added). It also squares with the Withdrawal’s requirement of a VER Determination only for a “new” plan of

operations. A.R. 10314-15.4

4

The Court reaches the same conclusion with respect to

§ 2813.3 of Forest Service Manual cited by Plaintiffs: “Otherwise

the use of validity determinations should be limited to situations

where valid existing rights must be verified where the lands in

App. 39

In summary, because no new plan was required for

the Canyon Mine after the Withdrawal, the relevant

regulations and guidance documents did not require a

VER Determination. Mining could have resumed without one.

C. The Practical Effect of the VER Determination.

Although not a legal requirement, the record suggests that completion of the VER Determination was

a practical requirement before the Canyon Mine resumed operations. On September 23, 2011, the Forest

Supervisor, Michael Williams, wrote a letter to the executive vice president of Energy Fuels. Mr. Williams

explained that “[a] mineral exam is scheduled to determine if your company has valid existing rights for the

Canyon Mine location. This is a requirement for any

public domain lands managed by the Forest Service

that have been withdrawn from mineral entry[.]” A.R.

12429; Doc. 126-12 at 1.

In a conference call with the Kaibab Paiute Tribe

on January 10, 2012, in which Mr. Williams participated, an employee of the Forest Service explained

that “the mineral exam will need to be completed before they start work at the Canyon Mine.” A.R. 10335;

Doc. 118-15 at 1. The next day, in a telephone

question have been withdrawn from mineral entry[.]” A.R. 7310.

The “situations” where such rights must be verified, as shown

above, are the approval of new mining operations on withdrawn

lands.

App. 40

conversation with the Hualapai Tribe, Mr. Williams

stated that Energy Fuels “would not be able to move

forward without VER under the mineral withdrawal.”

A.R. 10342; Doc. 118-18 at 1.

The VER Determination itself suggested that it

was required for renewed operation of the mine: “It is

Forest Service policy (FSM 2803.5) to only allow operations on mining claims within a withdrawal that have

valid existing rights (VER).” A.R. 10486; see also 10487,

10489. Although this statement is correct to the extent

it suggests that mining operations on withdrawn lands

must have valid existing rights, it is incorrect, for the

reasons explained above, to the extent it suggests that

a VER Determination was legally required before the

Canyon Mine could resume operations. The Forest Service concedes that the legal understanding of some of

its employees was incorrect, but this does not change

the fact that these employees took the position with

Energy Fuels and the tribes that a VER Determination

was required.

Other communications make clear that Energy

Fuels chose not to proceed with renewed operations

until the VER Determination was finished. A letter

from Energy Fuels’ executive vice president to Forest

Service employees concerning the process of the VER

Determination stated: “We would like to get the sample

analysis turned around as early as possible so that we

can hopefully close this out and proceed with our production plans.” Doc. 118-16 at 1. An email from a Forest

Service employee to representatives of the Kaibab

Paiute Tribe, sent the day after the January 10, 2012

App. 41

conference call mentioned above, contained this statement: “I called our geologist, and was told that [Energy

Fuels] will not be doing any ‘shaft sinking’ at the site

until the mineral exam is completed.” A.R. 10348; Doc.

126-13 at 1.

Thus, even though the law did not require the VER

Determination, these communications show that the

Forest Service, Energy Fuels, and interested tribes all

understood that mine operations would not resume until it was completed. It was a practical if not a legal

requirement.

IV. Threshold Matters.

Defendants raise four threshold matters: (1) Plaintiffs lack Article III standing on two claims, (2) Plaintiffs lack prudential standing on claim four, (3) the

VER Determination is not a final agency action subject

to judicial review, and (4) collateral estoppel bars two

claims.

A. Article III Standing.

“To satisfy Article III’s standing requirements, a

plaintiff must show (1) it has suffered an ‘injury in fact’

that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or

imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the

defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely

speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw

App. 42

Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000)

(quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,

560-61 (1992)).

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs lack standing to

bring claims one and four. Claim one asserts that the

Forest Service, in completing the VER Determination,

violated NEPA by not conducting an EIS. Claim four

asserts that the VER Determination failed to account

for several costs. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’

“concrete interests” stem not from the VER Determination, but from the Plan approved in 1986. Several of

the declarations submitted by Plaintiffs do not address

the VER Determination; rather, they appear to seek

modification of the Plan. Thus, Defendants argue,

Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate any injury traceable to the VER Determination.5

Plaintiffs argue that they suffered “concrete injuries to their environmental, cultural and procedural

interests [that] stem directly from the [VER Determination] and the agency’s failure to comply with NEPA

and the NHPA.” Doc. 151 at 6. They assert that the

VER Determination permitted mining to resume and

thus threatens their interests in the land surrounding

5

Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs lack standing to bring

claim two. Defendants characterize the claim as a direct challenge

to the VER Determination, but claim two asserts that the Forest

Service was required to conduct a consultation under § 106 of the

NHPA before allowing mining to continue. See Doc. 151 at 7. It

does not concern the VER Determination. Defendants’ arguments, which focus entirely on the VER Determination, are therefore insufficient to challenge Plaintiffs’ standing to bring claim

two.

App. 43

the Canyon Mine. Plaintiffs have submitted the declarations of Don Watahomigie and Rex Tilousi on behalf

of the Havasupai Tribe, Roger Clark on behalf [sic]

Grand Canyon Trust, Kim Crumbo on behalf of the Sierra Club, and Robin Silver on behalf of the Center for

Biological Diversity. Docs. 37-7, 37-8. They also submitted supplemental declarations of Clark and Silver.

Docs. 151-1, 151-2.

Declarations of the tribal representatives show

that they have historical and religious interests in the

lands surrounding the mine and on which the mine is

located. The Court concludes that federal action taken

without due consideration of environmental or historical impacts of the mine would constitute a concrete and

particularized injury to the tribes.

“[E]nvironmental plaintiffs adequately allege injury in fact when they aver that they use the affected

area and are persons ‘for whom the aesthetic and recreational values of the area will be lessened’ by the

challenged activity.” Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at

183 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735

(1972)). Plaintiffs have done just that. Roger Clark

states that resumption of mining “interfere[s] with my

enjoyment of the lands within and surrounding Grand

Canyon National Park[.]” Doc. 151-1, ¶ 20. He claims

he decided not to visit the park on several occasions

because of the “constant dust, noise, and traffic from

trucks constructing roads and developing the Canyon

Mine.” Id., ¶ 6. Robin Silver states that the mining activities “threaten to destroy my aesthetic enjoyment of

the Red Butte area due to dust, heavy truck traffic,

App. 44

light pollution and noise,” and also “limit and interfere

with my local photographic opportunities.” Doc. 151-2,

¶¶ 12, 13. Silver also notes the environmental impacts

caused by mining. Id., ¶¶ 13-17. In addition, several

declarants state they are harmed because the Forest

Service’s failure to comply with NEPA deprived them

of the opportunity to comment on and participate in

the Forest Service decision. See Doc. 37-8.

Plaintiffs’ declarations are sufficient to establish

injury in fact and are fairly traceable to the VER Determination, which they assert permitted mining to resume. See Cantrell v. City of Long Beach, 241 F.3d 674,

682 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Once a plaintiff has established

an injury in fact under NEPA, the causation and redressability requirements are relaxed.”). Therefore,

the first two elements of standing are met.

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to

demonstrate the third requirement – redressability.

They argue that the VER Determination did not create

any legal consequences and was not required. If the

Court were to invalidate it, they argue, a new VER Determination would not be required and mining would

resume.

This redressability position is essentially an argument on the merits. Defendants assert that Plaintiffs

will fail to prove that the VER Determination was necessary and therefore invoked NEPA and NHPA requirements, and thus will fail in obtaining relief for

their grievances. But the Court cannot consider the

merits when deciding standing. The Court must

App. 45

assume the truth of Plaintiffs’ claims and that Plaintiffs will succeed on the merits. See Friends of the

Earth, 528 U.S. at 180-81 (the plaintiff must show that

the injury will be redressed “by a favorable decision”);

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 503 (1975) (court must

take the allegations of the complaint as true); City of

Waukesha v. E.P.A., 320 F.3d 228, 235 (D.C. Cir. 2003)

(“Indeed, in reviewing the standing question, the court

must be careful not to decide questions on the merits

. . . and must therefore assume that . . . the plaintiffs

would be successful in their claims.”). Thus, even

though the Court has concluded above, for convenience

in the organization of this order, that the VER Determination was not legally required, it must assume that

Plaintiffs will prevail when deciding whether they

have standing to pursue their claims.

