Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Lynda Like, et al., Petitioners v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Company, LLC

Supreme Court briefMar 13, 2019

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App. 1

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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Nos. 17-3075, 17-3076, 17-3115 & 17-3116

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TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS PIPE

LINE COMPANY, LLC

v.

PERMANENT EASEMENTS FOR 2.14 ACRES AND

TEMPORARY EASEMENTS FOR 3.59 ACRES IN

CONESTOGA TOWNSHIP, LANCASTER COUNTY,

PENNSYLVANIA, TAX PARCEL NUMBER

1201606900000; HILLTOP HOLLOW LIMITED

PARTNERSHIP; HILLTOP HOLLOW PARTNERSHIP LLC GENERAL PARTNER OF HILLTOP

HOLLOW LIMITED PARTNERSHIP; LANCASTER

FARMLAND TRUST; ALL UNKNOWN OWNERS

Hilltop Hollow Limited Partnership and Hilltop

Hollow Partnership, LLC,

Appellants in 17-3075

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TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS PIPELINE

COMPANY, LLC

v.

PERMANENT EASEMENT FOR 2.02 ACRES AND

TEMPORARY EASEMENTS FOR 2.76 ACRES IN

MANOR TOWNSHIP, LANCASTER COUNTY

PENNSYLVANIA, TAX PARCEL NUMBER

4100300500000, 3049 SAFE HARBOR ROAD,

App. 2

MANOR TOWNSHIP, LANCASTER, PA; STEPHEN

D. HOFFMAN; AND ALL UNKNOWN OWNERS

Stephen D. Hoffman,

Appellant in 17-3076

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TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS PIPELINE

COMPANY, LLC

v.

PERMANENT EASEMENT FOR 1.33 ACRES AND

TEMPORARY EASEMENTS FOR 2.28 ACRES

CONESTOGA TOWNSHIP, LANCASTER COUNTY,

PENNSYLVANIA TAX PARCEL NUMBER

1202476100000, 4160 MAIN STREET CONESTOGA,

PA 17516; LYNDA LIKE, also known as Linda Like,

AND ALL UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS

Lynda Like,

Appellant in 17-3115

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TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS PIPELINE

COMPANY, LLC

v.

PERMANENT EASEMENT FOR 0.94 ACRES

AND TEMPORARY EASEMENTS FOR 1.61 ACRES

IN CONESTOGA TOWNSHIP, LANCASTER

COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA, TAX PARCEL NUMBER 1203589400000, SICKMAN MILL ROAD;

BLAIR B. MOHN; MEGAN E. MOHN, AND ALL

UNKNOWN OWNERS

Blair B. Mohn and Megan E. Mohn,

Appellants in 17-3116

App. 3

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On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D. C. Civil Actions Nos. 17-cv-00715, 17-cv-00723,

17-cv-00720, 17-cv-00722)

District Judge: Honorable Jeffery L. Schmehl

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Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

on October 2, 2018

Before: SHWARTZ, ROTH and FISHER,

Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: October 30, 2018)

Siobhan K. Cole

White & Williams

1650 Market Street

One Liberty Place, Suite 1800

Philadelphia, PA 19103

Jeremy P. Hopkins

Cranfill Summer & Hartzog

5420 Wade Park Boulevard Suite 300

Raleigh, NC 27607

Michael N. Onufrak

White & Williams

1650 Market Street

Suite 1800

Philadelphia, PA 19103

Carolyn Elefant

Law Offices of Carolyn Elefant

8th Floor

1440 G Street N.W.

Washington, DC 20005

App. 4

Mark L. Freed

Curtin & Heefner

2005 South Easton Road

Suite 100

Doylestown, PA 18901

Counsel for Appellants

Patrick F. Nugent

Sean T. O’Neill

Saul Ewing Arnstein & Lehr

1500 Market Street

Centre Square West, 38th Floor

Philadelphia, PA 19102

Elizabeth U. Witmer

Saul Ewing Arnstein & Lehr

1200 Liberty Ridge Drive

Suite 200

Wayne, PA 19087

Counsel for Appellees

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OPINION

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ROTH, Circuit Judge

Congress may grant eminent domain power to private companies acting in the public interest. This appeal requires us to determine the limits on Congress’s

grant of eminent domain power to private companies

building gas lines under the Natural Gas Act (NGA),

15 U.S.C. § 717f(h).

App. 5

The NGA gives natural gas companies the power

to acquire property by eminent domain, but it provides

only for standard eminent domain power, not the type

of eminent domain called “quick take” that permits immediate possession.1 The District Court granted a preliminary injunction to Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line

Company, which effectively gave the company immediate possession of certain rights of way owned by appellant landowners. The landowners claim that granting

immediate possession violated the constitutional principle of separation of powers because the taking of

property by eminent domain is a legislative power and

the NGA did not grant “quick take.” We disagree and

hold that the District Court’s order did not violate the

principle of separation of powers because Transcontinental properly sought and obtained the substantive

right to the property before seeking equitable relief. We

will therefore affirm.

I

Transcontinental is building a natural gas pipeline that runs through Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina. For this

project, named “Atlantic Sunrise Expansion Project,”

Transcontinental needed certain rights of way, including those owned by appellants Hilltop Hollow Limited

Partnership, Stephen Hoffman, Lynda Like, and Blair

and Megan Mohn (collectively “Landowners”). Under

1

infra.

For a further description of “quick take” see Section III.A

App. 6

§ 717f(h) of the NGA, gas companies may acquire property by eminent domain if they meet three requirements. A gas company must demonstrate, first, that it

holds a certificate of public convenience and necessity

from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

(FERC); second, that it was unable to acquire the right

of way through negotiation with the landowner; and

third, that the amount claimed by the owner of the

property exceeds $3,000. If these conditions are met,

the gas company may “acquire the [necessary right-ofway] by the exercise of the right of eminent domain in

the district court.”2

Transcontinental has met all three requirements

of § 717f(h). The administrative review leading up to

the certificate of public convenience and necessity

lasted almost three years and, as is evident from the

record, included extensive outreach and many avenues

of public participation. The process started when

FERC granted the company’s request to use the prefiling process on April 4, 2014.3 On July 29, 2014,

FERC issued a Notice of Intent to Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the Planned Atlantic Sunrise Expansion Project, Request for Comments

on Environmental Issues, and Notice of Public Scoping

Meetings (NOI).4 The NOI was then mailed to 2500

interested parties. It invited comment on the project’s

environmental issues from all levels of government,

2

§ 717f(h).

A1424.

4

A1424; 79 Fed. Reg. 44,023 (2014).

3

App. 7

interest groups, Native American tribes, affected property owners, local media and libraries, and other interested parties. The Commission heard from 93 speakers

and received over 600 written comments.5 On March

31, 2015, the company filed its application to construct

and operate the Atlantic Sunrise project.6 FERC

mailed letters to potentially affected landowners (as

well as to government officials and other stakeholders)

on October 22, 2015.7 FERC issued the draft EIS on

May 5, 2016, and published it on May 12, 2016.8 At four

public meetings in June 2016, FERC heard from 203

speakers and received over 560 written comments and

900 identical letters on the draft EIS.9 Two alternative

pipeline routes were identified following the draft EIS,

and additional notices were mailed to potentially affected stakeholders, in response to which FERC received 25 additional comment letters.10 FERC issued

the final EIS on December 30, 2016, and published it

on January 9, 2017.11

The Commission issued a certificate of public convenience and necessity to Transcontinental—the first

requirement of § 717f(h) of the NGA—on February 3,

2017.12 It found “[b]ased on the benefits” of the

5

A1424.

A1425.

7

A1425.

8

81 Fed. Reg. 29,557 (2016).

9

A1425.

10

A1426.

11

A1426; 82 Fed. Reg. 2,344 (2017).

12

A1396.

6

App. 8

pipeline, “the minimal adverse effects on landowners

or surrounding communities,” and “the absence of adverse effects on existing customers and other pipelines

and their captive customers, . . . that the public convenience and necessity require[d] approval” of the project “subject to the conditions” set out in the Order

Issuing Certificate.13 Those conditions included requirements that Transcontinental, inter alia, construct

the pipeline and make it available for service within

three years of the date of the order,14 comply with certain environmental conditions, and follow certain rate

schedules.15 FERC also required that Transcontinental

execute firm contracts for volumes and service terms

“equivalent to those in its precedent agreements” before construction.16 The Order Issuing Certificate contained information on those binding precedent

agreements, comprising 100% of the capacity generated by the project, with nine shippers.17 The Landowners sought rehearing and included a request to

13

A1410.

See 18 C.F.R. § 157.20(b), A1466.

15

A1466-67.

16

A1467.

17

A1400-01, A1407-10. FERC noted that while “a number of

the project shippers are producers,” its “policy does not require

that shippers be end-use consumers of natural gas. . . . [A] project

driven primarily by marketers and producers does not render it

speculative. Marketers or producers who subscribe to firm capacity on a proposed project on a long-term basis presumably have

made a positive assessment of the potential for selling gas to enduse consumers in a given market and have made a business decision to subscribe to the capacity on the basis of that assessment.”

A1408.

14

App. 9

stay the Order Issuing Certificate and construction of

the project,18 but FERC tolled the rehearing request on

March 13, 2017,19 denied the stay requests on August

31, 2017,20 and finally denied the rehearing request on

December 6, 2017.21

The second and third requirements for using the

eminent domain powers under § 717f(h) of the NGA

are that the gas company negotiate with the landowner for the necessary right of way and that value of

the right of way exceeds $3000. Transcontinental extended written offers of compensation exceeding $3000

to each of the Landowners, but these offers were not

accepted.22 Transcontinental thus satisfied the second

18

Request for Rehearing and Motion for Stay of Certain

Landowners (Mar. 6, 2017), Accession No. 20170306-5123; Petition for Rehearing of Lynda Like of Order Issuing Certificate for

the Atlantic Sunrise Project and Request for Stay of Certificate

(Mar. 6, 2017), Accession No. 20170306-5204; Petition for Rehearing of Follin Smith and Blair and Megan Mohn of Order Issuing

Certificate for the Atlantic Sunrise Project and Request for Stay

of Certificate (Mar. 6, 2017), Accession No. 20170306-5202.

19

The tolling order noted that if FERC had not responded to

the rehearing requests within 30 days, the requests would be considered denied under 18 C.F.R. § 385.713 (2016); therefore, FERC

tolled the request “[i]n order to afford additional time for consideration of the matters.” A669.

20

Order Denying Stay, Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co.,

LLC, 160 FERC ¶ 61,042 (Aug. 31, 2017), Accession No.

20170831-3088.

21

Order on Rehearing, Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co.,

LLC, 161 FERC ¶ 61,250 (Dec. 6, 2017), Accession No. 201712063073.

22

Transcontinental submitted a declaration in its summary

judgment briefing from Aaron Blair, a “Senior Land Representative”

App. 10

and third requirements. The company filed condemnation complaints pursuant to Rule 71.1 in four separate

actions against the Landowners on February 15,

2017.23

Having met the three requirements of § 717f(h),

Transcontinental moved for partial summary judgment on February 20, 2017, in the Hilltop, Hoffman,

and Mohn condemnation actions and on February 22,

2017, in the Like condemnation action.24 Transcontinental also requested an injunction giving immediate

access for the purpose of conducting a survey in the

Hilltop and Hoffman actions and claimed immediate

entitlement based on the existence of the FERC order.25 On April 6, 2017, the District Court denied the

motion for an injunction under the NGA because it had

not yet determined the merits of Transcontinental’s

condemnation action, though it granted Transcontinental limited survey access pursuant to Pennsylvania

state law.26 The court held that it would have been

premature to grant such an injunction at that time

given that the Landowners in related cases had not yet

for Transcontinental’s parent company, Williams Partners, L.P.,

establishing that it had made these offers, and there was also testimony to that effect at the preliminary injunction hearing. A609

(Blair Declaration); A1049 (Blair testimony).

23

A130, A1537, A1709, A1832.

24

A130, A1538, A1833, A1709.

25

A679.

26

A679, A680.

App. 11

finished briefing the summary judgment motions.27

The court noted that if Transcontinental later established its right to condemn, the court would be able to

use its equitable power to award preliminary injunctive relief.28

After briefing on the summary judgment motions

concluded, Transcontinental filed an omnibus motion

for preliminary injunction on June 28, 2017.29 The

Landowners responded on July 14, 2017.30 On June 30,

2017, the District Court scheduled oral argument on

the motions for July 17 and 20, 2017. At oral argument,

a witness for Transcontinental testified that construction was planned to begin in the fall of 2017 and that

it would need access to the rights of way by August

18,31 or else it would suffer various harms.32 The Landowners cross-examined Transcontinental’s witness,33

and all four Landowners testified.34 The Landowners’

testimony included statements that they had all participated in the FERC administrative process.35 Counsel for Landowners presented argument that the

27

A680.

A679.

29

A685.

30

A135, A1541, A1712, A1835.

31

A953-54, A957.

32

A957-961.

33

A963.

34

A1068, A1110, A1152, A1184.

35

A1108 (Hilltop), A1124-25 (Hoffman), A1158-59 (Mohn),

A1191 (Like).

28

App. 12

taking constituted a “quick take” and that it violated

separation of powers principles.36

On August 23, 2017, the District Court granted

Transcontinental’s motions for partial summary

judgment and omnibus motion for a preliminary injunction.37 The court found no dispute that Transcontinental met the three requirements for seeking eminent

domain under the NGA and held that the company was

therefore entitled to the entry of partial summary

judgment.38 The court addressed the Hilltop/Hoffman

Landowners’ due process claims and ruled that they

were essentially attacks on the FERC certificate, and

were therefore outside the court’s jurisdiction.39 The

court added that, even if it were to exercise jurisdiction, it would find that the Hilltop/ Hoffman Landowners had received “adequate due process” because they

had participated in oral argument, had filed a request

for rehearing with FERC, and had filed an appeal in

the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.40 The Hilltop/Hoffman Landowners had also argued that FERC’s tolling

order deprived them of due process because it indefinitely extended FERC’s time limit to rule on their Motion for Rehearing and Stay. The court rejected this

argument on the grounds that mere delay in the

36

A1202-10, A1214-16.

A35; A20-28, A75-82, A97-103, A114-21; A18-19, A73-74,

A95-96, A112-13.

38

A41-42.

39

A42.

40

A44.

37

App. 13

adjudication of a claim does not amount to a deprivation.41 The court then addressed the Like/Mohn Landowners’ claim that because the FERC certificate was

conditioned on certain requirements, some of which

had not yet been met, the certificate could not be used

to exercise eminent domain. As the NGA does not require FERC certificate holders to satisfy all the certificate’s conditions before exercising eminent domain,

and because the certificate itself contained no such requirement, the District Court rejected this argument.42

On the basis of this review, the court held that

Transcontinental had met the four factor test for a preliminary injunction. Under that test, the movant must

demonstrate: 1) that there is reasonable probability of

success on the merits, 2) that there will be irreparable

harm to the movant in the absence of relief, 3) that

granting the injunction will not result in greater harm

to the nonmoving party, and 4) that the public interest

favors granting the injunction.43 The first two factors

are the “most critical.”44 On the first prong, it found

that “Transco[ntinental] ha[d] already succeeded on

the merits.”45 The court quoted our decision in

41

A46-47.

A48-49.

43

Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 176 (3d Cir.

2017).

44

Id. at 179. If the first two “gateway” factors are met, the

court “then considers the remaining two factors and determines

in its sound discretion if all four factors, taken together, balance

in favor of granting the requested preliminary relief.” Id.

45

A51.

42

App. 14

Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. 1.01 Acres. In that

case, we affirmed the grant of partial summary judgment in an action for condemnation and the grant of a

preliminary injunction, noting that there was “no remaining merits issue” because the District Court had

already ruled that the gas company had the right to

the easements by eminent domain.46

On the second prong, the District Court found that

Transcontinental would suffer irreparable harm in the

form of construction delays, inability to complete surveys required to satisfy environmental conditions, risk

of non-compliance with shipper contracts, and monetary harm.47

On the third prong, the District Court noted again

that Transcontinental already had the substantive

right to possession and the only question was “the timing of the possession.”48 If the permits to build certain

pipeline sections on the Landowners’ property were

eventually denied, the Landowners would have legal

recourse to recover their property.49

Finally, on the public interest prong, the District

Court noted the project’s potential to provide the general public “throughout a vast area of the country” with

46

768 F.3d 300, 315 (3d Cir. 2014).

A53-54. The project is at an advanced stage. FERC has issued a series of Notices to Proceed on the construction of the project, and Transcontinental states in its brief that only 23% of the

construction remains to be completed.

48

A54.

49

A55.

47

App. 15

access to natural gas, and found that “the mere fact

that [certain subscribers] will have access to export facilities does not mean that they will in fact export the

natural gas out of the country.” 50 The District Court

noted also that FERC had found the project to be in

the public interest, which further tipped this factor in

favor of Transcontinental.51

The Landowners appealed.

II

As the grant of partial summary judgment did not

end the litigation as to all claims and all parties, only

the grant of the preliminary injunction is before us.52

We have jurisdiction over the appeal of the injunction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a). The Landowners, however,

do not bring a standard appeal of a preliminary injunction, reviewable for abuse of discretion. The Landowners contest only the constitutionality of the lower

court’s procedure, not the application of the four-factor

50

The Hilltop/Hoffman Landowners point out that the project is designed to generate 1,700,002 dekatherms per day, and

they argue that of this amount, 850,000 dekatherms, which is just

barely under 50%, will go to one shipper, Cabot Oil & Gas, which

plans to export this entire amount.

51

A56-57.

52

Andrews v. United States, 373 U.S. 334, 340 (1963).

