Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Lynda Like, et al., Petitioners v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Company, LLC
Supreme Court briefMar 13, 2019
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App. 1
PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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Nos. 17-3075, 17-3076, 17-3115 & 17-3116
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TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS PIPE
LINE COMPANY, LLC
v.
PERMANENT EASEMENTS FOR 2.14 ACRES AND
TEMPORARY EASEMENTS FOR 3.59 ACRES IN
CONESTOGA TOWNSHIP, LANCASTER COUNTY,
PENNSYLVANIA, TAX PARCEL NUMBER
1201606900000; HILLTOP HOLLOW LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP; HILLTOP HOLLOW PARTNERSHIP LLC GENERAL PARTNER OF HILLTOP
HOLLOW LIMITED PARTNERSHIP; LANCASTER
FARMLAND TRUST; ALL UNKNOWN OWNERS
Hilltop Hollow Limited Partnership and Hilltop
Hollow Partnership, LLC,
Appellants in 17-3075
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TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS PIPELINE
COMPANY, LLC
v.
PERMANENT EASEMENT FOR 2.02 ACRES AND
TEMPORARY EASEMENTS FOR 2.76 ACRES IN
MANOR TOWNSHIP, LANCASTER COUNTY
PENNSYLVANIA, TAX PARCEL NUMBER
4100300500000, 3049 SAFE HARBOR ROAD,
App. 2
MANOR TOWNSHIP, LANCASTER, PA; STEPHEN
D. HOFFMAN; AND ALL UNKNOWN OWNERS
Stephen D. Hoffman,
Appellant in 17-3076
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TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS PIPELINE
COMPANY, LLC
v.
PERMANENT EASEMENT FOR 1.33 ACRES AND
TEMPORARY EASEMENTS FOR 2.28 ACRES
CONESTOGA TOWNSHIP, LANCASTER COUNTY,
PENNSYLVANIA TAX PARCEL NUMBER
1202476100000, 4160 MAIN STREET CONESTOGA,
PA 17516; LYNDA LIKE, also known as Linda Like,
AND ALL UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS
Lynda Like,
Appellant in 17-3115
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TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS PIPELINE
COMPANY, LLC
v.
PERMANENT EASEMENT FOR 0.94 ACRES
AND TEMPORARY EASEMENTS FOR 1.61 ACRES
IN CONESTOGA TOWNSHIP, LANCASTER
COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA, TAX PARCEL NUMBER 1203589400000, SICKMAN MILL ROAD;
BLAIR B. MOHN; MEGAN E. MOHN, AND ALL
UNKNOWN OWNERS
Blair B. Mohn and Megan E. Mohn,
Appellants in 17-3116
App. 3
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D. C. Civil Actions Nos. 17-cv-00715, 17-cv-00723,
17-cv-00720, 17-cv-00722)
District Judge: Honorable Jeffery L. Schmehl
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Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on October 2, 2018
Before: SHWARTZ, ROTH and FISHER,
Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: October 30, 2018)
Siobhan K. Cole
White & Williams
1650 Market Street
One Liberty Place, Suite 1800
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Jeremy P. Hopkins
Cranfill Summer & Hartzog
5420 Wade Park Boulevard Suite 300
Raleigh, NC 27607
Michael N. Onufrak
White & Williams
1650 Market Street
Suite 1800
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Carolyn Elefant
Law Offices of Carolyn Elefant
8th Floor
1440 G Street N.W.
Washington, DC 20005
App. 4
Mark L. Freed
Curtin & Heefner
2005 South Easton Road
Suite 100
Doylestown, PA 18901
Counsel for Appellants
Patrick F. Nugent
Sean T. O’Neill
Saul Ewing Arnstein & Lehr
1500 Market Street
Centre Square West, 38th Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19102
Elizabeth U. Witmer
Saul Ewing Arnstein & Lehr
1200 Liberty Ridge Drive
Suite 200
Wayne, PA 19087
Counsel for Appellees
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OPINION
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ROTH, Circuit Judge
Congress may grant eminent domain power to private companies acting in the public interest. This appeal requires us to determine the limits on Congress’s
grant of eminent domain power to private companies
building gas lines under the Natural Gas Act (NGA),
15 U.S.C. § 717f(h).
App. 5
The NGA gives natural gas companies the power
to acquire property by eminent domain, but it provides
only for standard eminent domain power, not the type
of eminent domain called “quick take” that permits immediate possession.1 The District Court granted a preliminary injunction to Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line
Company, which effectively gave the company immediate possession of certain rights of way owned by appellant landowners. The landowners claim that granting
immediate possession violated the constitutional principle of separation of powers because the taking of
property by eminent domain is a legislative power and
the NGA did not grant “quick take.” We disagree and
hold that the District Court’s order did not violate the
principle of separation of powers because Transcontinental properly sought and obtained the substantive
right to the property before seeking equitable relief. We
will therefore affirm.
I
Transcontinental is building a natural gas pipeline that runs through Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina. For this
project, named “Atlantic Sunrise Expansion Project,”
Transcontinental needed certain rights of way, including those owned by appellants Hilltop Hollow Limited
Partnership, Stephen Hoffman, Lynda Like, and Blair
and Megan Mohn (collectively “Landowners”). Under
1
infra.
For a further description of “quick take” see Section III.A
App. 6
§ 717f(h) of the NGA, gas companies may acquire property by eminent domain if they meet three requirements. A gas company must demonstrate, first, that it
holds a certificate of public convenience and necessity
from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC); second, that it was unable to acquire the right
of way through negotiation with the landowner; and
third, that the amount claimed by the owner of the
property exceeds $3,000. If these conditions are met,
the gas company may “acquire the [necessary right-ofway] by the exercise of the right of eminent domain in
the district court.”2
Transcontinental has met all three requirements
of § 717f(h). The administrative review leading up to
the certificate of public convenience and necessity
lasted almost three years and, as is evident from the
record, included extensive outreach and many avenues
of public participation. The process started when
FERC granted the company’s request to use the prefiling process on April 4, 2014.3 On July 29, 2014,
FERC issued a Notice of Intent to Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the Planned Atlantic Sunrise Expansion Project, Request for Comments
on Environmental Issues, and Notice of Public Scoping
Meetings (NOI).4 The NOI was then mailed to 2500
interested parties. It invited comment on the project’s
environmental issues from all levels of government,
2
§ 717f(h).
A1424.
4
A1424; 79 Fed. Reg. 44,023 (2014).
3
App. 7
interest groups, Native American tribes, affected property owners, local media and libraries, and other interested parties. The Commission heard from 93 speakers
and received over 600 written comments.5 On March
31, 2015, the company filed its application to construct
and operate the Atlantic Sunrise project.6 FERC
mailed letters to potentially affected landowners (as
well as to government officials and other stakeholders)
on October 22, 2015.7 FERC issued the draft EIS on
May 5, 2016, and published it on May 12, 2016.8 At four
public meetings in June 2016, FERC heard from 203
speakers and received over 560 written comments and
900 identical letters on the draft EIS.9 Two alternative
pipeline routes were identified following the draft EIS,
and additional notices were mailed to potentially affected stakeholders, in response to which FERC received 25 additional comment letters.10 FERC issued
the final EIS on December 30, 2016, and published it
on January 9, 2017.11
The Commission issued a certificate of public convenience and necessity to Transcontinental—the first
requirement of § 717f(h) of the NGA—on February 3,
2017.12 It found “[b]ased on the benefits” of the
5
A1424.
A1425.
7
A1425.
8
81 Fed. Reg. 29,557 (2016).
9
A1425.
10
A1426.
11
A1426; 82 Fed. Reg. 2,344 (2017).
12
A1396.
6
App. 8
pipeline, “the minimal adverse effects on landowners
or surrounding communities,” and “the absence of adverse effects on existing customers and other pipelines
and their captive customers, . . . that the public convenience and necessity require[d] approval” of the project “subject to the conditions” set out in the Order
Issuing Certificate.13 Those conditions included requirements that Transcontinental, inter alia, construct
the pipeline and make it available for service within
three years of the date of the order,14 comply with certain environmental conditions, and follow certain rate
schedules.15 FERC also required that Transcontinental
execute firm contracts for volumes and service terms
“equivalent to those in its precedent agreements” before construction.16 The Order Issuing Certificate contained information on those binding precedent
agreements, comprising 100% of the capacity generated by the project, with nine shippers.17 The Landowners sought rehearing and included a request to
13
A1410.
See 18 C.F.R. § 157.20(b), A1466.
15
A1466-67.
16
A1467.
17
A1400-01, A1407-10. FERC noted that while “a number of
the project shippers are producers,” its “policy does not require
that shippers be end-use consumers of natural gas. . . . [A] project
driven primarily by marketers and producers does not render it
speculative. Marketers or producers who subscribe to firm capacity on a proposed project on a long-term basis presumably have
made a positive assessment of the potential for selling gas to enduse consumers in a given market and have made a business decision to subscribe to the capacity on the basis of that assessment.”
A1408.
14
App. 9
stay the Order Issuing Certificate and construction of
the project,18 but FERC tolled the rehearing request on
March 13, 2017,19 denied the stay requests on August
31, 2017,20 and finally denied the rehearing request on
December 6, 2017.21
The second and third requirements for using the
eminent domain powers under § 717f(h) of the NGA
are that the gas company negotiate with the landowner for the necessary right of way and that value of
the right of way exceeds $3000. Transcontinental extended written offers of compensation exceeding $3000
to each of the Landowners, but these offers were not
accepted.22 Transcontinental thus satisfied the second
18
Request for Rehearing and Motion for Stay of Certain
Landowners (Mar. 6, 2017), Accession No. 20170306-5123; Petition for Rehearing of Lynda Like of Order Issuing Certificate for
the Atlantic Sunrise Project and Request for Stay of Certificate
(Mar. 6, 2017), Accession No. 20170306-5204; Petition for Rehearing of Follin Smith and Blair and Megan Mohn of Order Issuing
Certificate for the Atlantic Sunrise Project and Request for Stay
of Certificate (Mar. 6, 2017), Accession No. 20170306-5202.
19
The tolling order noted that if FERC had not responded to
the rehearing requests within 30 days, the requests would be considered denied under 18 C.F.R. § 385.713 (2016); therefore, FERC
tolled the request “[i]n order to afford additional time for consideration of the matters.” A669.
20
Order Denying Stay, Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co.,
LLC, 160 FERC ¶ 61,042 (Aug. 31, 2017), Accession No.
20170831-3088.
21
Order on Rehearing, Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co.,
LLC, 161 FERC ¶ 61,250 (Dec. 6, 2017), Accession No. 201712063073.
22
Transcontinental submitted a declaration in its summary
judgment briefing from Aaron Blair, a “Senior Land Representative”
App. 10
and third requirements. The company filed condemnation complaints pursuant to Rule 71.1 in four separate
actions against the Landowners on February 15,
2017.23
Having met the three requirements of § 717f(h),
Transcontinental moved for partial summary judgment on February 20, 2017, in the Hilltop, Hoffman,
and Mohn condemnation actions and on February 22,
2017, in the Like condemnation action.24 Transcontinental also requested an injunction giving immediate
access for the purpose of conducting a survey in the
Hilltop and Hoffman actions and claimed immediate
entitlement based on the existence of the FERC order.25 On April 6, 2017, the District Court denied the
motion for an injunction under the NGA because it had
not yet determined the merits of Transcontinental’s
condemnation action, though it granted Transcontinental limited survey access pursuant to Pennsylvania
state law.26 The court held that it would have been
premature to grant such an injunction at that time
given that the Landowners in related cases had not yet
for Transcontinental’s parent company, Williams Partners, L.P.,
establishing that it had made these offers, and there was also testimony to that effect at the preliminary injunction hearing. A609
(Blair Declaration); A1049 (Blair testimony).
23
A130, A1537, A1709, A1832.
24
A130, A1538, A1833, A1709.
25
A679.
26
A679, A680.
App. 11
finished briefing the summary judgment motions.27
The court noted that if Transcontinental later established its right to condemn, the court would be able to
use its equitable power to award preliminary injunctive relief.28
After briefing on the summary judgment motions
concluded, Transcontinental filed an omnibus motion
for preliminary injunction on June 28, 2017.29 The
Landowners responded on July 14, 2017.30 On June 30,
2017, the District Court scheduled oral argument on
the motions for July 17 and 20, 2017. At oral argument,
a witness for Transcontinental testified that construction was planned to begin in the fall of 2017 and that
it would need access to the rights of way by August
18,31 or else it would suffer various harms.32 The Landowners cross-examined Transcontinental’s witness,33
and all four Landowners testified.34 The Landowners’
testimony included statements that they had all participated in the FERC administrative process.35 Counsel for Landowners presented argument that the
27
A680.
A679.
29
A685.
30
A135, A1541, A1712, A1835.
31
A953-54, A957.
32
A957-961.
33
A963.
34
A1068, A1110, A1152, A1184.
35
A1108 (Hilltop), A1124-25 (Hoffman), A1158-59 (Mohn),
A1191 (Like).
28
App. 12
taking constituted a “quick take” and that it violated
separation of powers principles.36
On August 23, 2017, the District Court granted
Transcontinental’s motions for partial summary
judgment and omnibus motion for a preliminary injunction.37 The court found no dispute that Transcontinental met the three requirements for seeking eminent
domain under the NGA and held that the company was
therefore entitled to the entry of partial summary
judgment.38 The court addressed the Hilltop/Hoffman
Landowners’ due process claims and ruled that they
were essentially attacks on the FERC certificate, and
were therefore outside the court’s jurisdiction.39 The
court added that, even if it were to exercise jurisdiction, it would find that the Hilltop/ Hoffman Landowners had received “adequate due process” because they
had participated in oral argument, had filed a request
for rehearing with FERC, and had filed an appeal in
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.40 The Hilltop/Hoffman Landowners had also argued that FERC’s tolling
order deprived them of due process because it indefinitely extended FERC’s time limit to rule on their Motion for Rehearing and Stay. The court rejected this
argument on the grounds that mere delay in the
36
A1202-10, A1214-16.
A35; A20-28, A75-82, A97-103, A114-21; A18-19, A73-74,
A95-96, A112-13.
38
A41-42.
39
A42.
40
A44.
37
App. 13
adjudication of a claim does not amount to a deprivation.41 The court then addressed the Like/Mohn Landowners’ claim that because the FERC certificate was
conditioned on certain requirements, some of which
had not yet been met, the certificate could not be used
to exercise eminent domain. As the NGA does not require FERC certificate holders to satisfy all the certificate’s conditions before exercising eminent domain,
and because the certificate itself contained no such requirement, the District Court rejected this argument.42
On the basis of this review, the court held that
Transcontinental had met the four factor test for a preliminary injunction. Under that test, the movant must
demonstrate: 1) that there is reasonable probability of
success on the merits, 2) that there will be irreparable
harm to the movant in the absence of relief, 3) that
granting the injunction will not result in greater harm
to the nonmoving party, and 4) that the public interest
favors granting the injunction.43 The first two factors
are the “most critical.”44 On the first prong, it found
that “Transco[ntinental] ha[d] already succeeded on
the merits.”45 The court quoted our decision in
41
A46-47.
A48-49.
43
Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 176 (3d Cir.
2017).
44
Id. at 179. If the first two “gateway” factors are met, the
court “then considers the remaining two factors and determines
in its sound discretion if all four factors, taken together, balance
in favor of granting the requested preliminary relief.” Id.
45
A51.
42
App. 14
Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. 1.01 Acres. In that
case, we affirmed the grant of partial summary judgment in an action for condemnation and the grant of a
preliminary injunction, noting that there was “no remaining merits issue” because the District Court had
already ruled that the gas company had the right to
the easements by eminent domain.46
On the second prong, the District Court found that
Transcontinental would suffer irreparable harm in the
form of construction delays, inability to complete surveys required to satisfy environmental conditions, risk
of non-compliance with shipper contracts, and monetary harm.47
On the third prong, the District Court noted again
that Transcontinental already had the substantive
right to possession and the only question was “the timing of the possession.”48 If the permits to build certain
pipeline sections on the Landowners’ property were
eventually denied, the Landowners would have legal
recourse to recover their property.49
Finally, on the public interest prong, the District
Court noted the project’s potential to provide the general public “throughout a vast area of the country” with
46
768 F.3d 300, 315 (3d Cir. 2014).
A53-54. The project is at an advanced stage. FERC has issued a series of Notices to Proceed on the construction of the project, and Transcontinental states in its brief that only 23% of the
construction remains to be completed.
48
A54.
49
A55.
47
App. 15
access to natural gas, and found that “the mere fact
that [certain subscribers] will have access to export facilities does not mean that they will in fact export the
natural gas out of the country.” 50 The District Court
noted also that FERC had found the project to be in
the public interest, which further tipped this factor in
favor of Transcontinental.51
The Landowners appealed.
II
As the grant of partial summary judgment did not
end the litigation as to all claims and all parties, only
the grant of the preliminary injunction is before us.52
We have jurisdiction over the appeal of the injunction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a). The Landowners, however,
do not bring a standard appeal of a preliminary injunction, reviewable for abuse of discretion. The Landowners contest only the constitutionality of the lower
court’s procedure, not the application of the four-factor
50
The Hilltop/Hoffman Landowners point out that the project is designed to generate 1,700,002 dekatherms per day, and
they argue that of this amount, 850,000 dekatherms, which is just
barely under 50%, will go to one shipper, Cabot Oil & Gas, which
plans to export this entire amount.
51
A56-57.
52
Andrews v. United States, 373 U.S. 334, 340 (1963).