If Plaintiffs succeed on their claim that Defendants violated NEPA and the NHPA, the Court will order NEPA and NHPA procedures to be followed. See Pit

River Tribe v. U.S. Forest Service, 469 F.3d 768, 779 (9th

Cir. 2006). This could certainly redress Plaintiffs’ procedural and aesthetic injuries. Thus, Plaintiffs have

satisfied the elements of standing on claims one and

four. See W. Watersheds Project v. Kraayenbrink, 632

F.3d 472, 482-83 (9th Cir. 2011) (an organization has

standing to bring suit on behalf of its members where

a member would have standing to sue in his own right,

the interests at stake are germane to the organization’s purpose, and neither the claim asserted nor the

App. 46

relief requested requires participation of the member

in the suit).6

B. Prudential Standing on Claim Four.

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs lack prudential

standing to bring claim four, which challenges the substance of the VER Determination. At oral argument,

Plaintiffs stated that claim four is tied to the Mining

Law of 1872, which sets forth the process by which

miners establish valid rights to mineral deposits.7 30

U.S.C. §§ 22-54.

To establish their alleged violation of the Mining

Law, Plaintiffs cite several cases articulating and applying tests for determining whether mining claims

are valid. See, e.g., Independence Min. Co. v. Babbitt,

6

The Court also notes that one who challenges the violation

of “a procedural right to protect his concrete interests can assert

that right without meeting all the normal standards” for traceability and redressability. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7. Such a litigant need only demonstrate that he has “a procedural right that,

if exercised, could protect [his] concrete interests and that those

interests fall within the zone of interests protected by the statute

at issue.” Defenders of Wildlife v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 420

F.3d 946, 957 (9th Cir. 2005), rev’d in part on other grounds by

Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644

(2007); see also Natural Res. Def. Council v. Jewell, 749 F.3d 776,

782-83 (9th Cir. 2014). Plaintiffs’ NEPA and NHPA claims satisfy

this requirement.

7

Alternatively, Plaintiffs assert that claim four is brought as

a stand-alone APA claim. Such a claim fails because “there is no

right to sue for a violation of the APA in the absence of a ‘relevant

statute’ whose violation ‘forms the legal basis for [the] complaint.’ ” El Rescate Legal Servs., Inc. v. Exec. Office of Immigration Review, 959 F.2d 742, 753 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Lujan v.

Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 883 (1990)).

App. 47

105 F.3d 502, 506-07 (9th Cir. 1997) (a validity determination requires the mineral examiner to do a “field

examination; collect and analyze samples; estimate the

value of the mineral deposit and the cost of extracting,

processing and marking the minerals, including the

costs of complying with any environmental and reclamation laws”); Lara v. Sec’y of Interior, 820 F.2d 1535,

1541 (9th Cir. 1987) (applying “prudent-man test”);

Hjelvik v. Babbitt, 198 F.3d 1072, 1074 (9th Cir. 1999)

(applying “marketability test”). They also cite Interior

Board of Land Appeals decisions on the nature of valid

claims. See, e.g., Great Basin Mine Watch, 146 IBLA

248 (1999); Moon Mining v. HECLA Mining, 161 IBLA

334 (2004). Plaintiffs argue that the Court should apply this law to the VER Determination and find it deficient.

But the Supreme Court has “interpreted [§ 702] of

the APA to impose a prudential standing requirement”

in addition to the requirements of Article III. Nat’l

Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co.,

522 U.S. 479, 488 (1998). “For a plaintiff to have prudential standing under the APA, ‘the interest sought to

be protected by the complainant [must be] arguably

within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute . . . in question.’ ” Id. (quoting Ass’n

of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,

153 (1970)). This test “is not meant to be especially demanding; in particular, there need be no indication of

congressional purpose to benefit the would-be plaintiff.” Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 399400 (1987). But APA claims cannot be asserted when

App. 48

“the plaintiff is not the subject of the contested regulatory action” and “the plaintiff ’s interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes

implicit in the statute that it cannot be reasonably assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit.” Ashley Creek Phosphate Co. v. Norton, 420 F.3d 934, 940

(9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399). Importantly, “whether a plaintiff ’s interest is within the

zone of interests protected by a statute ‘is to be determined not by reference to the overall purpose of the Act

in question . . . , but by reference to the particular provision of law upon which the plaintiff relies.’ ” Id. (quoting Bennett, 520 U.S. at 175-76).

The Court is not aware of any case applying the

“zone of interests” test to the Mining Law, and the parties have cited none. The Court must therefore look to

the “obvious purpose” of the “particular provision” to

which Plaintiffs tie their claim, Bennett, 520 U.S. at

176, and determine whether Plaintiffs’ interests “are

among the sorts of interests [the statute was] specifically designed to protect,” Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S.

at 886.

Section 22 of the Mining Law provides that “all

valuable mineral deposits in lands belonging to the

United States, both surveyed and unsurveyed, shall be

free and open to exploration and purchase[.]” 30 U.S.C.

§ 22. “[A] private citizen may enter federal lands to explore for mineral deposits” and, if a discovery is made,

“perfect[ ] the claim by properly staking it and complying with other statutory requirements.” California

Coastal Comm. v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 575

App. 49

(1987). The Mining Law’s “obvious intent was to reward and encourage the discovery of minerals that are

valuable in an economic sense.” United States v. Coleman, 390 U.S. 599, 602 (1968).

Plaintiffs do not fall within the zone of interests

protected or regulated by the Mining Law. That law

regulates mineral interests and provides procedures

by which mining claims may be discovered and protected. The purpose of a VER Determination, including

the determination in this case, is to confirm that valid

mineral rights have been acquired. Plaintiffs’ interests

are environmental and historical. They do not claim to

hold mineral rights at the Canyon Mine site, nor do

they assert economic interests in those mineral rights.

Claim four alleges that the VER Determination is

flawed – that it failed to consider and properly evaluate relevant information when it concluded that the

Canyon Mine had valid existing mineral rights. In essence, claim four challenges Energy Fuels’ rights in the

uranium at the Canyon Mine. But Plaintiffs do not assert competing interests in the uranium; they have not

engaged in the procedures established by the Mining

Law for acquiring mineral interests; and they did not

participate in the VER Determination. Nor does the

Mining Law protect the environmental and historical

interests Plaintiffs assert in this case. Other statutes

such as NEPA and NHPA protect such interests, but

the Mining Law does not.

Because Plaintiffs’ interests are not “marginally

related to . . . the purpose implicit” in the Mining Law,

App. 50

see Ashley Creek, 420 F.3d at 940, they lack prudential

standing to bring claim four. To hold otherwise would

give environmental groups and tribes the right to challenge every grant of private mineral rights under the

Mining Law. Mineral claimants would be forced into

the courts, the costs associated with validating rights

would increase, and the “obvious purpose” of the Mining Law – to reward and encourage mineral discovery

– would be undermined.

The Ninth Circuit has often held that purely economic interests are inconsistent with the environmental interests protected by NEPA. See, e.g., id. at 945;

Nevada Land Action Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Service, 8 F.3d

713, 716 (9th Cir. 1993); W. Radio Servs. Co. v. Espy, 79

F.3d 896, 903 (9th Cir. 1996); Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Fund United Stockgrowers of Am. v. U.S.

Dep’t Agric., 415 F.3d 1078, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 2005).

Thus, plaintiffs asserting economic injuries lack prudential standing under NEPA. “The purpose of NEPA

is to protect the environment, not the economic interests of those adversely affected by agency decisions.”

Nevada Land Action, 8 F.3d at 716. This case presents

the same situation in reverse – the “obvious purpose”

of the Mining Law is to protect economic interests in

mineral deposits, not the environmental or historical

interests held by Plaintiffs.8

8

Plaintiffs also argue their APA claim is tied to the FLPMA.

The Court rejects this argument because the sections of the statute to which Plaintiffs cite do not relate to validity determinations

or mineral examinations. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701(a)(4), 1702( j),

1714(a). These sections deal with the DOI’s authority to withdraw

App. 51

Plaintiffs’ [sic] argue that Match-E-Be-Nash-SheWish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 132

S. Ct. 2199 (2012), compels a different result. In

Patchak, the Supreme Court held that the owner of

property near the site of a proposed Indian casino had

prudential standing to challenge the decision of the

Secretary of the Interior to acquire nearby property

under the Indian Reorganization Act. Id. at 2211-12.

The government argued that the owner’s interests in

the land’s use were not within the zone of interests of

the Act, which focused on land acquisition. Id. at 2210.

The Court disagreed, finding that the Act dealt with

land use generally and required the Secretary to consider “potential conflicts of land use that may arise”

from acquisitions. Id. at 2211 (internal quotations and

citations omitted). Consequently, the owner’s interests

arguably fell within the zone of interests protected by

the Act, as “neighbors to the use . . . are reasonable –

indeed, predictable – challengers” to the agency decision. Id. at 2212.

Unlike Patchak, Plaintiffs’ interests do not arguably fall within the zone of interests protected by the

Mining Law. The statute in Patchak required the government to consider interests like those asserted by

the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have cited no provision of the

Mining Law that requires the government to consider

their environmental or historical interests when assessing the validity of mineral claims. And the specific

section of the Mining Law at issue here, which must be

land and do not provide the Court with any relevant law to apply

in deciding claim four. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).