App. 16

preliminary injunction test.53 Therefore, we review

their claims de novo.54

III

The Landowners ask us to hold that the procedure

followed by the District Court—grant of partial

summary judgment, awarding possession of the rightsof-way, followed by equitable relief in the form of

preliminary injunction—is unconstitutional. The

Landowners argue that such a procedure is an unconstitutional grant of “quick take” eminent domain

power, the type of eminent domain that allows for immediate possession. Congress granted “quick take” eminent domain power to government actors in the

Declaration of Taking Act (DTA),55 but the NGA neither contains nor incorporates such a provision. The

Landowners argue that since Congress did not grant

natural gas companies “quick-take” eminent domain

power in the NGA, the court cannot, in effect, grant

such powers on its own; doing so usurps the legislature’s authority. The question before us then is

whether Congress, in passing the NGA, intended to remove the judiciary’s access to equitable remedies to enforce an established substantive right. Put another

way, did Congress intend to forbid immediate access to

the necessary rights of way when it granted only

53

A56.

Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Attorney General, 825 F.3d

149, 159 (3d Cir. 2016).

55

40 U.S.C. § 3114.

54

App. 17

standard condemnation powers to natural gas companies?

A

We begin with the Landowners’ premise: that the

District Court effected a “quick-take.” As an initial

matter, eminent domain is a legislative power, but Congress can delegate it to other governmental actors56 or

to private actors “execut[ing] works in which the public

is interested.”57

Congress generally does this by delegating the

power of eminent domain. There are two primary types

of eminent domain at the government’s disposal. One

is “quick take,” permitted by the DTA, 40 U.S.C. § 3114,

in which the government files a “declaration of taking”

that states the authority for the taking, the public use,

56

E.g., 33 U.S.C. § 594 (providing the Secretary of the Army

the authority to acquire land, through eminent domain proceedings, “needed for a work of river and harbor improvements duly

authorized by Congress”).

57

Mississippi & Rum River Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S.

403, 406 (1878); see also First English Evangelical Lutheran

Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles County, Cal., 482 U.S. 304, 321

(1987) (“[T]he decision to exercise the power of eminent domain is

a legislative function.”); Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United States,

148 U.S. 312, 321 (1893). The Landowners acknowledge the existence of judicial takings, citing Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc.

v. Florida Dep’t Enviro. Protection, 560 U.S. 702, 713-14 (2010)),

but maintain that only Congress can grant eminent domain powers. See Secombe v. Milwaukee & St. P.R. Co., 90 U.S. 108, 11718 (1874) (“[T]he mode of exercising the right of eminent domain,

in the absence of any provision in the organic law prescribing a

contrary course, is within the discretion of the legislature.”).

App. 18

and an estimate of compensation. Upon depositing the

estimated compensation, title vests automatically with

the United States. The other is standard condemnation, permitted by 40 U.S.C. § 3113, in which title

passes and the right to possession vests after a final

judgment and determination of just compensation. The

procedures for standard condemnations are set forth

in Fed. R. Civ. P. 71.1. The NGA is an example of a grant

of eminent domain power from Congress to a private

actor to condemn land for public use, but it only embodies the second type—standard condemnation

power, not “quick take.”58

In the case before us, Transcontinental followed

standard condemnation procedure. The company filed

condemnation complaints under Rule 71.1, not a declaration of taking. Rule 71.1 has requirements that go

beyond the DTA.59 Transcontinental followed these

procedures by filing condemnation complaints under

Rule 71.1; it then established its substantive right to

the property by filing for summary judgment. Only after the District Court granted summary judgment in

Transcontinental’s favor did it grant injunctive relief.

Transcontinental also posted bond at three times the

appraised value of the rights of way, as required by the

58

East Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. Sage, 361 F.3d 808, 82021 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing Mississippi & Rum River Boom Co. v.

Patterson, 98 U.S. at 406).

59

E.g., a condemnation complaint that explains the authority for the taking, the uses for the property, a description sufficient to identify the property, the interests to be acquired, and

each owner; notice and personal or publication service; and procedures for the determination and payment of just compensation.

App. 19

orders of condemnation.60 If Transcontinental had in

fact exercised “quick take,” it would have simply filed

a declaration of taking with an estimate of compensation; title would have vested automatically. Here, unlike in a “quick take” action, Transcontinental does not

yet have title but will receive it once final compensation is determined and paid.61 Unlike in a “quick take”

action, the Landowners had the opportunity to brief

the summary judgment motions and participate in the

preliminary injunction hearing. The different procedures and opportunities for participation distinguish

60

See A22, A99, A116, A77. We note that the Landowners

have not received any of this money. Rule 71.1(c)(4) allows the

court to “order any distribution of a deposit that the facts warrant.” At least one court has interpreted this provision to apply

only after the final determination of just compensation. UGI Sunbury LLC v. A Permanent Easement for 71.7575 Acres, 16-cv-788,

2016 WL 7239945, at *2 n.14 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 15, 2016). In UGI

Sunbury, the court interpreted an Advisory Committee note on

this section, which states that the sentence “enables the court to

expedite the distribution of a deposit, in whole or in part, as soon

as pertinent facts of ownership, value and the like are established,” to mean that distribution can only occur after just compensation is determined. Such a reading conflicts with subsection

(j)(2), which provides that “[i]f the compensation finally awarded

to a defendant exceeds the amount distributed to that defendant,”

the court must recoup the deficiency from the plaintiff, and the

reverse is true if the final amount awarded is less than the

amount distributed. Such a scheme would be unnecessary if deposits never occurred before final determination of just compensation. In sum, while it does not seem to be common practice to

distribute compensation upon posting of the bonds, in cases presenting hardship to landowners, the court’s hands may not be

tied.

61

Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 284-85 (1939).

App. 20

the grant of the injunction here from an exercise of

“quick take” power.

B

The Landowners contend, nevertheless, that even

if the procedure below was not technically an exercise

of “quick take” eminent domain, the use of a preliminary injunction amounted to a “quick take.” However,

the technical distinctions they seek to elide are, in the

end, meaningful distinctions in the law. According to

the Landowners, there is a difference between the substantive right to access that arises under the NGA, and

the substantive right to immediate access, which only

Congress can authorize. The Like/Mohn Landowners

argue that granting injunctive relief for immediate

possession is in itself a substantive right of eminent

domain that a court cannot confer in the absence of

Congressional authorization. There is, however, no

case law to support the proposition that an injunctive

right of immediate possession is a substantive right,

conferrable only by Congress. The fact that “quick

take” power exists does not prohibit other kinds of immediate access. The only substantive right at issue is

the right to condemn using eminent domain, conferred

by Congress in the NGA. The District Court found that

Transcontinental had obtained that right.62 The preliminary injunction merely hastened the enforcement

62

See Seymour v. Freer, 75 U.S. 202, 213-14 (1868) (property

rights “distinct from the legal ownership . . . constitute an equity

which a court of equity will protect and enforce whenever its aid

for that purpose is properly invoked”).

App. 21

of the substantive right—it did not create any new

rights.63

The Like/Mohn Landowners portray Transcontinental as a customer who pays for 90% of an item and

then takes it home, but Transcontinental did not have

90% of a right to the rights of way—it had the whole

right. The Hilltop/Hoffman Landowners argue that

the fact that title to the property had not yet been

transferred is immaterial; it is the grant of the preliminary injunction that is the essence of the “quick take”

power. To the contrary, we conclude that the equitable

means by which Transcontinental’s possession vested

through the preliminary injunction differed in significant ways from “quick take” under the DTA. We decline

the invitation to conflate the two processes. These are

not trivial differences of procedure or paperwork.

The cases relied on by the Landowners are easily

distinguishable as they involve gas companies that

failed to obtain the crucial substantive right to condemn before seeking a preliminary injunction. In one,

Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. 17.19 Acres of Property Located in Maricopa County,64 the Ninth Circuit held

that a preliminary injunction was not appropriate because the company did not obtain an order of condemnation. While the gas company argued that it was

guaranteed success on the merits due to its FERC

63

De Beers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S.

212, 220 (1945) (issuing preliminary injunction “appropriate to

grant intermediate relief of the same character as that which may

be granted finally”).

64

550 F.3d 770 (9th Cir. 2008).

App. 22

certificate and the fact that it met the § 717f(h) factors,

at the time it sought equitable relief it had no right to

condemn.65 The Ninth Circuit explicitly endorsed the

procedure of first obtaining an order of condemnation

(as Transcontinental did here through partial summary judgment) followed by a request for preliminary

injunction.66

The Seventh Circuit’s Northern Border decision is

similar.67 There, the gas company moved for immediate

possession before the district court issued a decision on

the merits of its eminent domain proceeding. Since the

company had only the FERC certificate, the court denied its request: “A preliminary injunction may issue

only when the moving party has a substantive entitlement to the relief sought. . . . [The company has] an entitlement that will arise at the conclusion of the

normal eminent domain process” but not the right of

immediate access.68 The Landowners place much emphasis on the recognition in Northern Border that the

NGA does not incorporate “quick take” authority under

state law or under the DTA and on the statement in

Northern Border that the NGA “does not create an entitlement to immediate possession of the land.”69 Both

those statements are true: the NGA does not incorporate “quick take” authority and does not on its own

65

Id. at 773, 777.

Id. at 777.

67

Northern Border Pipeline Co. v. 86.72 Acres of Land, 144

F.3d 469 (7th Cir. 1998).

68

44 F.3d at 471.

69

Id. at 471, 472 (citation omitted).

66

App. 23

create an entitlement to immediate possession. But

Northern Border is clearly distinguishable because of

the gas company’s failure to “obtain an order determining that it had the right to condemn before it sought a

preliminary injunction. . . . Without having that right

in substantive law determined, the company could not

invoke equity.”70

The Landowners also suggest that due process,

the Fifth Amendment, or some combination of the two

require payment of just compensation before a condemnor can take possession. Such an argument directly contradicts established law that “due process

does not require the condemnation of land to be in advance of its occupation by the condemning authority,

provided only that the owner have opportunity, in the

course of the condemnation proceedings, to be heard

and to offer evidence as to the value of the land

taken.”71 In addition, compensation need not be paid

contemporaneously with the taking; instead, the Fifth

Amendment requires only that a provision for payment must be available.72 Thus the Landowners’

70

Sage, 361 F.3d at 827-28.

Bailey v. Anderson, 326 U.S. 203, 205 (1945); see also Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 489-90 (4th Cir. 2006)

(“[W]hen the alleged deprivation is effectively a physical taking,

procedural due process is satisfied so long as private property

owners may pursue meaningful postdeprivation procedures to recover just compensation.”); Collier v. City of Springsdale, 733 F.2d

1311, 1314 (8th Cir. 1984).

72

See Preseault v. I.C.C., 494 U.S. 1, 11 (1990).

71

App. 24

reliance on Kirby Forest Industries v. United States,73

Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Railway Co.,74

and Atlantic Seaboard Corp. v. Van Sterkenburg75 is

73

467 U.S. 1 (1984). Kirby explained how Rule 71.1 operates

in standard condemnation proceedings, where the “practical effect of final judgment on the issue of just compensation is to give

the Government an option to buy the property at the adjudicated

price.” Id. at 4. The central question in Kirby was how to determine the date on which a taking should be deemed to occur, a

question that affected the amount of interest due on a condemnation proceeding award.

74

135 U.S. 641 (1890). The act at issue in Cherokee provided

for full compensation “before the railway shall be constructed,”

though the Court also stated that the Constitution “does not provide or require that compensation shall be actually paid in advance of the occupancy of the land to be taken; but the owner is

entitled to reasonable, certain, and adequate provision for obtaining compensation before his occupancy is disturbed.” Id. at 659.

The Court noted that it could sometimes be difficult to judge

whether a particular provision was “sufficient to secure the compensation” to which a landowner is entitled under the Constitution, but that it had no trouble finding the statute at issue

constitutional. Id.

75

318 F.2d 455 (4th Cir. 1963). The gas company in this case

followed the condemnation procedures of Rule 71.1, and after the

determination of just compensation, announced that it wished to

proceed immediately with the construction of the pipeline. Id. at

459-60. It is not clear why the gas company chose to wait until

after the just compensation phase to seek possession. In any

event, the court upheld an order permitting the company to pay

the award and begin using the easement because “[i]nherently . . .

the condemnation court possesses the power to authorize immediate entry by the condemnor upon the condemned premises . . . .

There is no valid reason why an owner . . . should be allowed,

by a fruitless and meritless appeal, to postpone indefinitely the

condemnor’s enjoyment of the premises, imposing upon the condemnor great, perhaps irreparable, damage, all without risk of

further loss or injury to the owner.” Id. at 460 (emphasis added).

The case is distinguishable because the gas company completed

App. 25

misplaced. None of these cases lend support to the

Landowners’ argument that Transcontinental’s right

to possession of the properties will not vest until

Transcontinental has exercised its option to buy the

properties at the adjudicated price.

The Landowners go on to contend that because the

NGA does not grant “quick take” power, the statute

does not permit immediate possession.76 They make

this argument without any explanation for why a district court’s authority to issue a preliminary injunction

should disappear when a condemnation proceeding

has been filed. Nothing in the NGA suggests either explicitly or implicitly that the rules governing preliminary injunctions should be suspended in condemnation

proceedings.

Historically, the NGA, when first enacted, did

countenance a wide variety of eminent domain procedures because it required district courts to conform “as

nearly as may be” with the eminent domain procedure

of the state in which the property was situated. The

condemnation procedures before seeking possession, but even so,

Atlantic Seaboard’s recognition of an “inherent[]” power to authorize “immediate entry” more squarely helps Transcontinental.

76

For example, the Hilltop/Hoffman Landowners cite to

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority v. One Parcel of

Land in Montgomery County, 706 F.2d 1312 (4th Cir. 1983). In

that case, the Fourth Circuit upheld a quick take because Congress explicitly made the DTA available to the transit authority.

It did not do so in the NGA. The case does not address the use of

injunctions to permit immediate possession, and we do not find

the case to be persuasive evidence that the NGA prohibits such

injunctions.

App. 26

state procedures protected landowners to a varying degree.77 Reliance on state eminent domain procedures

ended with the adoption of Rule 71.1 (previously numbered 71A), which created a nationally uniform approach to eminent domain proceedings, and which,

because it conflicted with § 717f(h), superseded the

state-conformity language in the NGA.78 Courts now

generally agree that condemnation proceedings under

the NGA should follow Rule 71.1.79

77

In states with no specific pipe line condemnation statutes,

courts made do with laws intended for private utilities in general.

E.g., Williams v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 89

F. Supp. 485, 487-88 (W.D.S.C. 1950) (“[A]ll that is needed to

make the grant effective is a State court procedure which meets

the requirements of due process and which can be reasonably utilized . . . . The [state] procedure . . . meets these requirements. It

furnishes due process. With its Clerks’ juries, composed of the

landowners’ neighbors, to pass upon the compensation originally,

and with the right of appeal therefrom to the Common Pleas

Court with a de novo jury trial, the procedure affords every protection to the landowner.” (citations omitted)).

78

Northern Border Pipeline Co. v. 64.111 Acres of Land, 344

F.3d 693, 694 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Congress may itself decide that

procedural rules in statutes should be treated as fallbacks, to apply only when rules are silent. And it has done just this. . . . Thus

Rule 71A(h) prevails: its nationally uniform approach conflicts

with the conformity-to-state-practice approach of § 717f(h), and

under [the Rules Enabling Act’s supersession clause] the statutory rule ‘shall be of no further force or effect.’ ”) (citing Henderson

v. United States, 517 U.S. 654 (1996)); see also United States v.

93.970 Acres of Land, 360 U.S. 328, 333 n.7 (1959) (holding similar language in another statute “clearly repealed by Rule 71A”).

79

Northern Border Pipeline Co., 344 F.3d at 694; Sage, 361

F.3d at 822; Southern Natural Gas Co. v. Land, Cullman County,

197 F.3d 1368, 1375 (11th Cir. 1999) (“It is clear to us that Rule

71A was promulgated to override a number of confusing federal

App. 27

Moreover, we see no reason to read a repeal of Rule

65, governing preliminary injunctions, into the NGA.

In fact, subsection (a) of Rule 71.1 incorporates the

other Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—including the

preliminary injunction rule, Rule 65—in condemnation proceedings to the extent Rule 71.1 does not govern. We do not so easily exterminate equitable

remedies.

In so holding, we find the Fourth Circuit opinion

in East Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. Sage80 persuasive.

There, the landowners argued “that Congress does not

intend for gas companies to gain immediate possession

because it has not granted statutory quick-take power

to gas companies as it has to government officers who

condemn property in the name of the United States.”81

But the court held that this argument “overlooks the

preliminary injunction remedy provided in the Federal

eminent domain practice and procedure provisions, such as that

of 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h), and to provide a unified and coherent set

of rules and procedures to be used in deciding federal eminent

domain actions.”). But see Delaware Riverkeeper Network v.

FERC, 895 F.3d 102, 110-11 (3d Cir. 2018) (noting that the NGA

ensures the occurrence of “a hearing that itself affords due process” with respect to the taking because the statute provides that

eminent domain actions conform with the practice and procedure

of such actions in the courts of the state where the property is

situated); contra Township of Bordentown, NJ v. FERC, Nos. 171047, 17-3207, 2018 WL 4212061, at *18 n.21 (3d Cir. Sept. 5,

2018) (NGA “requires district courts to attempt to mirror the state

courts’ condemnation proceedings”).

80

361 F.3d 808.

81

Id. at 824.