App. 16
preliminary injunction test.53 Therefore, we review
their claims de novo.54
III
The Landowners ask us to hold that the procedure
followed by the District Court—grant of partial
summary judgment, awarding possession of the rightsof-way, followed by equitable relief in the form of
preliminary injunction—is unconstitutional. The
Landowners argue that such a procedure is an unconstitutional grant of “quick take” eminent domain
power, the type of eminent domain that allows for immediate possession. Congress granted “quick take” eminent domain power to government actors in the
Declaration of Taking Act (DTA),55 but the NGA neither contains nor incorporates such a provision. The
Landowners argue that since Congress did not grant
natural gas companies “quick-take” eminent domain
power in the NGA, the court cannot, in effect, grant
such powers on its own; doing so usurps the legislature’s authority. The question before us then is
whether Congress, in passing the NGA, intended to remove the judiciary’s access to equitable remedies to enforce an established substantive right. Put another
way, did Congress intend to forbid immediate access to
the necessary rights of way when it granted only
53
A56.
Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Attorney General, 825 F.3d
149, 159 (3d Cir. 2016).
55
40 U.S.C. § 3114.
54
App. 17
standard condemnation powers to natural gas companies?
A
We begin with the Landowners’ premise: that the
District Court effected a “quick-take.” As an initial
matter, eminent domain is a legislative power, but Congress can delegate it to other governmental actors56 or
to private actors “execut[ing] works in which the public
is interested.”57
Congress generally does this by delegating the
power of eminent domain. There are two primary types
of eminent domain at the government’s disposal. One
is “quick take,” permitted by the DTA, 40 U.S.C. § 3114,
in which the government files a “declaration of taking”
that states the authority for the taking, the public use,
56
E.g., 33 U.S.C. § 594 (providing the Secretary of the Army
the authority to acquire land, through eminent domain proceedings, “needed for a work of river and harbor improvements duly
authorized by Congress”).
57
Mississippi & Rum River Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S.
403, 406 (1878); see also First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles County, Cal., 482 U.S. 304, 321
(1987) (“[T]he decision to exercise the power of eminent domain is
a legislative function.”); Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United States,
148 U.S. 312, 321 (1893). The Landowners acknowledge the existence of judicial takings, citing Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc.
v. Florida Dep’t Enviro. Protection, 560 U.S. 702, 713-14 (2010)),
but maintain that only Congress can grant eminent domain powers. See Secombe v. Milwaukee & St. P.R. Co., 90 U.S. 108, 11718 (1874) (“[T]he mode of exercising the right of eminent domain,
in the absence of any provision in the organic law prescribing a
contrary course, is within the discretion of the legislature.”).
App. 18
and an estimate of compensation. Upon depositing the
estimated compensation, title vests automatically with
the United States. The other is standard condemnation, permitted by 40 U.S.C. § 3113, in which title
passes and the right to possession vests after a final
judgment and determination of just compensation. The
procedures for standard condemnations are set forth
in Fed. R. Civ. P. 71.1. The NGA is an example of a grant
of eminent domain power from Congress to a private
actor to condemn land for public use, but it only embodies the second type—standard condemnation
power, not “quick take.”58
In the case before us, Transcontinental followed
standard condemnation procedure. The company filed
condemnation complaints under Rule 71.1, not a declaration of taking. Rule 71.1 has requirements that go
beyond the DTA.59 Transcontinental followed these
procedures by filing condemnation complaints under
Rule 71.1; it then established its substantive right to
the property by filing for summary judgment. Only after the District Court granted summary judgment in
Transcontinental’s favor did it grant injunctive relief.
Transcontinental also posted bond at three times the
appraised value of the rights of way, as required by the
58
East Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. Sage, 361 F.3d 808, 82021 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing Mississippi & Rum River Boom Co. v.
Patterson, 98 U.S. at 406).
59
E.g., a condemnation complaint that explains the authority for the taking, the uses for the property, a description sufficient to identify the property, the interests to be acquired, and
each owner; notice and personal or publication service; and procedures for the determination and payment of just compensation.
App. 19
orders of condemnation.60 If Transcontinental had in
fact exercised “quick take,” it would have simply filed
a declaration of taking with an estimate of compensation; title would have vested automatically. Here, unlike in a “quick take” action, Transcontinental does not
yet have title but will receive it once final compensation is determined and paid.61 Unlike in a “quick take”
action, the Landowners had the opportunity to brief
the summary judgment motions and participate in the
preliminary injunction hearing. The different procedures and opportunities for participation distinguish
60
See A22, A99, A116, A77. We note that the Landowners
have not received any of this money. Rule 71.1(c)(4) allows the
court to “order any distribution of a deposit that the facts warrant.” At least one court has interpreted this provision to apply
only after the final determination of just compensation. UGI Sunbury LLC v. A Permanent Easement for 71.7575 Acres, 16-cv-788,
2016 WL 7239945, at *2 n.14 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 15, 2016). In UGI
Sunbury, the court interpreted an Advisory Committee note on
this section, which states that the sentence “enables the court to
expedite the distribution of a deposit, in whole or in part, as soon
as pertinent facts of ownership, value and the like are established,” to mean that distribution can only occur after just compensation is determined. Such a reading conflicts with subsection
(j)(2), which provides that “[i]f the compensation finally awarded
to a defendant exceeds the amount distributed to that defendant,”
the court must recoup the deficiency from the plaintiff, and the
reverse is true if the final amount awarded is less than the
amount distributed. Such a scheme would be unnecessary if deposits never occurred before final determination of just compensation. In sum, while it does not seem to be common practice to
distribute compensation upon posting of the bonds, in cases presenting hardship to landowners, the court’s hands may not be
tied.
61
Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 284-85 (1939).
App. 20
the grant of the injunction here from an exercise of
“quick take” power.
B
The Landowners contend, nevertheless, that even
if the procedure below was not technically an exercise
of “quick take” eminent domain, the use of a preliminary injunction amounted to a “quick take.” However,
the technical distinctions they seek to elide are, in the
end, meaningful distinctions in the law. According to
the Landowners, there is a difference between the substantive right to access that arises under the NGA, and
the substantive right to immediate access, which only
Congress can authorize. The Like/Mohn Landowners
argue that granting injunctive relief for immediate
possession is in itself a substantive right of eminent
domain that a court cannot confer in the absence of
Congressional authorization. There is, however, no
case law to support the proposition that an injunctive
right of immediate possession is a substantive right,
conferrable only by Congress. The fact that “quick
take” power exists does not prohibit other kinds of immediate access. The only substantive right at issue is
the right to condemn using eminent domain, conferred
by Congress in the NGA. The District Court found that
Transcontinental had obtained that right.62 The preliminary injunction merely hastened the enforcement
62
See Seymour v. Freer, 75 U.S. 202, 213-14 (1868) (property
rights “distinct from the legal ownership . . . constitute an equity
which a court of equity will protect and enforce whenever its aid
for that purpose is properly invoked”).
App. 21
of the substantive right—it did not create any new
rights.63
The Like/Mohn Landowners portray Transcontinental as a customer who pays for 90% of an item and
then takes it home, but Transcontinental did not have
90% of a right to the rights of way—it had the whole
right. The Hilltop/Hoffman Landowners argue that
the fact that title to the property had not yet been
transferred is immaterial; it is the grant of the preliminary injunction that is the essence of the “quick take”
power. To the contrary, we conclude that the equitable
means by which Transcontinental’s possession vested
through the preliminary injunction differed in significant ways from “quick take” under the DTA. We decline
the invitation to conflate the two processes. These are
not trivial differences of procedure or paperwork.
The cases relied on by the Landowners are easily
distinguishable as they involve gas companies that
failed to obtain the crucial substantive right to condemn before seeking a preliminary injunction. In one,
Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. 17.19 Acres of Property Located in Maricopa County,64 the Ninth Circuit held
that a preliminary injunction was not appropriate because the company did not obtain an order of condemnation. While the gas company argued that it was
guaranteed success on the merits due to its FERC
63
De Beers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S.
212, 220 (1945) (issuing preliminary injunction “appropriate to
grant intermediate relief of the same character as that which may
be granted finally”).
64
550 F.3d 770 (9th Cir. 2008).
App. 22
certificate and the fact that it met the § 717f(h) factors,
at the time it sought equitable relief it had no right to
condemn.65 The Ninth Circuit explicitly endorsed the
procedure of first obtaining an order of condemnation
(as Transcontinental did here through partial summary judgment) followed by a request for preliminary
injunction.66
The Seventh Circuit’s Northern Border decision is
similar.67 There, the gas company moved for immediate
possession before the district court issued a decision on
the merits of its eminent domain proceeding. Since the
company had only the FERC certificate, the court denied its request: “A preliminary injunction may issue
only when the moving party has a substantive entitlement to the relief sought. . . . [The company has] an entitlement that will arise at the conclusion of the
normal eminent domain process” but not the right of
immediate access.68 The Landowners place much emphasis on the recognition in Northern Border that the
NGA does not incorporate “quick take” authority under
state law or under the DTA and on the statement in
Northern Border that the NGA “does not create an entitlement to immediate possession of the land.”69 Both
those statements are true: the NGA does not incorporate “quick take” authority and does not on its own
65
Id. at 773, 777.
Id. at 777.
67
Northern Border Pipeline Co. v. 86.72 Acres of Land, 144
F.3d 469 (7th Cir. 1998).
68
44 F.3d at 471.
69
Id. at 471, 472 (citation omitted).
66
App. 23
create an entitlement to immediate possession. But
Northern Border is clearly distinguishable because of
the gas company’s failure to “obtain an order determining that it had the right to condemn before it sought a
preliminary injunction. . . . Without having that right
in substantive law determined, the company could not
invoke equity.”70
The Landowners also suggest that due process,
the Fifth Amendment, or some combination of the two
require payment of just compensation before a condemnor can take possession. Such an argument directly contradicts established law that “due process
does not require the condemnation of land to be in advance of its occupation by the condemning authority,
provided only that the owner have opportunity, in the
course of the condemnation proceedings, to be heard
and to offer evidence as to the value of the land
taken.”71 In addition, compensation need not be paid
contemporaneously with the taking; instead, the Fifth
Amendment requires only that a provision for payment must be available.72 Thus the Landowners’
70
Sage, 361 F.3d at 827-28.
Bailey v. Anderson, 326 U.S. 203, 205 (1945); see also Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 489-90 (4th Cir. 2006)
(“[W]hen the alleged deprivation is effectively a physical taking,
procedural due process is satisfied so long as private property
owners may pursue meaningful postdeprivation procedures to recover just compensation.”); Collier v. City of Springsdale, 733 F.2d
1311, 1314 (8th Cir. 1984).
72
See Preseault v. I.C.C., 494 U.S. 1, 11 (1990).
71
App. 24
reliance on Kirby Forest Industries v. United States,73
Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Railway Co.,74
and Atlantic Seaboard Corp. v. Van Sterkenburg75 is
73
467 U.S. 1 (1984). Kirby explained how Rule 71.1 operates
in standard condemnation proceedings, where the “practical effect of final judgment on the issue of just compensation is to give
the Government an option to buy the property at the adjudicated
price.” Id. at 4. The central question in Kirby was how to determine the date on which a taking should be deemed to occur, a
question that affected the amount of interest due on a condemnation proceeding award.
74
135 U.S. 641 (1890). The act at issue in Cherokee provided
for full compensation “before the railway shall be constructed,”
though the Court also stated that the Constitution “does not provide or require that compensation shall be actually paid in advance of the occupancy of the land to be taken; but the owner is
entitled to reasonable, certain, and adequate provision for obtaining compensation before his occupancy is disturbed.” Id. at 659.
The Court noted that it could sometimes be difficult to judge
whether a particular provision was “sufficient to secure the compensation” to which a landowner is entitled under the Constitution, but that it had no trouble finding the statute at issue
constitutional. Id.
75
318 F.2d 455 (4th Cir. 1963). The gas company in this case
followed the condemnation procedures of Rule 71.1, and after the
determination of just compensation, announced that it wished to
proceed immediately with the construction of the pipeline. Id. at
459-60. It is not clear why the gas company chose to wait until
after the just compensation phase to seek possession. In any
event, the court upheld an order permitting the company to pay
the award and begin using the easement because “[i]nherently . . .
the condemnation court possesses the power to authorize immediate entry by the condemnor upon the condemned premises . . . .
There is no valid reason why an owner . . . should be allowed,
by a fruitless and meritless appeal, to postpone indefinitely the
condemnor’s enjoyment of the premises, imposing upon the condemnor great, perhaps irreparable, damage, all without risk of
further loss or injury to the owner.” Id. at 460 (emphasis added).
The case is distinguishable because the gas company completed
App. 25
misplaced. None of these cases lend support to the
Landowners’ argument that Transcontinental’s right
to possession of the properties will not vest until
Transcontinental has exercised its option to buy the
properties at the adjudicated price.
The Landowners go on to contend that because the
NGA does not grant “quick take” power, the statute
does not permit immediate possession.76 They make
this argument without any explanation for why a district court’s authority to issue a preliminary injunction
should disappear when a condemnation proceeding
has been filed. Nothing in the NGA suggests either explicitly or implicitly that the rules governing preliminary injunctions should be suspended in condemnation
proceedings.
Historically, the NGA, when first enacted, did
countenance a wide variety of eminent domain procedures because it required district courts to conform “as
nearly as may be” with the eminent domain procedure
of the state in which the property was situated. The
condemnation procedures before seeking possession, but even so,
Atlantic Seaboard’s recognition of an “inherent[]” power to authorize “immediate entry” more squarely helps Transcontinental.
76
For example, the Hilltop/Hoffman Landowners cite to
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority v. One Parcel of
Land in Montgomery County, 706 F.2d 1312 (4th Cir. 1983). In
that case, the Fourth Circuit upheld a quick take because Congress explicitly made the DTA available to the transit authority.
It did not do so in the NGA. The case does not address the use of
injunctions to permit immediate possession, and we do not find
the case to be persuasive evidence that the NGA prohibits such
injunctions.
App. 26
state procedures protected landowners to a varying degree.77 Reliance on state eminent domain procedures
ended with the adoption of Rule 71.1 (previously numbered 71A), which created a nationally uniform approach to eminent domain proceedings, and which,
because it conflicted with § 717f(h), superseded the
state-conformity language in the NGA.78 Courts now
generally agree that condemnation proceedings under
the NGA should follow Rule 71.1.79
77
In states with no specific pipe line condemnation statutes,
courts made do with laws intended for private utilities in general.
E.g., Williams v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 89
F. Supp. 485, 487-88 (W.D.S.C. 1950) (“[A]ll that is needed to
make the grant effective is a State court procedure which meets
the requirements of due process and which can be reasonably utilized . . . . The [state] procedure . . . meets these requirements. It
furnishes due process. With its Clerks’ juries, composed of the
landowners’ neighbors, to pass upon the compensation originally,
and with the right of appeal therefrom to the Common Pleas
Court with a de novo jury trial, the procedure affords every protection to the landowner.” (citations omitted)).
78
Northern Border Pipeline Co. v. 64.111 Acres of Land, 344
F.3d 693, 694 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Congress may itself decide that
procedural rules in statutes should be treated as fallbacks, to apply only when rules are silent. And it has done just this. . . . Thus
Rule 71A(h) prevails: its nationally uniform approach conflicts
with the conformity-to-state-practice approach of § 717f(h), and
under [the Rules Enabling Act’s supersession clause] the statutory rule ‘shall be of no further force or effect.’ ”) (citing Henderson
v. United States, 517 U.S. 654 (1996)); see also United States v.
93.970 Acres of Land, 360 U.S. 328, 333 n.7 (1959) (holding similar language in another statute “clearly repealed by Rule 71A”).
79
Northern Border Pipeline Co., 344 F.3d at 694; Sage, 361
F.3d at 822; Southern Natural Gas Co. v. Land, Cullman County,
197 F.3d 1368, 1375 (11th Cir. 1999) (“It is clear to us that Rule
71A was promulgated to override a number of confusing federal
App. 27
Moreover, we see no reason to read a repeal of Rule
65, governing preliminary injunctions, into the NGA.
In fact, subsection (a) of Rule 71.1 incorporates the
other Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—including the
preliminary injunction rule, Rule 65—in condemnation proceedings to the extent Rule 71.1 does not govern. We do not so easily exterminate equitable
remedies.
In so holding, we find the Fourth Circuit opinion
in East Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. Sage80 persuasive.
There, the landowners argued “that Congress does not
intend for gas companies to gain immediate possession
because it has not granted statutory quick-take power
to gas companies as it has to government officers who
condemn property in the name of the United States.”81
But the court held that this argument “overlooks the
preliminary injunction remedy provided in the Federal
eminent domain practice and procedure provisions, such as that
of 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h), and to provide a unified and coherent set
of rules and procedures to be used in deciding federal eminent
domain actions.”). But see Delaware Riverkeeper Network v.
FERC, 895 F.3d 102, 110-11 (3d Cir. 2018) (noting that the NGA
ensures the occurrence of “a hearing that itself affords due process” with respect to the taking because the statute provides that
eminent domain actions conform with the practice and procedure
of such actions in the courts of the state where the property is
situated); contra Township of Bordentown, NJ v. FERC, Nos. 171047, 17-3207, 2018 WL 4212061, at *18 n.21 (3d Cir. Sept. 5,
2018) (NGA “requires district courts to attempt to mirror the state
courts’ condemnation proceedings”).
80
361 F.3d 808.
81
Id. at 824.