App. 52

the focus of the Court’s prudential standing analysis,

is designed to open up federal land to mineral exploration and the establishment of valid mining claims. 30

U.S.C. § 22. It says nothing about the interests asserted by Plaintiffs. Nor can it be said that Plaintiffs

are foreseeable challengers of a BLM or Forest Service

decision validating mineral rights, especially when

they have not cited a single case involving such a challenge.

Plaintiffs also cite Thomas v. Morton, 408 F. Supp.

1361, 1370 (D. Ariz. 1976), for the proposition that the

general public has a “paramount interest” in protecting lands from the effects of invalid mining claims. But

Thomas involved a mineral claim contest between private parties, not a suit by environmental plaintiffs. It

does not support Plaintiffs’ argument that the Mining

Law protects Plaintiffs’ interests.

In sum, the Court finds that Plaintiffs do not fall

within the zone of interests protected by the Mining

Law, and thus do not have prudential standing to bring

claim four. The Court will grant Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment on that claim.

C. Final Agency Action.

In their motion to dismiss, Defendants argued

that several of Plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed

because the VER Determination did not constitute a

final agency action subject to judicial review. Doc. 71.

The Court disagreed, finding that the VER Determination “marked the consummation of the Forest Service’s

App. 53

validity determination” and was “a practical requirement before the Canyon Mine resumed operations”

under Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. at 154. Doc. 131 at 7.

The Court found, for reasons discussed above, that

the VER Determination was a practical if not a legal

requirement. Id. at 9. Relying on Supreme Court and

Ninth Circuit authority, the Court then concluded that

such a practical requirement could satisfy the second

prong of the Bennett test, which requires that the

agency action be “one by which rights or obligations

have been determined, or from which legal consequences will flow.” 520 U.S. at 178 (quotation marks

and citation omitted); Doc. 131 at 9-10.

Defendants now argue that the Court erred in concluding that practical effects can satisfy the second

prong of Bennett. Defendants rely primarily on Columbia Riverkeeper v. U.S. Coast Guard, 761 F.3d 1084 (9th

Cir. 2014), a case decided two days before the Court issued its order on the motion to dismiss. The Court has

reviewed Columbia Riverkeeper and does not find it

contrary to the Court’s previous decision. Columbia

Riverkeeper appears to confirm that practical effects

can satisfy the second prong of the Bennett test: “We

agree that an agency’s characterization of its action as

being provisional or advisory is not necessarily dispositive, and courts consider whether the practical effects

of an agency’s decision make it a final agency action,

regardless of how it is labeled.” 761 F.3d at 1094-95

(emphasis added).

The court in Columbia Riverkeeper was faced with

a very different set of facts. The Ninth Circuit found

App. 54

that the letter of recommendation in question did not,

as a practical matter, have the effect of permitting

shipment of liquefied natural gas. As the Ninth Circuit

explained: “Nor does the record support Riverkeeper’s

argument that, as a practical matter, FERC always

complies with the Coast Guard’s letter of recommendation, which effectively gives it the force of law.” Id.

The record is quite different in this case. The

Court finds that the VER Determination, as a practical

matter, had to be completed before the Canyon Mine

could reopen. The Court therefore continues to conclude that the VER Determination constituted final

agency action under the Bennett test.9

D. Collateral Estoppel.

Defendants argue that claims two and three are

barred by collateral estoppel because those claims were

litigated in Havasupai Tribe following the approval of

the Canyon Mine Plan. Doc. 147-1 at 7. Defendants

dedicate only one paragraph of their combined 66

9

The Court admits that it has serious doubts as to whether

a purely practical effect can satisfy the second prong of the Bennett test. Such a holding seems inconsistent with Bennett’s requirement of actions “by which rights or obligations have been

determined, or from which legal consequences will flow.” 520 U.S.

at 178. But the cases discussed in the Court’s ruling on the motion

to dismiss (Doc. 131 at 9-10) and the language quoted above from

Columbia Riverkeeper seem to indicate that practical results can

suffice. Were it not for these cases, the Court would find that the

VER Determination is not a reviewable agency action for the

same reasons as Fairbanks North Star Borough v. U.S. Army

Corps of Engineers, 543 F.3d 586, 594 (9th Cir. 2008).

App. 55

pages of opening briefs to this issue, for good reason.

The Court previously rejected a similar argument

based on res judicata. Doc. 131 at 14-15. The Court

held that the claims brought by the Havasupai Tribe

and others in 1988, more than 20 years before the

Red Butte area was designated as a TCP, were not the

same as the claims asserted under the NHPA in the

amended complaint. Id. The Court continues to hold

that view. Although Defendants argue that the consultation procedures under NEPA and the NHPA are essentially the same, the authorities they cite do not

support this conclusion. Regulations do suggest that

such consultations can occur at the same time, but they

specifically identify matters that should be addressed

under the NHPA that are not addressed under NEPA.

See 36 C.F.R. § 800.8(a), (c). Collateral estoppel bars

“successive litigation of an issue of fact or law actually

litigated and resolved in a valid court determination

essential to the prior judgment.” Taylor v. Sturgell, 553

U.S. 880, 892 (2008). Because issues raised in the

amended complaint under the NHPA were not litigated in the earlier litigation, collateral estoppel does

not apply.

V.

NEPA Compliance – Claim One.

“NEPA is a procedural statute that does not ‘mandate particular results, but simply provides the necessary process to ensure that federal agencies take a

hard look at the environmental consequences of their

actions.’ ” Sierra Club v. Bosworth, 510 F.3d 1016, 1018

(9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). NEPA requires

App. 56

federal agencies to perform environmental analysis before taking “major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 4332(2)(C). Plaintiffs claim that the VER Determination was a major federal action and that the Forest Service therefore violated NEPA by failing to perform an

EIS in connection with the determination.

When the Forest Service received the proposed

plan of operations for the Canyon Mine in 1984, it complied with NEPA and prepared a full EIS. A.R. 461-693.

On the basis of the EIS, the Forest Service issued the

ROD and took the “major federal action” of approving

the Canyon Mine Plan on September 26, 1986. A.R.

915-29. The EIS and ROD were subsequently upheld

in two levels of appeal within the Forest Service, by

this Court, and by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

Thus, there can be no doubt that full NEPA compliance

occurred before operation of the Canyon Mine was approved.

Plaintiffs allege that the VER Determination constituted a new major federal action that triggered the

need for another EIS of the Canyon Mine. The Court

does not agree. As explained above, the VER Determination was not required as a matter of law before the

Canyon Mine could resume operations. In addition, after completing the Mine Review, the Forest Service

concluded that no modification or amendment of the

existing Plan was necessary for mining activities to resume. A.R. 10594. Thus, the Plan approved in 1986

after a full EIS evaluation continued to govern operations at the Canyon Mine.

App. 57

The Ninth Circuit has held “that where a proposed

federal action would not change the status quo, an EIS

is not necessary.” San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water

Auth. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 581, 646 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Upper Snake River Chapter of Trout Unlimited v.

Hodel, 921 F.2d 232, 235 (9th Cir. 1990)). The Ninth

Circuit has also held that EIS requirements do not apply to mere continued operation of a facility. See Upper

Snake River, 921 F.2d at 234-35 (holding that agency

need not prepare an EIS before adjusting water flow

from a dam because continued operation of the dam

would have consequences “no different than those in

years past”); Burbank Anti-Noise Group v. Goldschmidt, 623 F.2d 115, 116 (9th Cir. 1980) (“An EIS

need not discuss the environmental effects of mere continued operation of a facility.”); City & Cnty. of San

Francisco v. United States, 615 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir.

1980) (finding EIS adequate where Navy evaluated

effects of shipyard lease only in comparison to the

decades-long prior use of the facility as a shipyard, rather than “as if the Navy were proposing to establish

this multi-million dollar industrial complex for the

first time”).

Like the above-cited authorities, a resumption of

mining activities under the Plan approved by the Forest Service after full NEPA review did not constitute a

new major federal action that required preparation of

another EIS. The major federal action was the same as

approved in 1986 – mining under the Plan of Operations.

App. 58

Plaintiffs argue that “[i]f a federal approval is

needed for a project, that approval action is a NEPA

‘major federal action.’ ” Doc. 140-1 at 21. They assert that

the VER Determination was an “approval” needed before

mining could resume, and that the VER Determination

therefore constituted a new major federal action requiring full NEPA compliance. The Court finds this argument unpersuasive for two reasons. First, as noted

above, the VER Determination was not a required approval for mining operations to continue. The premise

of Plaintiffs’ argument is therefore incorrect. Second,

the law does not provide that every federal approval

amounts to a major federal action. This point was

made clear in Center for Biological Diversity v. Salazar

(“CBD”), 791 F. Supp. 2d 687 (D. Ariz. 2011), and the

Ninth Circuit opinion affirming that decision.

CBD involves facts nearly identical to this case.