App. 28

Rules.”82 Rule 71.1 “provides . . . that the regular rules

of procedure apply to any subject not covered by the

special rule.”83 Thus, there was no reason why equitable relief “in the form of immediate possession” would

be “barred in a condemnation case.”84 As the Sage court

noted, the landowners, in their attempts to protect

themselves from immediate possession, seemed to assume that the preliminary injunction process was

somehow less protective of their interests than “quick

take” procedures. The court held, however, that when

condemning land under the NGA, “a gas company that

seeks immediate possession has a much stiffer burden

than the government does under the DTA” because the

gas company must first establish the substantive right

to condemn and then prevail on the four factors considered in preliminary injunctions.85

Under either procedure, a “quick take” or condemnation under Rule 71.1, landowners are protected from

the possibility of initial underpayment; with standard

condemnation plus preliminary injunction, if the company does not pay the difference within a reasonable

time, it will be liable for trespass.86 The Landowners

claim that Sage did not address the separation of powers arguments they bring here, but a panel of the

Fourth Circuit recently followed Sage and persuasively

82

Id.

Id.

84

Id.

85

Id. at 825-26.

86

Id. at 825 (citing Cherokee Nation, 135 U.S. at 660).

83

App. 29

demonstrated that the opinion did in fact consider separation of powers principles.87 And this Court, too, albeit with less discussion, has ruled that where

summary judgment is properly granted on a condemnation complaint, a preliminary injunction is appropriate as well. We effectively granted immediate access on

the basis that the gas company had demonstrated success on the merits and strong arguments on the other

prongs of the preliminary injunction test.88

As the preliminary injunction was permitted by

the Rules, permitted by the NGA, and did not amount

to a grant of “quick take” eminent domain power in either name or substance, the court did not usurp legislative power or otherwise overstep the boundaries of

its judicial power. We therefore see no violation of the

87

Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. 76 Acres, More or

Less, 701 F. App’x 221, 231 n.7 (4th Cir. 2017) (rejecting landowners’ argument that “Sage is distinguishable because it did not

mention the words ‘separation of powers’ ” in part because Sage

explicitly rejected the assertion “that only Congress can grant the

right of immediate possession”).

88

Columbia Gas v. 1.01 Acres, 768 F.3d at 315-16. We note

that district courts around the country have implemented the procedure, relying on the Circuit decisions like Sage. See Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co., LLC v. Permanent Easement for 0.03

Acres, 17-cv-565, 2017 WL 3485752, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 15,

2017) (“It is commonplace for district courts to order immediate

possession after FERC has taken a lengthy period of time determining whether or not to issue a certificate of public convenience

and necessity.”) (collecting cases). See also Alliance Pipeline L.P.

v. 4.360 Acres of Land, 746 F.3d 362 (8th Cir. 2014) (no abuse of

discretion in granting pipeline’s immediate use and possession

following FERC certificate and grant of summary judgment and

preliminary injunction).

App. 30

principle of separation of powers in the District Court’s

procedure.

The Hilltop/Hoffman Landowners argue separately that the District Court’s procedure deprived

them of any meaningful opportunity to challenge

FERC’s public use determination. This argument also

fails.

First, and most importantly, the Hilltop/Hoffman

Landowners do not dispute that they had the opportunity to raise their concerns with FERC and did in

fact do so;89 sought stays of the construction, which

were denied;90 and sought rehearing,91 which was also

denied on December 6, 2017.92 Before the order denying rehearing, the Landowners appealed to the D.C.

89

Hilltop/Hoffman Landowners submitted 9 comments to

FERC. Like/Mohn Landowners submitted 47 comments.

90

Order Denying Stay, Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co.,

LLC, 160 FERC ¶ 61,042 (Aug. 31, 2017), Accession No.

20170831-3088.

91

Request for Rehearing and Motion for Stay of Certain

Landowners (Mar. 6, 2017), Accession No. 20170306-5123; Petition for Rehearing of Lynda Like of Order Issuing Certificate for

the Atlantic Sunrise Project and Request for Stay of Certificate

(Mar. 6, 2017), Accession No. 20170306-5204; Petition for Rehearing of Follin Smith and Blair and Megan Mohn of Order Issuing

Certificate for the Atlantic Sunrise Project and Request for Stay

of Certificate (Mar. 6, 2017), Accession No. 20170306-5202.

92

Order on Rehearing, Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co.,

LLC, 161 FERC ¶ 61,250 (Dec. 6, 2017), Accession No. 201712063073. The D.C. Circuit denied the landowners’ request for a stay

pending the appeal of the FERC Order. Allegheny Def. Project v.

Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, Nos. 17-1098, 17-1128, 17-1263,

18-1030, 2018 WL 1388557 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 2018) (per curiam).

App. 31

Circuit Court, where the case is pending.93 The NGA

explicitly provides that neither a request for rehearing

before FERC nor judicial review can stay the effectiveness of a FERC certificate.94

In sum, the Hilltop/Hoffman Landowners are attacking the underlying FERC order, but review of the

underlying FERC order is only properly brought to

FERC on rehearing and then to an appropriate circuit

court, as the Hilltop/Hoffman Landowners are pursuing. We lack jurisdiction to hear collateral attacks on

the FERC certificate, which contained a finding that

the project was for public use.95 Neither the District

Court nor this Court in this case may entertain arguments such as those brought by the Hilltop/Hoffman

Landowners that FERC unduly credited self-serving

statements by Transcontinental and ignored the potential that the project might have been intended to

provide companies with greater access to the higher

priced overseas market.96

V

The Landowners do not appeal the preliminary injunction based on an abuse of discretion in the District

Court’s analysis and so have waived that argument on

appeal. Even so construed, their petition lacks merit.

93

Nos. 17-1128, 18-1030.

15 U.S.C. § 717r(c).

95

15 U.S.C. § 717r(b) (appeal of the certificate allowed in the

circuit where the gas company is located or in the D.C. Circuit).

96

Hilltop/Hoffman Brief at 37, 38.

94

App. 32

Transcontinental clearly showed success on the merits

and would have been harmed if the injunction were denied.

For the above reasons, we hold that the NGA’s

grant of standard condemnation powers to natural gas

companies does not preclude federal courts from granting equitable relief in the form of a preliminary injunction when gas companies have obtained the

substantive right to condemn and otherwise qualify for

equitable relief. Because the Landowners fail to recognize the District Court’s equitable power to enter preliminary injunctions once substantive rights are

determined, their appeals lack merit. We therefore affirm the orders of the District Court, granting the motions for preliminary injunctions.

App. 33

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS

PIPE LINE COMPANY, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

PERMANENT EASEMENT

FOR 2.14 ACRES AND TEMPORARY EASEMENTS FOR

3.59 ACRES IN CONESTOGA

TOWNSHIP, LANCASTER

COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA,

TAX PARCEL NUMBER

1201606900000, et al,

Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION

NO. 17-715

TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS

PIPE LINE COMPANY, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

PERMANENT EASEMENT

FOR 1.33 ACRES, TEMPORARY EASEMENTS FOR

2.28 ACRES IN CONESTOGA

TOWNSHIP, LANCASTER

COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA,

TAX PARCEL NUMBER

1202476100000, 4160 MAIN

STREET, CONESTOGA, PA

17516, et al,

Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION

NO. 17-720

App. 34

TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS

PIPE LINE COMPANY, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

PERMANENT EASEMENT

FOR 0.94 ACRES AND TEMPORARY EASEMENTS FOR

1.61 ACRES IN CONESTOGA

TOWNSHIP, LANCASTER

COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA,

TAX PARCEL NUMBER

1203589400000, SICKMAN

MILL ROAD, et al,

CIVIL ACTION

NO. 17-722

Defendants.

TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS

PIPE LINE COMPANY, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

PERMANENT EASEMENT

FOR 2.02 ACRES AND TEMPORARY EASEMENTS FOR

2.76 ACRES IN MANOR

TOWNSHIP, LANCASTER

COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA,

TAX PARCEL NUMBER

4100300500000, 3049 SAFE

HARBOR ROAD, MANOR

TOWNSHIP, LANCASTER, PA,

et al,

Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION

NO. 17-723

App. 35

TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS

PIPE LINE COMPANY, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

PERMANENT EASEMENT

FOR 1.02 ACRES AND TEMPORARY EASEMENTS FOR

1.65 ACRES IN WEST

HEMPFIELD TOWNSHIP,

LANCASTER COUNTY,

PENNSYLVANIA, TAX PARCEL NUMBER 3000462100000,

et al,

CIVIL ACTION

NO. 17-1725

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Schmel J. [J.L.S]

I.

August 23, 2017

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Company,

LLC (“Transco”), is involved in a project to construct

and operate a natural gas pipeline running through

five states, including a portion of Lancaster County,

Pennsylvania. Before the Court is the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment of Plaintiff in the four of the

five above-captioned cases.1 Defendant/landowners

1

On July 7, 2017, this Court granted Plaintiff ’s Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment in case number 17-1725 as unopposed, but declined to grant Plaintiff ’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction as to the landowners in that matter, the Adorers of the

Blood of Christ (“Adorers”). Accordingly, this opinion will address

App. 36

Hilltop Hollow Limited Partnership, Hilltop Hollow

Partnership, LLC, General Partner to Hilltop Hollow

Limited Partnership (“Hilltop”), Stephen Hoffman

(“Hoffman”), Blair and Megan Mohn (“Mohn”) and

Lynda Like (“Like”) all filed oppositions to Plaintiff ’s

Motions for Partial Summary Judgment. Plaintiff filed

replies, and argument was held on said motions.

Also before the Court is Transco’s Motions for Preliminary Injunction as to the four landowners above,

as well as Adorers of the Blood of Christ, United States

Province (“Adorers”). The landowners in question have

opposed Plaintiff ’s Motions for Preliminary Injunction, and an evidentiary hearing was held on said motions. For the following reasons, I find that Plaintiff has

the substantive right to condemn the properties in

question and Plaintiff ’s Motions for Partial Summary

Judgment are granted. Further, I find that Plaintiff

has the right to immediate possession of the properties

in question and Plaintiff ’s Motions for Preliminary Injunction are granted.

II.

MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving

party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.

the Motions for Partial Summary Judgment in case numbers 17715, 17-720, 17-722, and 17-723. It will also dispose of the Motion

for Preliminary Injunction in those four cases, as well as 17-1725.

App. 37

R. Civ. Proc. 56(c). “A motion for summary judgment

will not be defeated by ‘the mere existence’ of some disputed facts, but will be denied when there is a genuine

issue of material fact,” Am. Eagle Outfitters v. Lyle &

Scott Ltd., 584 F.3d 575, 581 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-248

(1986)). A fact is “material” if proof of its existence or

non-existence might affect the outcome of the litigation, and a dispute is “genuine” if “the evidence is such

that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

In undertaking this analysis, the court views the

facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving

party. “After making all reasonable inferences in the

nonmoving party’s favor, there is a genuine issue of

material fact if a reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party.” Pignataro v. Port Auth. of N.Y. and N.J.,

593 F.3d 265, 268 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Reliance Ins. Co.

v. Moessner, 121 F.3d 895, 900 (3d Cir. 1997)). While the

moving party bears the initial burden of showing the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact, meeting

this obligation shifts the burden to the non-moving

party who must “set forth specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S.

at 250.

B. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On March 31, 2015, Transco filed an application

with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

(“FERC”) under section 7(c) of the Natural Gas Act, 15

App. 38

U.S.C. § 717f(c), and Part 157 of the FERC’s regulations for a certificate of public convenience and necessity for its project to construct and operate a natural

gas pipeline in Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia,

North Carolina and South Carolina. On October 22,

2015, FERC mailed a letter to affected landowners, describing the project and inviting them to participate in

the environmental review process. (FERC Order, ¶ 68.)

On May 5, 2016, FERC issued a draft Environmental

Impact Statement, setting a public comment period

from May 12, 2016 to June 27, 2016. (FERC Order,

¶ 72.) FERC staff held four public comment meetings

between June 13 and 16, 2016, at which over 200

speakers commented. (Id.) FERC also received over

560 written comments in response to the draft EIS.

(Id.)

On October 13, 2016, FERC sent a letter to landowners regarding two alternative pipeline routes, and

allowed a special 30 day comment period, during which

time it received 25 letters regarding the proposed alternatives. (FERC Order, ¶ 73.) On November 3, 2016,

FERC issued for comment a draft General Conformity

Determination. (FERC Order, ¶ 74.) On December 30,

2016, FERC issued a final Environmental Impact

Statement. (FERC Order, ¶ 75.) Thereafter, on February 3, 2017, FERC issued an order granting Transco a

certificate of public convenience and necessity to construct, install, modify, operate, and maintain the Project known as the Atlantic Sunrise pipeline. (David

Sztroin Declaration, ¶ 13.) In order to construct, install, operate and maintain the FERC-approved

App. 39

project, Transco needs to obtain rights of way as described and depicted as Exhibit A attached to the Complaint in each of the above matters and as Exhibit B

attached to the Sztroin declaration. (Sztroin Dec., ¶ 2,

17.) These rights of way conform to the pipeline route

reviewed and approved by the FERC in the order of

February 3, 2017. (Sztroin Dec., ¶ 18.) The value of the

Rights of Way sought in each of the above matters is

claimed by the respective Landowners to be in excess

of $3,000, as each Landowner has rejected an offer by

Transco to purchase the rights of way for more than

$3,000. (Declaration of Aaron Blair, ¶¶ 8, 9.)

The FERC Certificate lists timely and untimely intervenors. To be considered a timely intervenor, a landowner was required to file a motion to intervene within

two weeks of April 15, 2015, when notice of Transco’s

application was published in the Federal Register.

Landowner Stephen Hoffman timely intervened and

Gary and Michelle Erb (owners of Hilltop Hollow) also

intervened, albeit untimely, in the FERC proceeding as

party intervenors. (FERC Order, Appendix A and B.)

Although they did not intervene in the FERC proceedings, Landowners Blair and Megan Mohn and Lynda

Like submitted comments to FERC regarding the project during the public comment period.

C. DISCUSSION

The Natural Gas Act permits the holder of a certificate of public convenience and necessity issued by

FERC to use eminent domain to acquire rights of way

App. 40

necessary to construct, operate and maintain a project

as approved by the FERC Order. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h).

Courts have held that the NGA authorizes a party to

exercise the federal power of eminent domain if it

meets the three-prong test set forth in the statute:

1)

The party must hold a FERC Certificate of

Public Convenience and Necessity;

2)

The party has not been able to acquire the

property rights required to construct, operate

and maintain a FERC-approved pipeline by

agreement with the landowners; and

3)

The value of the property sought to be condemned is more than $3,000.

Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. 1.01 Acres, 768

F.3d 300, 304 (3d Cir. 2014); Steckman Ridge GP, LLC

v. An Exclusive Natural Gas Storage Easement Beneath 11.078 Acres, No. 08-168, 2008 WL 4346405, at

*12-*13 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 2008); Alliance Pipeline L.P.

v. 4.360 Acres of Land, 746 F.3d 362, 364 (8th Cir. 2014);

Millennium Pipeline Co., L.L.C. v. Certain Permanent

and Temporary Easements, 777 F.Supp.2d 475, 479

(W.D. N.Y. 2011); aff ’d 552 F.App’x 37 (2d Cir. 2014).

In the above matters, there is no dispute that

Transco holds a FERC certificate, that it has been unable to acquire the property rights in question to construct, operate and maintain the FERC-approved

pipeline by agreement with the landowners, and that

the value of the properties in question is greater than

$3,000. However, the landowners have opposed the entry of partial summary judgment in this matter and

App. 41

present several arguments in opposition to Transco’s

exercise of eminent domain. Landowners Hilltop and

Hoffman argue that they have been denied their due

process rights under the Fifth Amendment to the

United States Constitution and that Plaintiff therefore

does not have the authority to condemn the Rights of

Way. Landowners Like and Mohn argue that the FERC

order is a “conditioned” order without “force or effect”

and that the Rights of Way being condemned exceed

the scope of the FERC order. As discussed below, I find

that all of these arguments are unpersuasive. Landowners cannot establish any genuine issue of material

fact as to the three conditions set forth in the Natural

Gas Act required prior to the exercise of eminent domain by Transco; therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to the

entry of partial summary judgment in this matter.

1. HILLTOP HOLLOW AND HOFFMAN

Hilltop Hollow and Hoffman (“Hilltop”) do not dispute the fact that Transco has a FERC certificate, has

been unable to acquire the rights of way that it needs

to construct its pipeline, and that the value of the property in question is over $3,000. Rather, Hilltop argues

that its due process rights under the Fifth Amendment

are being violated.

First, Hilltop argues that this Court has jurisdiction in this matter beyond the issue of fair compensation. Hilltop admits that “FERC’s procedures and the

Natural Gas Act provide that substantive challenges

to the Certificate Order be directed in the first instance

App. 42

to FERC,” but then argues that the “importance of

Hilltop’s right to due process and the de facto finality

of the proposed taking,” should overrule the FERC provisions that prohibit substantive challenges in this

Court.2

This argument is incorrect. Hilltop’s claims of due

process violations are in fact attacks on the FERC order itself, disguised as constitutional claims. It is

widely accepted that the validity of a FERC Order can

only be challenged in front of FERC, and then in the

United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. It is important that this precedent be

followed so large pipeline projects cannot be challenged in many forums, so as to establish a sole final

arbiter for the decisions. In Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co.

v. 104 Acres of Land More of Less, 749 F.Supp. 427

(D.R.I. 1990), the court set forth the limitations of a

federal district court in reviewing FERC Certificates of

Public Convenience and Necessity pursuant to the

Natural Gas Act. It stated:

United States District Courts have a limited

scope of review under Section 7(h) of the Natural Gas Act. Disputes over the reasons and

procedure for issuing certificates of public

convenience and necessity must be brought to

the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

2

I note that Hilltop also argues that since FERC presently

has only one member, it lacks a quorum to address its request for

rehearing. However, on August 3, 2017, the United States Senate

confirmed two additional members of FERC. Therefore, FERC

now has a quorum and this argument of Hilltop is moot and will

be disregarded.