App. 28
Rules.”82 Rule 71.1 “provides . . . that the regular rules
of procedure apply to any subject not covered by the
special rule.”83 Thus, there was no reason why equitable relief “in the form of immediate possession” would
be “barred in a condemnation case.”84 As the Sage court
noted, the landowners, in their attempts to protect
themselves from immediate possession, seemed to assume that the preliminary injunction process was
somehow less protective of their interests than “quick
take” procedures. The court held, however, that when
condemning land under the NGA, “a gas company that
seeks immediate possession has a much stiffer burden
than the government does under the DTA” because the
gas company must first establish the substantive right
to condemn and then prevail on the four factors considered in preliminary injunctions.85
Under either procedure, a “quick take” or condemnation under Rule 71.1, landowners are protected from
the possibility of initial underpayment; with standard
condemnation plus preliminary injunction, if the company does not pay the difference within a reasonable
time, it will be liable for trespass.86 The Landowners
claim that Sage did not address the separation of powers arguments they bring here, but a panel of the
Fourth Circuit recently followed Sage and persuasively
82
Id.
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 825-26.
86
Id. at 825 (citing Cherokee Nation, 135 U.S. at 660).
83
App. 29
demonstrated that the opinion did in fact consider separation of powers principles.87 And this Court, too, albeit with less discussion, has ruled that where
summary judgment is properly granted on a condemnation complaint, a preliminary injunction is appropriate as well. We effectively granted immediate access on
the basis that the gas company had demonstrated success on the merits and strong arguments on the other
prongs of the preliminary injunction test.88
As the preliminary injunction was permitted by
the Rules, permitted by the NGA, and did not amount
to a grant of “quick take” eminent domain power in either name or substance, the court did not usurp legislative power or otherwise overstep the boundaries of
its judicial power. We therefore see no violation of the
87
Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. 76 Acres, More or
Less, 701 F. App’x 221, 231 n.7 (4th Cir. 2017) (rejecting landowners’ argument that “Sage is distinguishable because it did not
mention the words ‘separation of powers’ ” in part because Sage
explicitly rejected the assertion “that only Congress can grant the
right of immediate possession”).
88
Columbia Gas v. 1.01 Acres, 768 F.3d at 315-16. We note
that district courts around the country have implemented the procedure, relying on the Circuit decisions like Sage. See Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co., LLC v. Permanent Easement for 0.03
Acres, 17-cv-565, 2017 WL 3485752, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 15,
2017) (“It is commonplace for district courts to order immediate
possession after FERC has taken a lengthy period of time determining whether or not to issue a certificate of public convenience
and necessity.”) (collecting cases). See also Alliance Pipeline L.P.
v. 4.360 Acres of Land, 746 F.3d 362 (8th Cir. 2014) (no abuse of
discretion in granting pipeline’s immediate use and possession
following FERC certificate and grant of summary judgment and
preliminary injunction).
App. 30
principle of separation of powers in the District Court’s
procedure.
The Hilltop/Hoffman Landowners argue separately that the District Court’s procedure deprived
them of any meaningful opportunity to challenge
FERC’s public use determination. This argument also
fails.
First, and most importantly, the Hilltop/Hoffman
Landowners do not dispute that they had the opportunity to raise their concerns with FERC and did in
fact do so;89 sought stays of the construction, which
were denied;90 and sought rehearing,91 which was also
denied on December 6, 2017.92 Before the order denying rehearing, the Landowners appealed to the D.C.
89
Hilltop/Hoffman Landowners submitted 9 comments to
FERC. Like/Mohn Landowners submitted 47 comments.
90
Order Denying Stay, Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co.,
LLC, 160 FERC ¶ 61,042 (Aug. 31, 2017), Accession No.
20170831-3088.
91
Request for Rehearing and Motion for Stay of Certain
Landowners (Mar. 6, 2017), Accession No. 20170306-5123; Petition for Rehearing of Lynda Like of Order Issuing Certificate for
the Atlantic Sunrise Project and Request for Stay of Certificate
(Mar. 6, 2017), Accession No. 20170306-5204; Petition for Rehearing of Follin Smith and Blair and Megan Mohn of Order Issuing
Certificate for the Atlantic Sunrise Project and Request for Stay
of Certificate (Mar. 6, 2017), Accession No. 20170306-5202.
92
Order on Rehearing, Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co.,
LLC, 161 FERC ¶ 61,250 (Dec. 6, 2017), Accession No. 201712063073. The D.C. Circuit denied the landowners’ request for a stay
pending the appeal of the FERC Order. Allegheny Def. Project v.
Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, Nos. 17-1098, 17-1128, 17-1263,
18-1030, 2018 WL 1388557 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 2018) (per curiam).
App. 31
Circuit Court, where the case is pending.93 The NGA
explicitly provides that neither a request for rehearing
before FERC nor judicial review can stay the effectiveness of a FERC certificate.94
In sum, the Hilltop/Hoffman Landowners are attacking the underlying FERC order, but review of the
underlying FERC order is only properly brought to
FERC on rehearing and then to an appropriate circuit
court, as the Hilltop/Hoffman Landowners are pursuing. We lack jurisdiction to hear collateral attacks on
the FERC certificate, which contained a finding that
the project was for public use.95 Neither the District
Court nor this Court in this case may entertain arguments such as those brought by the Hilltop/Hoffman
Landowners that FERC unduly credited self-serving
statements by Transcontinental and ignored the potential that the project might have been intended to
provide companies with greater access to the higher
priced overseas market.96
V
The Landowners do not appeal the preliminary injunction based on an abuse of discretion in the District
Court’s analysis and so have waived that argument on
appeal. Even so construed, their petition lacks merit.
93
Nos. 17-1128, 18-1030.
15 U.S.C. § 717r(c).
95
15 U.S.C. § 717r(b) (appeal of the certificate allowed in the
circuit where the gas company is located or in the D.C. Circuit).
96
Hilltop/Hoffman Brief at 37, 38.
94
App. 32
Transcontinental clearly showed success on the merits
and would have been harmed if the injunction were denied.
For the above reasons, we hold that the NGA’s
grant of standard condemnation powers to natural gas
companies does not preclude federal courts from granting equitable relief in the form of a preliminary injunction when gas companies have obtained the
substantive right to condemn and otherwise qualify for
equitable relief. Because the Landowners fail to recognize the District Court’s equitable power to enter preliminary injunctions once substantive rights are
determined, their appeals lack merit. We therefore affirm the orders of the District Court, granting the motions for preliminary injunctions.
App. 33
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS
PIPE LINE COMPANY, LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
PERMANENT EASEMENT
FOR 2.14 ACRES AND TEMPORARY EASEMENTS FOR
3.59 ACRES IN CONESTOGA
TOWNSHIP, LANCASTER
COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA,
TAX PARCEL NUMBER
1201606900000, et al,
Defendants.
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 17-715
TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS
PIPE LINE COMPANY, LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
PERMANENT EASEMENT
FOR 1.33 ACRES, TEMPORARY EASEMENTS FOR
2.28 ACRES IN CONESTOGA
TOWNSHIP, LANCASTER
COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA,
TAX PARCEL NUMBER
1202476100000, 4160 MAIN
STREET, CONESTOGA, PA
17516, et al,
Defendants.
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 17-720
App. 34
TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS
PIPE LINE COMPANY, LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
PERMANENT EASEMENT
FOR 0.94 ACRES AND TEMPORARY EASEMENTS FOR
1.61 ACRES IN CONESTOGA
TOWNSHIP, LANCASTER
COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA,
TAX PARCEL NUMBER
1203589400000, SICKMAN
MILL ROAD, et al,
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 17-722
Defendants.
TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS
PIPE LINE COMPANY, LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
PERMANENT EASEMENT
FOR 2.02 ACRES AND TEMPORARY EASEMENTS FOR
2.76 ACRES IN MANOR
TOWNSHIP, LANCASTER
COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA,
TAX PARCEL NUMBER
4100300500000, 3049 SAFE
HARBOR ROAD, MANOR
TOWNSHIP, LANCASTER, PA,
et al,
Defendants.
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 17-723
App. 35
TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS
PIPE LINE COMPANY, LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
PERMANENT EASEMENT
FOR 1.02 ACRES AND TEMPORARY EASEMENTS FOR
1.65 ACRES IN WEST
HEMPFIELD TOWNSHIP,
LANCASTER COUNTY,
PENNSYLVANIA, TAX PARCEL NUMBER 3000462100000,
et al,
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 17-1725
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Schmel J. [J.L.S]
I.
August 23, 2017
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff, Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Company,
LLC (“Transco”), is involved in a project to construct
and operate a natural gas pipeline running through
five states, including a portion of Lancaster County,
Pennsylvania. Before the Court is the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment of Plaintiff in the four of the
five above-captioned cases.1 Defendant/landowners
1
On July 7, 2017, this Court granted Plaintiff ’s Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment in case number 17-1725 as unopposed, but declined to grant Plaintiff ’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction as to the landowners in that matter, the Adorers of the
Blood of Christ (“Adorers”). Accordingly, this opinion will address
App. 36
Hilltop Hollow Limited Partnership, Hilltop Hollow
Partnership, LLC, General Partner to Hilltop Hollow
Limited Partnership (“Hilltop”), Stephen Hoffman
(“Hoffman”), Blair and Megan Mohn (“Mohn”) and
Lynda Like (“Like”) all filed oppositions to Plaintiff ’s
Motions for Partial Summary Judgment. Plaintiff filed
replies, and argument was held on said motions.
Also before the Court is Transco’s Motions for Preliminary Injunction as to the four landowners above,
as well as Adorers of the Blood of Christ, United States
Province (“Adorers”). The landowners in question have
opposed Plaintiff ’s Motions for Preliminary Injunction, and an evidentiary hearing was held on said motions. For the following reasons, I find that Plaintiff has
the substantive right to condemn the properties in
question and Plaintiff ’s Motions for Partial Summary
Judgment are granted. Further, I find that Plaintiff
has the right to immediate possession of the properties
in question and Plaintiff ’s Motions for Preliminary Injunction are granted.
II.
MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.
the Motions for Partial Summary Judgment in case numbers 17715, 17-720, 17-722, and 17-723. It will also dispose of the Motion
for Preliminary Injunction in those four cases, as well as 17-1725.
App. 37
R. Civ. Proc. 56(c). “A motion for summary judgment
will not be defeated by ‘the mere existence’ of some disputed facts, but will be denied when there is a genuine
issue of material fact,” Am. Eagle Outfitters v. Lyle &
Scott Ltd., 584 F.3d 575, 581 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-248
(1986)). A fact is “material” if proof of its existence or
non-existence might affect the outcome of the litigation, and a dispute is “genuine” if “the evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
In undertaking this analysis, the court views the
facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party. “After making all reasonable inferences in the
nonmoving party’s favor, there is a genuine issue of
material fact if a reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party.” Pignataro v. Port Auth. of N.Y. and N.J.,
593 F.3d 265, 268 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Reliance Ins. Co.
v. Moessner, 121 F.3d 895, 900 (3d Cir. 1997)). While the
moving party bears the initial burden of showing the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact, meeting
this obligation shifts the burden to the non-moving
party who must “set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S.
at 250.
B. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On March 31, 2015, Transco filed an application
with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(“FERC”) under section 7(c) of the Natural Gas Act, 15
App. 38
U.S.C. § 717f(c), and Part 157 of the FERC’s regulations for a certificate of public convenience and necessity for its project to construct and operate a natural
gas pipeline in Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia,
North Carolina and South Carolina. On October 22,
2015, FERC mailed a letter to affected landowners, describing the project and inviting them to participate in
the environmental review process. (FERC Order, ¶ 68.)
On May 5, 2016, FERC issued a draft Environmental
Impact Statement, setting a public comment period
from May 12, 2016 to June 27, 2016. (FERC Order,
¶ 72.) FERC staff held four public comment meetings
between June 13 and 16, 2016, at which over 200
speakers commented. (Id.) FERC also received over
560 written comments in response to the draft EIS.
(Id.)
On October 13, 2016, FERC sent a letter to landowners regarding two alternative pipeline routes, and
allowed a special 30 day comment period, during which
time it received 25 letters regarding the proposed alternatives. (FERC Order, ¶ 73.) On November 3, 2016,
FERC issued for comment a draft General Conformity
Determination. (FERC Order, ¶ 74.) On December 30,
2016, FERC issued a final Environmental Impact
Statement. (FERC Order, ¶ 75.) Thereafter, on February 3, 2017, FERC issued an order granting Transco a
certificate of public convenience and necessity to construct, install, modify, operate, and maintain the Project known as the Atlantic Sunrise pipeline. (David
Sztroin Declaration, ¶ 13.) In order to construct, install, operate and maintain the FERC-approved
App. 39
project, Transco needs to obtain rights of way as described and depicted as Exhibit A attached to the Complaint in each of the above matters and as Exhibit B
attached to the Sztroin declaration. (Sztroin Dec., ¶ 2,
17.) These rights of way conform to the pipeline route
reviewed and approved by the FERC in the order of
February 3, 2017. (Sztroin Dec., ¶ 18.) The value of the
Rights of Way sought in each of the above matters is
claimed by the respective Landowners to be in excess
of $3,000, as each Landowner has rejected an offer by
Transco to purchase the rights of way for more than
$3,000. (Declaration of Aaron Blair, ¶¶ 8, 9.)
The FERC Certificate lists timely and untimely intervenors. To be considered a timely intervenor, a landowner was required to file a motion to intervene within
two weeks of April 15, 2015, when notice of Transco’s
application was published in the Federal Register.
Landowner Stephen Hoffman timely intervened and
Gary and Michelle Erb (owners of Hilltop Hollow) also
intervened, albeit untimely, in the FERC proceeding as
party intervenors. (FERC Order, Appendix A and B.)
Although they did not intervene in the FERC proceedings, Landowners Blair and Megan Mohn and Lynda
Like submitted comments to FERC regarding the project during the public comment period.
C. DISCUSSION
The Natural Gas Act permits the holder of a certificate of public convenience and necessity issued by
FERC to use eminent domain to acquire rights of way
App. 40
necessary to construct, operate and maintain a project
as approved by the FERC Order. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h).
Courts have held that the NGA authorizes a party to
exercise the federal power of eminent domain if it
meets the three-prong test set forth in the statute:
1)
The party must hold a FERC Certificate of
Public Convenience and Necessity;
2)
The party has not been able to acquire the
property rights required to construct, operate
and maintain a FERC-approved pipeline by
agreement with the landowners; and
3)
The value of the property sought to be condemned is more than $3,000.
Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. 1.01 Acres, 768
F.3d 300, 304 (3d Cir. 2014); Steckman Ridge GP, LLC
v. An Exclusive Natural Gas Storage Easement Beneath 11.078 Acres, No. 08-168, 2008 WL 4346405, at
*12-*13 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 2008); Alliance Pipeline L.P.
v. 4.360 Acres of Land, 746 F.3d 362, 364 (8th Cir. 2014);
Millennium Pipeline Co., L.L.C. v. Certain Permanent
and Temporary Easements, 777 F.Supp.2d 475, 479
(W.D. N.Y. 2011); aff ’d 552 F.App’x 37 (2d Cir. 2014).
In the above matters, there is no dispute that
Transco holds a FERC certificate, that it has been unable to acquire the property rights in question to construct, operate and maintain the FERC-approved
pipeline by agreement with the landowners, and that
the value of the properties in question is greater than
$3,000. However, the landowners have opposed the entry of partial summary judgment in this matter and
App. 41
present several arguments in opposition to Transco’s
exercise of eminent domain. Landowners Hilltop and
Hoffman argue that they have been denied their due
process rights under the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and that Plaintiff therefore
does not have the authority to condemn the Rights of
Way. Landowners Like and Mohn argue that the FERC
order is a “conditioned” order without “force or effect”
and that the Rights of Way being condemned exceed
the scope of the FERC order. As discussed below, I find
that all of these arguments are unpersuasive. Landowners cannot establish any genuine issue of material
fact as to the three conditions set forth in the Natural
Gas Act required prior to the exercise of eminent domain by Transco; therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to the
entry of partial summary judgment in this matter.
1. HILLTOP HOLLOW AND HOFFMAN
Hilltop Hollow and Hoffman (“Hilltop”) do not dispute the fact that Transco has a FERC certificate, has
been unable to acquire the rights of way that it needs
to construct its pipeline, and that the value of the property in question is over $3,000. Rather, Hilltop argues
that its due process rights under the Fifth Amendment
are being violated.
First, Hilltop argues that this Court has jurisdiction in this matter beyond the issue of fair compensation. Hilltop admits that “FERC’s procedures and the
Natural Gas Act provide that substantive challenges
to the Certificate Order be directed in the first instance
App. 42
to FERC,” but then argues that the “importance of
Hilltop’s right to due process and the de facto finality
of the proposed taking,” should overrule the FERC provisions that prohibit substantive challenges in this
Court.2
This argument is incorrect. Hilltop’s claims of due
process violations are in fact attacks on the FERC order itself, disguised as constitutional claims. It is
widely accepted that the validity of a FERC Order can
only be challenged in front of FERC, and then in the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. It is important that this precedent be
followed so large pipeline projects cannot be challenged in many forums, so as to establish a sole final
arbiter for the decisions. In Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co.
v. 104 Acres of Land More of Less, 749 F.Supp. 427
(D.R.I. 1990), the court set forth the limitations of a
federal district court in reviewing FERC Certificates of
Public Convenience and Necessity pursuant to the
Natural Gas Act. It stated:
United States District Courts have a limited
scope of review under Section 7(h) of the Natural Gas Act. Disputes over the reasons and
procedure for issuing certificates of public
convenience and necessity must be brought to
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
2
I note that Hilltop also argues that since FERC presently
has only one member, it lacks a quorum to address its request for
rehearing. However, on August 3, 2017, the United States Senate
confirmed two additional members of FERC. Therefore, FERC
now has a quorum and this argument of Hilltop is moot and will
be disregarded.