The uranium mine at issue in CBD, known as the Arizona 1 Mine, is located on the north side of Grand Canyon National Park and is owned and operated by

Energy Fuels. CBD, 791 F. Supp. 2d at 690. A plan of

operations for the Arizona 1 Mine was approved by

BLM in 1988 after completion of a full EIS. Id. When

uranium prices fell in the 1990s, the Arizona 1 Mine

was placed on stand-by status. Id. Several years later,

in 2007, the owner provided notice that it intended to

resume mining under the original plan of operations.

BLM required the mine owner to update its reclamation bond and obtain a clean air permit, and then approved the renewed operations. Id. The plaintiffs,

which included some Plaintiffs in this case, brought an

App. 59

APA action claiming that BLM’s approval of the renewed mining operations constituted a major federal

action that required a supplemental EIS. Id. The plaintiffs pointed to the update of the reclamation bond and

the clean air permit as new steps that made the renewed mine operation a major federal action under

NEPA.

The Court disagreed. It found that a supplemental

EIS was not required because BLM had complied with

NEPA in 1988 when it approved the original plan of

operations for the Arizona 1 Mine. Id. at 698. The

Court found that BLM’s approval of the updated bond

and the requirement of an air permit did not amount

to a major federal action because they were “not an

approval of a specific project by permit or regulatory

decision.” Id. at 704 (internal quotations omitted). Instead, the Court found that the “major federal action

was taken more than 20 years ago” when BLM approved the mine’s plan of operations after a full NEPA

review. Id.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Center for Biological

Diversity v. Salazar, 706 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2013). The

Ninth Circuit noted that approval of the mine’s plan of

operations in 1988 undoubtedly was a major federal

action, but that it was completed when the plan was

approved. Id. at 1095. “Before that action was complete, BLM performed the requisite environmental

analysis.” Id. “Accordingly, as far as the 1988 plan of

operations is concerned, appropriate NEPA review

took place and there is no ongoing ‘major Federal action’ that could require [EIS] supplementation.” Id.

App. 60

(quotation marks and citation omitted). The fact that

BLM required additional steps to be completed before

mining could resume did not alter this conclusion.

Those additional steps – updating of the bond and obtaining of the air permit – did not approve any new

specific project and constituted mere ministerial tasks.

Id. at 1095-96.

These holdings apply to the Canyon Mine. A full

NEPA analysis was performed by the Forest Service

when the Plan was approved in 1986. The major federal action – plan approval – was completed at that

time. The fact that the Forest Service elected to conduct a VER Determination before the mine resumed

operations, and that the owner agreed to wait until the

determination was finished, did not constitute a new

major federal action. The VER Determination was not

a legal requirement. Nor were the resumed mine operations going to vary from the previously approved

Plan. Like the bond update and the air permit required

in CBD, the VER Determination was not an approval

of a new project.10

Plaintiffs argue that this conclusion conflicts with

Pit River Tribe, which involved BLM’s extension of expired leases on federal land for development of a geothermal plant. 469 F.3d at 768. The Ninth Circuit, in

an opinion by the same judge who authored the Ninth

10

The Forest Service’s Mine Review reached the same conclusion: “No new federal action subject to further NEPA analysis

is required for resumption of operations of the Canyon Mine. The

existing [Plan] remains in place and in effect, and there is no need

for any amendment or modification of the [Plan].” A.R. 10629.

App. 61

Circuit opinion in CBD, held that extending the leases

required preparation of an EIS because, without the

extension, the lessee would have retained no rights on

the leased property. Id. at 784. Extension of the leases

thus constituted an affirmative grant of the right to

build a geothermal plant. Id. (“Without the affirmative

re-extension of the 1988 leases, Calpine would have retained no rights at all to the leased property and would

not have been able to go forward with the Fourmile Hill

Plant.”).

Unlike the leases in Pit River Tribe, which would

have expired without affirmative action by the government, the approved Plan for the Canyon Mine had no

time limit. The interim management provisions of the

Plan continued to govern the mine while on standby

status. Energy Fuels’ rights under the Plan were never

terminated and did not require affirmative renewal.

See Center for Biological Diversity, 706 F.3d at 1091-94

(holding that approved plan of operation for uranium

mine remained in effect through periods when mine

was inactive); 43 C.F.R. § 3809.423 (plan of operation

remains in effect unless terminated by agency); A.R.

10598 (Mine Review determination that the Plan for

the Canyon Mine had no time limit and remained in

effect in 2012). The expiration of the leases in Pit River

Tribe stripped the developer of all rights on the land.

Here, the Withdrawal had no such effect, and the

App. 62

Court’s decision does not conflict with the holding in

Pit River Tribe.11

In sum, the Withdrawal had no effect on the operations at Canyon Mine, the VER Determination was

not legally required, mining was to continue under the

Plan that had been subjected to full NEPA review in

1986, and the VER Determination did not alter or

amend the Plan. As noted above, EIS requirements

do not apply to mere continued operation of a NEPAapproved facility. As in CBD, the major federal action

in this case occurred more than twenty years ago and

remains unchanged. Because issuance of the VER Determination did not trigger NEPA or require a new

EIS, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on

claim one.

VI. NHPA Compliance – Claims Two and Three.

Before a federal agency implements, assists, or

licenses an “undertaking,” the NHPA requires the

agency to “take into account the effect of the undertaking on any district, site, building, structure, or object

that is included in or eligible for inclusion in the National Register” of Historic Places. 16 U.S.C. § 470f. For

purposes of this case, an “ ‘undertaking’ means a

11

Plaintiffs claim that another company, VANE Minerals

LLC, recognized that the Withdrawal changed its legal rights to

mine. VANE’s activities, however, involved exploratory drilling

and a request for approval of a new plan of operations. Doc. 1409. As noted above, the Withdrawal specifically required that new

plans of operations be approved only after a VER Determination

was completed.

App. 63

project, activity, or program . . . requiring a Federal

permit, license, or approval[.]” 16 U.S.C. § 470w(7)(C).

NHPA regulations are promulgated by the ACHP.

The regulations guide federal agencies in implementing the § 106 consultation process, which requires the

agency to identify the affected historical properties,

determine potential adverse effects, and identify

methods of mitigation. 36 C.F.R. §§ 800.2-800.7. The

regulations also require consultation with the public,

the ACHP, the AZSHPO, and Indian tribes that “attach

religious and cultural significance to historic properties that may be affected by an undertaking.” Id.,

§ 800.2(c)(2)(ii).

Plaintiffs allege in claim two that the Forest Service was obligated to complete a full NHPA § 106 consultation because resumed operation of the Canyon

Mine was an “undertaking” within the meaning of the

NHPA. They allege in claim three that the Forest Service erred in applying the NHPA process set forth in

§ 800.13(b)(3), rather than (b)(1), and did not comply

with (b)(3) in any event. The Court will address these

claims separately.12

12

As Defendants note, claims two and three as described in

Plaintiffs’ summary judgment briefing go well beyond the claims

laid out in the amended complaint, which simply allege that the

Forest Service failed to initiate and complete a § 106 process. Doc.

115 at 25-27. The Court nonetheless will address the claims as

described in the summary judgment briefing.

App. 64

A. Was There an Undertaking?

An undertaking is a “project, activity, or program

funded in whole or in part under the direct or indirect

jurisdiction of a Federal agency, including . . . those requiring a Federal permit license, or approval[.]” 16

U.S.C. § 470w(7)(C). The standards for the existence of

a federal undertaking are similar to those for a major

federal action under NEPA. See Dugong v. Rumsfeld,

2005 WL 522106, at *12 (N.D. Cal. March 2, 2005)

(citing cases from the Ninth, D.C., Fourth, and Fifth

Circuits which noted the similar standards). Plaintiffs

claim that the VER Determination constituted a permit, license, or approval, and that the resumption of

mining at the Canyon Mine was therefore an undertaking requiring full NHPA compliance. The Court disagrees for two reasons.13

First, for the resumed mining operations to constitute an undertaking, the VER Determination must

have been “a Federal permit license, or approval[.]” 16

U.S.C. § 470w(7)(C). As explained above, however, the

VER Determination was not legally required before

Energy Fuels could resume operations of the Canyon

Mine. The Court cannot conclude that it constituted a

13

Plaintiffs alleged in their amended complaint that the

VER Determination, not the resumed operation of the mine, constituted the “undertaking” for NHPA purposes. Doc. 115, ¶ 79. In

their summary judgment briefing and during oral argument,

Plaintiffs clarified their position. They claim that the undertaking

is the resumed operation of the mine and that the VER Determination is the license, permit, or approval for that undertaking. See

Docs. 140-1 at 34; 151 at 28.

App. 65

federal permit, license, or approval when mining operations could have resumed without it.

Second, operations at the Canyon Mine are to resume under the original Plan. There is no new plan. If

mining is the “undertaking” for purposes of the NHPA,

that undertaking was approved in 1986. With no modification to the Plan and no requirement of a VER Determination, there is no new undertaking subject to

NHPA compliance.