App. 43

for hearing. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(b). The District

Court’s role is to evaluate the scope of the certificate and to order condemnation of property

as authorized in the certificate. See Williams

Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma City, 890 F.2d

255, 262 (10th Cir.1989) (“Judicial review . . .

is exclusive in the courts of appeals once the

FERC certificate issues.”), cert denied, 497

U.S. 1003, 110 S.Ct. 3236, 111 L.Ed.2d 747

(1990); Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp.

v. 118 Acres of Land, 745 F.Supp. 366

(E.D.La.1990) (“review of FERC orders are to

be made only to United States Circuit Courts

of Appeal”). District Courts, therefore, are limited to jurisdiction to order condemnation of

property in accord with a facially valid certificate. Questions of the propriety or validity of

the certificate must first be brought to the

Commission upon an application for rehearing and the Commissioner’s action thereafter

may be reviewed by a United States Court of

Appeals.

Id. at 430. See also Steckman Ridge GP, LLC v. An Exclusive Nat. Gas Storage Easement Beneath 11.078

Acres, 2008 WL 4346405, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 2008)

(“Under the statutory framework, there is no appeal of

a FERC decision save to the appropriate Court of Appeals. Disputes as to the propriety of FERC’s proceedings, findings, orders, or reasoning, must be brought to

FERC by way of request for rehearing. Appeals may

thereafter be brought before a U.S. Court of Appeals

only.”)

App. 44

Clearly, abundant case law states that the jurisdiction of this court in this type of proceeding is to order condemnation only. Hilltop has failed to cite any

case that supports its proposition that this Court has

jurisdiction in this matter to independently address

the validity of the FERC order. Therefore, I find that

this Court lacks the jurisdiction to address any sort

of attack on the FERC order itself, constitutional or

otherwise.

Next, Hilltop argues that it has not been afforded

its due process right to challenge whether the project

serves a public purpose. It is undisputed in this matter

that Hilltop participated in the pre-deprivation hearing, filed a request for rehearing a FERC, and filed a

challenge to the FERC order in the United States

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.

As discussed above, this is the proper forum in which

to challenge the validity of a FERC order. Although

Hilltop’s request for rehearing is pending in front of

FERC, the NGA provides that the filing of a request

for rehearing shall not, unless specifically ordered by

FERC, operate as a stay of the certificate order. 15

U.S.C. § 717r(c); see Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 749 F.Supp.

at 431 (“Applications for rehearing by three public utility companies are presently before the commission.

However, the Natural Gas Act directs that an application for a rehearing shall not operate as a stay of the

Commission’s order unless specifically ordered by the

Commission or by a reviewing Court of Appeals.”)

Hilltop received adequate due process at the

FERC level, and on appeal. Its attempt to claim due

App. 45

process violations to this Court is a collateral attack to

the FERC order, which is not permitted. Any challenge

to the substance and/or validity of the order belongs in

front of FERC. “The district court’s function under the

statute is not appellate, but rather, to provide for enforcement.” Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. +/- 0.14

Acres of Land, 2016 WL 3189010 at *2 (M.D. Fl. June

8, 2016).

Further, the specific collateral attack that Hilltop

presents here, i.e., that the FERC order does not serve

a public purpose, has been rejected by other courts. See

Constitution Pipeline Co., LLC v. A Permanent Easement for 1.52 Acres, 2015 WL 12556149, at *3 (N.D.N.Y.

Feb. 26, 2015) (“[D]efendants argue that the FERC Order does not support a public purpose . . . plaintiff correctly points put that once a FERC certificate is issued,

judicial review of the FERC certificate itself is only

available in the circuit court.”). In addition, to the extent Hilltop is arguing that the process by which FERC

granted the certificate is deficient, that type of attack

has also been rejected. See Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co. v. 104

Acres of Land, 749 F.Supp. at 430 (finding that disputes over the procedures for issuing certificates of

public convenience and necessity must be brought to

the FERC for rehearing, and thereafter to a federal

court of appeals).

In addition, I find that even if this Court did have

jurisdiction to consider Hilltop’s constitutional arguments, which it does not, no due process violations

App. 46

have occurred. Hilltop presents two arguments regarding their constitutional due process rights.3 First, they

argue that due process requires an in-person evidentiary hearing prior to the issuance of the FERC order,

or prior to condemnation. Second, they argue that

FERC’s issuance of a Tolling Order which extends

FERC’s time to decide Hilltop’s request for rehearing

and a stay violates their due process rights, will address both arguments below.

First, reject Defendant’s argument that due process requires an in-person evidentiary hearing before

a FERC order can be issued. In the instant matter,

FERC issued the Order after a “paper hearing,” meaning Hilltop and other affected landowners submitted

written objections during the certificate review and

comment period, Hilltop claims that it is entitled to an

in-person hearing on this matter, and argues that the

lack of such a hearing violates its right to be heard.

However, the NGA does not require an in-person evidentiary hearing. “FERC’s choice whether to hold an

evidentiary hearing is generally discretionary.” Blumenthal v. FERC, 613 F.3d 1142, 1144 (D.C.Cir.2010).

“In general, FERC must hold an evidentiary hearing

only when a genuine issue of material fact exists, and

even then, FERC need not conduct such a hearing if

[the disputed issues] may be adequately resolved on

3

Hilltop also argues that because FERC lacks a quorum,

they have no effective means to challenge the FERC Order, and

its due process rights are therefore being violated, As discussed

above, FERC has a quorum as of August 3, 2017, Therefore, this

argument is moot.

App. 47

the written record.” Cajun Elec. Power Coop., Inc. v.

FERC, 28 F.3d 173, 177 (D.C.Cir.1994) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). See also Minisink Residents for Envtl. Pres. &

Safety v. F.E.R.C., 762 F.3d 97, 114 (D.C. Cir. 2014).

Clearly, FERC was not required to hold an in-person

evidentiary hearing in this matter, and the fact that

they granted the Order after a paper hearing does not

result in a due process violation.

In addition, federal courts have found that, for

purposes of a taking, due process only requires that

reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard is

provided in the compensation stage of the proceedings.

See Collier v. City of Springdale, 733 F.2d 1311, 1314

(8th Cir. 1984); Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464

F.3d 480, 489 (4th Cir. 2006).4

Next, Hilltop argues that FERC’s tolling order deprives them of their due process rights because it “indefinitely” extends FERC’s “time limit to rule on

[Landowners’] Motion for Rehearing and stay.” In response, Transco argues that the issuance of the Tolling

Order does not deprive Hilltop of a protectable due process, and therefore it is not entitled to due process protections. I find Transco is correct. Although a cause of

action constitutes a protectable property interest for

4

I find that Hilltop’s reliance on Brody v. Village of Port

Chester, 434 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2005) and Finberg v. Sullivan, 634

F.2d 50 (3d Cir. 1980) in support of their argument that they are

entitled to a pre-deprivation judicial hearing is misplaced, as neither case addresses a taking under the Natural Gas Act and both

are clearly distinguishable from the instant set of facts.

App. 48

the purposes of evaluation of due process violations,

mere delays in the adjudication of a claim do not

amount to a deprivation of property. See Council of &

for the Bline of Delaware Cty. Valley, Inc. v. Regan, 709

F.2d 1521, 1533-34 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“In order to state a

legally cognizable constitutional claim, appellants

must allege more than the deprivation of the expectation that the agency will carry out its duties.”) (emphasis in original); see also Polk v. Kramarsky, 711 F.2d

505, 508-09 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding that plaintiff ’s property right, while delayed, was not extinguished, and

that no deprivation of property interest occurred). The

reconstituted FERC, now with a quorum to act, has the

ability to address Hilltop and the other landowners’

claims for relief. Accordingly, Hilltop’s due process

claims must fail.

2. LIKE AND MOHN

Landowners Lynda Like and Brian and Megan

Mohn (“Like and Mohn”) do not dispute that FERC issued an order granting a certificate of public convenience and necessity, that the value of the rights of way

sought exceed $3,000, that Transco has been unable to

obtain the Rights of Way in question from the landowners, and that the Rights of Way being condemned conform to the pipeline route that was contained in the

FERC order. Accordingly, they are clearly unable to

present any genuine issues of material fact regarding

Transco’s substantive right to condemn. Like and

Mohn instead argue that the FERC order is a “conditional order” that is “without force and effect” and that

App. 49

the rights of way being condemned exceed the scope of

the FERC order. I find both of these arguments to be

unpersuasive.

Like and Mohn argue that FERC can condition a

FERC order on “reasonable terms and conditions” as

the public convenience and necessity may require pursuant to the NGA. They further argue that because the

FERC order for the project in this matter incorporated

many conditions, some of which have not yet been met,

Transco is not permitted to exercise eminent domain.

However, the NGA does not contain a requirement that

the holder of a FERC certificate satisfy all conditions

of said certificate prior to the exercise of eminent domain. Rather, the FERC order specifically stated that

“[o]nce a natural gas company obtains a certificate of

public convenience and necessity, it may exercise the

right of eminent domain in a U.S. District Court or a

state court.” FERC Order, ¶ 67. Courts have repeatedly

rejected similar arguments that a pipeline company

cannot exercise eminent domain because a FERC Order is conditioned. See, e.g., Constitution Pipeline, 2015

WL 12556145, at *2 (rejecting argument that pipeline

company could not exercise eminent domain until it

had obtained certain permits required prior to construction as conditions of the certificate order because

the FERC had not expressly made such permits a condition to exercising eminent domain); Columbia Gas

Transmission, LLC v. 370.393 Acres, 2014 WL 5092880,

at *4 (D. Md. Oct. 9, 2014) (rejecting argument that

pipeline company had failed to comply with certain

conditions listed in the FERC certificate arid finding

App. 50

that claims that a company is not in compliance with

the FERC certificate must be brought to FERC, not the

court); Portland Natural Gas Transmission Sys. v. 4.83

Acres, 26 F.Supp.2d 332, 336 (D.N.H. 1998) (“Compliance with FERC conditions cannot be used as a defense to the right of eminent domain and cannot be

cited to divest the court of the authority to grant immediate entry and possession to the holder of a FERC

certificate); Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co. v. 104 Acres of Land,

749 F.Supp. 427, 433 (D.R.I. 1990) (holding that “requirements in the FERC order arise after ownership of

the rights of way are obtained and do not operate as a

shield against the exercise of eminent domain power”).

Like and Mohn cite Delaware Dept. of Natural Resources and Environmental Control v. FERC, 558 F.3d

575, 579 (D.D.C. 2009), and Ruby Pipeline, L.L.C., 133

FERC ¶ 61015, at 61055 (2010), for the proposition

that Transco cannot condemn the property in question

based on the FERC order because it is “an incipent authorization without force or effect.” However, neither of

these cases supports the landowners’ argument that a

pipeline company cannot exercise eminent domain if

the certificate order contains conditions. Rather, both

Delaware Dept. of Natural Resources and Ruby Pipeline address the fact that conditioned certificate orders

do not authorize construction to start.

The FERC certificate in question does, in fact, contain prerequisite conditions, some of which remain unmet at this time. However, the landowners do not cite

to, nor have I located, any case that holds that

Transco’s exercise of eminent domain is prohibited

App. 51

until the conditions in the FERC certificate are met,

Lacking any such case law, I will not order such an extreme outcome. It is true that there are conditions in

the FERC certificate that Transco will need to meet

prior to commencing actual construction of the pipeline, but the fulfillment of these conditions is not a prerequisite to Transco’s exercise of eminent domain.

Furthermore, those conditions must be met before any

construction begins.

Like and Mohn also argue that the rights of way

being condemned exceed the scope of the FERC order.

In particular, Like and Mohn take issue with the fact

that the Complaint states Transco seeks to acquire

rights of way that include the right to “alter, repair,

change the size of, replace and remove” the pipeline.

Complaint, ¶1(f ). At oral argument in this matter,

counsel for the landowners indicated a particular concern with the language that allows Transco to “change

the size of ” the pipeline, arguing that this would allow

Transco to expand the pipeline beyond the right of way

authorized by the FERC order. This argument is

clearly incorrect, because the description of the rights

of way in the Complaints in these matters expressly

limits the rights of way being condemned to those

rights “approved by the Order of the Federal Energy

Regulatory Commission dated February 3, 2017,

Docket No. CP15 138 000, 158 FERC ¶ 61,125 (2017).”

Based upon this description, the rights of way that are

being condemned in this matter are not subject to being increased in size. However, out of an abudance of

caution, I will limit the rights being sought by Transco

App. 52

in this regard to the right to alter, repair, change but

not increase the size of, replace and remove the

pipeline.

III. MOTIONS FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

A. LEGAL STANDARD

Once Transco has established that it has a substantive right to condemn the property at issue, a court

“may exercise equitable power to grant the remedy of

immediate possession through the issuance of a preliminary injunction” pursuant to Rule 65 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. E. Tenn. Natural Gas Co. v.

Sage, 361 F.3d 808, 828 (4th Cir. 2004). A party seeking

a preliminary injunction must prove four factors: 1) a

reasonable probability of success on the merits; 2) irreparable harm to the movant in the absence of relief;

3) granting the preliminary injunction will not result

in greater harm to the nonmoving party; and 4) the

public interest favors granting the injunction. American Exp. Travel Related Services, Inc. v. SidamonEristoff, 669 F.3d 359, 366 (3d Cir. 2012). In Reilly v.

City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 2017), the

Third Circuit recently clarified the preliminary injunction standard:

A movant for preliminary equitable relief

must meet the threshold for the first two

“most critical” factors: it must demonstrate

that it can win on the merits (which requires

a showing significantly better than negligible

but not necessarily more likely than not) and

App. 53

that it is more likely than not to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief. If these gateway factors are met, a court

then considers the remaining two factors and

determines in its sound discretion if all four

factors, taken together, balance in favor of

granting the requested preliminary relief.

Reilly, 858 F.3d at 179.

B. DISCUSSION

After analysis of the four factors set forth above

with regard to the five landowners currently before me,

I find that the factors favor the entry of a preliminary

injunction in favor of Transco.

1. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

First, Transco has already succeeded on the merits. A preliminary injunction in a condemnation case is

unlike preliminary injunctions in other types of civil

matters because the plaintiff requests a decision on the

merits of the matter at the same time. As explained by

the Third Circuit:

This is not a “normal” preliminary injunction,

where the merits will await another day. In

those situations, the probability of success is

not a certainty such that weighing the other

factors is paramount. Here, there is no remaining merits issue; we have ruled that Columbia has the right to the easements by

eminent domain. The only issue is the amount

App. 54

of just compensation – which will definitely be

determined on remand, but the result of

which can have no affect [sic] on Columbia’s

rights to the easement.

Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. 1.01 Acres, 768

F.3d at 315. Further, all three Pennsylvania district

courts within the Third Circuit have held that the

grant of a preliminary injunction is appropriate when

a FERC certificate holder has established the substantive right to condemn a property, subject to a future

determination of just compensation. Constitution Pipeline Company, LLC v. A Permanent Easement for 1.92

Acres, 2015 WL 1219524 at *4 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 2015);

Steckman Ridge, 2008 WL 4346405, at *18; Columbia

Gas Transmission Corp. v. An Easement, 2006 WL

401850, at *3. Therefore, given my determination

above that Transco has the substantive right to condemn the properties at issue, the likelihood of success

on the merits has been established. Accordingly, this

factor favors Transco.

2. Irreparable Harm

Second, Transco will suffer irreparable harm if a

preliminary injunction is not granted. In their opposition to the preliminary injunction, the defendants

make several arguments. They argue that the project

in question is already delayed and will not be completed in time for the 2017-18 winter heating season,

that the project still has numerous conditions that

need to be satisfied before construction can begin, so

the timeliness of the project does not depend on

App. 55

immediate possession of the properties in question and

that the monetary losses Transco will incur if the project is delayed do not constitute irreparable harm.

These arguments are insufficient to defeat the

claims of irreparable harm put forth by Transco. First,

Transco argues that a construction delay itself is irreparable harm and it cannot even begin construction in

Pennsylvania until it has survey access and has satisfied relevant pre-construction conditions. Numerous

courts have agreed that construction delays in building

these types of pipelines constitute irreparable harm.

See, e.g., Constitution Pipeline Co. v. A Permanent Easement for 0.42 Acres, 2015 WL 12556145, at *5 (holding

that pipeline company would be irreparably harmed

without immediate possession because it would be unable to begin construction in time to allow the project

to be completed by the in service date); Steckman

Ridge, 2008 WL 436405, at *17 (holding that pipeline

company would be irreparably harmed without immediate possession because it would suffer undue delay

and be in non-compliance with the in service date required by the FERC Certificate). Admittedly, Transco

has already missed the deadline to have the pipeline

in service by the 2017-18 winter heating season as contained in the Order. (Sztroin testimony, July 17, 2017.)

However, Transco argues that the date the pipeline

will commence operation will continue to be pushed

back if possession is not granted by August 18, 2017.

Mr. Sztroin testified that every delay has a “domino effect” that delays the entire project further.

App. 56

Further, Mr. Sztroin testified that Transco must

have possession by August 18, 2017 in order to avoid

specific construction delays. According to Mr. Sztroin,

possession is necessary so Transco can complete surveys that are required to satisfy certain pre-construction conditions. In addition, he testified that

construction is limited in some places by environmental conditions. In order to complete construction and

ensure compliance with shipper contracts, he testified

that Transco must have possession by August 18, 2017,

to complete the surveys necessary on endangered and

threatened wildlife that can only be done during certain times each year.

In addition, Transco argues that it will suffer irreparable harm in the manner of monetary loss if a

preliminary injunction is not granted. Transco alleges

that non-possession of the properties at issue here will

cause it to lose $500,000 per month, and will delay revenue of $33,000,000 per month, This argument was

supported by the testimony of Mr. Sztroin. Further,

Sztroin testified about the costs of “move-arounds” in

linear pipeline construction if crews cannot access a

particular property.