App. 43
for hearing. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(b). The District
Court’s role is to evaluate the scope of the certificate and to order condemnation of property
as authorized in the certificate. See Williams
Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma City, 890 F.2d
255, 262 (10th Cir.1989) (“Judicial review . . .
is exclusive in the courts of appeals once the
FERC certificate issues.”), cert denied, 497
U.S. 1003, 110 S.Ct. 3236, 111 L.Ed.2d 747
(1990); Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp.
v. 118 Acres of Land, 745 F.Supp. 366
(E.D.La.1990) (“review of FERC orders are to
be made only to United States Circuit Courts
of Appeal”). District Courts, therefore, are limited to jurisdiction to order condemnation of
property in accord with a facially valid certificate. Questions of the propriety or validity of
the certificate must first be brought to the
Commission upon an application for rehearing and the Commissioner’s action thereafter
may be reviewed by a United States Court of
Appeals.
Id. at 430. See also Steckman Ridge GP, LLC v. An Exclusive Nat. Gas Storage Easement Beneath 11.078
Acres, 2008 WL 4346405, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 2008)
(“Under the statutory framework, there is no appeal of
a FERC decision save to the appropriate Court of Appeals. Disputes as to the propriety of FERC’s proceedings, findings, orders, or reasoning, must be brought to
FERC by way of request for rehearing. Appeals may
thereafter be brought before a U.S. Court of Appeals
only.”)
App. 44
Clearly, abundant case law states that the jurisdiction of this court in this type of proceeding is to order condemnation only. Hilltop has failed to cite any
case that supports its proposition that this Court has
jurisdiction in this matter to independently address
the validity of the FERC order. Therefore, I find that
this Court lacks the jurisdiction to address any sort
of attack on the FERC order itself, constitutional or
otherwise.
Next, Hilltop argues that it has not been afforded
its due process right to challenge whether the project
serves a public purpose. It is undisputed in this matter
that Hilltop participated in the pre-deprivation hearing, filed a request for rehearing a FERC, and filed a
challenge to the FERC order in the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
As discussed above, this is the proper forum in which
to challenge the validity of a FERC order. Although
Hilltop’s request for rehearing is pending in front of
FERC, the NGA provides that the filing of a request
for rehearing shall not, unless specifically ordered by
FERC, operate as a stay of the certificate order. 15
U.S.C. § 717r(c); see Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 749 F.Supp.
at 431 (“Applications for rehearing by three public utility companies are presently before the commission.
However, the Natural Gas Act directs that an application for a rehearing shall not operate as a stay of the
Commission’s order unless specifically ordered by the
Commission or by a reviewing Court of Appeals.”)
Hilltop received adequate due process at the
FERC level, and on appeal. Its attempt to claim due
App. 45
process violations to this Court is a collateral attack to
the FERC order, which is not permitted. Any challenge
to the substance and/or validity of the order belongs in
front of FERC. “The district court’s function under the
statute is not appellate, but rather, to provide for enforcement.” Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. +/- 0.14
Acres of Land, 2016 WL 3189010 at *2 (M.D. Fl. June
8, 2016).
Further, the specific collateral attack that Hilltop
presents here, i.e., that the FERC order does not serve
a public purpose, has been rejected by other courts. See
Constitution Pipeline Co., LLC v. A Permanent Easement for 1.52 Acres, 2015 WL 12556149, at *3 (N.D.N.Y.
Feb. 26, 2015) (“[D]efendants argue that the FERC Order does not support a public purpose . . . plaintiff correctly points put that once a FERC certificate is issued,
judicial review of the FERC certificate itself is only
available in the circuit court.”). In addition, to the extent Hilltop is arguing that the process by which FERC
granted the certificate is deficient, that type of attack
has also been rejected. See Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co. v. 104
Acres of Land, 749 F.Supp. at 430 (finding that disputes over the procedures for issuing certificates of
public convenience and necessity must be brought to
the FERC for rehearing, and thereafter to a federal
court of appeals).
In addition, I find that even if this Court did have
jurisdiction to consider Hilltop’s constitutional arguments, which it does not, no due process violations
App. 46
have occurred. Hilltop presents two arguments regarding their constitutional due process rights.3 First, they
argue that due process requires an in-person evidentiary hearing prior to the issuance of the FERC order,
or prior to condemnation. Second, they argue that
FERC’s issuance of a Tolling Order which extends
FERC’s time to decide Hilltop’s request for rehearing
and a stay violates their due process rights, will address both arguments below.
First, reject Defendant’s argument that due process requires an in-person evidentiary hearing before
a FERC order can be issued. In the instant matter,
FERC issued the Order after a “paper hearing,” meaning Hilltop and other affected landowners submitted
written objections during the certificate review and
comment period, Hilltop claims that it is entitled to an
in-person hearing on this matter, and argues that the
lack of such a hearing violates its right to be heard.
However, the NGA does not require an in-person evidentiary hearing. “FERC’s choice whether to hold an
evidentiary hearing is generally discretionary.” Blumenthal v. FERC, 613 F.3d 1142, 1144 (D.C.Cir.2010).
“In general, FERC must hold an evidentiary hearing
only when a genuine issue of material fact exists, and
even then, FERC need not conduct such a hearing if
[the disputed issues] may be adequately resolved on
3
Hilltop also argues that because FERC lacks a quorum,
they have no effective means to challenge the FERC Order, and
its due process rights are therefore being violated, As discussed
above, FERC has a quorum as of August 3, 2017, Therefore, this
argument is moot.
App. 47
the written record.” Cajun Elec. Power Coop., Inc. v.
FERC, 28 F.3d 173, 177 (D.C.Cir.1994) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). See also Minisink Residents for Envtl. Pres. &
Safety v. F.E.R.C., 762 F.3d 97, 114 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
Clearly, FERC was not required to hold an in-person
evidentiary hearing in this matter, and the fact that
they granted the Order after a paper hearing does not
result in a due process violation.
In addition, federal courts have found that, for
purposes of a taking, due process only requires that
reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard is
provided in the compensation stage of the proceedings.
See Collier v. City of Springdale, 733 F.2d 1311, 1314
(8th Cir. 1984); Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464
F.3d 480, 489 (4th Cir. 2006).4
Next, Hilltop argues that FERC’s tolling order deprives them of their due process rights because it “indefinitely” extends FERC’s “time limit to rule on
[Landowners’] Motion for Rehearing and stay.” In response, Transco argues that the issuance of the Tolling
Order does not deprive Hilltop of a protectable due process, and therefore it is not entitled to due process protections. I find Transco is correct. Although a cause of
action constitutes a protectable property interest for
4
I find that Hilltop’s reliance on Brody v. Village of Port
Chester, 434 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2005) and Finberg v. Sullivan, 634
F.2d 50 (3d Cir. 1980) in support of their argument that they are
entitled to a pre-deprivation judicial hearing is misplaced, as neither case addresses a taking under the Natural Gas Act and both
are clearly distinguishable from the instant set of facts.
App. 48
the purposes of evaluation of due process violations,
mere delays in the adjudication of a claim do not
amount to a deprivation of property. See Council of &
for the Bline of Delaware Cty. Valley, Inc. v. Regan, 709
F.2d 1521, 1533-34 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“In order to state a
legally cognizable constitutional claim, appellants
must allege more than the deprivation of the expectation that the agency will carry out its duties.”) (emphasis in original); see also Polk v. Kramarsky, 711 F.2d
505, 508-09 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding that plaintiff ’s property right, while delayed, was not extinguished, and
that no deprivation of property interest occurred). The
reconstituted FERC, now with a quorum to act, has the
ability to address Hilltop and the other landowners’
claims for relief. Accordingly, Hilltop’s due process
claims must fail.
2. LIKE AND MOHN
Landowners Lynda Like and Brian and Megan
Mohn (“Like and Mohn”) do not dispute that FERC issued an order granting a certificate of public convenience and necessity, that the value of the rights of way
sought exceed $3,000, that Transco has been unable to
obtain the Rights of Way in question from the landowners, and that the Rights of Way being condemned conform to the pipeline route that was contained in the
FERC order. Accordingly, they are clearly unable to
present any genuine issues of material fact regarding
Transco’s substantive right to condemn. Like and
Mohn instead argue that the FERC order is a “conditional order” that is “without force and effect” and that
App. 49
the rights of way being condemned exceed the scope of
the FERC order. I find both of these arguments to be
unpersuasive.
Like and Mohn argue that FERC can condition a
FERC order on “reasonable terms and conditions” as
the public convenience and necessity may require pursuant to the NGA. They further argue that because the
FERC order for the project in this matter incorporated
many conditions, some of which have not yet been met,
Transco is not permitted to exercise eminent domain.
However, the NGA does not contain a requirement that
the holder of a FERC certificate satisfy all conditions
of said certificate prior to the exercise of eminent domain. Rather, the FERC order specifically stated that
“[o]nce a natural gas company obtains a certificate of
public convenience and necessity, it may exercise the
right of eminent domain in a U.S. District Court or a
state court.” FERC Order, ¶ 67. Courts have repeatedly
rejected similar arguments that a pipeline company
cannot exercise eminent domain because a FERC Order is conditioned. See, e.g., Constitution Pipeline, 2015
WL 12556145, at *2 (rejecting argument that pipeline
company could not exercise eminent domain until it
had obtained certain permits required prior to construction as conditions of the certificate order because
the FERC had not expressly made such permits a condition to exercising eminent domain); Columbia Gas
Transmission, LLC v. 370.393 Acres, 2014 WL 5092880,
at *4 (D. Md. Oct. 9, 2014) (rejecting argument that
pipeline company had failed to comply with certain
conditions listed in the FERC certificate arid finding
App. 50
that claims that a company is not in compliance with
the FERC certificate must be brought to FERC, not the
court); Portland Natural Gas Transmission Sys. v. 4.83
Acres, 26 F.Supp.2d 332, 336 (D.N.H. 1998) (“Compliance with FERC conditions cannot be used as a defense to the right of eminent domain and cannot be
cited to divest the court of the authority to grant immediate entry and possession to the holder of a FERC
certificate); Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co. v. 104 Acres of Land,
749 F.Supp. 427, 433 (D.R.I. 1990) (holding that “requirements in the FERC order arise after ownership of
the rights of way are obtained and do not operate as a
shield against the exercise of eminent domain power”).
Like and Mohn cite Delaware Dept. of Natural Resources and Environmental Control v. FERC, 558 F.3d
575, 579 (D.D.C. 2009), and Ruby Pipeline, L.L.C., 133
FERC ¶ 61015, at 61055 (2010), for the proposition
that Transco cannot condemn the property in question
based on the FERC order because it is “an incipent authorization without force or effect.” However, neither of
these cases supports the landowners’ argument that a
pipeline company cannot exercise eminent domain if
the certificate order contains conditions. Rather, both
Delaware Dept. of Natural Resources and Ruby Pipeline address the fact that conditioned certificate orders
do not authorize construction to start.
The FERC certificate in question does, in fact, contain prerequisite conditions, some of which remain unmet at this time. However, the landowners do not cite
to, nor have I located, any case that holds that
Transco’s exercise of eminent domain is prohibited
App. 51
until the conditions in the FERC certificate are met,
Lacking any such case law, I will not order such an extreme outcome. It is true that there are conditions in
the FERC certificate that Transco will need to meet
prior to commencing actual construction of the pipeline, but the fulfillment of these conditions is not a prerequisite to Transco’s exercise of eminent domain.
Furthermore, those conditions must be met before any
construction begins.
Like and Mohn also argue that the rights of way
being condemned exceed the scope of the FERC order.
In particular, Like and Mohn take issue with the fact
that the Complaint states Transco seeks to acquire
rights of way that include the right to “alter, repair,
change the size of, replace and remove” the pipeline.
Complaint, ¶1(f ). At oral argument in this matter,
counsel for the landowners indicated a particular concern with the language that allows Transco to “change
the size of ” the pipeline, arguing that this would allow
Transco to expand the pipeline beyond the right of way
authorized by the FERC order. This argument is
clearly incorrect, because the description of the rights
of way in the Complaints in these matters expressly
limits the rights of way being condemned to those
rights “approved by the Order of the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission dated February 3, 2017,
Docket No. CP15 138 000, 158 FERC ¶ 61,125 (2017).”
Based upon this description, the rights of way that are
being condemned in this matter are not subject to being increased in size. However, out of an abudance of
caution, I will limit the rights being sought by Transco
App. 52
in this regard to the right to alter, repair, change but
not increase the size of, replace and remove the
pipeline.
III. MOTIONS FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
A. LEGAL STANDARD
Once Transco has established that it has a substantive right to condemn the property at issue, a court
“may exercise equitable power to grant the remedy of
immediate possession through the issuance of a preliminary injunction” pursuant to Rule 65 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. E. Tenn. Natural Gas Co. v.
Sage, 361 F.3d 808, 828 (4th Cir. 2004). A party seeking
a preliminary injunction must prove four factors: 1) a
reasonable probability of success on the merits; 2) irreparable harm to the movant in the absence of relief;
3) granting the preliminary injunction will not result
in greater harm to the nonmoving party; and 4) the
public interest favors granting the injunction. American Exp. Travel Related Services, Inc. v. SidamonEristoff, 669 F.3d 359, 366 (3d Cir. 2012). In Reilly v.
City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 2017), the
Third Circuit recently clarified the preliminary injunction standard:
A movant for preliminary equitable relief
must meet the threshold for the first two
“most critical” factors: it must demonstrate
that it can win on the merits (which requires
a showing significantly better than negligible
but not necessarily more likely than not) and
App. 53
that it is more likely than not to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief. If these gateway factors are met, a court
then considers the remaining two factors and
determines in its sound discretion if all four
factors, taken together, balance in favor of
granting the requested preliminary relief.
Reilly, 858 F.3d at 179.
B. DISCUSSION
After analysis of the four factors set forth above
with regard to the five landowners currently before me,
I find that the factors favor the entry of a preliminary
injunction in favor of Transco.
1. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
First, Transco has already succeeded on the merits. A preliminary injunction in a condemnation case is
unlike preliminary injunctions in other types of civil
matters because the plaintiff requests a decision on the
merits of the matter at the same time. As explained by
the Third Circuit:
This is not a “normal” preliminary injunction,
where the merits will await another day. In
those situations, the probability of success is
not a certainty such that weighing the other
factors is paramount. Here, there is no remaining merits issue; we have ruled that Columbia has the right to the easements by
eminent domain. The only issue is the amount
App. 54
of just compensation – which will definitely be
determined on remand, but the result of
which can have no affect [sic] on Columbia’s
rights to the easement.
Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. 1.01 Acres, 768
F.3d at 315. Further, all three Pennsylvania district
courts within the Third Circuit have held that the
grant of a preliminary injunction is appropriate when
a FERC certificate holder has established the substantive right to condemn a property, subject to a future
determination of just compensation. Constitution Pipeline Company, LLC v. A Permanent Easement for 1.92
Acres, 2015 WL 1219524 at *4 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 2015);
Steckman Ridge, 2008 WL 4346405, at *18; Columbia
Gas Transmission Corp. v. An Easement, 2006 WL
401850, at *3. Therefore, given my determination
above that Transco has the substantive right to condemn the properties at issue, the likelihood of success
on the merits has been established. Accordingly, this
factor favors Transco.
2. Irreparable Harm
Second, Transco will suffer irreparable harm if a
preliminary injunction is not granted. In their opposition to the preliminary injunction, the defendants
make several arguments. They argue that the project
in question is already delayed and will not be completed in time for the 2017-18 winter heating season,
that the project still has numerous conditions that
need to be satisfied before construction can begin, so
the timeliness of the project does not depend on
App. 55
immediate possession of the properties in question and
that the monetary losses Transco will incur if the project is delayed do not constitute irreparable harm.
These arguments are insufficient to defeat the
claims of irreparable harm put forth by Transco. First,
Transco argues that a construction delay itself is irreparable harm and it cannot even begin construction in
Pennsylvania until it has survey access and has satisfied relevant pre-construction conditions. Numerous
courts have agreed that construction delays in building
these types of pipelines constitute irreparable harm.
See, e.g., Constitution Pipeline Co. v. A Permanent Easement for 0.42 Acres, 2015 WL 12556145, at *5 (holding
that pipeline company would be irreparably harmed
without immediate possession because it would be unable to begin construction in time to allow the project
to be completed by the in service date); Steckman
Ridge, 2008 WL 436405, at *17 (holding that pipeline
company would be irreparably harmed without immediate possession because it would suffer undue delay
and be in non-compliance with the in service date required by the FERC Certificate). Admittedly, Transco
has already missed the deadline to have the pipeline
in service by the 2017-18 winter heating season as contained in the Order. (Sztroin testimony, July 17, 2017.)
However, Transco argues that the date the pipeline
will commence operation will continue to be pushed
back if possession is not granted by August 18, 2017.
Mr. Sztroin testified that every delay has a “domino effect” that delays the entire project further.
App. 56
Further, Mr. Sztroin testified that Transco must
have possession by August 18, 2017 in order to avoid
specific construction delays. According to Mr. Sztroin,
possession is necessary so Transco can complete surveys that are required to satisfy certain pre-construction conditions. In addition, he testified that
construction is limited in some places by environmental conditions. In order to complete construction and
ensure compliance with shipper contracts, he testified
that Transco must have possession by August 18, 2017,
to complete the surveys necessary on endangered and
threatened wildlife that can only be done during certain times each year.
In addition, Transco argues that it will suffer irreparable harm in the manner of monetary loss if a
preliminary injunction is not granted. Transco alleges
that non-possession of the properties at issue here will
cause it to lose $500,000 per month, and will delay revenue of $33,000,000 per month, This argument was
supported by the testimony of Mr. Sztroin. Further,
Sztroin testified about the costs of “move-arounds” in
linear pipeline construction if crews cannot access a
particular property.