Plaintiffs admit in their amended complaint that

a § 106 process was completed in 1986. Doc. 115, ¶ 85

(“The Forest Service conducted a Section 106 Process

in connection with approving the 1986 Plan of Operation for Canyon Mine.”). As described in the Mine Review, the 1986 process included consultation with

AZSHPO and ACHP to develop a plan for archeological

tests; archeological review of the proposed mine site

and access roads; a cultural resources survey of the

proposed power line location; notice to and responses

from the Havasupai, Hopi, Hualapai, and Navajo

tribes; consultation with these tribes; and meetings

with the Havasupai and Hopi tribes. A.R. 10601-11.

The Mine Review concluded that “[a] review of the

NHPA Section 106 compliance analysis and the ROD

for the Canyon Mine indicates that the agency did adequately address all the effects to historic properties

that had been identified in the ROD.” A.R. 10602; see

also A.R. 10611 (“it appears that the [Forest Service]

was diligent and thorough in its efforts to solicit tribal

input and understand tribal concerns”); A.R. 10612

(“All of the Tribal comments were responded to and the

App. 66

EIS was substantially revised to reflect the information provided by the Havasupai and Hopi.”).14

With the “undertaking” of mining having been approved in 1986 after compliance with § 106, the Court

cannot conclude that resumed mining under the same

Plan constitutes a new undertaking. The Court agrees

with the conclusion in the Mine Review: “Since [Energy Fuels] has not proposed any new activities which

would require modification of the existing [Plan] or a

new [Plan], there will be no new federal undertakings

subject to NHPA Section 106 compliance.” A.R. 10601.

Of course, one significant change has occurred

since the 1986 approval – Red Butte and surrounding

land, including the location of the mine, have been designated a TCP and added to the National Register of

Historic Places. Recognizing this change, the Forest

Service chose to treat Red Butte’s TCP status as a new

discovery and to apply the NHPA regulations for new

discoveries. The Forest Service followed the procedures

in 36 C.F.R. § 800.13(b)(3). Plaintiffs claim this was error.

14

In its decision on the sufficiency of the 1986 EIS and ROD,

this Court noted that the Forest Service distributed more than

100 copies of the proposed Plan for the Canyon Mine to interested

parties; received over 200 letters in response; and, following the

decision to do a full EIS, distributed more than 2,000 scoping letters to federal, state, and local government agencies, Indian

tribes, news media and other interested parties. Havasupai Tribe,

752 F. Supp. at 1476-77.

App. 67

B. The Forest Service’s Decision to Apply

(b)(3) Was Reasonable.

Section 800.13 of the applicable regulations sets

forth the NHPA’s consultation process for “[p]ost-review

discoveries.” 36 C.F.R. § 800.13. These are discoveries

of historic properties, or effects on historic properties,

made after a § 106 process has been completed. Paragraph (a) states that agreements made during the

§ 106 process can anticipate such discoveries and lay

out procedures for dealing with them. Paragraph (b)

applies when no such procedures are in place. It states

that “[i]f historic properties are discovered or unanticipated effects on historic properties found after the

agency official has completed the section 106 process

. . . , the agency official shall make reasonable efforts

to avoid, minimize or mitigate adverse effects to such

properties” and shall comply with subparagraphs

(b)(1) through (b)(3). Id., § 800.13(b).

Subparagraph (b)(1) applies when the § 106 process

is finished but “the agency official has not approved the

undertaking or . . . construction on an approved undertaking has not commenced[.]” Id., § 800.13(b)(1). It

requires the agency to comply with § 800.6, which

sets forth detailed procedures for resolving adverse effects during a full § 106 process. Id. Among other requirements, § 800.6 requires that the agency adopt a

memorandum of agreement evidencing the agency’s

“compliance with section 106” and governing “the undertaking and all of its parts.” 36 C.F.R. § 800.6. The

agency must “ensure that the undertaking is carried

App. 68

out in accordance with the memorandum of agreement.” Id.

Subparagraph (b)(2) applies when the newly discovered site is relevant only for data collection purposes. § 800.13(b)(2). It is not at issue in this case.

Subparagraph (b)(3) applies “[i]f the agency official has approved the undertaking and construction

has commenced[.]” Id., § 800.13(b)(3). It requires the

agency to “determine actions that the agency official

can take to resolve adverse effects” and to notify interested parties, including Indian tribes, “within 48 hours

of the discovery.” Id. Interested parties must respond

within 48 hours of receiving notice, and the agency

then must take into account their recommendations

and “carry out appropriate actions.” Id. By merely requiring that the agency “carry out appropriate actions,” (b)(3) is less demanding than (b)(1) and its

requirement of a detailed consultations process resulting in a memorandum of agreement that governs the

undertaking in the future.

In conducting the Mine Review, the Forest Service

recognized that Red Butte had not been listed on the

National Register at the time of the previous § 106 process.15 A.R. 10602. Therefore, the Forest Service decided to treat Red Butte as a newly discovered historic

property and looked to § 800.13 of the regulations:

15

In 1986, the NHPA did not allow tribal religious sites to be

listed. A.R. 10602-03.

App. 69

Because the earlier definition [of historic

property] did not include properties of traditional religious and cultural importance, Red

Butte was only recorded as a TCP and evaluated as eligible on the NR after the [1986]

ROD but before the project has been completed. Therefore, it could be considered a

newly “discovered” historic property, and section 36 C.F.R. § 800.13(b) of the regulations

would apply.

A.R. 10603.

The question, then, was whether the Forest Service should proceed under subparagraph (b)(1) or (b)(3).

Because the Canyon Mine had been approved in 1986

and construction of the mine had commenced, the Forest Service decided that subparagraph (b)(3) applied.

Id. The Forest Service acknowledged that “[t]he Canyon Mine project is a somewhat unusual situation in

that the Section 106 process was completed more than

20 years ago.” Id. But the Forest Service concluded that

it could provide the notice required by subparagraph

(b)(3), allow the tribes and other interested parties 30

days to respond because there was no timing emergency requiring a 48-hour response, and address ways

to avoid or minimize adverse effects on Red Butte from

the Canyon Mine operations. Id. Notices were mailed

on June 25, 2012, meetings were held with the tribes,

a memorandum of agreement was considered, but

this lawsuit intervened. See, e.g., A.R. 10540 (email to

SHPO regarding consultation for MOA); A.R. 10542

(email to ACHP regarding consultation for MOA); A.R.

10643-44 (consultation notice letters to chairman of

App. 70

Kaibab Paiute Tribes), 10690-91 (Havasupai Tribe),

10737-38 (Hopi Cultural Preservation Office), 1078485 (Hopi Tribe), 10831-32 (Hualapai Tribe), 10878-79

(Hualapai Tribe), 10925-26 (Navajo cultural specialist), 10972-73 (Navajo Nation), 11019-20 (Kaibab Band

of Paiute Indians), 11066-67 (Yavapai-Prescott Indian

Tribe), 11113-14 (Yavapai-Prescott Indian Tribe),

11160-61 (Pueblo of Zuni); A.R. 11380 (Aug. 15, 2012

emails discussing Havasupai MOA) A.R. 11390-91

(Hopi meeting agenda); A.R. 11411 (Sept. 6, 2012 meeting notes with Kaibab Band of Paiute Indians); A.R.

11790 (Sept. 19, 2012 meeting notes and agenda re:

Hopi Cultural Preservation Office); A.R. 11796 (Sept.

20, 2012 meeting notes and agenda re: Navajo Nation);

A.R. 11799 (Sept. 20, 2012 meeting notes and agenda

re: Pueblo of Zuni); A.R. 11809 (Oct. 4, 2012 meeting

notes re: Havasupai Tribal Council); A.R. 11832 (Oct.

19, 2012 meeting notes re: Hopi Cultural Resources

Task Team); A.R. 12238 (Jan. 7, 2013 intertribal meeting notes); A.R. 12387 (summary of communications

with tribes).

Because Plaintiffs’ claim is brought under the APA,

the Court can set aside the Forest Service’s decision to

follow the (b)(3) procedure only if it was arbitrary and

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in

accordance with law. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). This is a

“highly deferential” standard of review. Nw. Ecosystem

Alliance, 475 F.3d at 1140. Plaintiffs make several arguments that do not satisfy this standard.

App. 71

1. The Undertaking Was Approved Previously.

Plaintiffs argue that the “undertaking” in this case

was the resumption of mining operations at the Canyon Mine, that the undertaking as so defined has never

been approved before, and that § 800.13(b)(3) therefore

did not apply. For reasons explained above, however,

the Court does not agree that the “undertaking” was

the resumption of mining activities. Operations were

to continue under the Plan approved in 1986, without

modification. The “undertaking” was mining at the

site, and that undertaking was approved by the Forest

Service in 1986. Plaintiffs do not argue that a new Plan

of Operations was required for mining activities to resume. Indeed, that argument was rejected by this Court

and the Ninth Circuit in CBD. CBD, 791 F. Supp. 2d

at 692-96, 706 F.3d at 1091-94. Thus, the Plan under

which mining would continue was fully approved by

the Forest Service in 1986 after a § 106 consultation

process, and no new undertaking required another approval.