I find that Transco has sufficiently proven that it

will suffer irreparable harm if it does not obtain possession of the properties at issue. As recently stated by

the Honorable Matthew W. Brann of the U.S. District

Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, in addressing different properties located along the same

pipeline project:

App. 57

In sum, the Atlantic Sunrise Project is large

in both scope and geography, spanning five

states. “The magnitude of the Project requires

a complex and coordinated construction process, with work activities being performed in

sequential phases.” Sabal Trail Transmission,

LLC v. +/- 0.41 Acres of Land in Hamilton Cty.

Florida, 2016 WL 3188985, at * 3 (M.D. Fla.

June 8, 2016). Each piece of the construction

puzzle depends on the prior piece timely

placed. Untimeliness in one small part of this

enormous project would result in a domino effect on the timeliness of all other areas of the

project.

Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Company, LLC v. Permanent Easement for 3.70 Acres, No. 17-CV-628, Memorandum Opinion, ECF no. 27 (M.D. Pa., Aug. 9, 2017).

The irreparable harm factor weighs strongly in favor

of Transco.

3. Harm to the Nonmoving Party

Granting Transco’s preliminary injunction will

not result in greater harm to the landowner, despite

Defendants’ arguments to the contrary. As determined

above, Transco has the substantive right to possession.

Therefore, Transco will eventually obtain possession of

the properties at issue; the only question is the timing

of possession. It is natural for some landowners to

want to delay possession as long as possible, but there

is no legal basis for further delay. As stated by the

Court in Constitution Pipeline Co., 2015 WL 12556145,

at *5, “[a]ny injury to defendant will arise from the

App. 58

[Natural Gas Act] and the FERC Order, and will occur

regardless of whether the Court grants a preliminary

injunction to [the pipeline company]. In the exercise of

its discretion, the Court finds that the harm alleged by

defendants weighs less heavily than the harms alleged

by plaintiff.” Constitution Pipeline Co., 2015 WL

12556145, at *5. “Nothing indicates that the defendants will suffer any greater harm by allowing [the

pipeline company] to possess the property immediately

instead of after trial and the determination of just compensation.” Columbia Gas Transmission LLC v. 0.85

Acres, 2014 WL 4471541, at *7.

Defendants Like and Mohn argue that they face a

risk of harm because the project lacks certain permits

and if their property is taken and the permits are eventually denied, they will have lost their property with

no means to recover it. I find this contention to be incorrect, as the landowners would have legal recourse if

this unlikely event would occur. See USG Pipeline Co.

v. 1.74 Acres, 1 F.Supp.2d 816, 825-26 (E.D. Tenn. 1998)

(granting immediate possession because even if the

FERC Order is overturned by FERC or some other

court with jurisdiction over it, the properties could be

restored substantially to their prior condition and

landowners could seek damages in trespass.) Like and

Mohn also argue that they will be irreparably harmed

because Plaintiff may mobilize its equipment on their

properties and remove trees prior to construction approval. This argument is unpersuasive, because this

conduct will either occur now or after just compensation has been determined. I find this alleged harm to

App. 59

be outweighed by Plaintiff ’s risk of harm in not obtaining immediate possession.

Defendant Adorers argue they will suffer harm

that implicates their fundamental rights to free exercise of religion and ownership of property if Transco is

granted immediate possession. Adorers claim that they

“exercise their religious beliefs by, among other things,

coxing for and protecting the land they own,” and that

their efforts to “preserve the sacredness of God’s

Earth” are integral to the practice of their faith. However, the Adorers have failed to establish how Transco’s

possession of the right of way on their land will in any

way affect their ability to practice their faith and

spread their message. They have not presented one

piece of evidence that demonstrates how their religious

beliefs will be abridged in any way. Clearly, the harm

alleged by Transco outweighs this harm alleged by the

Adorers. Additionally, Transco will post sufficient

bonds upon the grant of the preliminary injunction;

therefore, any amount of money damages any landowner may suffer will be secure and a remedy will be

available. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of

Transco.

4. Public Interest

Lastly, granting the preliminary injunction is in

the public interest, as the project will provide the general public throughout a vast area of the country with

access to the Marcellus Shale natural gas supplies for

heating their homes and other purposes. Defendants

App. 60

Hilltop and Hoffman argue that much of the natural

gas that will be carried by the pipeline is intended for

exportation, and therefore, not in the public interest.

However, this argument is speculative. Hilltop argues

that 87% of the Project’s capacity is currently subscribed to by four gas production companies that will

have direct access to export facilities, but the mere fact

that these companies will have access to export facilities does not mean that they will in fact export the natural gas out of the country. This argument is too

speculative for me to find that this factor weighs in favor of the landowners.

“Congress passed the Natural Gas Act and gave

gas companies condemnation power to insure that consumers would have access to an adequate supply of

natural gas at reasonable prices.” E. Tennessee Nat.

Gas Co. v. Sage, 361 F.3d at 830, citing Clark v. Gulf Oil

Corp., 570 F.2d 1138, 1145-46 (3d Cir. 1977). Congress

and FERC have found that interstate natural gas projects, and this project in particular, are in the public

interest. Accordingly, this factor also weighs in favor of

Transco.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff ’s Motions

for Partial Summary Judgment and for Preliminary

Injunction are granted. Plaintiff shall post a bond with

the Clerk of Court for each property in accordance with

the Court’s Order. Appropriate orders will follow.

App. 61

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT

OF PENNSYLVANIA

:

:

:

:

:

Plaintiff,

: CIVIL ACTION –

:

LAW

v.

:

Docket No.

PERMANENT EASEMENTS

: 5:17-CV-00715

FOR 2.14 ACRES AND TEMPO- :

RARY EASEMENTS FOR 3.59

:

ACRES IN CONESTOGA TOWN- :

SHIP, LANCASTER COUNTY,

:

PENNSYLVANIA, TAX PARCEL :

NUMBER 1201606900000, 415

:

HILLTOP DRIVE, CONESTOGA, :

CONESTOGA TOWNSHIP,

:

LANCASTER COUNTY, PA

:

:

HILLTOP HOLLOW

:

LIMITED PARTNERSHIP

:

203 SIDEHILL TERRACE

:

WILLOW STREET, PA 17584

:

HILLTOP HOLLOW PARTNER- :

SHIP, LLC GENERAL PARTNER :

OF HILLTOP HOLLOW

:

LIMITED PARTNERSHIP

:

203 SIDEHILL TERRACE

:

WILLOW STREET, PA 17584

:

TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS

PIPE LINE COMPANY, LLC

2800 POST OAK BOULEVARD

HOUSTON, TEXAS 77251-1396,

App. 62

LANCASTER FARMLAND

TRUST 125 LANCASTER

AVENUE

STRASBURG, PA 17579

AND ALL UNKNOWN

OWNERS,

Defendants.

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

ORDER

AND NOW, this 23rd day of August, 2017, upon

consideration of Plaintiff ’s Omnibus Motion for Preliminary Injunction for Possession of Rights of Way by

August 18, 2017 Pursuant to the Natural Gas Act and

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 71.1 and 65, and the

accompanying documents, Defendants’ opposition

thereto, and Plaintiff ’s Reply, and after a hearing and

oral argument being held, it is hereby ORDERED

that the Motion is GRANTED. It is further ORDERED as follows:

(1) Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Company,

LLC (“Transco”) has the substantive right to condemn

the following easements and rights of way (collectively

referred to as the “Rights of Way”):

a.

Permanent rights of way and easements of

2.14 acres, as described as “Area of Proposed

CPLS R/W #1,” “Area of Proposed CPLS R/W

#2,” and “Area of Proposed CPLS R/W #3” in

Exhibit A attached hereto, for the purpose of

constructing, operating, maintaining, altering, repairing, changing but not increasing

the size of, replacing and removing a pipeline

App. 63

and all related equipment and appurtenances

thereto (including but not limited to meters,

fittings, tie-overs, valves, cathodic protection

equipment, and launchers and receivers) for

the transportation of natural gas, or its byproducts, and other substances as approved

by the Order of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission dated February 3, 2017,

Docket No. CP15-138-000, 158 FERC ¶ 61,125

(2017), together with the right to construct,

maintain, operate, repair, alter, replace and

remove cathodic protection equipment and

the necessary appurtenances thereto, such as

but not limited to poles, guy wires, anchors,

rectifiers, power lines, cables, deep well anode

and anode ground beds under, upon, and over

the permanent right of way and easement,

and conducting all other activities as approved by the Order of the Federal Energy

Regulatory Commission dated February 3,

2017, Docket No. CP15-138-000, 158 FERC

¶ 61,125 (2017); together with all rights and

benefits necessary or convenient for the full

enjoyment or use of the right of way and easement. Further, the landowner shall not build

any permanent structures on said permanent

right of way or any part thereof, will not

change the grade of said permanent right of

way, or any part thereof, will not plant trees

on said permanent right of way, or any part

thereof, or use said permanent right of way or

any part thereof for a road, or use said permanent right of way or any part thereof in such

a way as to interfere with Transco’s immediate and unimpeded access to said permanent

App. 64

right of way, or otherwise interfere with

Transco’s lawful exercise of any of the rights

herein granted without first having obtained

Transco’s approval in writing; and the landowner will not permit others to do any of said

acts without first having obtained Transco’s

approval in writing. Transco shall have the

right from time to time at no additional cost

to landowners to cut and remove all trees including trees considered as a growing crop, all

undergrowth and any other obstructions that

may injure, endanger or interfere with the

construction and use of said pipeline and all

related equipment and appurtenances

thereto; and

b.

Temporary easements of 3.59 acres, as described as “Area of Proposed Temporary Work

Space #1,” “Area of Proposed Temporary Work

Space #2,” Area of Proposed Temporary Work

Space #3,” “Area of Proposed Temporary Work

Space #4,” “Area of Proposed Temporary Work

Space #5,” and “Area of Proposed Temporary

Work Space #6” in Exhibit A attached hereto,

for use during the pipeline construction and

restoration period only for the purpose of ingress, egress and regress and to enter upon,

clear off and use for construction and all other

activities approved by the Order of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission dated

February 3, 2017, Docket No. CP15-138-000,

158 FERC ¶ 61,125 (2017).

(2) Upon filing the bond required below, beginning August 18, 2017, Transco is granted access to, possession of and entry to the Rights of Way for all

App. 65

purposes allowed under the Order of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission dated February 3, 2017,

Docket No. CP15-138-000, 158 FERC ¶ 61,125 (2017);

(3) In the event of a violation of this Order by Defendants, such as interference with Transco’s possession of the Rights of Way by Defendants or by third

parties who are authorized by Defendants to be on the

Property, the U. S. Marshal Service, or a law enforcement agency it designates, shall be authorized to investigate and to arrest, confine in prison and/or bring

before the Court any persons found to be in violation

of this Order and in contempt of this Order, pending

his/her compliance with the Court’s Order.

(4) Transco shall post a bond in the amount of

$70,710.00 as security for the payment of just compensation to Defendants.

(5) Transco shall record this Order in the Office

of the Recorder of Deeds for Lancaster County, Pennsylvania.

BY THE COURT

/s/ Jeffrey L. Schmehl

Jeffrey L. Schmehl, J.

App. 66

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT

OF PENNSYLVANIA

:

:

:

:

:

Plaintiff,

: CIVIL ACTION –

:

LAW

v.

:

Docket No.

PERMANENT EASEMENT FOR :

1.33 ACRES AND TEMPORARY : 5:17-CV-00720

EASEMENTS FOR 2.28 ACRES :

IN CONESTOGA TOWNSHIP,

:

LANCASTER COUNTY, PENN- :

SYLVANIA, TAX PARCEL

:

NUMBER 1202476100000,

:

4160 MAIN STREET,

:

CONESTOGA, PA 17516

:

:

LYNDA LIKE A/K/A LINDA

:

LIKE 4160 MAIN STREET

:

CONESTOGA, PA 17516

:

AND ALL UNKNOWN

:

OWNERS,

:

Defendants.

:

TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS

PIPE LINE COMPANY, LLC

2800 POST OAK BOULEVARD

HOUSTON, TEXAS 77251-1396,

ORDER

AND NOW, the 23rd day August, 2017, upon consideration of Plaintiff ’s Omnibus Motion for Preliminary Injunction for Possession of Rights of Way by

App. 67

August 18, 2017 Pursuant to the Natural Gas Act and

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 71.1 and 65, and the

accompanying documents, Defendant’s opposition

thereto, and Plaintiff ’s Reply, and after a hearing and

oral argument being held, it is hereby ORDERED

that the Motion is GRANTED. It is further ORDERED as follows:

(1) Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Company,

LLC (“Transco”) has the substantive right to condemn

the following easements and rights of way (collectively

referred to as the “Rights of Way”):

a.

A permanent right of way and easement of

1.33 acres, as described as “Area of Proposed

CPLS R/W” in Exhibit A attached hereto, for

the purpose of constructing, operating, maintaining, altering, repairing, changing but not

increasing the size of, replacing and removing

a pipeline and all related equipment and appurtenances thereto (including but not limited to meters, fittings, tie-overs, valves,

cathodic protection equipment, and launchers

and receivers) for the transportation of natural gas, or its byproducts, and other substances as approved by the Order of the

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

dated February 3, 2017, Docket No. CP15-138000, 158 FERC ¶ 61,125 (2017), together with

a right of way and easement to construct,

maintain, operate, repair, alter, replace, and

remove cathodic protection equipment and

the necessary appurtenances thereto, such as

but not limited to poles, guy wires, anchors,

rectifiers, power lines, cables, deep well anode

App. 68

and anode ground beds under, upon, and over

the permanent access easement, and conducting all other activities as approved by the Order of the Federal Energy Regulatory

Commission dated February 3, 2017, Docket

No. CP15-138-000, 158 FERC ¶ 61,125 (2017);

together with all rights and benefits necessary or convenient for the full enjoyment or

use of the right of way and easement. Further,

the landowner shall not build any permanent

structures on said permanent right of way or

any part thereof, will not change the grade of

said permanent right of way, or any part

thereof, will not plant trees on said permanent

right of way, or any part thereof, or use said

permanent right of way or any part thereof for

a road, or use said permanent right of way or

any part thereof in such a way as to interfere

with Transco’s immediate and unimpeded access to said permanent right of way, or otherwise interfere with Transco’s lawful exercise

of any of the rights herein granted without

first having obtained Transco’s approval in

writing; and the landowner will not permit

others to do any of said acts without first having obtained Transco’s approval in writing.

Transco shall have the right from time to time

at no additional cost to landowners to cut and

remove all trees including trees considered as

a growing crop, all undergrowth and any other

obstructions that may injure, endanger or interfere with the construction and use of said

pipeline and all related equipment and appurtenances thereto; and

App. 69

b.

Temporary easements of 2.28 acres, as described as “Area of Proposed Temporary Work

Space #1” and “Area of Proposed Temporary

Work Space #2” in Exhibit A attached hereto,

for use during the pipeline construction and

restoration period only for the purpose of ingress, egress and regress and to enter upon,

clear off and use for construction and all other

activities approved by the Order of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission dated

February 3, 2017, Docket No. CP15-138-000,

158 FERC ¶ 61,125 (2017).

(2) Upon filing the bond required below, beginning August 18, 2017, Transco is granted access to, possession of and entry to the Rights of Way for all

purposes allowed under the Order of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission dated February 3, 2017,

Docket No. CP15-138-000, 158 FERC ¶ 61,125 (2017);

(3) In the event of a violation of this Order by Defendants, such as interference with Transco’s possession of the Rights of Way by Defendants or by third

parties who are authorized by Defendants to be on the

Property, the U. S. Marshal Service, or a law enforcement agency it designates, shall be authorized to investigate and to arrest, confine in prison and/or bring

before the Court any persons found to be in violation

of this Order and in contempt of this Order, pending

his/her compliance with the Court’s Order.

(4) Transco shall post a bond in the amount of

$40,440.00 as security for the payment of just compensation to Defendants.

App. 70

(5) Transco shall record this Order in the Office

of the Recorder of Deeds for Lancaster County, Pennsylvania.

BY THE COURT

/s/ Jeffrey L. Schmehl

Jeffrey L. Schmehl, J.

App. 71

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT

OF PENNSYLVANIA

:

:

:

:

:

Plaintiff,

: CIVIL ACTION –

:

LAW

v.

:

Docket No.

PERMANENT EASEMENT FOR :

0.94 ACRES AND TEMPORARY : 5:17-CV-00722

EASEMENTS FOR 1.61 ACRES :

IN CONESTOGA TOWNSHIP,

:

LANCASTER COUNTY, PENN- :

SYLVANIA, TAX PARCEL

:

NUMBER 1203589400000,

:

SICKMAN MILL ROAD

:

BLAIR B. MOHN AND MEGAN :

E. MOHN 356 SAND HILL ROAD :

:

CONESTOGA, PA 17516

:

AND ALL UNKNOWN

:

OWNERS,

:

Defendants.

:

TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS

PIPE LINE COMPANY, LLC

2800 POST OAK BOULEVARD

HOUSTON, TEXAS 77251-1396,

ORDER

AND NOW, this 23rd day of August, 2017, upon

consideration of Plaintiff ’s Omnibus Motion for Preliminary Injunction for Possession of Rights of Way by

August 18, 2017 Pursuant to the Natural Gas Act and

App. 72

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 71.1 and 65, and the

accompanying documents, Defendants’ opposition

thereto, Plaintiff ’s Reply, and after a hearing and oral

argument being held, it is hereby ORDERED that the

Motion is GRANTED. It is further ORDERED as follows:

(1) Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Company,

LLC (“Transco”) has the substantive right to condemn

the following easements and rights of way (collectively

referred to as the “Rights of Way”):

a.