I find that Transco has sufficiently proven that it
will suffer irreparable harm if it does not obtain possession of the properties at issue. As recently stated by
the Honorable Matthew W. Brann of the U.S. District
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, in addressing different properties located along the same
pipeline project:
App. 57
In sum, the Atlantic Sunrise Project is large
in both scope and geography, spanning five
states. “The magnitude of the Project requires
a complex and coordinated construction process, with work activities being performed in
sequential phases.” Sabal Trail Transmission,
LLC v. +/- 0.41 Acres of Land in Hamilton Cty.
Florida, 2016 WL 3188985, at * 3 (M.D. Fla.
June 8, 2016). Each piece of the construction
puzzle depends on the prior piece timely
placed. Untimeliness in one small part of this
enormous project would result in a domino effect on the timeliness of all other areas of the
project.
Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Company, LLC v. Permanent Easement for 3.70 Acres, No. 17-CV-628, Memorandum Opinion, ECF no. 27 (M.D. Pa., Aug. 9, 2017).
The irreparable harm factor weighs strongly in favor
of Transco.
3. Harm to the Nonmoving Party
Granting Transco’s preliminary injunction will
not result in greater harm to the landowner, despite
Defendants’ arguments to the contrary. As determined
above, Transco has the substantive right to possession.
Therefore, Transco will eventually obtain possession of
the properties at issue; the only question is the timing
of possession. It is natural for some landowners to
want to delay possession as long as possible, but there
is no legal basis for further delay. As stated by the
Court in Constitution Pipeline Co., 2015 WL 12556145,
at *5, “[a]ny injury to defendant will arise from the
App. 58
[Natural Gas Act] and the FERC Order, and will occur
regardless of whether the Court grants a preliminary
injunction to [the pipeline company]. In the exercise of
its discretion, the Court finds that the harm alleged by
defendants weighs less heavily than the harms alleged
by plaintiff.” Constitution Pipeline Co., 2015 WL
12556145, at *5. “Nothing indicates that the defendants will suffer any greater harm by allowing [the
pipeline company] to possess the property immediately
instead of after trial and the determination of just compensation.” Columbia Gas Transmission LLC v. 0.85
Acres, 2014 WL 4471541, at *7.
Defendants Like and Mohn argue that they face a
risk of harm because the project lacks certain permits
and if their property is taken and the permits are eventually denied, they will have lost their property with
no means to recover it. I find this contention to be incorrect, as the landowners would have legal recourse if
this unlikely event would occur. See USG Pipeline Co.
v. 1.74 Acres, 1 F.Supp.2d 816, 825-26 (E.D. Tenn. 1998)
(granting immediate possession because even if the
FERC Order is overturned by FERC or some other
court with jurisdiction over it, the properties could be
restored substantially to their prior condition and
landowners could seek damages in trespass.) Like and
Mohn also argue that they will be irreparably harmed
because Plaintiff may mobilize its equipment on their
properties and remove trees prior to construction approval. This argument is unpersuasive, because this
conduct will either occur now or after just compensation has been determined. I find this alleged harm to
App. 59
be outweighed by Plaintiff ’s risk of harm in not obtaining immediate possession.
Defendant Adorers argue they will suffer harm
that implicates their fundamental rights to free exercise of religion and ownership of property if Transco is
granted immediate possession. Adorers claim that they
“exercise their religious beliefs by, among other things,
coxing for and protecting the land they own,” and that
their efforts to “preserve the sacredness of God’s
Earth” are integral to the practice of their faith. However, the Adorers have failed to establish how Transco’s
possession of the right of way on their land will in any
way affect their ability to practice their faith and
spread their message. They have not presented one
piece of evidence that demonstrates how their religious
beliefs will be abridged in any way. Clearly, the harm
alleged by Transco outweighs this harm alleged by the
Adorers. Additionally, Transco will post sufficient
bonds upon the grant of the preliminary injunction;
therefore, any amount of money damages any landowner may suffer will be secure and a remedy will be
available. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of
Transco.
4. Public Interest
Lastly, granting the preliminary injunction is in
the public interest, as the project will provide the general public throughout a vast area of the country with
access to the Marcellus Shale natural gas supplies for
heating their homes and other purposes. Defendants
App. 60
Hilltop and Hoffman argue that much of the natural
gas that will be carried by the pipeline is intended for
exportation, and therefore, not in the public interest.
However, this argument is speculative. Hilltop argues
that 87% of the Project’s capacity is currently subscribed to by four gas production companies that will
have direct access to export facilities, but the mere fact
that these companies will have access to export facilities does not mean that they will in fact export the natural gas out of the country. This argument is too
speculative for me to find that this factor weighs in favor of the landowners.
“Congress passed the Natural Gas Act and gave
gas companies condemnation power to insure that consumers would have access to an adequate supply of
natural gas at reasonable prices.” E. Tennessee Nat.
Gas Co. v. Sage, 361 F.3d at 830, citing Clark v. Gulf Oil
Corp., 570 F.2d 1138, 1145-46 (3d Cir. 1977). Congress
and FERC have found that interstate natural gas projects, and this project in particular, are in the public
interest. Accordingly, this factor also weighs in favor of
Transco.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff ’s Motions
for Partial Summary Judgment and for Preliminary
Injunction are granted. Plaintiff shall post a bond with
the Clerk of Court for each property in accordance with
the Court’s Order. Appropriate orders will follow.
App. 61
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT
OF PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
:
:
:
Plaintiff,
: CIVIL ACTION –
:
LAW
v.
:
Docket No.
PERMANENT EASEMENTS
: 5:17-CV-00715
FOR 2.14 ACRES AND TEMPO- :
RARY EASEMENTS FOR 3.59
:
ACRES IN CONESTOGA TOWN- :
SHIP, LANCASTER COUNTY,
:
PENNSYLVANIA, TAX PARCEL :
NUMBER 1201606900000, 415
:
HILLTOP DRIVE, CONESTOGA, :
CONESTOGA TOWNSHIP,
:
LANCASTER COUNTY, PA
:
:
HILLTOP HOLLOW
:
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
:
203 SIDEHILL TERRACE
:
WILLOW STREET, PA 17584
:
HILLTOP HOLLOW PARTNER- :
SHIP, LLC GENERAL PARTNER :
OF HILLTOP HOLLOW
:
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
:
203 SIDEHILL TERRACE
:
WILLOW STREET, PA 17584
:
TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS
PIPE LINE COMPANY, LLC
2800 POST OAK BOULEVARD
HOUSTON, TEXAS 77251-1396,
App. 62
LANCASTER FARMLAND
TRUST 125 LANCASTER
AVENUE
STRASBURG, PA 17579
AND ALL UNKNOWN
OWNERS,
Defendants.
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
ORDER
AND NOW, this 23rd day of August, 2017, upon
consideration of Plaintiff ’s Omnibus Motion for Preliminary Injunction for Possession of Rights of Way by
August 18, 2017 Pursuant to the Natural Gas Act and
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 71.1 and 65, and the
accompanying documents, Defendants’ opposition
thereto, and Plaintiff ’s Reply, and after a hearing and
oral argument being held, it is hereby ORDERED
that the Motion is GRANTED. It is further ORDERED as follows:
(1) Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Company,
LLC (“Transco”) has the substantive right to condemn
the following easements and rights of way (collectively
referred to as the “Rights of Way”):
a.
Permanent rights of way and easements of
2.14 acres, as described as “Area of Proposed
CPLS R/W #1,” “Area of Proposed CPLS R/W
#2,” and “Area of Proposed CPLS R/W #3” in
Exhibit A attached hereto, for the purpose of
constructing, operating, maintaining, altering, repairing, changing but not increasing
the size of, replacing and removing a pipeline
App. 63
and all related equipment and appurtenances
thereto (including but not limited to meters,
fittings, tie-overs, valves, cathodic protection
equipment, and launchers and receivers) for
the transportation of natural gas, or its byproducts, and other substances as approved
by the Order of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission dated February 3, 2017,
Docket No. CP15-138-000, 158 FERC ¶ 61,125
(2017), together with the right to construct,
maintain, operate, repair, alter, replace and
remove cathodic protection equipment and
the necessary appurtenances thereto, such as
but not limited to poles, guy wires, anchors,
rectifiers, power lines, cables, deep well anode
and anode ground beds under, upon, and over
the permanent right of way and easement,
and conducting all other activities as approved by the Order of the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission dated February 3,
2017, Docket No. CP15-138-000, 158 FERC
¶ 61,125 (2017); together with all rights and
benefits necessary or convenient for the full
enjoyment or use of the right of way and easement. Further, the landowner shall not build
any permanent structures on said permanent
right of way or any part thereof, will not
change the grade of said permanent right of
way, or any part thereof, will not plant trees
on said permanent right of way, or any part
thereof, or use said permanent right of way or
any part thereof for a road, or use said permanent right of way or any part thereof in such
a way as to interfere with Transco’s immediate and unimpeded access to said permanent
App. 64
right of way, or otherwise interfere with
Transco’s lawful exercise of any of the rights
herein granted without first having obtained
Transco’s approval in writing; and the landowner will not permit others to do any of said
acts without first having obtained Transco’s
approval in writing. Transco shall have the
right from time to time at no additional cost
to landowners to cut and remove all trees including trees considered as a growing crop, all
undergrowth and any other obstructions that
may injure, endanger or interfere with the
construction and use of said pipeline and all
related equipment and appurtenances
thereto; and
b.
Temporary easements of 3.59 acres, as described as “Area of Proposed Temporary Work
Space #1,” “Area of Proposed Temporary Work
Space #2,” Area of Proposed Temporary Work
Space #3,” “Area of Proposed Temporary Work
Space #4,” “Area of Proposed Temporary Work
Space #5,” and “Area of Proposed Temporary
Work Space #6” in Exhibit A attached hereto,
for use during the pipeline construction and
restoration period only for the purpose of ingress, egress and regress and to enter upon,
clear off and use for construction and all other
activities approved by the Order of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission dated
February 3, 2017, Docket No. CP15-138-000,
158 FERC ¶ 61,125 (2017).
(2) Upon filing the bond required below, beginning August 18, 2017, Transco is granted access to, possession of and entry to the Rights of Way for all
App. 65
purposes allowed under the Order of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission dated February 3, 2017,
Docket No. CP15-138-000, 158 FERC ¶ 61,125 (2017);
(3) In the event of a violation of this Order by Defendants, such as interference with Transco’s possession of the Rights of Way by Defendants or by third
parties who are authorized by Defendants to be on the
Property, the U. S. Marshal Service, or a law enforcement agency it designates, shall be authorized to investigate and to arrest, confine in prison and/or bring
before the Court any persons found to be in violation
of this Order and in contempt of this Order, pending
his/her compliance with the Court’s Order.
(4) Transco shall post a bond in the amount of
$70,710.00 as security for the payment of just compensation to Defendants.
(5) Transco shall record this Order in the Office
of the Recorder of Deeds for Lancaster County, Pennsylvania.
BY THE COURT
/s/ Jeffrey L. Schmehl
Jeffrey L. Schmehl, J.
App. 66
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT
OF PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
:
:
:
Plaintiff,
: CIVIL ACTION –
:
LAW
v.
:
Docket No.
PERMANENT EASEMENT FOR :
1.33 ACRES AND TEMPORARY : 5:17-CV-00720
EASEMENTS FOR 2.28 ACRES :
IN CONESTOGA TOWNSHIP,
:
LANCASTER COUNTY, PENN- :
SYLVANIA, TAX PARCEL
:
NUMBER 1202476100000,
:
4160 MAIN STREET,
:
CONESTOGA, PA 17516
:
:
LYNDA LIKE A/K/A LINDA
:
LIKE 4160 MAIN STREET
:
CONESTOGA, PA 17516
:
AND ALL UNKNOWN
:
OWNERS,
:
Defendants.
:
TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS
PIPE LINE COMPANY, LLC
2800 POST OAK BOULEVARD
HOUSTON, TEXAS 77251-1396,
ORDER
AND NOW, the 23rd day August, 2017, upon consideration of Plaintiff ’s Omnibus Motion for Preliminary Injunction for Possession of Rights of Way by
App. 67
August 18, 2017 Pursuant to the Natural Gas Act and
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 71.1 and 65, and the
accompanying documents, Defendant’s opposition
thereto, and Plaintiff ’s Reply, and after a hearing and
oral argument being held, it is hereby ORDERED
that the Motion is GRANTED. It is further ORDERED as follows:
(1) Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Company,
LLC (“Transco”) has the substantive right to condemn
the following easements and rights of way (collectively
referred to as the “Rights of Way”):
a.
A permanent right of way and easement of
1.33 acres, as described as “Area of Proposed
CPLS R/W” in Exhibit A attached hereto, for
the purpose of constructing, operating, maintaining, altering, repairing, changing but not
increasing the size of, replacing and removing
a pipeline and all related equipment and appurtenances thereto (including but not limited to meters, fittings, tie-overs, valves,
cathodic protection equipment, and launchers
and receivers) for the transportation of natural gas, or its byproducts, and other substances as approved by the Order of the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
dated February 3, 2017, Docket No. CP15-138000, 158 FERC ¶ 61,125 (2017), together with
a right of way and easement to construct,
maintain, operate, repair, alter, replace, and
remove cathodic protection equipment and
the necessary appurtenances thereto, such as
but not limited to poles, guy wires, anchors,
rectifiers, power lines, cables, deep well anode
App. 68
and anode ground beds under, upon, and over
the permanent access easement, and conducting all other activities as approved by the Order of the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission dated February 3, 2017, Docket
No. CP15-138-000, 158 FERC ¶ 61,125 (2017);
together with all rights and benefits necessary or convenient for the full enjoyment or
use of the right of way and easement. Further,
the landowner shall not build any permanent
structures on said permanent right of way or
any part thereof, will not change the grade of
said permanent right of way, or any part
thereof, will not plant trees on said permanent
right of way, or any part thereof, or use said
permanent right of way or any part thereof for
a road, or use said permanent right of way or
any part thereof in such a way as to interfere
with Transco’s immediate and unimpeded access to said permanent right of way, or otherwise interfere with Transco’s lawful exercise
of any of the rights herein granted without
first having obtained Transco’s approval in
writing; and the landowner will not permit
others to do any of said acts without first having obtained Transco’s approval in writing.
Transco shall have the right from time to time
at no additional cost to landowners to cut and
remove all trees including trees considered as
a growing crop, all undergrowth and any other
obstructions that may injure, endanger or interfere with the construction and use of said
pipeline and all related equipment and appurtenances thereto; and
App. 69
b.
Temporary easements of 2.28 acres, as described as “Area of Proposed Temporary Work
Space #1” and “Area of Proposed Temporary
Work Space #2” in Exhibit A attached hereto,
for use during the pipeline construction and
restoration period only for the purpose of ingress, egress and regress and to enter upon,
clear off and use for construction and all other
activities approved by the Order of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission dated
February 3, 2017, Docket No. CP15-138-000,
158 FERC ¶ 61,125 (2017).
(2) Upon filing the bond required below, beginning August 18, 2017, Transco is granted access to, possession of and entry to the Rights of Way for all
purposes allowed under the Order of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission dated February 3, 2017,
Docket No. CP15-138-000, 158 FERC ¶ 61,125 (2017);
(3) In the event of a violation of this Order by Defendants, such as interference with Transco’s possession of the Rights of Way by Defendants or by third
parties who are authorized by Defendants to be on the
Property, the U. S. Marshal Service, or a law enforcement agency it designates, shall be authorized to investigate and to arrest, confine in prison and/or bring
before the Court any persons found to be in violation
of this Order and in contempt of this Order, pending
his/her compliance with the Court’s Order.
(4) Transco shall post a bond in the amount of
$40,440.00 as security for the payment of just compensation to Defendants.
App. 70
(5) Transco shall record this Order in the Office
of the Recorder of Deeds for Lancaster County, Pennsylvania.
BY THE COURT
/s/ Jeffrey L. Schmehl
Jeffrey L. Schmehl, J.
App. 71
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT
OF PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
:
:
:
Plaintiff,
: CIVIL ACTION –
:
LAW
v.
:
Docket No.
PERMANENT EASEMENT FOR :
0.94 ACRES AND TEMPORARY : 5:17-CV-00722
EASEMENTS FOR 1.61 ACRES :
IN CONESTOGA TOWNSHIP,
:
LANCASTER COUNTY, PENN- :
SYLVANIA, TAX PARCEL
:
NUMBER 1203589400000,
:
SICKMAN MILL ROAD
:
BLAIR B. MOHN AND MEGAN :
E. MOHN 356 SAND HILL ROAD :
:
CONESTOGA, PA 17516
:
AND ALL UNKNOWN
:
OWNERS,
:
Defendants.
:
TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS
PIPE LINE COMPANY, LLC
2800 POST OAK BOULEVARD
HOUSTON, TEXAS 77251-1396,
ORDER
AND NOW, this 23rd day of August, 2017, upon
consideration of Plaintiff ’s Omnibus Motion for Preliminary Injunction for Possession of Rights of Way by
August 18, 2017 Pursuant to the Natural Gas Act and
App. 72
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 71.1 and 65, and the
accompanying documents, Defendants’ opposition
thereto, Plaintiff ’s Reply, and after a hearing and oral
argument being held, it is hereby ORDERED that the
Motion is GRANTED. It is further ORDERED as follows:
(1) Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Company,
LLC (“Transco”) has the substantive right to condemn
the following easements and rights of way (collectively
referred to as the “Rights of Way”):
a.