2. The Language of (b)(3) Is Not Limited

to Emergencies.

Plaintiffs argue that § 800.13(b)(3) is an emergency measure that does not apply to the Canyon

Mine. They cite the history of the regulation and argue

that it was intended to apply when a historically significant property is uncovered in the midst of constructing an approved undertaking, which did not

App. 72

occur here. Doc. 140-1 at 41. The citations provided by

Plaintiffs, however, are not persuasive.

Plaintiffs cite prior titles in § 800.13(b)(3). In one,

the title refers to “[r]esources discovered during construction.” 44 Fed. Reg. 6068, 6077 (Jan. 30, 1979). In

the other, the title refers to “[p]roperties discovered

during implementation.” 51 Fed. Reg. 31115, 31123

(Sept. 2, 1986). Although these titles suggest that the

section applies when a discovery is made in the midst

of construction, the actual text of these earlier regulations is worded differently – it refers to discoveries that

occur “after beginning to carry out the undertaking,”

which accurately describes the Canyon Mine situation.

51 Fed. Reg. at 31123; see also 44 Fed. Reg. at 6077

(noting that section applies if “an Agency Official finds

or is notified after construction has started”) (emphasis

added). Text usually controls over titles in a statute or

regulation. See generally Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1947)

(recognizing that “the title of a statute and the heading

of a section cannot limit the plain meaning of the

text”). Thus, the Court cannot conclude from these earlier versions of the regulation that (b)(3) was limited to

emergency situations.

More importantly, the Court must apply the current regulation. The title of the current version is

“Post-review discoveries,” suggesting that it applies to

discoveries made after the § 106 review is completed

and is not necessarily limited to events occurring in

the midst of active, ongoing construction. 36 C.F.R.

§ 800.13(b). What is more, courts resort to statutory or

App. 73

regulatory history to construe statutes or regulations

only when those statutes or regulations are ambiguous. See United States v. Williams, 659 F.3d 1223, 1225

(9th Cir. 2011). Subparagraph (b)(3) is not ambiguous.

It applies when “the agency official has approved the

undertaking and construction has commenced[.]” 36

C.F.R. § 800.13(b)(3). No further limitation is imposed.

The undertaking in this case – operation of the Canyon

Mine – was approved by the Forest Service in 1986 and

construction commenced in 1991. As noted earlier, the

mine owner built access roads, storage buildings, a

power line, a perimeter fence, diversion structures, a

holding pond, a 100-foot tall head frame, a hoist, and

support buildings, and sunk the mine shaft to a depth

of 50 feet. A.R. 10487; Doc. 146-1 at 17; Hangan Declaration, Doc. 53-4, ¶ 4. The situation at the Canyon

Mine thus fell squarely within the plain language of

subparagraph (b)(3).

3. Deference to the ACHP Is Not Warranted.

The ACHP is the agency that promulgates NHPA

regulations, including § 800.13. 16 U.S.C. § 470s. In Auer

v. Robbins, the Supreme Court held that an agency’s

interpretation of its own regulation is controlling unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the

language of the regulation. 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).

Plaintiffs argue that the ACHP interpreted subparagraph (b)(3) in this case and the Court must defer to

that interpretation. For several reasons, the Court

does not agree.

App. 74

The “interpretation” relied on by Plaintiffs is contained in a letter the ACHP wrote to the Forest Service

on August 1, 2012. The letter provides this explanation:

In this situation, we understand that the Plan

of Operations for the undertaking has been

approved, and that some construction has occurred. Based upon the information you provided, it appears this construction activity has

started and stopped over the years. The intent

of Section 800.13(b)(3) is to provide an expedited review process where construction activities have begun and would be ongoing, and

thus, the agency has limited time and opportunity for consultation. Should the Forest Service pursue this approach, we are concerned

that it would continue the unproductive conflict between the Forest Service and the Indian tribes that consider Red Butte a sacred

place. Further, because of the nature and timing of this undertaking and the current request to resume previously halted mining

operations, we believe consultation in accordance with Section 800.13(b)(1) to develop and

execute a Section 106 agreement is the appropriate way forward.

A.R. 11335.

The letter does describe the intent of (b)(3) as

applying to emergency situations, but its recommendation that the Forest Service proceed under (b)(1) appears to be more tactical advice than an interpretation

of the regulation. The ACHP suggests that the Forest

App. 75

Service use (b)(1) not because the language of that provision applies, but because the ACHP is concerned that

applying (b)(3) “would continue the unproductive conflict between the Forest Service and the Indian tribes

that consider Red Butte a sacred place.” Id. This reasoning is more a comment on the situation facing the

Forest Service than on the meaning of the regulation.

The Court therefore doubts that the letter constitutes

the kind of regulatory interpretation entitled to deference under Auer.

But even if the ACHP letter constituted an interpretation of (b)(1) and (b)(3), it is not entitled to deference. The Supreme Court has explained that “Auer

deference is warranted only when the language of the

regulation is ambiguous.” Christensen v. Harris Cnty.,

529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000). “To defer to the agency’s position [when a regulation is not ambiguous] would be

to permit the agency, under the guise of interpreting a

regulation, to create de facto a new regulation.” Id.; see

also Bassiri v. Xerox Corp., 463 F.3d 927, 931 (9th Cir.

2006) (“Under Auer, as amplified by Christensen, the

court must first determine whether the regulation was

ambiguous.”).

As noted above, § 800.13(b) is not ambiguous. Subparagraph (b)(1) applies when the agency “has not approved the undertaking” or “construction on an approved

undertaking has not commenced.” Subparagraph (b)(3)

applies when neither of the (b)(1) conditions is present

– when the agency “has approved the undertaking and

construction has commenced.” Subparagraphs (b)(1)

and (b)(3) thus cover all possible scenarios for

App. 76

discoveries of historical properties after a § 106 process is completed. If the undertaking is not yet approved, (b)(1) applies. If the undertaking is approved

but construction has not yet commenced, (b)(1) applies.

If the undertaking is approved and construction has

commenced, (b)(3) applies. The Court sees no ambiguity in these provisions. Every eventuality is addressed.

Plaintiffs argue that the scenario in this case – the

undertaking has been approved, construction has commenced, and construction has stopped – is not covered

by the regulations. The Court does not agree. This scenario falls within (b)(3) because the regulations do not

make work stoppage a factor in deciding which subparagraph applies. If an undertaking has been approved

and construction has commenced, the criteria for (b)(3)

are fully satisfied. Although undertakings where the

construction has subsequently stopped may be a subset of the scenarios covered by (b)(3), it is a subset that

is not assigned in the regulations to different treatment. It is fully covered by the (b)(3) criteria. Certainly

it is not assigned to (b)(1), which applies only if there

has been no undertaking approval or no start of construction.

Plaintiffs suggest that an ambiguity is created because the 48-hour provisions in (b)(3) clearly show that

it is designed for emergency situations, and restart of

the Canyon Mine is not an emergency situation. Although the 48-hour provisions do suggest that (b)(3)

was designed primarily for emergency situations,

nothing in (b)(3) states that it is limited to those situations. Subparagraph (b)(3) does not say that it applies

App. 77

when “the agency has approved the undertaking, construction has commenced, and 48-hour notice is necessary,” or comparable language.

Because the Court does not find § 800.13(b) ambiguous, Auer deference is not warranted. Christensen,

529 U.S. at 588; Bassiri, 463 F.3d at 931. And with no

deference being required for the ACHP interpretation,

the Court cannot say that the Forest Service’s reading of § 800.13(b) – applying its plain language – was

arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or not

in accordance with the law.

What is more, even if the Court were to find some

ambiguity in § 800.13(b), Auer deference would be warranted only if the ACHP’s interpretation is not “inconsistent with the regulation.” Auer, 519 U.S. at 461. The

Court finds that the ACHP interpretation is inconsistent with the plain language. Subparagraph (b)(1)

applies only when the agency “has not approved the

undertaking” or “construction on an approved undertaking has not commenced.” Under no reading could

this provision apply to the Canyon Mine, where the undertaking was approved in 1986 and construction commenced in 1991. ACHP’s advice that subparagraph

(b)(1) applies is simply contrary to the language of

(b)(1).

As noted, the ACHP letter appears to be based

more on the factual situation related to the Canyon

Mine than the meaning of (b)(1) and (b)(3). But if

viewed as an attempt to construe those provisions,

the letter appears to create a new category under

App. 78

§ 800.13(b) for undertakings approved, started, and

then stopped. That category does not exist in the current version of the regulations. Accepting it would, as

the Supreme Court warned, “permit the agency, under

the guise of interpreting a regulation, to create de facto

a new regulation.” Christensen, 529 U.S. at 588.