A permanent right of way and easement of

0.94 acres, as described as “Area of Proposed

CPLS R/W” in Exhibit A attached hereto, for

the purpose of constructing, operating, maintaining, altering, repairing, changing but not

increasing the size of, replacing and removing

a pipeline and all related equipment and appurtenances thereto (including but not limited to meters, fittings, tie-overs, valves,

cathodic protection equipment, and launchers

and receivers) for the transportation of natural gas, or its byproducts, and other substances as approved by the Order of the

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

dated February 3, 2017, Docket No. CP15-138000, 158 FERC ¶ 61,125 (2017), together with

the right to construct, maintain, operate, repair, alter, replace and remove cathodic protection equipment and the necessary

appurtenances thereto, such as but not limited to poles, guy wires, anchors, rectifiers,

power lines, cables, deep well anode and anode ground beds under, upon, and over the

App. 73

permanent right of way and easement, and

conducting all other activities as approved by

the Order of the Federal Energy Regulatory

Commission dated February 3, 2017, Docket

No. CP15-138-000, 158 FERC ¶ 61,125 (2017);

together with all rights and benefits necessary or convenient for the full enjoyment or

use of the right of way and easement. Further,

the landowner shall not build any permanent

structures on said permanent right of way or

any part thereof, will not change the grade of

said permanent right of way, or any part

thereof, will not plant trees on said permanent

right of way, or any part thereof, or use said

permanent right of way or any part thereof for

a road, or use said permanent right of way or

any part thereof in such a way as to interfere

with Transco’s immediate and unimpeded access to said permanent right of way, or otherwise interfere with Transco’s lawful exercise

of any of the rights herein granted without

first having obtained Transco’s approval in

writing; and the landowner will not permit

others to do any of said acts without first having obtained Transco’s approval in writing.

Transco shall have the right from time to time

at no additional cost to landowners to cut and

remove all trees including trees considered as

a growing crop, all undergrowth and any other

obstructions that may injure, endanger or interfere with the construction and use of said

pipeline and all related equipment and appurtenances thereto; and

b.

Temporary easements of 1.61 acres, as described as “Area of Proposed Temporary Work

App. 74

Space #1” and “Area of Proposed Temporary

Work Space #2” in Exhibit A attached hereto,

for use during the pipeline construction and

restoration period only for the purpose of ingress, egress and regress and to enter upon,

clear off and use for construction and all other

activities approved by the Order of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission dated

February 3, 2017, Docket No. CP15-138-000,

158 FERC ¶ 61,125 (2017).

(2) Upon filing the bond required below, beginning August 18, 2017, Transco is granted access to, possession of and entry to the Rights of Way for all

purposes allowed under the Order of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission dated February 3, 2017,

Docket No. CP15-138-000, 158 FERC ¶ 61,125 (2017);

(3) In the event of a violation of this Order by Defendants, such as interference with Transco’s possession of the Rights of Way by Defendants or by third

parties who are authorized by Defendants to be on the

Property, the U. S. Marshal Service, or a law enforcement agency it designates, shall be authorized to investigate and to arrest, confine in prison and/or bring

before the Court any persons found to be in violation

of this Order and in contempt of this Order, pending

his/her compliance with the Court’s Order.

(4) Transco shall post a bond in the amount of

$62,340.00 as security for the payment of just compensation to Defendants.

App. 75

(5) Transco shall record this Order in the Office

of the Recorder of Deeds for Lancaster County, Pennsylvania.

BY THE COURT

/s/ Jeffrey L. Schmehl

Jeffrey L. Schmehl, J.

App. 76

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT

OF PENNSYLVANIA

:

:

:

:

:

Plaintiff,

: CIVIL ACTION –

:

LAW

v.

:

Docket No.

PERMANENT EASEMENT FOR :

2.02 ACRES AND TEMPORARY : 5:17-CV-00723

EASEMENTS FOR 2.76 ACRES :

IN MANOR TOWNSHIP,

:

LANCASTER COUNTY,

:

PENNSYLVANIA, TAX PARCEL :

NUMBER 4100300500000,

:

3049 SAFE HARBOR ROAD,

:

MANOR TOWNSHIP,

:

LANCASTER, PA 17551

:

:

STEPHEN D. HOFFMAN

:

3049 SAFE HARBOR ROAD

:

MILLERSVILLE, PA 17551

:

AND ALL UNKNOWN

:

OWNERS,

:

Defendants.

:

TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS

PIPE LINE COMPANY, LLC

2800 POST OAK BOULEVARD

HOUSTON, TEXAS 77251-1396,

ORDER

AND NOW, this 23rd day of August, 2017, upon

consideration of Plaintiff ’s Omnibus Motion for

App. 77

Preliminary Injunction for Possession of Rights of Way

by August 18, 2017 Pursuant to the Natural Gas Act

and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 71.1 and 65, and

the accompanying documents, Defendant’s opposition

thereto, Plaintiff ’s Reply, and after a hearing and oral

argument being held, it is hereby ORDERED that the

Motion is GRANTED. It is further ORDERED as follows:

(1) Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Company,

LLC (“Transco”) has the substantive right to condemn

the following easements and rights of way (collectively

referred to as the “Rights of Way”):

a.

A permanent right of way and easement of

2.02 acres, as described as “Area of Proposed

CPLS R/W” in Exhibit A attached hereto, for

the purpose of constructing, operating, maintaining, altering, repairing, changing but not

increasing the size of, replacing and removing

a pipeline and all related equipment and appurtenances thereto (including but not limited to meters, fittings, tie-overs, valves,

cathodic protection equipment, and launchers

and receivers) for the transportation of natural gas, or its byproducts, and other substances as approved by the Order of the

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

dated February 3, 2017, Docket No. CP15-138000, 158 FERC ¶ 61,125 (2017), together with

a right of way and easement to, construct,

maintain, operate, repair, alter, replace and

remove cathodic protection equipment and

the necessary appurtenances thereto, such as

but not limited to poles, guy wires, anchors,

App. 78

rectifiers, power lines, cables, deep well anode

and anode ground beds under, upon, and over

the permanent access easement, and conducting all other activities as approved by the Order of the Federal Energy Regulatory

Commission dated February 3, 2017, Docket

No. CP15-138-000, 158 FERC ¶ 61,125 (2017);

together with all rights and benefits necessary or convenient for the full enjoyment or

use of the right of way and easement. Further,

the landowner shall not build any permanent

structures on said permanent right of way or

any part thereof, will not change the grade of

said permanent right of way, or any part

thereof, will not plant trees on said permanent

right of way, or any part thereof, or use said

permanent right of way or any part thereof for

a road, or use said permanent right of way or

any part thereof in such a way as to interfere

with Transco’s immediate and unimpeded access to said permanent right of way, or otherwise interfere with Transco’s lawful exercise

of any of the rights herein granted without

first having obtained Transco’s approval in

writing; and the landowner will not permit

others to do any of said acts without first having obtained Transco’s approval in writing.

Transco shall have the right from time to time

at no additional cost to landowners to cut and

remove all trees including trees considered as

a growing crop, all undergrowth and any other

obstructions that may injure, endanger or interfere with the construction and use of said

pipeline and all related equipment and appurtenances thereto; and

App. 79

b.

Temporary easements of 2.76 acres, as described as “Area of Proposed Temporary Work

Space #1” and “Area of Proposed Temporary

Work Space #2” in Exhibit A attached hereto,

for use during the pipeline construction and

restoration period only for the purpose of ingress, egress and regress and to enter upon,

clear off and use for construction and all other

activities approved by the Order of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission dated

February 3, 2017, Docket No. CP15-138-000,

158 FERC ¶ 61,125 (2017).

(2) Upon filing the bond required below, beginning August 18, 2017, Transco is granted access to, possession of and entry to the Rights of Way for all

purposes allowed under the Order of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission dated February 3, 2017,

Docket No. CP15-138-000, 158 FERC ¶ 61,125 (2017);

(3) In the event of a violation of this Order by Defendants, such as interference with Transco’s possession of the Rights of Way by Defendants or by third

parties who are authorized by Defendants to be on the

Property, the U. S. Marshal Service, or a law enforcement agency it designates, shall be authorized to investigate and to arrest, confine in prison and/or bring

before the Court any persons found to be in violation

of this Order and in contempt of this Order, pending

his/her compliance with the Court’s Order.

(4) Transco shall post a bond in the amount of

$41,910.00 as security for the payment of just compensation to Defendants.

App. 80

(5) Transco shall record this Order in the Office

of the Recorder of Deeds for Lancaster County, Pennsylvania.

BY THE COURT

/s/ Jeffrey L. Schmehl

Jeffrey L. Schmehl, J.

App. 81

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS

PIPE LINE COMPANY, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

PERMANENT EASEMENTS

FOR 2.14 ACRES AND

TEMPORARY EASEMENTS

FOR 3.59 ACRES IN

CONESTOGA TOWNSHIP,

LANCASTER COUNTY,

PENNSYLVANIA; HILLTOP

HOLLOW LIMITED

PARTNERSHIP; HILLTOP

HOLLOW PARTNERSHIP,

LLC GENERAL PARTNER

OF HILLTOP HOLLOW

LIMITED PARTNERSHIP;

and LANCASTER

FARMLAND TRUST,

Defendants.

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 5:17-cv-00715

App. 82

TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS

PIPE LINE COMPANY, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

PERMANENT EASEMENT

FOR 2.02 ACRES AND

TEMPORARY EASEMENTS

FOR 2.76 ACRES IN MANOR

TOWNSHIP, LANCASTER

COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA;

and STEPHEN HOFFMAN,

Defendants.

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 5:17-cv-00723

OPINION

Plaintiff ’s Omnibus Motion for

Preliminary Injunction – Denied

Joseph F. Leeson, Jr.

United States District Judge

I.

April 6, 2017

Introduction

Plaintiff Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Company,

LLC (“Transco”) is involved in a project to operate and

construct a natural gas pipeline running through five

states, including a portion of Lancaster County, Pennsylvania. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

(FERC) issued a certificate on February 3, 2017, authorizing the construction and operation of the pipeline. Transco thereafter filed fourteen complaints in

condemnation in this Court seeking to acquire the

rights-of-way on Defendants’ properties. Presently

pending in two of these actions is Transco’s Omnibus

App. 83

Motion for Preliminary Injunction. For the reasons set

forth below, a determination as to whether Transco has

a right to condemn, which must be established before

the Court may grant injunctive relief, would be premature. Regardless, Transco has failed to show that it

will suffer irreparable harm because it may obtain access to Defendants’ property to conduct surveys pursuant to 26 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 309. The Omnibus Motion

for Preliminary Injunction is denied, but Transco will

be granted limited access pursuant to § 309.

II.

Legal Standard – Motion for Preliminary

Injunction

To prevail on a motion for a preliminary injunction, the moving party must show: (1) a likelihood of

success on the merits;1 (2) a likelihood of suffering

irreparable harm without the injunction;2 (3) the

1

For a natural gas company “to establish a right to condemn,

the following elements must be proved: (1) [the company] has

been issued a certificate of public convenience and necessity;

(2) [the company] has been unable to acquire the needed land by

contract with the Defendants; and (3) [t]he value of the subject

property claimed by the owner exceeds $ 3,000.00.” Steckman

Ridge GP, LLC v. Exclusive Nat. Gas Storage Easement Beneath

11.078 Acres, No. 08-168, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71302, at *39-40

(W.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 2008) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) of the Natural Gas Act of 1938 (NGA)).

2

“[O]f critical importance, ‘the irreparable harm requirement contemplates the inadequacy of alternate remedies available to the plaintiff.’ ” Contech Casting, LLC v. ZF Steering Sys.,

LLC, 931 F. Supp. 2d 809, 818 (E.D. Mich. 2013) (quoting Smith

& Nephew, Inc. v. Synthes (U.S.A.), 466 F. Supp. 2d 978, 982

(W.D. Tenn. 2006)). “[I]rreparable harm is not demonstrated

when there are available alternatives even when the alternatives

App. 84

balance of equities weighs in the moving party’s favor;

and (4) the public interest favors the injunction. Winter

v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).

The moving party bears the burden of showing that

each of these four factors tips in its favor. Ferring

Pharm., Inc. v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 765 F.3d 205, 210

(3d Cir. 2014) (“The ‘failure to establish any element

. . . renders a preliminary injunction inappropriate.’ ”

(quoting NutraSweet Co. v. Vit-Mar Enters., Inc., 176

F.3d 151, 153 (3d Cir. 1999))). “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as a

matter of right,” Winter, 555 U.S. at 24, and is reserved

for “limited circumstances,” Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx

Corp. 369 F.3d 700, 708 (3d Cir. 2004).

III. Findings of Fact3

“In granting or refusing an interlocutory injunction, the court must . . . state the findings and conclusions that support its action,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(2),

which requires the court to “find the facts specially and

state its conclusions of law separately,” Fed. R. Civ. P.

52(a)(1). While “Rule 52 does not require hyper-literal

adherence,” findings of fact and conclusions of law

are less convenient.” Corbett v. United States, No. 10-14106, 2011

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38531, at *14 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 1, 2011).

3

These findings of fact, which are made after an independent

review of the record, including all exhibits and briefs filed in regard to the Omnibus Motion for Preliminary Injunction, are

drawn from the two sides’ proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. See No. 17-715, ECF Nos. 25, 28; No. 17-723, ECF

Nos. 18, 21.

App. 85

must be delineated in such a manner that does not

leave an appellate court “unable to discern what were

[the court’s] intended factual findings.” See In re Frescati Shipping Co., 718 F.3d 184, 197 (3d Cir. 2013); see

also 9C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2579 (3d ed. 2008) (“The

district court should state separately its findings of

fact and conclusions of law without commingling

them. . . .”). Accordingly, this Court’s findings of facts

pertinent to the disposition of Transco’s Motion follows.

1. Transco is an interstate natural gas transmission company that will be the operator of a proposed

natural gas pipeline that will cross Defendants’ respective properties. Sztroin Decl. ¶¶ 3, 6, ECF No. 6-6 (No.

17-715); Hoffman Aff. ¶¶ 5-7, 11, ECF No. 23 (No. 17723); Erb Aff. ¶¶ 6-7, ECF No. 30 (No. 17-715); Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co., 158 FERC ¶ 61,125

(Feb. 3, 2017) (hereinafter FERC Order).

2. Defendants Stephen and Dorothea Hoffman

reside at 3409 Safe Harbor Road, Manor Twp., Millersville, Lancaster County, PA 19551. They own approximately 110 acres and have lived there for

approximately 10 years. Hoffman Aff. ¶ 2.

3. The appraised value of the Hoffmans’ property

is $13,970. Pl.’s Hr’g Ex. 17.4

4

Plaintiff submitted additional exhibits in support of the

Omnibus Motions for Preliminary Injunction at the hearing on

March 20, 2017.

App. 86

4. Defendants Gary and Michelle Erb, the principals of Defendant Hilltop Hollow Limited Partnership, live at 415 Hilltop Rd., Conestoga Twp.,

Conestoga, Lancaster County, PA 17516. They own

about 72 acres and have lived there for approximately

seven years. The Erbs’ property is also enrolled in the

Lancaster Farmland Trust. Erb Aff. ¶ 2.

5. The appraised value of the property on Hilltop

Road is $23,570. Pl.’s Hr’g Ex. 17.

6. Transco’s proposed current route for the pipeline crosses both aforementioned properties, running

close to their homes. Hoffman Aff. ¶¶ 5-7, 11; Erb Aff.

¶¶ 6-7; FERC Order.

7. In 2015, Transco submitted an application under section 7(c) of the NGA, seeking a certificate of public convenience and necessity authorizing Transco to

construct and operate the pipeline project. FERC Order.

8. The project involves approximately 199.5 miles

of pipeline running through Pennsylvania, Maryland,

Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina. Sztroin

Decl. ¶¶ 3, 6.

9. FERC issued a certificate on February 3, 2017,

authorizing the construction and operation of this

pipeline. FERC Order.5

5

For the reasons discussed below, this Court offers no opinion, at this time, as to the validity of this certificate in light of

Defendants’ due process challenges.

App. 87

10. Transco entered into a contract with its shippers that requires the project be completed and in service for the 2017-2018 winter heating season, or as

soon as commercially practicable thereafter. Sztroin

Aff. ¶ 10, ECF No. 7-4 (No. 17-715).6

11. Between February 15, 2017, and March 7,

2017, Transco filed multiple condemnation complaints

in this Court, claiming immediate entitlement to

rights-of-way across the properties based on the FERC

Order. See Nos. 5:17-cv-711 to -723 (E.D. Pa. filed Feb.

15, 2017); No. 5:17-cv-1010 (E.D. Pa. filed Mar. 7, 2017).

12. Between February 20, 2017, and February

22, 2017, Transco filed an Omnibus Motion for Preliminary Injunction, seeking injunctive relief granting

Transco immediate possession of the rights-of-way in

each case.

13. Transco alleges that in order to complete the

pipeline project on time, it must have survey access to

the properties by March 20, 2017. Sztroin Aff. ¶ 12.

14. The FERC Order imposes environmental

conditions on the project, at least twelve of which require access to the rights-of-way to conduct field surveys and the submission of additional documentation

to FERC based on the results of the surveys. Sztroin

Aff. ¶¶ 14-16.

6

To avoid confusion between the Declaration of Sztroin attached to the Motion for Summary Judgment (“Sztroin Decl.”)

from the Declaration attached to the Omnibus Motion for Preliminary Injunction, this Court will refer to the later as “Sztroin Aff.”

App. 88

15. There are limited, seasonal windows of time

during which certain surveys, such as threatened and

endangered species surveys, may occur. Sztroin Aff.

¶ 17.

16. If Transco misses those windows, it may have

to wait until the following year to complete the surveys. Sztroin Aff. ¶ 17.

17. Some of these surveys have taken an average

of two to three months to complete. Sztroin Aff. ¶ 17.