A permanent right of way and easement of
0.94 acres, as described as “Area of Proposed
CPLS R/W” in Exhibit A attached hereto, for
the purpose of constructing, operating, maintaining, altering, repairing, changing but not
increasing the size of, replacing and removing
a pipeline and all related equipment and appurtenances thereto (including but not limited to meters, fittings, tie-overs, valves,
cathodic protection equipment, and launchers
and receivers) for the transportation of natural gas, or its byproducts, and other substances as approved by the Order of the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
dated February 3, 2017, Docket No. CP15-138000, 158 FERC ¶ 61,125 (2017), together with
the right to construct, maintain, operate, repair, alter, replace and remove cathodic protection equipment and the necessary
appurtenances thereto, such as but not limited to poles, guy wires, anchors, rectifiers,
power lines, cables, deep well anode and anode ground beds under, upon, and over the
App. 73
permanent right of way and easement, and
conducting all other activities as approved by
the Order of the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission dated February 3, 2017, Docket
No. CP15-138-000, 158 FERC ¶ 61,125 (2017);
together with all rights and benefits necessary or convenient for the full enjoyment or
use of the right of way and easement. Further,
the landowner shall not build any permanent
structures on said permanent right of way or
any part thereof, will not change the grade of
said permanent right of way, or any part
thereof, will not plant trees on said permanent
right of way, or any part thereof, or use said
permanent right of way or any part thereof for
a road, or use said permanent right of way or
any part thereof in such a way as to interfere
with Transco’s immediate and unimpeded access to said permanent right of way, or otherwise interfere with Transco’s lawful exercise
of any of the rights herein granted without
first having obtained Transco’s approval in
writing; and the landowner will not permit
others to do any of said acts without first having obtained Transco’s approval in writing.
Transco shall have the right from time to time
at no additional cost to landowners to cut and
remove all trees including trees considered as
a growing crop, all undergrowth and any other
obstructions that may injure, endanger or interfere with the construction and use of said
pipeline and all related equipment and appurtenances thereto; and
b.
Temporary easements of 1.61 acres, as described as “Area of Proposed Temporary Work
App. 74
Space #1” and “Area of Proposed Temporary
Work Space #2” in Exhibit A attached hereto,
for use during the pipeline construction and
restoration period only for the purpose of ingress, egress and regress and to enter upon,
clear off and use for construction and all other
activities approved by the Order of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission dated
February 3, 2017, Docket No. CP15-138-000,
158 FERC ¶ 61,125 (2017).
(2) Upon filing the bond required below, beginning August 18, 2017, Transco is granted access to, possession of and entry to the Rights of Way for all
purposes allowed under the Order of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission dated February 3, 2017,
Docket No. CP15-138-000, 158 FERC ¶ 61,125 (2017);
(3) In the event of a violation of this Order by Defendants, such as interference with Transco’s possession of the Rights of Way by Defendants or by third
parties who are authorized by Defendants to be on the
Property, the U. S. Marshal Service, or a law enforcement agency it designates, shall be authorized to investigate and to arrest, confine in prison and/or bring
before the Court any persons found to be in violation
of this Order and in contempt of this Order, pending
his/her compliance with the Court’s Order.
(4) Transco shall post a bond in the amount of
$62,340.00 as security for the payment of just compensation to Defendants.
App. 75
(5) Transco shall record this Order in the Office
of the Recorder of Deeds for Lancaster County, Pennsylvania.
BY THE COURT
/s/ Jeffrey L. Schmehl
Jeffrey L. Schmehl, J.
App. 76
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT
OF PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
:
:
:
Plaintiff,
: CIVIL ACTION –
:
LAW
v.
:
Docket No.
PERMANENT EASEMENT FOR :
2.02 ACRES AND TEMPORARY : 5:17-CV-00723
EASEMENTS FOR 2.76 ACRES :
IN MANOR TOWNSHIP,
:
LANCASTER COUNTY,
:
PENNSYLVANIA, TAX PARCEL :
NUMBER 4100300500000,
:
3049 SAFE HARBOR ROAD,
:
MANOR TOWNSHIP,
:
LANCASTER, PA 17551
:
:
STEPHEN D. HOFFMAN
:
3049 SAFE HARBOR ROAD
:
MILLERSVILLE, PA 17551
:
AND ALL UNKNOWN
:
OWNERS,
:
Defendants.
:
TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS
PIPE LINE COMPANY, LLC
2800 POST OAK BOULEVARD
HOUSTON, TEXAS 77251-1396,
ORDER
AND NOW, this 23rd day of August, 2017, upon
consideration of Plaintiff ’s Omnibus Motion for
App. 77
Preliminary Injunction for Possession of Rights of Way
by August 18, 2017 Pursuant to the Natural Gas Act
and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 71.1 and 65, and
the accompanying documents, Defendant’s opposition
thereto, Plaintiff ’s Reply, and after a hearing and oral
argument being held, it is hereby ORDERED that the
Motion is GRANTED. It is further ORDERED as follows:
(1) Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Company,
LLC (“Transco”) has the substantive right to condemn
the following easements and rights of way (collectively
referred to as the “Rights of Way”):
a.
A permanent right of way and easement of
2.02 acres, as described as “Area of Proposed
CPLS R/W” in Exhibit A attached hereto, for
the purpose of constructing, operating, maintaining, altering, repairing, changing but not
increasing the size of, replacing and removing
a pipeline and all related equipment and appurtenances thereto (including but not limited to meters, fittings, tie-overs, valves,
cathodic protection equipment, and launchers
and receivers) for the transportation of natural gas, or its byproducts, and other substances as approved by the Order of the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
dated February 3, 2017, Docket No. CP15-138000, 158 FERC ¶ 61,125 (2017), together with
a right of way and easement to, construct,
maintain, operate, repair, alter, replace and
remove cathodic protection equipment and
the necessary appurtenances thereto, such as
but not limited to poles, guy wires, anchors,
App. 78
rectifiers, power lines, cables, deep well anode
and anode ground beds under, upon, and over
the permanent access easement, and conducting all other activities as approved by the Order of the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission dated February 3, 2017, Docket
No. CP15-138-000, 158 FERC ¶ 61,125 (2017);
together with all rights and benefits necessary or convenient for the full enjoyment or
use of the right of way and easement. Further,
the landowner shall not build any permanent
structures on said permanent right of way or
any part thereof, will not change the grade of
said permanent right of way, or any part
thereof, will not plant trees on said permanent
right of way, or any part thereof, or use said
permanent right of way or any part thereof for
a road, or use said permanent right of way or
any part thereof in such a way as to interfere
with Transco’s immediate and unimpeded access to said permanent right of way, or otherwise interfere with Transco’s lawful exercise
of any of the rights herein granted without
first having obtained Transco’s approval in
writing; and the landowner will not permit
others to do any of said acts without first having obtained Transco’s approval in writing.
Transco shall have the right from time to time
at no additional cost to landowners to cut and
remove all trees including trees considered as
a growing crop, all undergrowth and any other
obstructions that may injure, endanger or interfere with the construction and use of said
pipeline and all related equipment and appurtenances thereto; and
App. 79
b.
Temporary easements of 2.76 acres, as described as “Area of Proposed Temporary Work
Space #1” and “Area of Proposed Temporary
Work Space #2” in Exhibit A attached hereto,
for use during the pipeline construction and
restoration period only for the purpose of ingress, egress and regress and to enter upon,
clear off and use for construction and all other
activities approved by the Order of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission dated
February 3, 2017, Docket No. CP15-138-000,
158 FERC ¶ 61,125 (2017).
(2) Upon filing the bond required below, beginning August 18, 2017, Transco is granted access to, possession of and entry to the Rights of Way for all
purposes allowed under the Order of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission dated February 3, 2017,
Docket No. CP15-138-000, 158 FERC ¶ 61,125 (2017);
(3) In the event of a violation of this Order by Defendants, such as interference with Transco’s possession of the Rights of Way by Defendants or by third
parties who are authorized by Defendants to be on the
Property, the U. S. Marshal Service, or a law enforcement agency it designates, shall be authorized to investigate and to arrest, confine in prison and/or bring
before the Court any persons found to be in violation
of this Order and in contempt of this Order, pending
his/her compliance with the Court’s Order.
(4) Transco shall post a bond in the amount of
$41,910.00 as security for the payment of just compensation to Defendants.
App. 80
(5) Transco shall record this Order in the Office
of the Recorder of Deeds for Lancaster County, Pennsylvania.
BY THE COURT
/s/ Jeffrey L. Schmehl
Jeffrey L. Schmehl, J.
App. 81
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS
PIPE LINE COMPANY, LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
PERMANENT EASEMENTS
FOR 2.14 ACRES AND
TEMPORARY EASEMENTS
FOR 3.59 ACRES IN
CONESTOGA TOWNSHIP,
LANCASTER COUNTY,
PENNSYLVANIA; HILLTOP
HOLLOW LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP; HILLTOP
HOLLOW PARTNERSHIP,
LLC GENERAL PARTNER
OF HILLTOP HOLLOW
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP;
and LANCASTER
FARMLAND TRUST,
Defendants.
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
No. 5:17-cv-00715
App. 82
TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS
PIPE LINE COMPANY, LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
PERMANENT EASEMENT
FOR 2.02 ACRES AND
TEMPORARY EASEMENTS
FOR 2.76 ACRES IN MANOR
TOWNSHIP, LANCASTER
COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA;
and STEPHEN HOFFMAN,
Defendants.
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
No. 5:17-cv-00723
OPINION
Plaintiff ’s Omnibus Motion for
Preliminary Injunction – Denied
Joseph F. Leeson, Jr.
United States District Judge
I.
April 6, 2017
Introduction
Plaintiff Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Company,
LLC (“Transco”) is involved in a project to operate and
construct a natural gas pipeline running through five
states, including a portion of Lancaster County, Pennsylvania. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) issued a certificate on February 3, 2017, authorizing the construction and operation of the pipeline. Transco thereafter filed fourteen complaints in
condemnation in this Court seeking to acquire the
rights-of-way on Defendants’ properties. Presently
pending in two of these actions is Transco’s Omnibus
App. 83
Motion for Preliminary Injunction. For the reasons set
forth below, a determination as to whether Transco has
a right to condemn, which must be established before
the Court may grant injunctive relief, would be premature. Regardless, Transco has failed to show that it
will suffer irreparable harm because it may obtain access to Defendants’ property to conduct surveys pursuant to 26 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 309. The Omnibus Motion
for Preliminary Injunction is denied, but Transco will
be granted limited access pursuant to § 309.
II.
Legal Standard – Motion for Preliminary
Injunction
To prevail on a motion for a preliminary injunction, the moving party must show: (1) a likelihood of
success on the merits;1 (2) a likelihood of suffering
irreparable harm without the injunction;2 (3) the
1
For a natural gas company “to establish a right to condemn,
the following elements must be proved: (1) [the company] has
been issued a certificate of public convenience and necessity;
(2) [the company] has been unable to acquire the needed land by
contract with the Defendants; and (3) [t]he value of the subject
property claimed by the owner exceeds $ 3,000.00.” Steckman
Ridge GP, LLC v. Exclusive Nat. Gas Storage Easement Beneath
11.078 Acres, No. 08-168, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71302, at *39-40
(W.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 2008) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) of the Natural Gas Act of 1938 (NGA)).
2
“[O]f critical importance, ‘the irreparable harm requirement contemplates the inadequacy of alternate remedies available to the plaintiff.’ ” Contech Casting, LLC v. ZF Steering Sys.,
LLC, 931 F. Supp. 2d 809, 818 (E.D. Mich. 2013) (quoting Smith
& Nephew, Inc. v. Synthes (U.S.A.), 466 F. Supp. 2d 978, 982
(W.D. Tenn. 2006)). “[I]rreparable harm is not demonstrated
when there are available alternatives even when the alternatives
App. 84
balance of equities weighs in the moving party’s favor;
and (4) the public interest favors the injunction. Winter
v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
The moving party bears the burden of showing that
each of these four factors tips in its favor. Ferring
Pharm., Inc. v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 765 F.3d 205, 210
(3d Cir. 2014) (“The ‘failure to establish any element
. . . renders a preliminary injunction inappropriate.’ ”
(quoting NutraSweet Co. v. Vit-Mar Enters., Inc., 176
F.3d 151, 153 (3d Cir. 1999))). “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as a
matter of right,” Winter, 555 U.S. at 24, and is reserved
for “limited circumstances,” Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx
Corp. 369 F.3d 700, 708 (3d Cir. 2004).
III. Findings of Fact3
“In granting or refusing an interlocutory injunction, the court must . . . state the findings and conclusions that support its action,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(2),
which requires the court to “find the facts specially and
state its conclusions of law separately,” Fed. R. Civ. P.
52(a)(1). While “Rule 52 does not require hyper-literal
adherence,” findings of fact and conclusions of law
are less convenient.” Corbett v. United States, No. 10-14106, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38531, at *14 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 1, 2011).
3
These findings of fact, which are made after an independent
review of the record, including all exhibits and briefs filed in regard to the Omnibus Motion for Preliminary Injunction, are
drawn from the two sides’ proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. See No. 17-715, ECF Nos. 25, 28; No. 17-723, ECF
Nos. 18, 21.
App. 85
must be delineated in such a manner that does not
leave an appellate court “unable to discern what were
[the court’s] intended factual findings.” See In re Frescati Shipping Co., 718 F.3d 184, 197 (3d Cir. 2013); see
also 9C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2579 (3d ed. 2008) (“The
district court should state separately its findings of
fact and conclusions of law without commingling
them. . . .”). Accordingly, this Court’s findings of facts
pertinent to the disposition of Transco’s Motion follows.
1. Transco is an interstate natural gas transmission company that will be the operator of a proposed
natural gas pipeline that will cross Defendants’ respective properties. Sztroin Decl. ¶¶ 3, 6, ECF No. 6-6 (No.
17-715); Hoffman Aff. ¶¶ 5-7, 11, ECF No. 23 (No. 17723); Erb Aff. ¶¶ 6-7, ECF No. 30 (No. 17-715); Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co., 158 FERC ¶ 61,125
(Feb. 3, 2017) (hereinafter FERC Order).
2. Defendants Stephen and Dorothea Hoffman
reside at 3409 Safe Harbor Road, Manor Twp., Millersville, Lancaster County, PA 19551. They own approximately 110 acres and have lived there for
approximately 10 years. Hoffman Aff. ¶ 2.
3. The appraised value of the Hoffmans’ property
is $13,970. Pl.’s Hr’g Ex. 17.4
4
Plaintiff submitted additional exhibits in support of the
Omnibus Motions for Preliminary Injunction at the hearing on
March 20, 2017.
App. 86
4. Defendants Gary and Michelle Erb, the principals of Defendant Hilltop Hollow Limited Partnership, live at 415 Hilltop Rd., Conestoga Twp.,
Conestoga, Lancaster County, PA 17516. They own
about 72 acres and have lived there for approximately
seven years. The Erbs’ property is also enrolled in the
Lancaster Farmland Trust. Erb Aff. ¶ 2.
5. The appraised value of the property on Hilltop
Road is $23,570. Pl.’s Hr’g Ex. 17.
6. Transco’s proposed current route for the pipeline crosses both aforementioned properties, running
close to their homes. Hoffman Aff. ¶¶ 5-7, 11; Erb Aff.
¶¶ 6-7; FERC Order.
7. In 2015, Transco submitted an application under section 7(c) of the NGA, seeking a certificate of public convenience and necessity authorizing Transco to
construct and operate the pipeline project. FERC Order.
8. The project involves approximately 199.5 miles
of pipeline running through Pennsylvania, Maryland,
Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina. Sztroin
Decl. ¶¶ 3, 6.
9. FERC issued a certificate on February 3, 2017,
authorizing the construction and operation of this
pipeline. FERC Order.5
5
For the reasons discussed below, this Court offers no opinion, at this time, as to the validity of this certificate in light of
Defendants’ due process challenges.
App. 87
10. Transco entered into a contract with its shippers that requires the project be completed and in service for the 2017-2018 winter heating season, or as
soon as commercially practicable thereafter. Sztroin
Aff. ¶ 10, ECF No. 7-4 (No. 17-715).6
11. Between February 15, 2017, and March 7,
2017, Transco filed multiple condemnation complaints
in this Court, claiming immediate entitlement to
rights-of-way across the properties based on the FERC
Order. See Nos. 5:17-cv-711 to -723 (E.D. Pa. filed Feb.
15, 2017); No. 5:17-cv-1010 (E.D. Pa. filed Mar. 7, 2017).
12. Between February 20, 2017, and February
22, 2017, Transco filed an Omnibus Motion for Preliminary Injunction, seeking injunctive relief granting
Transco immediate possession of the rights-of-way in
each case.
13. Transco alleges that in order to complete the
pipeline project on time, it must have survey access to
the properties by March 20, 2017. Sztroin Aff. ¶ 12.
14. The FERC Order imposes environmental
conditions on the project, at least twelve of which require access to the rights-of-way to conduct field surveys and the submission of additional documentation
to FERC based on the results of the surveys. Sztroin
Aff. ¶¶ 14-16.
6
To avoid confusion between the Declaration of Sztroin attached to the Motion for Summary Judgment (“Sztroin Decl.”)
from the Declaration attached to the Omnibus Motion for Preliminary Injunction, this Court will refer to the later as “Sztroin Aff.”
App. 88
15. There are limited, seasonal windows of time
during which certain surveys, such as threatened and
endangered species surveys, may occur. Sztroin Aff.
¶ 17.
16. If Transco misses those windows, it may have
to wait until the following year to complete the surveys. Sztroin Aff. ¶ 17.
17. Some of these surveys have taken an average
of two to three months to complete. Sztroin Aff. ¶ 17.