The cases cited by Plaintiffs do not require a different result. See Doc. 140-1 at 42. The decision in CTIAThe Wireless Ass’n v. FCC, 466 F.3d 105, 115-16 (D.C.

Cir. 2006), did not address Auer deference – deferring

to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation. It

addressed deferring to an agency’s interpretation of a

statute through promulgated regulations. Id. at 116.

That is a different kind of deference. See Go v. Holder,

744 F.3d 604, 612 (9th Cir. 2014) (Wallace, J., concurring) (noting the distinction recognized in Price v. Stevedoring Services of America, Inc., 697 F.3d 820, 829

(9th Cir. 2012), between “an agency’s informal interpretations of its own regulations [which are entitled to

Auer deference] and of its governing statute [which are

entitled to Chevron deference].”) (brackets in original).

Plaintiffs’ other cases, Stinson v. United States, 508

U.S. 36, 45 (1993), Karuk Tribe of California v. U.S. Forest Service, 681 F.3d 1006, 1017 (9th Cir. 2012), and

Sayler Park Village Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 2002 WL 32191511, at *6 n.5 (S.D. Ohio, Dec.

30, 2002), simply restate the rule established in Auer.

They do not detract from the fact that Auer deference

applies only when a regulation is ambiguous, nor from

the fact that an agency’s interpretation of an

App. 79

ambiguous regulation must, if deference is to be accorded, comport with the regulation’s language.

In summary, the Court does not find that the Forest Service’s decision to apply (b)(3) was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or not in accordance

with law.

C. Compliance with (b)(3).

Plaintiffs also argue that the Forest Service failed

to comply with (b)(3). Plaintiffs claim that (1) no notice

was sent out to interested parties within 48 hours,

(2) no actions were proposed to mitigate adverse effects, (3) the local tribes’ responses to the notice went

unaccounted for, and (4) no reports of any actions were

provided to interested parties. The Court disagrees

with Plaintiffs’ characterization of the Forest Service’s

efforts.

The same day that the Forest Service concluded

(b)(3) applied, it sent a consultation letter to Don Watahomigie, Chairman of the Havasupai Tribe (A.R.

10690), as well as to the Hopi Tribe, Hualapai Tribe,

the Kaibab Band of Paiute Indians, the Navajo Nation,

the Yavapai-Prescott Indian Tribe, and the Pueblo of

Zuni, to initiate consultation under § 800.13(b)(3). A.R.

12388. Plaintiffs argue that the notice was required

within 48 hours of Energy Fuels’ informing the Forest

Service of its intent to reopen the Canyon Mine. As the

Forest Service acknowledges, however, this was an unusual situation. A.R. 10603. It took some time for the

Forest Service to determine what kind of review was

App. 80

required. Once it determined – correctly, as explained

above – that the situation was governed by (b)(3), it

sent the notice required by that section within 48

hours. A.R. 10603-04.

Over the course of the next several months, the

Forest Service entertained objections and responses

from the various tribes, met with representatives from

various tribes, conducted field visits, and engaged in

discussions regarding the potential impacts of the

Canyon Mine. A.R. 12388-89. For example, in August

2012, the Forest Service conducted field visits with representatives from the Zuni Cultural Resource Advisory

Task Team at Red Butte. A.R. 12389. In September, the

Forest Service met with the Kaibab Band of Paiute

Indians in Pipe Springs, Arizona to discuss several projects, including the Canyon Mine. Id. Throughout September and October, Forest Service representatives

responded to letters sent by various tribes and met

multiple times with the Hopi Tribe in Kykotsmovi, Arizona; the Navajo Nation in Window Rock, Arizona;

and the Pueblo of Zuni in Zuni, New Mexico. Representatives also hiked eight miles to Supai, Arizona to

consult with the Havasupai Tribe. Id. In January 2013,

the Forest Service and Energy Fuels met with representatives from multiple tribes and conducted a field

visit to the Canyon Mine site. Id. The next day, a MOA

workshop was conducted with several tribes in Flagstaff, Arizona. Id. Two months later, Plaintiffs filed this

lawsuit, effectively ending the consultation process.

Notwithstanding the above, Plaintiffs assert that

the Forest Service failed to take unilateral action to

App. 81

avoid or mitigate effects to Red Butte and falsely informed the tribes that the only mitigation measures

that would occur would be voluntarily undertaken by

Energy Fuels. Doc. 140-1 at 23-25. But the procedures

set forth in (b)(3) do not direct the Forest Service to

undertake unilateral action or impose a memorandum

of agreement on the mine operator, and Plaintiffs’ arguments again fail to recognize the extensive efforts

the Forest Service did undertake to consult with the

tribes, efforts that were cut short when Plaintiffs filed

this lawsuit. The Forest Service engaged in discussions

with the tribes in order to address their concerns and

sought to memorialize their obligations in a MOA.

The Forest Service’s ongoing environmental analysis and tribal consultation over the past twenty years

evidences its efforts to comply with the NHPA. In 1985,

the Forest Service traveled to the Supai Village to meet

with representatives from the Havasupai Tribe for two

days. Havasupai Tribe, 752 F. Supp. at 1495. When Energy Fuels’ predecessor submitted its original plan in

1984, over 100 copies were sent to interested parties

and several meetings were held to address public and

tribal concern. Id. at 1476-77. More than 2,000 scoping

letters were sent to the media and interested parties

and a “public scoping session” was held in Flagstaff,

Arizona in May 1985. Id. at 1477. In 1994, the Forest

Service sent a letter to the Havasupai, Navajo, and

Hopi Tribes requesting permission to conduct water

sampling for ongoing monitoring of the site. A.R. 5955.

In February 2008, twenty letters were sent to representatives from the Navajo Nation, Havasupai Tribe,

App. 82

Hopi Tribe, and Hualapai Tribe regarding projects in

the Kaibab National Forest, including the Canyon

Mine. A.R. 7518-86. Follow-up letters were sent in May.

A.R. 7589-643. In August 2008, a Memorandum of Understanding was reached between the Forest Service

and the Havasupai Tribe to establish areas in which

the Forest Service would carry out tribal consultations.

A.R. 7646-54. In January 2011, the Forest Service sent

emails to representatives from the Sierra Club addressing further analysis of the Canyon Mine EIS. A.R.

8517. In October 2011, the Forest Service confirmed

dates and sent an agenda for a meeting with Havasupai tribal elders. A.R. 10140. Proposed meetings

were also negotiated with the Navajo Nation, the

Pueblo of Zuni, and the Hopi Tribe. A.R. 10239, 10240,

10263. Conference calls were scheduled and held regarding the Canyon Mine with the Kaibab Band of Paiute Indians, Hualapai Tribe, Navajo Nation, Yavapai

Prescott Indian Tribe, and Pueblo of Zuni. A.R. 10282;

10283; 10286; 10291; 10297; 10298. In fact, the Forest

Service reviewed all of the documents prepared in connection with the 1986 ROD when it was deciding

whether to apply (b)(1) or (b)(3) and noted that the “tribal

scoping process used during development of the EIS

probably exceed the standards of the time.” A.R. 10611.

In summary, for some twenty years the Forest Service has been engaging in environmental analyses and

consultation meetings with tribes and environmental

organizations regarding the Canyon Mine. Recognizing the unique situation it faced when mining was to

resume, the Forest Service reviewed the regulations,

App. 83

found that (b)(3) applied, and engaged in consultation

with the tribes to “seek reasonable ways to minimize

the effects” of mining at the site. A.R. 10604. It did

this by providing immediate notice of its decision,

initiating consultation with tribes and environmental

groups, and planning and attending meetings to discuss

cultural and environmental impacts over several

months. Had this lawsuit not intervened, the Forest

Service and the tribes might well have executed a

memorandum of agreement regarding appropriate

ways to minimize effects on Red Butte. The Court cannot conclude that the Forest Service’s application of

the (b)(3) process was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of

discretion, or not in accordance with law.

VII. Conclusion.

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to establish a NEPA violation in claim one or a NHPA violation in claims two and three, and that Plaintiffs lack

prudential standing to assert claim four. The Court accordingly will grant summary judgment in favor of Defendants.

IT IS ORDERED:

1.

Defendants’ and Defendant-Intervenors’ motions for summary judgment are granted on

all counts. Docs. 146, 147.

2.

Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is

denied. Doc. 140.

3.

The Clerk shall enter judgment and terminate this action.

App. 84

Dated this 7th day of April, 2015.

/s/

David G. Campbell

David G. Campbell

United States District Judge

App. 85

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Grand Canyon Trust, et al., No. CV-13-08045-PCT-DGC

Plaintiffs,

JUDGMENT IN A

CIVIL CASE

v.

Michael Williams, et al.,

Defendants.

Decision by Court. This action came for consideration before the Court. The issues have been considered and a decision has been rendered.