18. Transco alleges that if the project is delayed

it will suffer approximately $500,000 in additional

costs each month, may lose up to $1.1 million in revenues each day, and will lose customer confidence if unable to provide service to its shippers by the promised

date. Sztroin Aff. ¶¶ 33-35.

19. Between February 20, 2017, and March 17,

2017, Transco filed a Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment in all pending cases, seeking orders of condemnation pursuant to the NGA to provide Transco

with the substantive right to condemn the rights-ofway sought on the properties in the FERC Order.

20. The motions for partial summary judgment,

although filed separately in each case, are almost identical and are based on substantially the same facts.

21. Transco entered into stipulations with Defendants in eight cases to grant Transco access to and

entry upon the rights-of-way of their properties for the

sole purpose of conducting the surveys required by the

FERC Order. See, e.g., ECF No. 27 (No. 17-711).

App. 89

22. Pursuant to the stipulations, Transco agreed

to withdraw its Omnibus Motion for Preliminary Injunction in those cases.

23. Transco also agreed in the stipulations in

four of the cases to extend the time for Defendants to

respond to the motions for partial summary judgment

until April 15, 2017. See, e.g., ECF No. 16 (No. 17-714).

24. Defendants in the above-captioned cases

have opposed the Complaints, the Omnibus Motion for

Preliminary Injunction, and the motions for partial

summary judgment, raising complex questions of constitutional law regarding the FERC Order and proceedings.

25. On March 16, 2017, Transco’s cases were reassigned to the Undersigned.

26. A hearing on the Omnibus Motion for Preliminary Injunction was held on March 20, 2017.

IV. Conclusions of Law

In the NGA, Congress granted condemnation

power to private corporations. See E. Tenn. Nat’l Gas

Co. v. Sage, 361 F.3d 808, 821-25 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing

15 U.S.C. § 717f(h)). The general procedure in such

cases is that a gas company applies for a certificate of

public convenience and necessity from FERC to build

and operate a new pipeline. Id. at 818-19. Once a certificate is issued, the NGA empowers the company to

exercise the right of eminent domain to acquire the

lands needed for the project. Id. The company usually

App. 90

enters negotiations with landowners to acquire their

property, but if these negotiations are unsuccessful,

the company may institute condemnation proceedings,

asking the court to enter an order of condemnation declaring that the company has the substantive right to

condemn the property in the FERC certificate. See

Kirby Forest Indus. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 3-6

(1984); E. Tenn. Nat’l Gas Co., 361 F.3d at 820-25.

A condemnation action can take three paths: (1)

straight condemnation, (2) quick-take, and (3) legislative taking. Id. In a straight condemnation action, the

plaintiff (gas company) files a complaint setting forth

its authority for the taking, the use for which the property is being taken, a description identifying the property, the interest to be acquired, and a designation of

the owners. Id. The court determines how much compensation is due to the landowner and once that

amount is tendered, the right to possession passes. Id.

The second method of taking provides the government

with a more expeditious procedure, requiring the filing

of a declaration of taking that sets forth the authority

for the taking, the public use for which the land is

taken, and an estimate of just compensation. Id. Once

the estimated amount is deposited with the court, the

government is authorized to take immediate possession of the condemned property. Id. Finally, a legislative taking occurs when Congress exercises the power

of eminent domain directly by, for example, enacting a

statute. Id.

Here, Transco followed the first path by filing

condemnation complaints pursuant to the NGA and

App. 91

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 71.1. However, in its

motions for partial summary judgment, Transco seeks

an order of condemnation declaring that it has the substantive right to condemn. The Omnibus Motion for

Preliminary Injunction then asks the Court to grant

Transco immediate possession prior to a determination of just compensation. This is not an avenue recognized by the NGA. See E. Tenn. Nat’l Gas Co, 361 F.3d

at 822-23 (concluding that the NGA “contains no provision for quick-take or immediate possession”).

Nevertheless, once Transco has established its

right to condemn, the Court may use its equitable

power to award preliminary injunctive relief. See Id.

(holding that a court has the power to grant equitable

relief after the gas company establishes a substantive

right to condemn). Until it is determined that Transco

has the authority to condemn Defendants’ property,

however, this Court is without jurisdiction to grant

Transco’s Omnibus Motion for Preliminary Injunction.

See Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. 1.01 Acres,

More or Less, 768 F.3d 300, 308 (3d Cir. 2014) (explaining that once it is determined that a gas company has

the right to eminent domain over the property sought

from the landowners, the court will conduct a preliminary injunction analysis); Mid-Atlantic Express, LLC v.

Balt. Cty., 410 F. App’x 653, 657 (4th Cir. 2011) (holding

that because the company did not have the authority

to condemn the property, “the district court was without jurisdiction to enter the preliminary injunction”);

Transwestern Pipeline Co., LLC v. 17.19 Acres, 550 F.3d

770, 776 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that “a district court

App. 92

lacks authority to grant a preliminary injunction under Rule 65 if the party does not have a substantive

right to the injunction” and that the gas company’s

“substantive right to condemn the affected parcels accrues only through the issuance of an order of condemnation by the district court”); E. Tenn. Nat’l Gas Co,

361 F.3d at 823 (concluding that a “federal court has

the power to grant equitable relief, but this power is

circumscribed by the venerable principle that ‘equity

follows the law’ ” (citations omitted)).

A decision on Transco’s substantive right to relief

is premature. Although Transco’s Partial Motion for

Summary Judgment and Omnibus Motion for Preliminary Injunction are fully briefed and ripe for disposition in the two above-captioned cases, the summary

judgment motions are not ripe7 in four other related

cases because Transco granted those Defendants additional time to prepare their responses. Transco’s motions in all these cases are substantially identical, and

any decision by this Court addressing the validity of

the FERC Order, which is the first step in determining

whether Transco has a substantive right to condemn

any of the properties, will therefore likely apply to all

the pending cases. Because the Court has not had the

benefit of reviewing briefs from Defendants in all the

related cases, there is the possibility of inconsistent decisions. This delay is of Transco’s own making as it

7

See Cluck-U Corp. v. Docson Consulting, LLC, No. 1:11-CV1295, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96638, at *2 n.1 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 29,

2011) (explaining that a motion is not ripe for review until the

nonmoving party has had an opportunity to file a brief ).

App. 93

stipulated to the extension of time for Defendants to

respond in the other cases. Consequently, this Court

will not render a decision on Transco’s substantive

right to condemn at this time.8

The fact that the validity of the FERC Order

raises difficult questions of constitutional law further

counsels against resolving this issue definitively in the

rushed atmosphere of a request for immediate injunctive relief, without full briefing from all interested

parties. See Sovereign Order of St. John of JerusalemKnights of Malta v. Messineo, 572 F. Supp. 983, 990

(E.D. Pa. 1983) (holding that the existence of difficult

legal questions of law may create sufficient doubt

about the probability of plaintiff ’s success to justify

denying a preliminary injunction); La Chemise Lacoste

v. General Mills, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 596, 605 (D. Del. 1971)

(“A Court should not decide doubtful and difficult

questions on a motion for a preliminary injunction.”);

Coffee Dan’s, Inc. v. Coffee Don’s Charcoal Broiler, 305

F. Supp. 1210, 1213 (N.D. Cal. 1969) (“On an application for a preliminary injunction the court is not bound

to decide doubtful and difficult questions of law or disputed questions of fact.”).

Moreover, even if Transco has a right to condemn,

it has not shown that it will be irreparably harmed because it has an alternative remedy to obtain the immediate relief it needs. See McHenry v. Comm’r of Internal

Revenue, No. 1:10-cv-00021, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

8

“This time” amounts to a matter of weeks, as the summary

judgment motions should be fully briefed by the end of April.

App. 94

77977, at *8 (D.V.I. 2011) (“[T]he availability of an

adequate alternative remedy generally precludes a

finding of irreparable harm sufficient to warrant

injunctive relief.”); Curtis 1000 v. Youngblade, 878

F. Supp. 1224, 1248 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (“Irreparable

harm will not be found where alternatives already

available to the plaintiff make an injunction unnecessary.”). By withdrawing its Omnibus Motion for Preliminary Injunction in those cases in which it entered

into stipulations with the landowners to obtain access

to the properties to conduct surveys, Transco has essentially conceded that it will not suffer irreparable

harm if granted survey access.9 Pennsylvania law

9

Notably too, Transco’s claimed irreparable harm is in the

nature of additional costs, diminished revenues, and loss in customer confidence, all of which are not the types of harms that usually suffice for an injunction to issue. See Checker Cab of Phila.

Inc. v. Uber Techs., Inc., 643 F. App’x 229, 232 (3d Cir. 2016) (concluding that the plaintiff failed to show that it was entitled to a

preliminary injunction because the only harm alleged “is the loss

of customers,” which “is a purely economic harm that can be adequately compensated with a monetary award following adjudication on the merits”). Further, Transco’s alleged additional costs

and loss in customer confidence with its shippers if unable to complete the project on time appears to be a self-inflicted harm because Transco entered into this contract with suppliers before

knowing whether it would need to initiate formal condemnation

proceedings. These alleged harms may have been avoidable. See

Caplan v. Fellheimer Eichen Braverman & Kaskey, 68 F.3d 828,

839 (3d Cir. 1995) (“If the harm complained of is self-inflicted, it

does not qualify as irreparable.” (citing 11A Charles A. Wright,

Federal Practice & Procedure § 2948.1 pp. 152-53 (1995)); San

Francisco Real Estate Investors v. Real Estate Inv. Trust, 692 F.2d

814, 818 (1st Cir. 1982) (concluding that the alleged harm caused

by investor apprehension over the litigation was largely “selfinflicted” and “entirely avoidable”).

App. 95

provides a procedure for which Transco can obtain survey access. See 26 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 309 (providing that,

upon notice to the landowner, “the condemnor or its

employees or agents shall have the right to enter upon

any land or improvement in order to make studies, surveys, tests, soundings and appraisals”). Consequently,

Transco’s Omnibus Motion for Preliminary Injunction

is denied.

Although Transco sought injunctive relief under

the NGA, this Court will grant Transco limited survey

access to the properties pursuant to § 309. In applying

§ 309, this Court recognizes the potential conflict between the conformity clause in the NGA, which can be

found at 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h),10 and Rule 71.1(a) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.11 The conformity

clause was repealed by Rule 71.1, but only insofar as it

required federal courts to conform state procedures to

secure a condemnation. See United States v. 93.970

Acres, 360 U.S. 328, 333 n.7 (1959); Guardian Pipeline,

10

Section 717f (h) provides in part that “[t]he practice and

procedure in any action or proceeding [to exercise the right of eminent domain] in the district court of the United States shall conform as nearly as may be with the practice and procedure in

similar action or proceeding in the courts of the State where the

property is situated.”

11

Rule 71.1(a) provides: “[t]hese rules govern proceedings to

condemn real and personal property by eminent domain, except

as this rule provides otherwise.” “The purpose of Rule [71.1] is to

provide a uniform procedure for condemnation in the federal district courts.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 71.1 advisory committee’s note (“Rule

71[.1] affords a uniform procedure for all cases of condemnation

invoking the national power of eminent domain . . . and supplants

all statutes prescribing a different procedure.”).

App. 96

L.L.C. v. 295.49 Acres of Land, more or less, 2008 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 35818, at *43-44 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 11, 2008)

(concluding that because Rule 71.1 addressed the subject of condemnation procedure, the conformity clause

in the Natural Gas Act was preempted and does not

apply to any state mandated procedures). Section 309,

however, does not deal with the steps that must be followed to secure a condemnation and its use in a federal

condemnation proceeding is therefore not prohibited

by Rule 71.1, nor does it conflict with Rule 71.1.

Congress has prescribed that “[a]ll laws in conflict

with [the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] shall be of

no further force or effect after such rules have taken

effect.” 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b). However, “there is no federal law that deals specifically with entries to survey

property, so there is nothing to preempt state law in

such a proceeding.” Alliance Pipeline L.P. v. 4.360 Acres

of Land, 746 F.3d 362, 367 (8th Cir. 2014); Sabal Trail

Transmission, LLC v. 72 Acres of Land, No: 5:16-cv162, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62857, at *6 (M.D. Fla. May

12, 2016) (concluding that “federal law does not provide a right to survey, so there exists no conflict between state law and federal law”). Although some

courts have been of the belief that Rule 71.1 prohibits

the federal courts from applying any state laws in the

area of eminent domain, see, e.g. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co.

v. Garrison, No. 3:10-CV-1845, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

94422, at *7-8 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2010) (concluding

that because the plaintiff filed for condemnation under

the NGA that it could not use Pennsylvania’s Eminent

App. 97

Domain Code to gain pre-condemnation access to the

land), “the NGA certainly does not operate to completely preempt state eminent domain law,” Bowyer v.

Rover Pipeline, LLC, No. 1:16CV203, 2017 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 8892, at *8 (N.D. W. Va. Jan. 23, 2017) (explaining that the NGA only “preempts state law when the

two are in conflict”).

V.

Conclusion

Considering that the same Omnibus Motion for

Preliminary Injunction, which is the subject of the instant opinion, was filed by Transco in twelve related

actions, along with substantially identical motions for

partial summary judgment, four of which are not yet

ripe in light of the stipulated extensions of time entered into between those Defendants and Transco, this

Court will not render a decision on Transco’s right to

condemn at this time. Regardless, Transco has failed

to show that it will suffer irreparable harm if not

granted injunctive relief because it has an alternative

remedy under Pennsylvania law to obtain the survey

access it needs. Accordingly, the Omnibus Motion for

Preliminary Injunction is denied, but, pursuant to

§ 309, Transco is granted access to and entry upon the

rights-of-way, as defined in the respective complaints,

for the sole purpose of conducting surveys required under the FERC Order.

App. 98

Appropriate orders will follow.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Joseph F. Leeson, Jr.

JOSEPH F. LEESON, JR.

United States District Judge

App. 99

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Nos. 17-3075, 17-3076, 17-3115 & 17-3116

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS PIPE LINE CO, LLC

v.

PERMANENT EASEMENTS FOR 2.14 ACRES AND

TEMPORARY EASEMENTS FOR 3.59 ACRES IN

CONESTOGA TOWNSHIP, LANCASTER COUNTY,

PENNSYLVANIA, TAX PARCEL NUMBER

1201606900000; ET AL.

Hilltop Hollow Limited Partnership & Hilltop Hollow

Partnership, LLC; Stephen D. Hoffman; Lynda Like;

Blair B. Mohn and Megan E. Mohn,

Appellants

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

(E.D. Pa. Nos. 17-cv-00715, 17-cv-00723,

17-cv-00720 & 17-cv-00722)

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUR PETITION FOR REHEARING

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Present: SMITH, Chief Judge, MCKEE, CHAGARES,

JORDAN, HARDIMAN, GREENAWAY, JR., SHWARTZ,

App. 100

KRAUSE, RESTREPO, BIBAS, PORTER, *ROTH, and

*FISHER, Circuit Judges

The petition for rehearing filed by appellants in

the above-entitled case having been submitted to the

judges who participated in the decision of this Court

and to all the other available circuit judges of the circuit in regular active service, and no judge who concurred in the decision having asked for rehearing, and

a majority of the judges of the circuit in regular service

not having voted for rehearing, the petition for rehearing by the panel and the Court en banc, is denied.

BY THE COURT,

s/ JANE R. ROTH

Circuit Judge

Dated: December 13, 2018

PDB/cc: All Counsel of Record

* Votes of the Honorable Jane R. Roth and D. Michael Fisher

are limited to panel rehearing only.

App. 101

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR

THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SAUL EWING LLP

Attorneys for Plaintiff

Transcontinental Gas

Elizabeth U. Witmer, Esq.

Pipe Line Company, LLC

(55808)

Sean T. O’Neill, Esq. (205595)

1200 Liberty Ridge Drive,

Suite 200

Wayne, PA 19087-5569

TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS :

:

PIPE LINE COMPANY, LLC

:

2800 POST OAK BOULEVARD

:

HOUSTON, TEXAS 77251:

1396,

:

Plaintiff,

:

:

v.

:

PERMANENT EASEMENT

:

FOR 2.02 ACRES AND

:

TEMPORARY EASEMENT;

:

FOR 2,76 ACRES IN MANOR :

TOWNSHIP LANCASTER

:

COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA,

:

TAX PARCEL NUMBER

:

4100300500000,

:

3049 SAFE HARBOR ROAD, :

MANOR TOWNSHIP,

:

LANCASTER, PA 17551

:

CIVIL ACTION –

LAW

Docket No. _____

App. 102

STEPHEN D. HOFFMAN

3049 SAFE HARBOR ROAD

MILLERSVILLE, PA 17551

AND ALL UNKNOWN

OWNERS

Defendants.

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

VERIFIED COMPLAINT IN

CONDEMNATION OF PROPERTY

PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 71.1

Plaintiff, Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Company, LLC, for its causes of action against Defendants,

Permanent Easement for 2.02 Acres and Temporary

Easements for 2.76 Acres in Manor Township, Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, Tax Parcel Number

4100300500000, Stephen D. Hoffman, and All Unknown Owners, states as follows:

1. The following definitions are used in this Complaint:

a) “Transco” shall mean Transcontinental

Gas Pipe Line Company, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company with a principal place of business at

2800 Post Oak Boulevard, Houston, Texas 77251-1396.

b) “FERC” shall mean the Federal Energy

Regulatory Commission.

c) “FERC Order” shall mean the Order issued by the FERC on February 3, 2017, Docket No.

CP15-138-000, 158 FERC ¶ 61,125 (2017), authorizing

App. 103

the Atlantic Sunrise Project and granting Transco a

certificate of public convenience and necessity.1

d) “Project” shall mean the Atlantic Sunrise Project which was reviewed and approved by the

FERC by its issuance of the FERC Order.

e)

“Property” shall mean:

That property in Manor Township, Lancaster

County, Pennsylvania, described in the Deed dated

April 18, 2006, recorded in the Office of the Recorder of

Deeds of Lancaster County at Instrument Number

5519364, and known as Tax Parcel Number

4100300500000.

f) “Rights of Way” shall mean the following

easements and rights of way on the Property that are

necessary to install and construct the Project:

i.