18. Transco alleges that if the project is delayed
it will suffer approximately $500,000 in additional
costs each month, may lose up to $1.1 million in revenues each day, and will lose customer confidence if unable to provide service to its shippers by the promised
date. Sztroin Aff. ¶¶ 33-35.
19. Between February 20, 2017, and March 17,
2017, Transco filed a Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment in all pending cases, seeking orders of condemnation pursuant to the NGA to provide Transco
with the substantive right to condemn the rights-ofway sought on the properties in the FERC Order.
20. The motions for partial summary judgment,
although filed separately in each case, are almost identical and are based on substantially the same facts.
21. Transco entered into stipulations with Defendants in eight cases to grant Transco access to and
entry upon the rights-of-way of their properties for the
sole purpose of conducting the surveys required by the
FERC Order. See, e.g., ECF No. 27 (No. 17-711).
App. 89
22. Pursuant to the stipulations, Transco agreed
to withdraw its Omnibus Motion for Preliminary Injunction in those cases.
23. Transco also agreed in the stipulations in
four of the cases to extend the time for Defendants to
respond to the motions for partial summary judgment
until April 15, 2017. See, e.g., ECF No. 16 (No. 17-714).
24. Defendants in the above-captioned cases
have opposed the Complaints, the Omnibus Motion for
Preliminary Injunction, and the motions for partial
summary judgment, raising complex questions of constitutional law regarding the FERC Order and proceedings.
25. On March 16, 2017, Transco’s cases were reassigned to the Undersigned.
26. A hearing on the Omnibus Motion for Preliminary Injunction was held on March 20, 2017.
IV. Conclusions of Law
In the NGA, Congress granted condemnation
power to private corporations. See E. Tenn. Nat’l Gas
Co. v. Sage, 361 F.3d 808, 821-25 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing
15 U.S.C. § 717f(h)). The general procedure in such
cases is that a gas company applies for a certificate of
public convenience and necessity from FERC to build
and operate a new pipeline. Id. at 818-19. Once a certificate is issued, the NGA empowers the company to
exercise the right of eminent domain to acquire the
lands needed for the project. Id. The company usually
App. 90
enters negotiations with landowners to acquire their
property, but if these negotiations are unsuccessful,
the company may institute condemnation proceedings,
asking the court to enter an order of condemnation declaring that the company has the substantive right to
condemn the property in the FERC certificate. See
Kirby Forest Indus. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 3-6
(1984); E. Tenn. Nat’l Gas Co., 361 F.3d at 820-25.
A condemnation action can take three paths: (1)
straight condemnation, (2) quick-take, and (3) legislative taking. Id. In a straight condemnation action, the
plaintiff (gas company) files a complaint setting forth
its authority for the taking, the use for which the property is being taken, a description identifying the property, the interest to be acquired, and a designation of
the owners. Id. The court determines how much compensation is due to the landowner and once that
amount is tendered, the right to possession passes. Id.
The second method of taking provides the government
with a more expeditious procedure, requiring the filing
of a declaration of taking that sets forth the authority
for the taking, the public use for which the land is
taken, and an estimate of just compensation. Id. Once
the estimated amount is deposited with the court, the
government is authorized to take immediate possession of the condemned property. Id. Finally, a legislative taking occurs when Congress exercises the power
of eminent domain directly by, for example, enacting a
statute. Id.
Here, Transco followed the first path by filing
condemnation complaints pursuant to the NGA and
App. 91
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 71.1. However, in its
motions for partial summary judgment, Transco seeks
an order of condemnation declaring that it has the substantive right to condemn. The Omnibus Motion for
Preliminary Injunction then asks the Court to grant
Transco immediate possession prior to a determination of just compensation. This is not an avenue recognized by the NGA. See E. Tenn. Nat’l Gas Co, 361 F.3d
at 822-23 (concluding that the NGA “contains no provision for quick-take or immediate possession”).
Nevertheless, once Transco has established its
right to condemn, the Court may use its equitable
power to award preliminary injunctive relief. See Id.
(holding that a court has the power to grant equitable
relief after the gas company establishes a substantive
right to condemn). Until it is determined that Transco
has the authority to condemn Defendants’ property,
however, this Court is without jurisdiction to grant
Transco’s Omnibus Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
See Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. 1.01 Acres,
More or Less, 768 F.3d 300, 308 (3d Cir. 2014) (explaining that once it is determined that a gas company has
the right to eminent domain over the property sought
from the landowners, the court will conduct a preliminary injunction analysis); Mid-Atlantic Express, LLC v.
Balt. Cty., 410 F. App’x 653, 657 (4th Cir. 2011) (holding
that because the company did not have the authority
to condemn the property, “the district court was without jurisdiction to enter the preliminary injunction”);
Transwestern Pipeline Co., LLC v. 17.19 Acres, 550 F.3d
770, 776 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that “a district court
App. 92
lacks authority to grant a preliminary injunction under Rule 65 if the party does not have a substantive
right to the injunction” and that the gas company’s
“substantive right to condemn the affected parcels accrues only through the issuance of an order of condemnation by the district court”); E. Tenn. Nat’l Gas Co,
361 F.3d at 823 (concluding that a “federal court has
the power to grant equitable relief, but this power is
circumscribed by the venerable principle that ‘equity
follows the law’ ” (citations omitted)).
A decision on Transco’s substantive right to relief
is premature. Although Transco’s Partial Motion for
Summary Judgment and Omnibus Motion for Preliminary Injunction are fully briefed and ripe for disposition in the two above-captioned cases, the summary
judgment motions are not ripe7 in four other related
cases because Transco granted those Defendants additional time to prepare their responses. Transco’s motions in all these cases are substantially identical, and
any decision by this Court addressing the validity of
the FERC Order, which is the first step in determining
whether Transco has a substantive right to condemn
any of the properties, will therefore likely apply to all
the pending cases. Because the Court has not had the
benefit of reviewing briefs from Defendants in all the
related cases, there is the possibility of inconsistent decisions. This delay is of Transco’s own making as it
7
See Cluck-U Corp. v. Docson Consulting, LLC, No. 1:11-CV1295, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96638, at *2 n.1 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 29,
2011) (explaining that a motion is not ripe for review until the
nonmoving party has had an opportunity to file a brief ).
App. 93
stipulated to the extension of time for Defendants to
respond in the other cases. Consequently, this Court
will not render a decision on Transco’s substantive
right to condemn at this time.8
The fact that the validity of the FERC Order
raises difficult questions of constitutional law further
counsels against resolving this issue definitively in the
rushed atmosphere of a request for immediate injunctive relief, without full briefing from all interested
parties. See Sovereign Order of St. John of JerusalemKnights of Malta v. Messineo, 572 F. Supp. 983, 990
(E.D. Pa. 1983) (holding that the existence of difficult
legal questions of law may create sufficient doubt
about the probability of plaintiff ’s success to justify
denying a preliminary injunction); La Chemise Lacoste
v. General Mills, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 596, 605 (D. Del. 1971)
(“A Court should not decide doubtful and difficult
questions on a motion for a preliminary injunction.”);
Coffee Dan’s, Inc. v. Coffee Don’s Charcoal Broiler, 305
F. Supp. 1210, 1213 (N.D. Cal. 1969) (“On an application for a preliminary injunction the court is not bound
to decide doubtful and difficult questions of law or disputed questions of fact.”).
Moreover, even if Transco has a right to condemn,
it has not shown that it will be irreparably harmed because it has an alternative remedy to obtain the immediate relief it needs. See McHenry v. Comm’r of Internal
Revenue, No. 1:10-cv-00021, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8
“This time” amounts to a matter of weeks, as the summary
judgment motions should be fully briefed by the end of April.
App. 94
77977, at *8 (D.V.I. 2011) (“[T]he availability of an
adequate alternative remedy generally precludes a
finding of irreparable harm sufficient to warrant
injunctive relief.”); Curtis 1000 v. Youngblade, 878
F. Supp. 1224, 1248 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (“Irreparable
harm will not be found where alternatives already
available to the plaintiff make an injunction unnecessary.”). By withdrawing its Omnibus Motion for Preliminary Injunction in those cases in which it entered
into stipulations with the landowners to obtain access
to the properties to conduct surveys, Transco has essentially conceded that it will not suffer irreparable
harm if granted survey access.9 Pennsylvania law
9
Notably too, Transco’s claimed irreparable harm is in the
nature of additional costs, diminished revenues, and loss in customer confidence, all of which are not the types of harms that usually suffice for an injunction to issue. See Checker Cab of Phila.
Inc. v. Uber Techs., Inc., 643 F. App’x 229, 232 (3d Cir. 2016) (concluding that the plaintiff failed to show that it was entitled to a
preliminary injunction because the only harm alleged “is the loss
of customers,” which “is a purely economic harm that can be adequately compensated with a monetary award following adjudication on the merits”). Further, Transco’s alleged additional costs
and loss in customer confidence with its shippers if unable to complete the project on time appears to be a self-inflicted harm because Transco entered into this contract with suppliers before
knowing whether it would need to initiate formal condemnation
proceedings. These alleged harms may have been avoidable. See
Caplan v. Fellheimer Eichen Braverman & Kaskey, 68 F.3d 828,
839 (3d Cir. 1995) (“If the harm complained of is self-inflicted, it
does not qualify as irreparable.” (citing 11A Charles A. Wright,
Federal Practice & Procedure § 2948.1 pp. 152-53 (1995)); San
Francisco Real Estate Investors v. Real Estate Inv. Trust, 692 F.2d
814, 818 (1st Cir. 1982) (concluding that the alleged harm caused
by investor apprehension over the litigation was largely “selfinflicted” and “entirely avoidable”).
App. 95
provides a procedure for which Transco can obtain survey access. See 26 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 309 (providing that,
upon notice to the landowner, “the condemnor or its
employees or agents shall have the right to enter upon
any land or improvement in order to make studies, surveys, tests, soundings and appraisals”). Consequently,
Transco’s Omnibus Motion for Preliminary Injunction
is denied.
Although Transco sought injunctive relief under
the NGA, this Court will grant Transco limited survey
access to the properties pursuant to § 309. In applying
§ 309, this Court recognizes the potential conflict between the conformity clause in the NGA, which can be
found at 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h),10 and Rule 71.1(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.11 The conformity
clause was repealed by Rule 71.1, but only insofar as it
required federal courts to conform state procedures to
secure a condemnation. See United States v. 93.970
Acres, 360 U.S. 328, 333 n.7 (1959); Guardian Pipeline,
10
Section 717f (h) provides in part that “[t]he practice and
procedure in any action or proceeding [to exercise the right of eminent domain] in the district court of the United States shall conform as nearly as may be with the practice and procedure in
similar action or proceeding in the courts of the State where the
property is situated.”
11
Rule 71.1(a) provides: “[t]hese rules govern proceedings to
condemn real and personal property by eminent domain, except
as this rule provides otherwise.” “The purpose of Rule [71.1] is to
provide a uniform procedure for condemnation in the federal district courts.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 71.1 advisory committee’s note (“Rule
71[.1] affords a uniform procedure for all cases of condemnation
invoking the national power of eminent domain . . . and supplants
all statutes prescribing a different procedure.”).
App. 96
L.L.C. v. 295.49 Acres of Land, more or less, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 35818, at *43-44 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 11, 2008)
(concluding that because Rule 71.1 addressed the subject of condemnation procedure, the conformity clause
in the Natural Gas Act was preempted and does not
apply to any state mandated procedures). Section 309,
however, does not deal with the steps that must be followed to secure a condemnation and its use in a federal
condemnation proceeding is therefore not prohibited
by Rule 71.1, nor does it conflict with Rule 71.1.
Congress has prescribed that “[a]ll laws in conflict
with [the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] shall be of
no further force or effect after such rules have taken
effect.” 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b). However, “there is no federal law that deals specifically with entries to survey
property, so there is nothing to preempt state law in
such a proceeding.” Alliance Pipeline L.P. v. 4.360 Acres
of Land, 746 F.3d 362, 367 (8th Cir. 2014); Sabal Trail
Transmission, LLC v. 72 Acres of Land, No: 5:16-cv162, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62857, at *6 (M.D. Fla. May
12, 2016) (concluding that “federal law does not provide a right to survey, so there exists no conflict between state law and federal law”). Although some
courts have been of the belief that Rule 71.1 prohibits
the federal courts from applying any state laws in the
area of eminent domain, see, e.g. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co.
v. Garrison, No. 3:10-CV-1845, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
94422, at *7-8 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2010) (concluding
that because the plaintiff filed for condemnation under
the NGA that it could not use Pennsylvania’s Eminent
App. 97
Domain Code to gain pre-condemnation access to the
land), “the NGA certainly does not operate to completely preempt state eminent domain law,” Bowyer v.
Rover Pipeline, LLC, No. 1:16CV203, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8892, at *8 (N.D. W. Va. Jan. 23, 2017) (explaining that the NGA only “preempts state law when the
two are in conflict”).
V.
Conclusion
Considering that the same Omnibus Motion for
Preliminary Injunction, which is the subject of the instant opinion, was filed by Transco in twelve related
actions, along with substantially identical motions for
partial summary judgment, four of which are not yet
ripe in light of the stipulated extensions of time entered into between those Defendants and Transco, this
Court will not render a decision on Transco’s right to
condemn at this time. Regardless, Transco has failed
to show that it will suffer irreparable harm if not
granted injunctive relief because it has an alternative
remedy under Pennsylvania law to obtain the survey
access it needs. Accordingly, the Omnibus Motion for
Preliminary Injunction is denied, but, pursuant to
§ 309, Transco is granted access to and entry upon the
rights-of-way, as defined in the respective complaints,
for the sole purpose of conducting surveys required under the FERC Order.
App. 98
Appropriate orders will follow.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Joseph F. Leeson, Jr.
JOSEPH F. LEESON, JR.
United States District Judge
App. 99
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Nos. 17-3075, 17-3076, 17-3115 & 17-3116
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS PIPE LINE CO, LLC
v.
PERMANENT EASEMENTS FOR 2.14 ACRES AND
TEMPORARY EASEMENTS FOR 3.59 ACRES IN
CONESTOGA TOWNSHIP, LANCASTER COUNTY,
PENNSYLVANIA, TAX PARCEL NUMBER
1201606900000; ET AL.
Hilltop Hollow Limited Partnership & Hilltop Hollow
Partnership, LLC; Stephen D. Hoffman; Lynda Like;
Blair B. Mohn and Megan E. Mohn,
Appellants
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(E.D. Pa. Nos. 17-cv-00715, 17-cv-00723,
17-cv-00720 & 17-cv-00722)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUR PETITION FOR REHEARING
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Present: SMITH, Chief Judge, MCKEE, CHAGARES,
JORDAN, HARDIMAN, GREENAWAY, JR., SHWARTZ,
App. 100
KRAUSE, RESTREPO, BIBAS, PORTER, *ROTH, and
*FISHER, Circuit Judges
The petition for rehearing filed by appellants in
the above-entitled case having been submitted to the
judges who participated in the decision of this Court
and to all the other available circuit judges of the circuit in regular active service, and no judge who concurred in the decision having asked for rehearing, and
a majority of the judges of the circuit in regular service
not having voted for rehearing, the petition for rehearing by the panel and the Court en banc, is denied.
BY THE COURT,
s/ JANE R. ROTH
Circuit Judge
Dated: December 13, 2018
PDB/cc: All Counsel of Record
* Votes of the Honorable Jane R. Roth and D. Michael Fisher
are limited to panel rehearing only.
App. 101
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
SAUL EWING LLP
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Transcontinental Gas
Elizabeth U. Witmer, Esq.
Pipe Line Company, LLC
(55808)
Sean T. O’Neill, Esq. (205595)
1200 Liberty Ridge Drive,
Suite 200
Wayne, PA 19087-5569
TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS :
:
PIPE LINE COMPANY, LLC
:
2800 POST OAK BOULEVARD
:
HOUSTON, TEXAS 77251:
1396,
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
PERMANENT EASEMENT
:
FOR 2.02 ACRES AND
:
TEMPORARY EASEMENT;
:
FOR 2,76 ACRES IN MANOR :
TOWNSHIP LANCASTER
:
COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA,
:
TAX PARCEL NUMBER
:
4100300500000,
:
3049 SAFE HARBOR ROAD, :
MANOR TOWNSHIP,
:
LANCASTER, PA 17551
:
CIVIL ACTION –
LAW
Docket No. _____
App. 102
STEPHEN D. HOFFMAN
3049 SAFE HARBOR ROAD
MILLERSVILLE, PA 17551
AND ALL UNKNOWN
OWNERS
Defendants.
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
VERIFIED COMPLAINT IN
CONDEMNATION OF PROPERTY
PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 71.1
Plaintiff, Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Company, LLC, for its causes of action against Defendants,
Permanent Easement for 2.02 Acres and Temporary
Easements for 2.76 Acres in Manor Township, Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, Tax Parcel Number
4100300500000, Stephen D. Hoffman, and All Unknown Owners, states as follows:
1. The following definitions are used in this Complaint:
a) “Transco” shall mean Transcontinental
Gas Pipe Line Company, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company with a principal place of business at
2800 Post Oak Boulevard, Houston, Texas 77251-1396.
b) “FERC” shall mean the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission.
c) “FERC Order” shall mean the Order issued by the FERC on February 3, 2017, Docket No.
CP15-138-000, 158 FERC ¶ 61,125 (2017), authorizing
App. 103
the Atlantic Sunrise Project and granting Transco a
certificate of public convenience and necessity.1
d) “Project” shall mean the Atlantic Sunrise Project which was reviewed and approved by the
FERC by its issuance of the FERC Order.
e)
“Property” shall mean:
That property in Manor Township, Lancaster
County, Pennsylvania, described in the Deed dated
April 18, 2006, recorded in the Office of the Recorder of
Deeds of Lancaster County at Instrument Number
5519364, and known as Tax Parcel Number
4100300500000.
f) “Rights of Way” shall mean the following
easements and rights of way on the Property that are
necessary to install and construct the Project:
i.