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that, pursuant to the Court’s Order filed April 7, 2015, which

granted the Motions for Summary Judgment, judgment is entered in favor of defendants and defendantintervenors and against plaintiffs. Plaintiffs to take

nothing, and the amended complaint and action are

hereby dismissed.

Brian D. Karth

District Court Executive/

Clerk of Court

April 7, 2015

s/ Leann Dixon

By Deputy Clerk

App. 86

54 U.S.C. § 306108

§ 306108. Effect of undertaking on historic property

The head of any Federal agency having direct or indirect jurisdiction over a proposed Federal or federally

assisted undertaking in any State and the head of any

Federal department or independent agency having authority to license any undertaking, prior to the approval of the expenditure of any Federal funds on the

undertaking or prior to the issuance of any license,

shall take into account the effect of the undertaking on

any historic property. The head of the Federal agency

shall afford the Council a reasonable opportunity to

comment with regard to the undertaking.

54 U.S.C. § 300320

§ 300320. Undertaking

In this division, the term “undertaking” means a project, activity, or program funded in whole or in part

under the direct or indirect jurisdiction of a Federal

agency, including –

(1) those carried out by or on behalf of the Federal agency;

(2) those carried out with Federal financial assistance;

(3) those requiring a Federal permit, license, or

approval; and

App. 87

(4) those subject to State or local regulation administered pursuant to a delegation or approval

by a Federal agency.

54 U.S.C. § 302706

§ 302706. Eligibility for inclusion on National Register

(a) In general. – Property of traditional religious and

cultural importance to an Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization may be determined to be eligible

for inclusion on the National Register.

(b) Consultation. – In carrying out its responsibilities

under section 306108 of this title, a Federal agency

shall consult with any Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian

organization that attaches religious and cultural significance to property described in subsection (a).

...

36 C.F.R. § 800.1

§ 800.1 Purposes.

(a) Purposes of the section 106 process. Section 106 of

the National Historic Preservation Act requires Federal agencies to take into account the effects of their

undertakings on historic properties and afford the

Council a reasonable opportunity to comment on such

undertakings. The procedures in this part define how

Federal agencies meet these statutory responsibilities.

The section 106 process seeks to accommodate historic preservation concerns with the needs of Federal

App. 88

undertakings through consultation among the agency

official and other parties with an interest in the effects

of the undertaking on historic properties, commencing

at the early stages of project planning. The goal of consultation is to identify historic properties potentially

affected by the undertaking, assess its effects and seek

ways to avoid, minimize or mitigate any adverse effects

on historic properties.

...

(c) Timing. The agency official must complete the section 106 process “prior to the approval of the expenditure of any Federal funds on the undertaking or prior

to the issuance of any license.” This does not prohibit

agency official from conducting or authorizing nondestructive project planning activities before completing

compliance with section 106, provided that such actions do not restrict the subsequent consideration of

alternatives to avoid, minimize or mitigate the undertaking’s adverse effects on historic properties. The

agency official shall ensure that the section 106 process is initiated early in the undertaking’s planning, so

that a broad range of alternatives may be considered

during the planning process for the undertaking.

App. 89

36 C.F.R. § 800.3

§ 800.3 Initiation of the section 106 process.

...

(f ) Identify other consulting parties. In consultation

with the SHPO/THPO, the agency official shall identify

any other parties entitled to be consulting parties and

invite them to participate as such in the section 106

process. The agency official may invite others to participate as consulting parties as the section 106 process

moves forward.

...

(2) Involving Indian tribes and Native Hawaiian

organizations. The agency official shall make a

reasonable and good faith effort to identify any Indian tribes or Native Hawaiian organizations that

might attach religious and cultural significance to

historic properties in the area of potential effects

and invite them to be consulting parties. Such Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization that

requests in writing to be a consulting party shall

be one.

...

App. 90

36 C.F.R. § 800.4

§ 800.4 Identification of historic properties.

...

(b) Identify historic properties. Based on the information gathered under paragraph (a) of this section,

and in consultation with the SHPO/THPO and any Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization that might

attach religious and cultural significance to properties

within the area of potential effects, the agency official

shall take the steps necessary to identify historic properties within the area of potential effects.

...

36 C.F.R. § 800.5

§ 800.5 Assessment of adverse effects.

(a) Apply criteria of adverse effect. In consultation

with the SHPO/THPO and any Indian tribe or Native

Hawaiian organization that attaches religious and cultural significance to identified historic properties, the

agency official shall apply the criteria of adverse effect

to historic properties within the area of potential effects. The agency official shall consider any views concerning such effects which have been provided by

consulting parties and the public.

(1) Criteria of adverse effect. An adverse effect is

found when an undertaking may alter, directly or

indirectly, any of the characteristics of a historic

property that qualify the property for inclusion in

App. 91

the National Register in a manner that would diminish the integrity of the property’s location, design, setting, materials, workmanship, feeling, or

association. Consideration shall be given to all

qualifying characteristics of a historic property, including those that may have been identified subsequent to the original evaluation of the property’s

eligibility for the National Register. Adverse effects may include reasonably foreseeable effects

caused by the undertaking that may occur later in

time, be farther removed in distance or be cumulative.

(2) Examples of adverse effects. Adverse effects

on historic properties include, but are not limited

to:

(i) Physical destruction of or damage to all

or part of the property;

(ii) Alteration of a property, including restoration, rehabilitation, repair, maintenance,

stabilization, hazardous material remediation, and provision of handicapped access,

that is not consistent with the Secretary’s

standards for the treatment of historic properties (36 CFR part 68) and applicable guidelines;

...

(iv) Change of the character of the property’s

use or of physical features within the property’s setting that contribute to its historic

significance;

App. 92

(v) Introduction of visual, atmospheric or

audible elements that diminish the integrity

of the property’s significant historic features;

...

36 C.F.R. § 800.6

§ 800.6 Resolution of adverse effects.

(a) Continue consultation. The agency official shall

consult with the SHPO/THPO and other consulting

parties, including Indian tribes and Native Hawaiian

organizations, to develop and evaluate alternatives or

modifications to the undertaking that could avoid,

minimize, or mitigate adverse effects on historic properties.

...

(c) Memorandum of agreement. A memorandum of

agreement executed and implemented pursuant to this

section evidences the agency official’s compliance with

section 106 and this part and shall govern the undertaking and all of its parts. The agency official shall ensure that the undertaking is carried out in accordance

with the memorandum of agreement.

...

App. 93

36 C.F.R. § 800.13

§ 800.13 Post-review discoveries.

...

(b) Discoveries without prior planning. If historic

properties are discovered or unanticipated effects on

historic properties found after the agency official has

completed the section 106 process without establishing a process under paragraph (a) of this section, the

agency official shall make reasonable efforts to avoid,

minimize or mitigate adverse effects to such properties

and:

(1) If the agency official has not approved the

undertaking or if construction on an approved undertaking has not commenced, consult to resolve

adverse effects pursuant to § 800.6; or

(2) If the agency official, the SHPO/THPO and

any Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization

that might attach religious and cultural significance to the affected property agree that such

property is of value solely for its scientific, prehistoric, historic or archeological data, the agency

official may comply with the Archeological and

Historic Preservation Act instead of the procedures in this part and provide the Council, the

SHPO/THPO, and the Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization with a report on the actions

within a reasonable time after they are completed;

or

(3) If the agency official has approved the undertaking and construction has commenced, determine actions that the agency official can take to

App. 94

resolve adverse effects, and notify the SHPO/THPO,

any Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization

that might attach religious and cultural significance to the affected property, and the Council

within 48 hours of the discovery. The notification

shall describe the agency official’s assessment of

National Register eligibility of the property and

proposed actions to resolve the adverse effects.

The SHPO/THPO, the Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization and the Council shall respond

within 48 hours of the notification. The agency official shall take into account their recommendations regarding National Register eligibility and

proposed actions, and then carry out appropriate

actions. The agency official shall provide the

SHPO/THPO, the Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian

organization and the Council a report of the actions when they are completed.

...

36 C.F.R. § 800.16

§ 800.16 Definitions.

...

(l)(1) Historic property means any prehistoric or historic district, site, building, structure, or object included in, or eligible for inclusion in, the National

Register of Historic Places maintained by the Secretary of the Interior. This term includes artifacts, records, and remains that are related to and located

within such properties. The term includes properties of

traditional religious and cultural importance to an

App. 95

Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization and that

meet the National Register criteria.

(2) The term eligible for inclusion in the National

Register includes both properties formally determined

as such in accordance with regulations of the Secretary

of the Interior and all other properties that meet the

National Register criteria.

...

(y) Undertaking means a project, activity, or program

funded in whole or in part under the direct or indirect

jurisdiction of a Federal agency, including those carried

out by or on behalf of a Federal agency; those carried

out with Federal financial assistance; and those requiring a Federal permit, license or approval.

...

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Havasupai Tribe, Petitioner v. Heather C. Provencio, et al. | Frix