1

A permanent right of way and easement of

2.02 acres, as described as “Area of Proposed

CPLS R/W” in Exhibit A to the Verified

Complaint, for the purpose of constructing,

operating, maintaining, altering, repairing,

changing the size of, replacing and removing

a pipeline and all related equipment and appurtenances thereto (including but not limited to meters, fittings, tie-overs, valves,

The FERC Order is a matter of public record that is subject

to judicial notice under Fed. R. Evid. 201. A true and correct copy

of the relevant excerpts of the FERC Order will be attached as

Exhibit A to Transco’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

The full FERC Order is available at https://www.ferc.gov/Calendar

Files/20170203163124-CP15-138-000.pdf.

App. 104

cathodic protection equipment, and launchers

and receivers) for the transportation of natural gas, or its byproducts, and other substances as approved by the Order of the

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

dated February 3, 2017, Docket No. CP15-138000, 158 FERC ¶ 61,125 (2017), together with

a right of way and easement to construct,

maintain, operate, repair, alter, replace and

remove cathodic protection equipment and

the necessary appurtenances thereto, such as

but not limited to poles, guy wires, anchors,

rectifiers, power lines, cables, deep well anode

and anode ground beds under, upon, and over

the permanent access easement, and conducting all other activities as approved by the

Order of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission dated February 3, 2017, Docket No.

CP15-138-000, 158 FERC ¶ 61,125 (2017); together with all rights and benefits necessary

or convenient for the full enjoyment or use of

the right of way and easement. Further, the

landowner shall not build any permanent

structures on said permanent right of way or

any part thereof, will not change the grade of

said permanent right of way, or any part

thereof, will not plant trees on said permanent

right of way, or any part thereof, or use said

permanent right of way or any part thereof for

a road, or use said permanent right of way or

any part thereof in such a way as to interfere

with Transco’s immediate and unimpeded access to said permanent right of way, or otherwise interfere with Transco’s lawful exercise

of any of the rights herein granted without

App. 105

first having obtained Transco’s approval in

writing; and the landowner will not permit

others to do any of said acts without first having obtained Transco’s approval in writing.

Transco shall have the right from time to time

at no additional cost to landowners to cut and

remove all trees including trees considered as

a growing crop, all undergrowth and any other

obstructions that may injure, endanger or interfere with the construction and use of said

pipeline and all related equipment and appurtenances thereto; and

ii.

Temporary easements of 2.76 acres, as described as “Area of Proposed Temporary Work

Space #1” and “Area of Proposed Temporary

Work Space #2” in Exhibit A to the Verified

Complaint, for use during the pipeline construction and restoration period only for the

purpose of ingress, egress and regress and to

enter upon, clear off and use for construction

and all other activities approved by the Order

of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission dated February 3, 2017, Docket No.

CP15-138-000, 158 FERC ¶ 61,125 (2017).

g) “Appraised Value” shall mean the fair

market value of the Rights of Way sought to be condemned, as set forth in an appraisal prepared by an

independent appraiser retained by Transco. The appraisal values the Rights of Way sought to be condemned at $13,970.00.

h) “Landowner” shall mean Stephen D.

Hoffman, the owner of the Property on which Transco

App. 106

is seeking to acquire the Rights of Way; the Landowner

is an individual residing at 3049 Safe Harbor Road,

Millersville, PA 17551.

i)

“Interest Holders”2 shall mean; None

known.

j) “Defendants” shall collectively refer to

the Landowner, Interest Holders, and any Unknown

Owners.

PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE

2. Transco is the Plaintiff and will be the operator of the proposed pipeline facilities being constructed

and modified in connection with the Project.

3. Defendants are the Landowner, Interest Holders, and all Unknown Owners of the Property on which

Transco is seeking to acquire the Rights of Way.

4. This is a civil action brought under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 71.1 by Transco for the taking

of the Rights of Way on the Property that are necessary

to install and construct pipeline facilities as part of the

Project.

5. Transco’s authority to maintain the action in

this Court derives from the Natural Gas Act, 15

2

Transco has not yet verified the identity, property interest

and service address of any persons that may hold a mortgage, lien

or judgment of record against the Property. In accordance with

Fed. R. Civ. P. 71.1(c)(3) and 71.1(f), Transco will amend its Complaint to name any such interest holders prior to any hearing on

compensation.

App. 107

U.S.C.A. §§ 717a, et seq. (the “Natural Gas Act”). Section 717f(h) states in relevant part:

When any holder of a certificate of public

convenience and necessity cannot acquire by contract, or is unable to agree

with the owner of property to the compensation to be paid for, the necessary

right-of-way to construct, operate, and

maintain a pipe line or pipe lines for the

transportation of natural gas, and the

necessary land or other property, in addition to right-of-way, for the location of

compressor stations, pressure apparatus, or other stations or equipment

necessary to the proper operation of

such pipe line or pipe lines, it may acquire the same by the exercise of the

right of eminent domain in the district

court of the United States for the district

in which such property may be located,

or in the State courts. The practice and procedure in any action or proceeding for that purpose in the district court of the United States

shall conform as nearly as may be with the

practice and procedure in similar action or

proceeding in the courts of the State where

the property is situated: Provided, that the

United States district courts shall only have

jurisdiction of cases when the amount claimed

by the owner of the property to be condemned

exceeds $3,000.

15 U.S.C.A. § 717f(h) (emphasis added).

App. 108

6. Venue is appropriate in the Eastern District of

Pennsylvania because the Property is located in Lancaster County, within the District.

7. On February 3, 2017, the FERC issued the

FERC Order to Transco approving the Project, authorizing Transco to construct and operate approximately

199.5 miles of pipeline composed of (a) Central Penn

Line North, which is 58.7 miles of 30-inch diameter

natural gas pipeline running from Columbia County,

Pennsylvania to Susquehanna County, Pennsylvania;

(b) Central Penn Line South, which is 127.3 miles of

new 42-inch diameter natural gas pipeline running

from Lancaster County, Pennsylvania to Columbia

County, Pennsylvania; (c) Chapman Loop, which is 2.5

miles of new 36-inch diameter pipeline looping in Clinton County, Pennsylvania; (d) Unity Loop, which is 8.5

miles of new 42-inch diameter pipeline looping in Lycoming County, Pennsylvania; and (e) replacement of

2.5 miles of 30-inch diameter pipeline in Prince William County, Virginia; together with associated appurtenant facilities and appurtenant aboveground

facilities, such as valves, cathodic protection, communication towers, and internal inspection device launchers and receivers. FERC Order, ¶¶ 5, 6.

8. The Project also includes the construction and

operation of two new compressor stations in Wyoming

County, Pennsylvania and Columbia County, Pennsylvania; two new meter stations in Susquehanna County,

Pennsylvania and Wyoming County, Pennsylvania and

three new regulator stations in Luzerne, Columbia,

App. 109

and Lancaster Counties in Pennsylvania, with interconnecting piping; additional compression and related

modifications to three existing compressor stations in

Lycoming County, Pennsylvania, Columbia County,

Pennsylvania and Howard County, Maryland; minor

modifications at existing compressor stations in Maryland, Virginia and North Carolina to allow for bi-directional flow; installation of supplemental odorization,

odor detection and odor masking/deodorization equipment at various aboveground facilities in North Carolina and South Carolina; modification to an existing

meter station in Pennsylvania and additional piping to

an adjacent new meter station; and installation of ancillary facilities such as valves, cathodic protection,

communication towers, and internal inspection device

launchers and receivers. FERC Order, ¶¶ 7, 8.

9. Transco is the holder of a certificate of public

convenience and necessity issued by the FERC – the

FERC Order.

10. Under the Natural Gas Act, the holder of a

certificate of public convenience and necessity has the

power to condemn land for a federally approved natural gas pipeline project if:

(a) the company has been granted a Certificate of Public convenience and Necessity

from the FERC,

(b) the company has been unable to acquire

the needed land by contract with the

owner, and

App. 110

(c) the value of the property at issue is

claimed by the landowner at more than

$3,000.

15 U.S.C. § 717f(h); see Columbia Gas Transmission,

LLC v. 1.01 Acres, 768 F.3d 300, 304 (3d Cir. 2014); E.

Tenn. Natural Gas Co. v. Sage, 361 F.3d 808, 827-28

(4th Cir. 2004).

11. Transco meets these three requirements, as

detailed below.

TRANSCO IS A HOLDER OF A CERTIFICATE

OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY

12. On March 31, 2015, Transco filed an application with the FERC under section 7(c) of the Natural

Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) and Part 157 of the FERC’s

regulations for a certificate of public convenience and

necessity for its Project to construct and operate the

Project in Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North

Carolina and South Carolina. The Project will provide

an incremental 1.7 million dekatherms (Dth) per day

of year round firm transportation capacity from the

Marcellus Shale production area in northern Pennsylvania to Transco’s existing market areas to meet the

growing demand for natural gas in the Mid-Atlantic

and southeastern markets.

13. Transco’s Project underwent an extensive review process. The FERC evaluated the public need for

the Project (referred to as the “public convenience and

necessity” under Section 7(c) of the Natural Gas Act),

and completed a thorough review of environmental

App. 111

impacts and operational considerations before issuing

the FERC Order authorizing the Project.

14. The public was notified of the Project and

provided multiple opportunities to comment as outlined in the FERC Order, paragraphs 68, 70, 71-75:

a) On April 4, 2014, FERC staff granted

Transco’s request to use the pre-filing process in

Docket No. PF14-8-000. As part of the pre-filing review,

on July 18, 2014, FERC issued a Notice of Intent to Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement for the

Planned Atlantic Sunrise Expansion Project, Request

for Comments on Environmental Issues, and Notice of

Public Scoping Meetings (NOI). The NOI was published in the Federal Register on July 29, 2014,3 and

mailed to nearly 2,500 interested parties, including

federal, state, and local government representatives

and agencies; elected officials; environmental and public interest groups; Native American tribes; affected

property owners; other interested parties; and local libraries and newspapers. The NOI briefly described the

project and the environmental review process, provided a preliminary list of issues identified by FERC

staff, invited written comments on the environmental

issues that should be addressed in the draft EIS, listed

the date and location of four public scoping meetings4

3

79 Fed. Reg. 44,023 (2014).

FERC staff held the public scoping meetings between August 4 and 7, 2014, in Millersville, Annville, Bloomsburg, and Dallas, Pennsylvania.

4

App. 112

to be held in the project area, and established August

18, 2014, as the deadline for comments;

b) Transco filed its project application on

March 31, 2015. On October 22, 2015, FERC staff

mailed a letter to landowners potentially affected by

the path of several proposed project reroutes under

evaluation. The letter was mailed to over 300 affected

property owners, government officials, and other

stakeholders. The letter briefly described the proposed

alternative routes, invited newly affected landowners

to participate in the environmental review process,

and opened a special 30-day limited scoping period;

c) FERC staff issued the draft Environmental

Impact Statement (EIS) for the project on May 5, 2016,

which addressed the issues raised during the scoping

period and up to the point of publication. Notice of the

draft EIS was published in the Federal Register on May

12, 2016, establishing a 45-day public comment period

ending on June 27, 2016.5 The draft EIS was mailed to

the environmental mailing list for the project, including additional interested entities that were added

since issuance of the NOI. FERC staff held four public

comment meetings between June 13 and 16, 2016.6 Approximately 203 speakers provided oral comments regarding the draft EIS at these meetings and FERC

also received over 560 written comments from federal,

state, and local agencies; Native American tribes;

5

81 Fed. Reg. 29,557 (2016).

FERC staff held the public comment meetings in Lancaster, Annville, Bloomsburg, and Dallas, Pennsylvania.

6

App. 113

companies/organizations; and individuals in response

to the draft EIS. In addition, FERC received over 900

nearly identical letters. The transcripts of the public

comment meetings and all written comments on the

draft EIS are part of the public record for the project;

d) On October 13, 2016, FERC staff mailed a

letter to landowners potentially affected by two alternative pipeline routes identified following the issuance

of the draft EIS. The letter was mailed to 56 potentially

affected property owners, government officials, and

other stakeholders. The letter briefly described the proposed alternative routes, invited potentially affected

landowners to participate in the environmental review

process, and opened a special 30-day comment period.

FERC staff received 25 comment letters from individuals regarding the proposed alternative;

e) On November 3, 2016, FERC issued for

comment a draft General Conformity Determination,

which assessed the potential air quality impacts associated with construction of the project in accordance

with NEPA, the Clean Air Act, and the Commission’s

regulations.7 The Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (PADEP), Clean Air Council,

Lebanon Pipeline Awareness, Sierra Club Pennsylvania Chapter, Concerned Citizens of Lebanon County,

Lancaster Against Pipelines, and Elise Kucirka Salahub filed timely comments on the draft General

7

The draft General Conformity Determination is publicly

available at: https://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/common/opennat.asp?

fileID=14391786.

App. 114

Conformity Determination. The final General Conformity Determination addressed all the comments received prior to the close of the comment period on

December 5, 20168; and

f ) On December 30, 2016, FERC staff issued

the final EIS for the project which was published in the

Federal Register on January 9, 2017.9 The final EIS addresses timely comments received on the draft EIS.10

The final EIS was mailed to the same parties as the

draft EIS, as well as to newly identified landowners

and any additional parties that commented on the

draft EIS.11 The final EIS addresses geology; soils; water resources; wetlands; vegetation; wildlife and fisheries; special status species; land use, recreation, and

visual resources; socioeconomics; cultural resources;

air quality and noise; reliability and safety; cumulative

impacts; and aboveground site alternatives and minor

route variations incorporated into the project’s design.

8

The final General Conformity Determination is publicly

available at: https://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/file_list.asp?accession_

num=20170117-3039.

9

82 Fed. Reg. 2,344 (2017).

10

Volume III of the final EIS includes responses to comments

on the draft EIS received through the close of the comment period

on June 27, 2016, and responses to additional comments received

between June 28 and November 14, 2016, that raised new issues

not previously identified prior to the close of the comment period.

Any new issues raised after November 14, 2016, which were not

previously identified, are addressed in this order.

11

The distribution list is provided in Appendix A of the final

EIS.

App. 115

15. The FERC held public meetings and noticed

the certificate application and EIS for the Project as

referenced above, and considered hundreds of comments from various parties, including federal, state,

and local agencies, conservation groups and landowners, before issuing the FERC Order.

16. When evaluating applications for certificates

to construct new pipeline facilities, the FERC takes

guidance from the Certificate Policy Statement, Certification of New Interstate Natural Gas Pipeline Facilities, 88 FERC ¶ 61,227 (1999), clarified, 90 FERC

¶ 61,128 (2000), further certified, 92 FERC ¶ 61,094

(2000).

The Certificate Policy Statement establishes

criteria for determining whether there is a

need for a proposed project and whether the

proposed project will serve the public interest.

The Certificate Policy Statement explains

that in deciding whether to authorize the construction of major new natural gas facilities,

the Commission balances the public benefits

against the potential adverse consequences.

The Commission’s goal is to give appropriate

consideration to the enhancement of competitive transportation alternatives, the possibility of overbuilding, subsidization by existing

customers, the applicant’s responsibility for

unsubscribed capacity, the avoidance of unnecessary disruptions of the environment,

and the unneeded exercise of eminent domain

in evaluating new pipeline construction.

FERC Order, ¶ 20.

App. 116

17. On February 3, 2017, the FERC approved the

Project and issued the FERC Order.

18. The FERC Order authorizes Transco, among

other things, to construct and install the new and modified pipeline facilities described above in Lancaster

County, Pennsylvania.

19. The Rights of Way on the Property are required to construct, install, operate and maintain the

pipeline facilities approved in the FERC Order.

20. The Rights of Way are more fully depicted

and identified in the drawings attached hereto as Exhibit A, which are incorporated by reference.

21 The Rights of Way sought to be acquired on

the Property were reviewed and approved by FERC.

22. In issuing the FERC Order, the FERC considered the impact on landowners and communities

along the route of the Project. The FERC concluded

that the Project “has been designed to minimize impacts on landowners and the surrounding communities.” FERC Order, ¶ 25.

23. The FERC concluded that “[b]ased on the

benefits that Transco’s project will provide, the absence of adverse effects on existing customers and

other pipelines and their captive customers, and the

minimal adverse effects on landowners or surrounding

communities, we find, consistent with the Certificate

Policy Statement and NGA section 7(c), that the public

App. 117

convenience and necessity requires approval of

Transco’s proposal, subject to the conditions discussed

below.” FERC Order, ¶ 33.

24. Accordingly, Transco has a valid FERC Order

covering the Rights of Way sought in this Action.

25. Transco has satisfied the first condition for

the exercise of eminent domain under Section 7(h) of

the Natural Gas Act.

TRANSCO HAS BEEN UNABLE TO ACQUIRE

THE RIGHTS OF WAY BY AGREEMENT

26. Transco, by its agents, contacted Landowner

numerous times for the purpose of negotiating the acquisition of the Rights of Way.

27. A copy of the appraisal setting forth the Appraised Value was provided to the Landowner.

28. Transco offered an amount that is higher

than the Appraised Value.

29. Landowner rejected, or otherwise did not accept, Transco’s offer.

30. Transco is unable to acquire the Rights of

Way by contract or to agree on the compensation to be

paid for the Rights of Way with the Landowner.

31. Accordingly, Transco has satisfied the second

condition required prior to the exercise of eminent domain under Section 7(h) of the Natural Gas Act.

Ap

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Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Lynda Like, et al., Petitioners v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Company, LLC | Frix