1
A permanent right of way and easement of
2.02 acres, as described as “Area of Proposed
CPLS R/W” in Exhibit A to the Verified
Complaint, for the purpose of constructing,
operating, maintaining, altering, repairing,
changing the size of, replacing and removing
a pipeline and all related equipment and appurtenances thereto (including but not limited to meters, fittings, tie-overs, valves,
The FERC Order is a matter of public record that is subject
to judicial notice under Fed. R. Evid. 201. A true and correct copy
of the relevant excerpts of the FERC Order will be attached as
Exhibit A to Transco’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
The full FERC Order is available at https://www.ferc.gov/Calendar
Files/20170203163124-CP15-138-000.pdf.
App. 104
cathodic protection equipment, and launchers
and receivers) for the transportation of natural gas, or its byproducts, and other substances as approved by the Order of the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
dated February 3, 2017, Docket No. CP15-138000, 158 FERC ¶ 61,125 (2017), together with
a right of way and easement to construct,
maintain, operate, repair, alter, replace and
remove cathodic protection equipment and
the necessary appurtenances thereto, such as
but not limited to poles, guy wires, anchors,
rectifiers, power lines, cables, deep well anode
and anode ground beds under, upon, and over
the permanent access easement, and conducting all other activities as approved by the
Order of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission dated February 3, 2017, Docket No.
CP15-138-000, 158 FERC ¶ 61,125 (2017); together with all rights and benefits necessary
or convenient for the full enjoyment or use of
the right of way and easement. Further, the
landowner shall not build any permanent
structures on said permanent right of way or
any part thereof, will not change the grade of
said permanent right of way, or any part
thereof, will not plant trees on said permanent
right of way, or any part thereof, or use said
permanent right of way or any part thereof for
a road, or use said permanent right of way or
any part thereof in such a way as to interfere
with Transco’s immediate and unimpeded access to said permanent right of way, or otherwise interfere with Transco’s lawful exercise
of any of the rights herein granted without
App. 105
first having obtained Transco’s approval in
writing; and the landowner will not permit
others to do any of said acts without first having obtained Transco’s approval in writing.
Transco shall have the right from time to time
at no additional cost to landowners to cut and
remove all trees including trees considered as
a growing crop, all undergrowth and any other
obstructions that may injure, endanger or interfere with the construction and use of said
pipeline and all related equipment and appurtenances thereto; and
ii.
Temporary easements of 2.76 acres, as described as “Area of Proposed Temporary Work
Space #1” and “Area of Proposed Temporary
Work Space #2” in Exhibit A to the Verified
Complaint, for use during the pipeline construction and restoration period only for the
purpose of ingress, egress and regress and to
enter upon, clear off and use for construction
and all other activities approved by the Order
of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission dated February 3, 2017, Docket No.
CP15-138-000, 158 FERC ¶ 61,125 (2017).
g) “Appraised Value” shall mean the fair
market value of the Rights of Way sought to be condemned, as set forth in an appraisal prepared by an
independent appraiser retained by Transco. The appraisal values the Rights of Way sought to be condemned at $13,970.00.
h) “Landowner” shall mean Stephen D.
Hoffman, the owner of the Property on which Transco
App. 106
is seeking to acquire the Rights of Way; the Landowner
is an individual residing at 3049 Safe Harbor Road,
Millersville, PA 17551.
i)
“Interest Holders”2 shall mean; None
known.
j) “Defendants” shall collectively refer to
the Landowner, Interest Holders, and any Unknown
Owners.
PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE
2. Transco is the Plaintiff and will be the operator of the proposed pipeline facilities being constructed
and modified in connection with the Project.
3. Defendants are the Landowner, Interest Holders, and all Unknown Owners of the Property on which
Transco is seeking to acquire the Rights of Way.
4. This is a civil action brought under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 71.1 by Transco for the taking
of the Rights of Way on the Property that are necessary
to install and construct pipeline facilities as part of the
Project.
5. Transco’s authority to maintain the action in
this Court derives from the Natural Gas Act, 15
2
Transco has not yet verified the identity, property interest
and service address of any persons that may hold a mortgage, lien
or judgment of record against the Property. In accordance with
Fed. R. Civ. P. 71.1(c)(3) and 71.1(f), Transco will amend its Complaint to name any such interest holders prior to any hearing on
compensation.
App. 107
U.S.C.A. §§ 717a, et seq. (the “Natural Gas Act”). Section 717f(h) states in relevant part:
When any holder of a certificate of public
convenience and necessity cannot acquire by contract, or is unable to agree
with the owner of property to the compensation to be paid for, the necessary
right-of-way to construct, operate, and
maintain a pipe line or pipe lines for the
transportation of natural gas, and the
necessary land or other property, in addition to right-of-way, for the location of
compressor stations, pressure apparatus, or other stations or equipment
necessary to the proper operation of
such pipe line or pipe lines, it may acquire the same by the exercise of the
right of eminent domain in the district
court of the United States for the district
in which such property may be located,
or in the State courts. The practice and procedure in any action or proceeding for that purpose in the district court of the United States
shall conform as nearly as may be with the
practice and procedure in similar action or
proceeding in the courts of the State where
the property is situated: Provided, that the
United States district courts shall only have
jurisdiction of cases when the amount claimed
by the owner of the property to be condemned
exceeds $3,000.
15 U.S.C.A. § 717f(h) (emphasis added).
App. 108
6. Venue is appropriate in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania because the Property is located in Lancaster County, within the District.
7. On February 3, 2017, the FERC issued the
FERC Order to Transco approving the Project, authorizing Transco to construct and operate approximately
199.5 miles of pipeline composed of (a) Central Penn
Line North, which is 58.7 miles of 30-inch diameter
natural gas pipeline running from Columbia County,
Pennsylvania to Susquehanna County, Pennsylvania;
(b) Central Penn Line South, which is 127.3 miles of
new 42-inch diameter natural gas pipeline running
from Lancaster County, Pennsylvania to Columbia
County, Pennsylvania; (c) Chapman Loop, which is 2.5
miles of new 36-inch diameter pipeline looping in Clinton County, Pennsylvania; (d) Unity Loop, which is 8.5
miles of new 42-inch diameter pipeline looping in Lycoming County, Pennsylvania; and (e) replacement of
2.5 miles of 30-inch diameter pipeline in Prince William County, Virginia; together with associated appurtenant facilities and appurtenant aboveground
facilities, such as valves, cathodic protection, communication towers, and internal inspection device launchers and receivers. FERC Order, ¶¶ 5, 6.
8. The Project also includes the construction and
operation of two new compressor stations in Wyoming
County, Pennsylvania and Columbia County, Pennsylvania; two new meter stations in Susquehanna County,
Pennsylvania and Wyoming County, Pennsylvania and
three new regulator stations in Luzerne, Columbia,
App. 109
and Lancaster Counties in Pennsylvania, with interconnecting piping; additional compression and related
modifications to three existing compressor stations in
Lycoming County, Pennsylvania, Columbia County,
Pennsylvania and Howard County, Maryland; minor
modifications at existing compressor stations in Maryland, Virginia and North Carolina to allow for bi-directional flow; installation of supplemental odorization,
odor detection and odor masking/deodorization equipment at various aboveground facilities in North Carolina and South Carolina; modification to an existing
meter station in Pennsylvania and additional piping to
an adjacent new meter station; and installation of ancillary facilities such as valves, cathodic protection,
communication towers, and internal inspection device
launchers and receivers. FERC Order, ¶¶ 7, 8.
9. Transco is the holder of a certificate of public
convenience and necessity issued by the FERC – the
FERC Order.
10. Under the Natural Gas Act, the holder of a
certificate of public convenience and necessity has the
power to condemn land for a federally approved natural gas pipeline project if:
(a) the company has been granted a Certificate of Public convenience and Necessity
from the FERC,
(b) the company has been unable to acquire
the needed land by contract with the
owner, and
App. 110
(c) the value of the property at issue is
claimed by the landowner at more than
$3,000.
15 U.S.C. § 717f(h); see Columbia Gas Transmission,
LLC v. 1.01 Acres, 768 F.3d 300, 304 (3d Cir. 2014); E.
Tenn. Natural Gas Co. v. Sage, 361 F.3d 808, 827-28
(4th Cir. 2004).
11. Transco meets these three requirements, as
detailed below.
TRANSCO IS A HOLDER OF A CERTIFICATE
OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY
12. On March 31, 2015, Transco filed an application with the FERC under section 7(c) of the Natural
Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) and Part 157 of the FERC’s
regulations for a certificate of public convenience and
necessity for its Project to construct and operate the
Project in Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North
Carolina and South Carolina. The Project will provide
an incremental 1.7 million dekatherms (Dth) per day
of year round firm transportation capacity from the
Marcellus Shale production area in northern Pennsylvania to Transco’s existing market areas to meet the
growing demand for natural gas in the Mid-Atlantic
and southeastern markets.
13. Transco’s Project underwent an extensive review process. The FERC evaluated the public need for
the Project (referred to as the “public convenience and
necessity” under Section 7(c) of the Natural Gas Act),
and completed a thorough review of environmental
App. 111
impacts and operational considerations before issuing
the FERC Order authorizing the Project.
14. The public was notified of the Project and
provided multiple opportunities to comment as outlined in the FERC Order, paragraphs 68, 70, 71-75:
a) On April 4, 2014, FERC staff granted
Transco’s request to use the pre-filing process in
Docket No. PF14-8-000. As part of the pre-filing review,
on July 18, 2014, FERC issued a Notice of Intent to Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement for the
Planned Atlantic Sunrise Expansion Project, Request
for Comments on Environmental Issues, and Notice of
Public Scoping Meetings (NOI). The NOI was published in the Federal Register on July 29, 2014,3 and
mailed to nearly 2,500 interested parties, including
federal, state, and local government representatives
and agencies; elected officials; environmental and public interest groups; Native American tribes; affected
property owners; other interested parties; and local libraries and newspapers. The NOI briefly described the
project and the environmental review process, provided a preliminary list of issues identified by FERC
staff, invited written comments on the environmental
issues that should be addressed in the draft EIS, listed
the date and location of four public scoping meetings4
3
79 Fed. Reg. 44,023 (2014).
FERC staff held the public scoping meetings between August 4 and 7, 2014, in Millersville, Annville, Bloomsburg, and Dallas, Pennsylvania.
4
App. 112
to be held in the project area, and established August
18, 2014, as the deadline for comments;
b) Transco filed its project application on
March 31, 2015. On October 22, 2015, FERC staff
mailed a letter to landowners potentially affected by
the path of several proposed project reroutes under
evaluation. The letter was mailed to over 300 affected
property owners, government officials, and other
stakeholders. The letter briefly described the proposed
alternative routes, invited newly affected landowners
to participate in the environmental review process,
and opened a special 30-day limited scoping period;
c) FERC staff issued the draft Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS) for the project on May 5, 2016,
which addressed the issues raised during the scoping
period and up to the point of publication. Notice of the
draft EIS was published in the Federal Register on May
12, 2016, establishing a 45-day public comment period
ending on June 27, 2016.5 The draft EIS was mailed to
the environmental mailing list for the project, including additional interested entities that were added
since issuance of the NOI. FERC staff held four public
comment meetings between June 13 and 16, 2016.6 Approximately 203 speakers provided oral comments regarding the draft EIS at these meetings and FERC
also received over 560 written comments from federal,
state, and local agencies; Native American tribes;
5
81 Fed. Reg. 29,557 (2016).
FERC staff held the public comment meetings in Lancaster, Annville, Bloomsburg, and Dallas, Pennsylvania.
6
App. 113
companies/organizations; and individuals in response
to the draft EIS. In addition, FERC received over 900
nearly identical letters. The transcripts of the public
comment meetings and all written comments on the
draft EIS are part of the public record for the project;
d) On October 13, 2016, FERC staff mailed a
letter to landowners potentially affected by two alternative pipeline routes identified following the issuance
of the draft EIS. The letter was mailed to 56 potentially
affected property owners, government officials, and
other stakeholders. The letter briefly described the proposed alternative routes, invited potentially affected
landowners to participate in the environmental review
process, and opened a special 30-day comment period.
FERC staff received 25 comment letters from individuals regarding the proposed alternative;
e) On November 3, 2016, FERC issued for
comment a draft General Conformity Determination,
which assessed the potential air quality impacts associated with construction of the project in accordance
with NEPA, the Clean Air Act, and the Commission’s
regulations.7 The Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (PADEP), Clean Air Council,
Lebanon Pipeline Awareness, Sierra Club Pennsylvania Chapter, Concerned Citizens of Lebanon County,
Lancaster Against Pipelines, and Elise Kucirka Salahub filed timely comments on the draft General
7
The draft General Conformity Determination is publicly
available at: https://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/common/opennat.asp?
fileID=14391786.
App. 114
Conformity Determination. The final General Conformity Determination addressed all the comments received prior to the close of the comment period on
December 5, 20168; and
f ) On December 30, 2016, FERC staff issued
the final EIS for the project which was published in the
Federal Register on January 9, 2017.9 The final EIS addresses timely comments received on the draft EIS.10
The final EIS was mailed to the same parties as the
draft EIS, as well as to newly identified landowners
and any additional parties that commented on the
draft EIS.11 The final EIS addresses geology; soils; water resources; wetlands; vegetation; wildlife and fisheries; special status species; land use, recreation, and
visual resources; socioeconomics; cultural resources;
air quality and noise; reliability and safety; cumulative
impacts; and aboveground site alternatives and minor
route variations incorporated into the project’s design.
8
The final General Conformity Determination is publicly
available at: https://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/file_list.asp?accession_
num=20170117-3039.
9
82 Fed. Reg. 2,344 (2017).
10
Volume III of the final EIS includes responses to comments
on the draft EIS received through the close of the comment period
on June 27, 2016, and responses to additional comments received
between June 28 and November 14, 2016, that raised new issues
not previously identified prior to the close of the comment period.
Any new issues raised after November 14, 2016, which were not
previously identified, are addressed in this order.
11
The distribution list is provided in Appendix A of the final
EIS.
App. 115
15. The FERC held public meetings and noticed
the certificate application and EIS for the Project as
referenced above, and considered hundreds of comments from various parties, including federal, state,
and local agencies, conservation groups and landowners, before issuing the FERC Order.
16. When evaluating applications for certificates
to construct new pipeline facilities, the FERC takes
guidance from the Certificate Policy Statement, Certification of New Interstate Natural Gas Pipeline Facilities, 88 FERC ¶ 61,227 (1999), clarified, 90 FERC
¶ 61,128 (2000), further certified, 92 FERC ¶ 61,094
(2000).
The Certificate Policy Statement establishes
criteria for determining whether there is a
need for a proposed project and whether the
proposed project will serve the public interest.
The Certificate Policy Statement explains
that in deciding whether to authorize the construction of major new natural gas facilities,
the Commission balances the public benefits
against the potential adverse consequences.
The Commission’s goal is to give appropriate
consideration to the enhancement of competitive transportation alternatives, the possibility of overbuilding, subsidization by existing
customers, the applicant’s responsibility for
unsubscribed capacity, the avoidance of unnecessary disruptions of the environment,
and the unneeded exercise of eminent domain
in evaluating new pipeline construction.
FERC Order, ¶ 20.
App. 116
17. On February 3, 2017, the FERC approved the
Project and issued the FERC Order.
18. The FERC Order authorizes Transco, among
other things, to construct and install the new and modified pipeline facilities described above in Lancaster
County, Pennsylvania.
19. The Rights of Way on the Property are required to construct, install, operate and maintain the
pipeline facilities approved in the FERC Order.
20. The Rights of Way are more fully depicted
and identified in the drawings attached hereto as Exhibit A, which are incorporated by reference.
21 The Rights of Way sought to be acquired on
the Property were reviewed and approved by FERC.
22. In issuing the FERC Order, the FERC considered the impact on landowners and communities
along the route of the Project. The FERC concluded
that the Project “has been designed to minimize impacts on landowners and the surrounding communities.” FERC Order, ¶ 25.
23. The FERC concluded that “[b]ased on the
benefits that Transco’s project will provide, the absence of adverse effects on existing customers and
other pipelines and their captive customers, and the
minimal adverse effects on landowners or surrounding
communities, we find, consistent with the Certificate
Policy Statement and NGA section 7(c), that the public
App. 117
convenience and necessity requires approval of
Transco’s proposal, subject to the conditions discussed
below.” FERC Order, ¶ 33.
24. Accordingly, Transco has a valid FERC Order
covering the Rights of Way sought in this Action.
25. Transco has satisfied the first condition for
the exercise of eminent domain under Section 7(h) of
the Natural Gas Act.
TRANSCO HAS BEEN UNABLE TO ACQUIRE
THE RIGHTS OF WAY BY AGREEMENT
26. Transco, by its agents, contacted Landowner
numerous times for the purpose of negotiating the acquisition of the Rights of Way.
27. A copy of the appraisal setting forth the Appraised Value was provided to the Landowner.
28. Transco offered an amount that is higher
than the Appraised Value.
29. Landowner rejected, or otherwise did not accept, Transco’s offer.
30. Transco is unable to acquire the Rights of
Way by contract or to agree on the compensation to be
paid for the Rights of Way with the Landowner.
31. Accordingly, Transco has satisfied the second
condition required prior to the exercise of eminent domain under Section 7(h) of the Natural Gas Act.
Ap
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